
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE ANTI-NUCLEAR POWER MOVEMENT:

REALLY A WORKING PAPER

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Emilie Schmeidler

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Linda Kaboolian, Bert Useem, and Mayer Zald assisted and consulted on the project.

This working paper is intended to help further study, rather than as an analysis-- or even a full description -- of the anti-nuclear power movement. It is the product of a series of efforts by several people.

Initially, we assumed the anti-nuke movement was comprised of both special interest and general interest groups, and we decided to concentrate on those groups which were trying to effect decisions on the national level. In order to locate organizations comprising the social movement, Linda Kaboolian identified the interests we expected to have represented in the social movement: peace, consumer, environmental, scientific, labor, and women's groups.

She began collecting names of organizations which appeared in the media and contacted a Washington lobbyist. She then telephoned these organizations, and solicited the names of other organizations from them. In the summer of 1979, she conducted 12 open-ended interviews in New York, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C. In the spring of 1981, Emilie Schmeidler collected information on a less formal basis from seven informants. (In order to preserve confidentiality, we are not listing the names of our informants; contact us if you need specific information.)

In addition to our interviews, we collected printed information from each organization, the media, and published material. These printed sources are listed with each organizational summary.

Besides these national organizations, we have included the Clamshell Alliance as an organization focussed around a more specific local issue. For this, Emilie Schmeidler conducted three personal interviews and one telephone interview during the spring of 1981.

The body of this working paper describes these organizations in terms of eight categories: history, organizational structure, goals and targets, strategy and tactics, resources, alliances within the movement, relations with authorities, and relations with opponents. The account of the Clamshell Alliance is somewhat more

extensive to show how these categories might be used to examine changes within an organization over time.

In these descriptions, we have noted explicitly places where information was lacking in order to alert others to the kinds of information they might want to obtain, but which we did not find readily available.

CRITICAL MASS (CM)

HISTORY

In November 1974, Ralph Nader organized a "Critical Mass Convention" with workshops and resource people; about 300 anti-nuclear activists attended. In February 1975, a steering committee set up a Critical Mass office in Washington. In November 1975, 1000 people came from all over the country to a second Critical Mass convention.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Critical Mass is one of the 15 organizations begun by Ralph Nader, and one to five (Public Citizen, Congress Watch, Critical Mass, Tax Reform Research Group, and Public Interest Research Group of Washington) which deal with energy issues. Funding comes through Public Citizen and through subscriptions to the Critical Mass Journal (CMJ). Apparently Nader makes the decisions about the size of allocations to the various groups, staffing, pay, etc. There is at least some consultation with the staff (for example, discussion about who to respond to the opportunities they saw as a result of Three Mile Island; see below under Tactics), but I've little information about either the formal or informal structure other than that Nader makes most of the major decisions.

Apparently CM has quite a small staff. (It is difficult to tell just how small: McFarland says there are 10-15 people working on energy issues in all five Nader organizations. The masthead for CMJ lists 10-20 people, mostly as "contributors;" but it is not clear what relations these people have to CM: not all people who have articles in the issue are listed as contributors, and all the contributors may not be members of CM.)

The staff of CM is primarily young and middle class. Nader's policy has been for the staff to work for low pay; this results in considerable turnover. Most of the staff are drawn from somewhat related work, e.g., local PIRGs, journalism, work with legislators; they work for CM temporarily, e.g., until they need more money or go back to school. Linda's informant spoke of seeing the work as a kind of

training, and spoke of intending to continue doing similar kinds of work long after she left CM.

There are organizational inefficiencies because of the high turnover among the staff. It is not a membership organization: its membership is the same as its subscription list, and the subscribers do not have any formal control over decisions.

TARGETS AND GOALS

There are the broader goals of Nader and the Nader organizations as a whole, and the specific goals of CM. The overarching goals of the Nader organizations are conservation, low-energy growth, a moratorium on nuclear development, governmental regulation of gas and oil prices, and scrupulous environmental restrictions on development of oil and coal; they support the development of solar power (as long as it is not high technology). (These are the goals pertinent to CM; there are another related set which have to do with consumers' rights.) Most broadly, "corporate America" is the opponent. The immediate targets for much of their actions are governmental and regulatory bodies (legislatures, the NRC, etc.).

CM's stated goal is the development of safe, efficient energy, it opposes the development of nuclear power as being neither safe nor efficient. Although members of the staff see connections with the issue of nuclear weapons, CM focuses on nuclear power and related safety issues. Its targets have been legislative and regulatory bodies, primarily.

STRATEGY AND TACTICS

I have little sense of CM's broad strategic thinking. The only issue on which I have any information about strategy is CM's response to TMI. Before TMI, CM mainly concentrated on issues of safety, for example studying accidents in the transporting of nuclear wastes, problems of storage, and the use of radioactive materials in hospitals. In response to TMI, many people turned to CM for information. CM decided to organize around the concerns for safety (rather than bring in the issue of nuclear weapons), because the local people had not been mobilized before, and they were now

concerned about local safety issues. The CM staff thought the local people would not be critical of the use of nuclear weapons for national defense. The staff does see a connection between these issues, but thinks CM will be more likely to be able to mobilize this constituency if they go one step at a time.

Beyond organizing specifically around TMI, CM sees TMI as indicating that the anti-nuclear movement has a larger potential constituency than that to which it had been relating (i.e., anti-nuke activists). CM is discussing how to respond to this opportunity, especially how to do more grassroots organizing; and, at the time of Linda's interview, was searching for a person with organizing skills to be added to the staff.

CM's major activities have been providing information to local anti-nuclear groups, doing research, and lobbying. Critical Mass Journal (CMJ) is a monthly 12-16 page tabloid which

gives the reader a sense that he is part of a burgeoning nationwide movement by chronicling antinuclear activities in various areas; the latest antinuclear arguments; the latest information on Washington lobbying, with congressional voting charts; articles on the possibilities for conservation of energy; information on alternative sources of energy, especially solar power; inside information on what ERDA, FEA, and other federal agencies are up to; criticism of leading pro-nuclear advocates; and an annotated reading list of recent energy research, emphasizing federal documents and reports by public interest research groups.

Through CMJ, other publications, and through participation in coalitions, CM urges lobbying and provides some training for this. For example, in the May 6 demonstration, CM organized the lobbying which took place on May 7th (see relations with opponents for some more information on this). While CMJ reports civil disobedience with considerable enthusiasm, it urges its readers towards lobbying, presenting material to the NRC, and other forms of legal action.

In addition to trying to get others to lobby, and preparing materials to help them do so, CM itself lobbies, gathers names of individuals and groups willing to lobby, sent a public letter to Carter criticising energy policies, etc.

(It is interesting how differently CMJ seems to have dealt with TMI and Seabrook. CMJ reports favorably on Seabrook and other citizen group actions-- both legal and illegal. However, in CMJ there is no indication that CM did substantial rethinking in light of Seabrook, e.g., that it saw public response to Seabrook as indicating a potential constituency to organize. Similarly, Linda's informant mentions the impact of TMI in this respect, but not Seabrook. Three possible explanations: (1) Seabrook protestors used civil disobedience and CM uses legal tactics, therefore, Seabrook did not look like a model for CM; (2) the public invocation of safety concerns resonated with CM's long involvement on that basis; and (3) this is an artifact of my reliance on a few issues of CMJ and an interview which took place after TMI with an informant who had not been at CM during the Seabrook demonstrations.)

RESOURCES

Nader himself is a major resource for CM. Much of its funding comes through the Nader organizations, and CM's reputation for trustworthiness is because of Nader. However, CM doesn't control Nader: it can't simply tell him where to go and at which events to speak because there are far too many demands on his time and CM is only one of the organizations to which he relates. (I have no information about the size of CM's budget. McFarland says that the Nader organizations had a total of about \$2,000,000.)

CMJ cites a Harris poll in 1978 which showed 80% of the population wanted a crash program in development of solar power, and less than 50% wanted nuclear power plants constructed more rapidly.

The organizers of the May 6 demonstration claim 100,000 people attended, but few were members of minority groups. National figures at the demonstration included James Fonda, Ralph Nader, Dick Gregory, Jerry Brown, and sever musicians.

CMJ also reports figures about increased participation in local protest groups in the wake of TMI.

ALLIANCES

CM is mainly tied to the other Nader groups in terms of funding and setting priorities. (However, inferring from Linda's interviews with CM and PIRG, the groups do operate separately.)

CMJ and Linda's informant [redacted] both indicate that CM cooperates with a number of organizations; neither indicates points of competition. [redacted] describes the various groups in Washington--Union of Concerned Scientists, Friends of the Earth, Sierra Club, Environmental Health Center--as dividing up what had to be done so there would be little duplication of effort. CM worked with what it [redacted] described as a "diverse range of citizen, environmental, and labor groups" in organizing the May 6 demonstration. The CMJ reports favorably on activities by direct action and citizen groups, and refers its readers to many of these organizations.

RELATIONS WITH AUTHORITIES

CM is particularly critical of Schlesinger and the nuclear industry; it identifies them as being fundamentally untrustworthy. For example, in 1977, Schlesinger announced that environmental groups backed the Administration's energy proposals at a time when, in fact, the groups were still meeting to formulate their statement; CMJ proclaimed this as showing how the Administration was trying to use environmental groups, and said these groups should learn a lesson from this. (This is CMJ's account of the situation.) Similarly, in summarizing the lessons from TMI, CMJ stated that commercial industry is not well-suited to operate high-risk technologies safely, and that an industry which is not accountable for its actions will act recklessly.

In general, CM is critical of the NRC as having ties with the industry and as being irresponsible in letting the industry continue with little regulation and inadequate safeguards, despite repeated accidents and problems. Most of CMJ's coverage of TMI emphasized the NRC's irresponsibility; however, it

approved the NRC's May 21 moratorium on licensing new reactors, and said that some members of the NRC appeared interested in further restrictions on construction.

Also in response to TMI, CMJ reported Congressional probes and investigations, and the criticisms and reservations by members of Congress. It provides considerable discussion of these investigations and the potential legislation as positive steps. Particular members of Congress and state legislatures are identified as sympathetic with CM's stances. (It may be that there is more of this relatively positive coverage of legislation; I have only four issues of CMJ, so its hard to tell.) CMJ also reprinted a column from a national newspaper in which the columnist reports shifting from pro-nuclear to anti-nuclear on the basis of TMI.

RELATIONS WITH OPPONENTS

Following TMI, CM perceived the nuclear industry as increasing its level of activity, but not changing the types of actions--primarily public relations and lobbying. The industry asked employees to contact their representatives; this was an important impetus for CM deciding to use the May 6 demonstrations as an opportunity for massive lobbying. Linda's informant sees industry expenditures on lobbying as paying off for it, but sees its public relations as being a wasted effort. (It's not clear how she evaluates campaign contributions.) CMJ, however, took a more public stand denouncing industry propaganda, especially materials sent to schools.

CMJ, before TMI, mentions the industry's use of the media in a number of ways, e.g., pushing its own case and suppressing information about the dangers of nuclear power. It also accused the American Nuclear Energy Council of misrepresenting two governors as having urged the Carter administration to push for nuclear development when they had not done so.

There are no mentions, in the material I have, about the relations with pro-nuclear grassroots organizations.

PHYSICIANS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (PSR)

I HISTORY

PSR has had two phases. It was founded in 1962 by physicians, primarily in the Boston area, who were concerned about nuclear war. They chose to focus on medical rather than strategic or political considerations, and saw a need for the medical community and the public in general to have better information about the extent to which a nuclear bombing would be a catastrophe. In May 1962, PSR published a series of articles outlining the medical consequences of a thermonuclear war. PSR played an important role in passage of the Anti-Ballistics Missile Treaty, and remained active through the Vietnam War.

It was revived in 1978, largely through the leadership of Dr. Helen Caldicott. It has continued to place primary emphasis on sharing information and trying to mobilize the medical community for active opposition to nuclear dangers--war, weapons, power plants, the nuclear fuel cycle, etc. The discussion below concerns only this second phase of PSR.

Just at the time of TMI, PSR had placed a major ad in the New England Journal of Medicine. Following that, its membership increased dramatically as have requests for information. In the past two years, it has established chapters throughout the country, become a national organization, and hired staff.

II ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

PSR currently has a national office, more than 30 chapters, and more than 3000 members. It is governed by a board of directors and an executive committee. Individuals may join the PSR (i.e., need not be affiliated with a chapter). The chapters are fairly autonomous and free to determine their specific goals and actions within the framework of the larger organization. All contributions to the national office and divided 50-50 with the chapter in the area from which the contribution came (policy since 1/1/80). The chapters raise the rest of the money they need for their programs themselves.

When PSR revived, most of its members were in the Boston and San Francisco area. It had no regular staff (although it did have some temporary staffing by a medical student). By the time of TMI (March 1979), PSR had just over 300 members. By the end of 1980, it had about 3000 members, 25 formal chapters, and another 18 groups in the process of organizing as chapters. Most of the chapters have a core of 10-15 active members; some also have a large number of nominal members. Chapters vary in the proportion of medical students to established doctors.

During 1979, PSR hired staff; by the end of that year it had two full-time and two part-time staff members. As its program expanded, it has seen the need for more staff to meet particular needs (e.g., to train speakers or to handle press relations).

In 1979 and 1980, much of the work was carried out by members and staff in the Boston area. In 1980, the board and executive committee voted to create several national committees to take responsibility for the work which had been being done by those in the Boston area. These committees include the Technical Committee (for gathering and distributing technical information), Chapter Outreach, Medical Outreach, Labor Outreach, International Outreach, Press Committee, and Public Policy Committee.

I do not have information about the formal or informal relations among these various parts except that members are invited to join any committee in whose work they have interest.

PSR's budget for the national office for 1981 is \$110,230 (with additional budgets for speaker training and other projects). Of this, it planned to be able to raise \$70,000 from memberships, contributions, and sale of literature.

III GOALS AND TARGETS

PSR's main concern is with the medical hazards of nuclear radiation, and sees its purpose as providing information to the medical community and general public about the dangers from nuclear weapons, nuclear power, and the

nuclear fuel chain. It sees the medical consequences of nuclear war as so catastrophic, that much of its attention is on this; however, it sees the whole set of issues as related, and so opposes all these facets. (Caldicott, however, characterized nuclear power as compared to nuclear war as like "a pimple on a pumpkin.")

PSR identifies the major problems of nuclear power as being radioactive wastes, the dangers of nuclear accidents, and nuclear weapons proliferation. In addition to calling for nuclear weapon disarmament, PSR calls for a moratorium on construction of nuclear power plants and phasing out of existing ones, a comprehensive program to conserve energy and develop alternative sources of energy, and studies of populations exposed to nuclear radiation (e.g., uranium miners as well as the victims at Hiroshima).

PSR wants to affect both US and USSR governmental policies (and presumably those of other nations with nuclear weapons). Most of its work is educational, however, and for this its targets are primarily the medical community, and through it, the general public.

IV STRATEGY AND TACTICS

PSR has taken education of the medical profession and public as being critical aspects of the problem on which it will work. Its analysis is as follows. There is no way for physicians to treat the medical consequences of a nuclear attack; therefore the basic health issue is prevention rather than preparation for nuclear war. Physicians are widely respected and accustomed to reporting scientific findings. Therefore they make a potentially forceful pressure group for rational control over this destructive weaponry. Since physicians throughout the world share traditions, language, and practices, they are in a position to create an international movement against nuclear hazards.

PSR's program is overwhelmingly educational. It has put a high priority on training speakers and so encouraging physicians to speak as experts to the public, before government bodies and in courts, and through the media. It organizes symposia about the consequences of radiation, and especially about the catastrophic effects of a nuclear attack. Many of these have been oriented primarily at the medical community, e.g., are sponsored by medical schools. They rely heavily on presentations by experts, both from the medical profession and those with knowledge of the international arms race (e.g., former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and former director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Paul Warnke. PSR also presents its views to the medical community through articles in major medical journals, especially the New England Journal of Medicine, and at professional gatherings. PSR also makes public statements to the broader public, e.g., through news releases, press conferences, advertisements, and by organizing public lectures and film series.

The national office has been putting together a library of books, reprints, tapes, films, and cassettes for the use of its members. It is also assembling educational materials for rent or sale: informational packets on clinical and scientific literature on the medical hazards of nuclear radiation, power, and weapons.

In addition, those at the national level have given considerable attention to organizational issues. Initially they focussed primarily on getting some full-time staff and recruiting new members, e.g., by running ads in the New England Journal of Medicine and NY Times. PSR has not been satisfied with the limited amount of support it has been able to give new chapters, and so is working on developing a whole program of recruitment and chapter outreach. This includes a mass mailing to 500,000 doctors, analysis of which recruitment techniques have worked best, developing a package for starting new chapters, connecting with medical elites (where students predominate in chapters), fund-raising, and working with the broader movement.

A related concern has been over how to manage the increased workload and support it financially. PSR's initial solution was to hire staff. Then it organized nationwide committees in order that all the work would not fall on those in the Boston area.. These committees cover a range of activities, e.g., chapter outreach, making connections with the labor movement, urging members to work through other medical groups to make presentations and pass resolutions against nuclear weapons and nuclear power, identifying what expertise is available among chapter members so that PSR may draw on these people in response to the requests it gets for experts. In addition, PSR has developed fund-raising proposals for many aspects of its work during the past three years: national speaker training--\$23,225; technical information resources--\$40,500; media--\$17,500; chapter development--\$39,000; and national office support--\$39,500.

In addition to this work by the national organization, the chapters carry on their own programs. Many of these center around sharing information, e.g., through lectures, films, conferences. Others focus on conducting studies and putting together education material such as slide shows. A number of these have been in reference to particular local conflicts about power plants, uranium mining, or radioactive wastes. At least a few have become actively engaged in local conflicts, e.g., taking a nuclear power plant to court.

V RESOURCES

PSR describes itself as comprised of physicians, dentists, and students from these fields; non-physicians may join as associate members. (Interestingly, PSR does not give any indication that it tries to recruit nurses and other health-related professionals.) Both its literature and activities emphasize the special expertise of physicians and therefore their responsibility to take a firm stand on this as an issue of life and health. The role of doctor-as-expert seems to be the resource to which PSR gives most attention, and also the one which distinguishes it most from the other organizations in the anti-nuke

reports that its conferences, symposia, and lectures are well-attended (though the size of these meetings ranges considerably, e.g., 60-900). For these meetings, PSR relies heavily on experts from within the medical profession and from national and international affairs (e.g., Cyrus Vance and Paul Warnke). Its publicity emphasizes these experts' participation. Coverage of the major symposia by the media is improving, but PSR is working on improving it still further by hiring a staff person to work part-time specifically on relations with the media, rather than having this done on an ad hoc basis.

VI RELATIONS WITH ALLIES

PSR has established committees to deal with relations within the medical community (primarily to encourage its members to work through the various medical associations to which they belong) and to work with labor. In addition, one of the concerns of the chapter outreach committee is that chapters cooperate with other organizations in the broader movement. (However, I am not clear of just which movement PSR would consider itself to be a part.)

The PSR symposia mostly indicate relations within the medical community, e.g., joint sponsorship by major medical schools and participation by prestigious figures such as deans and department chairs. In addition, there are scattered reference to participation by people from other organizations or specific events co-sponsored by other organizations: Union of Concerned Scientists, Environmentalists for Full Employment, American Friends Service Committee, Environmental Policy Institute, Council for a Liveable World, etc. None of the materials I have (which are very limited in this respect) give any indication of conflict or competition with other organizations. However, they also give little sense of whether there are any sorts of continuing relations with groups other than the medical ones. On the other hand, PSR receives far more requests for speakers and information than it can handle. In 1979(?) national PSR reported that it had provided speakers for over 300 events, and that chapters received 1-10 requests for speakers each week.

PSR's labor committee has focused on occupational hazards, e.g., of uranium miners. Its members were involved in some coalition work and in the formation of the Labor Committee for Safe Energy and Full Employment. The PSR labor committee members see unions as primarily concerned about occupational safety issues. They see problems having arisen when anti-nuke activists erroneously assume that nuclear workers who are concerned about health and safety regulations are also opposed to nuclear power.

PSR issued a statement calling for Soviet physicians to join them in protesting nuclear weaponry. Members of PSR, including Caldicott, have met with Soviet physicians, issued a joint statement, and planned a joint meeting for March 1981.

VII RELATIONS WITH AUTHORITIES

In general, PSR seems to have had relatively positive relations with authorities in the sense that it is able to get a hearing for its position. In 1980 the Washington DC chapter organized an educational forum on "Health Effects of Radiation" for Congress. PSR's major symposia are receiving increasing amounts of media coverage--though more radio and print media and only a little on TV.

On the other hand, PSR's basic position is critical of the federal government, calling on both the US and USSR to stop the arms race and the threat of nuclear war. To this end, it had a full-page ad in the NY Times and made a public statement calling for change in policy and for physicians in both countries to join in this appeal. On this basis, PSR has begun working with physicians in the Soviet Union.

VIII RELATIONS WITH OPPONENTS

PSR's relations with the federal government are described above. Beyond that, I have no indication of national PSR focussing on others as opponents.

However, some of the chapters have undertaken projects directed against specific opponents. The New Mexico chapter accused the national coal and uranium

mining lobbies of being willing to sacrifice everyone else to their narrow interests. The San Francisco chapter has become very involved in trying to arouse public opinion against the University of California Livermore Nuclear Weapons Laboratory. The Portland, Oregon, chapter has taken legal action to assure that the Energy Facilities Siting Council will review the status of the Trojan Nuclear Power Plant. However, in none of these cases do I have any information about the nature of the chapter's interaction with its opponent.

UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (UCS)

I HISTORY

I have no information about the founding of the UCS. The only information I do have about its history is from one of its funding appeals which lists its accomplishments since 1971. All of these focus on nuclear safety, first its criticisms of the inadequacy of the AEC regulations (1971), and then pressure to replace the AEC (1974); a declaration signed by 2300 "members of the technical community" criticizing the nuclear power program and calling for a reduction in it (1975); and criticisms of the Rasmussen Report (1977) followed by exposure of hazardous conditions which were permitted on the basis of Rasmussen estimates of the probability of various kinds of accidents.

II ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

The UCS has about 85,000 dues-paying members. They have a minimal role in setting policy: periodically, UCS sends out a questionnaire in its mailings and gets information about membership concerns in this way. Policy is set, officially, by the board of directors; I have no information about how the board is selected or about its composition.

The UCS is primarily a staff organization. It has two offices, the main office in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and another in Washington, D.C. The Cambridge office sets policy, but I have no other information about its size or work. The Washington office has a staff of four and concentrates in lobbying both in Congress and with the NRC. Linda's informant (~~Lisa~~ Shulock), located in the Washington office, perceived the Cambridge office as more conservative, and saw the Washington office as being more concerned to involve the membership. She saw the office as having made some changes in that direction, e.g., having staff help in the May 6 demonstration.

III TARGETS AND GOALS

The UCS defines its goal as stopping nuclear power until it is proven safe. Its emphasis is on issues of safety and health; its position

is that since the nuclear power plants are unsafe now, they should be opposed for now. Some members believe the plants could be made safe enough to live with, but that since this would be very expensive, and nuclear power is already too expensive to be viable, nuclear power is unlikely ever to be made safe enough. Because of this concern with issues of health and safety, UCS does oppose nuclear weapons--but in terms of arms control, not disarmament. UCS does not take a position on the issue of centralization of power.

UCS's ultimate target is the nuclear power industry which it identifies as being more concerned with protecting its investments than protecting citizens. UCS's immediate target is the government--primarily Congress and the NRC--which the staff approach both directly and through the membership:

...What concerns us is that the Federal government, which still promotes nuclear power vigorously, will seek a hasty, politically motivated, cosmetic solution instead of a safe, long-range plan....
from a funding appeal, p. 2

IV STRATEGY AND TACTICS

UCS's tactics center around education, lobbying, and testifying. It sees itself as having credibility because of its scientific base and access to experts, and because it does not demonstrate. It uses this expertise to analyse safety issues and bring them to public attention, e.g., through calling for hearings; testifying before committees and the NRC, lobbying, sending material to constituents, and publications. The lobbyists see the role of the membership as very important in providing pressure from constituents so members of Congress will listen to UCS's arguments; and therefore, they provide information about legislation to the membership.

UCS identifies the major issues as being the inadequacy of the basic safety systems in nuclear power plants, suppression of information about these problems by the government, the federal government's support for development of nuclear power, and inadequate means of waste disposal. It sees the claims that America needs nuclear power to prevent energy shortages as false, and has produced a book arguing that conservation and more efficient use of

existing supplies of energy would be ample for continued economic and population growth. The samples I have of literature sent to prospective members emphasizes UCS's functions as a watchdog on the federal government, especially the NRC. The issues of its publication, Nucleus, primarily present information about issues--TMI, SALT II, and testimony. In addition, UCS puts out informational pamphlets, e.g., on the hazards of nuclear power and on US surveillance of Soviet compliance with SALT.

The materials we have (especially the interview) have a little other information about elements of UCS's analysis: that nuclear power is not economically viable, that in the longrun nuclear power provides fewer jobs than would solar, and that demonstrations are not likely to be as effective a way to persuade members of Congress than either such events as TMI or public opinion polls showing voter support for stopping construction.

Informant says UCS receives requests for assistance and for speakers, but that it has neither the time nor the resources to respond to such requests; she does not treat this as a matter of strategy. One strategic issue she does raise, however, is that UCS has emphasized the need to stop nuclear power but has not emphasized positive alternatives to it. She sees this in terms of not having had enough resources to do both, but also says UCS is thinking of lobbying for money to be taken from the breeder reactor program and put into renewable resources.

(This account may have missed the weighting UCS gives to education versus lobbying. Informant is one of the lobbyists, and she seemed to have much less sense of what was happening in other parts of the organization.)

V RESOURCES

UCS has 80,000-85,000 dues-paying members. I have no information about the size of its budget or staff (but 80,000 X \$15 --the standard annual contribution--would give a minimum of \$1,200,000 income).

UCS presents itself in terms of representing scientists, professionals, and responsible people concerned about nuclear power and willing to make a careful study of it, and without a vested interest in it. It sees its scientific credibility as very important, and as depending partly on having experts to support its positions and partly as resulting from its policy of not demonstrating.

Informant did not have a sense of the composition of UCS's membership. However, she said that the anti-nuke movement is definitely spreading to new constituencies: a lot of labor groups, labor unions one-by-one, local League of Women Voters, and the more liberal wing of the Democratic Party.

Informant's assessment of the importance of demonstrations was mixed. She indicated that she did not think the May 6 demonstration was likely to have had much impact on members of Congress. She contrasted that demonstration with the events around the TMI accident itself and with a CBS/NY Times poll showing voter support for stopping nuclear power plant construction, both of which she thought would have more influence. On the other hand, in a different context, she described the nuclear industry as anxious to avoid the kinds of problems with demonstrators which occurred at Seabrook.

VI ALLIANCES IN THE MOVEMENT

As a matter of policy, UCS does not join coalitions or give formal support to demonstrations by others. However, its staff does work with people from other organizations around specific issues--Informant mentions the Solar Lobby, Environmental Policy Center, Friends of the Earth, and Critical Mass. Although UCS as such does not take part in demonstrations, staff members can give some assistance: the Washington UCS staff did help some in the lobbying part of the May 6 demonstration. (Informant says this is a relatively recent shift in UCS practice, and comes as result of the concern of the local staff.)

Informant also indicates that some of those in the anti-nuke movement see UCS as helping the nuclear industry because by emphasizing make the plants safe, they are postponing stopping them entirely.

of the anti-nuke movement's concern with other issues such as centralized power.

VII RELATIONS WITH AUTHORITIES

Much of UCS's work focuses on trying to influence the federal authorities, and its relations seem to vary from relatively cordial to antagonistic. The subcommittee most directly responsible for nuclear power is the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, chaired (then) by Morris Udall. Some of UCS's literature carries a testimonial by Udall for the UCS's work. Nucleus reports UCS testimony before that subcommittee in which it criticized the Rasmussen report and the NRC, and advocated tighter Congressional controls over the NRC and independent sources of information on nuclear power.

UCS literature regularly criticizes the government for suppressing information about the dangers of nuclear power and for its policy of financial support for development of nuclear power. It is particularly critical of the NRC for doing more to promote nuclear power than to safeguard public health through regulating the industry. UCS identifies itself with exposing governmental cover-ups and policies which expose people to danger, e.g., first by opposing the Rasmussen report and eventually by forcing the government to repudiate the report; and then by using the Freedom of Information Act to challenge NRC decisions which had been based on the Rasmussen Report.

UCS makes use of authorities in two other ways. First, it uses the media to present information--through ads, stories, press releases, etc. Second, in its literature it cites a variety of authorities as supporting its positions (Wall Street Journal, MITRE Corporation--a Virginia think-tank, insurance companies, Ralph Nader, the AEC regulatory staff, US Geological Survey, etc.).

VIII RELATIONS WITH OPPONENTS

The UCS describes the nuclear power industry as using deceit, evasion, and subterfuge, and as willing to sacrifice the public good for its own narrow interest: despite the dangers to health and safety from accidents, sabotage, and nuclear wastes, the industry is trying to push the country to become more dependent on nuclear power and is trying to capitalize on the fears of an energy shortage by making untrue claims about the need for nuclear energy. The UCS attributes this to the industry being more concerned with protecting its own investments than with the safety and health of the population.

Informant says the industry is becoming more desperate because of mounting economic and political pressures, including the capital costs of constructing plants, problems of liability (particularly if the Price-Anderson Act is repealed).

There is no indication of any relationship between UCS and the pro-nuke movement.

MOBILIZATION FOR SURVIVAL (MFS)

I HISTORY

In early 1976, Sidney Lens published "The Domsday Strategy" in The Progressive which criticized the U.S. effort to attain security through nuclear weapons. During the next year, he gathered several other public figures into a discussion of the need for an umbrella organization to combat this threat. Members of established peace organizations--AFSC, WILPF, WRL, etc.--were approached, and in April 1977 120-130 people representing 60-70 organizations met in Philadelphia. This group appointed a committee to continue the discussion, and this latter group suggested the formal structure for the new organization--the Mobilization for Survival. In December 1977, 400 people met in Chicago for the first national conference; they set an agenda for their work together. During the intervening months, there were locally-oriented actions around the arms race and its costs.

From the time of its founding, MFS saw itself as the organization which would join together many diverse organizations, and thereby both put more pressure on the government and help reawaken public awareness of the nature and scale of the problem. MFS sets its own national priorities and encourages constituent groups to undertake their own programs; in each, it supports both legal activities and nonviolent civil disobedience. MFS has been involved in many of the major demonstrations including those at Barnwell, SC; Rocky Flats, CO; Bangor, WA; the Hollywood Bowl; in New York and San Francisco (in relation to the UN Special Assembly on Disarmament), and at Seabrook. In 1980 it organized "Survival Summer" as an effort to get the issues out into communities throughout the nation.

II ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

The MFS is a coalition of organizations and individuals. Its literature describes it as uniting more than 200-250 peace, environmental, religious, student, women's, social justice, and labor groups, and having ties with similar organizations

— in other countries. (Some of these groups which are part of MFS are local MFS chapters; others are local or national groups which affiliate with MFS.)

I have little information about the formal structure of MFS. There is a national staff (but I don't know how many members, or whether there is a regional staff), and a coordinating committee which oversees implementation of decisions made at the annual conference. I don't have anything specific in our written materials or interview about the national conference or representation of affiliates, but I gather from informal conversations that the national conference is relatively open, and that a modified version of consensus is used in formulating national policies. MFS has fifteen task forces; however, the only one about which I have any information is the religious task force.

Organizations may affiliate with MFS in two ways. A "cooperating organization" may use the MFS's name on its literature, and the national MFS offers to support its activities through supplying literature, speakers, and contacts. National MFS may use the group's name on its literature. In addition, the group agrees to give space to publicize MFS activities in its newsletter and to encourage its members to participate in these activities. "Supporting organizations" do all this plus provide a financial contribution and some staff time for promoting and/or implementing MFS program. I have no information about the ratio of supporting to cooperating organizations, whether there is any coordination among the staffs, or whether supporting organizations have a different relation to decision-making (either formally or informally).

From informal conversations, I gather that there have been some problems around organizational issues: staff, gaining and maintaining support from established groups, and questions about whether any group which wants to affiliate should be allowed to do so, even if existing members have reservations about the prospective one.

III GOALS AND TARGETS

MFS describes itself as "a nonviolent movement of organizations and individuals dedicated to awaken people to the growing threats to human survival and

to channel that awareness into massive public action." Its 1977 "Call to Action" stated its purpose as

to reawaken public awareness of the scale of the threat which faces us all; to channel this awareness into dramatic and effective actions; to take the initiative from those with a vested interest in the arms race; to build a truly massive movement which can change the policies and direction of the nation, and to achieve a transformation of consciousness on the international level, in cooperation with groups active in Europe, Asia, and the Third World. (reprinted in The Progressive, 9/77)

MFS identifies four interrelated long-term goals: no nuclear weapons, ban nuclear power, stop the arms race, and meet human needs; and four interim goals: a substantial cut in military programs and redirecting taxes from military to social programs, full employment through converting local nuclear and military programs to constructive social programs, a complete moratorium on nuclear power and weapons, and ending arms sales and military assistance to foreign countries. Thus, while ending the use of nuclear power is one of the central issues, it is seen as only one piece out of a larger set of issues.

MFS has a diverse program and so its projects have a range of targets. It is not clear whether it identifies the federal government or corporations as the main opponent; it may see the military-industrial complex as the main target and this as being comprised of some governmental and some corporate components. Much of its work is aimed at arousing the general public to take part in protests; in this sense, the public is a major target of its mobilization efforts.

IV TACTICS AND STRATEGY

MFS encompasses a wide range of strategies and tactics. At the national level, MFS strategy appears to have two related components: first, to join the scattered protests and organizations together so they can present their demands to the government more forcefully; and second, to mobilize the general population to take part in these activities. To accomplish the first, MFS makes it quite easy for other organizations to affiliate with it; this allows MFS to speak in the name of those organizations, and to take part in a series of significant demonstrations. To accomplish the second, MFS sponsors and encourages much

educational work, rallies, and other forms of outreach--both to inform the public and to display public support for its agenda.

At the national level, MFS has a timeline of activities which has been approved by the annual convention. These include legal gatherings such as conferences, rallies, and teach-ins; and nonviolent civil disobedience at nuclear, military, and corporate sites. Some of the national events are designed to have local components, e.g., simultaneous actions to commemorate the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Local MFS affiliates are expected to take part in these activities and to plan their own local ones, too. National MFS also produces literature and informational packets to assist in local organizing, e.g., leaflets about MFS, reprints about specific issues such as the medical implications of nuclear power, and a mimeographed manual about how to organize a teach-in. While MFS does demonstrate in Washington to influence government policy, I have found no indications of lobbying or related activities, except the circulation of a petition for a nuclear moratorium.

The major innovation in MFS tactics appears to have been the 1980 Survival Summer, evoking the examples of the 1964 Mississippi Freedom Summer and the 1967 Vietnam Summer. Its purpose was to educate communities throughout the nation on MFS issues; it relied primarily on young people going door-to-door, making presentations at churches and other organizations, leafletting at shopping centers, and speaking on radio and TV.

We have some scattered information about strategy, e.g., the national secretary's views on violent protests and analysis of the May 6 demonstration, and the religious task force's calendar of events. However, I've no indication how broadly these represent MFS. For instance, Bob Moore, the national secretary, is very explicit about the nonviolent base for the organization; however the materials we have do not indicate that commitment to nonviolence is a criterion for participating, and once an organization does join, it can use MFS's name on its literature, whatever its activities.

V RESOURCES

I have no information about the extent of MFS finances or staff, or about the social composition of its membership--even the proportion recruited as individuals, as members of MFS groups, or as members of other groups affiliated with MFS.

Both national MFS and the local organizations in it require resources. Some of MFS's literature indicates a variety of means of raising money in addition to contributions and paying to be on the mailing list; these include sale of T-shirts and bumper stickers, sale of Helen Caldicott's Nuclear Madness with 40% of the proceeds going to MFS, and a fund-raising appeals by Benjamin Spock for the Survival Summer. The teach-in manual prepared by national MFS for the local groups contains a major section about both the need for fund-raising and some techniques for doing it.

MFS's organizational structure has implications for access to resources. It does not make a financial contribution a requirement for a group to be part of the organization (although it is not clear whether groups must contribute to be on the mailing list). However, three conditions for participation are that MFS can use the other group's name on its mailings, that MFS has access to the group's newsletter for publicizing its activities, and that the group will encourage its members to participate in MFS activities. From "supporting organizations," MFS does require a financial contribution and also expects some staff time to be given to promoting MFS activities.

The MFS national secretary sees a number of events as being of use. TMI showed people that nuclear disasters were possible and would happen unless people organize to put an end to nuclear power. The movie "China Syndrome" helped set the context for understanding TMI. The May 6 demonstration was important because the size of the protest showed this was an issue with which Carter had to deal.

VI ALLIANCES WITHIN THE MOVEMENT

MFS sees itself as an umbrella organization, and sees its reason for being as the greater force exerted when organizations are joined together. It contains

peace, environmental, religious, student, women's, social justice, and labor groups, and is allied with organizations in other countries. I have no list of the groups affiliated with MFS (and presumably the list changes), but several of the publications we have list some affiliates and/or like-minded groups; cf. the May 25, 1979 memo, Religious Call for a Moratorium, and Teach-in Mini Manual.

Linda's interview contains a long discussion of relations between PIRG, MFS, and other organizations in relation to the May 6 demonstration. Informant says that all the organizations involved in planning were supposed to send representatives to meetings, but that MFS was the only organization from outside Washington which attended. He also discusses some interorganizational conflicts and differences of strategy between MFS and PIRG. Some informal conversations I have had indicate that there have also been conflicts over the extent to which established organizations will support MFS.

VII RELATIONS WITH AUTHORITIES

There are several scattered comments about relations with authorities, but not enough to make a coherent assessment. MFS literature does express distrust of the government, e.g., the original "Call to Action" says "We are angry that Government leaders have thought us such fools that they believed they could buy our silence with words about disarmament..." (quoted in The Progressive 9/77). It also links government and industry as both making the claims that America needs nuclear power for its energy future and nuclear weapons for defense (cf "Join the Campaign for a Nuclear Moratorium"). Informant criticizes the establishment media coverage of the May 6 demonstration as having given inordinate attention to Jerry Brown and Jane Fonda rather than to other speakers who had more to say than did Brown. On the other hand, the Teach-in Mini Manual section on publicity and media relations emphasizes the importance of using the media; so did Survival Summer. The Mini Manual also suggests foundations as a possible source of funding.

From its founding, MFS has had support from some prominent people (see the list in The Progressive 9/77). It continues to make some use of this form

of sponsorship, e.g., the fund-raising letter by Spock lists sponsors on the front and endorsers of MFS's March for a Non-Nuclear World on the back. Infor. also talks about the importance of having reputable scientists speak out about the dangers of nuclear disasters, e.g., in relation to TMI.

VIII RELATIONS WITH OPPONENTS

There is very little material in the folder about relations with opponents. Infor. described his expectation that the nuclear power industry would mount an attack to counter the anti-nuke movement, and described some information that MFS had about industry plans. This included a campaign by the industry to say that TMI showed how safe nuclear power really is, military contracts for reactors, and the export of reactors. He anticipated that the industry would wait until gas and oil prices rise, and then say that these are depletable resources, and so America has no choice but to commit itself to nuclear power.

Infor. also discusses several instances of harassment and surveillance by utilities.

None of the materials we have gives any indication of the relation between MFS or its affiliates and any pro-nuke groups. Given the nature of MFS activities, however, I would assume that there must be some interaction, at least on the local level.

SIERRA CLUB

I HISTORY

The Sierra Club was founded by John Muir in 1892 "to enable more people to explore, enjoy and cherish the woodlands that are their heritage." Since then, in addition to encouraging appreciation of the wildlands, the Sierra Club has been important in shaping national legislation for preservation and care of such areas, e.g., through the National Park Service, Forest Service, Wilderness Preservation System, Wild and Scenic Rivers System, establishment of national parks, defense of parks against dams, curtailling overcutting in national forests, etc.

For several years, Sierra Club debated issues around nuclear power. Some members argued that nuclear power could take up the slack if environmental controls, which Sierra Club backed, put a ceiling on coal and oil production. This debate was resolved in 1974 when the Sierra Club Board of Directors voted for a moratorium on construction of new nuclear power plants.

II ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Sierra Club is a mass-membership organization with 153,000 members in 46 chapters (roughly, states) and 200 local groups. About half the members are in California, and less than one-third live east of the Mississippi. However, the number of eastern and southern members is growing.

Sierra Club has a Board of Directors elected by the membership. Apparently the candidates for the Board present policy statements. In 1974 a Board was elected which opposed nuclear power. Their election was apparently interpreted as being the membership statement on this issue which had been debated within the organization for several years; thereafter the matter was considered decided. This Board passed a resolution calling for a moratorium on new reactors. I have no indication if members have any other ways of influencing policy other than voting in sympathetic members of the Board.

Sierra Club offers its members many benefits (trips, magazines, etc.); therefore, many people join for the benefits. This means that the membership includes considerable diversity of opinion on issues other than conservation. As a result, Sierra Club does not take a strong stand in proposing legislation for conservation in general and energy conservation, but does not formulate a comprehensive energy policy.

There is a Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund. I have no information about its formal relation to the Sierra Club, but it may well be a separate legal entity.

I have no information about Sierra Club's budget or funding sources except that the membership is \$15 per year. If the 153,000 members each pay that, Sierra Club would receive about \$2,000,000 per year from these fees.

III

GOALS AND TARGETS

Sierra Club's primary goal is conservation of the natural environment. It sees itself as defending nature against "blind progress," and against those who see wilderness as mere waste space. Environmental protection, rather than energy, is the primary concern although the two overlap considerably. Sierra Club is concerned with trying to prevent the exhaustion of natural resources and with controlling population and so achieving a better balance between technology and the natural world.

Sierra Club's three main energy priorities are conservation, strict protection of the natural environment, and countering proposals which would lead to speedy development of energy without assessment of the impact on the environment. Its resolution opposing nuclear power stresses these elements; it calls for a moratorium on new construction pending development of policies to curb energy over-use and unnecessary economic growth, resolution of significant safety problems, and establishment of adequate regulatory machinery.

Sierra Club's primary targets appear to be the federal and state authorities whom they want to enact and enforce conservation measures. It

directs much of its work toward education of the public. In addition, it opposes corporations whom it sees as pursuing policies which damage the environment.

IV

STRATEGY AND TACTICS

Sierra Club uses legal tactics. A major part of its work has involved lobbying, especially with the California delegation where it has appreciable strength because of the size of its membership. Sierra Club members receive a monthly magazine and have the opportunity to receive Sierra Club books at a discount. Sierra Club also organizes trips and other gatherings where members can meet others with outdoor interests. In addition, at least on occasion, Sierra Club has gone to court, e.g., to try to require that those developing coal fields file interstate environmental impact statements rather than just local ones.

Beyond passing the 1974 resolution calling for a moratorium on building new reactors, and joining with other organizations to criticize President Carter's proposal to reorganize the NRC in ways they said would accelerate licensing of nuclear plants without enhancing safety or increasing public participation in decisions, I have no information on Sierra Club's anti-nuclear activities. (This probably reflects the lack of materials rather than Sierra Club's lack of action, although it is possible that it has not taken more action because of its diverse membership.)

V

RESOURCES

Sierra Club had 153,000 members as of 1976. The membership is predominantly upper-middle class; many members have communication and research skills and so are influential in local politics. The members can be counted on to give support to conservation and environmental goals; beyond that there is considerable diversity (e.g., about whether to rely on governmental controls or market mechanisms). This means there are people within Sierra Club with diverse views on nuclear power.

I have no information about sources of income except that it has the basic \$15 membership fee.

VI ALLIANCES WITHIN THE MOVEMENT

I have very little information about Sierra Club relations with other organizations. Among environmental groups, it is one of the prime initiators of conservation policy. I have one example of a letter criticizing the Carter administration's proposed reorganization of the NRC signed by Sierra Club, Critical Mass Energy Project, Natural Resources Defense Council, Environmental Policy Center, and Friends of the Earth.

VII RELATIONS WITH AUTHORITIES

Sierra Club has a reputation for defending the environment and has become the most famous of the environmental lobbies. It has a particular influence on the California congressional delegation--most of whose members want to stay on the right side of this organization which has about 78,000 members in California. Sierra Club's headquarters is in the district of Phillip Burton who has been an important power broker in the House and a leading environmentalist on the House Interior Committee.

VIII RELATIONS WITH OPPONENTS

It is not clear from the little information I have just who Sierra Club would consider its opponents beyond a formulation such as "those committed to blind progress." In practice, it has opposed those whom it sees as pursuing policies which would harm the environment. This has included opposition to dams which would have endangered Yosemite and Grand Canyon national parks and Dinosaur Monument; using the courts to try to force those developing the Wyoming-Montana coal fields to submit interstate environmental impact statements; and trying to reform the Forest Service so it would curtail overcutting of national forests and make an adequate study of roadless areas as potential wildernesses. (It is not clear to what extent Sierra Club views the Forest Service, for instance, as an ally or as an opponent; it helped lobby for the creation of the Forest Service.)

FRIENDS OF THE EARTH

HISTORY

Friends of the Earth (FOE) was founded in 1969, primarily by David Brower who had been the chief executive of Sierra Club. In Sierra Club, Brower led the organization to take militant stands on several environmental issues; this involves him in controversy within that organization. After his supporters lost an election, he resigned and formed FOE to carry on a vigorous program which would be forthrightly political in orientation.

FOE began with a staff of experienced environmentalists and has worked on traditional conservation and environment issues through lobbying, testimony, organizing, and publications. In the mid 1970's, FOE was increasingly involved in controversy over nuclear power and the connections between nuclear power and other environmental concerns. During the last two years, it has been making connections between nuclear power and nuclear weapons.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

FOE is both a grassroots organization and an international one. In its first year, it had between 5500 and 7000 members; by mid-1971, it had about 20,000 and was growing at a rate of about 2000 per month; but by 1976, it had grown only to 25,000. FOE is still trying to increase its membership, however, I have no later figures.

From its beginning, FOE had offices in several cities--New York, San Francisco, Washington, and Albuquerque. (None of the sources discusses why, but it appears that at least some of the staff simply stay where they are located and form an office there). By 1980, FOE's "principal US offices" were in New York, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington; in addition, it had eight field offices in the US and one in London, and "sister organizations" in 22 countries. I have no information about the relation between FOE in the US and these groups in other countries.

In 1970, FOE had a 15-member Board of Directors and a 6-member executive committee to set policies, 12 full-time staff and a few volunteers and temporary

workers. In 1980 it had a somewhat larger Board (21 members) and an executive committee which included 13 people drawn from the Board and staff. FOE had about 40 staff members and another 10 on the staff of its newsletter, Not Man Apart. In addition, there is a Friends of the Earth Foundation, but I have no information about the relation between the Foundation and the parent group.

During the first year, the staff discouraged members from starting local chapters because they thought this would drain the new organization's energy, time, and money. However, in 1971, FOE began actively forming chapters. At the same time, it was investing heavily in publishing environmental books. In 1972, eight members of the professional staff, consultants, and volunteers resigned from FOE to form the Environmental Policy Center; this put a strain on FOE, especially its Washington office which was left with only two members. Those who left believed FOE was putting too much emphasis on publishing and building chapters; they created the EPC to be a staff organization devoted to lobbying and litigation. However, the split took place "with a minimum of acrimony," and the two organizations cooperate with one another as does FOE with Sierra Club from which it split. (See below under Relations with Allies.)

During FOE's first years, it had financial difficulties, but grew rapidly. The first year, its income was primarily from membership fees, but I do not know how much it received. In March 1970, it did not have the money to pay the large bills it had incurred during that year; but the Washington staff was able to raise \$50,000 and accepted salary cuts, and the Board borrowed \$150,000 interest-free. FOE then set its 1971 budget at \$900,000 which was more than twice the 1970 budget. In early 1972, FOE was still in financial difficulty. Its debt was \$250,000 and it trimmed some activities. It was at this point that the EPC split off, in part over disagreement over how FOE was allocating resources.

I do not have information about FOE's current financial state, but it seems to have become a considerably larger operation than it was in the early 1970's. In 1979, FOE became a client for a fund-raiser who is attempting to do for liberal causes what Viguerie has done for conservatives.

III GOALS AND TARGETS

From the beginning, FOE's primary emphasis has been on traditional conservation and ecological goals, e.g., protection of wilderness, wildlife, and clean air, and opposition to strip mining, pesticides, and toxic wastes. More broadly, it has tried to expose the undesirability of incessant material growth, and works to preserve, restore, and use the Earth and its resources rationally.

Opposition to nuclear power has been part of these concerns, though not the over-riding one. Initially, FOE's major arguments were environmental ones and economic ones based on the work of Amory Lovins (FOE's United Kingdom representative) which emphasizes resolving energy issues through "soft paths" (see below under Strategy). More recently it has begun emphasizing the links between nuclear power and nuclear weapons, again based on the work of Lovins.

IV TACTICS AND STRATEGY

I do not have any information on FOE's overall analysis and strategy. Most of its work involves lobbying and testifying before Congressional committees, publications, some work on national issues (usually in coalition with other organizations, see below in Relations with Allies), and encouraging local projects. I have no indications of FOE using civil disobedience or other illegal tactics.

Most of FOE's activities are on environmental issues. Initially it was instrumental in opposing supersonic transportation (the SST), helping assure a supply of water to the Everglades National Park and opposing placement of the Miami jetport close to the Park, and helping conservationists in South Carolina in their struggle against a controversial plastics factory which would have endangered water and fishing. These helped establish that FOE was an organization to be taken seriously. ✓

FOE's opposition to nuclear power is part of its concern with a larger set of energy-related issues, e.g., negative consequences of massive use of coal--the greenhouse effect, strip-mining, etc. FOE emphasizes the analysis put forth by Amory Lovins which is, briefly, as follows:

Many people have accepted nuclear power on the basis that it is cheap and efficient, but it is neither. Traditionally, energy has been treated as though it were something homogeneous, e.g., that increasing electricity output would appreciably decrease the need for oil. However, this is not the case: energy is used for many different purposes and different forms of energy are most efficient depending on the purposes. In the US, about 8% of the energy needs require electricity for uses other than low-temperature heating and cooling. But we use electricity for many of these low-grade purposes (e.g., heating and cooling our houses) which could be done much more efficiently using other means. As a result, the US meets 13% of its energy needs through electricity, and generating this electricity uses 29% of our fossil fuels. Nuclear power is a way of generating still more electricity (and producing very high temperatures, essentially to boil water). Rather than go through that very expensive and inefficient process of transforming energy from one form to another and transporting it over long distances, we should concentrate on matching energy needs with appropriate energy sources. This "soft path" means using diverse technologies, each appropriate to the specifics of the task, scale, and locality.

Although the "soft path" argument has been picked up by many who oppose corporations and technology, the argument is not intrinsically hostile to either. What it does oppose is large-scale technologies being used under circumstances where they are inefficient ("cutting butter with a chain saw"). Lovin's and FOE's argument has been that we should develop the relatively low technologies which will enable the necessary diversification.

In 1980 Lovins and others published an argument linking nuclear power and nuclear weapons. In it they challenge three assumptions which they say underlie commitment to nuclear power: that world wide spread of nuclear power is desirable, that it would be necessary to reduce dependence on oil, and that it can be regulated so it will not lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The first two assumptions are treated above. For the last, they say that the wastes from nuclear power plants can be used for bombs as "good" as those made from weapons-grade plutonium. Reactors are already producing such wastes or can be made to do so without greatly increasing costs or being detected; so there are no safeguards. However, by ending the production of nuclear power, all the cases which currently are ambiguous and the cases where breaches do occur would become unambiguously military in intent.

Further, the government need not take up an anti-nuclear-power stance. What it does need to do is stop making heroic measures to prop up nuclear power. The market forces will rapidly force nuclear power generation out of business.

FOE as an organization uses nuclear power as one of the issues around which to organize. It has published Lovins's articles and has made a special issue of Not Man Apart devoted to the power-weapons connection and Lovins' argument. Not Man Apart regularly carries a column dealing with nuclear issues. In addition, FOE encourages its members to form anti-nuke groups, e.g., "alliances" along the line of the Clamshell, and local groups to oppose construction of nuclear plants.

V RESOURCES

FOE has a variety of types of resources on which to draw. It began with an experienced staff, drawn primarily from Sierra Club and other environmental groups. This enabled it to get into its three major activities--lobbying, publishing, and organizing--immediately. Initially, its staff was in a

weaker position for lobbying than they had been when they could speak in the name of a large established organization. However, FOE established itself by a combination of political successes (the SST, Everglades, etc.), skillful politicking, and weathering the financial crisis. It established itself quite rapidly as a major environmental lobby.

Since FOE does lobby, contributions to it are not tax-exempt; however, FOE does not have to pay taxes itself, and it does qualify for a non-profit mail permit. FOE planned to rely heavily on membership contributions and the sale of its books. I have no information about other sources of income. I also have no information about FOE's current membership (in 1976 about 25,000), or its social composition.

FOE has another major resource: Amory Lovins. Lovins's 1976 Foreign Affairs article, "Energy strategy: The road not taken?" had a major impact on the whole debate over energy issues and has redefined the terms of the argument. This is true not only within the environmental and anti-nuke movements, but also within the government and energy industry--although many disagree with his analysis. The editor of Energy Daily says Lovins's

piece provides an umbrella for a very large segment of the intelligensia in particular the young, that have been looking for a prophet, a new way, that are suffering from a kind of future shock....And he's done it almost effortlessly, because he's done it through the medium of one thing--energy."

VI RELATIONS WITH ALLIES

FOE appears to work with other groups within the environmental movement, both locally and nationally. It seems to have maintained some bonds both with the Sierra Club (from which it broke off) and the Environmental Policy Center (which broke off from it). It also collaborates with some of the Nader groups (Congress Watch and the Critical Mass Energy Project), the Natural Resources Defense Council, and others. One other organization with which FOE has had particularly close relations is the League of Conservation

Voters. (FOE established the LCV in 1970, as a way to endorse and assist candidates. Although the organizations were separate, FOE leadership played a major part in the LCV, e.g., five of the six members of the LCV steering committee were FOE officers and staff.) I don't know if the LCV continues to exist.

FOE staff and officers also serve on a variety of environmental coalitions.

As a matter of policy, FOE encourages members to get involved in local issues. This has meant working closely with local people and organizations, and sometimes being instrumental in starting up new organizations, e.g., the anti-nuke "alliances."

Lovins is widely-known within the anti-nuke movement. While there is a lot of support for his positions, there is some opposition, e.g., on the basis that it is not sufficiently anti-corporation.

VII RELATIONS WITH AUTHORITIES

Much of FOE's work is with authorities, especially at the federal level. FOE staff and officers lobby, testify at congressional hearings, and work with staff of the Interior and other departments. Lovins served as a consultant to the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), after publication of his 1976 article. During its first two years, FOE established itself as an important environmental lobby; it has maintained this reputation.

However, FOE does not see the federal administrations as sympathetic to environmental issues. It viewed the Ford administration record as almost uniformly poor. For the first two years, it saw the Carter administration as much stronger on environmental issues--a staff member, now the president of FOE, coordinated a statement signed by more than 30 environmental leaders, which called Carter's environmental record "outstanding." But six months later, FOE was very critical of Carter's positions on logging, wilderness

protection, and energy. FOE, and other environmental groups, were very critical of Carter's 1979 energy program which they saw as a victory for Energy Secretary James Schlesinger (a major supporter of nuclear power and other "hard-path" technology). They saw Carter as backing away from his earlier commitments and as particularly inept in handling environmental issues.

With regard to nuclear power specifically, FOE was at first optimistic and then pessimistic about the Carter administration. It sees the NRC as favoring the industry rather than regulating the industry to protect the public.

FOE has been able to get media coverage of its stances on several environmental issues. It sees this as important in terms of getting public attention and concern about the issues; some others have criticized FOE for this, characterizing it as "headline grabbing;" and some Administration staff members have criticized FOE for paying too much attention to such "media" issues, and not enough to important pieces of legislation on which their help was needed.

RELATIONS WITH OPPONENTS

FOE's relations with its opponents are primarily in the legislative and legal arenas, and through Lovins, to some extent in public debate. Because of its stances on environmental issues, FOE periodically opposes utilities, corporations, and their supporters in Congress. It sees these groups as having much more money to spend than does FOE (and the rest of the environmental and anti-nuke movements), and as being willing to use untrue propaganda. I don't have information about the details of this interaction, nor any information about conflict with groups which might be considered part of the counter social movement.

CAMPAIGN FOR ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY

I HISTORY

Campaign for Economic Democracy (CED) emerged from Tomas Hayden's 1976 campaign for the US Senate. Subsequently, CED has fielded progressive candidates in California elections, and lobbied for solar commissions and rent control initiative.

II ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Most of the material I have focuses on the two key figures in CED: Tom Hayden and Jane Fonda. Some describe it as a "grassroots political organization," but I have little information about the actual structure. CED has about 300 active members (as of the beginning of 1980). Most of the decisions are made by Hayden who is the formal head of CED; those who have challenged his leadership have left or been frozen out.

I have no information about CED's budget. See "Resources" for some of the sources of its funding.

III GOALS AND TARGETS

The goal of CED is to create a new populist movement which will make fundamental changes in the existing system. It sees a need for democratic control over the major corporations (which it sees as controlling government), and the need to make the system accountable to the people. There are a number of elements to this program: dealing with the problems of poverty and unemployment, working for rent control, holistic medicine, appropriate technology, public financing of elections, and support for the arts. Concern with energy is a part of this program: CED maintains that with energy conservation and conversion to solar and wind power, it would be possible to abandon nuclear power in less than a decade.

CED's major target is corporate power. It sees corporations as dedicated to profits; CED wants to make the economic system response to the needs of people instead of just to profits. It's program is to mobilize

a mass grassroots movement by which people take back control of their communities and economic destinies.

IV STRATEGY AND TACTICS

CED's analysis is that the liberal promises cannot be achieved, that most initiatives will come from the Right, and that basic changes will have to be made in the system. Currently, the country faces economic decline and inflation. Under these conditions, most people yearn for a return to traditional values, but the dismal situation and inability of the current system to solve these problems will make people more sympathetic to the idea of changing the system.

CED's political strategy involves coming across as respectable and patriotic, and playing down Hayden's and Fonda's radicalism, e.g., making no serious attacks on the military budget, supporting Israel and criticizing PLO terrorism, and avoiding issues such as bussing and abortion. CED champions the people's rage at giving money away while failing to prevent erosion of family and community life. From this base, it makes sweeping attacks on corporations which it sees as ignoring people's health and welfare needs. Corporations are greedy to the point of being criminal, e.g., their avarice is creating an epidemic of cancer. Corporations are essentially unAmerican: despite the needs of the country, they send capital and jobs abroad, and buy off our government.

CED uses legal tactics to do political organizing. One facet is electoral politics. Hayden has run for office and appears to be planning to do so again. Further, CED has supported candidates, especially in California. A second, related tactic has been speaking tours by Fonda and Hayden. In 1979 they spent a month speaking in 52 cities about economic democracy and opposition to nuclear power. In addition, CED has a tenants' rights program in which it has tried to organize around pocketbook issues such as rising rents and conversion of apartments to condominiums.

V RESOURCES

The materials I have focus on Hayden and Fonda as CED's main resources. Hayden formulates CED's political positions and runs the organization; Fonda provides much of the income. Both draw the attention of the media and public, although Fonda more than Hayden. Fonda uses her role as a star and her control over the production company to make political statements.

CED had about 300 active members by early 1980. They were mainly young, white, and college educated. It is not clear how large CED's tenants' rights program is, or who is involved in it.

I have no information about CED's income or details about its sources. Fonda contributes a major portion of her salary as a star, and much of the proceeds from her film production company and other enterprises. Hayden and Fonda also raise money through their speaking tours. Fonda is so in demand as a star that knowledgeable Hollywood agents say that with a good string of pictures, she should earn between \$10-15,000,000 in 1980-1985.

Both Hayden's 1976 campaign and the 1979 Hayden-Fonda tour were well received publicly. Hayden received 1,200,000 votes in the primary. The tour tended to speak to sold-out crowds on college campuses and to provide access to a number of audiences. Students were the largest and most demonstratively positive element. The tour went to 40 campuses ranging from elite schools to state universities to working-class community colleges. Their appearances were generally sold-out well in advance, and the students responded with wild applause. Speaking at anti-nuclear rallies, Hayden and Fonda combined their economic analysis with Fonda's role in The China Syndrome. Their appearance at least temporarily revitalized local groups such as the ones around Harri- burg, in which the local people were still concerned about the issues but exhausted. Almost everywhere they went, Hayden and Fonda made contact with citizen action groups; at least some of these groups used Hayden and Fonda for their own fund-raising and mobilization efforts. Fonda spoke with women's groups; although secretaries seemed guarded when she raised the issue of economic democracy, they gave sufficient response to be encouraging to CED,

Unions have been more ambivalent in response. Usually there are some sympathetic union members (often a woman or former SDS member); but in many cases, the sympathetic members have not been able to persuade the union to give public support because of other pressures--either because of CED's anti-nuclear stance or because groups such as the VFW maintain that CED is unpatriotic.

One other indication of public support for Fonda (although it is not clear to what extent this also represents acceptance of CED's agenda) is a public opinion poll in which half the respondents said they held Fonda in "high" or "somewhat high" regard; and more than half said she should have been appointed to the California Arts Council (see below under "Relations to Authorities").

Hayden and Fonda have used the connection between The China Syndrome and TMI. The major lesson they drew from TMI is that people must not let the heads of corporations and utilities look after the public good because such people will concentrate on the demands of their jobs--for high profits--despite the risks to the public.

VI RELATIONS WITH ALLIES

CED appears to have a mixed set of relationships with potential allies. On the one hand, Hayden and Fonda appear to be a valuable resource for other groups. For instance, on the 1979 tour, Massachusetts Fair Share used them exhaustively for fund-raising and mobilization of supporters; similarly, they came to Detroit as part of an ADA fund-raiser. In addition, for groups such as those in the Harrisburg area, the visit was an inspiration and helped revitalize the group, at least temporarily.

On the other hand, there appears to be considerable distrust and antagonism between CED and other groups and individuals. Leftist activists and groups criticize CED--mainly Hayden--as being opportunistic, claiming credit for achievements in which CED had only a small part, using others, and being unwilling to work with those who express any disagreement. Further,

some have been critical of Hayden's political ambitions, e.g., placing himself as the head of CED and using what was supposed to be a tour focussing on issues as a means of politicking.

Hayden's response to criticisms has been to dismiss the critics as jealous because they have no groups, no programs, and no support. Because he is often contemptuous of others, some potential allies whom he has not wronged wind up disliking him. An apparent exception has been the relation between CED and Governor Jerry Brown of California. Although Hayden and Fonda did not endorse any candidate on the 1979 tour, they said publically that Brown had been very good on nuclear power (see section on Relations with Authorities).

It is not clear what relation exists between those organizing around tenants' rights and CED. CED does have a tenants' rights program; however, in late 1979 the CED tenants' rights specialist said that if all went well in their organizing effort, the tenant groups would work in the 1980 campaigns, but not as a part of CED.

VII. RELATIONS WITH AUTHORITIES

CED was basically critical of the Carter administration: welcoming its election because this would help expose the bankruptcy of liberalism, critical of Carter's assessment that the accident at TMI would make nuclear power safer. CED is even more critical of "the establishment:" the utilities and corporations cannot be trusted to look after the public welfare, and they buy off the government.

CED says that the people are fed up with being ignored by the government and trampled by the oil companies. It calls for a strong government role, e.g., a new energy authority to develop resources on public lands and for restrictions on oil companies' control of other types of energy resources and technologies.

Relations between CED and California Governor Jerry Brown have been fairly cordial. CED provides Brown with access to the anti-nuke movement and a potential New Left constituency. Brown has appointed Hayden (and less often, Fonda) to minor state commissions. These contacts provide a legitimate way for

the media to give them a lot of coverage. In talking with a reporter covering CED for Mother Jones, the CED political director argued strenuously that Brown was the most clever politician they knew, and the only one from whom they had learned anything.

VIII RELATIONS WITH OPPONENTS

CED sees itself as opposing the unbridled power of major corporations. It sees the actions of these corporations to be due to the corporations social role (making profits) rather than to evil individuals. Its solution is that the corporations and government must be made more accountable to the public.

CED sees the opposition to its program from groups on the Right as being an indication that CED is attacking the important issues and defending the rights of ordinary citizens against those of big business. It dismisses the criticisms from the Left as basically irrelevant (see above under Relations with Allies).

The Young Americans for Freedom conducted a mock trial of Fonda, charging her with dishonoring America by her visit to Hanoi, aiding and abetting the enemy, and ignoring the plight of the boat people. They used their opposition to what she stands for as part of their mobilization efforts. California State Senator Paul Carpenter used \$63,000 of his own money for newspaper ads denouncing Fonda and Hayden, and led the opposition to Fonda's appointment to the California Arts Council. The Edison Electric Institute sent "truth squads" to follow Hayden and Fonda on their tour and to counter their presentations. I have no information about specific reactions by CED to any of these actions.

The Nuclear Information Resource Service (NIRS)

1. HISTORY

NIRS was established in 1978. It arose out of a concern by the traditional funders of the anti-nuke movement who were getting numerous proposals for clearing-houses and other informational services. The funders hired consultants to canvass a wide range of activist groups-- radical, liberal, and conservative--to see what kinds of services they they wanted. The consultants made two studies, and in response to their findings, the funders set up NIRS as a tax-exempt clearinghouse for technical information on nuclear energy and on organizing around the issue. (The funders were primarily interested in nuclear power issues, and few activists asked for information about nuclear weapons, so NIRS concentrates on nuclear energy issues.)

2. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

NIRS is a staff organization, not a grassroots one. Although the staff share the broader movement ideals of consensus decision-making and non-hierarchical structures, Linda's informant sees these as being more appropriate for grassroots organizations than for public interest groups. NIRS is located in Washington and must relate to other professional organizations; for these reasons, it is organized hierarchically. Internally, while not run collectively, it is relatively democratic.

3. TARGETS / GOALS

The target of NIRS' work is the nuclear power industry which it sees as very powerful and very well integrated financially and politically. NIRS identifies with what it sees as the anti-nuclear power movement's goals: stopping nuclear power and having the public gain control over the power industry and over related decisions which affect people's lives.

In response to questions about the goal of destroying monopoly capitalism, Infor. makes three points. First, the anti-nuke movement does provide a means for seeing some of the issues involved. Second, bringing down the monopoly capitalist system would take a much broader coalition than the anti-nuke movement, one which includes all segments of society. Third, despite charges from the nuclear industry that the anti-nuke movement is trying to destroy the system and doesn't care about nuclear power, the goal of the anti-nuke movement is that people gain more control over decisions on nuclear energy which affect their lives and communities.

4A. MOVEMENT STRATEGIES

A good deal of the interview centered on relatively broad issues of movement strategy. (It is not clear to what extent Infor. was representing NIRS' views on these matters; certainly he was not claiming to speak for the whole anti-nuke movement which he described as containing dozens of political perspectives.) Some of the discussion was about links among issues, e.g., the discussion of opposition to monopoly capitalism; some was more specifically about strategies for the anti-nuke movement.

Informant's view is that the society is in a state of crisis: during crises, people's lives are disrupted and they resist whatever is disrupting these routines; however, it is possible for people to transcend their routines and their resistance to these disruptions, and to revolutionize what is happening. The anti-nuke movement is not in a position to help make this transformation and won't be unless it expands its coalition markedly. Energy issues have the potential for linking many issues together. Inf. sees some hope of bringing together a wide variety of movements, even some which appear very reactionary, because he sees them as all wanting to get more say over decisions and a better deal for their members.

Infor. gave considerable emphasis to the need for the anti-nuke movement to link with other constituencies, particularly labor, but also the church and other institutions in which people have confidence. He described most unions as having an objective interest in being for nuclear energy, and said that the anti-nuke movement won't be able to get to the unions until it says to them both that it cannot guarantee the members union-scale jobs, and that what it does care about is that everyone have decent jobs and union protection.

Activists need to face up to the minority issues, too. The point is not to feel guilty that minorities are not participating, but rather to ask whether the movement is doing something detrimental to minorities or whether the movement is ignoring basic fights in which minorities are engaged.

The anti-nuke movement has made an effort to learn from the antiwar movement. We have a legacy of hierarchical structures, sexism, racism, and other forms of exclusion in the name of democracy. At the same time, there are thousands of wonderful, dedicated people. Therefore, the anti-nuke movement makes a deliberate effort to create community-oriented, grassroots organizations and to avoid having powerful leaders. At the same time, the movement is trying to have a national presence and to affect national policy; this is contradictory, but is a response to the national nature of the nuclear industry (see below in "Relations to Authorities"). Infor.'s interpretation of the Seabrook legal demonstration is that the Clamshell Alliance had been advocating and developing local control over issues. The local people objected to the proposal of another illegal occupation, and finally prevailed. This had a profound impact on everyone in the Clam; now there is a lot less regional organization, and much more of a coalition among decentralized groups.

4B. NIRS STRATEGY AND TACTICS

NIRS is an educational foundation. Its major activities are publishing Groundswell and being a clearinghouse for technical information on nuclear

5. RESOURCES

There is only a little scattered information about NIRS' resources. It began as a project among the funders of the anti-nuke movement who included the traditional public interest funders, individuals, churches, and liberals. It is now not so closely tied to these funders. I have no information about the size of the budget, or specifics about funders.

I also have no information about the size or composition of the staff except that the staff does not contain anyone who has expertise on nuclear weapons.

Infor sees both the Seabrook demonstration and TMI as having helped the movement. Seabrook's impact is described above under "Movement Strategies." TMI is important because it helped a lot of people see that the anti-nuke movement was right about issues even if it was affluent and elitist, and so TMI provides an opportunity for the movement to make some bonds with labor.

Infor believes that the current anti-nuke movement does not appeal to ghetto blacks, but that it could. He says that energy issues are increasingly on the agenda of black organizers, and that nuclear power plants are a large part of why inner city electric rates are so high and why the electric industry is not labor intensive. (See also the section of movement strategies for his discussion of the need for activists to face minority issues.)

Infor also sees increasing public distrust of industry and understanding of the nuclear industry. He says that while people might not have protested rising utility bills or nuclear power plants earlier, with the growing anti-nuke movement there are precedents, and the public is more easily mobilized.

6. ALLIANCES

There is little explicit information about alliances between NIRS and other organizations. Infor says NIRS cooperated in organizing the May 6 Demonstration, but indicates this was a temporary, and uneasy, coalition.

energy and organizing. In addition, it cooperated with other groups, for instance, it assisted in organizing the May 6 demonstration. It does not lobby, do direct action, or fund others' projects.

Groundswell covers local and federal legislation, and the positions of the executive branch on nuclear energy issues. It describes the state of the anti-nuke movement and lists a calander of local and national direct action. It also compiles a bibliography on nuclear energy, and on movement tactics and philosophy, and reviews educational materials on energy issues. Groundswell contains pullout fact sheets which can be reproduced by local groups. In addition to Groundswell, NIRS maintains a resource desk and WATS line so activists can make inquiries directly.

NIRS provides information about the politics of energy, particularly nuclear power plants. It has some information about renewable energy alternatives, and less about alternative sources such as solar. It has little information about nuclear weapons. It refers activists to other community groups for information about these other topics. In addition to energy, it has information on organizing: what other groups have done, how to write proposals, etc. NIRS distributes a wide range of information, some of which is contradictory in political orientation or strategy.

NIRS distributes Groundswell to all anti-nuke groups for which it can locate addresses. Its policy is to provide information to anyone who asks--activists (whether involved in legal or illegal activities), scholars, or individuals who just want more information.

Two early ideas were that NIRS have an "energy kitty" of money to distribute to groups which had particularly timely and crucial activities, and that NIRS would have regional directors to train activists and provide technical expertise. When NIRS was started, and the decision was to have it be a strictly educational foundation, it decided not to have the energy kitty. Because of financial limitations, it did not hire regional directors; however, the telephone resource desk serves some of the purposes the regional

He also alludes very favorably to a specific small project as an example of the kinds of low-profile organizing which are very important.

On the other hand, much of the interview deals with strategic issues about forging links within the anti-nuke movement and between the anti-nuke and other movements (most of this is covered in the section on movement strategy above). He describes the anti-nuke movement as containing dozens of perspectives and many different tactical approaches. He indicates that this sometimes makes for uneasy alliances, but that the alliances do work when they are needed (e.g., for the three weeks of preparation for the May 6 demonstration). He also says that there are organizations with which NIRS does not get along, but does not say which these are.

(Linda's notes--not interview--contain a list of organizations with which NIRS has apparently been in coalitions: WILPF, WSP, Greenpeace, Environmental Policy Center, Supporters of Silkwood, Citizens Energy Project, AFSC, MFS, CM, and Another Mother for Peace.)

Infor. also spoke about contradictory pressures within the anti-nuke movement, between it being decentralized and community-oriented, and it having a national presence and affecting national policies. He does not indicate particular organizations which emphasize one or the other of these, or specific interorganizational relations (cooperative or competitive) arising from this tension.

7. RELATIONS WITH AUTHORITIES

Two components of NIRS relations with federal authorities are discussed. First, from the time NIRS was founded, it was a tax-exempt organization, and so subject to political restrictions, particularly it was prohibited from lobbying. Second, the reason that members of grassroots organizations feel they need to create a national presence is that the federal government provides a national support system for the nuclear industry through the Federal Regulatory Commission, Department of Energy, Department of Agriculture loans to REAs. etc.

Infor.'s only allusion to the media was that the media also has pointed out the movement's need to expand its coalition.

8. RELATIONS WITH OPPONENTS

Infor. offers several examples of relations between the nuclear industry and the anti-nuke movement, but does not talk specifically about relations between NIRS and the industry or pro-nuke movements. He describes the nuclear industry people as ranging from bumbling idiots to very sophisticated and well-moneyed public relations people. He says that even before TMI the more sophisticated parts of the industry were shifting their emphasis to grassroots organizing, advocacy, and getting people to lobby; and that this was a result of the three years of organizing by the anti-nuke movement, combined with major industry errors, lack of government support, and the uncertainties of regulation. He sees this kind of industry organizing as a major threat, but thinks that for a variety of political reasons, the industry may have to concentrate on issues of finance and so attend more to investment bankers, stockholders, and major Congressional regulators than to grassroots organizing. He says that in doing rational capitalist planning, the major industry problem is dealing with uncertainty; and so the industry attacks regulation and the anti-nukes (whom they label "anti-energy" people).

One way in which the pro-nuclear campaign had a major impact on the anti-nuke movement was that originally the anti-nuclear people talked about the industry building a "bomb in your backyard." The industry attacked that argument, and so now anti-nuclear power activists are disinclined to try to organize around the connections between nuclear power and nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Infor. says that there is just no sense to the pro-nuke charges that the anti-nuke people deny minorities mobility and a share in prosperity: blacks don't get what jobs there are at nuclear installations, and the jobs are increasingly non-union ones.

CLAMSHELL ALLIANCE

I HISTORY

The roots of the controversy at the Seabrook nuclear plant preceed the formation of the Clamshell Alliance in the summer of 1976. By then, four sets of actors were already in place: the Public Service Company of New Hampshire (PSC) which was building the plant; state authorities (especially the governor and editor of the major state newspaper) who vigorously supported construction of the plant; environmental, economic, and political groups which opposed building the plant, and local citizens drawn into the conflict because of its proximity.

In 1969, PSC had bought land in Seabrook, New Hampshire, on which to build a nuclear power plant. Initially the people of the town responded favorably because PSC promised economic benefits. However, opposition mounted from several sources. In 1972, when PSC applied for a state license to begin construction, environmentalists began organizing opposition to the proposed construction on this particular site. Over the next four years the federal licensing authorities and PSC were relatively unresponsive to public concerns and opposition mounted drawing in additional environmental groups, the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution, and lawyers from the National Resource Defense Council. The locally-organized Seacoast Anti-Pollution League (SAPL) played a major role in bringing the issue before the public.

These groups used only legal methods, primarily taking part in the hearing process. Part of the strategy of those organizing legal interventions was to do public education and get local citizens involved in opposition to the plant. These groups were able to have some of the licensing hearings moved to Seabrook, and to get local people to attend. The hearings increased local opposition; townspeople were especially upset by the discussion of issues such as how the plant would be dismantled if it became too

radioactive. A group of local residents formed Concerned Citizens of Seabrook (CCSB) and used a series of referenda in the town elections to raise the issue. In March 1976 the town voted 768-632 against constructing the plant. However, PSC ignored the vote because it was not binding.

Meanwhile, during 1973-1976, events nearby and in other parts of New England helped produce allies who joined in the struggle. In 1973, Olympia Oil Company began plans to build an oil refinery off the New Hampshire coast. Local opposition mounted rapidly and forced Olympia to abandon these plans. The most active participants in this protest were recruited into the effort to oppose Seabrook, and were instrumental in building up local opposition to the plant through SAPL.

Also in 1973, Northeast Utilities announced plans to build a nuclear power plant at Montague, Massachusetts. A small group of local people opposed the plant, and in February 1974 one of them, Sam Lovejoy, toppled the weather tower as a protest. He turned himself in and used his trial as an opportunity to raise questions about the safety of nuclear power. Alternative media publicized Lovejoy's action widely, Lovejoy travelled around New England speaking about the dangers of nuclear power, and the group in Montague formed an Alternative Energy Coalition to continue the opposition.

In 1974, the Granite State Alliance (GSA) formed to help progressive social change groups (welfare rights organizations, food coops, women's groups, etc.) help each other and complement one another's impact on New Hampshire politics. Its strategy was to organize the poor, consumers, and social change activists around pressing pocketbook issues. Its most active project was the People's Energy Project (PEP) which opposed Seabrook on the basis that it would drive up utility rates. In 1975, the GSA newsletter began paying more attention to safety, environmental, and radiation issues. In late 1975, members of the Greenleaf Harvesters Guild (GHG) showed up at a PEP meeting and offered to print 10,000 leaflets on Seabrook for GSA. (GHG

was a group of social activists committed to nonviolent civil disobedience, and opposed to excessive dependence on technology. They set apart a portion of their income for progressive social causes.)

By late 1975, the leaders from these groups began meeting and coordinating their efforts. By this time, some opponents of the Seabrook plant began exploring protest demonstrations there. One member of the GHG wanted to take a personal stand and suggested destroying the Seabrook weather tower. Members of GSA and CCSB persuaded him that destruction of property would be counter-productive, so instead he had a symbolic vigil on top of the weather tower on January 4-5, 1976. In April 1976, members of the GHG with the help of GSA organized a march from Manchester to Seabrook; at Seabrook, CCSB distributed food and there were speeches and music.

Early in 1976, the local staff member from the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) pulled together a coalition of groups opposed to Seabrook, the Safe Energy Alternatives League (SEAL). SEAL combined environmental groups which emphasized legal interventions and social change groups associated with GSA which wanted to do community organizing through vigorous public education and demonstrations. However, after a few months, SEAL broke up over issues of tactics and style.

By the spring of 1976, even some of those who had been relying on public education and legal interventions were becoming convinced that the federal and state authorities and PSC would merely ignore their arguments, and that some sort of direct action was necessary. They decided to wait until the NRC actually gave permission to start plant construction in order to show that they had gone through all the legal channels available. On July 7 the NRC did grant PSC a construction license, and on July 13, 1976, the Clamshell Alliance was formed.

"The Clam" was to be an umbrella organization for 15 anti-nuke groups in New England: people from the New Hampshire seacoast near Seabrook, western Massachusetts, and Maine. It was formed explicitly to do direct action. For

the first few months, it was basically an informal meeting to coordinate demonstrations. Its first action was for 18 people to trespass on the site on August 1st. The participants and their supporters were pleased with this protest, and so planned another larger protest for which each of the original 18 was to bring ten people to occupy the site on August 22nd. Again the participants saw their protest as successful, and planned a third occupation for October; it was to be ten times as large as the August 22nd one.

As they planned for the October occupation, Sam Lovejoy argued strenuously that Clam was putting too much effort into occupations, and not enough into public education. So Clam decided to have a "Natural Energy Fair" instead, and to schedule its next occupation for April 1977. The October fair drew 3000 people, and delaying the occupation until April enabled Clam to recruit more people and to organize training for them. During the fall and winter, Clam made basic decisions about its structure: it would make decisions by consensus, and all those who wanted to participate in occupations would be organized into affinity groups to receive an orientation and training in nonviolence.

Clam's April 1977 occupation was a spectacular success in many respects. More than 2500 people participated of whom 1414 were arrested and held for up to two weeks in armories around the state. Clam received a tremendous amount of publicity which resulted in an increase in members and contributions, and helped in formation of local groups. In addition, groups throughout the country sprang up, modeled on the Clam's example. The incarceration in the armories had a marked effect on shaping Clam's sense of itself and it remained the symbolic incident in Clam's history.

However, some key participants were exhausted by the immense amount of work preparing for the occupation and then dealing with the problems of 1400 people being detained (in previous occupations, protesters had been

released the next day). Also, some internal problems arose from this occupation: local seacoast people felt they were not receiving their share of the credit, and some participants objected to the way consensus was used and to making the occupation merely symbolic.

In November 1977, Clam held a major meeting to decide on another action. Although there were disagreements, Clam decided to have another occupation in June 1978 and plans went ahead through the winter. By spring, key members from the seacoast area were unwilling to agree to another illegal occupation. Under this pressure, the coordinating committee cancelled the occupation a few weeks before it was to have happened, and instead called for a legal rally and energy fair. This decision caused great consternation within Clam because, on the one hand, many people had been working toward this occupation and saw such protests as their reason for being part of the Alliance but on the other hand, most agreed that it made no sense to impose an occupation on the local anti-nuke activists if they felt it would be counter-productive.

In June 1978, about 10,000 people did come to the legal rally. However, this shift in plans exacerbated the growing rifts in Clam, and at the rally those who objected most strongly to having it be legal formed a caucus within Clam, called Clams for Democracy (CFD). CFD argued that the Clam should organize an occupation which would actually take control of the site and stop construction of the plant; it objected to consensus on the basis that a small minority could block action. Others, including many of the seacoast residents, the office staff, and early members, urged the importance of strict nonviolence and of action which would mobilize the local constituency.

Both organizational and strategic matters were at issue. There were structural problems resulting from Clam's growth, particularly questions of how to include the many scattered groups in the decision-making. There was disagreement over the use of consensus, the role of staff and the coordinating committee, and the weight that should be given to the objections of

seacoast residents. Also there were philosophic and strategic disagreements over the meaning and practice of nonviolence articulated around the issue of whether it was permissible to destroy property.

During this period, events outside Clamshell shaped the political context of its protests. First, in October 1977, PSC obtained a \$27,000,000 rate increase, \$20,000,000 of which was to pay for "construction works in progress" or CWIP (i.e., to pay for construction at Seabrook). The public was outraged and early in 1978, the state legislature outlawed CWIP, but Governor Thomson vetoed the bill. This made CWIP a major issue in the 1978 state election: Thomson campaigned on an anti-tax platform, and his opponent charged that CWIP was Thomson's hidden tax. Many people saw the election as a statewide referendum on Seabrook. Thomson lost, and in May 1979, the new governor signed a bill outlawing CWIP. With the end of CWIP, Seabrook ceased to be as much of a statewide issue.

In the context of the growing controversy over CWIP, Clam tried to work out its program after the legal rally in June 1978. By this time, the PSC had constructed a fence around the site; therefore, any occupation would need to devise ways to get beyond the fence. Clam could not agree on how to organize another major occupation, but it did design two protests. During the fall, local Clam groups organized "wave actions" in which small groups came on different days and tried to climb the fences and occupy the site. Also by fall, plant construction had progressed to the point at which PSC would have to bring the pressurized reactor vessel soon. The Clam organized both sea and land blockades in hopes of preventing its delivery. In the spring of 1979, PSC moved the reactor despite Clam's blockade.

Another major event outside the Clam was the accident at TMI in the spring of 1979. This had mixed effects on the Clam. In the wake of the accident, many people sought out Clam affiliates. At the same time, nuclear power took on more of the dimensions of a national issue, and TMI became the current national symbol.

Through the spring of 1979, there was increasing bitterness between factions within Clam, and bickering and maneuvering over procedures. CFD designed an occupation, but could not get the rest of Clam to agree to it. In June, dissidents broke away from Clam and formed "Clams for Direct Action at Seabrook" (CDAS).

The Clamshell Alliance, as such, was not able to organize another major protest. However, in the fall of 1979 there were two significant actions which involved Clamshell members: on October 6th, CDAS had its occupation at Seabrook, and on October 29th, a coalition protested the connection between corporate capitalism and nuclear power with demonstrations at Wall Street. In January 1980, Clam tried to patch up its internal differences, but was unable to do so. Therefore, it decided that Clam would no longer hold actions, but would only endorse actions. Both factions within Clam planned activities for the summer of 1980, but neither mounted major actions, nor seems to have been able to maintain a viable structure.

Clamshell's history, then, might be summarized in terms of several periods. (1) A pre-history before its founding in 1976 was characterized by legal interventions by environmental groups while PSC sought approval of its plans for the plant, and scattered activities by anti-nuke and social change groups. (2) July 1976 through April 1977 was Clam's formative period: it was primarily an informal organization which designed rallies and protests. (3) From April 1977 to June 1978, Clam was at its height: it gained national prominence, many people joined, local affiliates formed, and people in other parts of the country formed alliances modeled on the Clam. (4) Between June 1978 and June 1979, factions within Clam became more pronounced and Clam activities tended to be locally organized. (5) After the spring of 1979, the Clam as an entity declined.

II ORGANIZATION

During Clam's first year, it set down the basic structure within which all later decisions (and disagreements about decision-making) would be worked out.

Clam was begun as an umbrella of fifteen anti-nuclear groups, and was committed to using direct action as well as education. It emphasized the importance of local opposition to nuclear power, and at the same time that the issues affected a far wider area than just the local community. Therefore, it organized itself as an alliance of groups throughout New England, with a major objective of mobilizing the local constituency. Through October, Clam functioned as an informal meeting to coordinate plans. It began as a network in which members talked over issues until they reached an agreement.

In planning for the October action, Clam apparently made the decision to construct a more durable movement, and so it centered the October action on education and mobilizing a wider constituency, planned to mobilize through the winter, and then to have a big occupation in April 1977. As it made these decisions, it began creating a more formal organization. It adopted consensus decision-making (introduced by members from an organization--AFSC-- which routinely used consensus) as a way to promote decentralization, facilitate full membership participation, and enhance group solidarity by eliminating unrepresented minorities. It decided to have representation on a regional basis. It created "congresses" open to all Clam members, which could make binding decisions, "conferences" to be educational gatherings, and a coordinating committee comprised of regional representatives to discuss issues, but not to make decisions. It decided that Clam would not have any formal officers, but rather would have task-oriented committees. Clam also decided to require all participants in the April occupation to be organized into affinity groups and to have a period of orientation and nonviolent

training. (See section on Tactics for how Clam became committed to affinity groups and training.)

During the winter of 1976-1977, Clam implemented these decisions. Through 1976, Clam had space within the AFSC office; in December it opened its own office. The office was intended as a resource center, a switchboard, and a place for Clam to gather. Clam saw the role of the staff as coordinating communication, gathering information, and performing tasks delegated by members, but not making decisions. It had no staff of its own until after April 1977; before then, staff from GSA worked fulltime on Clamshell office work and recruiting through its networks, and AFSC staff and volunteers organized nonviolence training. Through the winter, Clam recruited people to take part in the April occupation; but since these people were being recruited for one specific event, few got deeply involved in shaping decisions.

Clam's growth resulted in a cluster of problems about how to extend consensus to a much larger number of people spread throughout New England. Clam's solution centered around the coordinating committee (CC)* and an extensive process of consultation. The CC talked through issues and then referred them to the local groups for discussion. The local groups sent responses to their representatives (or sometimes had an intermediate step of statewide meetings), and then the CC reconsidered the matter to see if an agreement could be reached. If not, the process was repeated until there was agreement. Clam also held congresses irregularly, as the need arose. Clam hoped to be

* It is not clear just who was on the CC. Cohen says that at the beginning, there were no fixed number of representatives from a region to the CC, and that regional representation was not formalized until November 1977 (pp. 109-111, 148). An early participant reports that there were about fifteen members at the beginning, half from the seacoast and half regional representatives. Several participants report that there were problems carrying on discussions because the same people did not always attend CC meetings as representatives. Later, when Clam had an office, staff members and seacoast residents often attended CC meetings, although they were not formally members. It is not clear that people who claimed to have the right to attend were excluded, even when others doubted whether they were representatives or when their participation caused difficulties.

able to work out decisions in which all would concur. However, it never resolved the question of whether absolute consensus was required (i.e., if one person in one local group could block a decision).

Wasserman (Progressive, 1/77:43) says that during the winter, Clam faced severe legal and financial difficulties, and that its survival was uncertain. However, he gives no details.

During the 1977 occupation and imprisonment in the armories, Clam tried to use a similar structure which would permit decision-making to move forward smoothly and still preserve consensus. However, the size and diversity of the group, and the pressure to make decisions quickly, placed considerable strain on the process. Each affinity group selected a "spoke." The spokes came together to form the "decision-making body." However, because of the time pressure, uncertainties of the situation, and unfamiliarity with the process, the consensus-building process faltered and some affinity groups dissented. By the second day of the occupation, the process was working more satisfactorily, but then the occupation was broken up by the authorities. In the armories, Clam tried to maintain the affinity groups and again tried to create a larger structure of decision-making which would keep control democratic.

Both at the occupation and in the armories, central members of the Clam saw the need for the group to reach the best possible decision under the circumstances, and then to accept it rather than try to work out a perfect solution to each question. Their efforts to act responsibly brought them into conflict with others: both those who distrusted anyone making decisions in the name of the group, and more particularly a set of people who saw the protest in more confrontational terms. (See discussion of the Boston-based groups in the section on strategy.) These subgroups were not able to resolve their disagreements over the nature of the protest, and each saw the other as misusing the decision-making procedure. The "responsible

leaders" saw the "dissidents" as being unwilling to listen to others' views and unwilling to try to work out agreements which took account of others' views. The "dissidents" saw the "responsible leaders" as pretending to use the forms of concensus, but as actually stiffling open discussion and preventing minority views from being presented.

For most of the participants, whatever the problems, the April occupation and imprisonment were central experiences in defining what participation in Clam was about. Clam built a sense of solidarity, and the participants gained considerable experience and information during the workshops and other activities of those two weeks. In the period which followed, the expansion of Clamshell was built around this experience.

The April 1977 occupation resulted in tremendous growth for Clam. It had about 250 active members by this time. Contributions flowed in, enabling Clam to hire its own staff. People who had participated in the occupation returned to their own communities and started local groups which affiliated with Clam. Although these groups, in contrast to the original 15, did not have a pre-existing identity, because of Clam's structure they functioned as independent groups and the Alliance did not exert any coercive control over them. Clam continued to struggle with the issues of how it could draw all these scattered groups together and make genuinely concensual decisions.

At the November 1977 congress, Clam established regional representation on the coordinating committee. Also, it set up a committee to study concensus, but the committee was not able to propose solutions to the problems.

In the spring the CC cancelled the occupation and decided to have a legal rally in June instead (see Strategy section for discussion of what was at issue). The CC did not have the right to make this decision, and there was considerable consternation about it having done so. While some members accepted that it was probably necessary under the circumstances, the Boston

affiliate was in an uproar. At the June rally, those who disagreed most strongly with the decision to have a legal rally formed the CFD; this was primarily Clams from Boston, northern Vermont, Long Island (NY), and Rhode Island. The next year was marked by the increasing importance of conflicting factions within the Clam.

CFD saw itself as a militant caucus within the Clam, and tried to force the issues it saw as crucial out into the open (see Strategy for the content of this dispute). However, when Clam called a congress to talk about the June decision and future program, the factions talked past each other. CFD was a minority within Clam, and felt that it was always the group which had to give in. As CFD got more organized by the end of 1978, it was less willing to give up its demands; when it could not get others to agree with it, it used the procedure to its advantage (e.g., refusing to agree to others' decisions on anything unless its own plans were accepted). In January 1979, Clam raised the question of whether it should use high majority when it could not reach consensus (i.e., a majority of 80%); in March it agreed to this change. Meanwhile, CFD had been designing an occupation in accordance with its ideas; but at the June meeting, it could not get a high majority to approve the plan. The most it could get was a Clam endorsement for a demonstration organized outside of Clam. In reaction, a group formed CDAS.

CDAS, like CFD, drew most of its strength from Boston Clamshell (although there were other affinity groups sympathetic too--e.g., Newburyport and Providence), and differed philosophically from Clam (see Strategy). The strongest opposition to CDAS and CFD came from a faction which included the office staff, training committee, AFSC, and others who identified with the seacoast residents' concerns or who argued for strict nonviolence. Most people did not belong to either faction. Nevertheless, the conflicts between these factions, given Clam's decision-making procedures, made it impossible

for Clam to agree on any actions. For example, the Wall Street action was organized by Clam members, but outside Clam apparently only because there was so much dissent within the Clam. Therefore, in January 1980, Clam held a congress to try to bring the strict nonviolence people and CDAS together. But Clam concluded that rapprochement was impossible, and that each side would block the other on any proposal. Therefore, Clam decided it could no longer hold actions, but rather would endorse actions which met four criteria: the action had to be called by a Clam group, it had to maintain nonviolence toward people, it had to use affinity group structure, and there had to be some sort of preparation of participants (they couldn't agree even on whether to call this "training").

III GOALS AND TARGETS

The groups which opposed the Seabrook plant before Clam (and then became involved to varying degrees in Clam) had a variety of goals and targets. The environmental groups began by objecting to particular aspects of the plans and site; their targets were the licensing authorities and PSC. GSA initially opposed Seabrook because it expected the plant to result in rate increases; it tried to use Seabrook as a way to mobilize its constituency. The group in Montague was trying to stop nuclear power which it saw as very dangerous; its main target was the public which it wanted to educate and arouse to action. SAPL and CCSB focussed mainly on the Seabrook plant; their targets were both the authorities and local residents.

During Clamshell's first year, its primary goal was to stop construction at Seabrook. It saw this as a way to call attention to the dangers of nuclear power, and it believed that public protest would show PSC that there was too much opposition for PSC to continue construction. Clam identified three targets. The first was those with power to make decisions (PSC, state and federal regulators and legislatures, Public Service Commission, and businesses, especially electric companies). A second target was its constituency

which it saw as having power to stop nuclear power through its members' lives (e.g., construction workers refusing to build the plant), and through putting pressure on PSC. The third target was the broader public beyond the immediate area.

Beginning after the April 1977 occupation, and increasing sharply after the June 1978 legal rally, there was intense internal discussion within Clamshell about whether its goal was symbolic protests or a real occupation of the site. This had partly to do with conflicting analyses (see below under Strategy), and partly with choice of targets. Those who argued for "strict nonviolence" (i.e., no destruction of property) included those concerned with mobilizing local opposition as well as those philosophically committed to nonviolence. Those who wanted "real occupation" argued that the symbolic protests were merely appeals to illegitimate authorities, and that concerned people must take the matter into their own hands in order to show others that people could have control over their own lives.

As local groups got started, they had local targets as well as the shared concern about Seabrook. Many of them focused on alternative energy issues as well as on opposition to nuclear power.

In 1978 and 1979, there was increasing discussion of the role of capitalism and the state. The CFD faction and CDAS saw nuclear power as an example of the abuses of capitalism. In the Wall Street Action (October 1979), the primary objective was to show the connections between nuclear power and corporations; this was the first explicitly anti-capitalist protest by the Clam.

Also by 1979 and 1980, Clam was making more connection between nuclear power and nuclear weapons.

IV STRATEGY AND TACTICS

Prior to the formation of the Clamshell, three main kinds of tactics were being used in opposition to Seabrook. The environmental groups mainly used legal interventions in the license-hearing procedures. Both environmental and social change groups used a number of legal educational tactics: publicizing the issues through the public media and their own newsletters, circulating petitions, holding rallies and marches, and getting the issue on the town ballot. Finally, there were a few acts of symbolic civil disobedience, most notably Lovejoy's toppling of the weather tower.

Clamshell was founded explicitly to do direct action on the basis that legal intervention and education had not been sufficient. Its initial analysis was that it could use exemplary civil disobedience because the deliberate and public use of illegality would draw attention to the seriousness of their protest, and so would put pressure on PSC. Therefore, they were concerned about the quality of the protest, not just the size. Clam was committed to using nonviolence, but there was not agreement about what this meant. Some members saw this as a philosophical issue, others as a matter of tactics. For those who saw nonviolence as a philosophy, it was a way of treating everyone with respect; at the beginning, there was agreement in Clam that it was important to see the construction workers, police, and others as people doing their jobs and as neighbors to be persuaded, rather than as "enemies." Therefore, while Clam protestors deliberately trespassed and would not cooperate in their arrests, before the demonstration Clam informed the authorities what they would do, how many people would be involved, etc.; and after their arrests, the protestors cooperated with the authorities. There was agreement that nonviolence included tactics such as public demonstrations but also one-to-one conversations. Some members also saw it as part of a larger philosophical approach which would also include prayer and fasting.

During the first year, Clam used both civil disobedience and legal

approaches. One of its main strategies was escalating civil disobedience. From its experience in the August 1976 demonstrations, it devised its strategies of using affinity groups and training.

Its first action was the August 1, 1976 civil disobedience to show its opposition to the groundbreaking for the plant. It decided that all those being arrested should be from New Hampshire. Between 500-600 people from all over New England came to the rally, and 18 trespassed and were arrested. At the news conference following their arrests, Clam announced another occupation for August 22nd. On August 22nd, 1500 people attended the rally and 180 were arrested, and Clam announced its next occupation for October.

From these first two occupations, Clam drew several conclusions. First, it planned on escalating the civil disobedience. Eighteen people had been willing to be arrested for the first one, Clam planned to have them each bring ten people to the August 22nd action. One hundred eighty were arrested on August, and Clam planned to have each of them bring ten more to the next occupation. Although Clam changed the October action to a Natural Energy Fair and postponed the occupation until April 1977, its strategy of having ten times as many remained the same.

In addition, the strategy of having affinity groups and training emerged out of the experience during the first two demonstrations. Those who were to trespass on August 1st got together a number of times to prepare themselves for doing civil disobedience. They were uncertain about what might happen and were apprehensive about it, so the night before their protest, an AFSC staff member helping them prepare suggested that they role-play to get a better understanding of their own reactions and those of others (especially the police). They were so impressed with the extent to which these meetings and role-playing increased their sense of solidarity and preparedness, that Clam decided that those who wanted to participate on August

22nd should be organized into small groups and have orientation and training. Again Clam was very pleased with the results, and so made these a standard part of its procedures. Clam saw the training as strengthening participants' commitment to nonviolence, increasing their ability to stand the stressful situation, and as promoting group solidarity.

Clam was pleased with this occupation and saw it as showing the immense possibilities of using orderly protest for social change. In Wyl, Germany, citizens had occupied the site of a proposed nuclear plant and so prevented its construction. Some members of Clam envisioned it organizing a similar protest at Seabrook.

However, as Clam planned for the October action, some members, particularly Lovejoy, argued that it was a bad strategy to continue having occupations: Clam was not strong enough to mount another larger one; and it needed to do educational work as well as have protests. Clam decided to change the October action to a Natural Energy Fair in the hopes of attracting more diverse people, and especially seacoast residents who opposed nuclear power but were unwilling to be identified with civil disobedience. In this way it would also do more education and organizing around the issues. Clam was pleased that 3000 people attended, many of whom were local residents.

Clam spent the winter preparing for the April 1977 occupation. Some of the main issues were recruiting, keeping the protest well organized, and especially making sure there would be no violence. I have no specific information about recruitment, other than that those already involved used their networks. A major part of the effort to keep the protest well organized and nonviolent centered around training participants, and, given the size, training trainers. Clam used its own people and also people from other nonviolent direct action groups (see Relations with Allies), and developed training materials. Because Clam was concerned that no one participate except those who had been trained, it worked out extensive procedures, forms, and records.

In addition, Clam tried to construct guidelines of acceptable non-violent conduct. However, this brought out different interpretations, e.g., whether blocking workers and destruction of property should be allowed (since by this time construction had begun). These issues were not fully resolved; Clam did work out guidelines, but left some of the unresolved issues to be decided by the occupiers at the site.

Clam regarded the April 1977 occupation as a major success, and this remained a definitive experience for the Alliance. About 2500 people participated in the occupation and 1414 were arrested. (The affinity groups were organized with members who would not be arrested so they could provide support services for those who were, e.g., contacting their families and the media.) Since the authorities would not release all the protesters on their own recognizance, many chose to remain in custody until all were released. The authorities put the demonstrators in national guard armories, and the protesters organized a variety of activities there for themselves.

(In the August 1976 demonstrations, the people arrested had been released the next day. Although Clam did think through some of the implications of having ten times as many people arrested--since there would be no New Hampshire facilities large enough to hold them all--it did not plan for the protesters to be detained for two weeks. Trying to find out where different people were being held, making contact with their families, arranging bail for those who wanted it, etc. placed a tremendous strain on core members who were not in the armories, and especially on the seacoast supporters.)

Following the April 1977 occupation, Clam's major activity was expanding the organization, especially starting up new local groups. In addition, there was considerable discussion about whether Clam should have another occupation, and if so, how it should differ from the one in April.

Clam saw the publicity and public reaction to the April occupation as showing that there was an anti-nuke constituency to be organized. Many

of those who participated went back to their own communities and started up anti-nuke groups which got involved in local issues--some anti-nuke, some alternative energy sources, and some around other issues. In addition, people in more distant places began alliances modelled on the Clam, and there was some consideration of trying to weld together a truly national movement.

Within the Clam there was discussion both of how to include all these new members and about what to do next. Clam planned another occupation for the late summer, but did not get it organized because some of the experienced members were exhausted from the April occupation and its aftermath. But, in addition, there were some serious questions about the value of another occupation, and so Clam considered alternative actions.

A number of arguments were raised against having another occupation. Some people were concerned about the dangers of such large protests and of disturbances. If the authorities were willing to arrest 1400 people, and if that didn't persuade PSC to stop construction, bringing a few more people would have little impact. PSC was continuing construction and was therefore increasingly committed to completing the plant (in contrast to Why1 where no construction had been begun). Further, another occupation would not attract the media and would imply that Clam could do nothing else. Occupations attracted people with alternative life styles, but might repel the more moderate social activists. Finally, the local seacoast residents and those sensitive to them pointed to the monumental need for logistical support.

There were also objections by those who saw the April occupation as not having been a strong enough statement. These people questioned whether Clam had even intended to have an occupation: certainly people were not prepared to spend six months or a year on the site, and cooperation with the police and other authorities implied an acceptance of their legitimacy. Some of these Clam members argued that the authorities were not legitimate.

After much discussion, Clam approved an action for June 1978. This was to be a combined occupation and restoration which Clam hoped would

emphasize the more positive aspects of the action. In addition, Clam specified that the occupiers should go door-to-door throughout the area explaining the purpose of the protest, and that the occupiers must devise ways to be more self-sufficient and less burden on local supporters. This occupation did, however, include plans for civil disobedience. This time there was more discussion about destruction of property and whether the authorities should be told the plans. Finally, just a few weeks before the occupation, those who believed that destruction of property should be allowed gave in, but on the understanding that the guidelines for this action would apply only this once.

However, the local residents who were active in Clam were under increasing pressure. At the coordinating committee meeting just before the occupation, they said that they were unable to agree to it: opposition in the community was mounting, the local people feared the size of the crowds and the prospect for violent confrontations (e.g., between demonstrators and local construction workers). On this basis the CC changed the occupation to a legal rally.

Although 12,000 local people and about 6000 Clams attended, Clam was not satisfied with the June rally. There were two major issues: the process by which the decision had been made, and what kinds of actions Clam should be organizing. The decision by the CC was clearly a violation of Clam procedures of consultation and consensus. Those more sympathetic with the seacoast residents felt that under the circumstances it was probably the best decision, whatever their personal disappointment at not having another occupation. Others, who had joined the Clam to participate in civil disobedience against nuclear power within the kind of consensus organization Clam claimed to be, felt more betrayed by the decision.

Finally, there were some members who felt that a political rally was not the kind of political statement they were willing to make, that Clam

should do whatever it took to really occupy the site, and that the way the decision had been made showed that "consensus" was just a way to manipulate dissident minorities. This group argued vigorously that the state was illegitimate, and so opposed letting the authorities know their plans. It saw holding legal rallies as merely appealing to these authorities (and so giving them legitimacy), and saw ending the rally when the authorities told them to do so or cooperating after arrest as merely knuckling under.* It believed that people should take actions into their own hands rather than pleading with the state. At the rally, this group drew itself together and formed Clams for Democracy.

During the summer, Clam tried to resolve these philosophical and strategic issues, but the groups talked past each other. Over the next year, the split between the factions became sharper and more bitter, and their proposed plans diverged increasingly.

Clam could not agree on conditions under which to hold another major occupation. Some members argued that Clam should organize a real occupation of the site, using whatever forms of civil disobedience this might require. Others argued against a large-scale protest because of the danger of a violent confrontation with construction workers or authorities. As a compromise, in the fall of 1978, Clam approved "wave actions:" civil disobedience by small groups. The first group did slip onto the site and members chained themselves to the construction equipment, but none of the later waves got inside the fence. Although the Boston group (the CFD faction) didn't get inside, it regarded its attempt as a success because it had been a genuine attempt to occupy. Most of the Clam, however, was disappointed because the wave actions took almost as much preparation as an occupation, but did not receive the public attention.

* In the spring of 1979, Boston Clamshell, the main center of this group, was so opposed to demonstrations which seemed to be appealing to the government, that it refused to take part in the big May 6 demonstration in Washington following TMI.

The other important action during this period was the blockade of the reactor vessel. The same issues of how militant the protest should be and the meaning on nonviolence were raised, but there was much less disagreement over having the blockade (partly because it would not be at the Seabrook site, and so would not upset the residents there). A great deal of planning went into the blockade because it was being built under considerable secrecy; therefore, the protesters had to organize a major research effort to find out when the reactor vessel would be needed, where it was being built, and the route over which it would be transported. Since Clam could not set the timing of this action, it organized a telephone tree as a means of gathering protesters when the moment arrived. There were relatively elaborate plans including a blockade on the sea by local fishermen as well as a blockade of the land route. In the early spring of 1979, the reactor vessel was moved; Clam attempted to stop it, but was unsuccessful.

In the spring of 1979, CFD made plans for an occupation, but could not get the rest of Clam only to agree to endorse CFD organizing the protest outside of Clam. The dissidents were very angry about this and saw it as another instance of the power and control by the staff and long-term members who were unwilling to share power. The dissidents formed Clams for Direct Action at Seabrook in order to organize what they considered would be a real occupation. Preparing for it, they gave most of their attention to tactics for getting on the site, (e.g., bring ladders, wear gas masks) and left the participants relatively free to do whatever they considered necessary once they got there.

Meanwhile, Clam approved an educational rally, "Turning Tide," for July 1979. This rally was oriented toward the coastal constituency, and so was a marked change from the earlier occupations which had drawn people from other places as a show of broad support.

On October 6, 1979, CDAS had its occupation in which 1800 protesters tried to dismantle or pull down the fences around the site. The police repelled them. (Meanwhile another set of Clam-related people organized a vigil in order that there would be a nonviolent presence, despite CDAS's plans.) CDAS was disappointed because they thought they would be able to occupy the site, at least for a short while. The rest of Clam was relieved that there had not been more violence and had been no public denunciation of anti-nuke protest.

On October 28-29, 1979, the Wall Street Action took place. This also was organized by Clam members, but outside the Clam structure (because of the wrangling within Clam). Its organizers saw the basic issue as the exploitative capitalist system, but at the same time were more sensitive to the concerns of the seacoast residents than was CDAS. This action involved civil disobedience, but was organized with strict nonviolence and affinity groups. About 1000 people were arrested at the New York Stock Exchange.

In February 1980, Clam endorsed actions proposed by both factions: a CDAS occupation in May and a staff-seacoast "Seabrook Summer '80." The CDAS occupation was better organized than the October 1979 one; there was more destruction of property, but no violence against workers. CDAS was disappointed that only 1500 people came, that it was not able to get on the site, and that there was little public response to its efforts. Following that occupation, CDAS became less committed to the strategy of direct action since it did not seem able to mount a strong enough attack; but it was unsure what other tactics provided a sufficiently radical alternative.

The Seabrook Summer '80 was supposed to be a summer of symbolic actions including both legal rallies and civil disobedience, but it never got off the ground.

Currently none of the factions of Clamshell are active. However, some of the local groups still remain, and they are involved in a variety of tactics. For example, a number of towns around Seabrook are passing ordinances against carrying nuclear wastes through their communities, and there is an effort to get larger jurisdictions to pass such regulations.

V. RESOURCES

Throughout its history, Clam was able to mobilize people to take part in its protests. Those most active in the Clam were overwhelmingly white, well-educated, and approximately equal numbers of men and women; there were some low-income people, primarily from New Hampshire. Cohen characterizes Clam membership as primarily made of New Left activists, drawn into the struggle by environmental groups (see especially pp. 79-80, but scattered allusions and evidence throughout). Most of those who organized Clam were 25-45 years old. In the April 1977 occupation, perhaps half those arrested were in their mid-twenties, and another quarter college-aged; most of the remainder were older. (In the largest armory, where six hundred people were held, 36 were fifty years or older, i.e., about 6%; there were fewer than that of high school age, and no younger people were incarcerated.) At the support rallies, legal fairs, etc. there was an even wider spread of ages, and probably a larger proportion of middle-aged and older people.

Those involved before the formation of the Clam tended to be linked into environmental groups or GSA, or to be local residents. The composition of these groups apparently was fairly different: the environmental group members were older and more financially secure, while GHG members and GSA organizers were younger and "New Leftish," and the GSA constituency included the poor (e.g., welfare mothers) as well as progressive social activists.

From the time Clam formed, it was concerned with mobilizing local people, and it often measured success and/or designed strategy around this

criterion (e.g., pointing to the significance of the town votes against the nuclear plant, urging educational programs and tactics which would not frighten or offend local residents, and recruiting fishermen for the sea blockade). The first 18 protesters (August 1, 1976) were drawn from the founders of the Clam, and the 180 for the August 22nd protest were recruited through their networks. However, a major argument against having another occupation in October 1976 was that not enough local residents were being included. At the same time, the August protests--and the April 1977 occupation to a far greater extent--served as a means of recruitment to the Clam.

After April 1977, many people joined Clam and especially the local groups. The local groups tended to be comprised of people from that community, and, in some cases, also college students living there temporarily. (I can't tell from the sources how much variation there was among local groups) In the major actions after April 1977, there were larger numbers of younger demonstrators, e.g., 18-20 year olds. Many of the people who joined after the April occupation did not share the values of the original participants, and there was considerably less trust within the Clamas it increased in size.

After TMI, there was another influx of members, both to the Clam and to the local groups. The Clam did not develop mechanisms for incorporating these people; I have no information about the extent to which the local groups were able to do so. These people had a broader range of backgrounds, e.g., more middle-aged as well as youthful people, and working class as well as middle class.

The people who formed CFD in 1978 and CDAS in 1979 were drawn mainly from specific affinity groups. In both cases, Boston Clamshell was the primary center. Demographically, the members of CFD and CDAS were similar to the rest of Clam. Those who participated in the October 1979 CDAS occupation were mostly newer members and those pulling away from Clam.

People became involved in Clamshell activities in different ways. Networks were an important early source of participants. The August 1976 and April 1977 occupations were seen as successful, and both media coverage and personal networks were importance channels for involvement on new people. In 1978 and 1979, there was widespread public outrage in New Hampshire over CWIP; GSA (no longer actively involved in the Clam) was one of the first groups to organize around this issue, and there was a good deal of public involvement in opposition to CWIP; however, it is not clear that this brought more people into the Clam.

The April 1977 occupation was particularly significant for Clam. Not only did many people join because of it, but many people formed local groups in New England or formed similar alliances in other parts of the country. People contributed money to the Clam which enabled it to hire its first staff members (at minimal salaries--generally \$100 per month). Further, the Clam used the time in the armory--the enforced, intense time together made bonds among participants which helped redefine affinity groups from being temporary devices for a single demonstration to being the basic unit of the Clam. Further, the time in the armory was an opportunity for the Clam to have workshops by which to educate its members, and to develop its use of consensus further.

At the same time, the April 1977 occupation was also an appreciable drain on Clam. Many of the early core organizers were exhausted by it and withdrew, at least temporarily. Further, some of the local residents were upset both by the demands placed on them, and then by the way those in the armories got all the credit. (Since Clam had not planned on protesters being held so long in the armories, it had not made provisions for dealing with the ensuing problems. Local supporters helped handle these problems, and their homes were the headquarters for virtually all the activities.)

More broadly, the local residents gave the use of their land for assembling of protesters, allowed protesters to camp on their property, to use their water and telephones, and to let their homes be used for training and planning meetings.

I have little in the way of estimates about Clam's finances. A major occupation may have cost \$20,000, and a monthly phone bill might run as high as \$1000. Clam had 2-8 staff members who received \$100 per month.

Most Clam work was done by volunteers. Much of the organizing and planning was done by young people with discretionary time. Clam paid for no legal services, but relied instead upon donated services by the ACLU and other lawyers. Doctors and nurses volunteered their services at protest activities. Scientists and medical people provided technical information about biological effects of radiation and about alternative forms of energy. Other types of volunteer skilled labor included art, media, office work (secretarial and bookkeeping), and organizers. Especially for the first year, Clam depended for staffing on people from other organizations, especially GSA (office work and recruitment by staff working fulltime on Clamshell activities) and AFSC (for nonviolent training particularly).

VI. RELATIONS WITH ALLIES

Before the Clam was formed, a number of groups had become involved in opposing the Seabrook plant. Although there was some cooperation among them, there were substantial disagreements, especially over tactics and style. These groups included environmental organizations (SAPL, Society for Protection of New Hampshire Forests, Audobon Society, etc.) specifically anti-nuclear groups (such as the New England Coalition Against Nuclear Pollution and through it the Natural Resources Defense Council), local groups (particularly the one from Montague, Massachusetts and the CCCSB), the social change network built by GSA, the GHG, Maine PIRG, and the local staff of the AFSC.

Clam was formed as an umbrella for fifteen anti-nuclear organizations (I do not have a list of these). Some of the groups named above played specific roles in the development of Clam: GHG and AFSC members were important in shaping Clam's interpretation of nonviolence, the Montague group persuaded Clam to change the October 1976 occupation to an educational fair, etc. These organizations' networks were a major resource for Clam recruiting. GSA staff worked fulltime for Clam through April 1977 doing office work and recruiting. AFSC took much of the responsibility for training and setting up affinity groups (and drew on other nonviolent direct action organizations for the training, e.g., Committee for Nonviolent Action, The Ark, Movement for a New Society), and provided office space for Clam during 1976.

After the April 1977 occupation, Clam spawned other groups, both locally and nationally. On the one hand, Clam provided a focus which brought people from many places together, and unified them for one large action to stop one nuclear plant. This action inspired many of the people to go back to their communities and start local organizations. Eventually, these groups outgrew the Clam structure and so continued or dissolved as independent groups. During 1977-1979, however, these groups both strengthened the Clam and drew strength from it, e.g., participating in Clam activities, taking information back to their communities, and asking Clam for help in local protests. Further, groups in other parts of the country started alliances modelled on the Clam. There was a sense of comradeship among these groups, and they joined together for anti-nuclear protests, e.g., at Rocky Flats, Colorado; Ground Zero, Washington; and Barnswell, South Carolina.

As a matter of policy, Clam tried to reach out to groups who were directly affected by the Seabrook plant, even those implicated in building it, such as the construction workers, or those defending it against their

protests, such as the national guard. Clam prepared pamphlets for both the construction workers and the national guard, and recruited local fishermen for the sea blockade. I don't have much information on other activities in relation to these groups, or on relations with any other organizations involved.

In general there does not seem to have been either close cooperation or appreciable competition with other groups in New England since none of them seems to have been doing direct action on nuclear issues. Apparently there was a certain amount of sharing information and spreading information through newsletters; and individuals from other organizations became involved in Clamshell through these connections. Many organizations were glad to take part in Clam-sponsored educational activities (fairs, rallies) because this provided an opportunity for them to talk publically about their own concerns and programs.

The only indication of conflict with another organization that I have is that when Mobilization for Survival was starting, there seems to have been some friction and sense of competition. I do not have details about this, except that the organizations did work it out.

Conflicts within Clamshell built up during and after 1978. Much of this opposition centered in Boston Clamshell, although other affiliates were also involved, e.g., Newburyport, Providence, northern Vermont, etc. By the time of TMI, Boston Clamshell was so opposed to any action which seemed to be making an appeal to the government, that it refused to take part in the May 6, 1979 demonstration in Washington: it was the only notable exception to an anti-nuke coalition that included militant environmentalists, lobbying groups, PIRGs, peace groups, and others.

The Wall Street Action in October 1979 involved War Resisters League, Harlem Fightback, Mobilization for Survival, WIN Magazine, Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee, Union of Radical Economists, and

a variety of other anti-nuke groups, alliances, and coalitions. Some of these groups were not primarily anti-nuclear groups. However, at least some of them had been involved in earlier Clam activities, e.g., WRL had an affinity group at the 1977 occupation, and WIN published two whole issues and many articles on the Clam.

VII RELATIONS WITH AUTHORITIES

Clam's relations with authorities were complicated by the range of views within the alliance: some members saw most authorities as part of the constituency; others saw all the authorities as opponents. Through June 1978, Clam's policy was to inform the authorities fully about its plans. After June 1978 there was increasing disagreement about this policy.

Clam's expectations about authority responses to its actions also changed over time. Through the April 1977 occupation, Clam saw the authorities as willing to arrest all those who committed civil disobedience. Up to the April occupation, Clam hoped that increasing the numbers would force the authorities to reconsider, but after the massive arrests, Clam began questioning whether bringing more people would have any impact. By 1979, Clam saw the authorities as having learned their lesson--that mass arrests helped the Clam and so were a tactical mistake for the authorities. At the wave actions, the police repelled the protesters and made some arrests, but since these were smaller actions, there were no mass arrests. At the blockade and again at the CDAS occupations, the police relied more heavily on using force to disperse the protest than on making large numbers of arrests. Clam saw the combination of the PSC's fence around the site and the changed police tactics as preventing it from using mass civil disobedience at Seabrook, and as forcing it to devise new tactics. However, the Wall Street Action organizers were committed to using strict nonviolence and training protesters; as they expected, the authorities responded to their mass civil disobedience with arrests, not violence.

Local harassment was also an issue. During the winter of 1977-78 neighbors put pressure on local Clam supporters to prevent any confrontation, and there was some vandalism of their property. Further, a court injunction was obtained to prohibit the use of local supporters' land for staging areas, and local ordinances were passed against tenting on private land. I do not have information about who was involved in getting the injunction or ordinance passed, and whether this was part of a larger set of controversies. But the local Clam supporters insistence on not exacerbating local fears implies that they continued to see other residents as a potential constituency rather than as opponents.

Clam's relations with the media were mixed. Clam regarded William Loeb, editor of the Manchester Union-Leader as a major opponent and a powerful ally of Governor Meldrim Thomson. Some of its tactics were designed specifically to counter the Union-Leader's effect (e.g., the efforts to go door-to-door to present its side of the Seabrook issues). However, Clam's relations with the alternative media and with media from other places, such as Boston, seem generally to have been positive. Coverage of Clam protests was both positive and extensive (in contrast, for instance, to coverage of the CDAS protests), and Clam seemed concerned to have good coverage, e.g., it did not want to be portrayed as being irresponsible. Relations with the media was one of the points of controversy within Clam: CFD and CDAS saw the media much more as a tool of the establishment.

VIII RELATIONS WITH OPPONENTS

Within Clam there was agreement that PSC was a primary opponent, and that specific state leaders--the governor, Meldrim Thomson, and the editor of the Manchester Union-Leader, William Loeb--were ardent supporters of nuclear power, and that the regulatory agencies were biased toward building nuclear power plants. Before the formation of Clam, some of the groups which opposed the Seabrook plant hoped to have an impact through

legal channels. Clam was created by those who saw the PSC, regulatory agencies, and state as unwilling to take any account of their legitimate opposition. Clam saw Loeb as presenting a biased account of the issues, and Thomson as escalating the level of conflict.

However, there was disagreement within Clam over whether people such as the police and National Guard were opponents. Part of Clam saw these people as neighbors who were basically doing their jobs; this part of Clam emphasized reaching out to these people and saw Clam's success in winning over some of them (e.g., some of the guards in the armory). Others in Clam saw the police as having more physical force at their disposal, and as likely to use force if provoked; these people urged Clam to use nonviolence as a tactic because violence would lead to police reprisals. These people were not persuaded that it was worth trying to convince the police.

There was some concern within Clam about agents provocateurs. Clam's concern with training and affinity groups was partly intended to control the effectiveness of such agents, and some Clam members were suspicious that agents were involved in stirring up the dissidents who formed CFD and CDAS.

Boston Clamshell, CFD, and CDAS saw the authorities and state as opponents. Boston Clamshell wanted the June 1978 action to be more of a confrontation: they wanted it to be a real occupation, and wanted Clam not to tell the authorities ahead of time what Clam was planning to do. Boston saw the Clam coordinating committee's decision to have a legal rally as completely illegitimate and its willingness to leave the site when told to do so as capitulating. Boston formalized its position through the creation of CFD which took the stance that the state played a major part in nuclear development and that the Clam should be explicit in its criticism of nuclear power as an example of the abuses of capitalism. It saw no reason to tell the police its plans or bargain with the state: it saw the

state as illegitimate because it did not represent the will of the people. Thus the Boston wave action (October 1978) did not inform the police of its plans, and Boston Clam did not cooperate in the May 1979 Washington rally in response to TMI because it saw this as an effort to petition the government and therefore as an implicit endorsement of the government's legitimacy and its right to regulate nuclear power.

By 1979, others in Clam besides CFD and CDAS saw the problem as being capitalism, and saw nuclear power as being the most dangerous hazard of the exploitative capitalist system; however, they did not adopt CDAS's antagonistic style. The CDAS demonstrations sought confrontation and showed considerable hostility toward the police and media; the police responded with force and the media either were critical or gave little coverage. In contrast, the Wall Street Action maintained strict nonviolence and showed no hostility toward the police despite being explicitly anti-capitalist.

Those who made the connection between nuclear power and nuclear weapons saw this as expanding the range of issues greatly, as changing the nature of the struggle, and as having implications for both tactics toward the opponents and strategies for mobilizing the constituency. They saw organizing people to oppose the Department of Defence and to think about defense related issues as being quite different from trying to organize people to oppose the PSC about construction of a nuclear power plant.

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