Collective-Action Repertoires
In Five French Provinces, 1789-1914

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Different Regions, Different Structures

During the first half of the nineteenth century, the French General Staff undertook the preparation of a great map of the entire country at 1:80,000. The work proceeded under the direction of professional ingénieurs-géographes. But at the local scale young army officers attached to the General Staff did most of the legwork. In addition to preparing a detailed local map of the section assigned to him, the officer typically had to prepare a report describing the area, characterizing its people, and solving some sort of hypothetical military problem: how, for example, to hold off an invader coming from a given direction with a force of a certain size. That report took the name reconnaissance militaire. For his reconnaissance, each officer had to tramp his part of the country, compass and notebook in hand.

Although many of the reports set down their facts with crisp precision, some authors adopted the model of the Statistique then in vogue among regional officials and local savants. They presented ready-made histories of the localities, singled out the military features of those histories, sketched the people's cultural peculiarities, inventoried economic activities, tabulated population figures, and described the important structures, if any. In addition to their contribution to the General Staff map of France, each of those officers helped record the life of one small corner of his country at one moment of the nineteenth century.

Let us reconnoiter five provinces -- Anjou, Burgundy, Flanders, Languedoc, and the Ile de France -- with those nineteenth-century officers. While they sketch out the map of France, let us reflect on how the varying involvements of the five provinces in statemaking and the development of capitalism reshaped the ways in which their people contended for rights, privileges, interests, and advantages.

As the ingénieurs-géographes parceled out the squares of the big map, most officers found themselves assigned to tracts of villages and fields. In 1846, however, second lieutenant Normand Dufie, of the 55th Line Regiment, received quite a different assignment: His square included the city of Lille, with 75,000 inhabitants, "a rich, hard-working, commercial population." "The language of the common people is a corrupt French," reported Dufie. "It is the Flemish idiom. But in Lille everyone speaks French more or less well." In the countryside, he added, "the basic food is a very thick soup with butter or lard at noon and in the evening. During the summer they add a breakfast and a snack consisting of bread, butter, and cheese."

Dufie described the people of the region as "much given to drink; the cabaret is a consuming passion for them. To define Flemish character properly, we might say they are as faithful to the cabaret as to the Mass." Unfortunately, he commented, their favorite drink was gin, "a perfidious liquor almost always mixed with dangerous, corrosive ingredients" (AA [Archives Historiques de l'Armée, Vincennes] MR 1169).

His character sketch out of the way, Dufie went on to enumerate the "industrial arts" of Lille and its region: foundries for cannon and for bells, brass works, goldsmithing, manufacturing of starch, gin, all sorts of vegetable oils, leather goods, linen, cotton, and woolen cloth. "The city of Lille," he concluded,

> is the center of almost all manufacturing in its arrondissement and likewise of that of the whole department and many neighboring departments. The proximity of the frontier adds to commercial prosperity by making the city an entrepot for a great deal of trade (AA MR 1169).

Although people worked truck gardens hard in the hinterland, it was clear that the Nord's agricultural activity served mainly to support the region's manufacturing and trade.

Anjou lay far from Flanders. When Captain Testu described the region between Saumur and Cholet in 1839, he provided a very different picture. "In traveling through the southwest part," he wrote,

> one always comes to narrow, deep valleys containing brooks that become rivers in winter, local roads that are impassable eight months of the year, and that go around woods and around pastures surrounded by trees whose branches block the way, gates and stiles to open and close at every step, roads so sunken that you can only see the sky straight up, paths that

> cross constantly and make it easy for the traveler to lose his way, unending solitude.

That was the bocage, the hedgerow landscape of the region called the Mauges. Testu saw a large contrast between that forbidding countryside and the land nearer Saumur:

> The plain, richest part of the department, is composed almost entirely of the arrondissement of Saumur. Its fields are open, and its wheat harvest is very abundant. Most of the excellent wines, which are called côteaux de Saumur, are white; but at Champigny-le-Sec, on the left bank of the Loire, they make a small amount of exquisite red wine; people compare it to Bordeaux wines, and that is a proper comparison. The growing of mulberry trees and the raising of silkworms in the region is an industry which deserves support (AA MR 1275).

On went Testu's comparison between the "backward" agriculture of the Mauges and the "advanced" agriculture of the Saumurois. The good captain's tours through the Mauges's underbrush had not revealed to him the existence in the bocage of widespread cottage linen and cotton production or the importance of cattle-fattening for the Paris market. He had missed the modest cluster of cotton manufacturers in the city of Cholet. The textile workers and quarrymen of Angers, furthermore, fell outside his assigned zone. Nevertheless, Testu saw correctly that Anjou divided rather sharply into two different sorts of farming, and that in both parts of the region agriculture was the dominant activity.

Reconnaissances militaires from other regions place them between the extremes of industrial-commercial Flanders and heavily agricultural Anjou. In **Burgundy**, the military observers noted the scattering of forges in the east (especially in the hills approaching Franche-Comté) and toward the north (especially in the wooded region around Châtillon-sur-Seine), the openfield grain-farming and relative rural prosperity of north and northwest, the greater importance of enclosures and stockraising toward the south and east, the region of concentrated winegrowing below Dijon, the pockets of iron mining, coal mining, and capital-concentrated manufacturing around Châtillon and in the area from Le Creusot southward. More than one officer joined captain Brossard, reporter on the area around Nuits in 1839, when he deplored the expanding production of cheaper, more profitable wines such as Gamay and Noirieu, at the expense of the fine vintages that endeared Burgundy to connoisseurs (AA MR 1200).

Military mapmakers in **Languedoc** had even greater variety to contend with than their colleagues in Burgundy. They saw the grain production of the Toulousan plain, the small-scale metalworking of the Pyrenees foothills, the expanding production of cheaper wines around Narbonne, the manufacture of woolens and silks from the Cevennes down to Nimes, the relatively concentrated textile production of a Lodève or a Carcassonne, the smuggling -- a genuine industry for some wily souls -- of the mountains. As colonel Bentabole reported of eastern Languedoc and adjacent areas in his 1842 synthesis of multiple reports,

> the inhabitants who aren't involved in smuggling come down from the mountains at harvest time and spread out in the plain. That season is for them rather a source of enjoyment than of fatigue. Accustomed as they are to the most difficult labors, those they do in the lowlands do not bother their health or their good humor. They often spend part of the dinner hour with dances and songs that remind them of their mountains (AA MR 1303).

More so than in Anjou, Flanders, or Burgundy, seasonal migration played a crucial part in the economy of Languedoc.

General Staff attaches who mapped the **Ile de France**, finally, found themselves in the most intensely commercialized region of all. Anywhere they went in the hinterland, they saw the vast influence of Paris: truck gardening close in, heavily capitalized grain farming farther out, manufacturing tied to that of the metropolis in such centers as Beauvais, trade and migration oriented to Paris like water to a drain. Savor these notes from various **reconnaissances:**

> **Road from Paris to Aunay (1822):** They take an enormous quantity of fertilizer from the capital; farmers go there to get it, while bringing in vegetables and other agricultural products (AA MR 1287).
>
> **Valley of the Bievre (1822):** The proximity of Paris, where the inhabitants take all their crops for sale, means that contacts among the communes are unimportant (AA MR 1288)
>
> **Road to Vincennes (1822):** Connections with the surrounding

cantons, communes, and parishes are unimportant. Contacts with the capital are more active; the inhabitants go there to sell their products. They also have contact with Lagny, which has an important market . . . They have no retail trade of their own, and the four villages are entirely agricultural. Many Parisians have country houses here (AA MR 1287).

Road to Meaux (1825): The frequency of the trips that they make to deliver lime or to take fruits and vegetables to market, and their continual contact with the inhabitants of Paris must cause some of their air of distrust, sometimes even of insolence (AA MR 1289)

Road from Charenton to Paris (1827): There is continual contact among all these populations; they are involved in business and retail trade; their main orientation is toward the capital, whose markets they supply (AA MR 1290).

The Seine between Ecole Militaire and Argenteuil (1833): The department of the Seine, the smallest of the kingdom, is nonetheless the richest and most important because of the capital which occupies its center . . . The banks of the Seine are jammed with a mass of villages and adorned with country houses whose richness and elegance announces the proximity of a great capital (AA MR 1291).

Territory between Montmartre, Colombes, Courbevoie and St. Ouen (1833): Every village along the riverbank shows the influence of the capital's manufacturing industries (AA MR 1292).

Territory between Pantin, Pré Saint Gervais, Romainville, Noisy le Sec, and Bobigny (1846): If proximity to the capital has removed some of the originality that set them off fifty years ago, it has also made them feel the benefits of our modern civilization. On visiting the area, one is surprised to hear language spoken that is so free of patois and local words (AA MR 1293).

Military position between the forts of Vanves and Bicêtre (1856): The proximity of Paris and of large factories has so degraded the people of the area that their very physiques show it (AA MR 1294).

In the central area, as this last note suggests, the heavier forms of manufacturing were building up in the suburbs, as specialized trades, retail establishments, international commerce, finance, and governmental administration took over more of the central space. Although Paris, writ large, remained the country's largest single concentration of manufacturing, contrast was sharpening between the capital, with its diversified small-scale production, and coal-burning industrial monoliths such as Roubaix and Le Creusot. The identification of "industrialization" with "factory" (usine) was beginning to make sense.

Concentration on a National Scale

For most of eighteenth-century France, that equation was nonsensical. A few types of production characteristically took place in large establishments. That was especially true of products in which the state had a monopoly or a strong direct interest, such as arms, salt, sailcloth, or tobacco. Religious orders responsible for orphans, paupers, or moral offenders sometimes produced textiles in organizations resembling factories in their discipline and spatial segregation, if not in their reliance on hand-powered machinery. Mines, with their high capital requirements, also typically involved good-sized firms and centralized work-discipline.

The great bulk of France's manufacturing, however, went on in small shops and individual households. The great industrial regions, such as those around Lyon and Rouen, contained webs of mercantile cities whose financiers and entrepreneurs guided the production of thousands of small-scale producers. Those producers had little discretion concerning what they would produce, or even how much. Merchants often controlled them by debt, by legal pressure, and by ownership of housing, tools and raw materials. Nevertheless, the producers technically sold what they made to the merchants, instead of simply putting their time and effort at an employer's disposal for a wage. They were almost, but not quite, full-fledged proletarians.

Merchants certainly imposed exacting standards on the goods they bought from workers; indeed, much of the day-to-day bickering between merchants and ostensibly independent artisans concerned such questions as whether the finished goods met the standards for full payment, whether the workers had taken some of the raw materials the merchants had given them, and whose measure should be used in gauging the quantity of goods produced. But merchants could not specify when, where, and how a weaver, spinner, or woodworker would do the work, or with what help from other members of the household.

What is more, rural industrial workers typically spent part of their time in agricultural labor. France's manufacturing labor force of the later eighteenth century consisted mainly of quasi-proletarians producing in their own households or in small shops. Thus a heavily industrialized region was not one with many factories, but one with a large quasi-proletarian manufacturing labor force.

A clairvoyant observer of France in 1789 might have seen the structures of nineteenth-century industrial production forming.

Relatively large shops relying on water- or steam-power, similar to those that were proliferating in England, were beginning to take shape in Flanders, Normandy, and a few other regions. In 1788, when France's Bureau du Commerce called on provincial intendants for reports on "factories and boilers" in their jurisdictions, M. Esmangard of Flanders and Artois reported no foundries or metalworking factories in his provinces. But as power-using producers he was able to enumerate glassworks in Lille and Dunkerque, a pottery plant in Douai, a porcelain manufactory in Lille, two shops making pipes in Arras, a gin distillery in Dunkerque, 21 salt refineries, 26 soapworks, 12 sugar refineries, plus 16 other potteries and tileworks.

The clerk who summarized Esmangard's report for the Bureau remarked that:

> We see that the majority of these plants use coal, and that those using wood are too small to cause a shortage. In Maritime Flanders coal is cheap, because it comes from England. In the countryside they burn only peat, but a great deal of wood goes into heating in Lille, Arras, Douai, and St. Omer. The intendant indicates that wood is very expensive in those areas, but he does not indicate the price or the amount consumed. Hainaut's coal is too expensive for use in much of the Generality. The small amount that they get from Hainaut and Artois could not possibly meet the need. Companies have formed to search these provinces and find

coalbeds close to large cities or rivers (AN F^{12} 680). Those searches succeeded; within forty years, steam-powered mills and coal-burning forges employed thousands of workers in Flanders and Artois. But in 1788 the shift to coal fires as the source of industrial power was just beginning.

At the other extreme, the report filed concerning the "factories and boilers" of Anjou by the intendant of Tours had practically nothing to discuss. The section for the subdelegation of Montreuil-Bellay, for example, said flatly "There are no factories in this district." For the subdelegation of Saumur, the count included 20 lime kilns using charcoal, but nothing else (AN F^{12} 680).

Yet other reports of the time made it clear that Angevins were producing and selling plenty of manufactured goods. As of 1781, the royal inspector of manufacturing in the little linen center of Cholet, south of the Loire, counted only 234 textile "merchants, clothiers, and workers" in the city itself. All of them were producing by hand, most of them in their own homes. Another 848 -- counting only the adult males, and not the hundreds of women and children in their households -- worked in the surrounding villages and sold their goods to Cholet's merchants (ADIL [Archives Departmentales, Indre-et-Loire, Tours] C 114).

Cholet's linens, especially its kerchiefs, served the national market, but also entered the slave trade via Nantes. As the inspector noted in his report, most of the actual producers had no capital of their own, but worked for clothiers on small advances. Nevertheless, these household workers were collectively turning out around three million livres per year in finished goods, at a time when the national production of textiles was worth something like 1.1 billion livres (Markovitch 1965, table 6).

Although dispersed textile production in Cholet's hinterland hung on for decades, and although Cholet's merchants built small plants in the city during the nineteenth century, nothing like the urban implosion of Flanders occurred in the Choletais or elsewhere in Anjou. Indeed, Anjou as a whole **de**industrialized during and after the Revolution. Its people devoted less and less of their energy to producing manufactured goods for sale, more and more of their effort to agriculture.

In this sense, it happens, three of our five regions deindustrialized during the century after 1789. Not only Anjou, but also Languedoc and Burgundy, moved more decisively into agriculture. For Anjou, the nineteenth century brought an expansion of winegrowing along the Loire, and of grain and cattle production in the rest of the region; the largest single exception to Anjou's deindustrialization was the expansion of the slate quarries in Trélazé, southeast of Angers, close to Ponts-de-Cé and the river.

In Languedoc, similarly, the cottage textile industry of the uplands decayed. Although Lodève had decades of nineteenth-century prosperity as a producer of woolen cloth for military uniforms, the textile production of Bedarieux, Carcassonne and Lodève as well hardly survived the nineteenth century; Mazamet only stayed in the wool business by taking up the shearing and processing of sheep hides (Johnson 1982). Burgundy's wood-burning forges went out of business like their counterparts in Franche-Comté, while winegrowing expanded in importance; only the region from Le Creusot south toward Lyon hosted concentrated manufacturing. In different ways, the Ile de France and Flanders industrialized as Anjou, Languedoc, and Burgundy lost their industry.

Economic Fates

The three de-industrializing regions all moved into winegrowing, but with varying vigor and success. In Anjou, the winefields of the Loire Valley and the nearby Layon expanded modestly, but no new and important growing areas appeared. Nor did any remarkable concentration of landholding occur; Anjou's winegrowers remained a mixture of smallholders and day-laborers. In Burgundy, the old areas of fine wine production from pinot noir grapes -- the côtes -- retained their small scale of production, and continued to sustain communities dominated by smallholders. The cheaper wines of the gamay grape expanded in the areas adjacent to the côtes, but primarily through the multiplication of smallholding rather than the development of large vineyards.

Until the mid-century expansion of France's railroad network, the winegrowing regions of Languedoc did not boom either. Indeed, the hilly areas of finer wines and peasant property kept much of their character into the twentieth century. However, the arc of plains near the Mediterranean from Perpignan around to Nimes went through an enormous transformation: rapid growth of capitalist winegrowing in the 1860s, crisis of the phylloxera blight in the 1870s and 1880s, massive increase in the production of cheap wines on large properties thereafter.

The early growth, the crisis, and the renewed expansion linked to each other: Phylloxera arrived on the blight-immune American vines with which capitalizing winegrowers of the 1870s had hoped to make more money, the blighting of French vines encouraged the introduction of cheap, watered, and sugared wines from Spain and Italy while southerners were bringing new American vines to maturity, and the recovery permitted French winegrowers to enter the expanding market for mass-produced beverages. The shift to industrial techniques, large vineyards, and mass distribution proletarianized Languedoc's wine industry.

Not all of rural Languedoc turned to vineyard. The plains near Toulouse, for example, continued to concentrate on wheat production, while the highland regions kept their mixed economies of grazing, small crafts, and seasonal migration. Likewise, the bocages of Anjou maintained their system of grain and cattle production on medium-sized rented farms -- with the added fillip that a number of noble landlords began to take active interest in the management of their estates and the politics of their tenants, and even started to live in their modest castles some of the year. In Burgundy, despite the decline of rural industry and the spread of gamay winegrowing, most regions held to peasant polyculture, with cash crops gaining ground after mid-century. The agriculture of the Nord became ever more subservient to manufacturing. And the Ile de France continued its pattern of intensive market gardening close in, capitalist grain production further out.

Even in the agricultural regions, capital and manufacturing concentrated increasingly in the cities. Angers, Dijon, and Toulouse all saw their trade expand, their traders get rich, their banks grow, their small crafts give way to large plants. Angers, for example, specialized in industries based on agriculture: not only preparation and wholesaling of food and drink, but also sailcloth manufacturing and the spinning of wool, cotton and hemp; only the important slate quarries broke the city's ties to agriculture. Until mid-century, indeed, nearly a quarter of Angers' labor force worked directly in nurseries and market gardens within the city. Nevertheless, in 1856 a full 57 percent of Angers' labor force gained their living from manufacturing (Lebrun 1975: 199). From that point on, the city grew mainly through expansion of its commercial services. Like Dijon and Toulouse, Angers specialized more and more in the coordination of trade and capital.

Lille and Paris became very different kinds of industrial city. If we include Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing in the same urban cluster, that nineteenth-century metropolis epitomized France's new manufacturing centers: factories, dense and segregated working-class neighborhoods, rapid growth. Roubaix went from 9,000 people in 1806 to 121,000 in 1906, while Tourcoing grew from 12,000 to 82,000; the increase of Lille from 50,000 to 215,000 (a mere quadrupling!) contributed to the rise of the three-city complex from 71,000 to 424,000 inhabitants. Within the set, especially after mid-century, a division of labor appeared: Roubaix and Tourcoing as factory towns dominated by family firms, Lille as financial, administrative, and cultural center tied more strongly to international capital. Together, they became France's greatest concentration of large-scale manufacturing.

In the case of Paris, we must distinguish between the old center and the newer periphery. In the center, expanding trade, finance, services, and administration squeezed out both manufacturing establishments and working-class neighborhoods. Through the industrial shifts and the building of new, elegant residential areas, the city's segregation by class became much more pronounced. Net departure of workers and workplaces was already occurring under the July Monarchy. After 1852, the great bustle of Haussmann and Napoleon III brought it to a climax. Small-scale manufacturing tended to move to the edges of the built-up area, while heavy industry located increasingly outside the toll gates, where cheap land, exemption from city taxes, and easy access to canals and railways all made new sites attractive.

Metalworking plants, for example, were already relocating in Clichy, Saint-Ouen, Saint-Denis, and elsewhere to the north and east of Paris before 1848. (Remember the prophetic **reconnaissance militaire** for the area near Saint-Ouen in 1833: "Every village along the riverbank shows the influence of the capital's manufacturing industries": AA MR 1292). The northeastern suburbs became Paris' equivalent of Roubaix and Tourcoing -- with the important difference that instead of textiles many of the workers of Belleville and environs were making railroad cars, machines, chemicals, and other products requiring large applications of capital and energy.

As Figure 1 shows, all five urban clusters grew at similar rates during the nineteenth century's first half; Paris led and Angers lagged, but all the cities grew. During the great period of implosion after 1851, differences sharpened: Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing spurted ahead, Dijon and Paris accelerated, while the growth of Angers speeded up a bit, and that of Toulouse actually slowed down. After the turn of the century -- and especially with the first World War -- the growth of the cities fell almost to a standstill. In fact, the population of Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing, a combat zone in World War I, fell slightly between 1901 and 1921. As average annual percentage rates of increase, here are the relevant figures:



TOTAL POPULATION
OF MAJOR CITIES
1801–1921

CITY	1801-1851	1851-1901	1901-1921
Paris	1.3	1.9	0.3
Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing	1.2	2.2	-0.2
Dijon	0.8	1.6	0.5
Toulouse	1.2	0.9	0.8
Angers	0.7	1.1	0.2

All the regional capitals, that is, took part in France's urban implosion. But until the plateau of the early twentieth century, both centers of manufacturing and industrial capital grew faster than the rest.

Rates of growth, however, equalize places of very unequal size. Paris began the nineteenth century with more than half a million inhabitants, and left the century with 2.7 million. Throughout the century its population ran about five times that of its closest rival, Marseille, and at least six times that of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing combined. The sheer difference in scale meant that Paris could be less intensely industrial than Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing, and yet have the nation's largest mass of manufacturing. In manufacturing, in trade and, of course, in government Paris towered over the rest of France. And the movement of concentration continued through the nineteenth century.

As a result of concentration, the great manufacturers and merchants of the industrial centers grew wealthy. Figure 2 provides a sense of nineteenth century changes in wealth in three of our cities: Paris, Lille, and Toulouse. The evidence comes from estimates of the values of estates of persons dying in the three cities in different years scattered from 1806 to 1911 (source: Daumard 1973, multiple tables). The graph shows those values in terms of the quintals of wheat they would buy at the year's current prices -- a procedure that undervalues wealth in the high-priced years of 1846 and 1847, but otherwise gives an idea of purchasing power (Annuaire Statistique 1966: 406-407; 1 quintal = 100 kilograms = 220.5 lbs.).

Except for the poor disappearing day laborers of Toulouse, all categories experienced some increase in wealth over the century. The hierarchy of wealth, by this measure, corresponds nicely to the gradations of income, with the great merchants and manufacturers of Paris generally having about 5,000 times the wealth of the city's day-laborers. Shopkeepers and retailers clustered together in wealth in the three cities; toward the end of the century, the wholesale merchants of slow-growing Toulouse seem to have joined them in comfortable mediocrity. Workers in the three cities likewise ended the century fairly close together.

Yet the graph also reveals an important difference from city to city. The greater the industrial concentration, the poorer the workers and the richer the merchants. The difference in wealth between capitalists and workers therefore came out distinctly greater in Paris than in Lille, greater in Lille than in Toulouse. Within the industrial city, the trend ran to concentration and


MEAN PROPERTY AT DEATH, 1806-1911 EXPRESSED IN QUINTALS OF WHEAT AT CURRENT PRICE, OCCUPATIONS IN PARIS, LILLE, TOULOUSE
MERCHANTS & MANUFACTURERS, PARIS
MERCHANTS, LILLE
MERCHANTS, TOULOUSE
SHOPKEEPERS, PARIS
RETAILERS, LILLE
RETAILERS, TOULOUSE
WORKERS, TOULOUSE
WORKERS, LILLE
WORKERS AND CRAFTSMEN, PARIS
LABORERS, TOULOUSE
LABORERS, PARIS
VALUE OF PROPERTY IN QUINTALS OF WHEAT
50,000
10,000
5000
1000
500
100
50
10
5.0
1.0
0.0
1800
1810
1820
1830
1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920

class division.

Just after the revolution of February 1848, Henri Lecouturier wrote a curious little book called Paris Incompatible with the Republic. Plan of a New Paris where Revolutions Will Be Impossible. The book wrapped together the chief changes in the city -- growth, concentration, and segregation -- as causes of revolution. "While half of Paris dies of starvation," wrote Lecouturier, "the other half eats for two. Centralization takes care of it; we are seeing the exhaustion of France, which produces, for Paris, which devours" (Lecouturier 1848: 15-16). After enumerating the city's numerous forms of decadence and immorality, he went on to complain of an anonymity that gave free reign to degenerates and criminals.

"Paris will always be revolutionary," declared Lecouturier, "so long as fragmentation isn't complete, SO LONG AS THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO HAVE ENOUGH IS NOT GREATER THAN THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO HAVE TOO LITTLE" (Lecouturier 1848: 65-66). Yet he did not draw a socialist conclusion from that principle. Instead, his program for Paris included these elements:

* banning of all industrial production except that which is absolutely indispensable;

* expulsion of all businesses beyond those necessary to serve the residents;

* a census of the population, followed by expulsion of everyone without a trade;

* setting a limit on the labor force;

* division of the entire city into four quarters separated by green space, with each quarter divided into four autonomous villages;

- construction of wide, straight streets like those of Washington;

- new housing construction with easy purchase.

Except for the wide, straight streets cut through by Haussmann, Paris did not follow Lecouturier's advice. Nevertheless, Lecouturier's analysis reflects the widespread feeling in France's ruling classes that the combination of centralized power, concentrated production, rapid growth, and heightened inequality carried the threat of immorality, disorder, and rebellion.

A Changing State

Not long after Lecouturier set down his ideas about the consequences of Parisian concentration, Alexis de Tocqueville was writing his own analysis of the Revolution of 1848. Among the factors Tocqueville invoked were "the industrial revolution which in thirty years had made Paris the chief manufacturing city of France and had brought within its walls a whole new mass of workers to whom work on fortifications had added another mass of unemployed agricultural workers," and "the centralization which reduced the whole revolutionary action to seizing control of Paris and taking hold of the assembled machinery of government" (Tocqueville 1978: 113-114). Later on, Tocqueville generalized this analysis into an explanation of the eighteenth-century Revolution as well.

Although Tocqueville underestimated the extent to which the revolutionaries of 1789-1799 built a new system, he saw clearly that the conjunction of a centralized state and a great metropolis made control of Paris crucial to national politics. After revolutionaries struggled their way to a centralized state structure, neither Napoleon's men nor the kings of the Restoration nor the makers of nineteenth-century revolutions undertook seriously to dismantle the structure.

The strengthening and centralization of the French state followed a remarkable sequence: establishment of revolutionary committees, militias, and provisional governments; dissolution of rival governmental structures; assumption of their fiscal powers and financial obligations; imposition of uniform principles and procedures for taxation, conscription, voting, and other forms of civic obligation from one end of the country to the other; creation of a hierarchical structure of assemblies and administrations operating continuously from nation to commune; control of the assemblies and administrations by means of roving representatives of the central power who relied on existing networks of bourgeois patriots for support; gradual but forceful substitution of the formal hierarchy for the committees and militias; elaboration of a national surveillance system strongly resembling the one Paris' Old Regime police had used to control the metropolis; development of armed forces reliably subservient to the central government and to no one else. Organizers of the Revolution and the Empire built the most far-reaching centralized state the world had ever seen.

Chinese and Roman emperors had, to be sure, constructed vaster systems of government. But they and their counterparts in other empires had essentially ended their administration at the regional level, stationing their own bureaucrats and soldiers in provincial capitals and relying on coopted indigenous powerholders for routine government below that level. Old-regime France, on its much smaller scale, had not gone far beyond that arrangement. But the Revolution and the Empire, through intense struggle, established direct connections from national government to individual communes and almost -- via communal councils -- to local households and kin groups. Regional and local potentates who were hostile to the current national regime could still make life difficult for its representatives. Yet they had nothing like the bases of opposition afforded their old-regime predecessors by parlements, estates, corporate trades and chartered municipalities.

The work of building the state did not end with the First Empire. Professional policing provides one indication of the state's nineteenth-century expansion. If we exclude local forces such as game wardens, the Revolution and Empire consolidated official policing into two forces. The Gendarmerie Nationale, reporting to the minister of war and responsible for the patrolling of highways and rural areas, took over the functions of the Maréchaussée, which had formed in 1720 under the same auspices and for essentially the same purposes.

The *Sûreté Nationale* extended to urban France in general the organization of the pre-revolutionary Parisian police force, putting the system's control into the hands of the Minister of the interior. The Surete not only patrolled streets and tracked down thieves, but also pumped a regular stream of political intelligence from every department and major city to the capital. In the process, the Surete steadily absorbed existing muncipal police forces -- taking over, for example, the police of Lyon in 1851, of Marseille in 1908, of Toulon in 1918, of Nice in 1920.

The Gendarmerie and, especially, the Surete continued to grow through much of the nineteenth century. Figure 3 contains the fragmentary series concerning their forces and budgets now available (compiled from Nicolas 1883 and *Annuaire de l'Economie Politique* for individual years). The curves of growth have some interesting irregularities. The trend of expenditure for Gendarmerie already ran upward in the 1840s. Louis Napoleon accelerated the Gendarmerie's expansion during the first few years after his seizure of power, then let the force level off. After a declining investment in Gendarmerie during the last years of the Second Empire, the regime that came to power in the 1870 revolution again pumped strength into the force.

Fluctuations in Surete Nationale police were much greater. After each nineteenth-century revolution -- 1830, 1848, 1870 -- the new regime consolidated its control over the country by vigorously expanding the police force. The significant partial

Police Expenditures and Police Personnel in France, 1825-1895



exception to that rule is the Second Republic; it cut expenditures in half before Louis Napoleon, as President from the end of 1848, tightened his grip on state machinery. On the whole, policing and political repression waxed and waned together. The final effect was to lay down a uniform net of control over the entire country.

Nevertheless, not all regions participated equally in the state's nineteenth-century expansion. For one thing, strength of support for successive regimes varied dramatically from one part of France to another. To take the obvious cases, under the July Monarchy Anjou and Languedoc harbored many powerful Legitimists, while Burgundy, the Ile de France and the Nord had few. Anjou's Legitimists consisted mainly of country-dwelling nobles and their supporters; they aligned themselves against city-dwelling Orleanists and Republicans. In Languedoc, cities such as Toulouse overflowed with powerful Legitimists; the Legitimism of Languedoc, furthermore, had a sharp edge of opposition to the Protestant bourgeoisie. These variations affected both the ability of prefects to do the central government's bidding, and the likelihood that a region's notables would get their share of governmental largesse.

For another thing, the government's own investment in capital-intensive projects had distinct regional biases. This time the obvious example comes from the railroads. After an early period in which railway construction followed either the needs of mineowners or the whims of the royal court, the French undertook the construction of a rail system consisting largely of links between Paris and major provincial cities. The pattern favored the Nord and, obviously, the Ile de France far more than Burgundy, Anjou, or Languedoc. Burgundy gained some advantage over Languedoc and Anjou from its location on the path from Paris to Lyon to Marseille.

Paris had its first passenger line in 1837, and established direct connections to Rouen and Orleans in 1843. Lille linked directly to Paris via a main line in 1846, Dijon in 1849, Toulouse in 1856, Angers not until 1863. The extension of railroads represents a general pattern: Broadly speaking, a region's concentration of capital determined how soon and how much it received state-backed economic facilities, the favorability of its dominant classes to the current regime determined its receipt of amenities, and the strength of its opposition movements determined the extent of its repressive apparatus.

In these regards, the Revolution had made a profound difference. The shift to relatively direct rule diminished the impact of a region's economically dominant classes on its pattern of government. The consolidation and bureaucratization of the fiscal system further reduced region-to-region variability in the character and burden of taxation. The Catholic church emerged from the Revolution greatly diminished as an independent power. Although holders of land, both noble and bourgeois, continued to wield great influence in a property-qualified electorate, merchants, financiers, and manufacturers grew increasingly powerful in the national arena. While leaving many features of local social life, production, distribution, and consumption little changed after the early flurries of experimentation with each of them, the Revolution transformed the national structure of rule.

Five Kinds of Revolution

Because old-regime social organization and articulation with the central government varied significantly from region to region, the Revolution took significantly different forms in our five regions. In the **Nord,** we have already seen a strong, early movement of smallholders and rural proletarians against landlords in the Southeast (Hainaut and Cambrésis), and widespread struggles of rural proletarians against landlords and merchants in the Northwest (Flanders, properly speaking). In Hainaut and Cambresis, the abolition of feudal dues and the sale of church properties helped establish a republic of smallholders.

In Flanders, rich farmers and urban bourgeois dominated the sales. The rural population, on the whole, resisted the dissolution of the church and stuck with its parish clergy. Once they saw the limits of a revolution preempted and controlled by the bourgeoisie, the Nord's rural people turned to defending whatever gains they had made. Thus the rural areas created a genuine but short-lived revolutionary movement. In the cities, the already powerful mercantile and manufacturing bourgeoisie did little more than consolidate its power. During the first phase of France's revolutionary wars, the frontier province again became the scene of encampments, invasions, and battles. During that first phase, the Nord had its only large taste of Terror. In general, we see a department settling with the Revolution early, and cramping into a defense of its interests thereafter.

In **Languedoc** the Parlement, long a defender of provincial liberties against royal aggrandizement, quickly aligned itself with the old regime when its own privileges were threatened. Rural proletarians made some efforts to redress the landlords' eighteenth century wrongs early in the Revolution. But later they lacked the capital to take advantage of the sale of church and emigre properties.

Languedoc's Revolution took place mainly in the cities. In Toulouse, the absence of a grande bourgeoisie independent of the great landlords opened revolutionary power to merchants, professionals, and master craftsmen. Toulouse became a national center of Jacobinism. When the Convention smashed the Girondins in June 1793, the patriots of Toulouse eventually supported the Convention. In 1793, both before and after the Federalist insurrection, cities of the zone from Toulouse to Montpellier formed major units of the volunteer Revolutionary Armies. Those armies actively fought the counter-revolutionaries of the South as they worked to assure the defense and feeding of their home bases.

Nîmes, however, veered toward federalism. Nîmes divided between a powerful minority of Protestant entrepreneurs and a determined majority of Catholic workers; most of the Revolution of Nîmes and its hinterland played itself out in conflicts between those two factions. At the purge of Girondins in Paris, Nîmes and its region mounted an abortive rebellion.

Languedoc's Protestants, urban and rural, supported the Revolution with vigor. Rapidly a significant counter-revolutionary movement, led by landlords and manned by Catholic peasants and rural proletarians, formed in the region. Grouped around the non-revolutionary clergy, they opposed revolutionary conscription and taxation. In 1799, their rising dislodged revolutionary authorities in a number of Languedoc's cities, but failed to capture Toulouse, and ultimately fell to republican military force. The White Terror of 1815 marked the moment of bitter Catholic and royalist revenge against the former Jacobins -- Protestant, Catholic, and indifferent -- of Toulouse, Nîmes, and other centers.

In **Burgundy**, the Revolution opened with significant attacks on landlords both within and outside the winegrowing regions, as well as vigorous struggles for power in such cities as Beaune. But once the struggles of the first few years had put in place a new structure of power, the Revolution passed with much less open division than marked Languedoc. In 1789 and 1790, supporters and clients of the old Estates constituted an important party. In

1790, they even managed to recapture the municipal government of Dijon from the militant lawyers and merchants who had seized power in July 1789. Decimated by repression and emigration, however, that counter-revolutionary party soon disintegrated. Thenceforth, lawyers, merchants, and other bourgeois held the reins.

Winegrowers of Dijon, Beaune, Mâcon, and the vineyards in between leaned toward the revolutionary left, or at least toward opposition to bourgeois power. So did the industrial workers around Châtillon-sur-Sevre. Neither group, however, wielded much power. Beyond sporadic resistance to conscription and occasional demands for cheaper and more abundant foods, they mobilized rarely and ineffectively. The largely bourgeois committees, militias, and municipalities that formed throughout the region in July 1789 remained in power, mutatis mutandis, throughout the Revolution.

The **Ile de France,** to be sure, nurtured the national revolution. The experience of the Ile de France likewise nurtured some of the great myths of the French Revolution: that Enlightenment thought destroyed the monarchy, that the revolutionary movement sprang from a great subsistence crisis, that the threat of wanderers and brigands stimulated the creation of its political apparatus, that a bloodthirsty crowd smashed the old regime, that an assembly of sturdy provincials confronted a corrupt monarchy and insisted on reform. For each of these myths carries the trace of a genuine Parisian experience in 1789.

In fact, the city's great concentration of journalists, publicists, clerics, clerks, and literate artisans did create a clientele for the politicized clubs and salons that proliferated in 1788 and 1789. The defenders, first of the Parlements and then of the Third Estate, did indeed clothe their defenses in the language of Enlightenment; natural rights and reason justified their opposition to arbitrary rule. Yet they were protecting genuine popular interests against real royal threats.

The second myth likewise contains a half-truth. A widespread subsistence crisis, beginning in 1788, did spur an unusually broad range of blockages and seizures of grain in Paris and its hinterland. By the middle of 1789, as the Third Estate of the Estates General was successfully declaring itself the National Assembly, emergency committees and militias were indeed forming throughout the Ile de France, and preempting the power of the old municipalities. However, a significant part of the conflict over food in 1789 and thereafter resulted from the dispatch of official and semi-official raiding parties from Paris into the surrounding towns. Those parties were trying to assure the great capital's food supply in the face of increasing reluctance by producers to commit their grain to the market, and increasing unwillingness of villagers to let the grain leave for Paris.

Unemployed rural workers did roam the region's roads in the spring of 1789. Many a sexton rang the tocsin to call for armed defense against the approach of brigands. But the marauders rarely came. And when they did, they usually turned out to be hapless beggars or food-hunting delegations from Paris. Aside from food blockages and scattered attacks on landlords' hunting apparatus, the rural sections of the Ile de France experienced relatively little open conflict in 1789.

Orators, literati, clerks, and workers did gather regularly at the Palais Royal and elsewhere, calling for resistance to royal oppression, holding off or even recruiting the troops sent to disperse them. Ordinary Parisian people, furthermore, did repeatedly go to the streets, did increasingly proclaim popular sovereignty, and did occasionally take the law -- even capital punishment of traitors -- into their own hands. Marches of Parisian fishwives, militiamen, and officials, indeed, intimidated the king and eventually brought the royal family to Paris. That much might suggest the unleashing of angry mobs. But think of the context: the continuous marching, meeting and organizing of the capital, the conversion of electoral assemblies and provisional committees into instruments of municipal government, the tense but powerful alliances developed between street people and assembly people. Those features of the early Revolution in the Ile de France reveal an unprecedented popular mobilization.

In point of fact, the Third Estate that met in Versailles included many provincials who found the palace town shocking. But by the time of their definitively revolutionary actions they had long since fled Versailles for Paris. There, in tacit alliance with the city's artisans and shopkeepers, augmented by dissident clergy and nobles, they braved the crown. Their actions become more comprehensible, furthermore, in the light of the royal effort to check them, to ring the capital with troops, and to dismiss the reforming Necker -- in short, to engineer a coup d'état. Thus each myth refracts a reality while making its true image unrecognizable.

The myths also neglect other fundamental Parisian realities: the tension between the support and the threat to revolutionary leaders provided by the intense local organization of artisans and shopkeepers into their own assemblies, societies, and committees, the vulnerability of a national assembly located in the capital to organized invasions by determined activists, the incessant flow of people and information to and from the country's other cities, the eventual extension to the entire country of the system of surveillance and political control pioneered in the capital, indeed modeled to some degree on the royal policing apparatus of the old regime. In all these regards, Paris and the Ile de France occupied a unique position in the Revolution's unfolding.

Anjou's Revolution and Counter-Revolution

Anjou, too, could claim uniqueness. It shared with Languedoc the distinction of raising a serious counter-revolutionary movement, one that outlasted the Revolution itself. Although its counter-revolutionaries mobilized later than those of Languedoc, however, they soon posed a far more serious threat to the Revolution's survival.

In 1789 and 1790 Anjou did not look much different from Burgundy or Languedoc: Struggles over food supply taxed authorities throughout the region. Larger cities formed their committees, clubs, and revolutionary administrations in the face of those struggles, and in the presence of new allies in big cities elsewhere, including Paris. Merchants and lawyers -- essentially the same group who had gotten into politics in the new provincial assembly of 1787 and 1788 and had organized the province's preparations for the Estates General of 1789 -- established a new governing coalition. Nobles sulked, then started to emigrate in considerable numbers.

The more or less simultaneous dispossession of the church, imposition of an ecclesiastical civil service, sale of church properties, and penetration of revolutionary government to the village level sharpened the division in Anjou. On one side stood city-based bourgeois revolutionaries and their village allies. On the other, a coalition of substantial peasants, rural artisans, and parish clergy. That polarization, in turn, forced most rural people to take sides.

In a local parallel to the struggle of Paris with its hinterland, the National Guards of the region's small cities sought to subjugate the fractious back country. They marched around trying to enforce compliance with revolutionary edicts, protect the constitutional clergy, shore up their few rural allies, and assure their own food supply. That military proselytization only accentuated the division. In the Mauges, the bocage of southern Anjou, the bulk of the population lined up against the revolutionary bourgeoisie.

Similar processes aligned much of the rural population against the Revolution in almost all the bocages of western France -- not only those of Anjou, but also those of Poitou, Brittany, and Maine. "The terrain of rebellion," comments Paul Bois, "was the bocage, with its dispersed settlement; rebellion always stopped at the edge of open-field landscape" (Bois 1981: 124). But those bocages varied in the extent of their polarization, the intensity of their conflict, and their vulnerability to military and political control from the region's cities.

North of the Loire, in general, armed resistance to revolutionary authority took the form of Chouannerie. Chouannerie involved little open warfare, but plenty of ambush, harassment, individual assaults, and attacks on property -- of guerrilla or terrorism, depending on your sympathies for or against the rebels.

South of the Loire, things developed differently. The people of the Mauges and adjacent bocages of Poitou raised more sustained and effective resistance to the efforts of revolutionaries to impose control. Several features of local social organization combined to produce that difference: the presence in villages of bourgeois who were organizing cottage textile production and administering the estates of absentee nobles; the importance of substantial peasants who were typically tenants of nobles or ecclesiastical landlords but had to deal directly with their bourgeois agents; long struggles for local preeminence between the parish clergy and the resident bourgeoisie; the weakness of national military forces and revolutionary militias in the region. In 1791 and 1792, clandestine masses and nocturnal processions became the rallying points of counter-revolutionaries; they accelerated along with attacks on constitutional clergy, refusal to pay taxes and accept revolutionary administrative measures, boycotting of elections, assemblies, and offices, threats of violence to rural patriots.

The Mauges behaved in stunning contrast to the region around Saumur. In the Saumurois, rural winegrowers and small farmers quickly cooperated with the revolutionary bourgeoisie, accepting ecclesiastical reform, inducing their clergy to accept it as well, buying church properties, attending revolutionary ceremonies, serving in the National Guard, enlisting in the national armies, even joining in the forces sent to put down rebellion in the neighboring Mauges.

After a number of attacks on patriots in 1791 and 1792, the great insurrection of 1793 began in March, with widespread resistance to the national call for mass conscription, followed by attacks on local patriots and nearby cities. Community bands of improvised soldiers soon consolidated into makeshift armies commanded chiefly by local nobles with military experience. With the armies marched priests who had rejected the revolutionary reorganization of the church, then hidden out in the countryside in defiance of the beleaguered revolutionary authorities.

These ragged forces seized control of most of the Mauges and of adjacent sections of Poitou, made temporary conquests of Saumur, Angers, Cholet, and other patriotic cities, and held off major revolutionary armies for about six months. Rebellions of various sorts recurred in the region in 1794, 1795, 1796, 1799, 1815, and 1832; the rest of the period from 1793 to 1799, furthermore, was full of raids and confrontations. As in Languedoc, the resistance movement that formed during the Revolution's early years changed character considerably as years passed, but took decades to disappear.

Some of the difference between the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary regions of Anjou resulted quite directly from variations in the correspondence between local material interests and revolutionary programs. Monastic orders and external titheholders, for example, held much more of the ecclesiastical wealth of the Saumurois than was the case in the Mauges. In the Mauges, parish clergy held most of the church property. It was easier and more profitable to be anticlerical in the Saumurois.

Again, peasant property was relatively widespread in the Saumurois, while most of the Mauges' householders were tenants. The only peasants of the Mauges with capital, furthermore, were the larger tenant farmers; most often they leased their 20-hectare farms from rentier noble landlords via the landlords' bourgeois agents, and brought their capital in the form of cattle and tools. They had little prospect of outbidding the bourgeoisie in any auction of church or emigre property.

A revolution promoting the rights of property, restricting the power of the church, forwarding trade, and establishing relative political equality among propertyholders had a ready public in the merchants and smallholders of the Saumurois and Loire valley. In the Mauges, the tenant farmers, agricultural laborers, and textile workers who formed the great majority of the population had much less to gain from such a program.

The Mauges' people also had something to lose from the disestablishment of the church, whose parish revenues provided a small cushion against unemployment, and whose parish clergy served as a counterweight to the local bourgeoisie. To put welfare and political power into the hands of the very merchants and lawyers who had already demonstrated their interest in cutting wages, increasing the return from leases on the land they owned or administered, and acquiring more land for their own use -- that prospect threatened the well-being of most of the rural population.

Yet such a configuration did not guarantee that the peasants and artisans of the bocage would end up counter-revolutionary. That depended as well on the alliances and enmities they formed. Aligning themselves against the bourgeoisie threw the rural people of the Mauges into the arms of the clergy and the nobility. In other parts of the West, peasant communities that had maintained a certain independence vis à vis the local bourgeoisie made their peace with the Revolution (cf. Le Goff & Sutherland 1974).

Elsewhere in France, class coalitions likewise made a large difference in alignment for or against the Revolution. Peasants and agricultural laborers of Flanders, who had long fought to hold back the assaults of capitalizing landlords, nevertheless bought into the first round of revolutionary reforms. Among Languedoc's Protestants, merchants, artisans, and peasants alike opted for the Revolution, their alliance against Catholics overriding the divergence of their other interests.

On the whole, the less wealthy peasants and agricultural workers throughout France had long been struggling to hold off the advance of agricultural capitalism. The general fit between their interests and revolutionary programs concerning the land strongly affected their orientation to the Revolution as a whole. But within those limits, whether they lined up with or against revolutionaries whose actions would ultimately advance agricultural capitalism also depended on the local play of alliances with or against the bourgeoisie.

Anjou's Post-Revolutionary Contention

The century following Napoleon's defeat of 1815 created the France we know today. That truism is even truer for popular contention than for governmental structure or for character of the dominant classes.

Anjou, it is true, might seem to be a contrary case; there, after all, ostensibly counter-revolutionary movements stirred up the countryside from the early Revolution to the 1840s, and the department of Maine-et-Loire entered twentieth century electoral politics as a right-wing bastion. In May 1815 the marquis d'Autichamp had sounded the tocsin in southern Anjou. Like his allies in neighboring Deux-Sèvres and Vendée, he raised a force of a few thousand men to march against patriotic cities and Napoleonic troops. The insurgents even managed to control the bocage for a month, and to divert 20,000 imperial soldiers from the forces fighting around Waterloo.

After Napoleon's second abdication in July 1815, royalist forces occupied Durtal and disarmed the patriot centers south of the Loire. In 1832, when the duchesse de Berry debarked in Provence and made her way to the Vendée to call for a Legitimist rebellion against the new July Monarchy, a few half-hearted bands again mustered to attack government forces before succumbing again. Small bands of Chouans continued to attack government personnel and facilities from time to time over the next two years.

All this counter-revolutionary activity looks like a carryover from the eighteenth century. Indeed, its noble leaders portrayed it as a straightforward continuation of 1793's struggle. But in fact Anjou's nineteenth-century politics were falling into place. Instead of widespread popular insurrection of 1793, the events of 1815 and 1832 depended largely on important regional nobles' calling up of their personal clienteles in the name of the Bourbons. Returning to their estates, great Angevin landlords devoted themselves to managing their properties, building their regional political bases, and constructing the myth of a faithful royalist peasantry.

In the cities, especially Angers, life followed a very different beat. In February 1826, for example, Mardi Gras brought a guarded critique of Anjou's nobility from the liberals of Cholet. According to the subprefect, in the Mardi Gras tableau:

> A feudal lord, called Prince of Darkness, appeared with many followers. They all wore hats in the shape of candle-snuffers. They carried two signs. On one was painted a donkey carrying a torch covered by a snuffer, with bats at the four corners. On the other you could read LONG LIVE THE GOOD OLD DAYS! Others carried night birds and a gibbet. Last came a bust of Voltaire.

The maskers put on two scenes: the lord's marriage, complete with enumeration of his feudal rights; the trial and hanging of a vassal for killing a rabbit (ADML [Archives Départementales de Maine-et-Loire, Angers] 21 M 162). Local royalists, according to the subprefect, were not amused.

For several decades, the contestation of Anjou's liberal and republican activists took mainly symbolic forms: masquerades, scattered shouts of slogans, banquets. The government made more extensive action difficult. In June 1830, for instance, when Angers' liberals planned a gathering to welcome two deputies who had spoken out against the king's recent abridgements of civil rights, the prefect forbade the gathering. When a crowd led the deputies into town anyway, gendarmes surrounded the house where the deputies were scheduled to meet with their supporters, and scattered the crowd. That ended the mild display of opposition (Le Moniteur, 15 June 1830).

So it went through the 1830s. The regional prosecutor's report on the "moral and political situation" in April 1834, to take a convenient indicator, dwelt on the difficulties of cleaning up the last Chouans. It devoted but a sentence to Angers' Societe des Droits de l'Homme, who were "trying to indoctrinate workers on their doorsteps and in the wineshops" but had "failed in the face of the people's calm mood" (AN BB^3 167). Angers' republicans, drawn essentially from students and the local bourgeoisie, faltered through the 1830s. Nevertheless, they started their own newspaper -- le Précurseur de l'Ouest -- in 1840. During the 1840s, they began agitating for press freedom and expansion of suffrage.

What Angevin republicans did **not** do was to form alliances with organized workers or draw workers, organized or not, into their own ranks. That was not because all workers were inactive. During the 1830s and 1840s, strikes became more frequent in

Anjou's cities. They continued to take the form of the turnout: The initiators tried to bring out the workers in all the local shops one by one, to hold a general assembly of the trade in a protected location, and then to bargain with the city's masters collectively. Turnouts also continued to call down repression: Major strikes of Angers' locksmiths (1834), tailors (1836), cabinetmakers (1841) and, especially, construction workers (1845) all brought arrests and convictions.

Elsewhere, likewise, authorities used the language of repression to describe and deal with workers' collective action. The prosecutor of Poitiers, for example, described a turnout of Cholet's weavers on 8 and 9 October 1840 as "troubles". The city's workers had assembled to demand an increase in the price of the goods they finished. Two hundred weavers from nearby Mortagne-sur-Sevre joined them in the streets. When the clothiers had agreed to a new scale of payments, the troubles "calmed down" and, in the prosecutor's words,

> the workers, back at home, went back to their tasks and rejoiced in concessions that seemed likely to end their misery, which is unfortunately all too real.
>
> But the calm didn't last long. The clothiers having refused to abide by the scale they had previously accepted, the riot began again on the 12th. That day the workers of Mortagne did nothing, and the Justice of the Peace used his influence

> to make the workers do their duty.
>
> My deputy continues to assure me that up to now politics has nothing to do with Cholet's seditious movement. He adds that in the midst of the mob, the men in it declared their sincere attachment to the July dynasty and to our constitutional institutions. It is very likely that the workers mean it, and have no other fault but to be acting illegally. Still one can't help recognizing that behind them are Legitimists who are watching how things go, and would not miss the chance to profit by the discontent and irritation of the inferior classes (AN BB^{18} 1386).

The keywords clang: troubles, émeute, attroupement, mouvement séditieux, classes inférieures. The search for a "political" connection -- one tying the strikers to organized opponents of the regime -- informs the authorities' surveillance of workers. But in the absence of that political connection, and in the presence of reneging on an agreement by the local capitalists, the prosecutor is inclined to stay his hand. Thus the system leaves a little room for workers' collective action.

Except for slate quarrymen, however, Anjou's workers took little advantage of the 1848 Revolution to organize or to connect their existing organizations to national politics. Quarrymen then launched a general union (a syndicat). The general union, in its turn, may well have formed the matrix in which the Marianne, a secret society with socialist leanings, took shape after 1851. The quarrymen's strike of 1852, 500 workers strong, seemed to reflect more extensive organization than its predecessors, and very likely involved the Marianne. That secret society went so far as to organize, in 1855, an abortive armed insurrection in Trélazé, Saint-Barthélemy, Ponts-de-Cé, and Angers.

Anjou's most common varieties of open struggle in the 1830s and 1840s, however, were not strikes or insurrections. They were old-fashioned efforts at diverting to local consumption food supplies that were destined for other markets. Anjou's widespread blockages of grain shipments in 1839 and 1840 occurred not in the cities but mainly in bocage villages such as Le May-sur-Evre, St. Pierre Montlimart, Jallais, and Coron. In those villages, a significant part of the population worked in cottage textile production.

Blockages of grain continued to occur in those places during crisis years for another decade or so. 1846 and 1847 brought Anjou's last significant cluster of blockages, although here and there in Anjou people blocked shipments well into the 1850s. That was the end. Hunger and poverty continued, but people acted on them in other ways. In about 150 years, the various forms of open struggle for control of locally-available food had run their course.

From the 1850s onward, Anjou's public contention pivoted mainly on strikes, demonstrations and public meetings. Although strikes remained illegal until 1864 and trade unions were banned until 1868, workers, employers, and political authorities began pacing out new limits for legitimate strikes and workers' organizations.

Not that authorities abandoned their conception of strikes as disorders to be repressed. When some of Angers' carpenters struck in May 1860, the deputy prosecutor for Angers immediately charged them with the offense of coalition. The strike revived anyway in July. Then the prosecutor began preventive detention of its likely leaders. Yet he saw the logic of their action:

> We have a good deal of construction work in Angers. We might reasonably fear that as in 1854 the various building trades would follow the carpenters' lead, and that the strike would spread to all our construction sites. That is what persuaded me to ask the deputy prosecutor to put a case in the hands of the investigative judge (juge d'instruction) of this court, in order to give a healthy warning to workers who are susceptible to being drawn in (AN BB^{18} 1609, letter of 15 May 1860).

Five days later the same prosecutor recognized that in the upswing of the time, "workers found that it was a good time to ask for something, and they asked for it" (AN BB^{18} 1609).

Other strikes that year involved carpenters of La Flèche, slate quarriers of Trélazé, stonecutters of Angers, bleachers of Cholet, and construction tradesmen of Beaufort. Remembering the provoked three days of large anti-Semitic demonstrations, involving priests and students of the Catholic University, in Angers. But the disestablishment of the church divided Anjou more than the Dreyfus Case. During the first half-dozen years after the new century began, the church's defenders resisted the closing of monasteries, the secularization of schools, and the inventory of church property. Their action included one of the few occasions on which the most visible "rioters" in a violent demonstration were nobles. This was the news from Angers in August 1902:

> Following a lecture on freedom of education at the Circus chaired by the comte de Maillé, senator, and organized by a majority of the departmental council to protest the dismissal of the sisters, a demonstration took place. About two thousand participants in the meeting went through the streets leading to the prefecture, where they had no authorization to go. Extensive security measures had been taken, and Gendarmerie brigades came to reinforce the gendarmes of Angers.
>
> During the demonstration a number of arrests occurred, notably those of the marquis Henri d'Armaillé, mayor of le Bourg-d'Iré, for refusal to move on; of baron Pierre de Candé, mayor of Noyant-la-Gravoyère, for the same reason; of baron Louis de Candé, brother of the preceding person, for

Marianne insurrection five years earlier, the prosecutor looked searchingly at Trélazé's strikes for signs of secret society activity. He found none except the presence of a few former members of the Marianne.

From the 1860s to World War I, strikes provided the main occasions on which Angevins contended publicly on a large scale. Textile workers, men in the building trades and, as always, quarrymen led the way. Shoemakers, foundry workers, and railwaymen joined them from time to time. Even in Anjou, a latecomer to industrial concentration, the locus of strikes shifted away from whole communities toward larger firms and parts of cities.

The big strikes of 1887 and 1888 in Cholet and its region marked the last concerted effort of textile workers in small shops and domestic production to hold off the evils of concentration. Although the slateworkers of Trélazé and vicinity kept semi-rural sites from disappearing entirely, the characteristic Angevin strike increasingly resembled the conflict of 1903 in which 1,500 workers of the Bessonneau textile plant walked off the job. Small potatoes by the standards of Roubaix or Paris, such a strike nevertheless aligned Angers with industrial centers elsewhere in France.

As the firm-by-firm strike came into its own, so did the meeting and the demonstration. In Anjou, as compared with other regions, religious issues bulked large. In 1895, the Dreyfus Case

> assault on an officer; and M. Henri d'Aubigné, property owner in Bourg-d'Iré, seditious shouts; of Maximilien Nicolle and Henri Normand, insulting an officer (Le Constitutionnel, 25 August 1902).

Despite elite leadership and reactionary program, then, the opponents of secularization borrowed the prevailing forms of contention: the public meeting and the demonstration. Anjou, like the rest of France, had adopted the new repertoire.

Other Voices

As represented by Flanders, Burgundy, Languedoc, and the Ile de France, the rest of France underwent much of the same evolution as Anjou. But on the whole it did so earlier, with more direct participation in national revolutions and in collective demands for democratization, for workers' rights, for protection against arbitrary rule. We can see the difference by means of quick comparisons of the five regions at the time of five political crises: those of 1830, 1848, 1851, 1870-71, and 1905-07.

In **1830**, when Anjou's Legitimists were girding to turn back the work of the July Revolution, their cousins in Languedoc were likewise activating. But in Languedoc, a significant Republican movement was forming as well; around Toulouse, indeed, Legitimists and Republicans joined in a tacit alliance against the July Monarchy. Besides turnouts and opposition to tax-collectors, Languedoc's open contention of 1830 consisted largely of the display and destruction of political symbols such as the fleur de lis and tricolor; battles raged around the two flags in Toulouse on 4 August. Although Burgundy's winegrowers joined enthusiastically in the opposition to sales taxes, the year's big event was the insurrection of 28 July; at that moment, the people of Dijon not only hooted the Princess Royal, but stoned the royal troops sent to maintain order. People in Lille also stoned those troops that remained faithful to outgoing King Charles X, but not until 30 July. In the Nord, the rest of the year brought more turnouts and food riots than occurred in Anjou, Languedoc, or Burgundy.

In the Ile de France, finally, arrived the critical events of the revolution -- the gatherings to protest Charles X's dissolution of the National Assembly and institution of strict press controls, the building of barricades, the popular occupation of the Hotel de Ville, the street fighting with troops, and so on to the king's abdication. Furthermore, after the installation of the new regime its authorities had to contend continually with workers who demanded their share of the rewards. Perhaps the year's peak of post-revolutionary conflict came on 12 October, when people recognized the old regime's ex-convict police chief Vidocq (Balzac's Vautrin) on the street, and besieged the building in which he took shelter.

In **1848**, Anjou again remained peripheral to the revolution, facing the year with a few invasions of forests, workers' brawls, and other minor conflicts. Languedoc, in contrast, sprang into action with its own Republican banquet campaign, active support of the Revolution in the cities coupled with considerable opposition in the countryside, multiple invasions of forests, strikes, acts of resistance against tax collectors and, in Toulouse, struggles between moderate and radical Republicans. For Burgundy, 1848 brought a broad mobilization of workers and winegrowers in the region's cities, plus extensive efforts of peasants to even accounts with their landlords. In the Nord, Republicans organized demonstrations of their opposition to Louis Philippe almost as soon as their Parisian confreres, and rapidly joined in their own variant of the February Revolution. Throughout the region, opposition between workers and owners animated the politics of 1848. Seizures and blockages of grain occurred widely, struggles between Belgian and French workers reappeared, and strikes -- sometimes insurrectionary and sometimes quite general -- multiplied. Again the Ile de France, and especially Paris, dominated the national revolutionary movement; the region's action went from early attacks on railroad property to Parisian streetfighting in February and June to frequent workers' strikes and demonstrations.

1851 presented a different pattern. On the whole, Louis Napoleon's active searching out of enemies from 1849 onward demobilized radical republicans in every region. The year's action, however, clustered around the last step of that repression, his coup d'etat of 2 December. In Anjou, even the coup brought no more than an unarmed demonstration in Angers. Languedoc divided more sharply and actively before the coup, with small-town republicans actively asserting themselves. At the coup, towns and villages sent thousands of men to defend the Republic. Languedoc's departements of Ardèche (with an estimated 3,500 participants in armed rebellion), Gard (4,000), and Hérault (8,000) raised three of the largest rebel forces (Margadant 1979: 11). In the Hérault, Béziers stood at the center of a large network of small-town insurrections. Indeed, Béziers was the largest city in France actually taken over by the Republican insurgents of December, 1851.

By comparison, resistance in Burgundy remained scattered and small in scale. Although opponents of Louis Napoleon mounted demonstrations against the coup in Châtillon-sur-Seine, Dijon, Beaune, Louhans, St. Gengoux, Mâcon and Cluny, only the area around Mâcon produced an armed rebellion. The Nord, similarly, had begun 1851 with a few conflicts between Republicans and defenders of Louis Napoleon, but greeted the coup with no more than minor demonstrations in Lille and Douai and a failed attempt to raise armed rebellion around Anzin.

This time, as usual, the action began in Paris. But it did not end there. Before December, close surveillance and tight repression had squeezed the regime's opponents in Paris and vicinity. Then came the coup: Louis Napoleon's dissolution and occupation of the National Assembly, declaration of a state of siege, and arrest of opposition politicians. Within the city, it precipitated a rising of some 1,200 armed Republicans; there were barricades, streetfighting, and close to 400 dead. Yet the repression had been effective: Louis Napoleon's troops swept up the Parisian rebels rapidly, and no one elsewhere in the region joined them. The great bulk of 1851's insurgents rose in small places within France's southeastern third; of our whole regions, only Languedoc contributed large numbers.

By **1870**, Parisian dominance of collective action had returned. Neither in 1870 nor in 1871 was Anjou heavily involved in the conflicts that shook the country; only a few slateworkers' strikes broke the silence. Languedoc, in contrast, had a Republican movement that opposed the Franco-Prussian War, acted quickly to support the Republican regime of September 1870, and leaned toward the Paris Commune. Toulouse and Narbonne actually declared their own Communes in March 1871; neither lasted more than a week.

In Burgundy, Le Creusot likewise produced a small but militant Republican movement and briefly formed a Commune. The Prussian occupation of Dijon in 1870-71 silenced the Republicans of the regional capital, and the rest of the region remained relatively inactive. The Nord, too, became a war zone in 1870. It involved itself little in the great political struggles of those years, concentrating instead on strikes such as the one that brought troops to Roubaix in March 1871. The Ile de France marked out the most important battleground of all, for Paris and Versailles were the prizes. Paris stood out not only for the quick Republican seizure of power that followed the Emperor's defeat and capture in September 1870, but also for the Commune of 1871; in between, the capital shook with struggle among partisans of competing futures for France as a whole.

1905 to 1907 has less of a reputation as a national political crisis than do 1830, 1848, 1851, and 1870-71. Yet those years saw the definitive disestablishment of France's state church, the arrival of socialists as a national political party, an attempt to mount a May Day general strike, a national strike wave coordinated by Parisian labor leaders and involving large numbers of semi-skilled workers, open confrontation between labor leaders and the government, and a vast mobilization of southern winegrowers.

In Anjou, Republicans and clericals confronted each other repeatedly over the closing of convents and the inventory of church properties. Languedoc was the chief site of the huge winegrowers' mobilization of 1907; it proceeded from local organization in vintners' towns to meetings bringing hundreds of thousands of supporters into Carcassonne, Nîmes, and Montpellier to the mass resignation of municipal councils and bloody confrontations between troops and demonstrators. The old textile and wheat areas in the hills and around Toulouse, however, remained inactive during the winegrowers' movement and through the strike wave that washed industrial France. The Catholic towns of

Languedoc's northern reaches (present-day Ardèche and Lozère), however, offered determined resistance to the inventories of church property in 1906.

In Burgundy, winegrowers stayed away from the national movement; the most important actions of the period came from strikers of Montceau-les-Mines, Le Creusot, and a few other centers of big industry. The Nord occupied a central position in the strike wave of 1906; miners, textile workers, dockers, machine builders, and auto workers all joined in. But the Nord also saw considerable resistance to the inventories in Boeschape, Halluin, Lille, and other towns. The Ile de France greeted 1905-07 with numerous strikes; during the strike wave of 1906, aas in the Nord, workers in Parisian automobile plants joined a national movement for the first time. May Day demonstrations, furthermore, seemed to display the revolutionary solidarity of the Parisian working class.

In moving from crisis to crisis, we see the evolution of the basic means of collective action. From 1830 to 1907, large strikes accompanied major political crises with increasing frequency. After 1848, the once-common seizure or blockage of food disappeared as a component of major political crises. From 1848 onward, the deliberately-staged demonstration, complete with banners, chants, and marches, became a standard feature of big political conflicts. So did the mass meeting. By 1907, French people had clearly created their own version of the social movement, combining pre-planned meetings and demonstrations with the creation of special-interest associations, promulgation of programs and demands in the names of those associations, claims of support from a mass base, staged confrontations with powerholders, and constant struggles for internal control of the movement's organizations and strategy.

Outside of major crises, other changes were occurring. After 1848, the charivari -- rather an important instrument of local political struggle in the 1830s and 1840s -- virtually disappeared from French politics. So did a number of other venerable forms: the invasion of fields or forests, the attack on machines, the destruction of toll gates, and more. The French repertoire of contention altered rapidly.

Broadly speaking, the alteration happened earlier in those regions in which capital and coercion concentrated earlier: The Ile de France and the Nord moved into the era of large strikes, public meetings, rallies, demonstrations, coordinated insurrections, and social movements faster than Burgundy, Languedoc, or Anjou. And within the regions, areas of concentration generally led the way; although the artisanal winegrowers of Beaune and Mâcon remained militant for a long time, such centers as Le Creusot and Montceau-les-Mines eventually became Burgundy's prime sites of working-class action and innovation.

The differing patterns of contention in our five regions corresponded neatly to variations in the organization of production and coercion. Anjou shows us the politics of a region harboring powerful landlords and a mercantile bourgeoisie. Flanders reveals the effects of capital concentration and proletarianization. Burgundy displays the variation from artisanal winegrowing to metalworking and mining. Languedoc brings out the contrast among areas of large-scale but stagnant agriculture, areas of commercial winegrowing, and areas combining small-scale farming with small-scale textile production. The Ile de France marks the influence of a growing national capital surrounded by rings of expanding heavy industry and, farther out, of cash-crop agriculture on a grand scale.

The scope and intensity of workers' organization, for example, increased with the extent of capital concentration; in that regard, the Nord and the Seine towered above the other departements. On the other hand, government officials also worked harder at surveillance and repression in the Nord and the Seine than in most other departements; as a result, workers' organizations and dissident political groups that did exist in the peripheral regions had a greater chance of surviving periods of tightened central control.

A Rebellious Century

The new repertoire moved along in fits and starts. At the scale of a shop or a town, the repeated shocks of reorganization in the face of concentrating capital and growing state power altered the capacities of ordinary people to act collectively, as well as the relative importance of other parties -- parish priests, landlords, local employers, national political figures, and others -- to their fates. The local structure of a trade, for example, lost much of its strength as a base for collective action, while leaders of national political parties gained increasing influence over decisions affecting the welfare of people in one trade or another.

Not only the repertoire, but also the dramatis personae shifted. Landlords lost much of their importance as actors. Agents of the national government became ever more significant -- eventually, for example, figuring in almost every strike as observers and policemen, if not as mediators. Parties, labor unions and other interest associations appeared openly on the scene. Organized capital, organized labor, rivals for control of the state, and officials of the state itself emerged as the chief participants in large-scale collective action.

At the scale of a city, a region, or the country as a whole, each major political mobilization contributed to changing the character and relative efficacy of different forms of collective action. Both the process of mobilization and the strategic success or failure of different forms of action left residues affecting subsequent mobilizations.

Many mobilizations filled the time from 1789 to 1914. The most obvious were the revolutions: 1789, 1830, 1848, with 1815, 1870 and 1871 more debatable instances. In each of these cases massive popular mobilization accompanied, and helped cause, a transfer of power over the national state. In addition, a staccato of defeated rebellions sounded throughout the period from 1793 to 1871. If by "rebellion" we mean an occasion on which at least a few hundred people seized control of some significant public space and held it for more than a day against military force, nineteenth-century France had dozens of rebellions. Under the July Monarchy alone important rebellions occurred in 1831 (Lyon), 1832 (Paris), 1834 (Lyon, Paris, St. Etienne), and 1839 (Paris).

Later in the nineteenth century, great strikes such as those of the Nord in 1880 or of France's mining regions as a whole following the Courrières mining disaster of 1906 repeatedly took on the guise of rebellion. From the Revolution of 1870 onward, organized social movements, with their swirl of meetings, demonstrations, pronouncements, and petitions, periodically brought hundreds of thousands of French people into public places to voice common demands and complaints; the peaking of the great movement of southern winegrowers in 1907 brought that sort of mobilization to its highest point before World War I.

None of these events was a monologue. Every one of them involved dialogue -- often heated -- with powerholders. In the course of the conversations, three important things happened. First, powerholders and their challengers bargained out new agreements that constrained them thereafter: agreements about the demands and grievances that had brought people to the streets, agreements about the limits and possibilities of future collective action. Thus by striking, firm by firm, workers not only reached agreements with employers and authorities about the grievances and demands they articulated in their strikes, but also acquired the right to organize and to strike. The agreements were often unsatisfactory. The rights to organize and strike operated within stringent limits. Neither qualification denies the main point: that the agreements produced by dialogue constrained later rounds of collective action.

Second, powerholders altered their strategies of repression and facilitation, often by building up their forces for the next confrontation, but sometimes by adopting a new means of repression or abandoning an old one. Thus as the existence of the demonstration became a fait accompli, governmental authorities took to issuing permits to assemble or march, laying out geographic limits outside of which police or troops had the right to attack demonstrators.

Third, challengers shifted their own strategies. Thus as the right to public assembly extended (however contingently) from 1848 on, people moved away from stating their opinions through authorized ceremonies such as banquets and funerals, choosing instead to hold mass meetings, marches, demonstrations involving explicit statements of their grievances and affiliations. Again, the fading of food riots did not mean that shortages and high prices disappeared entirely, or that they disappeared as political issues. A Paris which had reverberated with food riots during earlier revolutions saw none at all during the starvation of the Prussian siege in 1870-71. When widespread vie chère protests occurred in the Nord and in Burgundy during 1911, they included some price-setting and sacking of merchants' premises, but consisted mainly of orderly boycotts, demonstrations, and marches by determined women. People concerned about food prices had adopted new means of dealing with them.

Put together, bargaining between powerholders and challengers, alteration of repression and facilitation, and changes in challengers' strategies added up to changes in repertoires of contention. The nineteenth-century shift in repertoires went even farther than that of the seventeenth century. In the seventeenth century, the rebellion linking regional powerholders to local populations had virtually disappeared, the civilian mutiny had likewise faded away, the massive tax rebellion had declined in importance, and the seizure or blockage of grain had come into its own. But many forms of popular collective action persisted through that seventeenth-century transition: Rough Music, inter-village fights, artisans' brawls, invasions of fields, and expulsions of unwanted outsiders all remained in the repertoire.

Practically none of the popular repertoire of contention that prevailed at the beginning of the nineteenth century survived to its end. Invasions of fields, artisans' brawls, inter-village fights, even the seizure or blockage of grains virtually disappeared. Strikes, public meetings, rallies, demonstrations, social movements, and related forms of action took over.

Consider May Day of 1913 in Dijon. During the last week of April, the building trades union and the Confédération Générale du Travail post handbills calling for demonstrations for a reduced work week and against the bill proposing three years of military service. Workers affiliated with the Bourse du Travail plan a concert, a meeting, and then a demonstration. Confidential reports reaching the Côte d'Or's central police commissioner, however, say that the workers will not demonstrate unless at least five hundred participants show up. Reports from Beaune, Châtillon, Auxonne, and Sémur assure the prefect that the First of May will be calm in those cities and their arrondissements. But the prefect of Saône-et-Loire requests a detachment of gendarmes to prevent trouble at Montceau-les-Mines. His colleague in Côte-d'Or sends 44 men to Montceau.

Acting on instructions from the Minister of the Interior, the Côte d'Or's prefect also asks the mayor of Dijon to forbid any demonstration against the Three Year Bill. The police commissioner notes the political problem such an instruction gives the mayor: If he forbids that demonstration but allows the Jeunesses Catholiques to make a march they plan for a few days later, he will appear partisan indeed. In any case, the mayor refuses to comply. "The Republican principles of the administration I have the honor to direct," he declared, "make it a rule to respect the freedom of our fellow citizens, including the freedom to move through the streets." He objects to the application of a double standard, pointing out that:

> At the time of the festival of Joan of Arc, I authorized the supporters of religious schools and their gymnastic associations to organize a parade through the city's streets, with a concert by their bands at the Place du Peuple.
>
> Furthermore, I have already implicitly authorized the Bourse du Travail to organize its street demonstration for May Day, as in previous years.
>
> We are informed that the members of the Bourse du Travail plan to demonstrate in favor of certain working conditions, likewise in favor of the so-called "English week" and perhaps against the Three Years Bill.
>
> The organizers have assured us that everything will go on in the customary order; in any case, we have given our police the necessary instructions for every eventuality.
>
> Knowing the temper of our population, we think it would be impolitic and dangerous to agitate people by forbidding the

> demonstration of members of the Bourse du Travail on 1 May.
>
> That to do so could lead to reprisals, especially on the 4th of May against the supporters of religious schools, even though they are only supposed to cross the city with their bands (ADCO SM 3511).

As it turns out, only a hundred-odd workers come to the 1 May meeting. The organizers therefore call off the demonstration. Yet the background of the non-event shows us a new world and a new repertoire: a world of surveillance and tight political calculation; a world in which challengers and powerholders bargain out not only the exercise of power but also the limits within which demonstrations occur; a world where specialized associations do a great deal of public business; a world in which orderly shows of strength make a political difference. All things considered, in Dijon of 1913 we see the world of collective action we know today.

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2. CONTEMPORARY PERIODICALS

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