
WARMAKING AND STATEMAKING

AS ORGANIZED CRIME

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Double-Edged Protection

In contemporary American parlance, the word "protection" sounds two contrasting tones. One is comforting, the other ominous. With one tone, "protection" calls up images of the shelter against danger provided by a powerful friend, a large insurance policy, or a sturdy roof. With the other, it evokes the racket in which a local strongman forces merchants to pay tribute in order to avoid damage, damage the strongman himself threatens to deliver. The difference, to be sure, is a matter of degree: a hell-and-damnation priest is only likely to collect contributions from his parishioners to the extent that they believe his predictions of brimstone for infidels; the neighborhood mobster may actually be, as he claims to be, a brothel's best guarantee of operation free of police interference.

Which image the word "protection" brings to mind depends mainly on our assessment of the reality and externality of the threat. Someone who produces both the danger and, at a price, the shield against it is a racketeer. Someone who provides a needed shield but has little control over the danger's appearance qualifies as a legitimate protector -- especially if his price is no higher than his competitors'. Someone who supplies reliable, low-priced shielding both from local racketeers and from outside marauders makes the best offer of all.

Apologists for particular governments and for government in general commonly argue, precisely, that they offer protection from local and external violence. They claim that the prices they charge barely cover the costs of protection. They call people who complain about the price of protection "anarchists", "subversives", or both at once. But consider the definition of a racketeer as someone who creates a threat, then charges for its reduction. Governments' provision of protection, by this standard, often qualifies as racketeering. To the extent that the threats against which a given government protects its citizens are imaginary, or are consequences of its own activities, the government has organized a protection racket. Since

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governments themselves commonly stimulate or even manufacture threats of external war, and since the repressive and extractive activities of governments often constitute the largest current threats to the livelihoods of their own citizens, many governments operate in essentially the same ways as racketeers. There is, of course, a difference: racketeers, by the conventional definition, operate without the authority of governments.

How do racketeer-governments themselves acquire authority? As a question of fact and of ethics, that is one of the oldest conundrums of political analysis. Back to Machiavelli and Hobbes, nevertheless, political observers have recognized that -- whatever else they do -- governments organize and, where possible, monopolize violence. It matters little whether we take violence in a narrow sense such as damage to persons and objects or in a broad sense such as violation of people's desires and interests; by either criterion governments stand out from other organizations by their tendency to monopolize the concentrated means of violence. The distinction between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" force, furthermore, makes no difference to the fact. Indeed, Arthur Stinchcombe's agreeably cynical treatment of legitimacy as the probability that other authorities will act to confirm the decisions of a given authority underscores the importance of the authority's monopoly of force. A tendency to monopolize the means of violence makes a government's claim to provide protection, in either the comforting or the ominous sense of the word, more credible and harder to resist.

Frank recognition of force's central place in governmental activity does not require us to believe that governmental authority rests "only" or "ultimately" on the threat of violence. Nor does it entail the assumption that a government's only service is protection. Even where the government's use of force imposes a large cost, some people may well decide that a government's other services outbalance the costs of acceding to its monopoly of violence. Recognition of the centrality of force

opens the way to an understanding of the growth and change of governmental forms.

This essay concerns the place of organized means of violence in the growth and change of those peculiar forms of government we call national states: relatively centralized, differentiated organizations whose officials more or less successfully claim control over the chief concentrated means of violence within a population inhabiting a large, contiguous territory. The argument grows from historical work on the formation of national states in western Europe, especially on the growth of the French state from 1600 onward. But it takes several deliberate steps away from that work, wheels, and stares hard at it from theoretical ground. The argument brings with it few illustrations, and no evidence worthy of the name.

As one repacks a hastily-filled rucksack after a few days on the trail -- throwing out the waste, putting things in order of importance, and balancing the load -- I have repacked my theoretical baggage for the climb to come; the real test of the new packing only arrives with the next stretch of the trail. The trimmed-down argument stresses a) the interdependence of warmaking and statemaking, b) the analogy between both of those processes and what, when less successful and smaller in scale, we call organized crime. War makes states, I will claim. Banditry, piracy, gangland rivalry, policing, and warmaking all belong on the same continuum -- that I will claim as well. For the historically-limited period in which national states were becoming the dominant organizations in western countries, I will also claim that c) mercantile capitalism and statemaking reinforced each other.

Here is a preview of the most general argument: Powerholders' pursuit of war involved them willy-nilly in the extraction of resources for warmaking from the populations over which they had control, and in the promotion of capital accumulation by those who could help them borrow and buy. Warmaking, extraction, and capital accumulation interacted to shape European statemaking. Powerholders did not undertake those three momentous activities with the intention of creating national

states: centralized, differentiated, autonomous, extensive political organizations. Nor did they ordinarily foresee that national states would emerge from warmaking, extraction, and capital accumulation. Instead, the people who controlled European states and states-in-the-making warred in order to check or overcome their competitors, and thus to enjoy the advantages of power within a secure or expanding territory. To make more effective war, they attempted to locate more capital. In the short run, they might acquire that capital by conquest, by selling off their assets, by coercing or dispossessing accumulators of capital. In the long run, the quest inevitably involved them in establishing regular access to capitalists who could supply and arrange credit, and in imposing one form of regular taxation or another on the people and activities within their spheres of control. As the process continued, they developed a durable interest in promoting the accumulation of capital, sometimes in the guise of direct return to their own enterprises. Variations in the difficulty of these activities -- how hard it was to collect taxes, how expensive was the particular kind of armed force adopted, how much warmaking it took to hold off competitors, and so on -- caused the principal variants in the forms of European states. It all began with the effort to monopolize the means of violence within a delimited territory adjacent to a powerholder's base.

Violence and Government

What distinguished the violence produced by states from the violence delivered by anyone else? In the long run, enough to make the division between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" force credible. Eventually, the personnel of states purveyed violence on a larger scale, more effectively, more efficiently, with wider assent from their subject populations, and with readier collaboration from neighboring authorities than did the personnel of other organizations. But that series of distinctions took a long time to establish. Early in the statemaking process, many parties shared the right to use violence, the practice of using it routinely to accomplish their ends, or

both at once. The continuum ran from bandits and pirates to kings via tax collectors, regional powerholders, and professional soldiers.

The uncertain, elastic line between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" violence appeared in the upper reaches of power. Early in the statemaking process, many parties shared the right to use violence, its actual employment, or both at once. The long love-hate affair between aspiring statemakers and pirates or bandits illustrates the division. "Behind piracy on the seas acted cities and city-states," writes Fernand Braudel of the sixteenth century. "Behind banditry, that terrestrial piracy, appeared the continual aid of lords . . ." (Braudel 1966, II: 88-89). In times of war, indeed, the managers of full-fledged states often commissioned privateers, hired sometime bandits to raid their enemies, and encouraged their regular troops to take booty. In royal service, soldiers and sailors were often expected to provide for themselves by preying on the civilian population: commandeering, raping, looting, taking prizes. When demobilized, they commonly continued the same practices, but without the same royal protection; demobilized ships became pirate vessels, demobilized troops bandits. It also worked the other way: a king's best source of armed supporters was sometimes the world of outlaws. Robin Hood's conversion to royal archer may be a myth, but the myth records a practice. The distinctions between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" users of violence only came clear very slowly, in the process of making the state's armed forces relatively unified and permanent.

Up to that point, as Braudel says, maritime cities and terrestrial lords commonly offered protection, or even sponsorship, to freebooters. Many lords who did not pretend to be kings, furthermore, successfully claimed the right to levy troops and maintain their own armed retainers. Without calling on some of those lords to bring their armies with them, no king could fight a war. Yet those same armed lords constituted the king's rivals and opponents, his enemies' potential allies. For that reason, before the seventeenth century, regencies for child-sovereigns reliably

produced civil wars. For the same reason, disarming the great stood high on the agenda of every would-be statemaker.

The Tudors, for example, accomplished that agenda through most of England.

"The greatest triumph of the Tudors," writes Lawrence Stone,

was the ultimately successful assertion of a royal monopoly of violence both public and private, an achievement which profoundly altered not only the nature of politics but also the quality of daily life. There occurred a change in English habits that can only be compared with the further step taken in the nineteenth century, when the growth of a police force finally consolidated the monopoly and made it effective in the greatest cities and the smallest villages (Stone 1965: 200).

The Tudor demilitarization of the great lords entailed four complementary campaigns: eliminating their great personal bands of armed retainers, razing their fortresses, taming their habitual resort to violence for the settlement of disputes, and discouraging the cooperation of their dependents and tenants. In the Marches of England and Scotland, the task was more delicate, for the Percys and Dacres who kept armies and castles along the border threatened the crown, but also provided a buffer against Scottish invaders. But they, too, eventually fell into line.

In France, Richelieu began the great disarmament in the 1620s. With Richelieu's advice, Louis XIII systematically ordered the destruction of the castles of the great rebel lords, Protestant and Catholic, against whom his forces battled incessantly. He began to condemn duelling, the carrying of lethal weapons, and the maintenance of private armies. By the later 1620s, Richelieu was declaring the royal monopoly of force as doctrine. The doctrine took another half-century to become effective:

Once more the conflicts of the Fronde had witnessed armies assembled by the 'grands'. Only the last of the regencies, the one after the death of Louis XIV, did not lead to armed uprisings. By that time Richelieu's principle had become a reality. Likewise in the Empire after the Thirty Years' War only the territorial princes had the right of levying troops and of maintaining fortresses . . . Everywhere the razing of castles, the high cost of artillery, the attraction of court life, and the ensuing domestication of the nobility had its share in this development (Gerhard 1981: 124-125).

By the later eighteenth century, through most of Europe monarchs disposed of permanent, professional military forces which rivaled those of their neighbors and far exceeded any other organized armed force within their own territories. The state's monopoly of large-scale violence was turning from theory to reality.

The elimination of local rivals, however, posed a serious problem. Beyond the scale of a small city-state, no monarch could govern a population with his armed force alone, and no monarch could afford to create a professional staff large and strong enough to reach from him to the ordinary citizen. Before quite recently, no European government approached the completeness of articulation from top to bottom achieved by imperial China. Even the Roman Empire did not come close. In one way or another, every European government before the French Revolution relied on indirect rule via local magnates. The magnates collaborated with the government without becoming officials in any strong sense of the term, disposed to some extent of government-backed force, and exercised wide discretion within their own territories: Junkers, Justices of the Peace, lords. Yet those same magnates were potential rivals, possible allies of a rebellious people.

Eventually, European governments reduced their reliance on indirect rule by means of two expensive but effective strategies: 1) extending their officialdom down to the local community, and 2) encouraging the creation of police forces that were subordinate to the government rather than to individual patrons, distinct from warmaking forces, and therefore less useful as the tools of dissident magnates. But in between the builders of national power all played a mixed strategy: eliminating, subjugating, dividing, conquering, cajoling, buying as the occasions presented themselves. The buying manifested itself in exemptions from taxation, creations of honorific offices, the establishment of claims on the national treasury, and a variety of other devices that made a magnate's welfare depend on the maintenance of the

existing structure of power. In the long run, it all came down to massive pacification, and monopolization of the means of coercion.

Protection as Business

In retrospect, the pacification, cooptation, or elimination of fractious rivals to the sovereign seems an awesome, noble, prescient enterprise, destined to bring peace to a people. Yet it followed almost ineluctably from the logic of expanding power. If a powerholder was to gain from the provision of protection, those competitors had to yield. As economic historian Frederic Lane put it twenty-five years ago, governments are in the business of selling protection . . . whether people want it or not. Lane argued that the very activity of producing and controlling violence favored monopoly, since competition within that realm generally raised costs, instead of lowering them. The production of violence, he suggested, enjoyed large economies of scale. Working from there, he distinguished between a) the monopoly profit, or tribute, coming to owners of the means of production of violence as a result of the difference between production costs and the price exacted from "customers", and b) the protection rent accruing to those customers -- for example, merchants -- who drew effective protection against outside competitors. Lane, a superbly attentive historian of Venice, allowed specifically for the case of a government that generates protection rents for its merchants by deliberately attacking their competitors. In their adaptation of Lane's scheme, furthermore, Ames and Rapp (1977) substitute the apt word "extortion" for Lane's "tribute". In this model, predation, coercion, piracy, banditry, and racketeering share a home with their upright cousins in responsible government.

Here is how Lane's model worked: If a prince could create sufficient armed force to hold off his and his subjects' external enemies and to keep the subjects in line for 50 megapounds, but was able to extract 75 megapounds in taxes from those subjects for that purpose, he gained a tribute of $(75 - 50 =)$ 25 megapounds. But if

the 10-pound share of those taxes paid by one of the prince's merchant-subjects gave him assured access to world markets at less than the 15-pound shares paid to their princes by the merchant's foreign competitors, the merchant also gained a protection rent of $(15 - 10 =)$ 5 pounds by virtue of his prince's greater efficiency. That reasoning differs only in degree and in scale from the reasoning of violence-wielding criminals and their clients. Labor racketeering (in which, for example, a ship-owner holds off trouble from longshoremen by means of a timely payment to the local union boss) works on exactly the same principle: the union boss gets tribute for his no-strike pressure on the longshoremen, while the shipowner avoids the strikes and slowdowns longshoremen impose on his competitors.

Lane pointed out what different behavior we might expect of the managers of a protection-providing government owned by:

1. citizens in general;
2. a single self-interested monarch;
3. the managers themselves.

If citizens in general exercised effective ownership of the government -- o distant ideal! -- we might expect the managers to minimize protection costs and tribute, thus maximizing protection rent. A single self-interested monarch, in contrast, would maximize tribute, set costs so as to accomplish that maximization of tribute, and act indifferent to the level of protection rent. If the managers owned the government, they would tend to keep costs high by maximizing their own wages, to maximize tribute over and above those costs by exacting a high price from their subjects, and likewise act indifferent to the level of protection rent. The first model approximates a Jeffersonian democracy, the second a petty despotism, the third a military junta.

Lane did not discuss the obvious fourth category of owner, a dominant class. If he had, his scheme would have yielded interesting empirical criteria for evaluating claims that a given government was "relatively autonomous" or strictly subordinate to

a dominant class's interests. Presumably a subordinate government would tend to maximize monopoly profits -- returns to the dominant class resulting from the difference between the costs of protection and the price received for it -- as well as protection rents tuned nicely to the economic interests of the dominant class. An autonomous government, in contrast, would tend to maximize manager's wages and its own size as well, and would act indifferent to protection rents. Lane's analysis immediately suggests fresh propositions, and ways of testing them.

Lane also speculated that the logic of the situation produced four successive stages within the general history of capitalism:

1. a period of anarchy and plunder;
2. a stage in which tribute-takers were attracting customers and establishing their monopolies by struggling to create exclusive, substantial states;
3. a stage in which merchants and landlords began to gain more from protection rents than governors did from tribute;
4. a period -- fairly recent -- in which technological changes surpassed protection rents as sources of profit for entrepreneurs.

Wanting to contain his analysis neatly within the neoclassical theory of industrial organization, Lane cramped his treatment of protection: treating all taxpayers as "customers" for the "service" provided by protection-manufacturing governments, brushing aside the objections to the idea of a forced sale by insisting that the "customer" always had the choice of not paying and taking the consequences of nonpayment, minimizing the problems of divisibility created by the public-goods character of protection, and deliberately neglecting the distinction between the costs of producing the means of violence in general and the costs of giving "customers" protection by means of that violence. Lane's ideas suffocate inside the neoclassical box, and breathe easily outside it. Nevertheless, inside or outside they properly draw the economic analysis of government back to the chief activities real governments have carried on historically: war, repression, protection, adjudication.

More recently, Richard Bean has applied a similar logic to the rise of European national states between 1400 and 1600. He appeals to economies of scale in the production of effective force, counteracted by diseconomies of scale in command and control. He then claims that the improvement of artillery in the fifteenth century (as cannon made small Medieval forts much more vulnerable to an organized force) shifted the curve of economies and diseconomies to make larger armies, standing armies, and centralized governments advantageous to their masters. Hence, according to Bean, military innovation promoted the creation of large, expensive, well-armed national states.

History Talks

Bean's summary does not stand up to historical scrutiny. As a matter of practice, the shift to infantry-backed artillery sieges of fortified cities only occurred during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. That was too late to have caused the increase in the viable size of states. Nor is it obvious that changes in land war had the sweeping influence Bean attributes to them. The increasing decisiveness of naval warfare, which occurred simultaneously, could well have shifted the military advantage to small maritime powers such as the Dutch Republic. Although many city-states and other microscopic entities disappeared into larger political units before 1600, furthermore, such events as the fractionation of the Habsburg empire and such facts as the persistence of large but loosely-knit Poland and Russia render ambiguous the claim of a significant increase in geographical scale. In short, both Bean's proposed explanation and his statement of what must be explained raise historical doubts.

Stripped of its technological determinism, nevertheless, Bean's logic provides a useful complement to Lane's. For varying military formats do cost substantially different amounts to produce, and do provide substantially different ranges of control over opponents, domestic and foreign. After 1400 the European pursuit of larger,


more permanent, and more costly varieties of military organization did, in fact, drive spectacular increases in princely budgets, taxes, and staffs. After 1500 or so, princes who managed to create the costly varieties of military organization were, indeed, able to conquer new chunks of territory.

The word "territory" should not mislead us. Until the eighteenth century, the greatest powers were maritime states, and naval warfare remained crucial to international position. Consider Fernand Braudel's roll-call of successive hegemonic powers within the capitalist world: Venice and its empire, Genoa and its empire, Antwerp/Spain, Amsterdam/Holland, London/England, New York/the United States. Although Brandenburg-Prussia offers a partial exception, only in our own time have such essentially landbound states as Russia and China achieved preponderant positions in the world's system of states. Naval warfare was by no means the only reason for that bias toward the sea. Before the later nineteenth century, land transportation was so expensive everywhere in Europe that no country could afford to supply a large army or a big city with grain and other heavy goods without having efficient water transport. Rulers only fed major inland centers such as Berlin and Madrid at great effort, and at considerable cost to their hinterlands. The exceptional efficiency of waterways in the Netherlands undoubtedly gave the Dutch great advantages at peace and at war (see de Vries 1978).

Access to water mattered in another important way. Those metropolises in Braudel's list were all major ports, great centers of commerce, and outstanding mobilizers of capital. Both the trade and the capital served the purposes of ambitious rulers. By a circuitous route, that observation brings us back to the arguments of Lane and Bean. Considering that both of them wrote as economic historians, the greatest weakness in the Lane/Bean analysis comes as a surprise: both of them understate the importance of capital accumulation to military expansion. As Jan de Vries says of the period after 1600:

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French Royal Revenues and Expenditures, 1515-1785, in Tons of Fine Silver.



Source: Guéry 1978: 227.

Looking back, one cannot help but be struck by the seemingly symbiotic relationship existing between the state, military power, and the private economy's efficiency in the age of absolutism. Behind every successful dynasty stood an array of opulent banking families. Access to such bourgeois resources proved crucial to the princes' state-building and centralizing policies. Princes also needed direct access to agricultural resources, which could be mobilized only when agricultural productivity grew and an effective administrative and military power existed to enforce the princes' claims. But the lines of causation also ran in the opposite direction. Successful state-building and empire-building activities plus the associated tendency toward concentration of urban population and government expenditure, offered the private economy unique and invaluable opportunities to capture economies of scale. These economies of scale occasionally affected industrial production but were most significant in the development of trade and finance. In addition, the sheer pressure of central government taxation did as much as any other economic force to channel peasant production into the market and thereby augment the opportunities for trade creation and economic specialization (de Vries 1976: 242-243).

Nor does the "symbiotic relationship" hold only for the period after 1600. For the precocious case of France, Figure 1 shows the increase of royal expenditures and revenues from 1515 to 1785. Although the rates of growth in both regards accelerated appropriately after 1600, they also rose substantially during the sixteenth century. After 1550, the internal Wars of Religion checked the work of international expansion Francis I began earlier in the century, but from the 1620s onward Louis XIII and XIV (aided and abetted, to be sure, by Richelieu, Mazarin, Colbert and other statemaking wizards) resumed the task with a vengeance. "As always," comments V.G. Kiernan, "war had every political recommendation and every financial drawback" (Kiernan 1980: 104).

Borrowing, then paying interest on the debt, accounts for much of the discrepancy between the two curves. Great capitalists played crucial parts on both sides of the transaction: as the principal sources of royal credit, especially in the short term; and as the most important contractors in the risky but lucrative business of collecting royal taxes.

For this reason, it is worth noticing that:

For practical purposes the national debt began in the reign of Francis I. Following the loss of Milan, the key to northern Italy, on September 15, 1522,

Francis I borrowed 200,000 francs . . . at 12.5 percent from the merchants of Paris, to intensify the war against Charles V. Administered by the city government, this loan inaugurated the famous series of bonds based on revenues from the capital and known as rentes sur l'Hotel de Ville (Hamilton 1950: 246).

(The government's failure to pay those rentes, incidentally, helped aligned the Parisian bourgeoisie against the Crown during the Fronde, some twelve decades later.) By 1595, the national debt had risen to 300 million francs; despite governmental bankruptcies, currency manipulations, and the monumental rise in taxes, by Louis XIV's death in 1715 war-induced borrowing had inflated the total to about 3 billion francs, the equivalent of about eighteen years in royal revenues (Hamilton 1950: 247, 249). War, state apparatus, taxation, and borrowing advanced in tight cadence.

Although France was precocious, she was by no means alone. "Even more than in the case of France," reports the ever-useful Earl J. Hamilton:

the national debt of England originated and has grown during major wars. Except for an insignificant carry-over from the Stuarts, the debt began in 1689 with the reign of William and Mary. In the words of Adam Smith, "it was in the war which began in 1688, and was concluded by the treaty of Ryswick in 1697, that the foundation of the present enormous debt of Great Britain was first laid" (Hamilton 1950: 254).

Hamilton, it is true, goes on to quote the mercantilist Charles Davenant, who complained in 1698 that the high interest rates promoted by government borrowing were cramping English trade. Davenant's complaint suggests, however, that England was already entering Frederic Lane's third stage of state-capital relations, when merchants and landowners get more of the surplus than do the suppliers of protection.

Until the sixteenth century, the English expected their kings to live on revenues from their own property, and to levy taxes only for war. G.R. Elton marks the great innovation at Thomas Cromwell's drafting of Henry VIII's subsidy bills for 1534 and 1540: ". . . 1540 was very careful to continue the real innovation of 1534, namely that extraordinary contributions could be levied for reasons other than war" (Elton 1975: 42). After that point as before, however, warmaking provided the main stimulus to increases in the level of taxation as well as of debt. Rarely did debt

and taxes recede. What Peacock and Wiseman call a "displacement effect" (and others sometimes call a "ratchet effect") occurred: when public revenues and expenditures rose abruptly during war, they set a new, higher floor beneath which peacetime revenues and expenditures did not sink (Peacock and Wiseman 1961). During the Napoleonic Wars, British taxes rose from 15 to 24 percent of national income, and to almost three times the French level of taxation (Mathias 1975: 122).

True, Britain had the double advantage of relying less on expensive land forces than her continental rivals and of drawing more of her tax revenues from customs and excise -- taxes which were, despite evasion, significantly cheaper to collect than land-, property-, and poll-taxes. Nevertheless, in England as well as elsewhere debt and taxes both rose enormously from the seventeenth century on. They rose mainly as a function of the increasing cost of warmaking.

What Do States Do?

As should now be clear, Lane's analysis of protection fails to distinguish among several different uses of state-controlled violence. Under the general heading of organized violence, the agents of states characteristically carry on four different activities:

1. WARMAKING: eliminating or neutralizing their own rivals outside the territories in which they have clear and continuous priority as wielders of force;
2. STATEMAKING: eliminating or neutralizing their rivals inside those territories;
3. PROTECTION: eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their clients;
4. EXTRACTION: acquiring the means of carrying out the first three activities: warmaking, statemaking, and protection.

The third item corresponds to protection as analyzed by Lane. But the other three also involve the application of force. They overlap incompletely, and to varying degrees; for example, warmaking against the commercial rivals of the local

bourgeoisie delivers protection to that bourgeoisie. To the extent that a population divides into enemy classes and the state extends its favors partially to one class or another, statemaking actually reduces the protection given some classes.

Warmaking, statemaking, protection, and extraction each take a number of different forms. Extraction, for instance, ranges from outright plunder through regular tribute to bureaucratized taxation. Yet all four depend on the state's tendency to monopolize the concentrated means of coercion. From the perspectives of those who dominate the state, each of them -- if carried on effectively -- generally reinforces the others. Thus a state which successfully eradicates its internal rivals strengthens its ability to extract resources, to wage war, and to protect its chief supporters. In the earlier European experience, broadly speaking, those supporters were typically landlords, armed retainers of the monarch, and churchmen.

Each of the major uses of violence produced its own characteristic forms of organization. Warmaking yielded armies, navies, and supporting services. Statemaking produced durable instruments of surveillance and control within the territory. Protection relied on the organization of warmaking and statemaking, but added to it an apparatus by which the protected called forth the protection that was their due -- notably through courts and representative assemblies. Extraction brought the fiscal and accounting structures into being. The organization and deployment of violence itself accounts for much of the characteristic structure of European states.

The general rule seems to have operated like this: the more costly the activity, all other things equal, the greater the organizational residue. To the extent, for example, that a given government invested in large standing armies -- a very costly, if effective, means of warmaking -- the bureaucracy created to service the army was likely to become bulky. Furthermore, a government building a standing army but controlling a small population was likely to incur greater costs, and


therefore to build a bulkier structure, than a government within a populous country. Brandenburg-Prussia was the classic case of high cost for the available resources; the Prussian effort to build an army matching those of its larger continental neighbors created an immense structure; it militarized and bureaucratized much of German social life.

When it comes to extraction, the smaller the pool of resources and the less commercialized the economy, other things being equal, the more difficult the work of extracting resources to sustain war and other governmental activities, hence the more extensive the fiscal apparatus. England illustrated the corollary of that proposition, with a relatively large and commercialized pool of resources drawn on by a relatively small fiscal apparatus. As Gabriel Ardant has argued, the choice of fiscal strategy probably made an additional difference. On the whole, taxes on land were expensive to collect as compared with taxes on trade, especially large flows of trade past easily-controlled checkpoints: Denmark's position astride the entrance to the Baltic gave her an extraordinary opportunity to profit from customs revenues.

With respect to statemaking (in the narrow sense of eliminating or neutralizing the local rivals of the people who controlled the state), a territory populated by great landlords or by distinct religious groups generally imposed larger costs on a conqueror than one of fragmented power or homogeneous culture; this time fragmented and homogeneous Sweden, with its relatively small but effective apparatus of control, may illustrate the corollary. Finally, the cost of protection (in the sense of eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of the statemakers' clients) mounted with the range over which that protection extended; Portugal's effort to bar the Mediterranean to its merchants' competitors in the spice trade provides a textbook case of an unsuccessful protection effort which nonetheless built up a massive structure. Thus the sheer size of the government varied directly with the effort devoted to extraction, statemaking, protection and, especially, warmaking, but

inversely with the commercialization of the economy and the extent of the resource base. What is more, the relative bulk of different features of the government varied with the cost-resource ratios of extraction, statemaking, protection and warmaking. In Spain we see hypertrophy of Court and courts as the outcome of centuries of effort at subduing internal enemies, while in Holland we are amazed to see how small a fiscal apparatus grows up with high taxes within a rich, commercialized economy.

Clearly, warmaking, extraction, statemaking, and protection were interdependent. Speaking very, very generally, the classic European statemaking experience followed this causal pattern:



In an idealized sequence, a great lord made war so effectively as to become dominant in a substantial territory. But that warmaking led to increased extraction of the means of war -- men, arms, food, lodging, transportation, supplies, and/or the money to buy them -- from the population within that territory. The building up of warmaking capacity likewise increased the capacity to extract. The very activity of extraction, if successful, entailed the elimination, neutralization, or cooptation of the great lord's local rivals; thus it led to statemaking. As a by-product, it created organization in the form of tax-collection agencies, police forces, courts, exchequeurs, account-keepers; thus it led to statemaking. To a lesser extent, warmaking likewise caused statemaking through the expansion of military organization itself, as a standing army, war industries, supporting bureaucracies and (rather later) schools grew up within the state apparatus. All of these structures checked potential rivals and opponents. In the course of making war, extracting resources, and building up the

state apparatus, the managers of states formed alliances with specific social classes. The members of those classes loaned resources, provided technical services, or helped assure the compliance of the rest of the population, all in return for a measure of protection against their own rivals and enemies. As a result of these multiple strategic choices, a distinctive state apparatus grew up within each major section of Europe.

This simplified model, however, neglects the external relations which shaped every national state. Early in the process, the distinction between "internal" and "external" remained as unclear as the distinction between state power and the power accruing to lords allied with the state. Later, three interlocking influences connected any given national state to the European network of states. First, there were the flows of resources in the form of loans and supplies, especially loans and supplies devoted to warmaking. Second, there was the competition among states for hegemony in disputed territories, which stimulated warmaking and temporarily erased the distinctions among warmaking, statemaking, and extraction. Third, there was the intermittent creation of coalitions of states which temporarily combined their efforts to force a given state into a certain form and position within the international network. The warmaking coalition is one example, but the peacemaking coalition played an even more crucial part: from 1648, if not before, at the ends of wars we find all effective European states coalescing temporarily to bargain out the boundaries and rulers of the recent belligerents. From that point on, the major reorganizations of the European state system came in spurts, at the settlements of widespread wars. From each large war, in general, emerged fewer national states than had entered it.

In these circumstances, war became the normal condition of the international system of states, and the normal means of defending or enhancing a position within the system. Why war? No simple answer will do; war as a potent means served more than one end. But surely part of the answer goes back to the central

mechanisms of statemaking: the very logic by which a local lord extended or defended the perimeter within which he monopolized the means of violence, and thereby increased his return from tribute, continued on a larger scale into the logic of war. Early in the process, external and internal rivals overlapped to a large degree. Only the establishment of large perimeters of control within which great lords had checked their rivals sharpened the line between internal and external.

George Modelski sums up the competitive logic cogently:

Global power . . . strengthened those states that attained it relatively to all other political and other organizations. What is more, other states competing in the global power game developed similar organizational forms and similar hardness: they too became nation-states -- in a defensive reaction, because forced to take issue with or to confront a global power, as France confronted Spain and later Britain, or in imitation of its obvious success and effectiveness, as Germany followed the example of Britain into Weltmacht, or as earlier Peter the Great had rebuilt Russia on Dutch precepts and examples. Thus not only Portugal, the Netherlands, Britain and the United States became nation-states, but also Spain, France, Germany, Russia and Japan. The short, and the most parsimonious, answer to the question of why these succeeded where 'most of the European efforts to build states failed' is that they were either global powers or successfully fought with or against them (Modelski 1978: 231).

This logic of international statemaking acts out on a large scale the logic of local aggrandizement. The external complemented the internal.

If we allow that fragile distinction between "internal" and "external" statemaking processes, then we might schematize European statemaking's history as three stages: 1) the differential success of some powerholders in "external" struggles establishes the difference between an "internal" and an "external" arena for the deployment of force; 2) "external" competition generates "internal" statemaking; 3) "external" compacts among states influence the form and locus of particular states ever more powerfully. In this perspective, state-certifying organizations such as the League of Nations and the United Nations simply extended the European-based process to the world as a whole. Whether forced or voluntary, bloody or peaceful, decolonization simply completed that process by which existing states leagued to create new ones.

The extension of the Europe-based statemaking process to the rest of the world, however, did not create states in the strict European image. Broadly speaking, internal struggles such as the checking of great regional lords and the imposition of taxation on peasant villages produced important organizational features of European states: the relative subordination of military power to civilian control, the extensive bureaucracy of fiscal surveillance, the representation of wronged interests via petition and parliament. On the whole, states elsewhere developed differently. The most telling feature of that difference appears in military organization. European states built up their military apparatuses through sustained struggles with their subject populations, and by means of selective extension of protection to different classes within those populations. The agreements on protection constrained the rulers themselves, making them vulnerable to courts, to assemblies, to withdrawals of credit, services, and expertise.

To a larger degree, states that have come into being recently through decolonization or through reallocations of territory by the dominant states have acquired their military organization from outside, without the same internal forging of mutual constraints between rulers and ruled. To the extent that outside states continue to supply military goods and expertise in return for commodities, or military alliance, or both, the new states harbor powerful, unconstrained organizations which easily overshadow all other organizations within their territories. To the extent that outside states guarantee their boundaries, the managers of those military organizations exercise extraordinary power within them. The advantages of military power become enormous, the incentives to seize power over the state as a whole by means of that advantage very strong. Despite the great place that warmaking occupied in the making of European states, the old national states of Europe almost never experienced the great disproportion between military organization and all other forms of organization that seems the fate of client states throughout the contemporary

world.

In our own time, not all states entering the Europe-based system of states have been clients, and not all have been equally vulnerable to military control. As a first attempt to reason from possible lessons of the European experience to alternative paths through the contemporary world, let me propose a simple fourfold classification. As usual, the four categories result from arbitrarily cutting each of two continua in half; the continua are a) the extent to which a state's military organization is created, trained, and supplied by other states: internal vs. external; b) the extent to which the resources to support military organization are generated directly by the export of labor or commodities to other countries: dependent vs. independent.

		<u>DEPENDENCE ON EXPORTS FOR MILITARY RESOURCES</u>	
		<u>DEPENDENT</u>	<u>INDEPENDENT</u>
SOURCE OF MILITARY ORGANIZATION	<u>EXTERNAL</u>	client states e.g. Honduras	clones e.g. South Korea
	<u>INTERNAL</u>	merchants e.g. Iraq	autonomous states e.g. China, South Africa

If we take European experience seriously, we should expect client states to follow signals from their patrons, clones to be especially vulnerable to military coups, merchants to wax and wane as a function of the world market for their commodities or labor, and autonomous states to occupy similar positions to the old members of the European state-system.

In the light of European experience, merchants -- especially, in our own time, exporters of oil -- pose some especially interesting questions. Their situation most resembles that of Spain when riches were flowing in from America. On the one hand, when demand for their exports is high, they avoid much of the statemaking

effort, and the consequent fighting out of agreements with major classes within their own territories, that so marked European preparation for war. That side of the equation suggests the possibility of an acquiescent population, and a relatively peaceful exercise of power by those who control the essential commodities. On the other, their military organizations acquire a fearsome power relative to other organizations in their vicinities. Where it is technically possible for the same small group to seize control of the military apparatus and the sources of exports, we should witness an incentive to military coups which will outshadow the petty maneuvers of the clones. Perhaps only the Shah's preference for the position of client to that of merchant saved Iran from being the first great example.

A Farewell Warning

Remember how thin is the tissue of evidence/^{on which} all this speculation lies. I have schematized the European experience of warmaking and statemaking, without taking account of all the other factors affecting variations in the fates of national states: language, religion, geopolitical position, access to trade routes. Then I have heedlessly extended the scheme outside of Europe, without any of the historical qualifications and recalibrations it requires. Consider it history in the As If, history as material for theoretical reflection, history as a source of hypotheses which must return, for refinement, rectification, and verification, to the actual experience from which it came. If summarizing European warmaking and statemaking is like skating on thin ice, extrapolating that summary to the contemporary world resembles walking on water. Send out the life-preservers!

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