DID THE CAKE OF CUSTOM BREAK?

Charles Tilly

University of Michigan

December 1978

CRSO Working Paper No. 189

Copies available through:
Center for Research on
Social Organization
University of Michigan
330 Packard Street
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109

DID THE CAKE OF CUSTOM BREAK?

Charles Tilly
University of Michigan
December 1978

Draft of chapter 2 in John Merriman, ed. CONSCIOUSNESS AND CLASS EXPERIENCE IN NINETEENTH CENTURY EUROPE (New York: Holmes & Meier; scheduled for publication in 1979)

Peasants into Frenchmen, Eugen Weber's big book, has caused a stir among historians of France. Many people have called it brilliant, some have called it great, and others have spoken of it as the most important work of the last decade. Considering the competition from such masters as Richard Cobb, Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Pierre Goubert and Maurice Agulhon, a book which receives such praise must be impressive.

Indeed it is. Weber's discussion of changes in rural France from 1870 to 1914 is vivid, rich, witty and bubbling with insight. (Who else, after all, would think to show us how recently twentieth-century necessities had been luxuries by pointing out that in the nineteenth-century Vivarais the visitor's ritual gift had been a package of coffee, a kilo of sugar, or a loaf of white bread?) Weber has found the means of blending folklore, ethnography and local history into a lively portrayal of a lost world. Every page bears a rich weave of proverbs, customs, couplets and anecdotes.

Beneath the brocade, however, the shape of Weber's argument is familiar. Until well into the nineteenth century, he tells us, most of rural France lived in near-isolation from the rest of the world, a congeries of diverse, slow-changing and, yes, barbarous little societies barely penetrated by French civilization. The thin, incoherent rural cultures had grown up as devices for coping with desperate poverty. All this, says Weber, changed fast after 1870. As the whole of France grew more prosperous, roads, rail lines, markets, schools and military conscription cut into the countryside. These nationalizing, rationalizing, institutions weakened rural particularism, flooded the hinterland with new ideas, goods and practices, then tied the countryside into an urbane

national culture and social life. The crucial changes, in Weber's account, were mental: confronted with new institutions and altered opportunities, peasants converted to rationalism and instrumentalism. The cake of custom, to use Walter Bagehot's famous phrase, broke. From diversity and barbarity emerged homogeneity and civilization. In a word, rural France modernized.

Weber draws his evidence for this view from three main sources: the testimonies of elite observers such as government officials, doctors, schoolteachers and travelers; the reports of the folklorists who swarmed over rural France during the early decades of the twentieth century; and the regional monographs for which French geographers and historians have become justly famous. He avoids two sorts of evidence which would, I think, require him to mend his argument extensively: a) systematic observations of the geography of "modernization" -- income, literacy, mobility, industrial production, political activity, and so on -- for France as a whole; b) observations on the pace and character of his crucial changes before 1870. That makes it possible for him to argue that

> Traditional communities continued to operate in the traditional manner as long as conditions retained their traditional shape: low productivity, market fluctuations beyond the producer's control, a low rate of savings, little surplus. What surplus the peasant could accumulate was taken from him in taxes or usurious interest, spent on church buildings and feasts, or invested in land. But land did not increase total production until capital investment in improvements became both possible and thinkable. And this did not happen until the market became an accessible reality, that is, until the expanding communications network brought it within reach (Weber 1976: 481-482).

That nineteenth-century agricultural life was grim, d'accord. But the idea that the grimness resulted from lack of involvement in the market is a basic misapprehension: the French countryside was already heavily involved in production for regional, national, and even international markets by the end of the eighteenth century.

Weber applies the same notions of isolation and autarky to politics:

> Political dispute, even rebellion, on the national level played its part in diminishing the significance of local solidarities, suggesting new rival ones, like the new-fangled idea of class. At mid-century, local solidarity had reigned supreme. By the end of the century it had lost its exclusive relevance. The autarkies characterizing most of the nineteenth century were breaking down. Great local questions no longer found their origin or solution in the village, but had to be resolved outside and far from it. The peasantry gradually awakened to urban (that is, general) ideas, abstract (that is, not local) concerns (Weber 1976: 276).

This time Weber's reasoning contains an element of truth. National issues and interests did begin to loom much larger in local politics during the nineteenth century. Yet the analysis goes wrong in several important ways.

First (although the vocabulary of class was, indeed, chiefly a nineteenth-century creation), the reality of class division was apparent in rural communities early in the nineteenth century, and before. Pierre de Saint-Jacob, after all, devoted much of his masterly study of eighteenth-century Burgundian peasants to the conflicts which separated peasants and landlords; the Revolution, in his view, crystallized divisions which had long been forming.

Second, Weber concentrates on issues with respect to which villagers took the initiative. He forgets the innumerable occasions on which country people reacted to outside challenges: challenges to local Protestant religious practices in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; challenges to local fiscal rights in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; challenges to local control over the food supply in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Religious struggles, tax rebellions and food riots had occurred frequently in the French countryside for three centuries before 1870; they involved "great local questions". In fact, Yves-Marie Bercé has built a whole series of books around the theme of a solidary, self-interested peasant community responding to outside attacks by means of repeated rebellions. Only with the nineteenth century, according to Bercé, did the unified interest and the solidarity decline to the point of undermining the basis for peasant revolts.

Third, Weber's timing is off: the shift toward national politics became noticeable during the French Revolution, and had gone far by the middle of the nineteenth century. The massive rural participation both in the mobilization of 1848 and in the 1851 resistance to Louis Napoleon's coup demonstrates that nationalization (see Merriman 1978).

Finally, the critical nineteenth-century alteration in the position of rural communities was not a move from autarky to integration, but a shift in control of their interests from local and regional elites to national capital and the national state. The adoption of an image of modernization as the breaking of the cake of custom makes those changes in organization and interests hard to see, and harder to understand.

The view of social change as the dissolution of customary small-scale social life is familiar. It became the dominant bourgeois analysis of the nineteenth century. It knits nicely with the notion that wealth, mobility and urban experience corrupt virtuous peasants. It fits just

as well, paradoxically, with the call for a civilizing mission on the part of schools, local government and military service. The former is the conservative, nostalgic version, the latter the liberal, progressive version, of the same theory. The delightful vibrancy of Weber's book results from his deft use of the conservatives' preferred sorts of evidence in the service of the progressive theory. At bottom, he finds the old ways barbaric, and the *mission civilisatrice* well worth undertaking; yet folklore and local history provide him with his materials.

The bourgeois analysis gave rise to the great nineteenth-century dichotomies: Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, status and contract, mechanical and organic solidarity. It also helped form such presumptuous disciplines as sociology and anthropology, whose objects were to document, to explain and perhaps to guide the transition from one side of the dichotomy to the other.

Nor did the ideas die with the nineteenth century. On the contrary. They became the basis of standard twentieth-century conceptions, both academic and popular, of large-scale social change. Although the particular set of variants called "modernization theory" rose and fell in the quarter-century after World War II, the general idea of modernization through dissolution and integration has survived from the nineteenth century to our own time. It has survived, as we have seen, into the fascinating work of Eugen Weber. In one form or another, it appears widely in North American analyses of Europe, including those of such widely-read authors as Cyril Black, Edward Shorter, Peter Stearns and John Gillis. The difference between Weber and his colleagues does not lie in the novelty of his basic argument, but in his insistence on the period from 1870 to 1914 and, more important, in his extraordinary use of ethnographic detail to present the argument.

Familiarity is not truth. Is it true that the dominant social changes in nineteenth-century Europe comprised (or resulted from) the displacement of traditional, localized, immobile cultures by industrialism, urbanism and expanding communications? That is doubtful. It is doubtful on two rather different grounds: 1) because many of the most important concrete changes in the social life of nineteenth-century Europe did not follow the paths required by theories of modernization; 2) because the massive industrialization, urbanization and communications shifts -- which did, indeed, occur -- grew from the interaction of two deeper and wider processes: the growth of national states and the expansion of capitalism.

My discussion will dwell on the first point: the failure of important processes to follow the courses charted by theories of modernization. That is the easier of the two points to establish. It also leads naturally to consideration of the reasons for the theories' failure, then to reflection on alternative general accounts of social change in nineteenth-century Europe. Those alternatives will easily take us back to capitalism and statemaking.

The issues matter in their own right: we are asking, after all, how the world changes, and how the world we know came into being. The issues also matter in another way: theories of modernization underlie many accounts of nineteenth-century conflict, consciousness and collective action. Conservative modernization models nest neatly with interpretations of protest, conflict and collective action as irrational responses to the stresses and strains of rapid change. Progressive modernization models, on the other hand, articulate plausibly with a vision of awakening consciousness, of increasing integration into cosmopolitan world-views which guide collective action on a large scale. If the underlying models prove incorrect, we shall have to consider another

alternative more seriously: that most of the time ordinary people have an idea, more or less clear, of their short-run interests, but vary enormously in their capacity and opportunity to act on those interests. If that is the case -- as, obviously, I think it is -- the proper substitute for the study of "modernization" is likely to be the study of the ways in which large social changes alter the interests, capacities and opportunities of ordinary people.

Notions of Modernization

Whether theories of modernization are worthless or merely cumbersome depends, however, on how much we ask of them. In an undemanding version, the notion of modernization is simply a name for general features of contemporary life: intense communications, big organizations, mass production, and so on. If our program is simply to inquire whether those features of social life were already visible in the nineteenth century, and to search for their origins, then the analysis of modernization is no more misleading than most other retrospective schemes.

In a somewhat more demanding guise, modernization becomes a label for dominant patterns of change. Rainer Lepsius, for instance, breaks modernization into these elements:

1. differentiation
2. mobilization
3. participation
4. institutionalization of conflict (Lepsius 1977: 24-29).

The fit between these terms and the main trends in nineteenth-century Europe depends on their specification: which units are supposed to be differentiating, who is supposed to be mobilizing with respect to what end, and so on. It also depends on our vantage point: from the

perspective of the national state and the national elite, differentiation, mobilization, participation and institutionalization summarize many of the changes going on in nineteenth-century Europe. From the perspective of the local community, many of the same changes involved de-differentiation, de-mobilization, perhaps even de-institutionalization; rights, rituals and rounds of life which had previously prevailed now lost their strength. Nevertheless, any model of social change requires us to take some vantage point, and the center is as permissible a vantage point as any other. Thus we can make it a question of fact whether differentiation, mobilization, participation and institutionalization do, indeed, describe the main trends in nineteenth-century Europe, as seen from its central locations.

The real difficulties with modernization theories only begin when we move from simple inventories of common themes to the analysis of what sorts of structures changed, and why. Did urbanism, industrialism and expanding communications dissolve previously stable, small, self-contained structures, release people from their control, generate disorder as a consequence, and finally produce a new, complex, large-scale set of connections to replace the old? Such an account, to my mind, has far too little power, interest and conflict in it. But even if it were sometimes a plausible account of social change, it would be an unlikely model for the European nineteenth century. Its most important weakness as a guide to the nineteenth century is its starting-point: a closed, traditional, unconnected, immobile set of social worlds. In the remainder of this essay, I shall spend a major part of my effort in demonstrating the openness, connectedness and mobility of the European world as it faced the nineteenth century. Because the rural world is the one in

which modernization models should apply most clearly, I shall concentrate on changes in Europe's rural areas.

What will we find in the countryside? We will find a mobile, differentiated population heavily involved in different forms of production for the market, and responsive to changes occurring far from home. We will find varying forms of mercantile capitalism penetrating deep into village life. We will find agents of national states intervening actively in local organization, in order to extract the men, food and money required for armies and other expensive governmental activities. We will find a sensitive interplay between economic structure and family life -- between the organization of production and of reproduction. We will find few traces of the isolation and autarky which are dear to theorists of modernization.

None of this means that the nineteenth century was a time of stability, or of trendless turbulence. Industrial capitalism took shape in important parts of Europe. Capital concentrated and the scale of production rose. The working population, urban and rural, proletarianized. Firms, parties, trade unions and other specialized associations assumed much more prominent roles in public life. National states continued to gain power by comparison with any other organizations. Capitalism and statemaking, in short, transformed social life. That includes the social life of the countryside.

We can have no hope of enumerating, much less of analyzing, the full range of nineteenth-century change in one brief essay. After a look at broad patterns of nineteenth-century change over the continent

as a whole, let us close in on the nature of employment in Europe's rural areas.

Population Growth and Vital Rates

A glance at the elementary statistics of the period gives an immediate sense of the nineteenth century's dynamism. The European population of 1800 stood in the vicinity of 190 million, that of 1900 around 500 million. The increase of more than 300 million people implies a growth rate around one percent per year. Such a rate is not sensational by twentieth-century standards: as Table 1 indicates, Europe is still growing at about that rate, and all other continents are growing faster. But for a whole continent to grow so fast for so long was an extraordinary event in the history of the world up to that time (see Durand 1967, McKeown 1976).

The increase occurred, furthermore, despite a probable net loss through migration on the order of 35 million people. For the century as a whole, a reasonable guess is that 45 million Europeans left the continent, and 10 million returned home. Close to half the century's emigrants left from Britain and Ireland, and three quarters of the British and Irish went to North America. The vast majority of emigrants from all parts of Europe sailed to the Americas; the transatlantic movement was one of the grandest migrations of all time. In sheer numbers and distances, it was probably unprecedented in human history.

If the estimates of migration are correct, Europe's excess of births over deaths during the century as a whole totaled close to 350 million. With a plausible crude birth rate of 35 for the whole continent and the whole century, that figure implies a crude death rate in the vicinity of 25. In the world of the later twentieth century, a crude birth rate of 35 and a crude death rate of 25 could only occur in a poor country. For purposes of comparison, Table 1 presents continental

Table 1. Annual Growth Rates and Vital Rates for Major World Areas, 1960-1968

Area	annual growth rate	crude birth rate	crude death rate
Africa	2.4%	45	21
North America	1.4	21	9
Latin America	2.9	40	12
Asia	2.0	38	17
Europe	0.9	18	10
Soviet Union	1.3	20	7
Oceania	2.1	26	10
World	1.9	34	15

Source: Annuaire Statistique de la France 1970/71: 7*.

rates from the 1960s. No continent now approximates the European nineteenth-century situation; all continents now have lower mortality, and the poorer parts of the world all have larger gaps between birth rate and death rate; that means, of course, that the rates of natural increase are higher today than they were in nineteenth-century Europe. The closest approximations of Europe's situation a hundred years ago are contemporary Africa and Asia.

Within Europe, the nineteenth century brought pivotal changes in the character and geography of natural increase. Over the continent as a whole, the trend of nineteenth-century fertility was no doubt a gentle decline, as compared with a significant drop in mortality; the difference between the two rates of decline accounted for the continent's large natural increase. Table 2 presents some scattered observations of birth rates and death rates for 1800, 1850 and 1900. In general, the poorer parts of Europe (which were probably also, on the average, the areas of higher fertility and mortality throughout the century) lack data for the early years; there was a rough correlation between prosperity and statistical reporting. As of 1900, the range of variation was large: crude birth rates running from 21.3 in France to 49.3 in Russia, crude death rates from 15.8 in Norway to 31.1 in Russia. As Ansley Coale and his collaborators have shown, a long frontier separated the high-fertility regions of eastern and southeastern Europe from the low- to medium-fertility regions of the north and west. In these statistics, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Russia and Serbia stand well above other countries.

The national units mask further diversity: fertility and mortality correspond much more closely to economic and cultural regions than to political boundaries. Although Hungary shows up in these statistics

Table 2. Vital Rates for Selected European Areas in 1800, 1850 and 1900

	Crude Birth Rate			Crude Death Rate		
Country	1800	1850	1900	1800	1850	1900
Austria		39.6	35.0		32.9	25.2
Belgium		30.0	28.9		21.2	19.3
Bulgaria			42.3			22.6
Denmark	29.9	31.4	29.7	28.5	19.1	16.8
Finland	37.6	35.7	32.6	25.5	26.3	21.9
France	32.9	26.8	21.3	27.7	21.4	21.9
Germany		37.2	35.6		25.6	22.1
Hungary			39.4			27.0
Ireland			22.7			19.6
Italy			33.0			23.8
Netherlands		34.6	31.6		22.2	17.9
Norway	22.7	31.0	29.7	27.6	17.2	15.8
Portugal			30.5			20.3
Romania			38.8			24.2
Russia			49.3			31.1
Serbia			42.4			23.5
Spain			33.9			29.0
Sweden	28.7	31.9	27.0	31.4	19.8	16.8
Switzerland			28.6			19.3
England, Wales		33.4	28.7		20.8	18.2
Scotland			29.6			18.5

(Source: Mitchell 1975: 105-120)

as a high-fertility area, for example, Hungary actually included some of Europe's lowest-fertility regions. Rudolf Andorka and his colleagues have done family-reconstitution studies of several villages in the Ormánság and Sárköz regions of Hungary during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; there they have discovered marital fertility plummeting to remarkably low levels. In those areas an arrangement known as the "one-child family system" prevailed; by 1850 actual completed family sizes were running between 3 and 4 (Andorka 1977). Plenty of other studies from elsewhere show significant village-to-village variation as a function of economic opportunity and family structure (e.g. Levine 1977, Gaunt 1977, Spagnoli 1977).

Industrialization

One of the factors behind the changing microgeography of fertility in nineteenth-century Europe was the continent's industrialization. Industrialization has two dimensions: 1) a decrease in the proportion of economic activity devoted to agriculture, forestry and fishing, 2) an increase in the scale of producing units. Our twentieth-century prejudice -- compounded by a sloganeering idea of the Industrial Revolution and a fixation on the factory as the vehicle of industrial growth -- is to think of the two as tightly correlated. In fact, they have often varied quite separately from each other. Many regions of Europe were already relatively industrial with respect to the first dimension by the end of the eighteenth century: major shares of the rural and small-town population were involved in various forms of manufacturing. But the scale remained very small; the household and the small shop were the typical producing units. The nineteenth century saw both a substantial decline in the share of agriculture, forestry and fishing, and a dramatic rise in the average scale of production.

No one has so far assembled comparable accounts of these nineteenth-century changes for all regions of Europe. Some features of the changes, nevertheless, are fairly clear:

1. The areas which experienced major industrialization during the nineteenth century were basically of two kinds:

   a) areas in which small-scale manufacturing had already been important during the eighteenth century -- the regions of Manchester, Lille, Milan, Barcelona, Moscow, and so on -- and which experienced an urbanization and increase in the scale of that industry during the nineteenth;

   b) areas in which coal deposits combined with water and/or rail transportation to facilitate the development of heavy industry: Yorkshire, much of Belgium, Silesia, etc.

2. As this "implosion" of industry occurred, large parts of the European countryside de-industrialized, devoting themselves more exclusively to agriculture.

3. In absolute terms, agriculture, forestry and fishing did not decline. They actually grew, but more slowly than manufacturing and services. In sheer numbers, the agricultural labor force probably reached its maximum some time around World War I.

4. Wage-laborers -- proletarians in both agriculture and industry -- increased far more rapidly than the rest of the labor force. One reasonable guess is that proletarians and their families comprised 90 million of Europe's 190 million people in 1800, and had grown to 300 million of the total of 500 million at the end of the century. Most of the increase took place in cities. Urbanization and proletarianization were interdependent processes.

As a result of these changes, regional disparities in industrial activity, wealth, urban concentration and population density increased through the nineteenth century. Around 1900 the major countries of Europe distributed themselves in this manner:

over 70% of the labor force in agriculture, forestry and fishing:

Bulgaria 81.9, Romania 79.6

61-70%: Hungary 70.0, Portugal 65.1, Spain 68.1

51-60%: Austria 59.8, Finland 51.5, Italy 58.7, Russia 58.6, Sweden 53.5

41-50%: Denmark 46.6, France 41.4, Ireland 42.9, Norway 40.8, Poland 45.9,

31-40%: Germany 39.9, Switzerland 34.2,

less than 31%: Belgium 27.1, Netherlands 30.8, United Kingdom 9.1

(Sources: Mitchell 1975: 153-165; Bairoch 1968: 83-120)

The proportions rose, broadly speaking, with increasing distance from the English Channel.

The changing geography of wealth shows up in Paul Bairoch's estimates of per capita gross national product. To take only the eight highest-ranking areas in 1830 and 1900:

1830		1900	
Netherlands	347	United Kingdom	881
United Kingdom	346	Switzerland	785
Belgium	295	Belgium	721
Norway	280	Germany	639
Switzerland	276	Denmark	633
Italy	265	Netherlands	614
France	264	France	604
Spain	263	Norway	577
EUROPE	240	EUROPE	455

(Bairoch 1976: 286; figures in 1960 U.S. dollars and prices.)

Real GNP per capita, according to Bairoch's estimates, rose by about 90 percent over those 70 years. That is slow growth by twentieth-century standards, but extraordinary as compared with anything that had happened before. Per capita GNP grew fastest in Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland,

Table 3. Number of Inhabitants and Percentage of Population in Cities of 100,000 or More, 1800-1900, in Selected Areas of Europe

	Number of Inhabitants in Cities of 100,000 or More (Thousands)			Percentage of Population in Cities of 100,000 or More		
Area	1800	1850	1900	1800	1850	1900
Austria	231.9	549.6	2462.4	1.7	3.0	9.5
Belgium	-	326.7	1148.7	-	7.5	17.1
Denmark	105.0	142.0	491.3	10.7	9.4	20.2
Finland	0	0	0	0	0	0
France	852.4	2025.7	6005.4	3.2	5.8	15.4
Greece	0	0	111.5	0	0	4.4
Hungary	0	170.0	837.2	0	1.3	4.3
Ireland	165.0	258.4	722.1	3.0	3.9	16.1
Italy	1053.0	1607.5	3206.4	5.8	6.7	9.9
Netherlands	200.0	224.0	1137.5	9.3	7.2	22.0
Norway	0	0	227.6	0	0	10.1
Poland	100.0	160.0	989.8	3.3	3.3	9.9
Portugal	180.0	240.0	529.4	5.8	6.3	9.8
Prussia/Germany	272.0	799.0	9007.3	1.1	2.3	16.0
Romania	0	120.0	282.1	0	3.1	4.5
Scotland	0	490.7	1390.9	0	16.8	30.8
Spain	400.0	450.0	1676.3	3.3	3.1	9.0
Sweden	0	0	452.6	0	0	8.9
Switzerland	0	0	364.7	0	0	11.0
European Turkey	600.0	850.0	1230.0	13.3	15.2	20.0
England and Wales	959.3	3992.1	12806.2	10.5	21.7	39.0
European Russia	470.0	850.0	5012.5	1.3	1.5	5.0
TOTAL EUROPE	5406.6	12656.9	50091.0	2.8	4.8	10.1

(Source: Tilly, Fonde, O'Shea 1972)

Germany and Belgium -- especially, that is, in the areas which saw the development of coal-consuming, metal-processing industries.

The map of urban population conformed more and more closely to the map of large-scale industry. Table 3 summarizes the changes. In 1800, something like 3 percent of the European population lived in cities of 100,000 or more. By 1850, the proportion had risen to around 5 percent. By 1900, 10 percent. That meant a rise from 5.4 million to 12.7 million to 50.1 million inhabitants of big cities -- almost a quadrupling in the last half of the century. The combination of substantial natural increase within cities and massive rural-to-urban migration produced thunderous urban growth: about 0.6 percent per year from 1800 to 1850, about 2.1 percent per year from 1850 to 1900.[1]

The regional disparities were wide in 1800, and widened during the century. In 1800, the presence of giant Constantinople made the European segment of what was to become Turkey the most urban of the continent's major political units: 13.3 percent of European Turkey's entire population lived in that one city of 600,000. Elsewhere, the range ran downward from the 10 or 11 percent for Denmark, England and Wales to a number of countries with no city of 100,000 or more. By the end of the century, Finland was the only large political unit with no city of 100,000; Helsinki then had about 90,000 residents. But the range ran from under 5 percent in Finland, Greece, Hungary and Romania to over 30 percent in Scotland, England and Wales. The rank orders of urbanization and industrialization had converged.

------

1. In Table 3, many states (e.g. Greece, Finland) did not exist for some or all of the nineteenth century; in those cases, the figures refer to the boundaries at the acquisition of independence. Others (e.g.

Either because no one with the heroic statistical capacities of a Paul Bairoch has so far compiled the evidence or because the changes involved do not lend themselves to simple numerical summary, other major changes which were undoubtedly happening are harder to document. Roads, then railroads, proliferated; mail and telegraph communications multiplied; newspapers circulated as schooling and literacy increased; voluntary associations, trade unions, political parties waxed; and so on through the inventory of communications, organizations and everyday routines.

Amid the great swirl of transformation, the expansion and reorganization of European states set some of the main currents of change. Perhaps the most dramatic feature of Europe's nineteenth-century statemaking was the consolidation of the state system into a smaller and smaller set of larger and larger units: about 50 states of various sorts on the eve of the French Revolution; a radical reduction through French conquests to about 25 states in 1800 and about 20 in 1812; a temporary reversion to about 35 states with France's defeat, followed by a new consolidation process which left 20 to 25 independent states (depending on how we define "independent" and "state") at World War I. Although French imperialism

------

Prussia/Germany) changed boundaries radically; in those cases, the figures refer to the boundaries at the date shown. The population estimates in Chandler & Fox 1974 yield slightly higher totals and slightly higher percentages, but the pattern is essentially the same as in my compilations. Here are Bairoch's figures for Europe without Russia (Bairoch 1977: 43-44):

date	percent in cities of 20,000 or more	percent in cities of 100,000 or more
1800	7.6	3.2
1850	12.6	6.1
1900	26.2	11.4

cleared the way and nineteenth-century wars took their toll, the chief paths to consolidation passed through semi-voluntary unions, notably those of Germany and Italy. Throughout the process, state structures expanded, centralized and became the dominant organizations within their own territories. A number of innovations followed: uniformed professional police forces, national elections and referenda, censuses and statistical bureaux, income taxes, technical schools for specialists, civil service careers, and many other pieces of the state apparatus that prevailed into our own time.

Can we reasonably apply the word "modernization" to this ensemble of changes? That depends on how demanding an idea of modernization we adopt. If all we require is that recognizable features of twentieth-century life emerge, then the urbanization, large-scale industrialization, fertility decline and other changes portrayed by the statistics easily qualify as modernization. If we demand common paths of change -- something like Rainer Lepsius' differentiation, mobilization, participation and institutionalization of conflict -- the question remains moot; observations at a national or European scale simply do not tell us how the changes occurred. And if we want to try a causal model of modernization (one in which, for instance, intensified communications produce new states of consciousness which in turn make people more open to rational solutions for their problems), the hopelessness of approaching the analysis with hugely aggregated evidence becomes clear. We must look at evidence which comes closer to the experiences of individuals and small groups. Let us consider how work changed in Europe's rural areas.

Peasants and Proletarians

In order to understand changes in the nineteenth-century European countryside, we must exorcise the ghosts in the word "peasantry". If all we mean by peasants is poor people who work the soil, then in 1800 most Europeans were peasants. Usually, however, we have something more precise in mind: something like agriculturalists organized in households which control the land on which they live, draw most of their subsistence from that land, and supply the bulk of their own labor requirements from their own efforts. By that definition, the bulk of the European rural population was already non-peasant by the start of the nineteenth century. In much of Eastern and Southern Europe, large landlords made the basic agricultural production decisions, and used a variety of devices to draw labor from a mass of agricultural workers who controlled little or no land. In much of Northern and Western Europe, a major share of the agricultural labor force consisted either of day-laborers or of live-in servants and hands. Although the serfs of Eastern Europe and the day-laborers of Western Europe often had garden plots or small fields of their own, they depended for survival on the sale of their household labor power. They were, in a classic Marxian sense of the word, proletarians.

Again a little exorcism is in order. Despite Marx' own clear concentration on changes in the rural labor force, the word "proletarian" has taken on an urban-industrial imagery: Modern Times, with Charlie Chaplin turning bolts on the assembly line. If we confine the proletariat to people working at subdivided tasks in large units under close time-discipline, then that industrial proletariat certainly grew during the nineteenth century, but it probably did not approach a fifth of the European labor force in 1900.

If, however, we include all people whose survival depended on the sale of their labor power -- which was, after all, Marx's basic idea of the proletariat -- then by the end of the nineteenth century the great majority of the European labor force was proletarian. Agricultural wage-laborers were probably the largest category, but industrial and service workers were then competing for the lead. Before the middle of the nineteenth century, most of the large increase in the proletarian population occurred in small towns and rural areas. By a rough computation from the figures presented earlier, perhaps 50 million of the 70 million increase in the European population from 1800 to 1850 occurred in places under 20,000. It is reasonable to suppose that at least 40 of that 50 million increase in smaller places consisted of wage-workers and their families. During the second half of the century, the smaller places may have grown by another 140 million, with the great bulk of the increase proletarian. By then, however, the cities were beginning to take over: 100 million of the 240-million increase occurred in places of 20,000 or more, and many of the smaller settlements that grew were actually suburbs and satellites of major industrial centers. To be sure, in the present state of the evidence any such numbers rest on a tissue of suppositions. Yet the main point is firm: the patterns of urban growth and of total population growth imply a massive proletarianization of the European people during the nineteenth century. Contrary to common impressions, much of that proletarianization took place in smaller towns and rural areas.

The sketchy evidence I have presented leaves open the possibility that the "places of fewer than 20,000 inhabitants" in question were mainly

seats of mines, mills and other large-scale industrial establishments. Some were; the hinterlands of Manchester and Lille, for example, were full of smaller industrial centers. Even in those two quintessential manufacturing regions, however, agricultural proletarians and rural outworkers multiplied during the nineteenth century. Away from the major poles of industrial growth, much more of the expansion took place in agriculture and in manufacturing on a very small scale.

The earlier European experience provides numerous examples of proletarianization within rural areas. In fact, the rural versions of proletarianization were so visible at the middle of the nineteenth century that Karl Marx considered them the basis of primitive accumulation: "The expropriation of the agricultural producer, of the peasant, from the soil, is the basis of the whole process" (Capital, chapter 26). It would be useful, however, to differentiate types of agricultural regions rather more than Marx did. At a minimum we need to distinguish:

1. areas, such as coastal Flanders, in which peasants specialized in cash-crop production, and non-producing landlords were unimportant;

2. areas, such as East Prussia, in which large landlords produced grain for the market by means of servile labor, whose subsistence came mainly from small plots assigned to their households;

3. areas, such as southern England, in which large landlords likewise produced grain for the market, but with wage labor;

4. areas, such as western France, in which landlords lived from rents and peasants lived from various combinations of owned, rented and sharecropped land.

Within category 1, proletarianization tended to occur as a consequence of differentiation within the peasantry: extra children and households losing in the local competition moved into wage labor for other peasants. In category 2, the redistributions of land which commonly accompanied

nineteenth-century emancipations produced a temporary movement away from the proletariat, but the substitution of cash payments for access to subsistence plots created a far larger movement toward wage labor. Category 3 began with an essentially proletarian agricultural labor force, and grew by adding more wage laborers. Category 4, finally, sometimes transformed itself into category 1 by means of the increasing involvement of peasants in cash-crop production, sometimes transforemd itself into category 3 as the landlords consolidated their control over production, but rarely created proletarians within the agricultural sector. (Category 4 was not, however, a bulwark against proletarianization; it was an especially favorable environment for cottage industry.) The European agrarian structure, then, provided multiple paths out of the peasantry and multiple paths into the agricultural proletariat. Over the nineteenth century, the net shift from one to the other was very large.

In Europe as a whole, the proletarianization of agricultural labor had begun well before the nineteenth century. Great Britain was one sort of extreme; except for some portions of its Celtic fringes, Britain had essentially eliminated its peasantry by the start of the nineteenth century. By the time of the 1831 census, the breakdown of agricultural families in Britain ran as follows:

occupying families employing labor	144,600
occupying families employing no labor	130,500
laboring families	686,000
	961,100 (1831 Census Abstract, Vol. I: ix)

Table 4 presents the occupations of males 20 and over for 1831. Both

Table 4. Percent Distribution of Occupations of Males 20 and Over in Great Britain, 1831

Category	England	Wales	Scotland	Total
Agricultural occupiers employing laborers	4.4	10.1	4.7	4.7
Agricultural occupiers not employing laborers	3.0	10.3	9.8	4.3
Agricultural laborers	23.3	28.5	15.9	22.5
Employed in manufacturing	9.8	3.2	15.3	10.3
Employed in retail trade or handicraft	30.1	22.2	27.7	29.4
Capitalists, bankers, professionals and other educated men	5.6	2.7	5.3	5.4
Non-agricultural laborers	15.7	16.2	13.9	15.4
Servants	2.2	1.1	1.1	2.0
Others	5.9	5.7	6.4	6.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.1	100.0
Number	3,199,984	194,706	549,821	3,944,511

Source: Great Britain, Census Office. Abstract of the answers and returns made pursuant to an act, passed in the eleventh year of the reign of His Majesty King George IV, intituled, "An Act for Taking an Account of the Population of Great Britain, and of the Increase or Diminution Thereof" (Westminster: House of Commons, 1831) Vol. I, p. xiii, "General Summary of Great Britain"

the breakdown for families and the breakdown for adult males show about 71 percent of Great Britain's agricultural labor force to be essentially landless laborers. For England alone, the figure was 76 percent. Although the division between owners and wage-workers within the category "Retail Trade or Handicraft" (in which the letter P, for example, includes Paper-maker; Pastry-cook, Confectioner; Patten-maker; Pawnbroker; Poulterer; Printer; Printseller; Publican, Hotel or Innkeeper, Retailer of Beer) is hard to guess, the figures suggest that in 1831 Britain's agricultural labor force was more proletarian than the rest. By 1851, laborers amounted to some 85 percent of all agricultural workers (Deane and Cole 1967: 143-144). That was the peak; thereafter, hired labor began to desert British agriculture for industry, and machines began to replace or displace labor as never before (Jones 1964: 329-344).

Although Britain was extreme, it was not unique. Much of Eastern Europe began the nineteenth century with the bulk of its agricultural population proletarians of a different kind from their English cousins: servile landless laborers on large estates (Blum 1978: 38-44). Although nineteenth-century emancipations eventually gave some of them title to land, the main trend ran toward the creation of a vast agricultural proletariat. Peasant property may have increased in absolute terms, but the rural population grew much faster. A common interpretation of those trends (e.g. Blum 1978: 435-436) is that an exogenously-generated population increase overran the supply of land; my own view is that proletarianization helped create the population increase; whichever argument is correct, however, the correlation between proletarianization and rural population growth is clear. In such southern European areas as Sicily, likewise, the dispossession of feudal landlords made property-owners of some former tenants; but its main effect was to accelerate the

expropriation of the land by large farmers and bourgeois, and thus to hasten the proletarianization of the remainder of the agricultural workers (Romano 1963, Schneider & Schneider 1976: 116-118). Again a rapid population increase aggravated the process of proletarianization, and again the causal connections between proletarianization and population increase are debatable.

The cases of Eastern and Southern Europe are well known. Less known until recently was the extensive proletarianization of the Scandinavian rural population. Christer Winberg sums up the Swedish experience:

> Between 1750 and 1850 the population of Sweden doubled. The increase in population was particularly rapid after 1810. Throughout this period about 90 percent of the national population lived in rural areas. The increase was very unequally distributed among the different social groups of the rural population. The number of bönder (peasants) rose by c. 10 per cent, while the number of landless -- i.e. torpare (crofters), inhyseshjon (bordars), statare (farm workers partly paid in kind) etc. -- more than quadrupled (Winberg 1978: 170).

Winberg attributes the rural proletarianization to two main processes: a capitalistic reorganization of large estates which squeezed out the tenants in favor of wage laborers, and an increasing integration of the peasantry into the national market economy, which in turn produced increased differentiation between landed and landless. If that is the case, Sweden combined the paths of category 1 and category 2, and ended with a combination of a small number of capitalist landlords, a larger number of cash-crop farmers, and a very large number of agricultural wage-workers.

Protoindustry and Proletarianization

Sweden was unusual in one important regard: unless we count mining and forestry, very few of Sweden's rural workers went into industry. Over Europe as a whole, manufacturing played a large part in the transformation of the nineteenth-century countryside. Economic historians have recently begun to speak of protoindustrialization: the growth of manufacturing through the multiplication of small producing units rather than through the concentration of capital and labor. Economic historian Franklin Mendels introduced the term into the literature in order to cope with the way that sections of rural Flanders made large shifts from agriculture to manufacturing without the development of factories, without important changes in production techniques, without large accumulations of capital, without substantial urbanization of the working class.

Older economic historians, back to Marx, knew about cottage industry and allied forms of production long ago. The advantage of the new term is to draw attention to the variety of ways in which European entrepreneurs of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries organized networks of households to produce large volumes of cheap goods for national and international markets. In the process, they made manufacturing not a mere by-employment for farmers, but the dominant economic activity in important parts of the European countryside. A recent book, Industrialisierung vor der Industrialisierung, by Peter Kriedte, Hans Medick and Jürgen Schlumbohm, surveys the growing literature on the subject. The book emphasizes the ways in which protoindustrialization transformed the rest of the rural economy, established its own peculiar patterns of family structure, and cleared the way for large-scale industrialization. It makes clear the utter inadequacy of any portrayal of the nineteenth-century rural world as a territory essentially populated by peasants and fundamentally devoted to agriculture.

As Peter Kriedte sums up the importance of protoindustrialization:

> Proto-industry stands between two worlds, the narrow world of the village and the boundary-breaking world of trade, between the agrarian economy and merchant capitalism. The agrarian sector produces a labor supply, a supply of merchant-entrepreneur knowledge and capital, supplies of products and markets. Merchant capital opens foreign markets to rural crafts, whose personnel thus become aware of the opportunity for expansion if they enter into protoindustrialization . . . The unified symbiosis of merchant capital and peasant society thereby marks a decisive step on the way to industrial capitalism (Kriedte et al. 1977: 88).

The general line of argument, in terms of "vent-for-surplus", goes back to Adam Smith (see Caves 1965, 1971). But Kriedte and his collaborators go on to point out the irreversible effects of the new symbiosis: commercialization of the entire rural economy, dependence on adjacent agricultural areas for subsistence, transformation of households into suppliers (and breeders) of wage-labor, detachment of marriage and reproduction from the inheritance of land, acceleration of population growth, rising rural densities, the growth of an industrial proletariat in the countryside.

Kriedte et al. brush against, but do not quite state, a fundamental advantage of protoindustrial production over urban shops and/or factories: in a time of small-scale agricultural production with high costs for the transportation and storage of food, protoindustry kept the bulk of the labor force close to the food sources, and made industrial labor available, in odd moments and peak seasons, for food production. Up to a point, the individual merchant could assume that the workers would feed themselves. The logic of the system, in short: a cheap, elastic, compliant labor force for merchants who are short on capital and technical expertise but

long on knowledge of opportunities and connections.

Protoindustrial production and producers multiplied beginning well before 1800, and did not start to contract visibly until well into the nineteenth century. A labor force consisting largely of dispersed, part-time and seasonal workers resists enumeration; we are unlikely ever to have precise counts of the rise and fall of protoindustrial workers. Nevertheless, we have enough evidence to be sure that protoindustrialization was not simply one of several known patterns of change. Before the middle of the nineteenth century, when manufacturing increased significantly in some part of Europe, it normally increased through the multiplication of households and other small, dispersed producing units linked to national and international markets by webs of entrepreneurs and merchants. It increased, that is, not through the concentration of capital, labor and the scale of production, but through protoindustrialization.

That is notably true of textile production. As Milward and Saul put it:

> It is impossible not to be struck by the extraordinary growth of spinning and weaving in the countryside of many European areas. In some areas the manufacture of iron products, toys or watches developed in the same way, but textiles, whether of linen, wool or the newfangled cotton were the typical rural product. The technological transformations which initiated the Industrial Revolution in Britain, were heavily concentrated in these rural textile industries and their development on the continent may therefore be seen as the true precursor of the Industrial Revolution there rather than the older 'manufactures'. But setting on one side the developments of the Industrial Revolution itself and looking at the matter simply from the point of view of employment in industrial activities whether those industries were 'revolutionised' or not it would still be true to say that the most industrial landscapes in late eighteenth-century Europe, for all their lack of chimneys, were the country areas around Lille, Rouen, Barcelona, Zurich, Basel and Geneva (Milward and Saul 1973: 93-94).

The rise of coal-burning and metal-working industries during the nineteenth century eventually changed the picture. But it took a long time. The expansion of manufacturing continued to take a protoindustrial form well past 1800.

Because of Rudolf Braun's rich, intensive analyses of the Zürich region, the Züricher Oberland has become the <u>locus classicus</u> for students of protoindustrialization. In the Züricher Oberland, the poor subsistence-farming areas far from the city had been thinly-settled exporters of domestic servants and mercenaries until the eighteenth century. Then the growth of an export-oriented cotton industry based in Zürich but drawing the bulk of its labor from the countryside transformed the uplands: farm workers took to spinning and weaving, emigration slowed, population densities rose, and an essentially industrial way of life took over the villages and hamlets of the mountains. A rural proletariat took shape.

During the nineteenth century, as the scale of production in Zürich and its immediate vicinity rose, the process reversed. The hinterland de-industrialized, and migrants flowed toward Zürich. The Zürich region moved from 1) urban manufacturing fed by a largely agricultural countryside to 2) rural protoindustrialization coupled with expanded mercantile activity in the central city to 3) concentration of industry near the center, bringing hardship to rural producers, to 4) de-industrialization of the countryside. Zürich's sequence provides a paradigm for the

regional history of protoindustry throughout Europe. The chief variables are when the sequence occurred, how extensive each stage was, and whether a significant industrial nucleus survived the final period of urban implosion and rural contraction.

Urbanization of Industry, De-Industrialization of the Country

Properly generalized, Zurich's experience has significant implications for Europe's nineteenth-century experience as a whole. Protoindustry did finally give way to its urban competitors throughout the continent. If so, the rural workers involved disappeared. But only in the artificial world of statistics can workers simply vanish. In real life, Europe's protoindustrial workers either hung on unemployed, moved into other employment in the countryside, or followed industry to the city. They did all three, although in what proportions we do not know so far. In the region of Lyon, at mid-century, rural workers miles from the city lived in its long shadow. "For if we observe," comments Yves Lequin,

> the concentration of workers in urban centers which were seizing, to their advantage, declining rural industries, the latter held on to a considerable share; in some places, indeed, the spreading of work into the countryside had found its second wind and was promoting the expansion of other more dynamic branches of industry. The large shares of the districts of Saint-Etienne and Lyon should not mislead us: cities without boundaries, they attracted people, to be sure, but even more so they projected their energy into distant villages; rather than men coming to industry, it was work that went to men (Lequin 1977: I, 43).

The balance shifted in the next half-century. Despite a decline in the old handicraft manufacture of silk, despite a distinct suburbanization of Lyon's manufacturing, and despite some tendency for mills with power

looms to head for the water power of the Alpine slopes, the industrial capital swelled. Lyon grew from 235,000 to 456,000 inhabitants between 1851 and 1906. The depression of the 1870s and 1880s first struck at the manufacturing population of the countryside and temporarily augmented the agricultural labor force. But the depression marked the end of a long expansion for the hinterland. The villages began to leak women and men to the cities.

Especially to Lyon. The changing relationship between Lyon and its hinterland had a paradoxical effect: the geographical range from which the city recruited its working population narrowed during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Instead of arriving from Switzerland, from Italy, from industrial centers elsewhere in France, they arrived increasingly from Lyon's own surrounding region. Within the region, however, Lyon and the other industrial cities did not simply attract a cross-section of the rural population; they drew disproportionately from the old centers of rural industry (Lequin 1977: I, 239-246). The incomplete evidence suggests that they also drew disproportionately on the <u>people</u> of the hinterland who were already involved in their industrial networks.

The other side of this process was a wholesale de-industrialization of the countryside. Rural areas became more exclusively agricultural than they had been for centuries. Area by area, the homogenization of rural life was even greater, for the specialization in one cash crop or another tended to convert whole regions into vineyards, or wheat fields, or dairy farms. So we arrive at a set of unexpected consequences: an industrialization which recruited, not peasants, but experienced industrial workers from the countryside; a "ruralization" of that same countryside as a consequence of the increasing importance of the city; an increasingly great contrast between the economic activities of city and country.

Rural Exodus

In absolute terms, Europe's rural population kept growing until some time in the twentieth century. Its proportion declined only because the urban population grew faster than the rural. Nevertheless, the cloud of numbers through which we have made our way implies a huge nineteenth-century exodus from the European countryside. Let us take a very conservative assumption: that rates of natural increase were just as high in places above 20,000 inhabitants as in smaller places. Even on that assumption, the figures imply that the smaller places lost about 25 million people to net migration in the first half of the century, and about 90 million in the second half. A substantial number of those migrants went overseas, but the net movement to larger places within Europe must have been on the order of 80 or 90 million migrants.

Who left? That depended on the pattern of opportunities in country, city, and overseas area. Those patterns varied with time and place. As a working hypothesis, I suggest the following rough rank order for departures from the nineteenth-century European countryside:

1. rural industrial workers
2. agricultural wage-workers
3. tenants and sharecroppers
4. landowning farmers.

I suggest, but with greater hesitation, that their school-leaving children emigrated in roughly the same order: children of rural industrial workers first, and so on. The logic of the hypothesis is simple: having transferable skills promotes migration, but having a stake in the land impedes it. The same logic suggests that in the case of migration to farms elsewhere (as in much of the Scandinavian migration to the American Midwest), agricultural workers headed the list. But that was a secondary stream; most people who

fled Europe's rural areas entered urban employment.

The consequence of such an order of departure would be first to deindustrialize the countryside, then to strip it of its remaining proletarians. At the logical end of such a process, family farms would predominate. For Europe as a whole, rural natural increase may well have exceeded out-migration -- thus producing continued slow growth in the total rural population -- until the end of the century. In the precocious case of rural France, however, large regions were losing population before 1900. In those regions, by and large, the remaining population was becoming more nearly peasant than it had been for centuries. There and elsewhere, deindustrialization and rural exodus had the ironic consequence of creating an agrarian world which resembled the "traditional" countryside postulated by simple models of modernization.

At first view, the rural exodus itself seems to fit one part of the modernization model: the presumed rise of mobility and of urban contacts breaks down rural isolation and opens the countryside to civilization. A closer look at nineteenth-century mobility patterns, however, gives a very different idea of what was going on. In the early nineteenth century and before, local markets for wage labor were very active, generally involved more than a single village, and commonly promoted widespread seasonal, annual and lifetime migration from village to village. In areas of wage labor, mobility rates comparable to those prevailing in the contemporary United States -- a fifth of the population changing residence in an average year -- seem to have been common (see, e.g., Eriksson & Rogers 1978: 177-239). Temporary migration, over short distances and long, permitted millions of European workers to supplement the inadequate incomes available at their homes by meeting the seasonal demand for labor elsewhere (see, e.g., Châtelain 1976).

Some rural regions (upland Switzerland is a famous example) built their economic survival on the exportation of domestic servants and mercenaries, and the importation of remittances from the servants and mercenaries, until the expansion of cottage industry permitted excess hands to remain on the land (see, e.g., Perrenoud 1971). Growing cities generated huge migration flows because cities both 1) recruited many of their workers as temporary migrants who moved on or returned home and 2) were death-traps, especially for the migrants themselves; both factors meant that the total numbers of migrants were far, far greater than the net increases through migration (see, e.g., Sharlin 1978).

All these features were true of European mobility patterns before the nineteenth century, and continued well into the century. Yet the nineteenth century did not simply bring more of the same. Overseas migration, as we have already seen, played an incomparably greater role than it had in previous centuries. The net flows of migrants to cities from rural areas rose far above earlier levels. The average distances people moved undoubtedly increased. The definitiveness of long-distance moves probably increased as well: fewer people spending their lifetimes in repeated migration from one distant location to another. Short-distance migration probably declined, at least relatively, as people began to substitute daily commutation by rail or bicycle for longer-term changes of residence. (For a general survey of these trends, see C. Tilly 1978). With one crucial exception -- the influence of governments, wars and political crises on international migration was to become preponderant during the twentieth century -- the mobility patterns with which Europeans are familiar today were taking shape. The mistake is to think that those contemporary mobility patterns emerged from a previously immobile world.

Summed up, the nineteenth-century changes in work, mobility and population distribution have another important implication. The locus of proletarianization was shifting radically. For a long time, most individuals and families who passed into the proletariat had made the fateful transition in villages and small towns. During the nineteenth century, the balance shifted toward cities. Within the city, and in the move to the city, people passed from having some control over their means of production to depending on the sale of their labor power to others. Those others were mostly capitalists of one variety or another. The work they offered consisted increasingly of disciplined wage-labor in relatively large organizations: offices, stores, factories, railroads, hospitals, and so on. Capitalists, managers and large organizations took over the task of creating a compliant proletariat. While the small entrepreneurs who preceded them had relied on cash payments, personal patronage and community pressure to secure compliance, the nineteenth-century capitalist boldly undertook the creation of new kinds of people: tidy, disciplined, sober, reliable and uncomplaining. That they did not quite succeed is a tribute to the staying power of the European working class.

Did the Cake of Custom Break?

Much more changed, of course, in nineteenth-century Europe. In order to build a comprehensive analysis of nineteenth-century social change, we would have to follow the expansion and elaboration of capitalism much farther. We would have to deal seriously with the concentration of power in national states. We would have to examine the changes in organization, productive technique, communications, politics and everyday

experience which developed from the interaction of capitalism and statemaking. We would have to take account of the interdependent but distinct trajectories of center and periphery, of North, South, East and West. The thin slice we have taken from the century is far from a cross-section.

Nevertheless, the evidence we have reviewed is broad enough to make clear what did not happen. A congeries of isolated, immobile agrarian societies did not give way under the impact of industrialization, urbanization and expanding communications. The isolated, immobile societies did not give way during the nineteenth century because they did not exist at the beginning of the century. The European world bequeathed to the nineteenth century by the eighteenth was actually connected, mobile and even, in its way, industrial. There was no solid cake of custom to break.

What did change, then? The scale of producing organizations increased greatly. The average range of geographic mobility expanded. National states, national politics and national markets became increasingly dominant. The population of Europe urbanized and proletarianized. The long transition from a high-fertility/high-mortality world began. Inanimate sources of energy started to play an indispensable role in everyday production and consumption. Capitalism matured. The European way of life we now know took shape.

So is there anything wrong with summing up those changes as the "modernization" of Europe? No, if the name is nothing but a convenient name. The errors only begin with the elevation of the idea of modernization into a model of change -- especially as a model in which expanded contact with the outside world alters people's mentalities, and altered mentalities produce a break with traditional forms of behavior. That magic mentalism is not only wrong, but unnecessary. The analysis of capitalism and of statemaking offers a far more adequate basis for the understanding of change in nineteenth-century Europe.

REFERENCES

In addition to items cited specifically in the text, I have added a number of general sources dealing with major nineteenth-century changes. I am grateful to Cecilia Brown for assistance with bibliography, and to the National Science Foundation for support of the research on social change and collective action which lies behind this paper.

Wilhelm Abel

1974 Massenarmut und Hungerkrisen im Vorindustriellen Europa. Hamburg/Berlin: Paul Parey.

Kurt Ågren et al.

1973 Aristocrats, Farmers, Proletarians. Essays in Swedish Demographic History. Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell. Studia Historica Upsaliensia, 47.

Sune Åkerman, Hans Christian Johansen and David Gaunt, eds.

1978 Chance and Change. Social and Economic Studies in Historical Demography in the Baltic Area. Odense: Scandinavian Universities Press.

Risto Alapuro

1976 "On the Political Mobilization of the Agrarian Population in Finland: Problems and Hypotheses," Scandinavian Political Studies, 11: 51-76.

Rudolf Andorka

1977 "The one-child family system in two microregions of Hungary in the 18th and 19th century". Unpublished paper, Central Statistical Office, Budapest.

Paul Bairoch, ed.

1968 La population active et sa structure. Brussels: Institut de Sociologie, Université Libre de Bruxelles.

Paul Bairoch

1976 "Europe's Gross National Product, 1800-1975," Journal of European Economic History, 5: 273-340.

1977 Taille des villes, conditions de vie et développement économique. Paris: Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales.

Yves-Marie Bercé

1974 Croquants et Nu-Pieds. Les soulèvements paysans en France du XVIe au XIXe siècle. Paris: Gallimard/Julliard; Collection "Archives".

1976 Fête et révolte. Des mentalités populaires du XVIe au XVIIIe siècle. Paris: Hachette.

Cyril Black

1966 The Dynamics of Modernization. A Study in Comparative History. New York: Harper & Row.

Grethe Authen Blom, ed.

1977 Industrialiseringens første fase. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. Urbaniseringsprosessen i Norden, vol. 3.

Jerome Blum

1978 The End of the Old Order in Rural Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Rudolf Braun

1960 Industrialisierung und Volksleben. Zurich: Rentsch.

1965 Sozialer und kultureller Wandel in einem landlichen Industriegebiet. Zurich: Rentsch.

1978 "Early Industrialization and Demographic Change in the Canton of Zurich," in Charles Tilly, ed., Historical Studies of Changing Fertility. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Richard E. Caves

1965 "'Vent for Surplus' Models of Trade and Growth," in Robert E. Baldwin et al., eds., Trade, Growth, and the Balance of Payments: Essays in Honor of Gottfried Haberler. Chicago: Rand-McNally.

1971 "Export-Led Growth and the New Economic History," in Jagdish N. Bhagwati et al., eds., Trade, Balance of Payments and Growth. Papers in International Economics in Honor of Charles P. Kindleberger. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Tertius Chandler and Gerald Fox

1974 3000 Years of Urban Growth. New York: Academic Press.

Abel Châtelain

1976 Les migrants temporaires en France de 1800 à 1914: Histoire économique et sociale des migrants temporaires des campagnes françaises du XIXe siècle au début du XXe siècle. Lille: Publications de l'Université de Lille. 2 vols.

Ansley Coale

1969 "The Decline of Fertility in Europe from the French Revolution to World War II," in S.J. Behrman et al., Fertility and Family Planning. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Phyllis Deans and W.A. Cole

1967 British Economic Growth, 1688-1959. Trends and Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

J.P.D. Dunbabin

1974 Rural Discontent in Nineteenth-Century Britain. New York: Holmes & Meier.

Ingrid Eriksson and John Rogers

1978 Rural Labor and Population Change. Social and Demographic Developments in East-Central Sweden during the Nineteenth Century. Uppsala: Uppsala University. Distributed by Almqvist & Wiksell, Stockholm. Studia Historica Upsaliensia, 100.

David Gaunt

1976 "Familj, hushåll och arbetsintensitet," Scandia, 42: 32-59.

1977 "Pre-Industrial Economy and Population Structure: The Elements of Variance in Early Modern Sweden," Scandinavian Journal of History, 2: 183-210.

John Gillis

1970 "Political Decay and the European Revolutions, 1789-1848," World Politics, 22: 344-370.

1974 Youth and History. Tradition and Change in European Age Relations, 1770-present. New York: Academic Press.

Friedrich-Wilhelm Henning

1977 "Der Beginn der modernen Welt im agrarischen Bereich," in Reinhart Koselleck, ed., Studien zum Beginn der modernen Welt. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.

Eric L. Jones

1964 "The Agricultural Labour Market in England, 1793-1872," Economic History Review, 17: 322-338.

1968 "The Agricultural Origins of Industry," Past and Present, 40: 58-71.

Ann-Sofie Kälvemark

1977 "The Country that Kept Track of Its Population," Scandinavian Journal of History, 2: 211-230.

Hermann Kellenbenz

1976 The Rise of the European Economy. An economic history of Continental Europe from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Wolfgang Köllmann

1974 Bevölkerung in der industriellen Revolution. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

1974 "Zur Bevölkerungsentwicklung der Neuzeit," in Reinhart Koselleck, ed., Studien zum Beginn der modernen Welt. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.

Leszek A. Kosiński

1970 The Population of Europe. A Geographical Perspective. London: Longmans.

Peter Kriedte, Hans Medick and Jurgen Schlumbohm

1977 Industrialisierung vor der Industrialisierung. Gewerbliche Warenproduktion auf dem Land in der Formationsperiode des Kapitalismus. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Stein Kuhnle

1973 Social Mobilization and Political Participation: the Nordic Countries, c. 1850-1970. Bergen: Institute of Sociology.

David S. Landes

1969 The Unbound Prometheus. Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

M. Rainer Lepsius

1977 "Soziologische Theoreme über die Sozialstruktur der 'Moderne' und die 'Modernisierung'," in Reinhart Koselleck, ed., Studien zum Beginn der modernen Welt. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.

Yves Lequin

1977 Les ouvriers de la région lyonnaise (1848-1914). Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon. 2 vols.

Ron J. Lesthaege

1977 The Decline of Belgian Fertility, 1800-1970. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

David Levine

1977 Family Formation in an Age of Nascent Capitalism. New York: Academic Press.

Sven Lundqvist

1977 Folkrörelserna i det Svenska samhallet, 1850-1920. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell.

Franklin Mendels

1972 "Proto-industrialization: The First Phase of the Industrialization Process," Journal of Economic History, 32: 241-261.

1975 "Agriculture and Peasant Industry in Eighteenth-Century Flanders," in William N. Parker and Eric L. Jones, eds., European Peasants and their Markets. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Pierre Merlin, et al.

1971 L'Exode rural, suivi de deux etudes sur les migrations. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Institut National d'Etudes Demographiques, Travaux et Documents, Cahier 59.

Alan S. Milward and S.B. Saul

1973 The Economic Development of Continental Europe, 1780-1870. London: George Allen & Unwin.

Luciano Pellicani

1973 "La rivòluzione industriale e il fenomeno della proletarizzazione," Rassegna italiana di sociologia, 14: 63-84.

Alfred Perrenoud

1971 "Les migrations en Suisse sous l'Ancien Régime: Quelques problèmes," Annales de Démographie Historique 1970: 251-259.

Jean Pitié

1971 Exode rural et migrations intérieures en France. L'exemple de la Vienne et du Poitou-Charentes. Poitiers: Norois.

Fritz Redlich and Herman Freudenberger

1964 "The Industrial Development of Europe: Reality, Symbols, Images," Kyklos, 17: 372-401.

Salvatore Francesco Romano

1963 Storia della Mafia. Milan: Sugar.

Harald Runblom and Hans Norman, eds.,

1976 From Sweden to America. A History of the Migration. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Pierre de Saint-Jacob

1960 Les Paysans du Bourgogne du Nord. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

John Saville

1969 "Primitive Accumulation and Early Industrialization in Britain," Socialist Register 1969: 247-271.

Jane Schneider and Peter Schneider

1976 Culture and Political Economy in Western Sicily. New York: Academic Press.

Alan Sharlin

1978 "Natural Decrease in Early Modern Cities: A Reconsideration," Past and Present, 79: 126-138.

Edward Shorter

1975 The Making of the Modern Family. New York: Basic Books.

Paul G. Spagnöli

1977 "Population History from Parish Monographs: The Problem of Local Demographic Variations," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 7: 427-452.

Peter Stearns

1975 European Society in Upheaval. Social History since 1750. New York: Macmillan. 2d. edn.

Gustav Sundbärg

1908 Aperçus statistiques internationaux. Stockholm: Imprimerie Royale. Reprinted in 1968 by Gordon & Breach.

Charles Tilly

1978 "Migration in Modern European History," in William H. McNeill, ed., Human Migration: Patterns, Implications, Policies. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Louise A. Tilly and Joan W. Scott

1978 Women, Work and Family. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

Richard Tilly and Charles Tilly

1971 "An Agenda for European Economic History in the 1970s," Journal of Economic History, 31: 184-197.

Gabriel Tortella Casares

1973 Les origines del capitalismo en España: Banca, industria y ferrocarria en el siglo XIX. Madrid: Editorial Ternos.

Jan deVries

1978 "Barges and capitalism: Passenger transportation in the Dutch economy, 1632-1839," A.A.G. Bijdragen, 21: 33-398.

Etienne van de Walle

1974 The Female Population of France in the Nineteenth Century. A Reconstruction of 82 Departements. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Eugen Weber

1976 Peasants into Frenchmen. The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Christer Winberg

1978 "Population Growth and Proletarianization. The Transformation of Social Structures in Rural Sweden during the Agrarian Revolution," in Sune Åkerman et al., eds., Chance and Change. Social and Economic Studies in Historical Demography in the Baltic Area. Odense: Scandinavian Universities Press.

WORKING PAPERS OF THE CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

The Center for Research on Social Organization is a facility of the Department of Sociology, University of Michigan. Its primary mission is to support the research of faculty and students in the department's Social Organization graduate program. CRSO Working Papers report current research and reflection by affiliates of the Center; many Working Papers are published later elsewhere after revision. Working Papers which are still in print are available from the Center for a minimum fee of 50 cents, with higher prices (at a rate of roughly one cent per page) for papers longer than 50 pages. The Center will photocopy other papers at cost (approximately five cents per page). Recent Working Papers include:

179 "Two Reports on Sociology and History," by Charles Tilly, July 1978, 24 pages.

180 "Organizations, Social Structure, and Historical Change: Towards an Historical Sociology of Organizations," by Andrew G. Walder, September 1978, 66 pages.

181 "The Routinization of Protest in Nineteenth-Century France," by Charles Tilly, October 1978, 18 pages.

182 "The Attribution of Responsibility in a Wife Abuse Context," by Debra Kalmuss, October 1978, 22 pages.

183 "Interactive, Direct-Entry Approaches to Contentious Gathering Event Files," by R.A. Schweitzer and Steven C. Simmons, October 1978, 141 pages.

184 "The Marburg Studentenkorps: An Alternative View of the 'Prehistory' of Nazism," by Rudy Koshar, November 1978, 29 pages.

185 "Social Control and Public Policy: Understanding Dilemmas of Regulation and Implementation," by Erwin Hargrove and Mayer N. Zald, November 1978, 35 pages.

186 "Source Reading for Contentious Gatherings in Nineteenth-Century British Newspapers," by R.A. Schweitzer, December 1978, 53 pages.

187 "Was Holding Out the Key to Success in Strikes?: Massachusetts, the Early Years of Advanced Industrial Capitalism," by Carol Conell, November 1978.

188 "Resource Mobilization, Repression, and Working-Class Protest: Lyon, France Under the Second Republic and the Second Empire," by Robert Liebman, November 1978.

Request copies of these papers, the list of available Working Papers and other reprints, or further information about Center activities from: Center for Research on Social Organization, University of Michigan, 330 Packard Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109.