CLASS AND CONSEQUENCES:

TWO EXPERIMENTS ON THE EFFECTS OF
SOCIAL STATUS ON RESPONSIBILITY JUDGEMENT*

Joseph Sanders, Thomas Regulus
and V. Lee Hamilton

University of Michigan

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By

Joseph Sanders

Thomas Regulus

V. Lee Hamilton

What factors do we use in judging responsibility of another for some untoward act? This is a central question in understanding moral judgement and the cognative process of attributing responsibility. While the number of issues which might be considered are legion, there are certain styles of judgement which have come to the notice of many who have addressed this topic. One of the most important has been what Jean Piaget (1965) has called the use of moral realism as a view which holds the actor responsible for the consequences of his acts regardless of the mental state of the actor at the time of the action. As an ideal type, moral realism focuses upon the consequences of action. It is an after the fact, external analysis of responsibility.

In distinction to moral realism is an attitude which we might call moral idealism (Piaget does not use this phrase preferring a set of terms, including; autonomy, cooperation, reciprocity, etc).[1] This style of judgement relies upon internal, before the fact considerations in making responsibility decisions. Most importantly it attends to the mental state of the actor as a conscious being in deciding his degree of responsibility.

Piaget, and others (Kohlberg, 1969) have constructed stages of moral development around these two styles. As children mature they move from a style of judgement based upon moral realism toward a style based upon moral idealism. But while there is support for the idea of stages of moral development for children, there is a contrary body of literature in experimental social psychology on the adult use of consequence information in deciding the responsibility of actor for accidents.

Researchers have found that an increase in the severity of consequences increase the actor's ascribed responsibility (Walster, 1966); that it decreases ascribed responsibility (Shaver, 1970); that it increases responsibility in situations labeled as ambiguous (Phares and Wilson, 1972), and that it decreases responsibility in situations which have "low causal clarity" (Schroder and Linder, 1976). Further there appear to be complex patterns of relationships between the

subject's personal characteristics and experimental outcomes which defy simple

explanation. (See Vidmar and Crinklaw, 1974). Perhaps the only clear message

emerging from published studies in the area is that the effects of consequence

severity on responsibility attribution is unclear. In so far as it is measured by

the use of consequence information, a moral realism standard seems to be a feature

of some adult judgements and not others.

This paper will bring an additional consideration to bear in untangling

the use of different styles in judgements of responsibility: the social class of

actors and respondents. The intellectual thrust of the present experiments comes

from hypotheseses concerning the effect of social class on child discipline. (e.g.

Kohn, 1969; Sears, 1957; Bronfenbrenner; 1958; McKinley, 1964). Perhaps the best

known work in the area is that of Melvin Kohn. He argues that individuals of lower

social class (as measured by the Hollingshead Index) adopt a moral realism style

of judgement in deciding whether to punish their children. Contrarywise, middle

class parents use a more subjective style. Kohn notes: "With girls as with boys,

working-class mothers tend to respond to misbehavior more in terms of direct and

immediate consequences, middle class mothers more in terms of presumed intent."

Likewise, "middle class fathers respond more to intent and working class fathers

more to consequences." (Kohn, 1969: 101, 103).

Given the relationship between styles of judgements and class status, Kohn

tries to explain the source of this difference. His general conclusion is that the

self-direction reflected in the subjective orientation to responsibility comes

from opportunities and experiences that are more available to those who are favorably

situated in the hierarchial order of society, while moral realism is the consequence

of fewer opportunities at self direction. (Kohn, 1969: 189).

Kohn argues that the relationship of status to values, therefore, is not a

function of related dimensions such as race or religion. Nor is it to be explained in terms of facets of stratification such as income and subjective class, or class origins. Rather, the relationship of social status to values of this type "must take into account the cumulative impact of education and occupational position" (Kohn, 1969: 190). It is these two variables, education and nature of work, upon which most explanatory weight has been placed: Education, "because self direction requires more intellectual flexibility," than Conformity; and occupation, because people "who do not have an opportunity for self direction in work come to regard it as a matter of necessity to conform to authority, both on and off the job." (190) Kohn's work thus suggests that the use of consequence information in determining responsibility for wrongdoing should vary inversely with certain components of social class, especially education and job experiences; and that the use of mental state information should vary directly with these same components.

Kohn generally argues that social class is invariably associated with a certain judgemental style. Lower class individuals judge according to a moral realism standard, while upper class individuals judge according to moral idealism standard. There is, however, a complication in his argument which his data cannot address. If the job experience of working class individuals is one which requires objective conformity to rules, we might ask who enforces those rules? Presumably the answer in part is those men and women who we would call middle class. In their child disciplining practices and values for selves this group is governed by moral idealism. Yet they may be willing to impose a type of moral realism in the workplace. Thus we might ask, are these different styles of judgement invariant within individuals, or are they mediated by the status of others? Do upper status individuals have one standard of judgement for upper status actors and another for lower status actors?[2] In the following pages we present two experiments which try to untangle the relationship between judge (respondent) status, actor status and judgemental style.

## The Experiments

The present study uses a sample of adults[3] to test both the Kohn hypothesis that the use of consequence and mental state information to determine responsibility is related to the respondent's education and job experience; and to examine whether this relationship between status and types of information is influenced by the status of the actor being judged.

## Manipulated Variables

In each of two experiments both the severity of consequence and the actor's mental state are manipulated with the context of two short vignettes or stories about automobile accidents.[4]  Both variables are operationalized as High or Low.[5] In each story there is an additional variable.  In experiment one  it is the actor's past pattern of behavior, where in the low condition the actor has no history of accidents while in the high condition he does.[6]  In the second experiment the third manipulated variable is the status of the actor in the story.  In the high condition he is a college professor.  In the low condition he is a clerk. All of the manipulated variables are effect coded low = -1, high = 1.

The two stories were randomly distributed to respondents so that each respondent heard only one of these two vignettes.  The full design for each story was 2 x 2 x 2 (mental state by consequence by past pattern by actor status).  The actual stimulus stories are reproduced in Appendix A.

## Manipulation Checks

For the mental state variable we employed a manipulation check which asked whether the actor could or could not have avoided what happened.  The manipulation check for consequences was an eleven-point scale asking the respondent to rate the consequence from 0="not at all serious" to 10="extremely serious".  The effect of the actor's past pattern was checked with a question asking whether the deed was or was not predictable from what the respondent knew about the actor.  We had no manipulation check for actor status in experiment #2.

In both stories all manipulation checks were significantly affected by the appropriate manipulation. Table 1 presents t-tests and chi squares for these relationships.

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Table 1 about here
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## Education and Workplace Autonomy Variables

Kohn's arguments about the effects of social class could be tested with a wide choice of operationalizations of social class. In line with his concluding theoretical discussion, however, we used respondent education level and two measures relating to autonomy in the workplace.[7] Because we had educational attainment data on nearly all of our respondents, while we had workplace autonomy data only on those employed at the time of the interview, the education variable must serve as our primary operationalization of class. Education is collapsed into three categories; 1= less than high school, 2= high school, 3= more than high school.[8]

Supplementing the education variable are two questions about workplace environment. These were, 1) Whether the individual was paid hourly or by salary, and 2) whether the respondent was closely supervised on the job. The first item may be thought of as an objective measure of job autonomy, while the second is a more subjective indicator. The two were combined into a single index (Workplace Autonomy), where 1= low autonomy, 2= middle levels of autonomy, and 3= high autonomy.[9]

## Dependent Variable

Respondents were asked to assess responsibility of the actor on an eleven-point scale ranging from 0= "not at all responsible" to 10= "fully responsible for what happened". For computational convenience this scale was transformed to a 1-11 scale in the present analysis.

RESULTS

Experiment #1

In the first story actor status is undefined. The respondent is free to define the actor as he or she will. If it is the case that actor status makes no difference in style of judgement any definition imposed by the respondent should have no consequence. If actor status does make a difference we need to ask, how does one decide when there is no actor information. Does one assume a certain type of actor, and how conscious is this assumption? Presumably there is variance in both the type of actor imagined and the consciousness of this imagery. To the degree that respondents assume an actor of a staus similar to themselves or, which may be the same thing, make no assumptions and simply decide the case according to their "normal" style (i.e. as they ordinarily decide about people usually around them) the frist experiment is a within status judgement.[10] Thus the situation is isomorphic with that in the Kohn work, and we should expect similar results.

Specifically prior research suggests three hypotheses. First, given that mental state is often viewed as the primary basis for adult responsibility judgement, we would predict a main effect for mental state. Second, Kohn's results suggest that mental state should interact with attributes of status such that it is a more important consideration for individuals with higher social status. Third, his results also suggest that consequence severity should interact with status such that consequence information is more important for individuals with lower social status.

Table two presents regression results for the main effect of the three manipulated variables and education on responsibility. Table three presents results for the three manipulated variables plus the workplace autonomy index.

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Table 2 & 3 about here

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As one can see there is a main effect for mental state and for past pattern. There is no main effect for consequence or for education or workplace autonomy.

We then tested for significant interaction effects between; 1) mental state and workplace autonomy, 2) consequence and workplace autonomy, 3) mental state and education, and 4) consequence and education.[11] Interaction (1) was not significant at the .05 level. Interaction (2) was significant at the .05 level. Interactions 3 and 4 were significat at the .01 level.

Tables 4 and 5 present a pair of equations which allow us to examine the effect of mental state and consequence within levels of workplace autonomy and education.

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Table 4 about here

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The equation in table 4 includes the past pattern and workplace autonomy variables plus 6 additional variables indicating the effect of mental state and consequence within levels of workplace autonomy. Thus, the third variable indicates the effect of mental state for low autonomy individuals; the fourth variable, the effect of mental state for individuals with a middle score on workplace autonomy, etc. As one can see while the mental state-workplace autonomy interaction was not significant, the mental state information makes a substantial difference in responsibility judgements for middle and high autonomy respondents. When the actor is in the high mental state (negligence) condition he is judged more responsible than when he is in the low condition. Mental state makes a smaller (marginally significant) difference for low autonomy respondents.

When we turn to consequence information, the opposite is true. Consequence information has a substantial effect on responsibility judgements for low autonomy

respondents. More serious consequences lead to greater responsibility. For respondents with a middle score on the workplace autonomy index consequence has no effect. For high autonomy respondents one should note the sign change. (r=-.51) While not significant, this suggests an inverse relationship between consequence and responsibility such that the actor is judged less responsible when consequences are high than when consequences are low. We will return to this "sympathy" effect below.

In general the data in table 4 support Kohn's hypothesis. Higher status individuals use mental state information more than lower status respondents, and lower status respondents use consequence information more than higher status respondents.

Turning to table 5 we see the same pattern of results.

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Table 5 about here

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Mental state has a much greater (and significant) effect upon responsibility judgements for middle and high education individuals. It has a small (non-significant) effect among low education respondents. As mentioned in footnote 9 above, however, the relationship between mental state and its manipulation check is not significant for low education respondents ($x^2 = .66$, $\gamma =.20$ df=1/70). Thus one must be careful in interpreting the lack of effect of mental state on responsibility for this group. Presumably had the manipulation been percieved more clearly by low education actors, the effect of mental state would be greater. It is impossible to know, of course, whether this would have destroyed the mental state-respondent education interaction. On the basis of the workplace autonomy results it would appear to be a close call.

The failure of the manipulation for low education respondents does suggest

an important point, however. Lower status respondents may be less sensitive to mental state information. We will return to this point when discussing experiment #2.

The consequence-respondent education interaction closely resembles the consequence-workplace autonomy interaction. For low education respondents more serious consequences lead to greater responsibility. For middle and high education respondents there is no significat effect, but once again there is a "sympathy" effect among high status respondents. (r=-.46)

The results from Experiment #1 support the proposition that respondents do use different standards of judgement based upon their social status as measured by education and workplace autonomy. Lower status respondents adopt a style of judgement which more nearly approximates Piaget's moral realism, while higher status respondents adopt a style which more nearly approximates "moral idealism".[12]

Experiment #2

Recall that in the second story we manipulated mental state, consequence and the status of the actor in the story (high=college professor/ low=clerk). We had no clear predictions for the results in this vignette. It could be that the respondents would respond as in experiment #1, with interactions between respondent status and consequence. It could be, however, that the presence of information concerning the status of the actor would alter judgements. If styles of judgement are determined by the status of the actor we would expect interactions between actor status and mental state (respondents use mental state information more to judge high status actors) and between actor status and consequence (respondents use consequence information more to judge low status actors). Finally, it could be that styles of judgement are influenced both by the status of the actor and the status of the respondent.

Following the procedure in experiment #1, we first examined the main effects

of the manipulated variables, education and workplace autonomy on responsibility.

As displayed in tables 6 and 7, mental state is significantly related to responsibility

while actor status and consequence are not. In addition, there is a main effect of

education in experiment 2.

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Tables 6 & 7 about here

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We then tested for interaction effects between education and mental state,

education and consequence, workplace autonomy and mental state and workplace

autonomy and consequence. None of the interactions were significant. We were

unable to replicate the findings of experiment #1 in the second experiment.

Next we examined whether there were interactions between actor status and mental

state, and between actor status and consequence. Both interactions were significant.[13]

Following the style of presentation used above, table 8 presents an equation which

allows us to examine the effect of mental state and consequence within levels of

actor status.

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Table 8 about here

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The effect of actor status on the use of mental state information is as we

would expect. Respondents use mental state information more in judging high status

actors than they do in judging low status actors. Note, however, that the information

about mental state is significantly related to responsibility judgements for both

high status and low status actors.

The consequence, status interaction is more complex. While there is a tendency

to hold the low status actor more responsible when the consequences of his act are more serious, for the high status actor the tendency is in the opposite direction. The high status actor is held less responsible when the consequences are serious than when the consequences are not as serious. Again we have a "sympathy effect".

A further examination of the data indicate that this sympathy effect occurs in those versions of the story where the high status actor is not negligent (low mental state). Where the high status actor was not careless, but things turned out particularly badly (high consequence) it is as if the respondents felt he had been punished enough by the outcome. The seriousness of the consequence mitigates the high status actor responsibility.[14] Note there is no such effect for the low status actor. For him the effect is to further exacerbate his responsibility.

Returning for a moment to experiment #1, we find similar results. The mitigating effects of high consequence are primarily in the low mental state condition. While this occurs only for high education and high autonomy respondents in story one this would be expected if, as we have argued, respondents assume an actor of a status similar to themselves. When presented with a situation where the actor is not described high status respondents imagine a high status actor, and show sympathy for him when he is not negligent but things turn out poorly. Low status respondents, on the other hand, imagine a low status actor and the effect of high consequence is only to exacerbate responsibility, even in the low mental state condition.[15]

The results thus far indicate that actor status plays an important part in responsibility judgements. High status actors are judged more on the basis of their mental state than are low status actors, and the effect of consequence is in opposite directions. For low status actors it exacerbates responsibility. For high status actors it mitigates responsibility.

The final question to be addressed in experiment #2 is whether the respondent's status in some way interacts with actor status in attributing responsibility.

We tested for second order interactions between Education-Intent-Status; and between Education-Consequence-Status. There were no significant second order interactions. It is worthwhile, however, to look at the effect of actor status on the use of consequence and mental state information within respondent groups. First, low status respondents.

## Low Status Respondents

Importantly, low education respondents use the mental state information equally to judge both the high status and the low status actor. This result is contrary to the result in Experiment #1. Given the importance of actor status information, we might expect low education respondents to use mental state information to judge the high status actor, but not the low status actor. Recall, however, that low education respondents did not perceive the mental state manipulation in Experiment #1. They did perceive the manipulation in Experiment #2 (Chi-square between mental state and the avoid manipulation check = 8.07 Gamma = .62 df = 1.74).

The failure of the manipulation in Experiment #1 and its success among similar respondents in Experiment #2 might be due to unmeasured differences between the two groups. However, it is worth nothing, the differences in the mental state manipulations in the two experiments. In Experiment #1 the low mental state condition was that the actor was driving under the speed limit; while the high mental state condition was that he was driving over the speed limit. In experiment #2 the actor ran a stop sign. In the low mental state condition he did so because his brakes failed; while in the high condition he failed to see the sign. When we examine the two manipulations together it is clear that there is greater variance in the mental state manipulation in Experiment #2. The lower variance in the first experiment makes the mental state information less salient. (Compare chi squares and Gammas in Table 1)

If there are any difference between people of different social status in their

use of mental state information it may be a difference in degree and not in kind. Higher status actors may be more attentive to mental state information; they may have a lower threshold of awareness of this type of information. The results from Experiment #2, however, clearly imply that when mental state information is salient lower status individuals do employ it in making judgements. They are not uniformly caught in a moral realism standard of judgement, even when judging low status actors.

When we turn to the effect of status on the use of consequence information among low status respondents, they perversely, demonstrate the strongest sympathy effect for the high status actor. While all groups demonstrate a "sympathy effect" it is quite large for this group.

## Middle and High Status Respondents

Finally observe the effect of actor status on the use of mental state and consequence information for middle and high status respondents together. Table 9 presents separate regressions for the effect of mental state and consequence on responsibility within levels of actor status for the middle and high status actors. Panel A represents respondents with middle and high scores on education. Panel B represents respondents with middle and high scores on workplace autonomy. As the table indicates, these respondents employ a double standard in judging responsibility.

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Table 9 about here

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While they use mental state information to judge both the high and low status actor, the coefficient is two to three times larger in judging high status actors. The mental state-actor status interaction effect reported earlier is primarily attributable to high status actors.

The use of consequence information is equally startling, expecially when we use education to define high status respondents. Middle and high education respondents make use of consequence information in judging the low status actor. He is significantly more responsible when things turn out badly than when they turn out less badly. When these respondents judge the high status actor, however, they too, exhibit a tendency toward sympathy when things turn out poorly.[16]

The "moral idealism" exhibited so strongly among high status respondents in the first experiment appears to be something which is primarily reserved for judging high status individuals. When these respondents are called upon to judge lower status actors their standard of judgement looks much more like a moral realism standard.

## Summary and Discussion

In the first experiment where actor status was undefined we found, as suggested by Kohn's argument, that the social status of respondents made a significant difference in their style of judgement. High status respondents were more likely to use mental state information and less likely to use consequence information than were lower status respondents. In the second experiment, however, where the actor status was defined, we failed to find a mental state-respondent status inter-action or a consequence-respondent status interaction. Rather, we found interactions between actor status and mental state and between actor status and consequence. The "moral idealism" standard of judgement is reserved primarily for high status actors, while a moral realism standard is used for low status actors. This tendency is most pronounced for respondents who are of higher status themselves as measured by their educational attainment and workplace autonomy.

The implications of these findings, if they can be supported in subsequent research, are both theoretical and practical. At a theoretical level the data

suggest that standards of judgement are most strongly influenced by the relationship
of the actor and the judge. Contrary to the implication of Kohn's work, individuals
are not "locked into" a certain style of judgement in assessing responsibility.
Rather, individuals have a repetorie of judgemental styles which they can employ
as the occasion warrents. Lower status respondents are capable of using mental
state information, as suggested in experiment #2. Likewise, high status respondents
are able to use moral realism style of judgement. The choice of style appears to
be influenced by the salience of various types of information, and most importantly,
by the status of the person being judged.

The practical implication of such results are equally important. If higher
status respondents use different styles of judgement in the relatively neutral
setting of an automobile, they should be at least as willing to employ different
standards in workplace settings. A stratified workplace may produce a double
standard which will be difficult to remove as long as there are substantial status
differences between individuals and the higher status individuals have control over
the moral order.

In more traditional legal settings such as trials, the outcome of jury
decisions may vary with the status of the actor unless steps are taken to counteract
this tendency. And the life chances of an individual subsequent to conviction may
be affected by his status and the way we judge his responsibility (see Schwartz
and Skolnick, 1962:133).

FOOTNOTES

[1] As this wide choice of opposites suggests, moral realism, and its opposites, mean more to Piaget than the decision to go with consequences in making moral judgements. They also imply a set of attitudes about rules, the source of rules, their permiability, and their ultimate justification. They also imply a set of values about the relationship between people when acting within a set of rules, such as the relative right of each individual to have a voice in altering rules, and the relative right of individuals to certain defenses when confronted with accusations of rule violations.

[2] Kohn's data on child rearing practices could not address this issue across class lines since the judgemental sytles of parents was based on judgements of their own children (i.e. within class judgements). He does report, however: "The older the children, the more highly do fathers value responsibility, being a good student, honesty, and good sense and sound judgement; and the less highly do they value an interest in how and why things happen, manners, obedience, acting as a boy (or girl) should, and getting along well with children." (1969:53) While the child age effect does not destroy his parental class effect, it does suggest that judgemental styles are partly in response to the status of the actor (the child). The moral realism style is employed most strongly when the child is of tenderest years (and in a sense of lowest status).

[3] A stratified probability sample of 678 residents of the Detroit SMSA were interviewed in the spring and summer of 1977. The overall response rate was 68%. Although females and whites were interviewed at somewhat disproportionately high rates, the overall sample obtained reasonably approximates a random sample of the Detroit SMSA in 1977.

[4]These two stories were part of a one hour long interview schedule which was administered to all respondents. Approximately one-half of the interview time consisted of reading the respondents a series of short vignettes describing situations in which "something went wrong". These situations were designed to span everyday life events, a criminal incident, and a tort (the automobile accident stories). See Hamilton and Sanders, 1979, for a fuller description of the overall design.

Each story was an experiment, with variations in the actor's mental state, past pattern of behavior, severity of consequences, and (in the case of the everyday life situations) the influence of others upon the actor.

Questionnaires were computer-generated in order to assure random assignment of respondents to experimental conditions and random combinations of those conditions. No two questionnaires were identical. The vignettes were arranged in a Latin Square design such that each story both preceded and followed each other story. Therefore, effects cannot be attributed to sensitization from hearing particular prior stories or to hearing them in any particular order.

After hearing each story respondents were asked to assess the actor's responsibility for what happened. They were also asked to respond to a series of questions serving as manipulation checks.

[5]Fishbein and Ajzen (1973) note that studies concerning responsibility of accidents are typically ambiguous as to the mental state implied by the accident. If we use Heider's (1958) levels of intent as a benchmark by which to judge the level of this manipulation, we attempt to operationalize mental state in the low condition at Heider's Commission Level. That is, the actor caused the act, but there is not evidence of negligence or purposive conduct on his part. In the High condition we attempted to operationalize mental state at the Foreseeability level, where beside causation, there is some display of negligence on the part of the actor. See Shaw and Sulzer, 1964, for a fuller discussion of Heiderian levels.

[6]Past pattern was included because it is an important component of several other stories not discussed in the present paper. It is not directly relevant to this analysis.

[7]We did not attempt a Hollingshead index, combining education and occupation into a single score since in the present data set occupation itself was not coded in a manner detailed enough to replicate the index.

[8]We undertook a series of analyses to test for non-linear effects of education on responsibility judgements. The results were, as one may note from examining the tables below that the primary break is most typically between respondents without a high school degree and others. We considered collapsing the educational attainment variable into two categories, but decided against it because there are some differences, though rarely significant, between high school graduates and those having gone on to college. Thus there does appear to be a general linear effect of education with the primary break coming at the completion of high school.

[9]We must note that the correlation between the manipulated variables and the manipulation checks is not significant within all levels of workplace autonomy and education. Most importantly the mental state-avoid relationship is not significant for low education actors in Experiment #1. We will return to this point on page 8.

In addition the mental state-avoid relationship is not significant for high autonomy actors in Experiment #1 and the consequence-seriousness relationship is not significant for low autonomy actors in Experiment #1. These last two failures to achieve significance are primarily due to the small Ns involved. The relationships are fairly strong, and for both sub-groups the manipulated variable does significantly effect the responsibility score. All other relationships between the manipulation and its manipulation check are significant within sub-groups of education and workplace autonomy.

[10]There are other possibilities. In certain situations most people may imagine an actor of a particular status, as when we hear of a bar room murder late at night in the central part of a large city. Automobile accidents, however, are not so specifically identified with a particular type of actor. Therefore, this possibility seems less likely in our fact situation. In situations like automobile accidents people might fill in the missing information with an image of the "average" person. This is more plausible, but we shall try to indicate that the two experiments in this paper make most sense if we understand the respondent to be imagining, consciously or unconsciously, someone of a status similar to self. All of this speculation is necessary, of course, because we were not wise enough to ask respondents the type of person they assumed when deciding.

[11]The test for interactions used the following formula.

$$F = \frac{(R^2_{y.123} - R^2_{y.12}) / (k_1 - k_2)}{(1 - R^2_{y.123}) / (N - k_1 - 1)}$$

Where $R^2_{y.123}$ is for example the $R^2$ associated with mental state plus education plus mental state by education; $R^2_{y.12}$ is the $R^2$ associated with mental state plus education; $k_1$ is the number of vectors associated with the first $R^2$; and $k_2$ the number of vectors associated with the second $R^2$. The interaction term is created by multiplying education by the effect-coded manipulated variable. The associated Fs are: Mental State by Education= 10.08 df= 1/323; Consequence by Education= 8.86 df= 1/323; Mental State by Workplace Autonomy= 2.24 df= 1/171; Consequence by Workplace Autonomy= 5.31 df=1/171 (See Kerlinger & Pedhazur, 1973:251).

[12]Race poses a threat to our analysis of status in that it could be that class variables are highly correlated with race in Detroit and that the results are actually due to race. A race theory of moral judgement style could be far different from a status one. To test for race effects we ran regressions with both

both race and education included. The interactions between education and mental state and between education and consequence remain significant. There are no significant interactions between race and these two independent variables.

The results indicate that while race and education are correlated, the primary effect is due to the status variable, not race. (We could not replicate this analysis for workplace autonomy due to the few black respondents with the reduced N.) One might note that these results are similar to Kohn's findings (1969:59).

[13] In an equation with the three main effects plus the two interaction terms, the unstandardized coefficients, standard error significance levels for the interaction terms were: Mental state by Status, $r = .4078$ (.1563) $p < .009$. Status by consequence, $r = -.4076$ (.1563) $p < .01$.

[14] Here is a table of the cell means for the three main effects in experiment #2. The relevant comparison is between cells 5 and 6 for the high status actor, and between cells 1 and 2 for the low status actor.

| | Mental State | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Actor Status | Low | | High | |
| | Consequence | | | |
| | Low | High | Low | High |
| Low | 7.4 (1) | 8.2 (2) | 9.3 (3) | 10.0 (4) |
| High | 7.5 (5) | 5.9 (6) | 10.3 (7) | 10.1 (8) |

[15] Here is a table of the cell means for mental state and consequence within levels of education for experiment #1 (we collapsed across levels of past pattern). Again the relevant comparisons for high status respondents are cells 9 and 10. For low status respondents the relevant comparisons are between cells 1 and 2.

|  | Mental State | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Education | Low | | High | |
|  | Consequence | | | |
|  | Low | High | Low | High |
| Low | 4.5 (1) | 7.0 (2) | 4.7 (3) | 7.2 (4) |
| Middle | 4.4 (5) | 4.5 (6) | 7.8 (7) | 8.1 (8) |
| High | 5.0 (9) | 3.8 (10) | 8.2 (11) | 7.6 (12) |

[16]The interactions between mental state and actor status; and between Consequence and Actor status are significant for respondents with middle and high levels of educational attainment. The F statistics for the two interactions are F= 11.12 df= 1/235 p $<$.01; F=3.96 df= 1/235 p $<$.05. The interactions are not significant for middle and high workplace automony respondents, in part due to the drastically reduced N. F= 2.86 df=1/92; F= 1.07 df=1/92. We have reported them anyway to show the same general trend.

Table 1

Relationship between manipulated variables and their manipulation check in both experiments.

## Relationship between

|  | Mental State and "Avoid" | Past Pattern and "Predict" | Consequence and Seriousness |
|---|---|---|---|
| Experiment #1 | $x^2 = 24.73$[a] | $x^2 = 20.62$[a] | $T = 5.87$[a] |
|  | $\delta = .536$ | $\delta = .58$ | $r = .31$ |
|  | $N = 302$ | $N = 311$ | $N = 335$ |
| Experiment #2 | $x^2 = 49.61$[a] |  | $T = 7.14$[a] |
|  | $c = .782$ |  | $r = .37$ |
|  | $N = 298$ |  | $N = 334$ |

a) $p < .001$

Table 2

Unstandardized regression coefficients for mental state, Past Pattern, Consequence and Education on responsibility for experiment #1 (Standard error in parentheses)

|  | Coefficients | Standard Error |
|---|---|---|
| Constant | 5.95 | |
| Mental State | $1.35^a$ | (.175) |
| Past Pattern | $.58^a$ | (.175) |
| Consequence | .15 | (.175) |
| Education | .11 | (.223) |

N = 327

a = p $<$ .001

$R^2$ = .18

Table 3

Unstandardized regression coefficients for Mental State, Past Pattern, Consequence and Workplace Autonomy on Responsibility for experiment #1 (Standard Error in parentheses)

|  | Coefficients | Standard Error |
|---|---|---|
| Constant | 5.90 | |
| Mental State | $1.47^a$ | (.254) |
| Past Pattern | .30 | (.252) |
| Consequence | .15 | (.254) |
| Workplace Autonomy | .17 | (.325) |

N = 164

a = p $<$ .001

$R^2$ = .19

Table 4

Unstandardized regression coefficients for Past Pattern, Wrokplace Autonomy, Mental State for Low Autonomy, Mental State for Middle Autonomy, Mental State for High Autonomy Consequence for Low Autonomy, Consequence for Middle Autonomy, and Consequence for High Autonomy on Responsibility in Experiment #1 (Standard Errors in parentheses)

|  | Coefficients | Standard Error |
|---|---|---|
| Constant | 6.06 | |
| Past Pattern | .25 | (.239) |
| Workplace Autonomy | .06 | (.300) |
| Mental State (Low Autonomy) | .90[b] | (.456) |
| Mental State (Mid Autonomy) | 1.25[a] | (.387) |
| Mental State (High Autonomy) | 2.17[a] | (.415) |
| Consequence (Low Autonomy) | 1.04[b] | (.455) |
| Consequence (Mid Autonomy) | .11 | (.383) |
| Consequence (High Autonomy) | -.51 | (.418) |

N = 177

a = p < .001

b = p < .05

$R^2$ = .24

Table 5


Unstandardized Regression Coefficients for Past Pattern, Education, Mental
State for Low Education R spondent, Mental State for Middle Education Respondents,
Mental State for High Education Respondents, Consequence for Low Education Respondents,
Consequence for Middle Education Respondents, and Consequence for High Education
Respondents on Responsibility in Experiment #1 (Standard Errors in Parentheses).

|  | Coefficients | Standard Error |
|---|---|---|
| Constant | 5.71 | |
| Past Pattern | .63[a] | (.168) |
| Education | .18 | (.214) |
| Mental State (Low Education) | .11 | (.347) |
| Mental State (Mid Education) | 1.76[a] | (.284) |
| Mental State (High Education) | 1.76[a] | (.260) |
| Consequence (Low Education) | 1.25[a] | (.345) |
| Consequence (Mid Education) | .07 | (.284) |
| Consequence (High Education) | -.46 | (.261) |

N = 327

a = $p < .001$

$R^2 = .26$

Table 6

Unstandardized regression coefficients for Mental State, Actor Status, Consequence and Education on Responsibility for Experiment #2 (Standard errors in parentheses).

|  | Coefficients | Standard Error |
|---|---|---|
| Constant | 7.36 | |
| Mental State | 1.31[a] | (.157) |
| Actor Status | −.16 | (.157) |
| Consequence | −.07 | (.157) |
| Education | .60[b] | (.203) |

N = 322

a = $p < .001$

b = $p < .01$

$R^2$ = .21

Table 7

Unstandardized regression coefficients for Mental State, Actor Status, Consequence and Workplace Autonomy on Responsibility for Experiment #2 (Standard Errors in parentheses).

|  | Coefficients | Standard Error |
|---|---|---|
| Constant | 9.02 | |
| Mental State | 1.31[a] | (.225) |
| Actor Status | −.10 | (.225) |
| Consequence | .04 | (.226) |
| Workplace Autonomy | −.04 | (.285) |

N = 148

a = p $<$ .001

$R^2$ = .20

Table 8


Unstandardized Regression Coefficients for Actor Status, Mental State for Low
Status Actor, Mental State for High Status Actor, Consequence for Low Status Actor,
and Consequence for High Status Actor on Responsibility in Experiment #2 (Standard
Errors in parentheses).

|  | Coefficients | Standard Error |
|---|---|---|
| Constant | 8.65 | |
| Actor Status | -.14 | (.156) |
| Mental State (Low Status) | .91[a] | (.226) |
| Mental State (High Status) | 1.73[a] | (.215) |
| Consequence (Low Status) | .37 | (.226) |
| Consequence (High Status) | -.44[b] | (.215) |

N = 323

a = p < .001

b = p < .05

$R^2 = .21$

Table 9

Unstandardized Regression coefficients for Actor Status, Mental State for Low Status Actors, Mental State for High Status Actors, Consequence for Low Status Actors and Consequence for High Status Actors on Responsibility in Experiment #2 (Standard Errors in parentheses).

A. Respondents = Middle and High Education

|  | Coefficients | Standard Error |
|---|---|---|
| Constant | 8.95 | |
| Actor Status | -.31 | (.164) |
| Mental State (Low Status Actor) | .66[a] | (.243) |
| Mental State (High Status Actor) | 1.73[a] | (.220) |
| Consequence (Low Status Actor) | .54[b] | (.244) |
| Consequence (High Status Actor) | -.27 | (.220) |

N = 239

a = p .01

b = p .05

$R^2$ = .25

B. Respondents = Middle and High Workplace Autonomy

|  | Coefficients | Standard Error |
|---|---|---|
| Constant | 8.87 | |
| Actor Status | -.19 | (.272) |
| Mental State (Low Status Actor) | .89[b] | (.381) |
| Mental State (High Status Actor) | 1.79[a] | (.364) |
| Consequence (Low Status Actor) | .32 | (.381) |
| Consequence (High Status Actor) | -.13 | (.383) |

N = 96

a = p .01

b = p .05

$R^2$ = .26

Appendix A

(1) "Child" Story

A man was driving down a narrow one-way street when a child about eight years old stepped out from between two parked cars. The man's car hit the child. The child received (only a few bruises/several broken bones) from the accident. Witnesses stated that the man was driving (below/above) the speed limit. This was the man's (first/fourth) accident in his 12 years of driving.

Intent: below speed limit = low
       above speed limit = high

Consequence: only a few bruises = low
            several broken bones = high

Past Pattern: first accident = absent
             fourth accident = present

(2) "Housewife" Story

A housewife who was walking across the street at a stop sign was hit by a car and (received a broken leg/killed). The driver of the car was a (clerk/professor) at the university who was going out for lunch. The driver (saw the woman crossing the street but his brakes failed and he could not stop in time/failed to see the stop sign at the intersection and hit the woman).

Intent: Saw the woman crossing the street but his brakes failed and he could not stop in time = low

       failed to see the stop sign at the intersection and hit the woman = high

Consequence: received a broken leg = low
            killed = high

Actor's Status: clerk = low
               professor = high

(3) Items for Workplace Autonomy Index

(a) Objective Condition

How are you paid on your (main) job - by hourly wage, or by salary?

1. Hourly wage      2. Salary      7. Other (specify)      8. Don't know

_____

(b) Subjective Condition

Would you say you are supervised closely on the job, not too closely,
or are you pretty much on your own?

1. Supervised closely     2. Not too closely     3. On own

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