

---

HOW ONE KIND OF STRUGGLE -- WAR -- RESHAPED ALL  
OTHER KINDS OF STRUGGLE IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE

Charles Tilly

University of Michigan

August 1981

---

CRSO WORKING PAPER NO. 241

Copies available through:  
Center for Research on Social Organization  
University of Michigan  
330 Packard Street  
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109

How One Kind of Struggle -- War -- Reshaped All Other  
Kinds of Struggle in Seventeenth-Century France

Charles Tilly  
University of Michigan  
August 1981

CONTENTS	<u>Page</u>
War and Pacification under Louis XIII	1
Internal Enemies	4
The Prevalence of War	10
Extracting the Means of War	17
War and Contention	22
Resistance to Extraction	25
Internal War	33
Seventeenth-Century Repertoires	34
The Fronde	39
Divide and Conquer, Conquer and Divide	45
How Rebellions Happened	48
So-Called Reformed Religion and its Defenders	55
A Fateful Century	61
References	64

How One Kind of Struggle -- War -- Reshaped All Other  
Kinds of Struggle in Seventeenth-Century France

Charles Tilly  
University of Michigan  
August 1981

CONTENTS	<u>Page</u>
War and Pacification under Louis XIII	1
Internal Enemies	4
The Prevalence of War	10
Extracting the Means of War	17
War and Contention	22
Resistance to Extraction	25
Internal War	33
Seventeenth-Century Repertoires	34
The Fronde	39
Divide and Conquer, Conquer and Divide	45
How Rebellions Happened	48
So-Called Reformed Religion and its Defenders	55
A Fateful Century	61
References	64

War and Pacification under Louis XIII

Poets are not prophets. In the fall of 1622, while Louis XIII was busy crushing the Protestant lords of Languedoc, Théophile de Viau thought it politic to write the king these lines:

Young, victorious monarch  
 Whose glorious exploits  
 Have made the gods jealous  
 And the Fates afraid  
 What more do you want from destiny?  
 You've punished enough rebels.  
 You've razed enough cities.  
 We know that henceforth  
 The rage of civil wars  
 Will rob our peace no longer.  
 ("Au roy, sur son retour de Languedoc")

Théophile should have known what he was rhyming about. After all, hadn't he joined the early part of the Languedoc campaign as "professor of languages"? Furthermore, his home town, Clérac, was one of the many places that fell to the Protestant rebels that year; in fact, his brother Paul was one of the local rebel chiefs.

Perhaps the prediction of peace was wishful thinking. Théophile himself was a Protestant, an alumnus of the famous Protestant academy of Saumur. He might well have wished the warrior-king would turn his sword to other enemies than France's Huguenots. Or perhaps Théophile's mind was on more mundane things, such as the writing of his obscene Parnasse satyrique, published only the next year. (Le Parnasse was one of the creations that turned Paris' Jesuits against Théophile, and soon got him into jail.) At any rate, when he forecast peace he misjudged his sovereign and his century.

His sovereign was not an easy man to know. Three years earlier, in 1619, Sir Edward Herbert had come to Louis XIII as England's ambassador. As Herbert later recalled the king:

His words were never many as being so extream a Stutterer, that he would sometimes hold his Tongue out of his Mouth a good while before he could speak so much as one word. He had besides a double Row of teeth, and was observed seldom or never to spit or blow his Nose, or to sweat much though he were very laborious and almost indefatigable in his exercises of Hunting and Hawking to which He was much addicted. Neither did it hinder him though he was burst in his body, as we call it, or Herniosus, for he was noted in those his sports though often times on foot to tire not only his Courtiers but even his Lackies; being equally insensible as was thought either of heat or cold; His Understanding and natural parts were as good as could be expected in one that was brought up in so much ignorance, which was on purpose so done that he might be the longer governed; howbeit he acquired in time a great knowledge in Affairs as conversing for the most part with wise and active Persons. he was noted to have two Qualities incident to all who were ignorantly brought up, Suspicion and Dissimulation . . . neither his fears did take away his courage, when there was occasion to use it, nor his dissimulation extend itself to the doing of private mischiefs to his Subjects either of the one or the other Religion (Herbert 1976: 93-94).

Nevertheless this complex king, son of a monarch converted from Protestantism, became a scourge to France's Protestants.

The stuttering, hypochondriac king was only twenty-one in 1622, but he already had five years of rule behind him. They had not been easy years: two civil wars with his mother and her entourage, two seasons of campaigns against France's Protestant strongholds, foreign conflicts drumming up in Germany and Italy. Memories of the long wars of religion, ended only twenty-five years earlier, reminded France what ravages continuous combat could wreak. The nation and its poets might well pray for peace, but the past gave them every reason to believe that the gods preferred war.

The rest of the century saw little peace. Every single year from 1623 to Louis XIII's death in 1643 brought at least one substantial insurrection somewhere in France. Rebellions continued in annual cadence well into the reign of Louis' son and successor Louis XIV. Chief minister Richelieu began to build up France's military

forces and to intervene discreetly in the European war from 1629 on, although France did not enter the conflict openly until Louis XIII declared war on Spain in 1635. That burst the dam. During most of the next eighty years, France was fighting somewhere: along her eastern frontier, in Italy, or in Spain.

In his Traité de l'economie politique, published seven years before Theophile's ode to the king, Antoine Montchrestien had reflected on the cost of war. "It is impossible," he mused, "to make war without arms, to support men without pay, to pay them without tribute, to collect tribute without trade. Thus the exercise of trade, which makes up a large part of political action, has always been pursued by those peoples who flourished in glory and power, and these days more diligently than ever by those who seek strength and growth" (Montchrestien 1889 [1615]: 142). That money was the sinew of war was by then an old saw. Machiavelli had already felt compelled to combat the idea a century before Montchrestien's dictum: he turned the trick by arguing that while good money could not always buy valiant warriors, valiant warriors could always capture good money. Even then, many a monarch thought good money a better bet, and found unpaid warriors a source of mutiny. But the full argument from war back to trade only became the standard sermon during the seventeenth century. Montchrestien and his contemporaries did not draw the obvious conclusion: that cutting off trade would therefore be desirable, since it would prevent war. French conventional wisdom became, instead, that:

1. in order to make war, the government had to raise taxes;
2. to make raising taxes easier, the government should promote taxable commerce.

A large part of what we call "mercantilism" flowed from these simple premises. Both the raising of taxes and the promotion of commerce attacked some people's established rights and interests; they therefore produced determined resistance. Thus

began a century of army-building, tax-gathering, war-making, rebellion, and repression.

Let us examine how war and preparation for war affected other forms of struggle in seventeenth-century France. Warmaking had an enormous impact on all aspects of French life, from the availability of food to the character of the state. It directly and profoundly influenced collective action outside of war -- stimulating rebellions, lining up possible coalition partners, creating new grievances and new opportunities to act on old grievances, alternately reinforcing and undermining the coercive power of the authorities. This paper draws on the experiences of five provinces -- Anjou, Burgundy, Flanders, the Ile de France, and Languedoc -- to clarify what happened in France as a whole. It starts with the crown's own programs, then follows the consequences of those programs for the ebb and flow of conflict throughout the seventeenth century.

### Internal Enemies

Part of the royal domestic program consisted, in effect, of undoing the Edict of Nantes. The 1598 edict had pacified the chief internal rivals of the crown -- the Catholic and Protestant lords who had established nearly independent fiefdoms during the turmoil of the religious wars -- while Henry IV was bargaining for peace with a still-strong Spain. The edict had granted Huguenots the right to gather, to practice their faith, even to arm and to govern a number of cities of France's south, west, and southwest. It also absolved those officials who had raised troops, arms, taxes, and supplies in the name of one or another of the rebel authorities (Wolfe 1972: 225-230). The Edict of Nantes had frozen in place the structure of forces which prevailed in the France of 1598, while restoring the ultimate powers -- including the powers to raise troops, arms, taxes, and supplies -- to the crown. For a century, subsequent kings and ministers sought to unfreeze the structure, to dissolve the autonomous centers of organized power which remained within the kingdom.

Louis XIII had reason to worry about the Protestants: armed Huguenots had



supported the rebellion of the Prince of Condé in 1616, and his mother's rebellion of 1619. As soon as the young king had checked his mother and her counselors, he began a series of military campaigns against Protestant strongholds: La Rochelle, Rochefort, St. Jean d'Angély, Montauban, Privas, and many others. Sir Edward Herbert reported that the duc de Luynes:

. . . continuing still the Kings favorite, advised him to War against his Subjects of the reform'd Religion in France, saying he would neither be a great Prince as long as he suffered to Puissant a Part to remaine within his Dominions, nor could justly stile himself the most Christian King, as long as he permitted such Hereticks to be in that great number they were, or to hold those strong Places which by publick Edict were assigned to them, and therefore that he should extirpate them as the Spaniards had done the Moors, who are all banished into other Countreys as we may find in their Histories (Herbert 1976: 104).

Herbert reported making a prophetic remark to the duc de Guise: "whensoever those of the Religion were put down, the turn of the Great Persons and Governors of the Provinces of that Kingdome would be next" (Herbert 1976: 105). The prophecy fell on deaf ears.

The distinction between Great Persons and "those of the Religion" was then far from absolute; many magnates were also Protestants. When Louis XIII went off on his campaign of 1622 against Protestant strongholds in the Southwest, he faced multiple revolts allying influential nobles with rank-and-file followers of the religion.

"There were few of that Religion," reported the Mercure françois,

who last year had sworn oaths of fidelity to the king who did not this year revolt and again take up arms against him: some of them unhappy because they had not been compensated for the military governorships they had lost, the others on the specious pretext of the defense of their churches which was, they said, a matter of honor and conscience. One finds enough soldiers when one gives them the freedom to live off the land, and allowing them to pillage supports them without pay. Nevertheless, a party cannot survive without some sort of established order, and without having the means of paying the costs of war: that was why the Sieur de la Force established at St. Foy a Council of the Churches of Lower Guyenne. That Council, which he ran, was a miniature version of the Protestant Assembly, which . . . decided and decreed all political, military, and financial questions. Thus the first thing they decided was a levy of three hundred thousand livres, which would be divided among all the cities and towns of Lower Guyenne, and for which some average peasant or other resident would be seized and made a prisoner in St. Foy, so that he would act to collect from the other people of his parish (Mercure françois

1622: 446).

That technique, long employed by royal tax collectors, served equally well for the crown's opponents.

Indeed, the conquest of Protestant areas within France had much in common with war against foreign powers. For example, when the duc de Soubise went to besiege Protestant Sables d'Olonne, on the coast of Poitou, the city's leaders gave him 20 million ecus, some cannon, and three ships in order to avoid the sack of the city by his troops. Yet as soon as the troops entered Sables d'Olonne, they began pillaging. Soubise explained, according to the Mercure, that "I had promised them booty before you and I worked out the peace settlement" (Mercure françois 1622: 530-531).

The crucial difference between international wars and these campaigns against internal enemies was no doubt the treatment given the enemies. The domestic opponents of the crown qualified as rebels, their actions as treason. Not for them -- except for the great powerholders among them -- treaties, ransoms, and the courtesies of war. Jean Paul de Lescun had been an official of Pau, and had helped organize the Protestant resistance of 1622 in the Southwest. When Lescun was captured in battle, he went to Bordeaux for trial. This was his sentence:

. . . to be dragged on a frame through the streets and squares of this city, with a sign at his head (guilty of lèse-majeste, and President of the Assembly of La Rochelle) and from there to be led to the front of the royal palace of Lombrière, there to do penance in a plain shirt, noose around his neck, head and feet bare, and kneeling with a two-pound torch of burning wax, to declare that with evil and malice he had attended and presided over said Assembly of La Rochelle, and that in his role as President he had signed commissions to levy troops against the service and authority of the King, and attended the council of Justice set up in said city of La Rochelle by said Assembly to judge in a sovereign manner with respect to the lives and goods of subjects of the King; together with other people to have prepared the book called The Persecution of the Reformed Churches of Béarn, and that he asks forgiveness of God, the King, and Justice. And nevertheless this court commands that both said book and said Commissions will be burned by the Executioner for High Justice in the presence of said Lescun; and this done, said executioner will cut off his head and his four limbs on a scaffold to be built for this purpose. And after the execution, we order the head of said Lescun to be taken to the city of Royan, to be placed on top of a tower or gate of the

city, pointing toward said city of La Rochelle. The court furthermore declares the offspring of said Lescun ignoble and common, and all his goods in any place whatsoever confiscated and surrendered to the King, from which however the sum of three thousand livres will first be deducted, half for the feeding and maintenance of the poor of the Hospital St. André of this city, the other half for the repair of the Palace. The costs of the trial will likewise be deducted (Mercure françois 1622: 602-604).

Thus did rebels — when captured and vulnerable — suffer for braving royal authority. When those captured rebels were Protestant, they were more likely to be vulnerable.

In striking against Protestant autonomy, Louis XIII could count on popular support. If the Wars of Religion, as a matter of state, had ended with treaties and with the crowning of a converted Protestant, Catholic hostility to Protestants survived in many parts of France. Very likely the officially-enforced segregation of the religious minority accentuated the hostility. That included the religious segregation of Paris. There, Protestants could practice in only one church -- in Charenton, outside the city walls. In 1611:

The Protestants went to bury a small child in their Trinity Cemetery, near the rue St. Denis; they went in the evening, but before sunset. Two members of the watch officially led the procession. A vinegar-maker's helper began to throw stones at them, and was imitated by his master and by several others. One of the watchmen was wounded. The lieutenant criminel of the Châtelet had them arrested and, on the first of July, the helper was whipped outside of the Trinity Cemetery. But on Sunday the 21st of August, Protestants coming back from Charenton were insulted (Mousnier 1978: 75).

In Paris, the Sunday trips of Protestants to Charenton were frequent occasions for abuse from Catholics, and sometimes occasions for violence. When the news of the death of the (Catholic) duc de la Mayenne at the 1621 siege of (Protestant) Montauban arrived in the city, crowds attacked the carriages of Protestants, battled with the watchmen stationed at the St. Antoine gate to protect them, and rushed out to burn down the church. Later:

the other clerics and common people who had busied themselves with setting the fire and burning the Temple and drinking 8 or 10 kegs of wine that were in the concierge's cellar, and eating the provisions, after making a flag of a white sheet, came back to Paris through the St. Antoine gate, 400 strong, shouting Vive le Roy (Mercure françois 1621: 854). ↓

That "Vive le Roy" should remind us of the connection between popular hostility and

official policy. In this instance the stationing of armed guards to prevent an attack on the Protestants makes it dubious that royal officials directly instigated the violence. Yet from early in his reign Louis XIII sought to cow his Huguenots, to demilitarize them, and to circumscribe their activities.

Local groups of Protestants and Catholics also fought intermittently. Where the Protestants were relatively strong, as in Nîmes, Montpellier, and much of urban Languedoc, we find a series of struggles over control of public offices. In the mainly Protestant city of Pamiers, the Consuls sought to exclude all Catholics from the Consulate. In March 1623, Catholics demanded a voice; they persuaded the Parlement to decree equal representation of the two religious groups. The Consuls closed the city gates to the Parlement's emissary, and then to the envoy who brought confirmation of the decree by the king's council. Only when the king sent troops did the Consuls give in (*Mercure françois* 1624: 381-385). Later the same year, the emboldened Catholics complained against the stay in the planned destruction of local Protestant churches, and demanded a division of the city keys -- two per gate -- between Protestants and Catholics. By that time, Pamiers actually had three competing factions: 1) Protestants, 2) Catholics who had stayed in town during Languedoc's Protestant/Catholic wars of the previous years, and 3) the bishop, priests and (presumably wealthier) Catholics who had fled Pamiers when the wars came too close (*Mercure françois* 1624: 871-877). In 1625, the Pamiers Protestants joined those of a number of other cities of Languedoc in a new rebellion against the crown. In this case, as in most, the national conflict and the local one reinforced each other.

When French warmaking on an international scale resumed in the 1630s, the crown had two additional reasons for intervening against Protestants: France's claim to lead Europe's Catholic powers, and her conquest of territory from her chief Catholic rival, Spain. As French troops entered Spanish territory, her cardinal-ministers redoubled the prohibitions on Protestant religious services and proselytization

in the army. At the same time, it became an implicit national policy to encourage Protestant conversions to Catholicism, and to keep the remaining Protestants from retaliating against their turncoat brethren. Although the French crown took another half-century to arrive at a complete legal ban on Protestant worship, by the later 1630s it was already treating Protestants -- individually and collectively -- as a threat to the state's integrity.

Protestants were by no means the only threat. Great Catholic lords also caused trouble. As seen from the top down, seventeenth-century France was a complex of patron-client chains. Every petty lord had his gens, the retainers and dependents who owed their livelihood to his "good will", to his "protection" against their "enemies" (to use three key words of the time). Some of the gens were always armed men who could swagger in public on the lord's behalf, avenge the injuries he received, and protect him from his own enemies.

The country's great magnates played the same games on a larger scale. They maintained huge clienteles, including their own private armies. They held France's regional military governorships, and kept order with a combination of royal troops and their own. Indeed, at the century's start France did not really have a national army in the later sense of the word. In time of war or rebellion the king fielded his own personal troops plus those of the great lords he could both trust and persuade to take the field on his behalf.

Great Catholic lords, including such members of the royal family as the successive princes of Condé, tried repeatedly to strengthen their holds on different pieces of the kingdom. In the summer of 1605, according to a contemporary account:

The King, being in Paris, was warned by a certain captain Belin that in Limousin, Périgord, Quercy and other surrounding provinces many gentlemen were getting together to rebuild the foundations of rebellion that the late Marshal Biron had laid down. Their pretext was the usual one: to reduce the people's burdens and to improve the administration of justice. In any case, their plan was simply to fish in troubled waters and, while appearing to serve the public good, to fatten themselves on the ruin of the poor people (Mercure françois I: 12).

The king gave Belin a 1,200-livre reward, then saddled up for Limoges. There he convoked the nobles and hunted down the rebels. Five were decapitated in person, six more in effigy. That stilled the threat of noble rebellion in the Southwest for a few years.

Limousin's abortive rebellion never reached the stage of popular insurrection. Only half of the potent seventeenth-century combination -- noble conspiracy plus popular response to royal exactions -- came into play. But in those insurrectionary years the gentlemen-conspirators had a reasonable hope that if they kept fishing in their region's troubled waters, people's grievances against royal taxes, troops, laws, and officials would sooner or later coalesce into disciplined resistance. More than anything else, the popular contention of the seventeenth century swirled around the efforts of ordinary people to preserve or advance their interests in the face of a determined royal drive to build up the power of the state.

The France of 1598 was, then, a weakened country -- weakened by internal strife, but also weakened by threats from outside. Three remarkable kings spent the next century reshaping the French state into an incomparable force within its own borders and a powerful presence in the world as a whole. Henry IV, Louis XIII and Louis XIV made the transition from a leaky, creaking, wind-rocked vessel which alternated among mutiny, piracy and open war, which had either too many hands on the wheel or practically no steering at all. They ended their work with a formidable, tight man of war.

#### The Prevalence of War

Remember how much war the seventeenth century brought. To take only the

major foreign conflicts in which French kings engaged, there were:

<u>1635-1659</u>	war with Spain, ending with the Treaty of the Pyrenees
<u>1636-1648</u>	war with the Empire, ending with the Treaty of Westphalia
<u>1664</u>	expedition against the Turks at St. Gothard
<u>1667-1668</u>	War of Devolution, ending with the Treaty of Aachen
<u>1672-1679</u>	Dutch War, ending with the Treaty of Nimwegen
<u>1688-1697</u>	War of the League of Augsburg, ending with the Peace of Ryswick
<u>1702-1714</u>	War of the Spanish Succession, ending with the Peace of Utrecht

If we included the minor flurries, the list would grow much longer. In 1627 and 1628, for example, the British temporarily occupied the Ile de Re, on France's Atlantic coast, and sent a fleet to support besieged La Rochelle. In 1629 and 1630, while still battling domestic rebels, Louis XIII was sending expeditionary forces into Italy. In 1634, the king occupied and annexed Lorraine. War had long been one of the normal affairs of the state. Now it was becoming the normal state of affairs.

As they fashioned an organization for making war, the king's servants inadvertently created a centralized state. First the framework of an army, then a government built around that framework — and in its shape. The wherewithal of war included soldiers and arms, to be sure. It also included food for the soldiers, money to pay them, lodgings on the march and in the long off-season, wagons and draft animals, food and shelter for the animals and for cavalry horses. As a practical matter, if not as a logical necessity, the wherewithal of war also included drink, sex, and sociability, as well as the policing of the "disorder" occasioned by drink, sex, and sociability. All this came from a population which often harvested barely enough food to survive, which converted a significant part of its production into rents, tithes, and local taxes, and for which the loss of an ox, the occupation of a bed, or the increase of taxes could mean a family crisis.

In order to squeeze these precious resources from a reluctant population, the crown's agents adopted a series of expedients. They increased existing taxes, farmed them out to entrepreneurs who knew how to collect those taxes profitably, and backed the tax farmers with armed force and judicial sanction. They created new taxes, and insured their collection in the same way. They issued money to military commanders for the purchase of soldiers, food, lodging, and so on -- often by means of establishing yet another special tax on the local population. They allowed military chiefs to commandeer, within limits, the goods and services their armies required. Within more stringent limits, they also let the troops themselves commandeer food, labor, sex, drink, and sociability from the local population.

As the seventeenth century moved on, however, royal officials increasingly adopted three means of regularizing the entire support of military operations: first, creating a staff of specialists in supply and support linked to a geographically stable civil administration spread through the entire country; second, relying on large-scale purchases of goods and services in the national market, purchases carried out by agents of the central administration; third, constructing a well-defined national standing army with a relatively clear and stable hierarchy of command reaching up to the king's ministers. Combined with the growth of the apparatus for taxation and its enforcement, these innovations created most of the structure of a centralized national state. Among the major national institutions, only the courts and the church escaped a fundamental reorganization as a consequence of preparation for war. They escaped, in essence, by collaborating with preparation for war.

The chief counter-current to centralization was an important one. The whole system (if the word is not too strong) erected by the warmaking ministers relied on raising cash now, and quickly. They had neither the power nor the administrative apparatus to raise the cash directly. Instead, they relied on specialists in credit who had substantial funds at their disposal, and who -- for a good price -- were willing to



advance money to the crown. They fell into two overlapping classes: the munitionnaires who supplied the armed forces directly, and the various sorts of tax-farmers, who collected taxes on the basis of contracts (traites) which compensated them amply for their risks. (To be strictly accurate, we would have to distinguish among tax farmers in the narrow sense -- those who took control of regular indirect taxes -- and the traitants who took contracts for "extraordinary" revenues. We would likewise have to remember that those who actually signed the contracts were frequently prête-noms, front men for syndicates of capitalists; to review the seventeenth-century use of rich pejorative terms such as partisan and maltôtier for these fiscal entrepreneurs; and to make allowance for the significant changes of vocabulary which occurred as the process unfolded; for present purposes, the broad distinction between munitionnaires and tax-farmers will do.)

The greatest of these profit-making creditors became known as Financiers. A circle of a few hundred financiers formed a sort of parallel government, often holding offices but nonetheless putting a major part of their effort into the mobilization of capital. They were, in fact, the great capitalists of their day: the Fouquets, Colberts, and Maupeous who, in the short run, raised the cash to keep the French monarchy going. The munitionnaires, tax-farmers, and great financiers depended closely on one another, and made their money on the making of war. Indeed, the families involved in raising capital for the crown originated disproportionately in Burgundy, Champagne, and Picardy, where the waging of war had long provided opportunities for profit to those who knew how to supply grain, fodder, arms, and advances in pay to the troops of the monarchy (Dent 1973: 115-118). There, waxing capitalism and growing state power walked hand in hand.

For collectors of irony, the French seventeenth century is a treasure trove. One of the century's ironies is that the great guides in the early decades of French militarization were men of the cloth. Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin hammered out

a policy of conquest; that policy required in its turn the recruiting, organizing, supplying and paying of unprecedented armies. The effort brought to prominence such financiers as Fouquet, adept at the creation of combinazioni or the quick mobilization of credit. It called forth such administrative virtuosos as Le Tellier, indefatigable in the creation of armies and the large support structures required to keep them going. The consequence was the reshaping of the state into an administrative apparatus oriented increasingly toward the production and use of armed force.

Here is another irony. If the dominant process in seventeenth-century France was the militarization of the state, its effect was a civilianization of royal administration. Increasingly the representatives of the crown with whom local people had to deal were full-time civilian administrators. The administrators owed their livelihood not to the "protection" of a great regional lord but to the support of a minister in Paris and the sustenance of the royal apparatus as a whole.

That happened in two ways. The first was the long drive to disarm every place, person and group that was not under reliable royal control; the drive took the form of bans on duelling, dismantling of fortresses, and dissolutions of civic militias as well as the incorporation of private forces into the royal army. The second was the expansion of the numbers and powers of royal officials -- most obviously, the intendants and their staffs -- who were charged with raising the revenues, controlling the supplies, and securing the day-to-day compliance necessary to build and maintain a big military establishment. Over the century as a whole, the crown was successful in both regards: it greatly reduced the possibility of armed resistance within the kingdom, and it enormously increased the resources available for royal warmaking. Yet success came at the price of bloody rebellion, of brutal repression, of expedients and compromises which committed the crown to an immense, exigent clientele of creditors and officials. These statemaking processes stimulated the large-scale contention of the seventeenth century.

The ultimate irony is this: By and large, the people who built that increasingly bulky and centralized seventeenth-century state did not seek to create a more effective government, but to extend their personal power, and that of their allies. Yet they found themselves ever more implicated in their own design. Ministers of finance forced rich men to buy offices, only to find that the officeholders now needed military force to back their claims to the revenues assigned to those offices. Nobles aligned themselves with the king, and against other nobles, in civil war, only to find that the king was a demanding and tenacious ally. Artists and authors dipped into the royal treasury, only to find that subventions were habit-forming. Ordinary people, it is true, got little quid for their quo; but as their sometime supporters slipped into the state's grasp, ordinary people's capacity to resist the state's exactions slipped away as well.

Given the formidable growth of state power and the decreasing support of opposition movements by great lords, the persistence of popular rebellion and resistance through the seventeenth century offers a measure of the interests at stake. That ordinary people had the urge to resist is easy to understand. They could see their lives threatened; warmaking and statemaking proceeded at their expense. Warmaking and statemaking placed demands on land, labor, capital, and commodities which were already committed: grain earmarked for the local poor or next year's seed, manpower required for a farm's operation, savings promised for a dowry. The commitments were not merely fond hopes or pious intentions, but matters of right and obligation. Not meeting those commitments, or impeding their fulfillment, violated established rights of real people.

In addition to local and customary rights, raising new resources often meant abridging or rescinding privileges the state itself had ratified. Exemptions from taxation, rights to name local officers, established means of consent and bargaining over financial support to the crown -- all gave way as statemakers made the claims

of the government supplant the rights of individuals and communities. Popular indignation was the greater because of a standard seventeenth-century tactic: offering privileges and profits to the tax farmer, officeholder, or entrepreneur who was prepared to give the crown ready cash in exchange for the opportunity to draw future revenues from the local population. It was bad enough that a rich man should profit from other people's sacrifices. When his privileges actually increased the local burden (as regularly happened when a newly-exempted official stopped paying his share of the local tax quota, or when the office in question involved new or expanded fees), the rich man's neighbors were commonly outraged.

Not that the middlemen were the only objects of popular resistance. Ordinary people often felt the military effort quite directly. Soldiers and officials wrested from them the means of war: food, lodging, draft animals, unwilling recruits. People hid those resources when they could, and defended them against seizure when they dared. On the whole, however, the military got what they wanted.

The direct seizure of the means of war from the people lagged a distant second behind the extraction of money. In a relatively uncommercialized economy, demands for cash contributions were often more painful than demands for goods. They required people either to dig into the small stores of coin they had saved for great occasions or to market goods and labor they would ordinarily have used at home. The less commercialized the local economy, the more difficult the marketing. Taxes, forced loans, the sale of offices, and other means of raising money for the state and its armies all multiplied during the seventeenth century. Directly or indirectly, all of them forced poor people to convert short resources into cash at the current market's terms, and then to surrender that cash to the state.

When rights were at issue and the force available to the state was not overwhelming, ordinary people resisted the new exactions as best they could. Tax rebellions, attacks on new officeholders, and similar forms of resistance filled the

seventeenth century. Nevertheless, French statemakers managed to override rights and resistance alike; they succeeded in increasing enormously the financial burden borne by the population as a whole.

### Extracting the Means of War

How did the statemakers succeed? By dividing their opposition, by using force, by expanding the number of people and groups having a financial interest in the state's survival, by routinizing the collection of revenues, and by multiplying the specialists devoted to the extraction of those revenues. The definitive settling of the intendants in the provinces, accomplished after the Fronde had forced the temporary withdrawal of the intendants from the land, was no doubt the single most important stratagem. The intendants of Richelieu and Mazarin were still serving, by and large, as temporary troubleshooters. After the Fronde, however, things changed. Mazarin, and then Colbert, expanded and regularized their service. The intendants supervised the collection of revenues, applied coercion when necessary and feasible, kept watch over the local expenditure of state funds, and stayed alert for new opportunities to tax, to sell offices, to preempt local revenues, and to borrow, borrow, and borrow again.

Although the borrowing eventually increased the share of state revenues which went to service debts, it also expanded the number of people who had financial interests in the state's survival. It created a large class of officials and financiers who served their own advantage by helping to pay the expense of the state. The tax farmer advanced cash to the crown in return for the right to collect taxes at a profit. The purchaser of a new office made a substantial payment to the crown in return for the right to collect the office's revenues and, frequently, for some form of exemption from taxation. A local guild borrowed money on its own credit or levied contributions from its members, paid a "loan", a "gift" or a "tax" to the royal treasury, and gained confirmation of its monopoly over the production and sale of a

certain commodity.

That became the standard royal expedient: In order to raise current revenue, the king's agents found someone with capital, then induced or coerced him to advance money now in return for a claim on future income, and the assurance of governmental support in collecting that income. This routine deflected the indignation of ordinary people from the statemakers themselves to the tax farmers, officeholders and other profiteers who fattened themselves at the people's expense.

Well might the people complain. The burden was heavy and growing heavier, uneven and becoming more uneven. Not long after the Fronde, Peter Heylyn published his delightfully opinionated France Painted to the Life. "To go over all those impositions, which this miserable people are afflicted withal," wrote Heylyn, "were almost as wretched as the payment of them. I will therefore speak only of the principal . . ." (Heylyn 1656: 238). And so he enumerated: the salt-tax (gabelle), the taille, the taillon, and the pancarte or aides. Of the taillon, Heylyn reported:

In former times, the Kings Souldiers lay all upon the charge of the Villages, the poor people being fain to find them diet, lodging and all necessaries for themselves, their horses and their harlots, which they brought with them. if they were not well pleased with their entertainment, they used commonly to beat their Host, abuse his family, and rob him of that small provision which he had laid up for his Children, and all this cum privilegio. Thus did they move from one Village to another, and at the last returned unto them from whence they came . . . To redress this mischief, King Henry the second, Anno 1549, raised his imposition called the Taillon, issuing out of the lands and goods of the poor Country man; whereby he was at the first somewhat eased: but now all is again out of order, the miserable paifant being oppressed by the Souldier as much as ever, and yet he still payeth both taxes the Taille and the Taillon (Heylyn 1656: 242-243).

Heylyn went on to enumerate the innumerable inequalities and exemptions: nobles, clerics, officeholders, provinces which had bargained for special treatment, and so on. He concluded, quite properly, that the "miserable paifant" ultimately bore the French fiscal burden. He declared that the long chain of tax-farming intermediaries guaranteed two additional pernicious results: that only a fraction of the revenues collected in the king's name ever arrived in the royal coffers, and that those most


involved in the collection of taxes had the least interest in justice, compassion, or moderation. "Were the people but fo happy," reflected Heylyn,

as to have a certain rate fet upon their miferies, it could not but be a great eafe to them, and would well defend them from the tyranny of thefe theeves: but, which is not the leaft part of their wretchednefs, their taxings and affemblings are left arbitrary, and are exacted according as thefe Publicans will give out of the Kings neceffities. So that the Country man hath no other remedy, than to give Cerberus a cruft, as the faying is, and to kifs his rod and hug his punifhment. By this meanes the Quaeftors thrive abundantly, it being commonly faid of them, Fari bouvier au jourd huy Chevalier, to day a Swineheard, to morrow a Gentleman . . . (Heylyn 1656: 248).

When Heylyn wrote in 1656, what is more, the rise of taxes had slowed for a while, the age of fiscal expedients was just beginning, and another half century of surging taxation was in store. If the post-Fronde installation of the intendants regularized the fiscal system to some extent, it certainly did not lighten the burden, remove its cruelties, or eliminate its inequalities.

A graph of France's seventeenth-century tax burden (Figure 4-1) records the growth of a greedy state. Gross tax revenue (in millions of livres, from Clamag ran 1867-1876) displays the spectacular rise from the 1620s to the 1640s, the plateau of the 1650s, then the new acceleration of the 1660s, 1670s and 1680s. In short, it follows the timetable of war: mobilization under Louis XIII and Richelieu, a lull (although certainly no decline) with the Fronde and the slowing of the war against Spain, renewed armament with Louis XIV. Taxes as setiers of wheat (in units of 100,000, calculated by using the Paris price of first-quality wheat, as reported in Baulant 1968) is an ambiguous measure of tax burden: For those who sold enough wheat to meet their tax payments, rising prices made money taxes easier to bear. For them, the century apparently brought large swings in welfare, as prices themselves moved up and down. But for those who had to buy grain for survival -- at least a substantial minority of the population -- a rise in prices meant an even greater squeeze than usual.

The line for hundred millions of work-hours (representing Clamag ran's figures





as multiples of the hourly wage of a semi-skilled provincial worker, from Fourastie 1969: 44-49) and then as hours of work per capita (converting the total hours of work per year by means of the population estimates in Reinhard, Armengaud and Dupâquier 1968) shows us the same rhythm as gross tax revenue. But it gives a sense of the rhythm's effects on the lives of ordinary French people. In these terms, the rising taxes of the seventeenth century nearly tripled the annual effort a hypothetical average worker put in for the state: from some 50 hours per year in 1598 to more than 140 in 1683. Since many nobles, clergy, and officials were exempted, since local authorities who had borrowed to meet royal demands for loans likewise imposed new taxes, and since the tax farmers took their cuts over and above the state's gross tax revenue, Heylyn's "miserable Paisant" could easily have felt a quadrupling of his load.

Coming from Commonwealth England to Bourbon France, Peter Heylyn could well be impressed with French fiscal oppression. With the Civil War, England had more or less definitively established the principle of Parliamentary consent to taxation. English taxes suffered fewer exemptions and inequalities than the French. They bore more heavily on customs -- hence on international trade -- and less heavily on the land. And the overall weight of English taxation was significantly lower. "Louis XIII," commented John U. Nef, "succeeded in claiming at the end of his reign a revenue nearly ten times as large as that of Charles I. It is probable that considerably more than ten per cent of all French income, as compared with some two or three per cent of all English income, was collected by the crown" (Nef 1940: 129). That for the middle of the seventeenth century.

Looking at a much longer span of time, Pierre Chaunu sums up the place of the tax-hungry seventeenth century in these terms:

The decisive rise of the state appears through a seventeenth century we might end about 1680. It breaks into several periods. From 1600 to 1610, we find recuperation and consolidation. From 1610 to 1624, a halt, disorder, and

decline; but the losses are small if we compare them with the ground lost during the heat of the religious wars. An unparalleled surge from 1624 to 1643, with a continuation to 1648. Crisis and another halt from 1646 to 1653. Consolidation and partial recuperation from 1653 to 1661. Consolidation, confirmation and real progress from 1661 to 1683. Beginning in 1680, the fiscal growth of the state accompanies territorial expansion, demographic increase, and growth of GNP from 1680 to 1790. From 1600 to 1680 -- from 1624 to 1683, to be more exact -- we witness the true, definitive vertical growth of the state (Chaunu 1977: 181; cf. Briggs 1977: 215-221).

What the growth curve does not show, however, is the struggle between crown and commoners it represents. The crown won its struggle by exempting the strong and taxing the weak.

To reduce the political risks of this fiscal strategy, however, the crown had to tame and supplant its internal rivals. Otherwise, each new round of popular resistance would provide an opportunity for some set of magnates to offer themselves as champions of the people's rights. In parallel with its external warmaking and its internal fund-raising, the crown undertook a massive effort of cooptation, neutralization, and suppression. After the failure of the Fronde, the great princes and their clienteles fell into line. With some important exceptions, the major blocks of Protestant autonomy gave way under the continued grinding and blasting of Louis XIII and Louis XIV. The Parlements, the other "sovereign courts", the provincial Estates, the guilds, the municipalities all finally lost significant shares of their ability to resist royal demands and to ally themselves with ordinary people against the crown, as the intendants used a combination of force, fragmentation, and fiscal advantage to bring them into acquiescence. Thus the intendants and other royal officials became freer to use their growing repressive power when ordinary people dared to resist governmental demands directly.

These changes had predictable effects on the character of popular contention: a decline in the involvement of major powerholders in big rebellions, an increasing focus of popular resistance on the exactions of tax farmers and officeholders, a decreasing readiness of royal officials to negotiate with groups protesting the violations of their

rights. The word Absolutism describes such an incomplete and contested process quite badly. But it accurately conveys the claims the king's agents began to make on their master's behalf. They claimed an absolute right to override local privileges and individual rights in the interest of the crown.

### War and Contention

During the first half of the seventeenth century, however, royal agents had their work cut out for them. They were struggling simultaneously to build a viable army and to use it for conquest, to establish a regular system of taxation and to draw from it the wherewithal of war, to check the rivals of the crown and to enlist them in the work of statemaking, to extract ever more resources from the country's common people and to reduce the risks of popular rebellion. To a large degree, these tasks conflicted with each other. Each of the contradictions produced its own characteristic forms of contention: mutinies and popular resistance to the military; revolts against taxation; rebellions of dukes and princes; attacks on royal officials and beneficiaries. Often the contradictions and the contention reinforced each other. "Both taxpayers and fiscal officials," said J.-J. Clamag eran about the period of the Fronde, "found themselves in a vicious circle, for the authorities called in troops because people weren't paying taxes, and people refused to pay taxes because the presence of troops ruined and enraged the population" (Clamag eran 1867: II, 578).

The circle ran larger than that. In one way or another, all the major forms of contention in seventeenth-century France had strong connections with war and preparations for war. We might sketch a continuum of connections. At one end we would place forms of contention which were, in fact, part of war itself: pitched battles, direct participation of civilians in combat among armies, battles between regular armies and armed civilians, resistance to direct exactions by the military. At the other end of our continuum we would place internal conflicts which amounted to war: rebellions led by dukes and princes, struggles between royal troops and armed

Protestants. In mid-continuum, then, we would place the most frequent major forms of contention: resistance to official efforts to raise the means of support by armies via taxation, corvee and the like; resistance to efforts at diverting resources (especially food) to armies; conflicts (such as soldier-civilian brawls and clashes over military smuggling and poaching) occurring as by-products of the presence of troops; resistance to attempts of officeholders to exact new or larger returns from their privileges and official duties.

Contention in the form of war, genuine war, certainly played its part. If we include the forces of princes and great lords, all five of our regions experienced army-to-army combat at various points of the seventeenth century; all France was a battleground. In battles of French forces against French forces (I speak of their current allegiances, not of their origins; the forces of the Prince of Condé and other *grande*s were often Swiss, Croatian, or something else), Languedoc was no doubt the champion. As early as 1621, the duc de Rohan, using the Cévennes as his base, had Protestant armies marching against the royal forces in Languedoc. The king's pacification of Languedoc in 1622, occasion of Théophile de Viau's hopeful verses, was only the first of many royal pacifications in that rebellious province. In Languedoc, peace easily came unstuck.

When it came to clashes between French forces and those of foreign crowns, on the other hand, Burgundy and Flanders had much more experience of seventeenth-century war than did Anjou, Languedoc, or the Ile de France. Especially Flanders. After all, most of the region began the century as Spanish territory, and came to the French crown only as the result of conquest, reconquest, and military occupation. In 1641, we find the civic militia of Lille (still a Spanish possession) turning back the French troops who arrived to besiege the city. In the village of Ruméigies, near Valenciennes:

In 1660-1661, it was necessary to whitewash the church, "the walls having been

blackened and damaged by the wars, since both inhabitants and soldiers fired their guns there, on account of which the whole church -- roof, glass and paint -- was run down." In 1667, toward Ascension (16 May), the cure, fearing the approach of the armies of Louis XIV, sent the church's ornaments and his parish register to Tournai. Part of the population evacuated the village. The rest stayed there and, in order to protect themselves, fortified the cemetery and dug a trench all round: a means of defense by which the inhabitants had profited "many times during previous wars" (Platelle 1964: 504).

Rumégies' people did, in fact, take a reluctant part in war after war. They dug their trench of 1667, however, on the eve of a crucial change. With the end of the War of Devolution in 1668, the province of Tournai, and thus Rumégies, became French territory. From that point on, the marauders and occupiers most to be feared were the village's former masters, the Spaniards. The nearby frontier did not become relatively secure until the Peace of Utrecht, forty-five years later.

Some of Rumégies' wartime ravaging may have resulted from battles between regular army units and armed civilians. Most of the time, however, armies chased each other through the village; the villagers defended themselves and their property as best they could. For a clearer case of civilian involvement in combat, we may turn to Burgundy in April 1637. That was the second year of France's direct participation in what later became known as the Thirty Years War. According to the

Gazette de France:

Peasants from around St. Jean de Lône, Auxonne and Bellegarde, to avenge themselves for the burning that the garrisons of Autrey and Grey were doing along our frontier, recruited a few soldiers to lead them and, on the 21st and 22nd of this month, threw themselves into three big enemy villages, including 400-household Joux. After they had killed everything, they reduced the villages to ashes. They are determined to deal with all the other villages in the same manner, so long as the enemy gives them the example (Gazette 1637: 263).

Even this tale, to be sure, does not show us armed civilians confronting enemy units. Except when householders defended themselves against invading troops, such encounters were rare.

The most frequent struggles between soldiers and civilians did not arise from military actions, as such, but from the attempts of military men to seize precious resources from the civilian population. Agents of Louis XIII and Louis XIV created

armies much faster than they created the means to satisfy those armies' wants. They nationalized the troops at the same time, transforming them from private retainers of great lords to public employees of the national state. But only toward the end of Louis XIV's reign did something like a national structure for supplying, paying, and containing the growing armed forces begin to take shape. By that time, the armies were in almost perpetual motion — at least for the two-thirds of the year that the roads could support the artillery the seventeenth-century military had started to drag around with them.

The consequences were predictable. Pay was usually late and sometimes never. Commanders often lagged a year or more in paying their troops. Food supplies frequently ran low. Military housing was practically nil. Few young men willingly became soldiers; impressment and emptying of jails became common devices for recruitment. Mutiny and desertion were rarely far away. Colonels who wanted to keep their regiments intact threatened and coerced when they could, but only survived by promising or arranging rewards. They promised booty from a captured city . . . sometimes at the same moment as they took ransoms paid by the city fathers in order to avoid pillage. In theory, they were supposed to pay the populace for the labor, food, lodging and supplies their armies required. In practice, they tolerated or even encouraged their soldiers' commandeering of food, drink, lodging, services, goods, money, and sexual satisfaction. Many generals and supply officers had it both ways: they pocketed the royal funds and let the troops forage. Only when rapine threatened to call forth popular rebellion, or retaliation from military superiors and royal officials, did commanders commonly call a halt.

Soldiers involved in snatching what they could get from the population thought the commandeered sex, wine, meat, bread, labor, and lodging was no more than their due. The victims, however, disagreed. Hence an unending series of local conflicts in which demanding soldiers faced indignant householders. One of the householders' rare

successes occurred during the Duke of Montmorency's 1632 rebellion in Languedoc:

The sieur d'Alsaux, who during the rebellion seized a place called Montréal, between Carcassonne and Toulouse, had gone out to forage; the residents chased out the soldiers he left behind; at his return, they locked the gates and fired many musket rounds at him. Peasants of the region around Carcassonne knocked a number of his foreign troops off their mounts; and the 25th of September, when some of his Croats were passing close to a little village four leagues from the same city, the villagers went out and killed twenty-six of them, took all their baggage and treated the rest of them in such a way that they are not likely to feel the urge to return to France for a long time (Gazette 3 October 1632: 410-411).

More often, however, the reports which survive from the century run like the laconic note of March 1678 concerning the intendant of Burgundy: "M. Bouchu took care of the complaints he received from many localities about violence committed on the occasion of, and under the pretext of, the recruitment of soldiers" (A.N. G7 156). "Taking care" generally meant squelching. The army needed those men.

#### Resistance to Extraction

In the middle of our continuum of contention, we find various forms of resistance to drawing of resources from the population: direct by-products of the military presence, tax rebellions, fights against the diversion of supplies from local markets, struggles against officeholders' demands. At one time or another, for example, all five of our regions produced conflicts which were essentially by-products of the presence of troops. In the seventeenth century, whoever said "soldier" said "trouble".

Most of the trouble was the age-old outcome of having troops living in the midst of the civilian population: brawls, rapes, thefts, and vandalism. More peculiar to the seventeenth century, however, was the multiplication of conflicts over booty in times of open war. An incident on the Flemish frontier in 1693 gives the flavor. The Sieur de Beauregard, acting captain of the free company of the Governor of the city of Condé, rode out on his own the 24th of June. He had 70 men, and a warrant to bring back booty. His force met a loaded wagon on the road from Brussels to

Mons. Etienne Gorant, the driver, showed a passport covering far fewer goods than his wagonload. Beauregard seized wagon and driver. He sent them to Conde with 20 men and a sergeant. "But that sergeant," he reported "was pursued by a military detachment from Mons which, being larger, took away the loaded wagon without listening to his objections. The violent manner of the chief of the Mons detachment made it clear that he was in league with the merchants. Your petitioner has been to Mons, but has been unable to obtain justice" (A.N. G7 287, letter of 7 July 1693).

Military commanders remained ambivalent about the struggle for booty. It could distract soldiers from conquest or defense, and stir up the civilian population inconveniently. But in an age in which piracy, privateering, and regular naval warfare overlapped considerably, land forces did not make neat distinctions between legal and illegal acquisition of property either. When the pay of soldiers was meager, irregular, and a tempting source of income for greedy commanders, military chiefs often found it expedient to let the troops supplement their pay with pillage.

Another tactic was to wink at smuggling. Now the civilian population did not necessarily suffer -- if soldiers could bring salt or coffee into the region duty-free, they could easily sell it at a profit below the official price. But the tax-farmer, always sensitive to attacks on his pocketbook, felt the pinch at once.

In the frontier areas of Burgundy, for example, both civilians and soldiers made money by bringing in contraband salt. An interesting cycle developed. Civilians who were agile enough to speed salt across the border were also attractive prospects for military service. If the gardes des gabelles (salt-tax guards) caught civilian smugglers with the goods, the tax farmer sought to have the smugglers convicted with fanfare and shipped off for long terms in the galleys, far from Burgundy. While they were being held in jail pending the royal ratification of their sentences, however, Burgundy's military commanders, as short of recruits as ever, frequently pled for the convicts to be given the choice between enlistment and the galleys. Military



commanders often prevailed over the remonstrances of tax farmers. Local army units then gained recruits who were of dubious reliability as men of war, but who certainly knew how to smuggle salt.

When ordinary people fought back against the demands of troops, troops were there to put them down. But when ordinary people rose against civilian demands for taxes, corvees, and supplies to support the army, troops were often far away. The maréchaussée (the state police, one might say loosely) could deal with an individual or two, but was usually helpless in the grip of a determined crowd. The salt-tax guards and other armed forces in the service of the tax farmers acquired plenty of experience in small-scale crowd control, but likewise fell apart in the face of substantial risings; in any case, they generally confined their work to the particular purposes of the tax farmers. Municipal constables and militias, where they existed, tended to limit their efforts to their home bases, and to be unreliable allies for royal officials.

What was an intendant, faced with determined opposition, to do? He could try to intimidate with moral authority, threats and the thin armed force at his disposal. Or he could call on the military governors of provinces and regional capitals to send in royal troops to back him up; in that case, he not only confessed publicly to his inability to keep order on his own, but also acquired obligations to a significant rival within his own bailiwick. Small wonder, then, that the intendants' reports to Paris often swung from utter silence about a resistance movement to detailed reports, appeals for aid, and cries of vengeance. Small wonder that the intendants often explained popular resistance as the result of plots, treason, and barbarism.

The very process of establishing French administration after conquest was full of the risk of resistance. In the part of Hainaut recently taken from the Spanish, intendant Faultrier was busy organizing the collection of taxes in 1686. That meant negotiation and coercion, village by village. The village of Estrun, near Cambrai, had

put up more than the usual resistance to the elimination of the privileges it had enjoyed under Spanish dominion. In the process of bringing the villagers into line, the intendant had exiled their cure and put one of their notables in jail. By January 1686, Faultrier thought his decisive action and his threats of more jailings had sufficiently intimidated the people of Estrun (A.N. G7 286, letter of 3 January 1686).

Yet on 7 July the intendant was writing that

they have since presented a declaration to the farmer's agent which I find very insolent; when people are only insolent on paper, it isn't hard for an intendant to punish them. I therefore didn't give their action much weight, but they went much farther. For when the agent tried to collect his taxes, they sounded the tocsin on him and the men he had brought to help him. The women began with stones, and their husbands finished with clubs. All of them said that until they saw an order signed by the King they would not pay, and that my signature was not enough for a matter that important.

At that point, predictably, the intendant requested the dispatch of troops to enforce the royal prerogative (A.N. G7 286). Over the seventeenth century as a whole, some version of this encounter between tax collectors and citizens was no doubt the most frequent occasion for concerted resistance to royal authority. That was true not only in Hainaut and Flanders, but also in the rest of France.

As the century wore on, nevertheless, the locus of conflict moved increasingly to the market. The reasons for the shift are simple and strong: Royal officials turned increasingly toward the promotion of taxable trade and the use of the market to supply the needs of their growing state. The army, in particular, moved away from direct expropriation of its supplies and relied increasingly on munitonnaires to buy its necessities. (Troops were the constant exception: despite the availability of mercenaries outside of France, the free labor market never supplied enough soldiers.) The new strategy regularized governmental demands somewhat, and thus probably made them easier to sustain. It diverted popular indignation from intendants to merchants and munitonnaires. But it created new grievances.

The grievances, for the most part, concerned food. The other resources

(always excepting manpower) required by the armed forces were sufficiently commercialized and abundant for the market to supply them without great stress most of the time. The simultaneous growth of cities, bureaucracies, armies, and a landless proletariat, on the other hand, placed great strains on the French food supply. At the same time the intendants, their imaginations stimulated by Colbert's close surveillance, began to see a close connection between the marketing of food and the generation of income to pay taxes. The distinction between food for income and food for survival became clearer and clearer; as intendant d'Aguesseau of Languedoc wrote in the relatively comfortable year 1680, "There is plenty of wheat in Upper Languedoc; we need to be able to market it, so people can pay their obligations (charges). There is also plenty of millet, which feeds the peasants" (A.N. G 7 295).

In times of shortages and high prices, the new strategy led intendants, merchants, and local officials to challenge the established ways of assuring that local communities would have prior access to their means of survival. It challenged the inventories, exclusive marketing, price controls, and other tight regulations that were standard administrative responses to shortage up to that time. Ordinary people responded to the challenge by substituting themselves for the delinquent authorities. They seized, inventoried, marketed, controlled and punished on their own. The closer the authorities were to the local population, the more they hesitated either to suspend the old controls or to punish those who attempted to reinstate the old controls. Hence many "disorders" involving the "complicity" of local authorities.

The conflicts rose to national visibility with the subsistence crises of 1693-94, 1698-99, and 1709-10. Feeding the army was but one of several factors in these crises, but it was an important one. Probably more important than it had to be, because the army contractors had lush opportunities to speculate with the stocks they bought up by royal authority. In Buxy, Burgundy, at the beginning of September

1693, local people seized the grain which had been purchased by Burgundy's munitionnaire. The intendant accused a judge, a royal prosecutor and other officials of having encouraged the populace. Yet the root cause of the conflict, he reported, was that the munitionnaire was stockpiling old grains and buying new ones. "Allow me to tell you," he wrote the controleur general,

that we've never before seen in Burgundy what we're seeing now. It isn't usual for a munitionnaire to spend the whole year here getting his supplies, and even less so to employ a thousand persons who commit all sorts of irregularities in their purchases and in commandeering transportation, without our being quite able to speak openly about it for fear of slowing up the supply service (A.N. G7 158, letter of 13 September 1693; cf. G7 1630).

In short, the intendant had a strong presumption that the contractor in question was not only exceeding his authority, but also profiteering in the grain trade.

Rarely was the impact of military procurement on conflicts over food supply so unmixed and visible; it is the market's genius to mix motives and diffuse responsibilities. In a more general way, nevertheless, the recurrent patterns of conflict reveal the sore points in the system. High prices, shortages and hunger as such did not usually call up popular action; serious conflicts normally began with official inaction, with the withholding of stored food from the local market, with obvious profiteering and, especially, with the effort to remove sorely-needed grain from the locality. The latter was the case, for example, at Vernon in 1699, when citizens roughed up the merchants who came to the local market to buy grain for Paris (Boislisle 1874-1896: I, 512). During that crisis, as well as those of 1693-94 and 1709-10, military demand was only one of several attractions drawing grain away from local consumption with the sanction of the state. In all five of our regions, the three crises brought out popular resistance to the diversion of food from local markets.

The middle section of our continuum also includes officeholders' attempts to exact new or larger returns from their privileges and officials duties. Its connection

with war is indirect but real: most of the new offices and privileges in question came into being as part of the royal effort to raise more money for warmaking. In May 1691, the intendant of Languedoc announced a schedule of fees for the newly-established administrators of public sales. (They were the jurés-crieurs publics, parallel to the registrars of burials whose establishment in Dijon about the same time caused so much trouble.) Instead of merely collecting fees at public sales, the agent of the officeholders tried to set up a tollgate at the entrance to Nimes, and collect the fees on all goods entering the city. The intendant stopped him, but neglected to forbid him to do the same thing elsewhere. The agent tried the same game in Toulouse. The clerks, "who come from the dregs of the common people," reported the intendant, "asked 10 sous at the city gate for each wagonload of wood that came in, and a certain sum for each basket of peas, salads, and fruits." Several women beat up a clerk. The intendant decided to punish both the women and the agent. In the case of the women, he said, "it seems important to me to get people out of the habit of making justice for themselves in such cases." As for the agent, his offense was a "genuine swindle" which could not be tolerated in such difficult times (A.N. G7 300, letter of 2 June 1691). Yet the intendant faced a dilemma: people bought the new offices for their financial return, and expected the government to guarantee the perquisites of office. If the offices were not attractive, they would not sell -- and the government would lack the ready cash it needed for its incessant wars.

As a result, intendants usually took the side of officeholders. When the "young people" of Toulouse attacked the city's "clerk for marriage banns" in January 1698, and gave sword wounds to the clerk and his would-be rescuer, the same intendant of Languedoc despaired of getting action through the local courts. He proposed a royal prosecution "so that the people of Toulouse will understand that it is a major crime to attack and insult without reason those who are responsible for royal business" (A.N. G7 303, letter of 5 January 1698). The business of venal officeholders readily

became "royal business". And that royal business became crucial because not only the authority, but also the credit, of a warmaking state was at risk.

### Internal War

At the far end of our continuum appear conflicts among powerholders which took on the tones of war. That include struggles between Protestants and Catholics, between Huguenots and the crown. It also included the maneuvers of dukes, princes, and regional magnates. One of the century's great years for such maneuvers was 1632, when the full effects of Richelieu's consolidation of power and preparation for foreign war began to mark the provinces.

In 1632, Languedoc saw more internal war than any other province. Languedoc had then suffered a series of terrible years:

In 1632, the cup was full to the brim. Peasants and urban petty bourgeois were overwhelmed by four years of hardship. And when the Estates went into open rebellion, starting in December 1631, they explicitly mentioned mortality as well as fiscality; to justify their action, they referred to "a flood of new offices, taxes, and surcharges" and "a province decimated by disease, coupled with a horrible famine." The demographic allusion rounded out the antifiscal diatribe (Le Roy Ladurie 1966: I, 426).

The Estates were trying to head off the establishment of a royal Election, which would bypass them in the collection of taxes. Local assemblies petitioned against the Election, to no avail. But in June 1632, when the newly-named Elus began announcing their inflated tax bills, citizens in place after place decided publicly and collectively to refuse payment.

So far, events in Languedoc resembled the early phases of a tax rebellion, not a full-fledged civil war. Then two *grande*s entered the action. Gaston d'Orleans (the king's brother, and therefore titled Monsieur) re-entered France from exile, again calling for a revolt against the usurper Richelieu. The Duke of Montmorency, governor of Languedoc, joined him in rebellion at the end of July. As of 6 August, the Gazette de France gave its readers friendly reassurance:

You are right to find the Duke of Montmorency's revolt strange, for those of

us who are on the spot can't explain it ourselves. It began on the 22d of last month, when the declaration of the Estates of Lower Languedoc (which will be held against them for a long time) was made, including a diminution of the taille, and its collection in their own way. The Duke of Montmorency, making a large strap of someone else's leather, returned salt to its 1627 price on his own authority, having seized the salt-works of Pequaiz for that purpose. The next day -- you see how hot our heads are! -- everyone learned that Montreal, Lusignan and La Grace had been taken, and that the sieur de Restingler, governor of Lunel (only two leagues from Montpellier), had declared for Monsieur. Add to that the siege of the city and castle of Montlaur, an important post half a league from the road between Narbonne and Carcassonne, vigorously attacked for six days by the Baron de Mous and sieurs Alaric & Montguillart, his brothers. All this encouraged the rebels, gave them hope of becoming masters of that city and of the whole province, and incited our Parlement to issue, on the 28th of the same month, a solemn declaration, subsequently published throughout the province, against anyone who disturbed the peace. Since that time, if they have any desire to serve the king, they have not dared to show it (Gazette de France 1632: 314-315).

So it went, with declarations, alliances, sieges, and maneuvers, until the end of August. On the first of September, riddled with bullets and abandoned by his supporters, the Duke was taken prisoner at Castelnaudary. The Parlement of Toulouse obligingly sentenced him to death the following month. This time, there was no making up with the king: in Toulouse, at the Capitole, the executioner ended the Duke of Montmorency's life.

Our scale of distance from war, then, actually forms a circle. As we move away from the forms of contention which occurred as the most immediate consequences of royal warmaking, we approach another sort of war, an internal war. No contradiction there: early in the seventeenth century, the distinction between international war and domestic rebellion barely existed. Later, every new surge of warmaking stimulated popular rebellion, and every popular rebellion posed a threat to the state's ability to wage war. In a state so strongly oriented to war, it could hardly have gone otherwise.

#### Seventeenth-Century Repertoires

The pervasiveness of war's influence, and the variable character of that influence with distance from war, shows up emphatically in a comparison of the Ile de France and Languedoc during the 1640s. If we take a six-year slice from 1640

through 1645, for example, we are looking at a period in which the Ile de France stood at the very edge of the French campaigns in Artois, Picardy, and Champagne, while Languedoc was reluctantly helping to pay the rapidly-mounting cost of war and saw troops marching through to and from the fighting in Catalonia, but was relatively distant from major battlefields.

In the Ile de France, 1640 was a great year for attacks by local residents on billeted military units: at Champagne-sur-Oise, at Villeneuve-le-Roi and nearby villages, and in the vicinity of Senlis; near St. Quentin and Guise, at the northeast corner of the Ile de France, peasants fought off the attempt to make them cart military supplies to the siege of Arras. That same year brought an attack on the salt stores at Vesles, on the border of Picardy, by an Irish mercenary regiment, an illegal assembly to levy arms in Mantes, and rebellions against tax collectors in Proisy and the Election of Château-Thierry (A.A. Al 57, 58, 59, 60). The next five years brought more contention:

1641: violent resistance to the sol pour livre surtax in Nemours

1643: attack on light cavalrymen at St.-Germain-pres-Montargis

1644: expulsion of a tax farmer from Argenteuil

attacks on troops in Bourg-sur-Aisne, Vinsouet (?) and Garanciere

violence against the mayor of Etampes by troops stationed there

disorderly march of workers in Paris

1645: "sedition" against salt-tax guards and officers in St. Denis

barricades in streets of Paris to defend the Parlement against a rumored attack by royal troops

(Sources: Bonney 1978b: 329; Mousnier 1964: I, 534-536; A.A. Al 81, 82; B.N. Fr. 18432; Hillairet 1970: 53)

In addition, during those years Paris saw at least one extraordinary assembly of Protestants, and at least one brush between the law and a group of Frondeurs -- in the pre-Fronde meaning of young men who fought for the sake of adventure outside



the walls of the city.

In Languedoc, during the same period, we find a "seditious assembly" at Gimon for which ten people hanged (1640), then no major contention for the next two years (Gazette de France 1640: 630). In 1643, the featured events were attacks on tax collectors in Valence and Toulouse, and an armed Protestant gathering in Ribaute (Mousnier 1964: I, 589; Liublinskaya 1966: 36-38, 40-47). 1644 brought another fiscal rebellion in Figeac; a public confrontation between the Cour des Comptes and the intendant, with undertones of local opposition to taxes for the military, in Montpellier; and a turbulent assembly in Nimes on behalf of local notables accused of shaving coins (B.N. Fr. 18830; Porchnev 1963: 639-640; Beik 1974b; Liublinskaya 1966: 77-82). 1645, finally, was the year of a large insurrection against taxes in Montpellier, the forceful freeing of a young man imprisoned for tax evasion in Nimes, illegal Protestant assemblies in Aubenas, and gatherings against the bishop in Carcassonne (Porchnev 1963: 242-260, 654; Liublinskaya 1966: 133-137; Mousnier 1964: II, 737-738, 763-772; B.N. Fr. 18432). The incomplete calendars of contention for both regions contain a great deal of resistance to taxes. But the struggles between soldiers and civilians concentrated in that corner of the Ile de France crisscrossed by troops sent to conquer Spanish territory to the Northeast.

Of all these conflicts, only the Montpellier insurrection of 1645 has found much of a place in history books. In that insurrection, as a memoir written for Chancellor Seguier summed it up,

The dregs of the common people and the weaker sex had the nerve to take arms and to seize the city gates; to break into the houses of royal officials and tax collectors; to mark for pillage the houses of persons suspected of being tax-farmers and to threaten those same persons with death; to attack a Duke, Peer, and Marshal of France who is governor of the province in a city to which he has devoted his friendship, personal establishment, and time; to make him risk his life; to burn, sack, and massacre to the sound of the tocsin; to run down an Intendant; to brave the cannons of the fortress; in fact to push back the cannons, beat down the soldiers, and plan to attack and raze the fortress . . . (B.N. Fr. 18432).

And why all this? Bosquet, one of Languedoc's two intendants, declared that the artisans of Montpellier had encouraged their wives to act against a new tax because they were "extremely surprised both by the unprecedented character of the tax and by the large assessments levied on them" (Coquelle 1908: 69). The judicial inquiry of 30 June 1645 began with the judge's declaration that he had heard "word from various sources that many women of the city as well as artisans and workers of said city had gathered, two or three hundred in number, complaining about a certain tax on artisans organized in guilds within the city, a tax levied for the happy accession of Louis XIV to the crown and other taxes imposed upon them" (B.N. Fr. 18432). The "two or three hundred" swelled to several thousand, took over the city, sacked the elegant houses of a tax farmer and an official of the provincial Estates, defeated the troops of the viceroy (Marshal Schomberg, previously governor, but now lieutenant-général), and forced the viceroy to expel the tax farmers. It appears that city officials, already at odds with the money-starved royal government, sat on their hands for a day or two before moving decisively to the side of repression. That implicit assent from the bourgeoisie, plus bitter continuing rivalry between the two intendants then assigned to Languedoc, most likely gave the city's people more than the usual hope that they would succeed (Porchnev 1963: 251-254; Beik 1974b). Indeed, they did succeed. Eventually, however, two women hanged for their involvement in the uprising, and a man died in prison. Such victories were always temporary.

Despite the profusion of conflicts, seventeenth-century French people employed a limited number of ways to make their demands and grievances known. They assembled solemnly, itemized their grievances, and elected leaders or delegates. They gathered to attack oppressive officials or tax collectors and their premises. They ganged up on marauding soldiers, stripped them of their baggage, and ran them out of town. They conducted mocking ceremonies and stoned or beat moral offenders. Occasionally they formed their own militias and patrolled their towns, or even

marched off to punish some enemy. Those forms and a few others comprised the seventeenth-century repertoire of contention. When people did several of the very same things on a large scale, with leaders linking a number of localities, they created a popular revolt. When they did the very same things in conjunction with nobles who fielded private armies, the result was a great rebellion. If the consequences were very different, the forms of popular action were much the same.

Before mid-century, popular revolts and great rebellions occurred with remarkable frequency. In the Ile de France, Languedoc, Burgundy, and Anjou, we would certainly want to include these events:

- 1614-16: rebellion of the princes in Ile de France and elsewhere
- 1620: rebellion of Marie de Medici in Anjou and elsewhere
- 1621-29 war of Protestants with royal forces in Languedoc and elsewhere
- 1623 uprising against merchants of Angers in Beaufort (Anjou) and surrounding area
- 1630: rebellion against tax farmer in Angers
- 1630: "Lanturelu" rebellion against establishment of Election in Dijon
- 1632: partial involvement of Burgundy in rebellion of Gaston d'Orleans
- 1632: greater involvement of Languedoc in rebellion of Gaston, coupled with rebellion of Duke of Montmorency
- 1643: rebellion against subsistances tax in Angers
- 1645: tax rebellion in Montpellier
- 1648-: the Fronde, concentrated in the Ile de France, but with important repercussions in all other provinces

Other, lesser conflicts have sometimes figured in maps and inventories of rebellions leading up to the Fronde; in Languedoc, for example, the beginnings of an anti-gabelle revolt in Toulouse (1635), and two more movements against taxes in Montpellier (1639, 1644) have served as exemplary cases. But the list above gives a

sense of the major moments in which people who were clearly challenging established authorities exercised sustained control over a city or a group of towns despite the efforts of authorities to use force against them.

Not all the authorities, in the usual case. One requisite for large-scale popular rebellion was division among established authorities. That division could run from covert to blatant: at one extreme, reluctance to repress people who made demands in the streets or sacked the premises of tax-collectors; further along, visible sympathy with people's grievances; at the other extreme, outright declaration of opposition to the crown. Montpellier's rebellion of 1645 fell somewhere between the first two categories, with some authorities merely hesitant, but others visibly opposed to the crown's imposition of taxation without representation. The rebellions of 1632, on the other hand, gave rancorous commoners a clear chance to wrap their grievances in noble cloth -- at the risk, to be sure, of eventual hanging for their effrontery. Joining in lese-majeste always brought the risk of sudden, unpleasant death.

Our select list of major revolts displays a shift away from dynastic struggles to tax rebellion, and a corresponding shift from the Ile de France to outlying provinces. It also reflects a decline in the relative importance of battles between beleaguered Protestants and the crown. None of these shifts was permanent. Toward the century's end, both royal efforts to subdue Protestants and Protestant efforts to hold off royal threats reached new heights. Before that, the Fronde of 1648 to 1653 swept the Ile de France back into action, and combined dynastic struggles with tax rebellion. In that combination, the Fronde summed up the conflicts of the century's first half.

### The Fronde

Event for event, the Fronde brought nothing new to the forms of French contention. Assemblies of rebellious nobles had formed before, princes had declared their readiness to battle the king, creditors and officeholders had gathered to protest

reductions in their privileges and payments, great cities and whole regions had risen against the crown. During the 1630s and 1640s, as preparations for war gouged the goods and privileges of more and more French people, the frequency of such conflicts probably rose. The later rebellions show us an overextended, capital-hungry state threatening the interests of many of its clients and subjects, shaking the very structure of social relations within which those clients and subjects lived. And in the Fronde we discover a convergence of previously separate conflicts, a repeated slipping of previously contained areas and peoples into the control of opponents of royal authority, and a real, if temporary, check to royal expansion.

For a half-century, French kings and their ministers had operated on a narrow margin. They could only survive by squeezing acquiescence from a half-dozen different parties: existing creditors, potential sources of credit, royal officeholders, municipal and provincial officials, regional magnates, and the hapless households that paid taxes, performed corvee labor, and supplied men for the armies. The parties overlapped, to be sure. Existing creditors who still had cash reserves or borrowing power became attractive sources for new advances to the crown. The seventeenth-century fiscal strategy, furthermore, regularly transformed potential creditors and municipal officials into royal officeholders. Nevertheless, on the whole the parties had conflicting interests.

The conflicts of interest could work either for or against the crown. They produced barriers to effective coalitions against royal demands. Yet they meant that by favoring any one party the crown was sure to harm at least one other. Sometimes, as we have seen, royal power rode an upward spiral: borrowing, farming taxes, and selling offices expanded current royal revenues, decreased the crown's reliance on the direct seizure of the means of war, and increased the number of people dependent on the crown's success; the increased revenues bought armed force that could be used against domestic opposition as well as external foes; and the

presence of that armed force weakened resistance to mounting royal demands for taxes. The spiral could, however, unwind. If royal demands rose much faster than royal coercive power, opponents joined and became formidable. Much of the time, the most the king could hope for was to keep the parties at each other's throats, to aim the greatest harm at the least powerful, and to contain the discontent of the strong.

Although they differed enormously in power, each party had both an implicit program and a limit beyond which, if pressed, it was more likely to resist or to rebel than to cooperate. We have already surveyed the variety of ways in which ordinary people resisted demands for the wherewithal of war -- when they could. Merchants and rentiers who invested their reserves in bonds (rentes) secured by Parisian municipal revenues did not willingly suffer reductions or delays in the income from those bonds. Great nobles who served as provincial governors and lieutenants-general did not cheerfully see their regional hegemony challenged by intendants and other officeholders. Potential creditors, officeholders, and municipal or provincial officials likewise had their programs and limits. Add to the situation a nine-year-old king, a regency, large numbers of royal troops tied up in Flanders and Catalonia, and a chief minister -- Mazarin -- who was a foreigner still building his networks of patronage within France; those circumstances gave the great nobles additional hope of checking the monarchy's threats to their power.

During the 1640s, the monarchy was not merely maintaining itself, but aggrandizing. To win its wars with Spain and the Empire, it was pressing every available resource, mortgaging the future, disregarding inconvenient rights and obligations. The result was to push every one of the parties beyond the margin of its acquiescence to royal demands, and to create temporary but powerful coalitions of the parties against the crown. Each party resisted more or less as it always had. The old links between urban fiscal insurrections and rebellions of regional nobles

reappeared. But this time both the resistance and the coalitions were more widespread, intense, and durable than they had been before. That was the Fronde.

Remember the Fronde's bare chronology: In mid-1648, an assembly of regional Parlements and high courts demanded a rollback of many measures Mazarin and his agents had taken to build up royal military strength; they asked for control of the sale of offices, regular parliamentary review of taxation, recall of the intendants from the provinces, and other drastic steps. An insurrection sprang up in Pau, as peasants gathered in Paris to state their opposition to the taille. When Mazarin had leaders of the parliamentary movement arrested, Parisians erected barricades in the streets, and forced the Cardinal to release the prisoners; later, Mazarin acceded to most of the high courts' demands. Meanwhile, Mazarin and the royal family slipped out of Paris, preferring to issue orders to a fractious Parlement from the comfortable distance of Saint-Germain. They returned to Paris briefly, then decamped again at the start of 1649, leaving behind orders for the exile of the high courts. The Parlement of Paris took over the national government, and the city's populace badgered the royalist municipality while the Prince of Condé, still aligned with the king, blockaded the city. A provisional settlement brought protest from Parisians, but eventually permitted the return of the king, the queen mother, and the royal entourage to the capital.

By 1650, Condé and fellow magnates were seeking to displace Mazarin. The queen had Condé and others imprisoned. The movement of opposition by great nobles spread, and coupled with popular rebellion against the crown in many cities and their hinterlands. Although the rebellious cities generally came back under royal control by the end of the year, Parisian creditors of the government stepped up their complaints, while the Parlement of Paris moved increasingly against Mazarin and for his princely opposition. Early in 1651, Mazarin freed the imprisoned princes and went into exile. During the year, Parisians battled royal troops in the streets, a rebellious

coalition (the Ormée) arose in Bordeaux, and divisions opened up among the great Frondeurs, some of whom rejoined the royal side, and others of whom followed the Prince of Condé to the southwestern provinces. At the end of the year, Mazarin returned to France with troops of his own.

The following year, 1652, turned the tide against the Fronde. During the first eight months, the shifting tide was not obvious: Condé took Paris, the Ormée seized control of Bordeaux, and the people of Paris repeatedly acted against Mazarin. At summer's end, Mazarin again fled the country. Yet during the rest of the year, military defeats and defections weakened Condé's cause, Louis XIV and his mother returned triumphantly to Paris, and the Frondeurs began to lose everywhere. In 1653, Mazarin himself made a definitive return to the capital, the Ormée gave up Bordeaux, and royal agents reinstated their authority throughout the country. The great Fronde was over.

Seen in terms of our continuum of connections with war, the Fronde included the full range of seventeenth-century conflicts. When the Prince of Condé allied himself with the Spanish and sent his troops into Flanders against the armies of Louis XIV, the civil war melted into the international struggle. Even when foreigners were not so directly involved, many actions of the Fronde followed the routines of war: pitched battles, sieges, campaigns, treaties. During the first exile of the king and his party from Paris, for example, royal forces ringed Paris and attempted to cut off the city's food supplies. Throughout the Ile de France, troop movements brought the usual pillage, and the usual scattered resistance from the pillaged population. In place after place, furthermore, conquerors imposed corvees and taxes on the local population in order to support the costs of warmaking. In response to that pressure, other conflicts of the Fronde took the classic forms of rebellion: chasing out the tax collector, attacking the profiteer's premises, and so on. The combination of war and regional rebellion made the Fronde formidable.



In all five of our regions, officials and magnates had to choose sides repeatedly: whether to send messages of support to the Parlement of Paris, whether to swear allegiance to the king, whether to snuff out Condé's local supporters, and so on. Beyond that common ground, however, the five provinces built starkly different relationships to the Fronde. The Ile de France passed the civil war as both prize and arena: locus of assemblies, street fighting, and power struggles in 1648, divided between a rebellious, besieged Paris and a royally-controlled hinterland for the first part of 1649, relatively untroubled the second half of that year, scene of maneuvers between supporters of the king and of the imprisoned princes (plus protests by unpaid royal creditors) in 1650, site of insurrection and tumultuous assemblies in 1651, object of open warfare in 1652, stage for the triumphant return of the king and his followers from late 1652 into 1653. Anjou managed to remain in turmoil throughout the Fronde by tying existing conflicts within the region to the national divisions of successive years. Burgundy became more heavily involved in the Fronde during the later years of princely warfare, when troops fought for control of Bellegarde and other military outposts in the province. Flanders, although still mainly in Spanish hands, likewise figured as a battlefield where royal troops were unavoidably detained and dissident Frenchmen joined the side of the enemy. Languedoc, finally, offers something of a surprise: in that once-rebellious province, few powerful people took open stands against the king or Mazarin, and military action on behalf of the princes never spread very wide.

No need to follow the Fronde through its twists and turns. The central facts to grasp are, first, the intermittent action of several distinct groups -- the members of the high courts, Parisian rentiers, great nobles, residents of major cities, and others -- who had seen the warmaking growth of royal power attacking their autonomy, rights, and welfare; second, the making and breaking of temporary coalitions among different sets of those aggrieved parties. Unfortunately for the

popularity of their cause, the nobles who warred against the crown's forces likewise taxed the citizenry, impressed soldiers, grabbed supplies where they could find them, and used their military power to advance their personal advantages. As the struggle ground on, princely power and return to the rule of regional magnates looked no more enticing to ordinary people -- or to the officeholders of the high courts -- than the restoration of royal authority. At that point, the linked rebellions had lost.

What if the Fronde had not occurred? Paradoxically, without the great rebellion the monarchy would most likely have consolidated its power less quickly. That, for several reasons. First, Louis XIV never forgot the turmoil which beset him as a child-king, nine years old in 1648; it became a high priority of his regime to detect, coopt, and preempt potential rebels. Second, at the same time as it demonstrated the vulnerability of the crown, the Fronde displayed even more visibly the inability of all the crown's opponents to unite in a program or an effective military force. Third, the rebellion gave Mazarin and the queen mother license and incentive to repress their enemies. If the Prince of Condé could rush into service for the Spaniards as a general against the French, his independence of action now became exceptional; even dukes and major cities now felt royal vengeance.

#### Divide and Conquer, Conquer and Divide

Quelling the Fronde did not eliminate resistance to royal demands; it displaced and fragmented that resistance. Alliances between ordinary people (typically aggrieved by taxation or other forms of extraction) and important nobles (typically aggrieved by checks to their power) became both less likely and less effective. As the crown turned increasingly to the sale of offices and other indirect ways of raising revenue, fewer occasions arose for confrontations between citizens and direct representatives of the national state. As intendants and other disciplined royal officials in the provinces extended their knowledge and control, the chances of an inviting breakdown in official surveillance dwindled. All these changes diminished the

frequency and, especially, the scale of open resistance.

In the decade following the Fronde, all five of our provinces showed signs of diminished capacity for action against the crown, especially action requiring a broad coalition of classes. Anjou saw the rallying of a few nobles around the Frondeur Cardinal de Retz (1654), a large tax rebellion in Angers (1656), assemblies of nobles who still hoped to band together against Mazarin (1658-1659), and a few more conflicts over taxes in the early 1660s. In Burgundy, despite a drumroll of local resistance to tax-collectors, the only concerted attacks on officials were an insurrection in Chalons (1657) and a smaller "rebellion" in Commarin (1661). Paris and the Ile de France remained dutifully calm: a flurry of protest over the selection of a parish priest, a brawl or two, scattered resistance to increased taxation at the end of 1661, and an assembly of angry rentiers the following year. In those provinces, the Fronde's defeat seems to have made people lower their estimates of their chances to win concessions from the crown by outright rebellion. Cross-class coalitions became especially rare.

Flanders and Languedoc, however, behaved somewhat differently. Flanders, a war zone still largely in Spanish hands, had the usual run-ins between soldiers and civilians. In the borderland of Flanders and Artois under French rule, a few vigorous reactions to the royal imposition of new taxes occurred. The most important came in 1662, when the same borderland produced a major revolt -- the Lustucru rebellion -- after the king revoked its war-linked fiscal privileges. Languedoc had unruly Protestants assembling and arming in the Vivarais (1653, 1656), a struggle for power in Carcassonne (1656) drawing many citizens into the streets, a mutiny, destruction of a Protestant church, and several struggles over taxes in 1662; if we count adjacent Roussillon, that section of France also experienced the long struggle between authorities and the Angelets of the Pyrenees (1663-1672). Only Lustucru and the Angelets approached the scale of great rebellions before the Fronde, and neither of

them included the open alliance between provincial powerholders and commoners that had characterized the sustained struggles of the 1620s, 1630s, and 1640s.

Out at France's edges, however, things went differently. On the whole, the peripheral provinces were the last to come under central control, the slowest to lose particular privileges and exemptions. Frontier and coastal provinces commonly enjoyed fiscal advantages, either in exchange for special military services such as coastal defense or in recognition of the hopelessness of policing the flows of persons and goods across coastlines and mountain passes. Important parts of France, furthermore, only came to the crown as prizes of seventeenth-century wars; Bearn, Roussillon, Flanders, and Lorraine are outstanding examples. Yet in all these peripheral places Louis XIV, Colbert, and their collaborators kicked at the barriers to increasing royal revenues. That meant, inevitably, revoking or bypassing rights certified by treaty and decree. In those circumstances large rebellions involving several social classes, many localities, and open opposition to royal authority still occurred from time to time.

After the Fronde, France's great seventeenth-century rebellions included the Tardanizats (Guyenne, 1655-1656), Sabotiers (Sologne, 1658), Benauges (Guyenne, 1661-1662), Lustucru (Boulonnais, 1662), Audijos (Gascony, 1663), Angelets (Roussillon, intermittently from 1663 to 1672), Roure (Vivarais, 1670), Papier Timbré and Bonnets Rouges (also known as Torrêben: Brittany, 1675), and Camisards (Cévennes and Vivarais, intermittently from 1685 to about 1710, especially from 1703 onward). In those events, groups of people openly defied royal authority, and maintained control over multiple localities for many days.

Note the geography of the major rebellions. The Sabotiers of Sologne were the only people to mount a large, sustained insurrection against the crown in the central regions of France. The Southwest still contributed the rebellions of the Tardanizats, Benauges, and Audijos, but its preeminence was shaken. Once-rebellious Poitou and

Normandy only produced relatively local movements of resistance to taxation, such as the guerrilla organized by the swamp-dwellers near Sables d'Olonne in the late 1650s, when the crown sought to impose an exceptional tax for the draining of the land in addition to the quartier d'hiver, the levy for maintenance of troops in garrison. ("Thus you see," wrote Jean Baptiste Colbert's cousin Colbert de Terron, "that we have to establish the quartier d'hiver by acts of war, as if we were in enemy territory": B.N. Melanges de Colbert 101, letter of 17 March 1658.) Languedoc took at least as prominent a part in the post-Fronde rebellions as it had before. Nevertheless, the hearts of those rebellions were no longer Montpellier, Toulouse, and other important cities, but the province's mountainous edges, the Cévennes and Vivarais. In Brittany, the crown faced a forbidding province which had long benefited from special status, including exemption from the salt tax. In the Boulonnais and Roussillon, the king's agents were trying to extend routine fiscal administration into war zones, one of which received gentle treatment in return for its loyalty and military service, the other of which had only become French territory with 1659's Treaty of the Pyrenees.

#### How Rebellions Happened

After the devastation of the Fronde, the slowing of the Spanish war, and a pause for the treaty with Spain, 1661 marked the royal return to serious preparation for war. In that year, Mazarin died, Louis XIV took over full direction of the state, Colbert became the king's chief financial aide and -- not coincidentally -- Colbert's competitor Fouquet went to prison for his derelictions. Soon Colbert turned his attention to raising new revenue, with special emphasis on making taxation more "uniform" throughout France. That meant abolishing special agreements and particular privileges, extending the same basic taxes everywhere in the country.

As we might expect, people in the peripheral provinces did not relinquish their advantages joyfully. Near Bordeaux, the reaction came quickly: in December, 1661.

The insurrection of BÉnauge was the largest of a series of struggles with tax-collectors, and with soldiers sent to support the tax-collectors, which took place in the region of Bordeaux after the Fronde. When Colbert decided to collect back taxes from all those years, and a company of cavalry rode out from Bordeaux to enforce his call for payment, the tocsin rang in the villages of the BÉnauge region. A few hundred peasants occupied the chateau of BÉnauge, seat of the county, and a few hundred more besieged the royal troops in the mill to which they had fled. A "Captain Straw" (capitaine La Paille) appeared among the rebels, but that nicknamed local leader was the closest they came to noble support; with the exception of a surgeon and a few rural artisans, the rebellion remained whole-heartedly plebeian. It received the plebeian treatment: dispatch of seven or eight hundred troops, hanging of two chiefs, sentencing of four more likely participants to the galleys, fines assessed on the region's villages to compensate court costs and the families of cavalrymen killed in the rebellion and, of course, payment of the long-due taxes (B.N. Melanges Colbert 105-107 bis; Loirette 1966).

The Lustucru rebellion took place the following year, 1662, at the opposite end of France. The region of Boulogne, at the edges of Artois, Picardy, and Flanders, had a long experience of war on land and sea. The region enjoyed exemption from all major taxes, but had the obligation to supply able-bodied men for a frontier guard. Louis XIV had imposed "extraordinary" taxes on the region during the 1650s on the grounds of war emergency, but in 1661 his Council announced the regularization of taxes there. Protests from the Estates of the Boulonnais and the Estates of Artois went unheard.

Forewarned, the government sent 250 troops to accompany the new tax-collectors on their village rounds. Nonetheless the villagers fought off the troops where they could, formed bands which attacked both troops and local gentlemen who were exempt from taxation, and eventually regrouped in a barricaded town under the

nominal leadership of the one petty noble they had been able to recruit. Once a strong royal force tracked them down and surrounded the town, the rebels were easy work for professional troops. As the tough-talking Duke of Elbeuf reported:

I arrived Monday noon at Montreuil, where I learned that the Marquis de Montpézat and M. de Machault were scheduled to arrive that very evening. I used the rest of the day having bread made, getting four cannons ready to move, and doing everything else that I thought useful for punishing these miserable rebels. When they arrived, I ordered the commander of Montreuil's fort to give the Marquis of Montpézat and M. de Machault whatever they asked for. I had eighty horse from the Government of Montreuil made ready, with carts and wagons to carry ammunition and supplies . . . The troops went five leagues like Basques, and the rangers of the Guards and the Swiss, without even waiting for their battalions, attacked a thousand of these scum who were in a well-barricaded village on a good site, and forced them to retreat to the castle of Heudin, where we took them at will. We had four of them hanged immediately. All the chiefs are taken. We have found only a few soldiers of fortune who once served in the royal armies (B.M. *Mélanges Colbert* 109 bis, letter of 11 July 1662).

The captives included the one petty noble, who escaped for a while, but was recaptured, drunk on the eau-de-vie of a cellar in which he had hidden. After show trials, 365 men went to the galleys, three died broken on the wheel, and one more hanged (B.N. *Mélanges Colbert* 108-110; Heliot 1935).

At both ends of the Pyrenees, the royal effort to raise revenue by farming out a new salt tax soon incited sustained rebellions. At the Atlantic end, the Basquetoned foothills produced the rebellion of Audijos, named for the petty noble who darted to and from with his armed band, attacking tax-collectors and royal forces when they were vulnerable. Using the mountains and Spanish territory as his refuge, Audijos managed to impede the region's tax farmers and encourage urban rebellions during much of 1663, 1664, and 1665. He escaped capture; indeed, Louis XIV eventually rewarded his prowess in 1676 by giving him a regiment to command (A.A. A 1 247, 249; A.N. Z 1 a 890; B.N. *Mélanges Colbert* 120-133; Clement 1866: 289-293; Communay 1893).

At the Mediterranean end of the Pyrenees, the farming of the salt tax aroused the armed mountain-dwellers who plied the passages of the Vallespir. These Catalans

found themselves transferred from a distant Spain to a rather more vigilant France by the 1659 treaty. Their region produced metals, cloth and -- significantly -- salt which mule-drivers carried down both slopes of the mountains. When Roussillon's Sovereign Council (the regional body empowered by the French to govern on their behalf) discovered that its salaries would depend on salt-tax revenues, the Council authorized the collection of the tax. That was, however, to reckon without the mountaineers. As soon as the tax farmer's guards arrived in that part of the Pyrenees in 1663, the local bands began to attack them. Raids and kills on both sides continued for years, until the mountain people, the Sovereign Council, the tax farmer and the king's ministers worked out a compromise in 1669.

Soon the skirmishes began again. One of the mountaineers' leaders, nicknamed Hereu Just, fell into royal hands. At that point, guerrilla gave way to general insurrection. At royal instruction, the Sovereign Council issued a decree "as a result of the riots, arson, sacrilege, homicide, armed gatherings and other violence committed in the villages and mountains of the Vallespir and in a few parts of the Conflent by the seditious people commonly called Angelets . . .

who after entering by force into the city of Prats-de-Mollo, whose gates they broke open, forced the governor and bailiff of said city to free a certain Jean-Michel Mestre, called Hereu Just, of Vallestavia, one of the chiefs of said sedition, and one of his accomplices, both of them legally constituted prisoners, disturbed trade and public order for more than three months, occupied cities and villages of the mountains, took arms against troops and officers of the law, blocked the collection and administration of royal taxes, especially the salt tax, besieged the city of Ceret, resisted . . . M. de Chastillon, viceroy in the province of Roussillon when he came with royal troops to aid that city, and continued said sedition in various places, opposing an army commanded by the Comte de Chamilly, marshal of the king's armies (A.D. Pyrénées Orientales C 1395, criée of 4 September 1670).

It took two more years to put down the Angelets by means of a combination of bargaining and military force. Then those Pyrenean passes became a favorite route for salt-smugglers, who thus made their fortune from the tax they had previously fought (A.A. A 1 246-247; B.N. Mélanges Colbert 144-151; Clement 1861-1869: IV,



lxxvii-lxxxviii, 337-347; Depping 1850-1855: I, 620, 652-654, 803-804; Marcet 1977).

About the same time the Angelets were renewing their battles to the south of Languedoc, another fiscal rebellion was forming on the province's hilly northern flanks. The Roure rebellion took its name from the demi-noble Jean Antoine du Roure, whom the region's people drafted as its chief. Roure only became a rebel commander after a crowd of artisans and peasants, acting on the rumor that a new head tax was to be established, fell upon a tax collector in the city of Aubenas, threatened the city council, and inspired a rising of villages in the nearby countryside of the Vivarais. They ruled the territory for much of the time from April to July 1670.

Roure is said to have had 4,000 men under arms at one point. But once regular troops under the command of the Comte du Roure (no relation) and Marshal Lebret set out after them, toward the end of July, the beginning of the end was in sight. As the Gazette de France tells the tale:

They resisted at first, but once they saw the rest of the Musketeers, supported by the Choiseul Squadron, they fired and fled . . . The rebels were pursued right up into the rocks, where the royal forces killed 140 and took 80 prisoners. That evening, the army went back to camp, and the next day it marched to Aubenas, which the rebels had abandoned at the news of the rout. The inhabitants told the Comte du Roure of their joy at being freed from these insurgents. We have learned that since then most of the Gentlemen who had left their houses have returned, and have forced the rebels to lay down their arms, put them into the hands of their cures, and seek the mercy of the king (Gazette de France 1670: 766-767).

The Gentlemen apparently had good reason to skip town. In addition to their manifest opposition to profiteering tax collectors, the peasants and artisans sacked the houses of the rich. Still, their battle cry fell far short of outright class warfare. "Vive le roy, Fy des elus," it ran: Long live the king, and down with revenue officers (A.A. A I 247; B.N. Mélanges Colbert 155; Le Roy Ladurie 1966: I, 607-610).

A stronger strain of class antagonism appeared in the last great series of seventeenth-century fiscal rebellions, the 1675 events in Brittany variously called the

Revolte du Papier Timbré, the Bonnets Rouges, and Torrében. Roughly speaking the "stamped paper revolt" took place in the cities, while the "red caps" or Torreben belonged to the Breton countryside. To finance the Dutch war, begun in 1672, Colbert had not only pumped up the regular taxes and bargained for special allocations from the provinces, but also enacted a series of excise taxes on merchandise and official paper -- ninety years before a similar Stamp Act set American colonists against their mother country. When imposed in 1675, those excise taxes roused serious popular movements in many parts of France: Le Mans, Poitiers, Agen, and elsewhere. A generation after the Ormée, an insurgent force again took over Bordeaux: in late March, 1675, after people attacked excise agents and pewterers who had let their wares be marked by the excise agents, anti-tax rebels controlled the city for a week. In August, crowds burned bundles of stamped paper and the boat bearing them, then besieged Bordeaux's city hall (B.N. *Mélanges Colbert* 171-172; Bercé 1974: I, 517-518).

Nevertheless, the largest series of rebellions by far occurred in Rennes and its hinterland. There, in April 1675, people attacked the newly-established tobacco sales office, then went on a round of other excise and registry offices, sacking as they went. Shortly after, the people of Nantes did likewise. Then it was the turn of Brittany's rural areas, where excise taxes were a relatively minor concern.

In the countryside, peasants went after landlords and their agents. "It is certain," wrote the duc de Chaulnes, military governor, to Colbert, "that nobles here have treated peasants badly; the peasants are now taking their revenge; they have dealt with five or six of the nobles barbarously, assaulting them, sacking their houses, and even burning a few houses down" (Depping 1850-1855: I, 547, letter of 30 June 1675). The Marquis of Lavardin shared that opinion:

The peasants are still gathered in various places around Quimper and Corentin, and have even threatened Quimper. It seems that their anger is aimed at the gentlemen rather than at the authority of the king. They have returned to the

gentlemen some of the beatings the gentlemen have given them. Since they live under a very hard Custom we call the Usage of Broerek, which takes inheritance rights away from the peasants, they are forcing the landlords to give them receipts for their back rents on these properties . . . (B.N. Melanges Colbert 172, letter of 5 July 1675).

In some parts of rural Brittany, indeed, rebellious peasants went so far as to draft "peasant codes" in counter-images of the hard Customs under which they had been living, and to force signatures of those codes from their landlords. The code ratified under duress by the Carmelite monks of Pont-l'Abbé addressed the "noble city-dwellers" on behalf of the "well-intentioned" people of surrounding parishes. It included these items:

1. The inhabitants promise on pain of death to give aid, men, arms, and food to said well-intentioned people whenever called to do so by deputy or by sounding of the tocsin.
2. They will have their Syndic publish in their cities the revocation of all edicts contravening the rights and privileges of our province.
3. Neither they nor their associates will pay *corvées*, champart, or rents shown on the old rolls of 1625. On pain of a beating.
4. All innkeepers are forbidden to sell wine at more than 10 sous a pot, at the same penalty.
5. Judges are forbidden to charge more than 45 sous for an inventory.
6. Notaries are forbidden to use stamped paper, to charge more than 5 sous for a lease, or 13 sous for any transaction whatsoever, under the same penalty.
7. Clerks and officers of the official registry are forbidden to use stamped paper, and to charge more than 10 sous for an attestation. Nothing for an attestation from one lawyer to another.
8. The same prohibitions for lawyers as to stamped paper, and to finish all cases, however difficult, within a month, on pain of a beating.
9. Judges must announce their judgments free, not charge for them, and judge by common sense rather than trickery.
10. All sorts of residents may hunt on the lands of their lords, outside of game preserves.
11. Everyone may shoot the lord's pigeons when they are off the lord's land.
12. Rectors, vicars, cures and all priests are forbidden to take more than 5 sous for a mass, and they must do burials for 8 sous.

13. Said rectors, municipal Syndics, and vestrymen will be deputies to the Estates to complain to His Majesty's agents about the misery of his people, and to obtain the privileges stated in this document.

Enacted in the assembly of the well-intentioned on this happy day of a miserable year (Garlan and Nières 1975: 99-100).

The enactment of a peasant paradise -- never realized, one need hardly add -- marks a significant shift in the emphasis of seventeenth-century rebellions. At this point, hostility to landlords and to petty officials outweighed opposition to new taxes. In that sense, at least, the Bonnets Rouges looked forward to the eighteenth century.

#### So-Called Reformed Religion and its Defenders

The century's last great series of rebellions, however, grew from a century-old struggle. From the 1630s to the 1670s, the government ground away at the "so-called Reformed Religion" intermittently and without drama. By the 1670s, the Protestants of Languedoc had lost their noble leaders and great protectors, but still dominated the Cevennes and Vivarais, and still had a considerable following among the artisans and small merchants of the cities. Without patricians or patrons, they organized strenuous resistance to the long, long royal campaign against them.

Local battles with Catholics continued. A case in point occurred in the Protestant stronghold of le Mas d'Azil, near Pamiers, in October 1671. A day-laborer who had recently converted to Catholicism

was attacked in the middle of the fair by François and David Cave, former Huguenots . . . and many others armed with swords and staves. They wounded him so badly that he was left for dead . . . The Brother Prior and a Benedictine monk who happened by complained to them . . . and they shouted against the day-laborer Get the Rebel, Get the Rebel, for taking a religion that is worthless to its supporters and other words forbidden by law on pain of death (Wemyss 1961: 36, quoting interrogations of witnesses).

But no sustained, large-scale conflict developed at Mas d'Azil or elsewhere until after 1680, when the government of Louis XIV began the campaign to squeeze out Protestants.

At the provincial level, intendant d'Aguesseau was encouraging compliance by the simple expedient of suspending payments to Protestant officeholders: a "sure way

to multiply conversions", he called it (A.N. G 7 295, letter of 8 March 1680). In Mas d'Azil the campaign started in earnest with the decree of 29 April 1680, which forbade Protestants to sit on a city council they had previously divided equally with the Catholic minority. In 1685, after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, local people went through the mechanics of conversion to Catholicism en masse and without open resistance. A trickle of emigration began. The "new converts" of Mas-d'Azil survived by stratagem and subterfuge. The first serious confrontations there began after the Peace of Ryswick (1697), when word spread that royal policy toward Protestants was going to relax. Local Protestants -- not nearly so converted as it had seemed -- began holding secret "assemblies", or church services, in the countryside. Royal persecution drove Protestant religious practice back underground very quickly that time. But whenever royal authorities and Catholic clergy turned their attention elsewhere, the hidden organization of local Protestants started to reemerge (Wemyss 1961: 96-107).

Elsewhere in Languedoc the struggle between Protestants and royal authorities turned to open rebellion, to civil war. The cockpits were the mountain regions of Vivarais and Cévennes. Back to the 1620s of Louis XIII's anti-Protestant campaigns and the 1630s of the Montmorency rebellion, Cévennes and Vivarais had often mounted substantial opposition to the crown. When the duc de Rohan had lost to the royal offensive of 1622, for example, his troops received permission to retreat into the Protestant safety of the Cévennes. The new element later in the century was the exchange of noble leaders and private armies for assemblies of common people protected by their own improvised militias.

As early as 1653 "a band of seven or eight thousand Protestants tried to establish by force of arms the right to hold services at Vals in the Vivarais" (Bonney 1978: 398). That became the standard pattern: Protestants assembled to hold forbidden services in the countryside, royal officials sent troops to stop them, the

"assemblies in the desert" evolved into armed rebellions. By August 1683, d'Aguesseau was reporting that the Huguenots of the Vivarais "are organized by companies under designated leaders. They have taken various castles, have dug in, have ammunition and weapons and, in a word, show every sign of intending to resist the king's troops, aroused as they are by ministers who preach nothing but sedition and rebellion" (A.N. G 7 296).

With the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, a new intendant came in with a mandate to clear out Languedoc's Protestants. The famous intendant Baviile began his work with energy, and cautious optimism. After losing two officers in the course of a cavalry charge on an assembly of "new converts" near Le Vigan, Basville wrote:

I have been in the mountains for six days, and have set a strong example; it cost the life of a gentleman named Saint-Julien who was at the assembly; he had his head cut off. I also sentenced seven other defendants to be hanged. That and the movement of troops into the communities responsible for the assembly have worried the country. In any other region one might hope that such a punishment would put people on their good behavior, but these people are so crazy and stupid that I'm afraid they won't remember it very long. For the moment, they are off their heads with the ridiculous rumor that a League has formed in Germany against our king, to reestablish the Edict of Nantes. Nevertheless all the assemblies have been broken up. No regular ministers are preaching; the preachers are only miserable carders and peasants who lack common sense; I hope to arrest two or three of them, but haven't yet managed to find them (A.N. G 7 297, letter of 15 October 1686).

As it happened, there were many preachers, a nearly inexhaustible supply of inspired men, women, boys, and girls. And they had defenders. Soon Baviile was sending armies into the hills to search out and exterminate Protestant guerrilla forces, who eventually became known as Camisards. With many interruptions and changes of fortune, the War of the Camisards lasted twenty-five years.

#### Bread Nexus vs. Cash Nexus

As the hills of Languedoc blazed, elsewhere in France the food riot came into its own. Around the end of the seventeenth century, the food riot displaced the tax rebellion as the most frequent occasion on which ordinary people collectively and

openly attacked their enemies. Conflicts over food had, of course, arisen repeatedly before. Tax rebellions themselves sometimes concerned food indirectly: rank-and-file participants in tax rebellions rarely had the chance to explain themselves for the record; when they did, however, they commonly pointed out that in times of short food, high prices, and hunger, demands for new taxes added insult to injury (cf. Le Roy Ladurie 1966: I, 499-502, on the Croquants of 1643). When authorities dared to raise money by taxing grain, as they did with the cosse tax at Narbonne in 1682, they almost always faced determined resistance; at Narbonne, that resistance reached the scale of sedition (A.N. G 7 296-298). But the food riot, in the strict sense -- seizure and redirection of stored or transported food, with or without attacks on the food's owners or their premises -- were rare events before the 1690s, and common for 150 years after that.

It was not that hunger became more intense: over France as a whole, the famines of 1631-32 and 1661-62 were probably even more acute than the shortage of 1693-94; yet only the 1690s brought the food riot to center stage. Nor did some revolution of rising expectations make officials and ordinary people more sensitive to the suffering brought on by high prices and short supplies. During the crisis of 1661-62, for example, we find officials through much of France busy making pleas and inventing expedients to hold off hunger and its consequences: The Estates of Burgundy asking Colbert to "consider the universal famine and the terrible conditions for tax collection" and grant them a delay in their payments, the officers of Paris exercising meticulous control over grain sales and distributing bread to the poor at the Tuileries, and so on (B.N. Mélanges Colbert 109, 109bis). Paris is an important case: great city, brain and belly of the national market, stimulus to market gardening and large-scale capitalist agriculture over a large region, troublemaker by reputation, yet relatively free of public conflicts over food in 1661-62. In Paris during that famine, the royal courts and the city administration collaborated in enforcing tight controls

over the purchase, shipment, and distribution of food for, to, and in the city (B.N. Joly de Fleury 2531; Saint-Germain 1962: 269). Under those conditions, people did not collectively seize food and attack its holders; they did not make food riots.

What changed between then and the 1690s? The growth of cities and of wage-labor increased the number of people dependent on the purchase of food; perhaps it also made supplying them more difficult. The moderation of overall price levels for grains in the later seventeenth century, however, throws doubt on that factor as a major explanation. The diversion of marketed grain to the army on the eastern front surely put a severe strain on the national market from the 1660s to the 1690s. But the big change was the national state's promotion of marketing. From the time of Colbert's rise to chief minister, the government strove to assure French prosperity, and the crown's tax revenues, by encouraging trade. The encouragement certainly included the production and shipping of grain for sale. It gave profits to merchants who could assure a supply to Paris or the army. And it began to define all the old parochial controls over the grain trade -- inventorying, withholding, distributing locally at a fixed price, giving priority to local people, especially the local poor -- as retrograde. As a result, local and regional officials who tried to feed their own people first, and only then to let commodities enter the national market, found themselves at odds with ministers, intendants, and merchants who argued that national needs should take priority. Given that policy, shortages, and high prices, officials hesitated to impose the old controls. Then it was up to ordinary people to create their own controls. The various popular efforts to control the food supply, and to coerce officials and merchants into restoring the old rules, came to be known as food riots.

In Paris, 1692 and 1693 brought the century's first great wave of food riots. More often than not, a crowd of women, plus a few men and children, broke into a baker's shop, seized the bread, and sacked the premises. When that happened in May



1693, for example, city police commissioner La Reynie had a worker who led the attack on a baker's shop in the rue de Lourcine hanged at the Saint-Marcel gate the very next day (Clement 1866: 255). Still attacks on bakers continued in Paris, as people in the city's hinterland continued to block shipments when they could. Flanders was again a battleground, where it was hard to distinguish conflicts over food from the usual turmoil of war. But in Languedoc, Burgundy, and Anjou, the crisis and the food riots lasted up to the harvest of 1694. One of the more dramatic confrontations occurred in Toulouse at the beginning of May 1694. As touring royal official Abrancourt reported from Toulouse on 5 May:

Being here for the purposes of royal tax collection, I thought I should tell you what is going on. The common people here have been mutinous for five days without good reason. There have been such large mobs gathered to massacre the mayor that last Sunday, coming back from a meeting of the Hotel Dieu by the Garonne bridge, only by a miracle did he escape from the hands of two thousand women with daggers, clubs, and stones. The soldiers of the watch who were escorting him suffered wounds from the stones and his carriage door was broken. The bakers, claiming that the official bread price was too low for the cost of grain did not bake as much as usual. The beggars took that pretext to pillage the bread they found in a few shops. Then the mayor raised the price of bread to get rid of the problem and give the bakers their due. Then the little folk took the excuse of that increase and, knowing yesterday morning that the mayor had gone to the courthouse, the same number of women went to occupy the courthouse while the Grande Chambre de la Tournelle was meeting. They asked for the mayor's head, saying they wanted that, not bread (A.N. G 7 302).

Both Abrancourt and Toulouse's mayor claimed the protest occurred because of an earlier dispute between the mayor and the Parlement, so serious that the women might well have thought the Parlement would back them. In any case, the mayor and council, sitting as a court, sentenced Catherine Thémines, wife of Pierre Alibert, who worked at the Tobacco Office called "La Rouergue", to hang, and three other women to be banished from Toulouse. The mayor thought, in his letter on the subject, that the Parlement would mitigate the sentences on review (A.N. G 7 302). After all, the judges still had a score to settle with him. In this way, the lowly food riot acquired connections with high politics.

As the great crisis of the 1690s ended, the crown resumed its policy of promoting the national market and assuring food to the capital and the army. The policy itself required important choices, as we learn from Burgundy's intendant Ferrand. As the harvest of 1694 approached, he wrote about a request to send some 60 thousand 200-pound sacks of grain to Lyon: "The problem is not to supply that much, but to be sure that the shipment wouldn't mean a significant decrease in the amount available for the armies of the King and the city of Paris" (A.N. G 7 1634, letter of 24 August 1694). The intendant understood national priorities. He increasingly had the means to make them prevail.

### A Fateful Century

Think back to the start of the seventeenth-century. Looking out of the rubble left by the Wars of Religion, observing the weakness of the crown, watching the maneuvers of dukes and princes, one would have been daring to predict the growth of a powerful, centralized state out of that rubble. Nevertheless it happened. Henry IV, Louis XIII, Louis XIV, and their mighty ministers squeezed, cajoled, and stomped the means of warmaking from a reluctant population; built a powerful national army; conquered territory to their north, east, and south; quelled or coopted their greatest internal enemies; and in the process created the far-reaching apparatus of a national state. In doing so, they built an uneasy alliance with France's capitalists. On the one side, the kings relied on capitalists to mobilize and advance the money required for all this expensive activity, to generate trade which would produce taxable revenue, to buy the offices and privileges that secured long-term loans to the crown. On the other side, the kings made wars which hampered international trade, seized and taxed accumulations of capital wherever they could find them, regulated economic life in the interests of royal revenues, and borrowed so heavily as to undermine the government's credit.

If the government those great kings had created by 1700 was far more potent

than its predecessor of 1600, the kings had to some extent exchanged a parceling out of sovereignty among regional magnates for a parceling out of sovereignty among thousands of officeholders. If they had enormously increased the resources at the disposal of their ministers, they had also multiplied the royally-certified claims on those resources. By straining the economy to its limit, they had committed themselves to constant worry, surveillance, and intervention. The vast apparatus was far from self-regulating; any relaxation of centralized control produced a new crisis, as claimants helped themselves and ordinary citizens stiffened their resistance.

Those turbulent, contradictory processes created the common features of the century's collective action. Those processes explain the extraordinary impact of war and preparations for war on ordinary people's collective action. They explain the overwhelmingly defensive character of that collective action -- the defense of crucial rights against violation, the defense of precious goods and services against expropriation. They explain the prevalence of tax rebellion, in one form or another, through most of the century. They explain the remarkable readiness of villagers and city-dwellers alike to join rebellions against royal authority, despite recurrent losses and spectacular repression. They explain the domination of the collective-action repertoire by routines which resemble that of mutiny.

Among the recurrent protests and rebellions, however, some critical changes occurred. During the first half of the seventeenth century, it was common to see a set of people who had an established right to gather -- at least under some circumstances -- assembling, deliberating, appointing a leader or deputy, and then declaring by word or deed their unwillingness to comply with a demand from authorities. "Seditions" and "rebellions" often began in just that way. As the century moved on and the state sapped local autonomies, such deliberative assemblies lost much of their importance as bases of resistance. Embattled Huguenots continued their own form of assembly, while provincial Estates and sovereign courts kept on

deliberating, but for most Frenchmen that form of action became either impossible or ineffectual as a means of redressing their greatest grievances. Instead, ordinary people found themselves banging on the doors and windows of those who had retained or acquired the right to deliberate effectively. They used authorized assemblies of the whole population, such as festivals and public ceremonies, to convey their opinions. They undertook direct action, sometimes including guerrilla, against their oppressors and their delinquent protectors. They stepped in to impose the controls and punishments authorities had failed to deliver. They took the law into their own hands. If the deliberately rebellious assembly declined, the food riot and the popular avenging action rose.

These changes linked to another fundamental seventeenth-century alteration: the withdrawal of regional powerholders from popular rebellion. Up to the Fronde, great lords were often available -- at a price -- as protectors and allies against royal authority. The price could easily rise too high, as it did during the Fronde. But in the meantime noble protection and alliance offered access to military expertise and a chance to bargain from strength. With the defeat of the Fronde, the absorption of nobles into the royal party, the increasing dependence of those nobles on privileges (not least, relative exemption from ever-increasing taxes), and the systematic undermining of autonomous power bases within the country, nobles great and small became less and less available as partners in rebellion. Rebellion did not disappear. It became less frequent, and less dangerous to the government's survival. And it changed character, creating its own leaders, relying more heavily on existing community structure, aiming even more directly at the oppressors and oppressions endured by ordinary people. Class war was on its way.

NOTE. This paper is a lightly-retouched draft of chapter four of a book in progress, The Contentious French. Some material in the paper has also appeared in "Contention and Peasant Rebellion in Seventeenth-Century France" (CRSO Working Paper 208, 1980), and in the version of that paper printed in As Sociology Meets History (New York: Academic Press, 1981). The National Science Foundation supported some of the research reported here. I am also indebted to the Horace Rackham School of Graduate Studies, University of Michigan, and to the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, for support. Daniele Rodamer, Nels Christiansen, Mary Jo Peer, Arthur Zabenco and Denis Reynaud gave indispensable assistance in compiling the evidence, while Dawn Hendricks provided her usual cheery and efficient help with bibliography.

## REFERENCES

- Jean-Robert Armogathe and Philippe Joutard  
 1972 "Bâville et la guerre des Camisards," *Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine* 19:44-67.
- Micheline Baulant  
 1968 "Le prix des grains à Paris de 1431 à 1788," *Annales; Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations* 23: 520-540.
- William H. Beik  
 1974a "Magistrates and Popular Uprisings in France Before the Fronde: The Case of Toulouse," *Journal of Modern History* 46: 585-608.  
 1974b "Two Intendants Face a Popular Revolt: Social Unrest and the Structure of Absolutism in 1645," *Canadian Journal of History* 9: 243-262.
- Yves-Marie Bercé  
 1964 "De la criminalité aux troubles sociaux: la noblesse rurale du Sud-Ouest de la France sous Louis XIII," *Annales du Midi* 76: 41-60.  
 1974 *Histoire des Croquants. Etude des soulèvements populaires au XVIIe siècle dans le Sud-Ouest de la France*. Paris: Droz. 2 vols.
- Arthur de Boislisle  
 1874- ed., *Correspondance des Contrôleurs Généraux des Finances avec*  
 1896 *les intendants des provinces*. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale. 3 vols.  
 1903 "Le grand hiver et la disette de 1709," *Revue des questions historiques*, n.s. 29: 442-509; n.s. 30: 486-542.
- Richard Bonney  
 1978a "The French Civil War, 1649-53," *European Studies Review* 8: 71-100.  
 1978b *Political Change under Richelieu and Mazarin, 1624-1661*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Robin Briggs

1977 Early Modern France, 1560-1715. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Michel Caillard

1963 "Recherches sur les soulèvements populaires en Basse-Normandie (1620-1640) et spécialement sur la révolte des Nu-Pieds," pp. 23-154 in Michel Caillard et al., *A travers la Normandie des XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles*. Caen: Annales de Normandie. Cahiers des Annales de Normandie, 3.

Pierre Chaunu

1977 "L'Etat" in Pierre Chaunu and Richard Gascon, *L'Etat et la ville*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. *Histoire économique et sociale de la France* (eds. Fernand Braudel and Ernest Labrousse), t. I, v. 1.

J.-J. Clamagèran

1867- *Histoire de l'impôt en France*. Paris: Guillaumin.

1876 3 vols.

Pierre Clément

1861- *Lettres, instructions et memoires de Colbert*. Paris: Imprimerie

1869 Nationale. 6 vols.

1866 *La Police sous Louis XIV*. Paris: Didier.

A. Communay

1893 ed., Audijos. *La Gabelle en Gascogne*. Paris: Champion.

P. Coquelle

1908 "La sédition de Montpellier en 1645, d'après des documents inédits des Archives des Affaires Etrangères," *Annales du Midi* 20: 66-78.

Albert Croquez

1912 *La Flandre wallonne et les pays de l'intendance de Lille sous Louis XIV*. Paris: Champion

C.S.L. Davies

1973 "Peasant Revolt in France and England: A Comparison," *Agricultural History Review* 21: 122-134.

Julian Dent

1973 *Crisis in Finance: Crown, Financiers, and Society in Seventeenth-Century France*. Newton Abbot: David & Charles.

G.B. Depping

1850- *Correspondance administrative sous le règne de Louis XIV*. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale. 4 vols.

Pierre Deyon

1964 "A propos des rapports entre la noblesse française et la monarchie absolue pendant la première moitié du XVIIe siècle," *La Revue Historique* 88: 341-356.

1967 *Amiens capitale provinciale*. Paris: Mouton.

Arie Theodorus Van Doersen

- 1960 Professions et métiers interdits. Un aspect de l'histoire de la révocation de l'Edit de Nantes. Groningen: J.B. Wolters.

Madeleine Foisil

- 1970 La Révolte des Nu-Pieds et les révoltes normandes de 1639. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

F. Veron Duverger de Forbonnais

- 1758 Recherches et considerations sur les finances de France depuis l'année 1595 jusqu'à l'année 1721. Basel: Frères Cramer.

Jean Fourastie

- 1969 L'Evolution des prix a long terme. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Georges Frêche

- 1974 Toulouse et la region Midi-Pyrénées au siècle des Lumières (vers 1670-1789). Paris: Cujas.

Yvon Garlan and Claude Nières

- 1975 Les révoltes bretonnes de 1675. Papier Timbré et Bonnets Rouges. Paris: Editions Sociales.

Pierre Goubert

- 1960 Beauvais et le Beauvaisis de 1600 a 1730. Paris: SEVPEN.  
1967 ed., L'Avènement du Roi-Soleil, 1661. Paris: Gallimard/Juillard. "Archives".

Albert N. Hamscher

- 1976 The Parlement of Paris After the Fronde 1653-1673. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Robert R. Harding

- 1978 Anatomy of a Power Elite. The Provincial Governors of Early Modern France. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Pierre Héliot

- 1935 "La guerre dite du Lustucru et les privilèges du Boulonnais," Revue du nord 21: 265-318.

Edward Herbert (J.M. Shuttleworth, ed.)

- 1976 The Life of Edward, First Lord Herbert of Cherbury, written by himself. London: Oxford University Press.

Peter Heylyn

- 1656 France Painted to the Life by a Learned and Impartial Hand. London: William Leake.

Jacques Hillairet

- 1970 La rue Saint-Antoine. Paris: Editions de Minuit.

## Jean Jacquart

- 1956 "Une paroisse rurale de la région parisienne: Morangis aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles," *Mémoires de la Fédération des Sociétés Historiques et Archéologiques de Paris et de l'Île de France* 8: 187-211.
- 1960 "La Fronde des Princes dans la région parisienne et ses conséquences matérielles," *Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine* 7: 257-290.

## Philippe Joutard

- 1965 ed., *Journaux camisards, 1700/1715*. Paris: Union Centrale d'Editions. "10/18".
- 1976 ed., *Les Camisards*. Paris: Gallimard/Juillard. "Archives".

## Sharon Kettering

- 1978 *Judicial Politics and Urban Revolt in Seventeenth-Century France. The Parlement of Aix, 1629-1659*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

## Ernst Heinrich Kossmann

- 1954 *La Fronde*. Leiden: Universitaire Pers Leiden.

## A. Leguai

- 1965 "Les 'émotions' et séditions populaires dans la généralité de Moulins au XVIIe et XVIIIe siècle," *Revue d'Histoire Economique et Sociale* 43: 44-65.

## Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie

- 1966 *Les paysans de Languedoc*. Paris: SEVPEN. 2 vols.

## Charles Liagre

- 1934 "Les hostilités dans la région de Lille," *Revue du Nord* 20: 111-130.

## A.D. Liublinskaya

- 1966 *Vnutriennaya politika frantsuskovo absolutismo*. Moscow/Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka".

## F. Loirette

- 1966 "Une émeute paysanne au début du gouvernement personnel de Louis XIV: la sédition de Bénauge (dec. 1661-janv. 1662)," *Annales du Midi* 78: 515-536.

## Nicolo Machiavelli

- 1969 "Sopra la primi deca di Tito Livio," pp. 73-344 in *Opere* (Ezio Raimondi, ed.). Milan: Mursia.

## Alice Marcet

- 1977 "Une révolte antifiscale et nationale: les Angelets du Vallespir 1663-1672," *Actes du 102e Congrès National des Sociétés Savantes*, Limoges 1977. *Histoire Moderne*, t. I: 35-48.



- Jean Meyer  
1975 "Le XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle et sa place dans l'évolution à long terme,"  
XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle 106-107: 23-57.
- Michel Mollat  
1971 ed., Histoire de l'Île de France et de Paris. Toulouse: Privat.
- Antoine Montchrestien  
1889 Traité de l'économie politique. Paris: Plon. First published  
[1615] in 1615.
- A. Lloyd Moote  
1971 The Revolt of the Judges. The Parlement of Paris and the Fronde,  
1643-1652. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Roland Mousnier  
1964 ed., lettres et mémoires adressés au Chancelier Séguier  
(1633-1649). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 2 vols.  
1978 Paris capitale au temps de Richelieu et Mazarin. Paris: Pédone.
- John U. Nef  
1940 Industry and Government in France and England, 1540-1640. Ithaca,  
N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
- E. O'Reilly  
1882 Mémoires sur la vie publique et privée de Claude Pellot. Paris:  
Champion. 2 vols.
- Pierre Pierrard  
1978 Histoire du Nord. Flandre - Artois - Hainaut - Picardie. Paris:  
Hachette.
- René Pillorget  
1975 Les mouvements insurrectionnels de Provence entre 1596 et 1715.  
Paris: Pédone.
- Henri Platelle  
1964 "Un village du Nord sous Louis XIV: Rumégies," Revue du Nord  
46: 489-516.
- Boris Porchnev  
1963 Les soulèvements populaires en France de 1623 à 1648. Paris:  
SEVPEN.
- Marcel Reinhard, André Armengaud, and Jacques Dupâquier  
1968 Histoire générale de la population mondiale. Paris:  
Montchrestien.
- Daniel Robert  
1967 "Louis XIV et les Protestants," XVII<sup>e</sup> Siècle 76-77: 39-52.
- Jacques Saint-Germain  
1962 La Reynie et la police au Grand Siècle. Paris: Hachette.

Alexandre Thomas

1844 Une province sous Louis XIV. Situation politique et administrative de la Bourgogne de 1661 à 1715. Paris: Joubert.

Alice Wemyss

1961 Les Protestants du Mas-d'Azil. Histoire d'une résistance. Toulouse: Privat.

Martin Wolfe

1972 The Fiscal System of Renaissance France. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Philippe Wolff

1967 Histoire du Languedoc. Toulouse: Privat.