Group Influence and American Ideals: How Social Identity and Emotion Shape Our Political Values and Attitudes

by

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To my parents,
Barbara and Jim Suhay,
with love and gratitude

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It is my great pleasure to acknowledge the help I have received in writing this dissertation. And, given my interest in the study of social influence, I feel especially compelled to do so carefully.

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Finally, I would like to thank my parents. My parents are the reason why I am here, in so many ways. As my mom likes to tell it, I was conceived in Ohio State's Department of Political Science. As far as I know, not *exactly* on the premises—my parents met at a student mixer while they were political science graduate students at OSU. My mother went on to teach political science; my father decided that one political scientist in the family was probably enough (at least for the time being) and got his MBA. Throughout my life, my mom has inspired in me a sense of curiosity about the world, and about politics in particular. My dad has given me my sense of enthusiasm for life and work and my perseverance. Both have been unflagging supporters of my pursuits. And, as parents often do, they frequently have backed up their emotional support with financial help. In addition, as the dissertation deadline approached, Mom and Dad pitched in as unpaid RAs to help me move the project along: Both devoted many hours to help with the

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Chapter 1

Introduction

America is a country of strong families and strong values. My life's been blessed by both. I was raised by a single mom and my grandparents. We didn't have much money, but they taught me values straight from the Kansas heartland where they grew up. Accountability and self-reliance. Love of country. Working hard without making excuses. Treating your neighbor as you'd like to be treated....I approved this message because I'll never forget those values, and if I have the honor of taking the oath of office as president, it will be with a deep and abiding faith in the country I love.[1]

Once again, everybody seems to be talking about values this election cycle. Candidates have been working hard to convince voters that they "share their values." Citizens have been repeatedly polled regarding whether they think candidates indeed share their values. Pundits have attributed electoral wins and losses to the results of such polls. And news channels have kept the salience of values high by broadcasting events such as this year's Democratic forum on religion and values, "the Compassion Forum."

All the attention paid by politicians and pundits to values is not ill considered. Values play a tremendously important role in shaping Americans' political decisions. Their power has been documented at the individual level with respect to social welfare and civil rights and liberties (Feldman 1988; Feldman and Steenbergen 2001; Hochschild 1981; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Markus 2001; Stoker 2001), race-related public policy (Feldman 1988; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Markus 2001;

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[1] From Barack Obama's "Country I Love" television ad, released in June 2008.

Sniderman and Carmines 1997; Sniderman and Piazza 1993), and evaluations of political leaders and electoral choice (Abramowitz 1997; Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione, and Barbaranelli 2006; Feldman 1988; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Markus 2001; Mulligan 2008). Numerous scholars, many working from a historical perspective, have examined Americans' values at the national level as well, remarking on their role in shaping the nation's political institutions (Hartz 1955; Huntington 1981; Lipset 1963; Myrdal [1944] 1964; Smith 1997; Tocqueville 2004).

Despite all this attention to values, however, political scientists know surprisingly little about what shapes citizens' values or why citizens lean on their values so heavily when making political decisions. The import of values to political behavior is particularly puzzling given that values often appear to contradict individual citizens' self-interest. I argue here that, to better understand the mystery surrounding values, we need to better understand the process of value development at the individual level. And, to do that, I turn to work in political science, psychology, and sociology.

C. Wright Mills once argued that ordinary men and women lacked a sociological imagination, to their detriment (1959). My aim is to contribute needed knowledge to the discipline of political science with respect to values by exercising my own sociological imagination vigorously. The result is a theory of group influence over values, Social-Emotional Influence Theory, that posits that social identity and emotion together imbue citizens with a sense of commitment to the values that dominate within their respective social groups. Thus, SEI Theory helps us to understand both why citizens rely on values when making political choices as well as how citizens come to embrace the specific values that matter to them.

Definitions

We begin with what we already know about values.[2] What exactly are values, those constructs that appear to be so consequential to politics? Values are normative entities. They describe the world as it should, or ought to, be. They embody what we believe to be good and right, what we believe to be moral. Because they describe our vision of an ideal world, values are sometimes referred to as "ideals."[3] Values are often distinguished from facts. Values differ from facts in that they are ideal states toward which we should strive, whereas facts are observable truths about the world.

Values are abstract, or general; therefore, we can distinguish values from narrower normative judgments. For example, the belief that all citizens have an equal right to health and happiness is a value. On the other hand, the belief that the nation ought to adopt a single-payer health care system that covers all citizens is better thought of as an attitude; it is too specific to be considered a value. Because values are general, any one value will be associated with many specific attitudes or judgments.

Values are multifaceted. They clearly have a cognitive component (i.e., the belief itself); they can be thought of as idealized standards used to evaluate the goodness of people, objects, and situations (Rokeach 1973; Schwartz 1992). Values also have an emotional component (Rokeach 1973). Because people feel emotionally committed to their values, having to choose between two values is upsetting (Tetlock, Peterson, and Lerner 1996) and value violations by others often make us angry (Elster 2007, 153, 356; Herzog 1998, 221). Finally, values also have a behavioral component. Values are

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[2] In offering the definitional aspects of values in this paragraph and the one that follows, I draw on Feldman (2003b), Kinder and Sanders (1996), Rokeach (1973), and Stoker (2001).
[3] Of course, following this logic, one could also define values as reflecting "what we value." While there is truth in this, I am somewhat hesitant to emphasize such a definition because the word "value" has become so closely associated with monetary worth.

idealized goals toward which we strive in our daily lives (Rokeach 1973; Schwartz 1992).

Once they are formed, values are relatively stable; however, values can and do change

throughout our lives.

Technically, values are always good. I use the term "disvalues" (Rescher [1969]

1982) to refer to rejected values, to our visions of what is immoral, bad, wrong. Disvalues

may then be thought of as abstract standards used to judge the terribleness of people,

objects, or situations, or as potential outcomes to avoid. Whether a standard is a value or

a disvalue is subjective; one person or group's value may be another's disvalue.[4]

Some automatically assume that because values are moral, they are religious. This

interpretation of values may be particularly common today given the salience of the

"culture war" debate. But the term "value" is broad, encompassing both religious and

nonreligious values. For example, while many researchers have sought to assess whether

differences in income or moral values matter more to Americans' voting decisions (e.g.,

Bartels 2006; Brewer and Stonecash 2007; Fiorina 2006), values actually have something

to say about both economic and social issues. Citizens' stances on traditional family

values inform where they stand on abortion or gay rights, just as relative commitments to

the value economic equality inform views on tax policy or government aid to the poor.

Values are closely linked to the concept of social norms. I will occasionally refer

to "norms and values" where the discussion warrants. Perhaps the best way to distinguish

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[4] Not all values researchers agree with this idea. In particular, Rokeach (1973) proposed that all values were
held by all people. For this reason, he argued that values are best thought of as *value priorities* and best
measured via a ranking system. Political scientists seem to have implicitly rejected this idea given that they
typically measure values with Likert-type scales that measure the degree to which a person accepts or
rejects the value in question. While many values are widely shared (making value ranking a legitimate type
of value measurement), the fallaciousness of the statement that all values are embraced by all people
becomes clear with just a few examples: Most Americans no longer accept racial segregation, once an
important value among a large subset of Americans; most Americans reject the legitimacy of governing
aristocracies, a type of government accepted in many part of the world; a majority of Americans reject
polygamy, a custom practiced by a minority of Americans as well as by citizens elsewhere.

these two terms is to remember that values are normative beliefs, beliefs about what should or ought to be; in contrast, norms are widespread behaviors that are *supported* by beliefs about what should or ought to be. In this sense, values can be said to be causally prior to norms: In the U.S., most of us avoid explicit racial prejudice because we value social equality; the French follow the norm of wealth redistribution because they believe in economic equality. Norms also tend to be more specific than values. For example, the value "economic individualism" might translate into two norms: hard work and financial independence. This said, some norms cannot be easily paired with a more abstract value belief, such as wearing black at a funeral (in the West) or the appropriate use of eating utensils. Such norms are certainly supported by beliefs about right and wrong, but not by beliefs that we would necessarily refer to as values.[5]

A final difference between social norms and values bears discussion. Social norms are necessarily widely shared within a social group or society. Although values are typically shared in this way, the definition does not require widespread adherence; an individual may hold values that are considered to be disvalues by his or her peers. The term "shared values" is used to refer specifically to values that are widely held. While I emphasize in this dissertation the social forces that contribute to values, this definitional difference between social norms and values reflects the fact that any given individual's values may derive from both social and individual origins.

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[5] It is important to point out that the use of the word "norm" does not always imply a morally sanctioned behavior. For example, some might call driving on the left side of the road a "norm" in England. I prefer the word "convention" to refer to typical behavior without normative implications. Note, however, that it is difficult to think of many conventions that are not in some way endorsed as the "correct" way to behave.

Politically Relevant Values

As a political scientist, I am most interested in studying that set of values that is politically relevant. That is, I am interested in those values that are used by citizens to evaluate political candidates, political institutions, and public policies. In some cases, these values may be a part of the heralded American Creed, e.g., democracy, equality, and individualism. And in other cases—for example, in the case of religiously conservative values—they may rest outside that Creed.

Politically relevant values have become increasingly useful in descriptions of U.S. public opinion in the wake of Converse's findings that most Americans do not rely on sophisticated liberal-conservative political ideologies when making political decisions (1964; Feldman 1988). At the same time, Americans' use of values implies that they are not as unsophisticated as Converse believes them to be; discrete, abstract ideals organize citizens' more numerous and specific political attitudes, serving as important sources of what Converse refers to as "constraint." For the small percentage of citizens who use more sophisticated ideologies, values not only constrain attitudes but also serve as the backstops of more complicated belief systems (Tetlock, Peterson, and Lerner 1996).

Students of political behavior have successfully described a panoply of politically relevant values held by citizens (e.g., Bowers 1995; Feldman 1988; Feldman and Steenbergen 2001; Hochschild 1981; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Markus 2001; McClosky and Zaller 1984; Prothro and Grigg 1960) and, as discussed at the beginning of the chapter, examined the consistently strong impact of values on political decision-making. In addition, political researchers have focused more recently on the nature of value competition—when a person is faced with a political decision to which more than one

value is relevant—and its consequences (Alvarez and Brehm 1995; Brewer 2001; Grant and Rudolph 2003; Jacoby 2006; Kuklinski, Riggle, Ottati, Schwarz, and Wyer, Jr. 1991; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997; Peffley, Knigge, and Hurwitz 2001).

Yet, few researchers have explored why citizens come to embrace the values they do in the first place. Kinder and Sanders (1996) are among the few that wonder aloud where political values come from. They write, "We know remarkably little about this. In the empirical study of political principles, the question of origins seldom comes up, and when it does, it is not taken very seriously" (277).[6] Feldman criticizes scholars' omission more forcefully in his canvass of the empirical values literature:

> To be fully successful, this enterprise requires a clear
> conceptualization of societal values and the ways they are
> shaped and maintained. Unfortunately, this is currently a
> major gap in the literature. Societal values are either taken
> as a given in order to examine their consequences or are
> measured by mean levels of value priorities in (typically)
> small samples. And while researchers have used a variety
> of means to explore crosscultural differences in values,
> they have not really systematically explored how those
> differences emerge (2003b, 498-499).

In other words, in nearly every study to date that focuses on values at the individual level, values are either simply described or, if part of a causal analysis, are the independent, not the dependent, variable. As a result, political scientists have a very limited understanding of how politically relevant values are shaped and maintained.

Why this oversight? Certainly one reason may be the assumption, stemming from studies of "core" or "traditional" American values, such as liberty and democracy, that all

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[6] Kinder and Sanders (1996) do go on to conduct a limited analysis of the origins of political ideals, finding that conventional variables (such as education and income) matter not at all, but that political engagement, changing economic welfare, and sympathies for various interest groups in American society do matter.

Americans hold roughly the same values. If this were true, then studies of value competition, such as those focusing on value framing (e.g., Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997), would be of the greatest interest. The determinants of (supposed) value consensus hold less appeal than the causes of variation in actual value use. However, as just about any study of values at the individual level will reveal (see especially Hochschild 1981; Jacoby 2006; Prothro and Grigg 1960), and as we will see in Chapter 3, it is certainly not the case that Americans all share the same values.

A second problem stems from moving values from one side of the regression equation to the other. To the extent that politically relevant values are rooted in nonpolitical processes, any study of the determinants of values will be equivalently "nonpolitical." But this should not stop us. A great deal of political behavior is rooted in social, not political, processes (Walsh 2004; Zuckerman 2005). To ignore the social roots of political decision-making is to fail to fully understand political decision-making.

A third problem with respect to investigations into the development of values is that the value-formation process is not one we can learn much about via introspection. Introspection is important to research in political behavior in two respects: It may be used by the investigator to help form appropriate research hypotheses, and, of course, in many studies, hypothesis testing depends on the ability of subjects themselves to introspect. Introspection is often not available with respect to value formation because much significant value development occurs when we are children (see Sears and Levy 2003)— a long time ago for both adult subjects of studies and their investigators—and outside of conscious awareness (Bargh and Chartrand 1999; Sumner, [1907] 2002, 76-77).

That these barriers have prevented a better understanding of value formation at the individual level is unfortunate. As I touched on earlier, not only are values key elements of political decision-making, but their existence and import represents a vexing epistemological problem: Values appear not to fit into anything resembling the rational choice framework that has dominated political science in recent decades. If values appear not to fit into our discipline's dominant paradigm, then either we are wrong about values or we are wrong about the paradigm.

In recent years, many political scientists have assumed that we were wrong about values, ignoring them in models of political decision-making because they were assumed to play a limited role in politics or even to be complete fictions, Machiavellian cloaks for self-interest (see Stoker 1992 for a discussion of this phenomenon). Some who have paid close attention to values (and/or to the related construct, norms) have proclaimed that they *are* real and important, but that they are ultimately rooted in self-interest (e.g., Chong 2000; Hardin 1995). On the other hand, if my description of values thus far is roughly correct, and they indeed rest outside the rational choice paradigm, then we have two questions to answer: Not only "why, and how, do citizens come to embrace the values they do?" but also, "why, and how, do citizens come to embrace values at all?"

Previous Studies of Value Development

A handful of scholars of politics have given a great deal of attention to the issue of value development at the individual level. Perhaps the most extensive recent study of this kind in political science is Chong's *Rational Lives* (2000). Chong treats norms and values akin to rational choices. He argues that citizens accept the norms and values of their social

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groups because they expect rewards to flow from their conformity. I echo Elster's argument that, while interests can certainly inform norms and values, norms and values are not reducible to individual interests (1989b). Economic liberals can be found in the Bronx as well as in Beverly Hills. Often self-interest is nowhere evident, as in the case of pro-life activists or those living a vegan lifestyle.

In response to such points, Chong leans heavily on the benefits of a good reputation and group coordination around norms and values; however, people often act in accord with their values in the absence of interaction with, or surveillance by, the group (e.g., at home alone; while traveling abroad). In addition, rational choice explanations for norms and values that emphasize the benefits of a good reputation rely on a problematic assumption: that self-interested group members will invest energy in enforcing conformity to norms and values, overcoming the temptation to free-ride (Elster 1989a). A better explanation for norm and value enforcement, one that does not accord well with a rational choice perspective, stems from the emotional aspect of values. People are motivated to sanction value violators because violations, even those that do not affect them personally, make them angry (Elster 2007). Chong also argues that shared norms and values arise because individuals use peers as role models, imitating behavior that they assume to be helpful. That this behavior occurs is likely, but it does not really help us to understand values. As Tetlock and colleagues argue, people understand values not just as helpful, but as *right*, and not just as right for themselves or their group, but as right for *everyone* (Tetlock 2000; Tetlock, Peterson, and Lerner 1996).

More recently, some researchers have taken a new tack on value development, arguing that political ideologies are embedded in the human genome. In so doing, these

researchers have moved beyond individual-level, self-interest explanations for values to self-interest explanations at the genetic level (see Dawkins 1976). In the most prominent of these studies to date, Alford, Funk, and Hibbing (2005) argue that genes influence people's personality traits, traits which underlie commitment to political conservatism or liberalism. Employing quantitative behavioral genetic techniques—more specifically, a classic "twin study" design—the authors find that approximately 50% of the variance in conservatism in their sample is due to genetic variation.

The most important problem with this approach at the present time is methodological. Because of a problematic assumption underlying the method, the vast majority of twin studies cannot be counted on to accurately assess the extent to which genetic variability contributes to trait variability (Suhay, Kalmoe, and McDermott 2007).

Furthermore, empirical examples offer suggestive evidence that Alford, Funk, and Hibbing overstate the contribution of genetics to value differences. First, it is common for values to diverge in the face of likely genetic similarity. In the U.S., compare the economic views of working class, white union members to working class, white non-union members. Or compare the conservative social values of the Dutch in western Michigan to the liberal ones of the Dutch living in the Netherlands. Over-time comparisons can yield even more striking comparisons. Compare the level of racism in Germany during World War II to that found in Germany today. Or compare the environmental views of Americans today to those of just ten or twenty years ago. Second, it is common for values to converge in the face of genetic diversity. Adoption studies which examine trans-racial and trans-national adoptions offer perhaps the best evidence of this. The consistency with which such children fully adopt the norms and values of

their new culture strongly argues against any significant genetic determinism of cultural values (Richerson and Boyd 2005).

This said, humans are, of course, biological beings; therefore, genes must play some role—direct or indirect—in shaping values. Given the overwhelming genetic similarity of humans, it stands to reason that genes play a greater role in creating value similarities than differences. Where value differences exist, it is my belief that environmental causes (physical and social) overwhelm genetic ones. However, studies like Alford, Funk, and Hibbing's cannot test these presumptions. In addition to the methodological problems involved, such studies pay attention only to causes of trait difference, not similarity. They also cannot comment on the mechanisms by which genes affect traits like values. For the moment at least, I leave such arguments to the side.

Values: More Social, More Emotional

As I will argue in more detail in the next chapter, more promising studies of value formation focus on socialization by group members. Why focus immediately on group socialization? One reason for beginning with the social group is that politically relevant values and group membership co-vary. A second reason is the plethora of evidence that suggests that groups do in fact influence their members' political views.

The main problem with socialization studies, however, is that they have paid relatively little attention to the psychological mechanisms of value transfer from the group to the individual, leaving it unclear *why* individuals are motivated to take on the values of their groups, especially when those values conflict with self-interest.

In order to explain value socialization, I focus on two psychological attributes of the individual: subjective identification and emotion. I argue, first, that successful socialization depends on the individual's psychological identification with the group and, second, that identification matters in large part because we care about what our peers think of us. To clarify this latter point: I argue that social group members are able to influence one another's values in large part because of the power of emotions of self-assessment (pride, embarrassment, and shame). People feel pride when they are approved of by their peers, and embarrassment or shame when they are derogated by peers. Together, these emotions motivate value conformity.[7] I refer to the summation of these hypotheses as Social-Emotional Influence Theory. Thinking about American politics, social-emotional influence ought to occur within our national "group" as well as within diverse sub-national identity groups (family, neighborhood, class, race, religion, etc.).

In the first empirical chapter of the dissertation, Chapter Three, I seek to answer two questions with data from a recent Pew Research Center survey on Americans' values. First, a necessary empirical assumption underlying the Social-Emotional Influence model is that values and social groups overlap. Can we verify that politically relevant values vary according to social identity group in the U.S.? I assess whether *between*-group variation in value commitment is greater than *within*-group variation. The data show that

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[7] Note that I use pride and shame in a subtly different way than previous scholars of politics. The limited extant scholarship that focuses on these emotions in conjunction with identity has considered these emotions to be feelings we have *toward* our peer group, or, as in social identity theory, feelings we have about our own individual identity that stem from the status of our social group (Tajfel and Turner [1986] 2004). For example, we might consider "black pride" or "gay pride," or the shame that members of both of these groups have had to fight over the years because of group-based prejudice. But the older usage (pride and shame stemming from the status of one's group) and my, newer, usage (pride and shame stemming from one's own status *within* one's group) are not incompatible. In both cases, pride and shame are *intra*-group emotions related to individual status. In the prior formulation, one is focused on whether peers in a larger community (e.g., the United States) judge one positively or negatively based on the status of a narrower group identity (e.g., race, gender, sexual orientation). In the formulation discussed in this dissertation, one is focused on whether one's peers in a particular community (e.g., the United States or one's racial group) judge one positively or negatively based on whether one shares the group's values.

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Americans differ according to age cohort, class, gender, race / ethnicity, and religion with respect to a wide variety of politically relevant values. Next, I ask, can we attribute these differences to social conformity within groups? Controlling for overlapping social identities as well as income and education, I find that more than half of the group value differences persist. These persistent differences suggest that social processes within identity groups play a role in creating value differences among citizens.

Chapter Four is the first of three chapters to test key hypotheses that flow from Social-Emotional Influence Theory with experimental data. Data are drawn from an experimental test of influence over socially conservative values among Catholics living in the Midwest. The main goal of the study is to demonstrate that group influence over values depends on identification with the group. A secondary goal is to begin to explore the emotional mechanisms of SEI Theory. The data suggest that those with strong Catholic identities are influenced by their peers when they perceive that peers hold progressive views on traditional family values and *also* that such individuals actively seek to distinguish their values from those of out-group members. The data also suggest that these relationships are mediated by self-conscious emotions. Finally, in a test of the political import of traditional family values, participants' relative stands on these values were found to be closely associated with political opinions linked to electoral behavior.

Chapter Five, which examines social-emotional influence among college students with regard to the value economic individualism, focuses on the emotional mechanisms of SEI Theory. The main goal of the experiment is to test whether self-conscious emotions mediate group influence over economic individualism. A second goal is to confirm the import of subjective identification in such influence. Overall, the evidence

supports the dissertation's central emotion hypothesis. Participants were influenced by their peers' views on average only if a self-conscious emotion (pride or embarrassment) was aroused. Furthermore, this interactive relationship between emotions and group influence occurred only among students who closely identified with peers. This said, such students also resisted influence when no emotions were made salient, a finding that complicates our understanding of the role of identity somewhat.

In Chapter Six, I test the Social-Emotional Influence model with data from an Internet survey-experiment conducted with a representative sample of 300 Americans. Social-emotional influence is examined with respect to the value economic equality. Building on the results presented in Chapter Five, the study tests the emotional mechanisms of the model more carefully and explores whether social-emotional influence works differently among different age groups. The data offer mixed support for the SEI model. Younger adults' opinions (35 and under) unexpectedly shifted away from peers' views, as represented in letters to the editor, except for when a sense of shame was aroused. On the other hand, older Americans were persuaded by the letters, as expected, but persuasion did not increase as hypothesized when pride or shame was aroused. Finally, commitment to economic equality was found to be highly politically relevant; participants' views on this value were closely associated with their approval of President Bush and vote intentions with respect to the 2008 presidential election.

In addition to summarizing the dissertation's argument and findings, the concluding chapter discusses avenues of inquiry beyond the present one that would enrich our understanding of the Social-Emotional Influence model and related topics and also touches on some of the normative implications of the SEI model.

Chapter 2

Group Influence and American Ideals: How Social Identity
and Emotion Shape Our Political Values and Attitudes

It never troubles [man] that mere accident has decided which of these numerous worlds is the object of his reliance, and that the same causes which make him a churchman in London would have made him a Buddhist or a Confucian in Peking.[8]

For some time, political scientists have faced a fundamental puzzle: Why do values matter to citizens when they so often conflict with self-interest? To understand why values matter to citizens, I argue that we have to better understand the process of value formation and change at the individual level. And, to do that, we need to pay more attention to social identity[9] and emotion.

In this chapter, I put forward a unique social-psychological theory that aims to explain how values form at the individual level and, ultimately, why they matter to citizens. First, I place value formation firmly within the social group; individuals who subjectively identify with a social group will tend to take on the values of that group. In other words, group socialization depends for its success on individuals' psychological identification with the group. Second, I argue that, within the context of American

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[8] From J.S. Mill's *On Liberty* ([1859] 1980). Page 78.
[9] "Social identity" refers to the social group or groups to which the individual feels a sense of belonging and which the individual has incorporated into his or her personal identity. Throughout the dissertation, the terms "reference group," "identity group," and "in-group"—as well as the more colloquial word "peers"—are used interchangeably. Fiske (2004) defines a group at its most basic as two or more interacting individuals who are perceived, by the individuals themselves, as well as by others, as belonging together. Such a group has "entitativity;" it is seen as a coherent whole. Entitativity rests on three factors: similarity between individuals, a sense of common fate or interdependence, and, sometimes, proximity (460-461).

politics, citizens' identifications with the nation as well as with a wide range of sub-national groups (e.g., family, school peers, women, black Americans, Evangelicals) affect their values. Third, I argue that the role group identification plays in value formation stems, in part, from a specific set of emotions called "self-conscious emotions." In short, the emotions pride and shame, which result from positive and negative judgments of peers, push group members in the direction of value conformity. Further, these emotions become associated with group values (and disvalues) in the individual's mind, explaining why some values become internalized as good and why others are rejected.

Values and Groups Intertwined

Researchers have known for some time now that values and social groups overlap. In his survey of the empirical values literature, Feldman writes that there appear to be "mean differences in value priorities across people living in different societies" (2003b, 480). Inglehart, taking value differences among nations and regions as his starting point, builds a systematic theory to explain the covariation (1971; Inglehart and Baker 2000). Inter-group value variation exists not only at the national level. Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960, ch. 12) attribute patterns of voting behavior among social groups in the U.S. in part to unique group norms. And Putnam attributes political differences between the north and south of Italy to differing regional civic cultures (1994). In fact, the covariance of social groups and values is so strong and consistent that the term "culture," part and parcel of group life, includes values as a key component (Kluckhohn 1951).

Why does this correlation exist between values and social groups? One explanation for the fact that values tend to cluster together is that people who share

similar circumstances will be attracted to similar values. In his seminal paper, "The Silent Revolution in Europe" (1971), Inglehart borrows from Maslow to argue that only after physiological and safety needs are met will individuals value behaviors less essential to survival, such as self-expression and political participation. Thus, varying levels of economic development across societies will result in value differences as well. In later work, Inglehart focuses on the impact of other factors on values, such as the nature of service-oriented work in post-industrial economies (Inglehart and Baker 2000).

However, Inglehart's modernization theory only describes part of the value development story. Among societies in similar socio-economic circumstances, World Values Survey data reveal both convergence (as modernization theory predicts) and *divergence* (contrary to modernization theory). Inglehart and Baker attribute significant divergence, when it occurs, to the path-dependent nature of value traditions; in other words, to the persistence of unique national and regional cultures (2000).

An alternative account to modernization theory—an account which helps to explain value divergence among countries in similar socio-economic circumstances—attributes the value-group link to socialization within groups. Scholars in this tradition suggest that political values and attitudes[10] are significantly shaped by the family in childhood and adolescence (Bandura 1977; Bengtson, Biblarz, and Roberts 2002; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2007; Sears 1993). For example, Berelson et al. (1954, 93) write:

> Just as young people learn from their elders, say, the
> religion and table manners appropriate to their situation, so

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[10] I expand our inquiry to include studies of political attitudes, given that attitudes and values tend to be closely linked.

> do they learn the appropriate political beliefs….As he
> comes to voting age, the young voter's political
> consciousness is no *tabula rasa* on which various interests
> can contend; it is pre-shaped in particular political
> directions, as it is in other ways.

In other words, just as with religious beliefs or etiquette, children are taught which political values and attitudes they ought to hold, and they embrace them at an early age.

Reference groups beyond the family, and later in life, have an important role to play in socialization as well (Almond and Verba 1965; Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb 1991; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Newcomb 1963). Theodore Newcomb, analyzing longitudinal data, discovered that the female students at liberal Bennington College shifted their political views markedly in the liberal direction over the course of their four years there (1963).[11] Following up with the women many years later, Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb (1991) found that their political views continued to be affected by their years at Bennington as well as by new social affiliations, including friendship groups and husbands. In *The American Voter*, Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes provide compelling evidence of the social influence of unions and racial and religious groups over political attitudes (1960, ch. 12).

Moving beyond the classic reference group studies cited above, more recent studies of social influence have determined that husbands and wives influence one another's political views (Stoker and Jennings 2005), as do conversation partners more generally (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004; Mutz 2006; Parker, Parker, and McCann 2008; Walsh 2004). Studies show that with whom

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[11] This shift could not be attributed to the general "liberalizing" effects of a college education—the Bennington students shifted much more than students at less liberal but otherwise similar colleges nearby—or to attrition.

citizens talk (Mutz 2006) and cohabitate (Nickerson 2008) affects their levels of political

participation as well. Finally, influence need not always take place in person; it also takes

place at a distance, as when we read what "the majority" thinks in an opinion poll (Mutz

1998) or base our judgment of a candidate's debate performance on the enthusiasm of the

audience's reaction to him or her (Fein, Goethals, and Kugler 2007). While it is a

common mistake to underestimate the influence social factors have over behavior (Fiske

2004), scholars are increasingly recognizing the power our peers have to shape our

political views.

The Role of Identity in Influence Over Values

There is debate, however, over why people successfully influence one another. Most

scholars investigating the psychological mechanisms of peer influence have drawn their

explanations from more traditional ways of thinking about decision-making. That is,

either persuasive logic or new information relevant to a person's existing goals must be

supplied for influence to occur. Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) describe a "two-step

information flow" whereby opinion leaders share valuable information gleaned from the

media with peers. Petty and Cacioppo (1986) and other persuasion researchers (see

O'Keefe 1990) focus on the effectiveness of strong arguments in persuasion, along with

factors that can improve the persuasiveness of otherwise weak arguments. In an original

twist on these more cognitive theories of persuasion, Mutz (1998) argues that individuals

are persuaded by the majority's point of view (e.g., represented in a published opinion

poll) because, in trying to understand why the majority holds the view it does, they conjure up supportive arguments for that view and persuade themselves in the process.[12]

There is a problem applying this paradigm to values, however. The problem is that most people do not make very good arguments for, or against, values. Indeed, often people cannot offer *any* good reasons for their values whatsoever (Tetlock 2000; Tetlock, Peterson, and Lerner 1996). Writes Tetlock:

> When we press people to justify their policy preferences, all inquiry ultimately terminates in values that people find it ridiculous to justify any further. Antiabortion partisans consider "because life is sacred" a self-explanatory justification for their position just as pro-choice partisans consider "women's liberty" to be a self-justifying justification for their position (2000, 247).

Similarly, Sumner writes: "[F]or the people of a time and place, their own mores[13] are always good….The reason is because the standards of good and right are in the mores" ([1907] 2002, 58). In sum, because values are typically understood to be good in and of themselves, making reasoned arguments in support of them can be quite difficult. And, if arguments are rarely made in defense of values, it stands to reason that arguments are not important components of the persuasion process with respect to values.

Fortunately, there is experimental evidence from the field of psychology that strongly suggests that not all interpersonal influence fits within the traditional reasoning

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[12] Some scholars emphasize other mechanisms of value or attitude transfer from person to person, such as exposure to and comprehension of others' values (McClosky and Zaller 1984) or the salience and consistency of attitudes (Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2007). I agree with these scholars that these factors matter and, in some cases (i.e., exposure and comprehension), are necessary to influence. That said, these explanations for socialization do little to explain why individuals are motivated to take on the values of their peer groups. Even if I correctly perceive a salient and consistent group value, we would not expect me to mindlessly incorporate it as my own view based on these minimal criteria. What additional factor, or factors, might persuade me to internalize it as my own?

[13] The term "mores" is roughly synonymous with the term "social norms."

framework. Influence can occur even when no logic or new information is shared. Sherif ([1936] 1966) demonstrated with his "auto-kinetic effect" studies (in which a stable point of light appears to move, when in fact the movement is an optical illusion) that a group of previously unacquainted individuals will converge on an estimate of the light's supposed movement; furthermore, individuals will hold to these group estimates even when participating a second time apart from the group. In a more conservative test of the power of group influence, Asch (1951) asked groups of students to judge which line in a pair was longer; various pairs were presented, and the correct choice was always obvious. Unbeknownst to his subjects, Asch placed each real subject with a group of confederates who purposefully made errors.[14] The real subjects were persuaded by the confederates' errors about one-third of the time.

Some researchers have argued that the influence observed by Sherif and Asch is not real, that "normative influence" or "surface compliance" in order to ingratiate oneself with the group was at work (e.g., see Deutsch and Gerard [1955] 1965). But surface compliance does not explain why the auto-kinetic effect persisted when subjects participated alone or why Asch's findings replicate when subjects' judgments remain private (Deutsch and Gerard [1955] 1965; Turner 1991).

So why the influence? Additional studies suggest that one reason for such influence is participants' psychological identification with the group. Identification reflects a sense of closeness or "we feeling" with one's group (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960). While all social group members typically identify to some degree with the group of which they are a part, group members also vary in their degree

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[14] Asch conducted many variations of this experiment. In one variation, one confederate would "defect" from the others and side with the participant in giving correct answers; this variation reduced the participant's tendency to conform.

of identification. Thus, the expectation is that, while nearly all group members will be subject to influence, high identifiers will be more subject than others. As Campbell et al. write, "whenever a group holds distinctive beliefs about some issue, then within the group a differentiation appears between members according to the strength of their group identification" (1960, 308).

Experimental studies of influence that experimentally manipulate group identification provide the most convincing evidence for the role of identity in social influence. Such studies show that greater attraction to, or psychological identification with, the group leaves the subject more open to influence, including influence over social and political attitudes (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, and Turner 1990; Back 1951; Clark and Maass 1998; Kelley 1955; Wood, Pool, Leck, and Purvis 1996). This line of experimental work has carefully isolated identification as a cause of increased conformity. In other words, the effects are not confounded with competing causal hypotheses, such as the fact that people feel a stronger sense of identification with groups with whom they already share values and attitudes.

Admittedly, the similarity in values of social group members is a two-way street: People identify more with those who are similar, and they become more similar to those with whom they identify. It is because of this endogeneity that I focus here, and in the empirical chapters, on experimentation, which allows one to isolate causation. In addition, in the empirical chapters, I focus on those groups that are not likely to be formed around pre-existing political ideologies (such as friendship groups or political parties), although certainly they too can exert influence (e.g., see Layman and Carsey 1998). As Campbell et al. argue, "[I]n most groups formed along occupational, ethnic, or

religious lines membership is more likely to determine attitudes than are attitudes to determine membership" (1960, 323). We can extend this claim to many primary groups, such as family and neighborhood, as well as to one's nation. Whenever one interacts with individuals within a group for reasons other than value similarity—for example, due to geographic proximity or a specific cooperative goal—group identification (should it occur) will causally precede value similarity at the individual level.

Before we move on, let us examine the causal link between value similarity and group identity from another angle. In some cases, a person with significant value differences with his or her group will resist group influence. This is likely to occur when a particular value or attitude is very strongly held and is in sharp contrast to a dominant group value.[15] (The value disjuncture may exist due to identification with a second group with competing values or for more personal reasons.) Because identification in part relies on value similarity, such an individual is likely to eventually identify less with the peer group—or perhaps even completely disassociate him or herself from the group—as a result of the perceived value dissimilarity.

So far we have focused on influence by groups with which one subjectively identifies. What about those groups with which one does not identify? Can we make any predictions about individuals' interactions with out-groups? Interestingly, when individuals are exposed to the point of view of out-group members, they tend to shift their own views away from those of the out-group and in the direction of pre-existing in-group norms (Turner 1987; 1991). Note that, because identity is in part based on value similarity, some out-groups will be ideological out-groups, i.e., groups that are defined as

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[15] A dominant group value typically is one that is held by the majority of group members; however, sometimes a value held by a powerful, highly visible, and/or comparably vocal minority may be perceived to be a dominant group value.

out-groups because their views are diametrically opposed to one's own. Polarization due to an active lack of identification with a group is, in effect, the opposite of group-based influence, although the outcome is the same: greater similarity with the in-group.

Identity clearly plays an important role in group influence and also group polarization. But why should psychological identification on its own drive these phenomena? Identification as an explanation for influence may at first seem appealing but, upon second glance, is lacking a causal mechanism. What is it about a "we feeling" (or a "them feeling") exactly that opens a person up to group influence over his or her values, those consequential moral standards that so often shape political choices?

Self-categorization theory (Turner 1987; 1991), a close cousin of social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner [1986] 2004), takes up these questions. Synthesizing a vast and unruly literature on social influence in psychology, and drawing on Festinger (1950) in particular, Turner (1991) argues that peers provide the individual with helpful "social reality tests"[16] when they indicate whether or not they agree with his or her point of view. In other words, people are continually "bouncing ideas off" of one another; the feedback individuals receive constitutes evidence as to whether an idea is right or wrong.

Only those with whom one identifies, however, can provide such tests. Turner writes:

> In so far as we categorize ourselves as similar to others in the same situation (in relevant respects), it is natural and logical to think that we should tend to respond in the same way. In so far as we do, we should experience *subjective validity* [italics added]. The perceived, expected or believed

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[16] Social reality tests stand in contrast to "physical reality tests." With the latter, the individual separates fact from fiction through direct engagement with the physical environmental (e.g., hitting a piece of glass with a hammer to see whether it is breakable).

agreement of similar others in the same situation implies
that our behaviour is a function of the objective world
(1991, 161).

Likewise, in so far as we categorize ourselves as *dissimilar* from others, it is natural and

logical to think that we should act differently.

Applying these ideas to social influence over values within the context of U.S.

politics, we should expect value conformity in identity groups of all shapes and sizes: in

primary,[17] or face-to-face, groups such as families, churches, schools, and workplaces; in

larger secondary, or national, groups such as religious, racial, gender, and regional

groups; and, finally, in the nation as a whole. Further, to the extent that citizens identify

more or less with each of these groups, the conforming or polarizing influence of the

groups upon citizens' values should vary accordingly.

Explaining the Role of Identification with Emotion

Turner's synthesis of an enormous number of social influence studies into one coherent

theory offers a major step forward in our understanding of social influence. That said, I

argue that Turner's ambitious theory does not quite do what it sets out to do—provide a

comprehensive explanation for both group conformity and polarization. His very

cognitive theory leaves out an important player: emotion.[18]

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[17] I borrow the language of "primary" and "secondary" groups from Campbell et al. (1960, pp 296-297).
[18] Some might wonder whether Festinger's famous theory of "cognitive dissonance" (1957) provides an alternative "purely" cognitive account of value conformity similar to Turner's. It does not. Festinger's theory integrates cognition and emotion, hypothesizing that conflicting cognitions create emotional discomfort which motivates a dissonance reduction strategy, such as attitude change. Recent work has demonstrated that "dissonance" appears to be, as Festinger hypothesized, emotional discomfort (Elliot and Devine 1994). Among the situations that create dissonance is encountering disagreeing others (Matz and Wood 2005). Described in this way, the theory resembles the cognitive-emotional theory I offer below.

How do we know that leaving out emotion constitutes an important oversight? First, there is the question of selective motivation. People are different from their peers in literally millions of ways. What motivates a person to conform with respect to a particular behavior or attitude but *not* thousands of others? Incorporating emotion into a theory of social influence can help to better account for *which* discrepancies individuals see as problematic and therefore seek to remedy (Barrett 1995, 47). Second, we know that encounters with agreeing or disagreeing peers are thick with emotion; opinion disagreements are particularly uncomfortable for all involved (e.g., Asch 1951; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960, 150; Noelle-Neuman 1993). Third, as discussed in the last chapter, values have an important emotional component, as do attitudes more generally (Fiske 2004). Bringing emotion into our social influence model is one way to account for how an emotion becomes associated with a value or attitude.

More generally, recent research on emotions suggests that they have an important role to play in shaping political attitudes and behaviors. For example, fear and anxiety motivate individuals to abandon routine and pay close attention to an approaching threat (LeDoux 1996). Along these lines, recent political studies have found that anxious partisans rely less on their long-held partisan identifications (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000) and that citizens are more influenced by anxiety-provoking political ads (Brader 2006). Although emotions sometimes get in the way of decision-making, work by neuroscientists Damasio (1994) and LeDoux (1996) make clear that emotions are crucial to smart choices; we would not survive for long without them.

Which emotions deserve our attention as we think about social influence over citizens' political values? Empirically oriented political scientists have focused on the

role of three primary emotions in political decision-making: anxiety/fear, anger, and enthusiasm (e.g., Brader 2006; Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007; Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000; Valentino, Hutchings, Gregorowicz, Groenendyk, and Brader 2006; Valentino, Hutchings, Banks, and Davis 2008).[19] On the other hand, works by political philosophers address a broader range of emotions, including the "social emotions" (admiration, contempt, sympathy/empathy, and envy) and the "self-conscious emotions" (pride, embarrassment, shame, and guilt) (Burke [1790] 1953; Elias [1989] 1996; Elster 1999; Gibbard 1990; Herzog 1998; Hobbes [1651] 1994; Hume [1739/1740] 2000; Miller 1993, 1997; Rousseau [1762] 1988; Saxonhouse 2005; Smith [1759] 1982; Nussbaum 2001, 2004).[20]

The failure of political scientists to investigate the role of social and self-conscious emotions, especially given the obvious social and moral nature of politics, is unfortunate. But that is not why we cast our gaze in this direction. Rather, scholars interested in social influence have singled out these emotions—particularly the self-conscious emotions embarrassment and shame—as key players in social conformity (e.g., Asch 1951; Elster 1989a, 1989b, 1999, 2007; Goffman 1959; Milgram 1992; Noelle-Neuman 1993). Turning to the psychological literature on emotions, we find that scholars here also focus on the self-conscious emotions—especially embarrassment, shame, and pride—as motivators of conforming behavior and achievement (Lazarus 1991; Lewis

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[19] Psychologists Lerner and Small and colleagues have cast a wider net, examining the economic and political effects of the emotions sadness, disgust, and sympathy, as well as anger and fear (e.g., Fischhoff, Gonzalez, Lerner, and Small 2005; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, and Fischhoff 2003; Lerner, Small, and Loewenstein 2004; Small, Lerner, and Fischhoff 2006; Small, Loewenstein, and Slovic 2007).
[20] Some of these emotions are also referred to as "moral emotions," e.g., shame, guilt, and empathy (Tangney and Fischer 1995).

2000). Self-conscious emotions involve "elaborate cognitive processes that have, at their

heart, the notion of self" (Lewis 2000, 623).

Embarrassment and shame are similar negative emotions that differ mainly in

terms of their intensity level (Lazarus 1991).[21] According to Lazarus:

> Shame is generated by a *failure to live up to an ego-ideal*
> [i.e., the ideal self]. We feel disgraced or humiliated,
> especially in the eyes of a parent or parent-
> substitute….[A]nother person whose approbation is
> important to us views and presumably is critical of our
> failure (241).

In other words, we feel embarrassment or shame when we perceive that important others

have judged us harshly because we have not lived up to some ideal standard (see also

Lewis 2000; Mascolo and Fischer 1995).

On the other hand, pride "is enhancement of one's ego-identity [i.e., the self] by

taking credit for a valued object or achievement, either our own or that of someone or

group with whom we identify" (Lazarus 1991, 271).[22] The opposite of embarrassment

and shame, pride involves feeling good about ourselves because, in the eyes of important

others, we have achieved something valuable or measured up to an ideal standard (see

also Lewis 2000; Mascolo and Fischer 1995).

While these emotions stem from the perceived evaluations of oneself by

important others, the important person or people need not be actually observing us—or

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[21] Some would disagree with this characterization, arguing that differences other than intensity level may
separate these two emotions; however, one can interpret other apparent differences between the two
emotions within the "intensity" framework. For example, embarrassment is often felt in response to
missteps vis-à-vis relatively trivial social norms (e.g., wearing the wrong thing to a party), whereas shame
is often felt in response to missteps with respect to deeply ingrained norms (e.g., incest).
[22] Italics in original have been removed.

even be alive—to cause pride or shame. "It is only necessary that we imagine how [they] would react to what we have done or not done" (Lazarus 1991, 241).

That an important relationship exists between these self-conscious emotions and societal values may already be apparent. It is impossible to define self-conscious emotions without mentioning their relationship to the attitudes, behaviors, and other characteristics which we ourselves and our peers believe make people worthy of respect. Lewis (2000) defines embarrassment, shame, pride, and hubris with reference to societal "standards, rules, and goals" (i.e., values, norms, etc.). Embarrassment or shame results when we fail to meet a standard, rule, or goal, and pride or hubris when we do meet one.

Scheff (1988), drawing on work by Cooley ([1922] 2006), argues even more forcefully that these emotions motivate conformity to societal expectations: "Pride and shame make up a subtle and pervasive system of social sanctions. This system leads to experiencing social influence as compelling" (396). While the judgments of our peers are key, again, they need only be imagined to provoke pride or shame. "The deference-emotion system functions virtually continuously, even when we are alone, since we can imagine and anticipate its motion in vivid detail" (396).[23]

While the literature on self-conscious emotions advances us considerably in our understanding of group influence over values, it cannot do it alone. I argue that it can only do so in concert with Turner's self-categorization theory. First, emotions scholars focus on the role of "important others," or society in general, in generating pride, embarrassment, and shame. In so doing, these scholars stop short of addressing the importance of social groupings in generating these emotions. If we substitute the term

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[23] For this reason, I find it inappropriate to draw lines between influence that occurs "in person" and influence that occurs at a remove (e.g., a person reading an opinion column in the newspaper), as Mutz (1998) suggests we do. That said, certainly in-person influence will tend to be more intense.

"in-group" for "important others," then this line of research becomes much more relevant to group influence. Second, emotions scholars argue that pride, embarrassment, and shame motivate *behavioral* conformity to peers' expectations; however, *ideological* conformity is overlooked. I propose that the experiences of pride and shame provide a sense of "subjective validity" and "subjective invalidity" along the lines Turner describes, making these emotions relevant to conformity of value belief. Third, and finally, emotions scholars have little to say about the role of self-conscious emotions in attitude polarization with respect to out-groups. I take up this topic at the end of the chapter.

Social-Emotional Influence Theory

Putting the pieces together, I introduce a model of influence over political values called "social-emotional influence." The SEI model helps to explain why groups are so instrumental in shaping our values as well as why we often feel so passionately about values that seem to have little to do with our self-interest.

I argue that value socialization is highly dependent on psychological identification with the group. One key reason for the importance of identification in socialization is self-conscious emotion. Individuals feel pride when they receive positive feedback from peers, and embarrassment or shame when they are derogated by peers. When the individual perceives that such feedback (and the accompanying emotion) stems from value conformity or deviation, the relevant value is colored by that emotional experience, and value commitment strengthens or weakens accordingly.

In other words, when pride becomes associated with a value, it makes that value feel "good" or "right," i.e., subjectively valid. And when shame becomes associated with

a value, the value becomes a *dis*value, feeling "bad" or "wrong," i.e., subjectively invalid. In this way, values come to be both internalized and emotion laden. Note that both pride and shame tend to push the individual in the direction of conformity with the group, with pride strengthening or reinforcing group values, and shame stigmatizing group disvalues. Below, in Figure 2.1, I clarify the theoretical framework being introduced with a simplified depiction of the model's two causal paths.

Figure 2.1: Two Paths of Social-Emotional Influence

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┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│              ┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐              │
│              │      Exposure to group value or opinion   │              │
│              └──────────────────────────────────────────┘              │
│                       ⇩                    ⇩                           │
│   ┌────────────────────────────┐   ┌────────────────────────────┐     │
│   │ Person A perceives positive │   │ Person B perceives negative │     │
│   │ judgments because his/her   │   │ judgments because his/her   │     │
│   │ values are in line with group│   │ values are out of line with group│  │
│   └────────────────────────────┘   └────────────────────────────┘     │
│              ⇩                               ⇩                          │
│   ┌────────────────────────────┐   ┌────────────────────────────┐     │
│   │           Pride            │   │    Embarrassment or shame   │     │
│   └────────────────────────────┘   └────────────────────────────┘     │
│              ⇩                               ⇩                          │
│   ┌────────────────────────────┐   ┌────────────────────────────┐     │
│   │    Subjective validity:    │   │   Subjective *in*validity:  │     │
│   │      value is right        │   │      disvalue is wrong      │     │
│   └────────────────────────────┘   └────────────────────────────┘     │
│              ⇩                               ⇩                          │
│   ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐    │
│   │  Person A *and* B move in direction of value conformity       │    │
│   └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘    │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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
Finally, while Social-Emotional Influence Theory focuses on in-group socialization, it can be logically extended to explain group polarization as well. Recall that individuals tend to shift their attitudes away from those of out-group members. I

argue that this occurs because association with a derogated out-group, whether through personal interaction or the adoption of its values, is a source of shame within in-groups; the lack of association a source of pride. Thus, we would expect that when a person learns of a derogated out-group's values, pride (in his or her differentiated values) and embarrassment or shame (if his or her values resemble those of the out-group) should generate conformity to the in-group's values in a manner similar to that discussed above.

There are many indications that social-emotional influence is at work in the social and political world. Consider Michael Moore's 2007 film *Sicko*. Moore shares images and stories of sick infants, homeless people, and 9/11 heroes who have been abandoned by the U.S. healthcare system. Moore's film seems intended to make the viewer feel shame over the nation's care for its sick with the hope that such emotion will motivate opinion change. Or consider that the National Organization for Women, with the hope of decreasing sexism in the media, recently began a "Media Hall of Shame" to embarrass media who covered Hillary Clinton's Presidential bid in a sexist manner. Finally, consider that, for decades, pro-life activists have attempted to shame and humiliate women entering abortion clinics with the intent of discouraging women from seeking abortions. Certainly such pressure reduces the number of abortions sought; many of the women who do use such clinics will do their best to slip in unseen, heads bowed.

Not all social-emotional influence is so emotionally uncomfortable, of course. Consider the fact that polling places distribute "I voted" stickers on election day to encourage voting. Presumably, wearing the sticker reinforces the act of voting by making the voter feel even prouder for having fulfilled his or her civic duty; for nonvoters, *not* having a sticker to wear can lead to embarrassment, particularly if one is surrounded by

more civic minded colleagues or neighbors. Or consider why medals awarded to soldiers encourage service and bravery. The medals bring an emotional reward for sacrifice; soldiers who wear them are admired, and feel proud as a result. Or consider that, as environmental attitudes have become increasingly progressive, a "green" lifestyle is suddenly idealized; driving a tiny hybrid is cool (after years of SUVs being status symbols) and using plastic shopping bags is a sin in some cities.

Finally, a long list of social norms is enforced largely by the mechanisms described: We do our best to avoid walking out of restrooms with our fly undone or toilet paper trailing from one of our shoes. Most of the men among us avoid wearing skirts to the office. We generally eat with utensils and chew with our mouths closed.

Of course, the SEI model depends on the assumption that peers *do* regularly judge others favorably when they act in line with dominant group values and unfavorably when they do not.[24] In other words, we expect that group members are—consciously or not—active socialization agents. Both the academic literature (e.g., Elster 1989a, 1989b, 2007; Fredrickson 1998; Walsh 2004) and daily experience argue that this is the case.

Consider the uproar that ensues in the U.S. when a prominent person, such as former Senatorial candidate George Allen or actor Mel Gibson, is caught using prejudiced language. (Or even when a prominent person, such as former President Bill Clinton on the campaign trail for Hillary Clinton in 2008, is suspected of making veiled prejudiced statements.) Or consider the frank, and sometimes even obsessive, admiration we heap on those who embody our highest ideals, including respected politicians, such as Barack Obama, successful business leaders, such as Bill Gates, or popular entertainers,

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[24] Note that these judgments can also be conceived of in emotional terms: Strong approval can take the form of admiration, and disapproval contempt or disgust.

such as Oprah Winfrey and Clint Eastwood. Consider the popularity of Halls of Fame, Honor Rolls, and Walls (and Halls) of Shame. Parents and teachers scold students who are caught plagiarizing, and praise those who win scholarships. These kinds of positive and negative judgments of others are a ubiquitous part of our social life.

Variations and Limitations

It is important to note that Social Emotional Influence Theory is not one-size-fits-all. Individuals may differ in the degree to which they experience social-emotional influence. In particular, several factors may increase or decrease a person's susceptibility: Some feel self-conscious emotions more easily or intensely than others; others are much more oriented toward social groups than average, some less so; still others have personalities that are open to social influence while others pride themselves on going against the grain.

In addition, groups will differ in the extent to which social-emotional influence is a factor with respect to a value or set of values. Several factors are likely to increase or decrease such influence among groups: a relatively high or low rate of inter-personal communication, a relatively high or low level of identification on the part of group members, and a tendency to *value* conformity or diversity (in other words, holding a meta-group value that emphasizes either sameness or difference).

Finally, we should not expect social-emotional influence to always and everywhere be effective among group members. As noted earlier, group influence with respect to a politically relevant value may not occur if a pre-existing and contradictory value is strongly held by an individual. That said, if the individual continues to identify

with the group over time, the expectation is that the group will slowly make inroads with respect to the value in question.

A New Perspective

The theoretical framework of social-emotional influence allows us to look at much of the political science literature with a new, clarifying perspective. As discussed, it helps us to understand why individuals take on social group values, an especially perplexing phenomenon when those values conflict with self-interest. Moving from the individual to the group level, social-emotional influence helps us to understand why social groups, as large as a nation or as small as a neighborhood or even family, often maintain a consistent political culture over a long period of time.

In addition, social-emotional influence has relevance to the development of political attitudes and behaviors in general. Whenever a political attitude or behavior functions as a group expectation, such that conformity garners peers' respect and deviation their opprobrium, we are likely to find social-emotional influence at work generating (and reinforcing) conformity within the group. For example, Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes write that there are "expectations concerning the appropriate behavior for the 'loyal' Catholic or union member" (1960, 296), expectations that strongly influence group members' voting behavior. More recently, Mendelberg (2001) discusses the power of racial norms in shaping political campaigns. Social-emotional influence helps to explain *why* these social expectations affect behavior.

As a general model of peer influence, social-emotional influence represents an important addition to existing models of influence. It enriches Noelle-Neuman's account

of the "spiral of silence," which documents social pressure but stops short of clarifying the psychological mechanisms at work (1993). Social-emotional influence also complements Diana Mutz's more cognitive explanation for "impersonal influence" (1998). Especially with respect to values—where compelling arguments are few and far between—social-emotional influence is a better candidate for explaining group influence at work.

Social-Emotional Influence Theory also provides a missing mechanism for a wide range of social influence studies, from Huckfeldt and colleagues' studies of social networks (Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995) to experimental field studies of social influence over voting behavior (Gerber, Green, and Larimer 2008; Nickerson 2008).[25]

Finally, the social-emotional influence framework allows us to better understand why it is that groups coalesce around distinct sets of values. For this reason, SEI Theory links up with studies of ethnocentrism. Drawing on the work of William Graham Sumner, LeVine and Campbell argue that not only do social groups tend to adopt distinct sets of values (or "folkways"), but they also tend to view those values as superior to those held by other groups (1972). These phenomena are arguably the most important elements of ethnocentrism. Social-emotional influence theory helps to illuminate some of the causal mechanisms underlying these phenomena. We conform to the in-group in response to the judgments of our peers; these judgments not only produce opinion change, but they also embed values with a strong sense of pride and subjective validity, and they embed disvalues with a sense of shame and subjective invalidity. To the extent that other groups

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[25] The model need not be restricted to political variables. For example, it could also provide an explanation for the well-publicized recent finding that obesity is "contagious," i.e., that the average weight of family members and friends appears to affect one's own weight (Christakis and Fowler 2007).

do not share one's values, and especially to the extent that they embody one's disvalues, those groups will appear to be quite naturally both wrongheaded and contemptible.

Conclusion

In sum, I offer a social-psychological framework that seeks to explain value formation and change called Social-Emotional Influence Theory. I locate the source of citizens' politically relevant values within the social group and argue that subjective identification with one's peers is key to successful group socialization. I explain why identification matters by drawing on recent research on the self-conscious emotions: The emotions pride, embarrassment, and shame together motivate value conformity. Finally, focusing on the U.S., I expect that social-emotional influence occurs within groups of all sizes, ranging from the family to religious or ethnic groups to the nation as a whole.

In the pages ahead, I focus on building an empirical case for social-emotional influence over politically relevant values. I turn to survey evidence in Chapter Three to verify that politically relevant value differences do emerge among identity groups in the U.S. and to experimental evidence in Chapters Four, Five, and Six to test the various mechanisms of the Social-Emotional Influence model.

Chapter 3

Value Variation in the American Public

Each class or group in a society has its own mores. This is true of ranks, professions, industrial classes, religious and philosophical sects, and all other subdivisions of society.[26]

The Social-Emotional Influence model explains why citizens often embrace dominant group values. Psychologically identifying with a group, whether a nation, religion, social class, etc., causes the individual to conform to the group's values, all else equal. As I argued in Chapter 2, identification works through our self-conscious emotions: pride, shame, and embarrassment. When we identify with a group of individuals, we *care* what they think. When our peers approve of certain values (and the people who hold them) and disapprove of other disvalues (and those who hold *them*), they evoke our self-conscious emotions in relation to group values, motivating us to conform.

I have thus far emphasized value *conformity*, but notice that conformity within groups also implies difference between groups. If social-emotional influence drives conformity to the group, then it also drives value differences between individuals who happen to identify with different groups. Of course, group value differences may be further exaggerated due to polarization between groups, that is, the movement of group

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[26] From William Graham Sumner's *Folkways: A Study of Mores, Manners, Customs and Morals* ([1907] 2002). Page 39.

members away from the values of out-group members due to their dislike of the out-group. Because social-emotional influence (and social-emotional polarization) operates in social groups of all sizes, we should see value conformity within, and separation between, nations as well as a variety of groups at the subnational level.

With respect to the United States, we observe that, while there exists a set of "American values" that are somewhat distinct from those of other nations, e.g., independence, egalitarianism, and religiosity, among others, it is also true that individual Americans' commitments to these values vary. Frequently that variation falls along identity group lines. Previous scholars have discussed value and attitude differences between men and women (Sapiro 2003; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986), racial and ethnic groups (Huntington 2004; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Rokeach 1973), and religious groups (Barker and Carman 2000; Ellison and Sherkat 1993; Kohut, Green, Keeter, and Toth 2000), among others. However, with respect to differences among American identity groups, few scholars have attempted to examine a broad spectrum of politically relevant value differences across a wide range of groups.[27] This is precisely what I do in the analyses below. Drawing on a recent Pew survey of Americans' politically relevant values, I examine whether citizens' values cluster according to age, class, gender, race / ethnicity, and religion.

Demonstrating that such clustering occurs is particularly important in the wake of Fiorina's recent book *Culture War?* (2006). Fiorina's argument—that vocal differences among a small band of ideologues and better ideological sorting into the two parties has created the false appearance of deep political divisions in the U.S.—is persuasive. Yet,

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[27] While scholars have not systematically examined value differences among subgroups within the U.S., scholars *have* done so with respect to value differences among nations and world regions (see, for example, Inglehart 1971 and Inglehart and Baker 2000).

while Fiorina corrects an exaggerated view of cultural rifts supposedly tearing America in two (see Hunter 1991; White 2003), he may have overcorrected somewhat, leaving many with the impression that there are few value differences of import among Americans.

In seeking to illustrate value differences among social groups in America, I do *not* wish to argue that the concept of a "culture war" ought to be replaced by that of a "race war" or "class war." After all, I argue that not only do our subnational identities, all else equal, pull our values apart, but also that our shared American identity causes them to draw closer. Below, I simply wish to demonstrate that a number of substantial differences in commitment to politically relevant values *do* exist among Americans, and that many of these differences fall along traditional identity group lines.

Identifying such differences is a necessary precondition to demonstrating that some type of social process is at work within social groups shaping members' values. But it is just a start. Competing explanations exist for value differences among groups, one of the most well-known being Inglehart's argument that the material well-being of a group (typically a nation in Inglehart's analyses) influences its values.[28] However, as Inglehart himself finds, economic development does not explain all value differences among groups. Taking into account economic factors, cultural differences among nations and regions persist (Inglehart and Baker 2000).

Thus, the second thing I wish to demonstrate in the analyses below with respect to identity groups in the U.S. is similar to what Inglehart and Baker demonstrate in their

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[28] Inglehart's explanation for group values is a specific example of a more general argument put forward by Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960, ch. 12): Daily experiences influence people's political attitudes; because group members share many experiences, they will have similar attitudes. (Campbell et al. *also* argue, as I do, that groups influence attitudes directly.) In this broader formulation, experiences relevant to political values are many indeed, ranging from having children to experiencing discrimination to being the victim of a crime. Unfortunately, such experiential variables are not available in the Pew survey.

2000 analysis of values at the national level. Once we account for variation in income and education,[29] value differences remain among groups. In conducting such an analysis, the point is not to prove Inglehart's original thesis wrong. Rather, the point is to demonstrate that there exists ample room outside of the "material well-being" thesis for a group socialization account of value formation.

Data and Measures

Data

Data are drawn from the December 2006 Values Update Survey, sponsored by the Pew Research Center. The Values Update Survey[30] not only explores opinion on a range of values, but it also taps those values with multiple measures, allowing me to create reliable value scales. The survey sample is a nationally representative sample of 2,007 adults living in the continental U.S.; however, in many cases, to increase the number of questions asked, questions were asked of only one-half of the sample.

Value Scales

I examine group differences with respect to six values. I chose this particular set of values for three reasons: the values' political relevance, their prominence in the political science literature, and, from a practical perspective, the Pew survey's inclusion of enough relevant items to build a reliable scale for each. Each of the values is represented by a value scale made up of a combination of Likert-type agree/disagree items and, in most

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[29] While Inglehart tends to focus on income levels, he clearly includes educational advances as among those factors that stem from economic modernization and ultimately influence values. Of course, other scholars have noted the apparent influence of education on values (e.g., Rokeach 1973).
[30] Telephone interviews were conducted by Princeton Survey Research International. The interviews were conducted in English (and Spanish in some cases) from December 12, 2006 to January 10, 2007.

cases, one or more questions in other formats.[31] All of the scales met a minimum

threshold of reliability, with Cronbach's alphas of at least .60 (and most scales topping

.70). To ensure that each scale represents just one latent value dimension, the items in

each scale were factor analyzed. Eigenvalues for the first factors ranged from 1.14 to

2.25; no other significant factors emerged in the analyses.[32] Item correlations with the

primary factor for each scale were then used to weight scale items. Each scale was then

rescaled so as to range from 0 to 1.

The *Economic Populism Scale* consists of two questions and four Likert-type

agree/disagree statements that tap citizens' beliefs regarding whether the government

should aid poor and working class Americans.[33] The *Environmentalism Scale* consists of

one question and three Likert-type statements that reflect the citizen's commitment to

protecting the environment. The *Hawkishness Scale* consists of three questions and two

Likert-type statements that capture to what extent citizens believe the nation should use

force to achieve its goals. The alphas for the scale items are .77, .61, and .68 respectively.

The *Limited Government Scale* consists of one question and four Likert-type

statements that measure whether citizens desire a relatively small and restrained federal

government. The *Civic Duty Scale* consists of four Likert-type statements that tap the

citizen's commitment to following political events and voting. Finally, the *Social*

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[31] The various items making up the value scales are flawed in some respects. Most of the Likert items, in particular, are worded in the pro-value direction, causing concern with respect to acquiescence bias. However, the addition of non-Likert questions to the scales helps to correct this problem to some degree. In addition, some questions, in addressing specific public policies, such as the war in Iraq, are not themselves true value measures due to their specificity. This said, when such measures are included together with a number of related items, the resulting scale taps an underlying value dimension. Finally, several of the questions are factual rather than normative (e.g., asking whether one believes that government programs are inefficient). Although we can and should distinguish between facts and values, such factual claims tend to be closely related to citizens' normative ones. It is my view that the gains in reliability that result from multiple-item scales outweigh the drawbacks of the imperfect nature of some of the individual items.

[32] Analyses are available in the Appendix.

[33] Question wording for all value scales is available in the Appendix.

Conservatism Scale consists of two questions and five Likert-type statements that reflect whether citizens want to limit individual freedoms in favor of traditional mores. The Cronbach's alphas for the scale items are, respectively, .70, .75, and .77.

Identity Group Variables

I examined value differences among five different types of social identity groups: age cohort, socio-economic class, gender, race and ethnicity, and religious affiliation (including whether respondents considered themselves to be evangelical Christians).[34] The group distributions are below in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Identity Variable Distributions

	Gen-Y	Gen-X	Boomer	Pre-War	
Age Cohort	241	642	601	523	
	Professional	Working	Struggling		
Class	685	892	269		
	Male	Female			
Gender	1,026	981			
	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	
Race / Ethnicity	1,519	176	200	29	
	Protestant	Catholic	Jewish	Mormon	No Religion
Religion	1,117	514	38	26	208
	Evangelical	Not Evangelical			
Evangelical	661	976			

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[34] The conceptualization of group membership used for the purpose of this analysis differs somewhat from that used in other chapters. Here, respondents are categorized as possessing a group membership (or not), rather than being categorized according to their level of subjective identification. For example, the Catholic category includes nominal Catholics as well as devout Catholics, and the "professional class" category likely includes both patricians and those who were the first in their family to attend college. Such identity categorizations are somewhat rough, and, thus, the analyses will inevitably contain some error.

With respect to age, rather than grouping respondents according to whether they were younger adults, middle aged, retirement age, etc., the Age Cohort variable groups respondents by generation. Grouping was done in this way so as to better reflect the influence of respondents' generational peers, as opposed to their life stage (Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb 1991; Jennings and Niemi 1981). At the time of the survey, the youngest participants—Gen-Y, or the Millennial Generation—were between 18 and 27 years old. Gen-X, or Baby Bust, participants were between 28 and 46 years of age. Baby Boomers were between 47 and 62 years of age. Finally, those in the Pre-War, or Silent, Generation were at least 63 years old.[35]

The Class measure assessed whether participants considered their household to be "professional or business class," "working class," or "a struggling family or household."[36] The Race/Ethnicity variable was constructed from two questions asking respondents whether they were of Hispanic origin and whether they considered themselves to be white, black, or Asian. These measures were combined into a four-category variable; the racial categories exclude Hispanics, all of whom were placed in the Hispanic category. The Religion variable identifies Americans of the Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and Mormon faiths, as well as those who are either not affiliated with a religion

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[35] Sources disagree on the years demarcating these four generations. I ultimately settled on the years 1979 - 1994 for Gen-Y, 1960 - 1978 for Gen-X, 1944 - 1959 for Baby Boomers, and 1943 and earlier for the Pre-War Generation. This framework roughly reflects Carr (2002), Peltola, Milkie, and Presser (2004), and Howe, Strauss, and Matson (2000).

[36] Note that the class measure included in this Pew survey is different from those used by political scientists, who typically use the categories lower class, working class, middle class, upper-middle class, and upper class (or some similar permutation) to describe variation in socio-economic class. (See Chapter 6. Also see the General Social Survey and the American National Election Study for similar examples.) The main benefit of the Pew formulation seems to be that more Americans are willing to place themselves in the lowest category when it is described as "struggling," as opposed to "lower class." It may also be the case that the categories "professional" and "working" class draw sharper distinctions between types of employment and educational backgrounds than the more typical "middle" versus "working" class categorizations (into which the vast majority of citizens tend to place themselves).

or are not religious. Finally, the Evangelical variable separates those Christians who say

they have been "born again," or are evangelical, from those who do not.

As previously discussed, two important variables serve as controls to further

refine the analyses. The Income variable separates respondents into nine income levels,

and the Education variable separates respondents into seven different education levels.[37]

See the Appendix for details with respect to these variables.

Data Analyses

The first question to be investigated is as follows: Is *between*-group variation in

commitment to the six politically relevant values mentioned above greater than *within*-

group variation? In less academic language, are individuals' social identities associated

with their values? This question can be answered with *analyses of variance* (ANOVAs).

The second question is less straight-forward: If between-group variation is

greater, is there any correlational evidence available that points toward social influence

driving within-group value similarity, as opposed to material well-being or related

factors? As discussed above, I address this question by adding controls for income and

education. In addition, because group identities overlap—or, more to the point, because

observed value differences between individuals in any two groups may be driven by their

membership in overlapping identity groups—each of the ANOVAs in which control

variables are introduced also controls for the full spectrum of identity groups examined

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[37] These controls are especially important with respect to social class. By holding income and education constant in the class analyses, we can be more certain that value differences among classes are due to subjective identification with a socio-economic class rather than to income or educational differences.

here: age cohort, class, gender, race / ethnicity, religion, and whether the individual is an evangelical Christian.[38]

Age Cohort

The first identity group we examine is age cohort. It is commonly asserted, in both the popular media and the academic literature, that value differences exist among the generations. Some of these differences are attributable to life cycle effects, but others are likely attributable to unique characteristics of the generations themselves (e.g., Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb 1991; Jennings and Niemi 1981). Below I investigate whether value differences emerge across four generations of Americans.

When we conduct simple ANOVAs to assess between-group differences, we find clear differences among the generations with respect to environmentalism, limited government, civic duty, and social conservatism. When control variables are introduced, these differences remain. See Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: ANOVA Results for Age Cohort / Generation

	Without controls	With controls[39]
Economic Populism N = 793	1.32 p = .27	1.38 p = .25
Environmentalism N = 833	**2.79 p = .04**	**3.34 p = .02**

[38] Note that two versions of the identity group variables were used in the analyses. When the subject of an ANOVA, each identity variable included only those participants who could be placed in one of the identity group categories. I.e., those who said "don't know," who refused to answer, or who volunteered another response were excluded. However, when used as controls, the identity variables retained those "don't know" (etc.) respondents. This ensured that the data used in the full ANOVAs would be the same as those used in the corresponding simple ANOVAs.

[39] Controls include all social identity variables discussed in this chapter as well as income and education.

Hawkishness N = 792	.93 p = .43	.75 p = .52
Limited Government N = 777	**11.09** **p = .00**	**8.52** **p = .00**
Civic Duty N = 897	**17.42** **p = .00**	**11.27** **p = .00**
Social Conservatism N = 718	**9.02** **p = .00**	**9.47** **p = .00**

Cell entries are F statistics with associated p-values. Findings significant at the p ≤ .10 level are bolded.

The group means for these four values are graphed below in Figures 3.1a - 1d.[40]

Most of the value differences seem to reflect the changing *zeitgeist* of the times. The data

suggest that support for limited government and socially conservative ideals have fallen

with each successive generation since WWII. The difference between the youngest and

the oldest generation is equivalent to 11% of the scale with respect to Limited

Government, and 14% of the scale with respect to Social Conservatism. The difference

between these two generations with respect to Environmentalism equals approximately

6% of the scale range.

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[40] Throughout the chapter, the figures depict raw means for the various identity groups. Only those differences in means that remained significant when control variables were added are graphed. I used regression analyses with a complete series of dummy variables (as well as the income and education measures) to make sure that the relative group differences depicted in Figures 3.1 - 3.6 did not change direction with the introduction of controls. The comparison groups in the dummy variable analyses were as follows: age cohort (pre-war generation); class (struggling); gender (men); race / ethnicity (whites); religion (Protestant); Evangelical (non-Evangelical). The analyses revealed that just two relationships changed direction when controls were added. In the analysis of religion and social conservatism, the coefficients for those who were Jewish and who had no religious affiliation became positive (but nonsignificant). Additional analyses revealed that the reason for these reversals is the addition of the Evangelical control variable. In other words, when the Protestant category is emptied of the influence of Evangelicals, Jews and those with no religion are no more nor less socially conservative than Protestants.

Figures 3.1a - 1d

With respect to the differences observed in participatory values, the large difference between Gen-Y, with the least sense of civic duty, and the dutiful Pre-War generation, stretches across 16% of the range of the scale. This said, the lower mean for Gen-Y may well be attributable not to cohort effects, but to the fact that younger people have far less life experience relevant to politics (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).

Class

Next, we examine socio-economic class: whether identifying oneself as part of a professional, working, or "struggling" household appears to affect one's values.

What we find, first, is that notable differences among these three classes emerge for each of the six values examined. Once controls are introduced, however, most of these differences disappear; only differences in commitment to economic populism and environmentalism remain significant. See Table 3.3.

Table 3.3: ANOVA Results for Class

	Without controls	With controls
Economic Populism N = 765	**18.00** **p = .00**	**4.96** **p = .01**
Environmentalism N = 801	**6.93** **p = .00**	**2.98** **p = .05**
Hawkishness N = 771	**6.82** **p = .00**	1.85 p = .16
Limited Government N = 753	**3.76** **p = .02**	1.14 p = .32
Civic Duty N = 832	**14.55** **p = .00**	.79 p = .45
Social Conservatism N = 678	**18.65** **p = .00**	.77 p = .47

Cell entries are F statistics with associated p-values. Findings significant at the $p \leq .10$ level are bolded.

The differences in means across socio-economic classes for these two values are graphed below in Figures 3.2a - 2b. It is perhaps not surprising that those who identify themselves as "struggling" are the most likely to endorse economic populism.[41] The difference in means between this group and the professionals equals 14% of the range of

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[41] This particular difference may in part reflect Pew's unique choice of class labels, rather than group influence. Even when income is held constant, some will perceive their circumstances as more dire than others, and these individuals are more likely to embrace both a label like "struggling" and populist values.

the scale. More surprising is the fact that those who consider themselves to be struggling are more likely to endorse greater stewardship of the environment; here, the difference between them and the professional class is equivalent to 8% of the scale range.

Figures 3.2a - 2b

Gender

In recent decades, scholars have documented a partisan "gender gap." Scholars argue that women are more likely to vote Democratic because they are less hawkish and more supportive of the welfare state when compared to men (Conover and Sapiro 1993; Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986). Do the data discussed here bare these differences out?

Below, differences emerge in the first analysis for hawkishness and social conservatism. When we introduce controls, these differences remain, with differences in social conservatism increasing in significance. Contrary to expectations, the data reveal no statistically significant differences between men and women with respect to economic populism; no differences emerge with respect to environmentalism, limited government, or civic duty either. See Table 3.4.

Table 3.4: ANOVA Results for Gender

	Without controls	With controls
Economic Populism N = 807	.57 p = .45	.05 p = .83
Environmentalism N = 848	.79 p = .37	.27 p = .61
Hawkishness N = 806	**10.63** **p = .00**	**8.53** **p = .00**
Limited Government N = 790	.40 p = .53	.16 p = .69
Civic Duty N = 909	1.09 p = .30	.05 p = .82
Social Conservatism N = 727	**2.85** **p = .09**	**12.22** **p = .00**

Cell entries are F statistics with associated p-values. Findings significant at the $p \leq .10$ level are bolded.

In Figures 3.3a - 3b, differences in means for hawkishness and social conservatism are graphed. Women are both less hawkish[42] and less socially conservative[43] than men. The mean for hawkishness among men is approximately .5, whereas for women it is .45 (a difference of 5% of the scale). Note that the pictured difference in social conservatism, a very slight difference of 3% of the scale, increases somewhat once controls are introduced. Overall, however, despite the statistical significance of these two findings, the data reflect Sapiro's (2003) conclusion that opinion differences that emerge between women and men are often modest in size.

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[42] Some might argue that a missing variable—whether a woman is a mother—likely explains the differences observed between men and women with respect to hawkishness. Conover and Sapiro (1993) conducted such an analysis and found that the presence or absence of a child (or children) in the household made little difference to women's attitudes related to war.

[43] One might wonder whether the small difference in social conservatism observed is driven by the scale question on women's roles (with women offering much more liberal responses than men). However, if we remove the question about women's roles, the results are nearly identical to those using the full scale.

Figures 3.3a - 3b

Race and Ethnicity

In the U.S., racial and ethnic identities appear to be accompanied by significant differences of opinion with respect to politics. Kinder and Sanders (1996) document a large black/white racial divide in public opinion. More recently, and more controversially, Huntington (2004) argues that Hispanic values differ considerably from those of non-Hispanic whites. Do large value differences emerge among these groups? If so, with respect to which values?

Table 3.5: ANOVA Results for Race / Ethnicity

	Without controls	With controls
Economic Populism N = 779	**13.88** **p = .00**	**9.53** **p = .00**
Environmentalism N = 819	**6.11** **p = .00**	**3.67** **p = .01**
Hawkishness N = 778	**6.04** **p = .00**	**6.32** **p = .00**

|		
Limited Government N = 765	**3.27** **p = .02**	1.28 p = .28
Civic Duty N = 872	**6.03** **p = .00**	1.05 p = .37
Social Conservatism N = 701	1.78 p = .15	.33 p = .81

Cell entries are F statistics with associated p-values. Findings significant at the $p \leq .10$ level are bolded.

Simple ANOVAs reveal highly significant differences across racial and ethnic groups with respect to five of the six values. However, when controls are introduced, significant differences remain with respect to just three values: economic populism, environmentalism, and hawkishness. See Table 3.5 above.

Differences with respect to these three values are graphed below in Figures 3.4a - 4c. The group differences are not uniform; there is no one racial or ethnic group consistently out-of-step with the others. With respect to economic populism, non-whites are more populist than whites; however, black and Asian Americans ($M = .72$ and $M = .70$, respectively) make a distinctively populist pair when compared to whites and Hispanics ($M = .57$ and $M = .63$). Environmentalism is also higher among non-whites; the difference here between black and white Americans, the groups most and least committed to the environment, respectively, equals 8% of the value scale. Finally, white and Hispanic Americans are similar in their high level of hawkishness (Hispanics are the most hawkish), with black and Asian Americans similar in their lower levels. Hispanic Americans are 15 percentage points higher on this scale than black and Asian Americans.

Figures 3.4a - 4c

Overall, these data suggest that Kinder and Sanders are closer to the mark in focusing on opinion differences between black and white Americans than Huntington is in emphasizing differences between Hispanic and Anglo Americans. Non-Hispanic whites and Hispanics generally appear to be more similar than different.

Religion

Finally, we consider value differences among American religious groups. There is a long tradition of studying the political effects of religious affiliation in the U.S. (e.g., Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960;

Tocqueville [1835/1840] 2004; Weber [1930] 1992). Recent public opinion analyses show that evangelical Christians tend to hold the most conservative political views and Jewish Americans the most liberal ones, with Catholics and mainline Protestants falling in between (Cohen and Liebman 1997; Hunter 1991; Kohut, Green, Keeter, and Toth 2000; McConkey 2001). What patterns do we find in the Pew data?

When we examine differences among Protestants, Catholics, Jews, Mormons, and those who claim no religious affiliation, differences emerge with respect to hawkishness, limited government and social conservatism; however, only differences in social conservatism remain once we add the control variables.[44] See Table 3.6.

Table 3.6: ANOVA Results for Religion

	Without controls	With controls
Economic Populism N = 761	.37 p = .83	.09 p = .99
Environmentalism N = 804	1.24 p = .29	.45 p = .77
Hawkishness N = 765	**4.67** **p = .00**	.85 p = .49
Limited Government N = 749	**2.80** **p = .03**	.60 p = .66
Civic Duty N = 866	1.66 p = .16	1.31 p = .27

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[44] Further analyses revealed that differences in hawkishness were no longer significant in the control analysis primarily because of the addition of one control variable: whether the individual was an evangelical Christian. In other words, differences that emerged among religious groups with respect to hawkishness were largely driven by evangelical Christians. As we will see in the following analysis, Evangelicals tend to be more hawkish than others.

Social Conservatism N = 691	**27.99 p = .00**	**11.34 p = .00**

Cell entries are F statistics with associated p-values. Findings significant at the p ≤ .10 level are bolded.

Differences in social conservatism are graphed below in Figure 3.5. The data show that Jewish Americans and those claiming no religious affiliation are *much* less socially conservative than the various Christian denominations. In particular, the difference in means between Mormons and Jews is equivalent to 44% of the value scale. But differences between Protestants and Catholics should not be overlooked; they remain substantial, equaling 9% of the scale.[45]

Figure 3.5

Below, I look more closely at differences between Christians who do, and do not, consider themselves to be evangelical, or "born again." Here, differences in environmentalism, hawkishness, limited government, and social conservatism emerge,

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[45] Of course, the differences observed among religious groups with respect to social conservatism might be attributable to religious traditions and teachings, as opposed to peer influence. Unfortunately, these influences cannot be untangled with the Pew data. Chapter 4 takes up this question and presents more compelling evidence, in the form of experimental data, for the influence of religious peers.

although differences with respect to limited government do not reach standard levels of significance once control variables are introduced. See Table 3.7.

Table 3.7: ANOVA Results for Whether Evangelical

	Without controls	With controls
Economic Populism N = 647	.41 p = .52	.31 p = .58
Environmentalism N = 685	**2.70** **p = .10**	**4.50** **p = .03**
Hawkishness N = 651	**11.54** **p = .00**	**8.37** **p = .00**
Limited Government N = 640	**5.43** **p = .02**	.39 p = .53
Civic Duty N = 757	.08 p = .77	1.42 p = .23
Social Conservatism N = 604	**97.43** **p = .00**	**71.83** **p = .00**

Cell entries are F statistics with associated p-values. Findings significant at the $p \leq .10$ level are bolded.

The three remaining differences are graphed in Figures 3.6a - 6c. Evangelical Christians are less committed to the environment (although only slightly—a 3% difference), more hawkish (6% difference), and more socially conservative (16% difference) than non-evangelical Christians. It would appear as though the high level of

Protestant social conservatism uncovered in the previous analysis is largely driven by the

social conservatism of evangelical Christians.[46]

Figures 3.6a - 6c

Environmentalism by Whether Evangelical

Hawkishness by Whether Evangelical

Social Conservatism by Whether Evangelical

Conclusion

Overall, the results suggest that substantial differences exist among social groups in the

U.S. with respect to commitment to politically relevant values. One's generation, class,

race/ethnicity, and religion seem to be particularly tied up with one's values.

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[46] Although note that, while the majority of Evangelicals are Protestant, not all Evangelicals are. Over half (53%) of Protestants referred to themselves as evangelical or born again, but so did 15% of Catholics and 19% of Mormons.

In the simple analyses of variance (those without the control variables), these identities were associated with value differences at least two-thirds of the time. When controls were added in our search for better evidence of social influence, the evidence was particularly compelling that one's generational peers affect commitment to limited government and social conservatism, that one's racial or ethnic group influences commitment to economic populism and level of hawkishness, and, finally, that one's religion affects commitment to social conservatism.

With perhaps the exception of social conservatism among religious (and non-religious) folk, there exists little evidence of serious value rifts along identity group lines. This said, the evidence does suggest that group memberships play a meaningful role in determining one's commitment to politically relevant values.

Economic Populism

1. / 2. As I read some programs and proposals that are being discussed in the country today, please tell me whether you strongly favor, favor, oppose, or strongly oppose each.

> *An increase in the minimum wage, from $5.15 an hour to $7.25 an hour.*
>
> *The U.S. government guaranteeing health insurance for all citizens, even if it means raising taxes.*

3. It is the responsibility of the government to take care of people who can't take care of themselves.[47]

4. The government should help more needy people even if it means going deeper into debt.

5. The government should guarantee every citizen enough to eat and a place to sleep.

6. Poor people have become too dependent on government assistance programs.

Economic Populism Factor Analysis

	Factor 1
Item 1	0.52
Item 2	0.57
Item 3	0.62
Item 4	0.72
Item 5	0.73
Item 6	-0.42
N	807
Eigenvalue	2.20

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[47] Answer categories for this Likert item and all those that follow were: Completely agree / Mostly agree / Mostly disagree / Completely disagree.

Environmentalism

1. Is your overall opinion of the environmentalist movement very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable, or very unfavorable?

2. There needs to be stricter laws and regulations to protect the environment.

3. People should be willing to pay higher prices in order to protect the environment.

4. We should put more emphasis on fuel conservation than on developing new oil supplies.

Environmentalism Factor analysis

	Factor 1
Item 1	0.41
Item 2	0.69
Item 3	0.57
Item 4	0.42
N	848
Eigenvalue	1.14

Hawkishness

1. Do you think that using military force against countries that may seriously threaten our country, but have not attacked us, can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified?

2. Do you think the U.S. made the right decision or the wrong decision in using military force against Iraq?

3. Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified?

4. It is my belief that we should get even with any country that tries to take advantage of the United States.

5. The best way to ensure peace is through military strength.

Hawkishness Factor Analysis

	Factor 1
Item 1	0.49
Item 2	0.64
Item 3	0.43
Item 4	0.58
Item 5	0.62
N	806
Eigenvalue	1.57

Limited Government

1. If you had to choose, would you rather have a smaller government providing fewer services, or a bigger government providing more services?

2. Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good.

3. The federal government should run ONLY those things that cannot be run at the local level.

4. When something is run by the government, it is usually inefficient and wasteful

5. The federal government controls too much of our daily lives.

Limited Government Factor Analysis

	Factor 1
Item 1	0.53
Item 2	0.50
Item 3	0.62
Item 4	0.57
Item 5	0.30
N	790
Eigenvalue	1.34

Civic Duty

1. I feel it's my duty as a citizen to always vote.

2. I'm interested in keeping up with national affairs.

3. I'm pretty interested in following local politics.

4. I feel guilty when I don't get a chance to vote.

Civic Duty Factor analysis

	Factor 1
Item 1	0.69
Item 2	0.74
Item 3	0.67
Item 4	0.50
N	909
Eigenvalue	1.72

Social Conservatism

1. / 2. As I read some programs and proposals that are being discussed in the country today, please tell me whether you strongly favor, favor, oppose, or strongly oppose each.

> *Making it more DIFFICULT for a woman to get an abortion.*

> *Allowing gays and lesbians to marry.*

3. Women should return to their traditional roles in society.

4. AIDS might be God's punishment for immoral sexual behavior.

5. I have old-fashioned values about family and marriage.

6. There are clear guidelines about what's good or evil that apply to everyone regardless of their situation.

7. School boards ought to have the right to fire teachers who are known homosexuals.

Social Conservatism Factor Analysis

	Factor 1
Item 1	0.50
Item 2	-0.67
Item 3	0.53
Item 4	0.55
Item 5	0.58
Item 6	0.52
Item 7	0.61
N	727
Eigenvalue	2.26

Income

Less than $10,000 / From 10 to under $20,000 / From 20 to under $30,000 / From 30 to under $40,000 / From 40 to under $50,000 / From 50 to under $75,000 / From 75 to under $100,000 / From 100 to under $150,000 / $150,000 or more

Education

None, or grade 1 - 8 / Some high school / High school graduate / Technical, trade, or vocational school / Some college / 4-year college degree / Post-graduate training

Chapter 4

**Social-Emotional Influence and Catholics' Commitment to
Traditional Family Values**

Although religion in the United States never intervenes directly in government, it must be considered as the first of America's political institutions, for even if religion does not give Americans their taste for liberty, it does notably facilitate their use of that liberty.[48]

This chapter is the first of three based on experimental evidence. Drawing on data from an experiment conducted with Catholics living in the Midwest, I test key mechanisms of the Social-Emotional Influence model with respect to traditional family values. My primary goal in this chapter is to demonstrate that, when it comes to social influence over values, identity matters. That is, we tend to be influenced by the values of peers with whom we identify, and we tend *not* to be influenced by the values of peers with whom we do not identify. A secondary goal is to begin to explore the emotional mechanisms that are an important part of SEI Theory. Finally, in a third set of analyses, I seek to verify the political relevance of the values under investigation.

Drawing on previous scholarship by public opinion scholars, I have argued that values have an enormous impact on citizens' political decisions. Among the most influential are those that cluster together under the rubric of social conservatism. For example, Abramowitz found that a moral issues scale made up of items concerning abortion and gay rights had a stronger influence on candidate choice in the 1992

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[48] From Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America, Volume One* ([1835] 2004). Page 338.

presidential election than any other variable in his model except partisanship (1997, 220). In a similar analysis, Mulligan (2008) found that moral traditionalism played a key role in presidential vote choice in 2004. While the political import of social conservatism has at times been overstated, especially in the wake of the 2004 election,[49] the influence of socially conservative values on political choice is real and significant.

In the context of contemporary U.S. politics, many refer to conservative (or traditional) stands on the cluster of hotly debated social issues revolving around religion, the family, and sexuality as "moral values" or "family values." Relevant issues include abortion, divorce, euthanasia, homosexuality, religion in the public sphere, stem cell research, and women's roles, among others. While colloquial usage of these terms may suggest that they are little more than labels for bundles of issue positions, citizens' positions on such issues, which tend to lump together as consistently traditional or progressive, signify relatively coherent moral visions of how people ought to conduct their lives (Hunter 1991; Leege, Wald, Krueger, and Mueller 2002).

Politically speaking, the popularization of the terms "moral values" and "family values" represents a framing coup for social conservatives in that the terms suggest that those who disagree with a specific socially conservative point of view are not moral or are anti-family. Academically speaking, the terms are, of course, problematic for the same reason. My solution, below, is to rely instead on the general term "social conservatism" as well as on the term "traditional family values" to refer more specifically to the range of views having to do with the family and sexuality that are endorsed by the Catholic Church and reflective of an underlying socially conservative outlook.

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[49] See Langer and Cohen (2005), Mulligan (2008), and Schuman (2006).

Where citizens stand with respect to the cluster of socially conservative issues described above depends to a significant extent on their religious faith (Brewer and Stonecash 2007; Hunter 1991; Kohut, Green, Keeter, and Toth 2000; Leege, Wald, Krueger, and Mueller 2002). In considering religiously informed views, scholars are increasingly thinking about religion from the perspective of social identity (Djupe and Gilbert 2008; Leege 2001; Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988). If religious communities are social groups just as family or ethnic communities are, then, from the perspective of SEI Theory, subjective identification and self-conscious emotions may work together to encourage individuals to conform to their religious community with respect to its views on traditional morality. In this chapter, I test these ideas with an experimental study of American Catholics living in the Midwest.

Things have changed since voting scholars first studied Catholics in the mid-twentieth century (e.g., Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960). Catholics are no longer dependable Democratic voters. In 2004, Bush enjoyed a 13-point margin of victory among white Catholics (Pew Research Center 2008). In 2008, Catholics are an important "swing" group in the presidential election. Some of this movement to the political right in recent decades is due to Catholics' transformation from white, urban "ethnics" to mainstream suburbanites occupying a more elevated position in the socioeconomic order (Prendergast 1999; Wolfe 2006). However, as the data discussed in this chapter will make clear, Catholics' gravitation toward the Republican Party also reflects practicing Catholics' conservatism on moral issues related to the family and sexuality, especially abortion. As such issues have become more politically salient and the parties have polarized on them, more Catholics have had reason

to vote Republican (Brewer and Stonecash 2007; Leege, Wald, Krueger, and Mueller 2002; Prendergast 1999).

This said, there is a notable divide among Catholics. *Committed* Catholics (those with higher levels of religious practice and religious orthodoxy) are more socially conservative than other Americans. However, less committed Catholics are in fact *less* socially conservative than other Americans (Kohut, Green, Keeter, and Toth 2000).[50] This difference is reflected in the fact that 57% of committed Catholics say that they are Republican (compared to 30% who are Democrats), whereas only 38% of less committed Catholics are Republican (compared to 51% who are Democrats) (Dionne 2006).

Why are committed Catholics so much more socially conservative than less committed Catholics? Is it their greater exposure to traditional Church teachings, unique personal religious experiences, or the fact that they are surrounded by peers who hold traditional values? While each of these factors likely matters, I focus here on the often overlooked influence of religious peers. The often hidden influence of religious peers is evident in a *New York Times* article describing Pope Benedict's Mass at Yankee Stadium in April of 2008. While the Pope emphasized authority and obedience to the Church in his sermon, the attendees were just, if not more, taken with the crowd of 60,000 fellow believers. One woman who attended the Mass said that being there with so many other worshippers made her feel like she was part of a big family of Catholics. She added, "You were proud to be Catholic….It helped reaffirm our faith" (Vitello 2008).

Of course, as discussed in Chapter 2, it is not just the values and attitudes of in-group members that affect our own; the views of out-groups matter as well, albeit in a

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[50] This "committed" versus "not committed" categorization scheme is somewhat problematic in that it fails to distinguish between level of devotion and level of orthodoxy. While most devoted Catholics do also have more orthodox views, not all do.

different fashion. While in some cases political alliances have been formed between orthodox members of various religious groups (see Hunter 1991), there still exists much palpable dislike among religious groups. Consider the suggestion by the evangelical minister Reverend John Hagee that the Catholic Church is the "great whore" discussed in Revelations, or consider the prejudice faced by Jews running for public office (Berinsky and Mendelberg 2005). Perhaps it is not surprising then that group polarization is not unheard of in religion's hallowed sphere of influence. For example, in 1973 the Southern Baptist Convention endorsed Roe v. Wade in part because of their distrust of Catholics, who were resolutely anti-abortion (Wolfe 2006). In a similar vein, we expect that Catholics sometimes distance themselves from the values of perceived out-groups also.

These hypotheses with respect to the relevance of social identity to our values lie at the heart of the Social-Emotional Influence model. Below, I describe an empirical study of Catholics' values that will allow me to test these basic ideas.

The Catholic Values Experiment

<u>Study Administration and Sample Characteristics</u>

The experimental study was conducted during the months of March and April of 2008 and included 220 church-going Catholics from five churches in a large Archdiocese in the Midwest. The Archdiocese approved the study at the outset, easing the recruitment of individual churches and participants. Participants were recruited via a combination of flyers placed in weekly church bulletins and announcements from the pulpit. Participants were asked to take part in a short, anonymous, on-line study of Catholic opinion being conducted by University of Michigan researchers in return for a $5 donation to their

church and a $5 donation to a Catholic charity of their choice. Participants had to be at least 18 years of age, and only one person was allowed to participate per household.

An effort was made to recruit participants from both the more numerous traditional churches in the Archdiocese as well as from more progressive churches. Progressive churches were more eager to participate and, thus, three of the five churches fit this description. However, this progressive trend was counterbalanced somewhat by the fact that the parishioners who chose to participate from each church appeared to be significantly more committed to Catholicism—and, therefore, somewhat more ideologically conservative—than their fellow parishioners.

I presumed at the outset that participating parishioners would be more devoted Catholics than non-participating parishioners for two reasons. First, most participants, having been recruited in church on Sunday morning, are regular church-goers. Second, it is likely that those most motivated to take part in a study of Catholic opinion, especially when participation yields donations to Catholic organizations, are those who are more committed to the Church. Participants' high level of commitment to Catholicism is confirmed by their answer to the question "How important is being Catholic to you?" Thirty-four percent said "very important," and 44% said "extremely important." For the purposes of comparison, a recent Pew study found that 55% of Midwestern Catholics described religion as "very important" (the top commitment category) in their lives.[51] In addition, an astonishing 73% of participants reported attending Catholic school for at least some of their education. For a rough comparison, consider that, at any given point in recent years, about 20% of Catholic schoolchildren were attending Catholic school

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[51] Most of the statistics related to Catholics in the Midwest and nationally were taken from the Pew report "A Portrait of American Catholics on the Eve of Pope Benedict's Visit" (2008).

(Meyer 2007). (Although note that participants' high level of attendance is in part due to their older age; Catholic school attendance has declined markedly in recent decades.)

In terms of political ideology, the sample is roughly equivalent to the national Catholic average, identifying as somewhere between moderate and slightly conservative on average. However, the sample is more Republican than U.S. Catholics overall (41% as compared to 27%) and less Democratic (26% as compared to 37%). Finally, with respect to traditional family values specifically, 71% of participants indicated in the pre-test that they agreed with traditional church teachings on abortion, divorce, and homosexuality. (The precise wording of this pre-test question is available in Appendix B.)

In terms of demographic characteristics, the sample is racially homogeneous, with 98% of participants identifying as white (in the Midwest generally, 84% of Catholics are white). The age range for the study is 18-84, with a median age of 54, older than the national Catholic median of 46. The majority of the sample is female (69%). In addition to the factors cited above, these age and gender characteristics also help to explain the relative religiosity on the part of participants (see Pew 2008). The sample is also more upper-income than Catholics as a whole, with 50% calling themselves middle class and 40% upper-middle class.

Study Design

Participants began the on-line study by filling out a pre-test that addressed Catholic identity and basic political views and demographic characteristics. Afterward, participants were randomly assigned to an experimental group. The experiment had a simple 1x4 design. As previously discussed, the primary goal of the experiment was to

demonstrate that psychological identification plays a key causal role in group influence. Given that the "gold standard" in demonstrating causation in social science is the exogenous manipulation of a cause in a random experiment, I sought to experimentally vary identification by exposing some participants to the values of the Catholic in-group and other participants to the values of a religious out-group, Evangelicals.[52]

More specifically, those in the "Catholics conservative" treatment condition learned that a majority of American Catholics shun divorce, oppose abortion, and oppose gay marriage. Those in the "Catholics progressive" treatment condition learned that, to the contrary, most Catholics believe that one can be a good Catholic without following Church teachings on divorce, abortion, and gay marriage. Finally, those in the "Evangelicals conservative" condition learned that most Evangelicals share the Catholic Church's socially conservative views on divorce, abortion, and gay marriage. Those in the control group received no such information.

Table 4.1: Experimental Design

Control	Catholics conservative	Catholics progressive	Evangelicals conservative
49	46	65	60

To increase the external validity of the experimental stimuli, as well as to reduce the extent to which participants were misled during the course of the study, all of the public opinion information presented to participants was taken from reputable public

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[52] As touched on in the last chapter, only a very small percentage of Catholics refer to themselves as Evangelicals. Among participants in the Catholic Values Study, only one participant referred to him or herself as Evangelical.

opinion surveys.[53] The "Catholics socially conservative" / "Catholics socially

progressive" contrast was achieved by presenting the results of different survey questions

to participants. The various stimuli are available in Appendix A.

Following the stimulus, participants filled out a post-test that included questions

on their emotions and social and political values and attitudes. After completing the

study, all were debriefed regarding the study goals and experimental manipulations.

Key Measures

Traditional Family Values Scale   The Traditional Family Values Scale is an original,

additive scale intended to tap moral conservatism in the domain of the family and

sexuality. Most of the scale items are Likert-type statements presented in pairs—one

worded in the traditional (positive) direction and one in the progressive (negative)

direction—for each of five themes (divorce, pre-marital sex, homosexuality, sexuality

and teens, and working mothers).[54] An additional question on abortion, borrowed from

the National Election Study, constituted the final scale item. Each pair of Likert items and

the abortion item were weighted equally. The scale ranges from 0 to 1, with 1

representing the most conservative response. The scale mean is .56. While the scale is

made up of attitudes on specific issues, the high Cronbach's alpha of .83 demonstrates

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[53] Information on Catholics' traditional family values is taken from the General Social Survey. Information on Catholics' progressive values is taken from a Gallup poll of American Catholics presented in D'Antonio (2007). Information on Evangelicals' values is taken from a poll conducted by the Pew Research Center.

[54] How one best measures commitment to traditional family values or social conservatism is subject to debate. Here I combine many items on specific issues into an eleven-item scale. While each individual item, taken in and of itself, is not a value measure (due to the specificity of each), taken together, the items ought to accurately represent variation in social conservatism. I argue that this approach to measuring social conservatism is better than an alternative in which a smaller number of more general items are combined. (For example, consider an item taken from the ANES' four-item moral values scale: "The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society.") This is because social conservatism is typically expressed in public debate not as a commitment to abstract principles (although individuals may in fact be committed to such principles) but, rather, as a commitment to a unified set of policy stands.

that a coherent value dimension underlies the scale. Scale items for this variable, as well as the ones discussed below, are available in Appendix B.

Catholic Identity Scale   The Catholic Identity Scale includes four questions adapted from Huddy and Khatib's American identity scale (2007) for the purpose of measuring Catholic identity. The additive scale ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 representing maximum Catholic identity. The mean for the scale is .71 and the alpha .77.

Emotion Measures   Participants were asked "How proud are you of your views on…." following each of the six distinct themes covered by the traditional family values scale. These items were additively combined into a Pride-in-Values Scale. The scale ranges from 0 to 1, and its mean is .58. The alpha for the scale is .92.

In addition, at the end of the study, participants were asked to reflect on the public opinion information (i.e., the stimulus) they received and to indicate to what extent the information made them feel proud or ashamed. Unfortunately, most participants skipped these questions due to a weakness in the study design.[55] Originally intended to allow me to conduct a statistical mediation analysis, data from these two questions are used in the analyses below in a more limited way due to the small number of responses.

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[55] Participants were presented with the following question: "Earlier in the questionnaire, some participants read general poll / survey results on where others stand on traditional family values related to marriage, abortion, and homosexuality. Other participants did not receive this information. What about you? Did you receive this survey information?" Those who answered "yes" were directed to the emotion questions. Unfortunately, most of the participants who received a public opinion stimulus either said that they had not received it or were unsure whether they had received it. Conversations with two test subjects suggested that the problem was not that individuals had skipped the stimuli or did not remember receiving it but, rather, that participants had difficulty recognizing the brief description of Catholic or Evangelical opinion that they received as the "poll / survey results" described in the question. In hindsight, the emotion measures would have ideally followed a second presentation of the stimulus.

Hypotheses

We can investigate four hypotheses relevant to the Social-Emotional Influence model and one related to the model's political import with data from the Catholic Values Study.

The first two hypotheses stress the role of subjective identity in group influence (and polarization). First, *whereas participants' values will "move" in the direction of the perceived values of their identity group (Catholics), they will move* away *from the values of an out-group (Evangelicals)* (H1). This hypothesis depends on three distinct sub-hypotheses. Compared to the control group, participants who learn that Catholics hold traditional family values will express greater conservatism with respect to these values, participants who learn that Catholics hold progressive stances on traditional family values will express less social conservatism, and, finally, participants who learn that Evangelicals are pro-traditional family values will also express less social conservatism.

The second hypothesis (H2) takes advantage of the Catholic Identity Scale to propose a secondary test of identity's critical role in influence: *The group influence and polarization observed in response to the stimuli will be stronger for those who identify more closely with other Catholics*.

The next set of two hypotheses involves the role of self-conscious emotions in group influence. Our first expectation with respect to emotion (H3) is that those whose values reflect dominant group values tend to feel proud as a result. Specifically, *more conservative Catholics will feel more pride in their values on average than more progressive Catholics*. The second emotion hypothesis (H4) suggests that patterns of pride and shame in reaction to the opinion stimuli will reveal evidence of emotional mediation of opinion change. In particular, *participants will feel more pride (and less*

shame) when they learn that other Catholics share their traditional values, and

participants will feel more shame (and less pride) when they learn both that other

Catholics hold more progressive values and Evangelicals more conservative ones.

Our final hypothesis (H5) involves the political import of traditional family

values: *Participants' socially conservative value beliefs will be closely tied to their*

political views, and, in particular, their electoral intentions.

Data Analyses

We first examine the identity hypotheses. Figure 4.1 displays the means for the different

experimental groups with respect to traditional family values.

Figure 4.1: Value Means by Experimental Group

All three treatment groups expressed less support for traditional family values

than the control group. As expected, participants who learned that other Catholics are less

supportive of traditional family values shifted in the progressive direction, and

participants who learned that Evangelicals support family values also shifted in the progressive direction (i.e., away from the out-group). On the other hand, the fact that participants in the "Catholics conservative" condition *also* appeared to shift in the progressive direction is contrary to our expectation.

A regression analysis allows us to test whether these differences are statistically significant. The Traditional Family Values Scale was regressed onto dummy variables representing the three treatment groups; the control group was excluded so that it could act as a comparison group. The model is as follows: Family Values $= \beta_0 + \beta_1$Catholics Conservative $+ \beta_2$Catholics Progressive $+ \beta_3$Evangelicals Conservative $+ \varepsilon$.[56] Regression results are available in Table 4.2.

What we find is that, while all of the coefficients are negative, only those with respect to the "Catholics progressive" and "Evangelicals conservative" conditions are significant ($b_2 = -.08$; $b_3 = -.07$; $p \leq .10$). The overall pattern of results supports H1: While participants moved in the direction of Catholic peers in the "Catholics progressive" condition, they moved *away* from the views of the Evangelical out-group. The "Catholics conservative" condition had no effect.

Table 4.2: Effect of Treatment on Values for Whole Sample and by Strength of Identity

	Values scale	Values scale *Strong identity*	Values scale *Weak identity*
Constant	.607 (.030)***	.743 (.043)***	.508 (.036)***

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[56] I checked whether randomization failed with respect to several key variables, including social conservatism and general support for traditional Catholic Church teachings, across the four experimental groups, paying special attention to the all-important control (or comparison) group. Randomization was unproblematic and, therefore, no control variables are needed in the analyses.

Catholic conservative condition	-.031 (.042)	-.090 (.057)	-.029 (.054)
Catholic progressive condition	-.076 (.040)^	-.135 (.056)*	-.035 (.047)
Evangelical conservative condition	-.073 (.040)^	-.118 (.059)*	-.027 (.047)
N	207	91	116

Table entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
^ $p \leq .10$ * $p \leq .05$ ** $p \leq .01$ *** $p \leq .001$ (two-tailed test)

In order to test H2—whether group influence is more evident among strong Catholic identifiers— the above equation was re-estimated with each of the variables representing the experimental stimuli also interacted with a dummy variable representing strong versus weak Catholic identity.[57] This second model is as follows: Family Values = $\beta_0 + \beta_1$Catholics Conservative + β_2Catholics Progressive + β_3Evangelicals Conservative + β_4Identity + β_5Catholics Conservative x Identity + β_6Catholics Progressive x Identity + β_7Evangelicals Conservative x Identity + ε. The coefficients on the interaction terms with respect to the "Catholics progressive" and "Evangelicals conservative" conditions approached, but did not reach, standard levels of statistical significance ($b_6 = -.10$, $p = .17$; $b_7 = -.09$, $p = .23$). However, the coefficients imply stronger experimental results for strong as compared to weak identifiers.

If we re-run the original regression equation separately for strong and weak identifiers, the results reveal that it is the strong identifiers who are driving the original

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[57] Strong identifiers were those who scored above the Catholic Identity Scale median, and weak identifiers those who scored at or below the scale median. Those above the scale median chose the fourth or fifth response option on a 5-point scale for each of the four identity questions (see Appendix). E.g., in response to the question "When talking about Catholics, how often do you say 'we' instead of 'they'?" strong identifiers answered "most of the time" or "all of the time."

experimental results. See again Table 4.2. Those with strong Catholic identities were more influenced by the "Catholics progressive" and "Evangelicals conservative" stimuli than the sample as a whole (b_2 = -.14; b_3 = -.12; $p \leq .05$). The coefficient representing the "Catholics conservative" stimulus group remained negative for strong identifiers, again contrary to expectations, but did not reach standard levels of significance. Among weak identifiers, there is no evidence of influence in response to any of the three sets of stimuli. Overall, the evidence supports the idea that group influence—both conformity to the in-group, and deviation from the out-group—is mediated by identity.

We turn next to the two emotion hypotheses. Because we expect that most participants understand traditional stands on family values to be dominant among Catholics, we expect that those participants with more traditional, or orthodox, views will feel prouder of their values overall (H3). The data show that this certainly is the case. Restricting our analysis to participants in the control group (to avoid any contamination of the post-test Pride-in-Values measure by the experimental stimuli), we find a very strong, positive correlation between participants' conservatism on traditional family values and how proud they are of their values (r = .43, $p \leq .01$).

Our final stop in testing the mechanisms of Social-Emotional Influence Theory is the examination of emotional patterns in response to the experimental stimuli (H4). Recall that 71% of participants said in the pre-test that they agreed with traditional church teachings on abortion, divorce, and homosexuality. In short, at least at the outset of the study, our sample was relatively conservative with respect to traditional family values.

Therefore, we expect that participants will feel the most proud, and the least ashamed, in the "Catholics conservative" condition, as they reflect on the fact that their

values are in line with a majority of American Catholics. On the other hand, we expect

that participants will feel less proud, and more ashamed, in the other two conditions: in

response to the "Catholics progressive" stimulus (because participants' values are out-of-

step with a progressive majority) and the "Evangelicals conservative" stimulus as well

(because their values are in sync with a disliked out-group). See Figure 4.2.

Figure 4.2: Pride and Shame in Response to Treatments

This is indeed what we find. Study participants felt more pride when they

perceived that other Catholics are socially conservative and more shame when they

learned either that Catholics are socially progressive *or* that Evangelicals are socially

conservative. The differences in mean pride and shame between the "Catholics

conservative" group and the other two groups are statistically significant (p ≤ .10).[58]

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[58] The total N for the analysis is 46, less than expected because many participants skipped these questions, which appeared at the end of the study and were preceded by a screening question that many participants found to be confusing.

Finally, we ask one last question: Is any of this consequential with respect to American Catholics' electoral behavior? Below, I assess the impact of participants' views on traditional family values on three political variables closely related to voting behavior: how important it is that the president shares one's moral values, approval of how Bush is handling his job as President, and whether one plans to vote for John McCain or Barack Obama in November of 2008.[59]

These three variables were regressed separately onto an equation that included the Traditional Family Values Scale, Party Identification, Political Ideology, Age, Gender, and Class.[60] The model investigated was as follows: $DV = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Family\ Values + \beta_2 Party + \beta_3 Ideology + \beta_4 Age + \beta_5 Gender + \beta_6 Class + \varepsilon$.[61] All variables in the analyses were coded 0 to 1, with 1 representing the more conservative response.

The analyses were first conducted with ordinary least squares regression. Those results are available in Table 4.3. The equation was then re-estimated with maximum likelihood probit regression with respect to the one dichotomous dependent variable (voting intention in 2008). Probit results for just this variable are available in Table 4.4.

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[59] Precise question wording is available in the Appendix.

[60] Age is a continuous variable representing participants' ages at the time of the study. Class is a five-category variable ranging from lower class to upper class. Race and ethnicity were not included as control variables because of the racial/ethnic homogeneity of the sample.

[61] Using experimental data as one would survey data in this way necessitates that one check to make sure that the experimental manipulations have not affected one's results. I first checked whether the experimental manipulations had direct effects on the three dependent variables by re-estimating the above equation with the three treatment variables included. No such effects were found. Second, I checked whether the treatment conditions primed traditional family values among participants or otherwise altered the effect of the Traditional Family Values Scale on the dependent variables. (I did this by re-estimating the above equation with two additional variables included: a variable representing receipt of a treatment and a Treatment x Family Values interaction term.) I found no evidence of priming or other interactive effects.

Table 4.3: Effect of Values Scale on Political Opinions (OLS Regression)

	Important that president shares moral values	Bush approval	Vote for McCain (over Obama)
Constant	.145 (.087)^	-.181 (.084)*	-.242 (.137)^
Family Values Scale	.471 (.104)***	.301 (.101)**	.257 (.161)
Party	.024 (.055)	.303 (.053)***	.372 (.087)***
Political Ideology	.174 (.097)^	.353 (.094)***	.767 (.148)***
Age	.065 (.080)	-.020 (.078)	.048 (.122)
Gender	.004 (.037)	-.020 (.036)	-.106 (.055)^
Class	.072 (.077)	.028 (.074)	.181 (.118)
R^2	.261	.557	.560
N	184	185	164

Table entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
^ $p \leq .10$ * $p \leq .05$ ** $p \leq .01$ *** $p \leq .001$ (two-tailed test)

Table 4.4: Effect of Values Scale on Vote Choice (Probit Regression)

	Vote for McCain (over Obama) *Marginal effects*
Family Values Scale	.532 (.303)^
Party	.464 (.148)**

Political Ideology	1.250 (.295)***
Age	.121 (.251)
Gender	-.204 (.096)^
Class	.320 (.235)
Number of obs.	164
Log likelihood	-45.717
Likelihood ratio chi-square	128.82
Prob. > chi-square	0.000

Table entries are probit regression marginal effects with standard errors in parentheses. (Independent variables held at their means.) ^ $p \leq .10$ * $p \leq .05$ ** $p \leq .01$ *** $p \leq .001$ (two-tailed test)

In Tables 4.3 and 4.4, we see that the answer to the question of whether these values are relevant to electoral behavior among Catholics in the sample is "yes." Participants who held more conservative stances on traditional family values were more likely to say that it is important that the president shares their moral values ($b_1 = .47$, $p \leq .001$) and to approve of President Bush's performance in office ($b_1 = .30$, $p \leq .01$). In the latter case, the import of the Family Values Scale is on par with both political ideology and party; in the former case, the import of the scale far outpaces the other variables.

Conservative stances on family values were also associated with intending to vote for McCain over Obama in November 2008 ($ME_1 = .53$, $p \leq .10$).[62] This said, note that, while the marginal effect of the Traditional Family Values Scale with respect to vote intention is quite large, the standard error is large as well, diminishing its statistical significance. It is likely that the relatively large standard errors attached to the vote

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[62] Because of the unintuitive nature of probit regression coefficients, the marginal effects of each of the independent variables (with the other independent variables held at their mean) are reported instead.

intention variable (in both the OLS and probit analyses) stem from the fact that Obama and McCain had not considerably differentiated themselves with respect to many socially conservative issues at the time of the study.

Discussion and Conclusion

Overall, the pattern of results observed largely reflect expectations: Catholics who learned that other Catholics hold "progressive family values" themselves moved in a liberal direction when compared to the control group. And Catholics who learned that Evangelicals (a religious out-group) hold traditional family values also moved in a liberal direction. As expected, the above findings were sharpened among those who highly identified as Catholics and were not evident among those who weakly identified as Catholics. These findings are especially compelling when we consider that most practicing Catholics are deeply respectful of Church hierarchy and, thus, likely less open to peer influence than members of other religious groups.

That participants' values shifted in similar directions in response to news that most Catholics are progressive on traditional family values *and* that most Evangelicals are conservative may surprise some. Do Catholics dislike evangelical Protestants so much that they will rebel against traditional Church teachings in order to differentiate themselves from this out-group? The answer, which we assume to be "yes" from the regression analyses, is confirmed by evidence in the post-test. There, participants were given the opportunity to rate Catholics, Christians, and Evangelicals on a feeling thermometer, ranging from 0 to 100. On average, participants rated Evangelicals approximately 25 points lower than Catholics on the scale, whereas Christians in general

were rated only about 5 points lower. Ratings did not depend in any way on which experimental stimulus participants had received. The 25-point difference is just slightly less than conservatives' and liberals' average dislike for one another.

That the experimental results, which found Catholics moving in a progressive direction in response to the stimuli, were driven by *highly identified* Catholics may also surprise some. Those who highly identify as Catholics tend to be the most committed to orthodox views. Therefore, wouldn't we expect these individuals to be the *least* likely to be swayed by progressive Catholic "public opinion"? If we take another look at our group identity measure, we are reminded why the answer, in keeping with Social-Emotional Influence Theory, is "no." The items in the scale do not measure identification with the formal Church but to Catholics as a group. (One item—on the importance of being Catholic—is more ambiguous but yielded little variation.) Thus, we indeed expect highly identified participants to be quite sensitive to what Catholics *as a group* believe.

It is worth noting that the group influence and polarization described above occurred in a sample whose median age was 54. These were not impressionable youth. In fact, according to theories of political socialization, it is likely that the majority of the sample is at an age when their values and attitudes are at their most stable (Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb 1991; Sears and Levy 2003). The fact that such mature participants were influenced by a brief exposure to group opinion weighs in favor of a lifelong openness model of political socialization (Kinder and Sears 1985; Sigel 1989).[63]

Before we move on to the emotion hypotheses, we must also note that the group influence aspect of the experiment did not go *exactly* as expected. One hypothesis was

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[63] In Chapters 5 and 6, the question of age-specific effects will arise. Note that I did not observe any interactions between the experimental stimuli and age in this experiment. That said, only about 10% of the sample was 35 or under, making it difficult to detect varying levels of influence according to age.

not supported: that participants would become more socially conservative with respect to traditional family values when they perceived other Catholics to be supportive of those values. Why this particular disjuncture?

A helpful line of inquiry leads us back to the Catholic participants' recruitment. Participants were recruited in church and, in some cases, were encouraged to participate by their parish priests; prospective participants read in the recruitment materials that the study was approved by their Archdiocese. With these facts in mind, one might guess that participants began the study on their best Catholic behavior. In other words, there likely existed an unseen, unspoken influence in addition to the experimental stimuli—the parish priest, the Church itself—that affected all participants, including those in the control, or comparison, group. Under such a scenario, it might be difficult to get participants to move further toward traditional Church points of view.

With respect to the emotion hypotheses, patterns of participants' self-conscious emotions support the idea that these emotions play an important role in group influence. First, the strong relationship between feeling proud of one's values and holding conservative values (i.e., values in line with the Catholic Church) suggests that pride— again, a positive emotion stemming from the approval of important others—is tightly wrapped up with Catholics' views on traditional family values. This correlation suggests that if we dislodge participants' perceptions of what views garner others' approval, then we will dislodge the views as well.

Second, study participants, most of whom expressed support for traditional family values at the outset of the study, felt the most proud and the least ashamed when they learned that most Catholics support traditional family values; by contrast, they felt the

least proud and the most ashamed when they learned that most Catholics oppose traditional family values or, notably, that most Evangelicals support family values. These patterns do not prove emotional mediation of the observed influence, but they strongly suggest that self-conscious emotions played a role.

Finally, the last analysis strongly suggests that social-emotional influence among Catholics over traditional family values matters deeply to Catholics' electoral behavior. For example, those who held more traditional views on morality were more likely to approve of President Bush's performance in office and to say that they intend to vote for McCain over Obama in November 2008.

While there is much to appreciate in the Catholic Family Values study, it has its weaknesses as well. Perhaps the study's greatest weakness is the fact that it suggests, but does not demonstrate, emotional mediation of group influence over values. Furthermore, each test of the emotion hypotheses relies on emotion measures embedded in the questionnaire, which can be problematic. Even if we were to conduct a careful statistical analysis of emotional mediation relying on our questionnaire measures of emotion, we could not be certain that emotions are causal agents; they may be epiphenomenal, simply co-varying with the "real" source of group influence. In addition, questionnaire measures of emotions are prone to error because people are often unaware of their emotional reactions, and, when they are aware, they will sometimes purposefully misstate them for normative reasons. Thus, a clearer demonstration of the emotional aspects of SEI theory would find a way to exogenously manipulate participants' emotional reactions to peer opinion stimuli. This is the territory into which we venture next in Chapter 5.

Catholics conservative condition

> **PLEASE READ THE TEXT BELOW CAREFULLY.**
>
> **WHEN YOU ARE DONE, ADVANCE TO THE NEXT PAGE TO ANSWER SOME RELATED QUESTIONS**
>
> *Recent Polls Indicate Catholics Are Strong Supporters of Family Values*
>
> As you may know, the issue of "family values" continues to be discussed in the media. From time-to-time, public opinions polls are carried out to find out what different types of Americans believe regarding family values. For example, one recent survey indicates that American Catholics today continue to strongly support traditional family values. According to the survey:
>
> • The majority of Catholics who marry stay married and never divorce.
> • A majority of Catholics oppose abortion.
> • A majority of Catholics oppose gay marriage.
>
> What about you? We would like to know your opinion on family values.

Catholics progressive condition

> **PLEASE READ THE TEXT BELOW CAREFULLY.**
>
> **WHEN YOU ARE DONE, ADVANCE TO THE NEXT PAGE TO ANSWER SOME RELATED QUESTIONS**
>
> *Recent Polls Indicate Catholics Are Less Supportive of Family Values*
>
> As you may know, the issue of "family values" continues to be discussed in the media. From time-to-time, public opinions polls are carried out to find out what different types of Americans believe regarding family values. For example, one recent survey indicates that American Catholics today seem to question the importance of traditional family values. According to the survey:
>
> • A majority of Catholics say one can be a good Catholic without obeying the Church's teaching on divorce.
> • A majority of Catholics say one can be a good Catholic without obeying the Church's teaching on abortion.
> • A majority of Catholics say the Church's opposition to gay marriage is not very important to them.
>
> What about you? We would like to know your opinion on family values.

Evangelicals conservative condition

PLEASE READ THE TEXT BELOW CAREFULLY.

WHEN YOU ARE DONE, ADVANCE TO THE NEXT PAGE TO ANSWER SOME RELATED QUESTIONS

Recent Polls Indicate Evangelicals Are Strong Supporters of Family Values

As you may know, the issue of "family values" continues to be discussed in the media. From time-to-time, public opinions polls are carried out to find out what different types of Americans believe regarding family values. For example, one recent survey indicates that American Evangelical (or "born again") Christians today are strong supporters of traditional family values. According to the survey:

• A majority of Evangelicals say that divorce should be avoided, even in the event of an unhappy marriage.
• A majority of Evangelicals oppose abortion.
• A majority of Evangelicals oppose gay marriage.

What about you? We would like to know your opinion on family values.

Traditional Family Values Scale[64]

Divorce in this country should be more difficult to obtain than it is now.

Divorce is usually the best solution when a couple can't seem to work out their marriage

problems.

It is wrong for a man and a woman to have sexual relations before marriage.

It's a good idea for a couple who intend to get married to live together first.

Sexual relations between two adults of the same sex is wrong.

Homosexual couples should have the right to marry one another.

Sex education has no place in the nation's public schools.

Methods of birth control should be available to teenagers who need them.

Mothers should stay home to raise children, especially when children are young.

Women should feel free to work full-time outside the home even if they have young

children.

There has been discussion about abortion during recent years. Which one of the opinions

below best represents your view? (By law, abortion should **never** be permitted. / The

law should permit abortion **only** in the case of rape, incest, or when the woman's life

is in danger. / The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or

danger to the woman's life, but **only** after the need for the abortion has been clearly

established. / By law, a woman should **always** be able to obtain an abortion as a

matter of personal choice. / Other, please specify.)

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[64] Answer categories for all of the Likert statements were: Strongly agree /Agree / Slightly agree / Neither agree nor disagree / Slightly disagree / Disagree / Strongly disagree.

Catholic Identity Scale

How important is being Catholic to you? (Not very important / Somewhat important / Moderately important / Very important / Extremely important)

To what extent do you see yourself as a typical Catholic? (Not at all typical / Not very typical / Somewhat typical / Moderately typical / Very typical)

How well does the term "Catholic" describe you? (Not very well / Somewhat well / Moderately well / Very well / Extremely well)

When talking about Catholics, how often do you say "we" instead of "they"? (Never / Rarely / Some of the time / Most of the time / All of the time)

Pride-in-Values Scale[65]

Reflecting on your answers above, how proud are you of your views on divorce?

Reflecting on your answers above, how proud are you of your views on pre-marital sex and co-habitation?

Reflecting on your answers above, how proud are you of your views on homosexuality?

Reflecting on your answer above, how proud are you of your views on abortion?

Reflecting on your answers above, how proud are you of your views on sex education and birth control for teens?

Reflecting on your answers above, how proud are you of your views on women and childrearing?

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[65] Each of the items had five answer choices: Not proud at all / Somewhat proud / Moderately proud / Very proud / Extremely proud.

94

Emotional Reactions to Stimuli[66]

Did the information make you feel [proud / ashamed]?

Agreement with Traditional Church Teachings

To what extent would you say you agree with traditional Church teachings on issues like marriage, abortion, homosexuality, etc.? (Completely agree / Mostly agree / Somewhat agree / Neither agree nor disagree / Somewhat disagree / Mostly disagree / Completely disagree)

Important that President Shares Values

How important is it to you that the President of the United States shares your moral values? (Not important / Somewhat important / Moderately important / Very important / Extremely important)

Bush Approval

Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling his job as president? (Strongly approve / Approve / Neither approve nor disapprove / Disapprove / Strongly disapprove)

Candidate Preference in 2008 Presidential Election[67]

With respect to the upcoming Presidential election (in November 2008), if John McCain is the Republican candidate and Barack Obama is the Democratic candidate, then who do

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[66] Answer categories ranged from "not at all" (0) to "extremely" (4).
[67] This question was recoded to create a dichotomous variable: 1 = McCain vote, 0 = Obama vote.

you think you will vote for? (John McCain / Barack Obama / None of the above / I do not intend to vote)

Party Identification[68]

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent? (Republican / Democrat / Independent / Other)

Political Ideology

There is a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. How would you describe your own political viewpoint? (Very conservative / Conservative / Slightly conservative / Middle of the road–moderate / Slightly liberal / Liberal / Very liberal)

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[68] Those who answered "other" were recoded as missing.

Chapter 5

Social-Emotional Influence and College Students'
Belief in the Protestant Ethic

The peculiarity of this philosophy of avarice appears to be…above all the idea of a duty of the individual toward the increase of his capital, which is assumed as an end in itself. Truly what is here preached is not simply a means of making one's way in the world, but a peculiar ethic. The infraction of its rules is treated not as foolishness but as forgetfulness of duty….It is not mere business astuteness…it is an ethos.[69]

In the previous chapter, I presented experimental evidence to bolster the claim that group influence over values depends on individuals' psychological identification with the group. That chapter also included suggestive evidence that the self-conscious emotions pride and shame mediate the effect of identity but stopped short of demonstrating such mediation. In this chapter, again drawing on experimental data, I examine the role self-conscious emotions play in group influence more carefully by exogenously arousing the emotions pride and embarrassment. I also seek to verify the role of subjective identification in influence with respect to a new social group, college peers.

The experiment discussed in this chapter focuses on social-emotional influence over the value economic individualism for two reasons. First, economic individualism represents a sharp contrast to traditional family values, allowing us to test whether SEI Theory is relevant to a broad range of politically relevant values. I conceptualize economic individualism as the sum of two sub-components: a belief in "hard work" and

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[69] From Max Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* ([1930] 1992). Page 51.

financial self-reliance (Feldman 1999; Kinder and Sanders 1996). Second, economic individualism occupies perhaps an even more central place in American political culture (Feldman 1999; McClosky and Zaller 1984; Weber 1992) and plays a very important role in shaping the public's attitudes toward the welfare state and social welfare policy (Feldman 1988; Kinder and Mendelberg 2000; Markus 2001). If social-emotional influence can be shown to affect Americans' adherence to so popular and important a value, then the "real world" political implications are all the greater. In addition, demonstrating influence over a value so ingrained in American culture represents a conservative, and, if successful, more persuasive test of the theory.

The relevant identity (or reference) group in the experiment is University of Michigan undergraduates. While it is somewhat unusual in political science to consider a college community to be a politically important identity group, social identity theories (Brown 2000; Fiske 2004; Turner 1991) certainly would consider school peers to be reference or identity group members. And research suggests that, for college students, their university identity is an important one. In a study by Moskalenko, McCauley, and Rozin (2006), University of Pennsylvania students rated their university as more important to them than their ethnic or religious groups; only family and country were more important to students than their university affiliation. Identification with college peers was so important in Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb's (1991) study that it affected participants' post-college spousal and friendship choices and political views many years later. Anecdotally, note that the second-most popular social networking website in the United States, Facebook, was until recently organized around colleges and universities. With respect to the University of Michigan, a visit to Ann Arbor on "game day"—when

tens of thousands of maize and blue bedecked students and alums pack into Michigan stadium—suggests a strong identification with the university among those who attend it.

In conjunction with subjective identification with college peers, I test the effects of the self-conscious emotions pride and embarrassment. I chose embarrassment, rather than shame, because embarrassment is a less uncomfortable emotion than shame. Given that the design, as I explain below, includes priming participants' emotions, I prefer examining embarrassment over shame, *ceteris paribus*, for ethical reasons.

The Economic Individualism Experiment

<u>Study Administration and Sample Characteristics</u>

Participants were recruited from the University of Michigan's Introductory Psychology Subject Pool and participated in person during the spring of 2006. In order to counteract the isolating effects of the sterile lab environment, I took steps to create a somewhat "natural" group environment. All but three students took part in groups of two or more; almost 90% took part with at least three other students. Participants were seated around a large table, and they were allowed to talk prior to the experiment if they chose. Group identity was also subtly primed by placing the same light blue University of Michigan folder in front of each participant prior to the study (the folder contained two copies of the consent form) and by giving each student a University of Michigan pen with which to fill out the questionnaires. Four identical-looking versions of a paper-and-pencil questionnaire were randomly distributed to participants.

After all students had finished filling out the questionnaires, they were thoroughly

debriefed regarding the deceptive manipulations present in the study as well as the

essential roles that these manipulations played in testing the experimental hypotheses.

The sample was restricted to U.S. citizens but otherwise any member of the

Subject Pool could take part. Most of the student participants were nineteen years of age

(this was also the mean age) and college freshman. Fifty-two percent were men and 48%

women. In response to the question "What racial or ethnic group, or groups, best

describes you?" 78% identified as white on their first mention and 8% as African

American.[70] Fifty-nine percent of the sample considered themselves to be "liberal," 27%

"conservative," and 14% considered themselves "moderate." Forty-seven percent were

Democrats, 23% Republican, and 31% Independent or "other."

Study Design

The experiment had a 2x2 design. I randomly varied two factors: participants'

perceptions of whether most University of Michigan undergraduates support or oppose

economic individualism, and whether or not participants' self-conscious emotions were

primed. The experimental design, including the number of participants in each cell whose

data are analyzed in the results section, is below in Table 5.1.

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[70] Figures have been rounded to the nearest whole number. In addition, approximately 5% of students identified as Hispanic, 7% as Asian, 2% as Native American, and 1% as Jewish. Data were also collected on students' religious preference: 59% were Christian, 20% Jewish, 4% Muslim, 2% Hindu or Buddhist, and 16% agnostic or atheist.

Table 5.1: Experimental Design

	No emotion	Emotion
Pro-value / Agree	23	20
Anti-value / Disagree	22	20

The study questionnaires contained a pre-test immediately preceding the stimuli which contained value, political ideology, and identification measures and a post-test following the stimuli which contained emotion and various dependent measures.

Let me discuss the experimental design in more detail. The study was designed to examine social influence over only those individuals who were unambiguous supporters of economic individualism (i.e., most American college students). Because there was no good opportunity to pre-screen according to value-belief, two pro-economic individualism statements were included in the pre-test ("Individuals should strive to be financially self-reliant" and "One ought to work hard in life") and data from those who did not agree with both statements were set aside from the analyses reported on below.[71]

Half of participants read poll results that most University of Michigan undergraduates support economic individualism; the other half read poll results that most of these students oppose economic individualism. All poll results were in fact fabricated. Because all participants (whose data are analyzed below) supported economic individualism, those in the pro-value condition learned that they were in *agreement* with the majority of their peers with respect to economic individualism, and those in the anti-value condition learned that they were in *disagreement* with the majority. Participants who learned that they agreed with the majority of their peers were expected to feel some

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[71] As expected, only a small number of participants—approximately 15% of the initial sample—did not wholeheartedly support economic individualism; most of these individuals were not opposed to the value per se but, rather, expressed ambivalence (i.e., neutrality) with respect to one of the two statements.

pride as a result; participants who learned that they in fact disagreed with the majority were expected to feel some embarrassment or shame.

The opinion information was presented to participants as the results of a study conducted by UCLA during the prior year. Students read a short paragraph describing the fictional study[72] and then were presented with the percentages of Michigan undergrads who supposedly believed in the values of "hard work" and "financial self-reliance." The information was conveyed with text as well as pie-charts. The two questions that University of Michigan undergraduates had *supposedly* answered for the UCLA poll were exact copies of the economic individualism items that study participants answered in the pre-test. At the bottom of the page on which the UCLA poll results were presented was a question intended to get students to think actively about whether their answers to the two items placed them in agreement or disagreement with the majority. See Appendix A for a reproduction of the "pro-value" value-belief stimulus.

Next, the study tested for emotional mediation by experimentally arousing the presumed mediator (self-conscious emotions) in participants (MacKinnon, Fairchild, and Fritz 2007). The pro-value / anti-value factor was crossed with an emotion factor: whether or not relevant self-conscious emotions were exaggerated with emotion primes *preceding* the value stimulus.[73] Emotions were exogenously manipulated for two reasons. First, exogenous manipulation allowed me to isolate the causal effects of emotion. In

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[72] Details were given about the fabricated research study in order to increase the believability of the information being conveyed. UCLA was chosen as the institution supposedly conducting the research because they had actually conducted a somewhat similar study of university students in years past. A post-test probe did not turn up any skepticism with regard to the veracity of the opinion stimuli.

[73] Some may be skeptical of the fact that the emotion primes *preceded* the opinion stimulus. But nothing is out of order causally; the primes were expected to change how participants perceived the experimental stimuli that followed and, therefore, participants' emotional *reactions* to those stimuli. Emotion primes (and inductions) are commonly used in this way in psychology (e.g., see Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, and Fischhoff 2003; Small and Lerner 2005).

contrast, relying primarily on measures of "natural" emotional reactions to the opinion stimuli runs the risk of confusing emotional states with traits (see Lazarus 1991) or of confusing causal factors with epiphenomena. Second, for a variety of reasons, it is simply difficult to measure emotions with great accuracy.[74]

In the pro-value condition, approximately half of the participants were randomly assigned to read three emotional scenarios intended to prime pride. In the anti-value condition, approximately half of participants read three emotional scenarios in a similar format but intended to prime embarrassment. See Appendix A for these stimuli.

Emotion priming is still a new technique in political science, and, therefore, further explanation of the nature and role of emotion primes is needed. Typically, the goal of priming is to unobtrusively evoke an emotion in order to test its effects. In one set of studies, a subliminal (i.e., "suboptimal") happy face caused study participants to evaluate subsequent neutral stimuli more positively on average (Zajonc 1980; Winkielman, Zajonc, and Schwarz 1997). In another study, emotional movie clips caused participants to evaluate a congruent emotional display as more intense (Hansen and Shantz 1995). These and other findings have significant implications with respect to theories in psychology; however, for our purposes, we are interested in the fact that emotion primes ought to alter participants' reactions to stimuli that follow accordingly.

In the Economic Individualism Experiment, among those who would have experienced pride or embarrassment spontaneously in reaction to the opinion stimuli, we

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[74] Emotion is difficult to measure for two key reasons. First, much of the workings of our emotions are outside of conscious awareness (LeDoux 1996), meaning that asking people questions about their emotions is of somewhat limited value. Second, often cultural norms that regulate emotional expression will motivate individuals to either exaggerate or hide emotions that they are experiencing (Lewis 2000); such efforts introduce error into question-based, as well as observation-based, emotion measures. It is in part because of these difficulties that biological measures of emotion are gaining in popularity (e.g., testing for chemical compounds in body fluids, such as saliva; skin conductance tests; fMRI studies); however, these methods generally have not advanced to the point where they can accurately measure self-conscious emotions.

expect that the primes will ensure that these emotions will be felt with greater intensity. Among those who would not have experienced these emotions naturally in response to the opinion stimuli, we expect that the primes will increase the likelihood that pride or embarrassment will be felt in reaction to those stimuli.[75] In so doing, the primes allow us to test whether pride and embarrassment *mediate* social influence.

Also note that experimental participants in general are typically either unaware of the emotion-inducing purpose of a prime *or* they are unaware of the prime's presence altogether (e.g., see Zajonc 1980). Thus, participants remain unaware that their emotions are being manipulated. This is considered to be a good thing by experimentalists, given that awareness of the intended manipulation may cause participants to act unnaturally, try to "outsmart" the experiment, etc. In the study described in this chapter, the emotion primes were disguised as study questions for this reason.

Finally, emotion primes ought to be as simple as possible, and any non-emotional content of a prime ought to be unrelated to the stimuli that follow; otherwise, the researcher will have difficulty knowing whether the effect of the prime was due to emotional arousal or something else. For example, this study could have primed pride by exposing participants in the pro-value condition to peer quotes praising people who believe in hard work, but then we would not be certain whether the increased persuasiveness of the opinion polls was due to pride or more cognitive reactions (e.g., perceiving that the opinions represented in the poll were more strongly held).

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[75] This is because experiencing an emotion increases the likelihood that one will appraise situations as containing structural elements that are congruent with the emotion (Lazarus 1991). For example, if a person feels angry about something and then, a moment later, has a conversation with a stranger, that person is much more likely to perceive that the stranger has said something offensive, leading to anger.

<u>Key Measures</u>

The study gauged the effects of the stimuli on participants' beliefs regarding economic individualism with two dependent measures. The first dependent measure was the averaged "rank," or importance, participants assigned to two statements in support of the value economic individualism: "To make ends meet, people should rely on their own hard work, not on other people or the government," and "The government should see to it that all Americans have the basic necessities: food, clothing, and shelter."[76] (Participants were asked to rank six political value statements in all; see Appendix B.) These two statements were correlated at -.28. Both statements were re-coded so that high numbers reflect greater individualism. The short scale ranges from 0 to 1, with a mean of .45.

Note that the ranking variable is "ipsative," meaning that, each time a number is assigned to one of the value statements, it cannot be assigned to any of the other statements. An important result of this quality is that it is more difficult to experimentally influence how individuals rank a particular value because that ranking depends on the ranks of so many others. For this reason, the economic individualism ranking is the most conservative of the two dependent measures.

The second dependent measure is the average of responses to two questions on government policy which heavily implicate the value "economic individualism." The first question asked participants whether the federal government ought to give scholarships to *all* low-income high school graduates or only to those who have taken rigorous courses in

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[76] The ranking variable was used (as opposed to a variable assessing participants' relative support for economic individualism) because it was thought that the reappearance of the two pre-test economic individualism items, or similar Likert-style items, in the post-test would clue participants in to the purpose of the experiment. The ranking variable, with its novel format and six different value statements to grapple with, promised to help disguise the intent of the study. While the ranking method is not typically used by political scientists, it is one that Rokeach (1973) forcefully recommends.

high school. The second asked participants whether the federal government should provide welfare benefits to *all* low-income single mothers or only to those who are willing to work for those benefits. (See Appendix B for exact question wording.) Answers to these questions are correlated at .33.[77] The additive scale was recoded to range from 0 to 1, and so that relatively individualistic answers are represented by higher numbers. The mean is .54. The format of both questions was modeled on a format frequently used by the American National Election Study. These two questions offered the benefit of measuring value change in an unobtrusive way, as well as illustrating the impact the stimuli could have on "real" political attitudes, as opposed to abstract values.[78]

The questionnaire included measures of two other important variables: participants' subjective membership in the identity group in question, and participants' feelings. In order to test whether variations in identification contributed to greater or lesser social influence, the pre-test included the following question: "Generally speaking, how *close* do you feel to U of M undergraduates—to what extent do you feel that they are like you in terms of their ideas and interests and feelings about things?"[79]

In addition, a battery of emotion items was asked immediately following the opinion stimulus to provide a secondary test of emotional mediation. The instructions read: "Describe **how you feel right now** by indicating the extent to which you feel each emotion." Answer choices, arrayed on a five-point scale, ranged from "not at all" to

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[77] The alpha for this short scale is .49. Reliability is low in part because only two measures were used. Note that patterns of regression results presented below are similar when the variables are assessed separately.

[78] Even though they focus on specific policies, these questions can ably assess value change because one of the key underlying values used to evaluate the *locus of value* (Rescher 1982), i.e., welfare recipients working or not and scholarship recipients taking rigorous courses or not, is economic individualism. Certainly other values may be used to evaluate the various response options (e.g., sympathy for the poor), but these other values are not being experimentally manipulated and, thus, their effects should not vary across the experimental groups.

[79] The format of this question has been used for many years by the American National Election Study and was introduced by Gurin and Townsend (1986).

"extremely." This battery of questions was based on a widely-used emotion measure called the "Profile of Mood States" (POMS) created by McNair and Droppleman (1971). The emotions were listed in alphabetical order. Responses in the "embarrassment" family ("embarrassed" and "insecure") were added to responses in the "pride" family ("proud" and "self-confident") to create a measure of subjective self-conscious emotional intensity. The scale ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 representing greater emotional intensity. The mean for this measure was .31.

Hypotheses

We can investigate several hypotheses that stem from the Social-Emotional Influence model with data from the Economic Individualism Experiment.

The first hypothesis test (H1) focuses on simple group influence: *The (perceived) values of college peers will generate conformity among participants*. In other words, when no emotions are aroused, participants in the pro-value condition will express more individualistic views than participants in the anti-value condition.

The second hypothesis (H2) relates to the import of emotion: *Self-conscious emotions will increase conformity to peers' perceived values*. In other words, self-conscious emotions, measured objectively via assignment to the "emotion" condition and subjectively via participants' stated emotional reactions to the stimuli, will increase value differences between the pro-value and anti-value experimental groups.

Figure 5.1 (below) illustrates the relationships expected by H1 and H2.

Figure 5.1: Expected Relationships

Finally, the third hypothesis (H3) turns to social identity: *The above relationships will be mediated by participants' sense of identification with college peers*. Those participants who said that they feel closer and more similar to other UM undergraduates will on average conform more than others; those few who suggest they do not identify with other Michigan students should not conform at all.

Data Analyses

Statistical analyses were carried out with ordinary least squares regression. I regressed the value and policy scales onto a binary variable representing the pro-value condition, a binary variable representing the emotion condition, and an interactive variable (also binary) representing those who were assigned to both the pro-value and the emotion condition. The general regression model is as follows: $DV = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Value + \beta_2 Emotion +$

β_3Value x Emotion + β_4, β_5Controls + ϵ. Because of the interaction term, the Value variable represents the subset of participants also in the "no emotion" condition (i.e., when Emotion = 0), and the Emotion variable represents participants also in the "anti-value" condition (i.e., when Value = 0). The excluded group, represented by the constant term, is those assigned to the anti-value, no emotion condition.

Randomization across the treatment groups failed with respect to gender, and so gender was added as a control variable. While there were no statistically significant differences across the treatment groups with respect to political ideology,[80] ideology was also added as a control variable because of the close association between ideology and the dependent variables and the small size of the sample.

For H1 to be supported, b_1 must be positive and statistically significant. For H2 to be supported, b_2 must be negative and statistically significant, *and* the combination of b_2 + b_3 must be positive and statistically significant. Table 5.2, below, explains how the means for each experimental group are calculated from the regression results. For H3 to be supported, the aforementioned relationships must show evidence of being mediated by peer group identification.

Table 5.2: Calculating Experimental Group Means

	No emotion	Emotion
Pro-value / Agree	$b_0 + b_1$ (+ controls)	$b_0 + b_1 + b_2 + b_3$ (+ controls)
Anti-value / Disagree	b_0 (+ controls)	$b_0 + b_2$ (+ controls)

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[80] Ideology was measured in the pre-test with a seven-point scale, ranging from extremely liberal to extremely conservative.

The value ranking scale variable was first regressed onto the independent measures and control variables. The value scale variable yielded disappointing results; none of the coefficients of interest were close to reaching standard levels of significance. However, the policy scale variable yielded much more encouraging, if modest, results. See the first column of results below in Table 5.3.

Table 5.3: Results for Policy Scale Variable with Two Different Emotion Measures

|	Policy Scale *Emotion group assigned*	Policy Scale *Subjective emotion intensity*
Constant	.459 (.074)***	.617 (.108)***
b_1 Pro-value	-.061 (.071)	-.246 (.125)*
b_2 Emotion	-.105 (.073)	-.579 (.261)*
b_3 Value x Emotion	.183 (.108)^	.835 (.364)*
b_4 Ideology	.212 (.095)*	.215 (.094)*
b_5 Gender	.041 (.057)	.002 (.053)
N	79	77

Table entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
^ $p \leq .10$ * $p \leq .05$ ** $p \leq .01$ *** $p \leq .001$ (two-tailed test)

There is no significant difference between the pro-value and anti-value treatment groups when emotion is held at zero. (The coefficient b_1 is not statistically significant.) H1 is, therefore, not supported. However, the b_2 coefficient nears significance, and the sign is in the expected direction ($b_2 = -.11$, $p = .16$). Among those who received the anti-

individualism opinion stimulus, post-test views were less individualistic on average if

participants also received the emotion (i.e., embarrassment) stimulus. In addition, the b_3

coefficient (.18) is significant at the $p \leq .10$ level. This reveals that there is indeed an

interactive relationship; participants' reaction to the two sets of value stimuli changed

when self-conscious emotions were primed. Finally, if we add b_2 and b_3, we get .08; the

sum is significant at $p = .07$.[81] This is the final evidence we need to support H2. Among

those who received the pro-individualism stimulus, post-test views were *more*

individualistic on average if participants also received the emotion (i.e., pride) stimulus.

To clarify these relationships, the estimated group means are graphed below in

Figure 5.2.

Figure 5.2: Predicted Values for Experimental Groups (Policy Scale)

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
[81] To calculate the significance level of the effect of emotion on those who received the pro-value stimulus, i.e., the sum of b_2 and b_3, I took the square root of the following: $var(b_2) + (Value)^2 var(b_3) + 2(Value)cov(b_2, b_3)$. See Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006).

In the graph, ideology is held at its median ("slightly liberal") and gender is held at zero (males), although note that this latter decision makes little difference as gender has no significant effect on the dependent variable. We see in the graph that, although the opinion stimuli on their own did not affect attitudes as expected, participants' opinions moved in the direction of conformity with the stimuli when pride or embarrassment was primed.[82]

One important drawback of the above analysis, however, is that it only takes into account whether or not participants were assigned to receive an emotion prime. It does not include any measure of participants' subjective emotional experiences, including any strong emotional reactions (pride or embarrassment) participants may have had to the value stimuli when the emotion primes were *not* present. Therefore, I carried out a second analysis, replacing assignment to an emotion group with participants' subjective emotional reactions. The statistical model is the same as that used above, except that "emotion" ranges from zero to .625 (the top of the scale, 1, is not reached). Findings with this second emotion measure are presented in the second column of Table 5.3 (above).

Here, there is a significant difference between the pro-value and anti-value treatment groups when emotion is held at zero. The coefficient b_1 (-.25) is statistically significant at $p \leq .10$. However, the sign is in the wrong direction: In response to the pro-individualism stimulus, participants who had no self-conscious emotional reaction to the stimuli (they may or may not have received the emotion prime) expressed *less* of a commitment to individualism. Thus, H1 is not supported in this analysis either. However, both the b_2 (-.58) and the b_3 (.84) coefficients reach a significance level of $p \leq .05$ and

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[82] The raw means show the same pattern of results. Means were .51 for the pro-value message group, and .59 for the pride plus pro-value message group; one-tailed t-test p=.12. Means were .58 for the anti-value message group and .47 for the embarrassment plus anti-value message group; one-tailed t-test p=.08.

are in the expected direction. Among those who received the anti-individualism stimulus, post-test views became *less* individualistic—as we would expect and as we saw in the last analysis—as the intensity of embarrassment, pride, etc. increased. When we add b_2 and b_3, we get .26, which implies that, in the pro-value condition, emotion intensity pushes opinion in the individualism direction, again as we expect and saw before. However, while the magnitude of this effect is large, the significance level is only $p = .25$.

Again, these effects are easier to digest when graphed. Predicted values are graphed below in Figure 5.3.

Figure 5.3: Predicted Values with Subjective Emotion Intensity (Policy Scale)

The effect of emotion is examined at 0, at its mid-point (.3125), and at its end-point (.625); ideology is set to its median and gender to zero.[83] It is of note that the two lines cross when the self-conscious emotion intensity scale is at its median. Those who experienced a less intense emotional reaction than most tended to counter-argue against the value stimuli, whereas those who experienced a more intense emotional reaction than most were increasingly persuaded by the stimuli. It may be that not only are self-conscious emotions associated with conformity, but that low levels of self-conscious emotion are actually associated with resisting conformity.

There is one more hypothesis yet to test. H3 suggests that these results are mediated to some extent by participants' identification with the "in-group" (i.e., University of Michigan undergraduates). To test this hypothesis, I estimated the basic regression model with the assigned emotion groups separately for three levels of identification: low, median, and high.[84] As we see below in Table 5.4, the key coefficients are not significant when closeness to UM undergraduates is low or moderate, but they are significant when closeness is high. This implies that the relationships specified in H2 are indeed mediated by identity; high identifiers appear to be the ones most affected by the emotion primes. However, the findings also reveal that the counterintuitive effect observed among those who received the pro-value opinion stimulus but no emotion prime (B_1) is *also* mediated by identity; high identifiers were the only ones to move away from the opinion stimulus when emotion was *not* primed.

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[83] Note also that results for the value scale dependent variable grow closer to standard levels of significance when emotional intensity is included in the statistical model rather than assignment to an emotion priming group. Coefficients are signed as they are in the policy scale analysis, but the interaction term only reaches a p-level of .34.

[84] The identification variable—a feeling of closeness or similarity to other UM students—technically had five possible values. However, the lowest ("not close at all") and highest ("very close") values were chosen by only a handful of participants, and so I assigned the next closest value to these participants.

Table 5.4: Results for Policy Scale Variable According to Identity

	Policy Scale *Low identity*	Policy Scale *Median identity*	Policy Scale *High identity*
Constant	n.s.	.415 (.074)***	.618 (.132)***
b_1 Pro-value	n.s.	n.s.	-.249 (.142)^
b_2 Emotion	n.s.	n.s.	-.298 (.151)^
b_3 Value x Emotion	n.s.	n.s.	.399 (.207)^
b_4 Ideology	.606^	n.s.	n.s.
b_5 Gender	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
N	15	36	25

Table entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
^ $p \leq .10$ * $p \leq .05$ ** $p \leq .01$ *** $p \leq .001$ (two-tailed test)

This said, note that the pattern of results displayed in Table 5.4 emerged only with

respect to the assigned emotion variable; when the analysis was repeated with the

subjective emotion intensity variable, the findings were not significant for high identifiers

and no similar pattern emerged.

Discussion and Conclusion

Overall, the findings suggest that the self-conscious emotions pride and embarrassment

play an important role in increasing individuals' susceptibility to social influence by

peers. When student participants simply read opinion information about other students'

beliefs regarding economic individualism, they were not influenced on average; however, when their sense of pride or embarrassment was primed preceding the stimulus, participants on average did respond to the stimulus as expected by conforming their views on economic individualism to the perceived views of their college peers. The same pattern occurred with respect to the measured intensity of participants' self-conscious emotional reactions to the stimuli.

While Hypothesis 1 was not supported, these somewhat disappointing results can be interpreted as lending even stronger support to Hypotheses 2: *Only* with self-conscious emotional priming, or self-conscious emotional reactions above the median, did the information regarding the value-beliefs of college peers influence participants. Returning to the critique of Turner's (and self-categorization theory's) emphasis on cognition in Chapter 1, these findings suggest that emotion may be important because it has the potential to problematize ways in which we are different from our peers, or make ways in which we are similar appear to be great successes. In other words, we differ from peers in many respects, and we are similar to peers in many respects. But only when we feel emotionally self-conscious about these similarities or differences—self-consciously lousy or self-consciously elated—are we motivated to conform.

There is an important caveat to these findings, however: The value ranking variable proved tough to experimentally manipulate. Regression findings with respect to the value scale dependent variable tended to push in the same direction as the policy scale findings, but the value scale findings never reached standard levels of significance.

Finally, Hypothesis 3 posited that high identifiers would be more susceptible to social influence in general, and to social-*emotional* influence in particular. High

identifiers did *not* appear to be more susceptible to social influence in the absence of the emotion primes; in fact, high identifiers were the only participants who, on average, moved opposite the opinion stimuli in this condition. However, these participants were *also* the only ones who appeared to be susceptible to social influence when either pride or embarrassment was primed. Why might this pattern exist?

We can leverage additional information from the experiment to understand better why the high identifiers were not susceptible to influence in the absence of emotion primes. Seventeen participants, whose data are not analyzed in the OLS regressions above, were part of a "pure" control group. If we restrict our focus to just those control participants who were high identifiers, we find that their mean position on the policy scale ($M = .5$) was almost exactly the same as the mean among those who received just the pro-value stimulus ($M = .49$). Those who received just the anti-value stimulus expressed views that were more individualistic than both the control and the pro-value group ($M = .68$). In sum, it was those who received the anti-economic individualism stimulus who polarized against their peers' views.

One way of understanding these results is by hypothesizing that Michigan students who highly identify with the student body feel more confident in their values. In a low intensity social situation like the one represented in the Economic Individualism Experiment, the well-integrated students may label disagreeing peers as a value out-group—in this case, "lazy" student peers—and recoil against those perceived inferior values, championing their own values even more strongly. This said, if indeed these results are due to a greater feeling of confidence, or subjective validity, this feeling dissipated once the students' self-conscious emotions were primed. I argue that the pride

and embarrassment primes increased the salience of peer approval in these participants'

minds, motivating them to loosen their commitment to their previously held values. The

only problem with this interpretation is that it does not mesh with the finding in Chapter 4

that strong Catholic identifiers exhibited the most influence, even when peers were

perceived as championing values with which participants largely disagreed at the outset.

This discrepancy will be taken up in the concluding chapter.

Moving on, an important counterargument can be made that challenges the

observed effects of the emotion primes. Perhaps participants' emotional arousal, in

general—and *not* self-conscious emotions, in particular—motivated greater attention to

the experimental stimuli. To address this argument, I additively combined subjective

measures of three "basic" emotions—anger, anxiety, and enthusiasm—just as I had

combined subjective self-conscious emotion measures (i.e., pride, self-confidence,

embarrassment, and insecurity). If the same pattern appears when anger, anxiety, and

enthusiasm are substituted for the four self-conscious emotions, then it may well be that

emotional arousal was in fact at work instead. However, the same pattern did *not* emerge.

A second important counterargument challenging the observed effects flows from

Affective Intelligence theory (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000). Perhaps self-

conscious emotions co-vary with anxiety, and anxiety is a critical "missing variable"

causing the observed effects by increasing participants' attentiveness to the opinion

stimuli. This hypothesis is similar to the arousal hypothesis above. A simple correlational

analysis reveals that the self-conscious emotion intensity scale and the single anxiety

measure do in fact co-vary ($r = .31$). And, when we replace the self-conscious emotion

variable with the anxiety variable in our regression analysis, a pattern emerges that is

similar to that discussed in the previous section, although the statistical significance of

the emotion coefficients are slightly lower. See the first column of Table 5.5 below.

Table 5.5: Results for Policy Scale Variable with Anxiety

	Policy Scale	Policy Scale
Constant	.464 (.070)***	.602 (.109)***
b_1 Pro-value	-.054 (.069)	-.246 (.125)*
b_2 Self-Conscious Emotion	--	-.413 (.280)
b_3 Value x Emotion	--	.672 (.389)^
b_4 Anxiety	-.341 (.161)*	-.274 (.174)
b_5 Value x Anxiety	.395 (.217)^	.274 (.232)
b_6 Ideology	.229 (.094)*	.224 (094)*
b_7 Gender	.464 (.055)	.026 (.056)
N	79	77

Table entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
^ $p \leq .10$ * $p \leq .05$ ** $p \leq .01$ *** $p \leq .001$ (two-tailed test)

When *both* the self-conscious emotion intensity variables and the anxiety

variables are entered into the regression equation simultaneously, the self-conscious

emotion results are weakened ($b_2 = -.41$, $p = .15$; $b_3 = .67$, $p = .09$) but they remain

stronger than the anxiety results ($b_4 = -.27$, $p = .12$; $b_5 = .27$, $p = .24$). Looking closely, if anxiety has any effect at all, it seems to push participants who have received the anti-individualism stimulus further in the anti-individualism direction. This result makes sense within the "affective intelligence" framework: Only when the information contained within the stimulus is surprising—Michigan students reject individualism!?—does anxiety result and produce some opinion change. The two theories appear to be complementary to one another in this analysis.

In closing, this chapter has described a more stringent test of the emotional mechanisms that are a critical part of Social-Emotional Influence Theory. The results suggest that, where pride and embarrassment are greater, whether because of characteristics particular to the individual or to the context in which he or she finds him or herself, the individual is more likely to internalize the political values of his or her peers. In so doing, the findings bolster the more tentative findings with respect to self-conscious emotional mediation presented in Chapter 4. The findings with respect to identity are more ambiguous: They suggest that identity plays a key role in social-emotional influence but that, in some settings, strong identification—perhaps due to the confidence that stems from social status—can in fact cause individuals to resist influence.

Appendix A: Stimuli

Emotion Stimuli

<u>Pride</u>

Take a moment to imagine each of the following scenarios, focusing on how each situation would make you **feel**. Then circle the situation that you believe would make you feel the **best**.

       a. You leave school in April to spend the summer at home. One of your goals is to improve the way you look—get in shape, buy some new clothes, maybe get a new haircut, etc. When you return to school in the fall, everyone tells you how great you look. You go to a party the first weekend back, and two cute guys (or girls) approach you during the evening and ask you out.

       b. You attend a family gathering over winter break with various family members. One of your relatives asks you how school is going. As it happens, you got straight As in the fall semester and have secured a really prestigious summer internship, all of which you tell your relatives. The group gushes about your accomplishments, and your mom looks especially pleased.

c. You are standing on the curb of a busy street, waiting

for the light to turn green so that you can cross, when you

see a little girl wander away from her mother and dart into

the street. You run after her into the traffic, pick her up,

and return her to her mother. A small crowd that has

gathered on the sidewalk to watch breaks into applause.

Embarrassment

Take a moment to imagine each of the following scenarios, focusing on how each

situation would make you **feel**. Then circle the situation that you believe would make

you feel the **worst**.

a. You are on a first date with someone you really like.

You go to dinner, then to a party. As the evening is coming

to an end, both of you are sitting together on a couch. Your

date leans in close to you, and you're thinking it is finally

time for a kiss. But, instead, your date whispers to you,

"Sorry to tell you this, but, uh, the zipper on your pants has

been down since we left the restaurant."

b. It's a warm spring day, and you are walking through the

Diag, which is filled with students socializing, studying,

playing Frisbee, etc. All of a sudden you trip and, with a

loud grunt, fall down. Several books and the bag you had been carrying scatter all around you. Everyone on the Diag seems to stop what they are doing to stare at you sprawled out on the pavement.

c. You are attending the wedding ceremony of a family member. The room is quiet, except for the bride and groom exchanging their vows. All of a sudden you get a case of the hiccups. Hiccup! Hiccup! A number of people sitting around you turn to you and say "shhhhh……" You put your hand over your mouth, but you can't stop hiccupping.

## Opinion Stimuli (Pro-Economic Individualism Version)

HOW DO YOU COMPARE?
(PLEASE READ THE INFORMATION BELOW AND THEN ANSWER THE QUESTION THAT FOLLOWS.)

In the spring of 2005, researchers at UCLA (University of California, Los Angeles) carried out opinion polls of college students at ten major universities throughout the United States, including the University of Michigan. UCLA researchers asked random samples of undergraduate students at each university about what majors they chose and why, about study habits and extracurricular activities, about Internet use, about their consumer habits, and, finally, about various social attitudes and political opinions.

Two of the survey questions focused on attitudes regarding "economic individualism." According to results published last year in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, most University of Michigan students **agree** with this principle.

64% of Univ. of Michigan undergraduates either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement "Individuals should strive to be financially self-reliant."

N = 325

61% of Univ. of Michigan undergraduates either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement "One ought to work hard in life."

N=318

19. You were asked to respond to the same two statements on page 2. Compare your answers to the published data and then check the appropriate response below.
I am in agreement with the majority of U of M undergraduate students….
____ on **both** survey items.
____ on **one** of the survey items.
____ on **neither** of the survey items.

Appendix B: Measures

Value Ranking Measure

Below is a list of six opinions. Please rank them according to how **important** you

believe each one is. The most important opinion should receive a "1," the second most

important a "2," the third most important a "3," and so on. If you disagree with a

statement, place an "X" in the blank space provided.

All citizens ought to have an equal chance to influence the government.

RANK _____

The government should see to it that all Americans have the basic necessities: food,

clothing, and shelter.

RANK_____

Schools and businesses should not discriminate according to race, gender, or religion.

RANK _____

To make ends meet, people should rely on their own hard work, not on other people

or the government.

RANK _____

People should be free to think and behave however they would like.

RANK _____

The national government ought to restrict itself to carrying out only the most essential

activities.

RANK _____

Government Policy Questions

The federal government currently gives money for college to many low-income high school graduates. Some people believe that these college grants should go *only* to those low-income graduates who have taken rigorous courses in high school. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Other people feel that such college grants should go to *all* low-income high school graduates, regardless of what courses they have taken. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale? (Money for poor grads only if rigorous courses (1), Neutral (4), Money for all poor grads (7))

Currently, the government in Washington provides aid to low-income, single mothers who have dependent children; this program is typically referred to as "welfare." Some people feel that the government should require these women to work in order to receive welfare benefits. Suppose these people are at one end of the scale, at point 1. Others feel that the government should provide welfare regardless of work status. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale? (Require welfare recipients to work (1), Neutral (4), Provide welfare regardless of work status (7))

Political Ideology

There is a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a seven-point

scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely

liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or

haven't you thought much about this? (Extremely liberal / Liberal / Slightly liberal /

Moderate / Slightly conservative / Conservative / Extremely conservative)

Emotions Assessed Following Stimuli

Angry, annoyed, anxious, discouraged, embarrassed, enthusiastic, happy, insecure,

interested, pleased with myself, proud, sad, self-confident, surprised

Identification with UM Undergraduates

Generally speaking, how *close* do you feel to U of M undergraduates—to what extent do

you feel that they are like you in terms of their ideas and interests and feelings about

things? (Not close at all (1) / Somewhat close (3) / Very close (5))

Chapter 6

Social-Emotional Influence and Americans' Support
for Economic Equality

Maria is in a bind. She knows *that she works as hard as she can, that she hasn't enough money, that her employers underpay her, that many people deserve neither their wealth nor their poverty, and that her descendents seem destined to relive her frustrations. But she* believes *that the rich should keep their wealth, that a hardworking cleaner deserves less than a lazy executive, that work and education are supposed to bring upward mobility, and that wages should not reflect need or promote equality.*[85]

In Chapter 5, I examined experimental evidence for social-emotional influence among college students and with respect to the value economic individualism. This chapter builds on that discussion by testing the emotional mechanisms of the model with a fuller experimental design and by examining social-emotional influence with respect to a new politically relevant value (economic equality), identity group (Americans), and mode of public opinion (letters to the editor). I also take advantage of a representative sample of Americans to test whether influence varies according to certain demographic factors, such as age. Finally, the chapter examines the political relevance of economic equality with an analysis of its influence on presidential approval and vote choice.

Let me discuss these aspects of the Economic Equality Experiment in more detail. First, the study focuses on social-emotional influence over the value economic equality. The value economic equality refers to what Hochschild calls "strict equality" with special

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[85] From Jennifer Hochschild's *What's Fair? American Beliefs about Distributive Justice* (1981). Page 114.

reference to the economic realm: "All community members deserve equal amounts of the good being divided" (1981, 52). When one is committed to economic equality, one believes that equality of income and wealth among members of a society is normatively desirable.[86] Achieving perfect equality is an impossibility, of course. In more practical terms, citizens' commitment to economic equality may reflect "a desire…for a limited range of wealth—a floor on income or an income limit" (Feldman 1999, 161).

Levels of economic inequality in the U.S. have reached record levels, making understanding the dynamics underlying public sentiment toward economic equality and inequality particularly relevant. In addition, Americans' ambivalence with respect to economic equality (Feldman 1999; Hochschild 1981)[87] suggests that beliefs regarding this value may be more susceptible to peer influence than other value beliefs.

Second, social-emotional influence is examined among Americans. This may seem an odd choice to some scholars of American politics because the field has tended to view "identity groups" as those subsumed *by* the nation, not the nation itself. However, researchers in American politics are increasingly recognizing the American nation as an identity group, in keeping with psychological theories on social identity (Citrin, Sears, Muste, and Wong 2001; Huddy and Khatib 2007; Transue 2007). Further, many studies of social influence and socialization find that perceptions of what "the nation" thinks, whether interpreted as majority opinion or elite views, influence individual Americans' opinions (e.g., Bartels 1985, 1987; McClosky and Zaller 1984). A practical advantage to

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[86] Many prefer the term "equality of results." I believe the term "economic equality" best represents the ideal of equality of economic resources in a society. The terminology reflects Verba and Orren's (1985) use of "income equality," with "economic" substituted for "income" to denote a focus on both wealth and income equality. Note that the term "equality of results," originally coined to stand in contrast to "equality of opportunity," contains no reference to income, wealth, or economics.
[87] Although see Markus (2001) for empirical analyses suggesting that Americans are far more willing to advocate government intervention in the economy than is assumed by many.

studying Americans as a group is that, given the immense interest in representative surveys of the nation, it is relatively easy to procure data from a representative sample. (Indeed, Americans' great interest in polling one another is yet another indication that to be American is of great importance to them.)

Third, the Economic Equality Experiment builds on the previous experiment by examining another source of social influence. Rather than looking at opinion polls, this experiment examines the effects of what we might call more "qualitative" opinions that appear in the media: lengthy, original opinion statements made by a small number of identifiable individuals. In this case, newspaper letters to the editor are examined.

Fourth, and finally, the study makes two substantive changes with respect to its examination of emotion. First, instead of embarrassment, shame is the negative self-conscious emotion aroused. Given shame's theoretical importance in the SEI model, its effects need testing. Second, instead of emotion primes, this experiment uses emotion *inductions*. The inductions are described in detail in the next section.

In addition to changes intended to extend the theoretical reach of the SEI model, the study also includes a number of design improvements. The experiment assesses the emotional mechanisms of social-emotional influence among a representative sample of Americans. Also, a larger and more reliable set of dependent variables is tested.

However the most important improvement addresses a key shortcoming of the experimental design of the Economic Individualism Experiment. That study, as you will recall, employed a 2x2 design. Participants were exposed to a student poll that indicated that peers were either in favor of economic individualism or against economic individualism. About half of participants were exposed to a relevant emotion prime

(either pride or embarrassment) preceding the poll. The simplicity of the design was necessitated because of the small number of participants; however, in its simplicity, the design potentially masked some important effects.

In particular, it is possible that pride had the direct effect of increasing commitment to economic individualism, and embarrassment the direct effect of decreasing it. If this were the case, then what appears to be an interaction taking place between the opinion and emotion stimuli is really the result of additive effects. On the other hand, it is also possible that direct effects worked in the *opposite* direction to dampen the opinion / emotion interactions. For example, if pride, on its own, tends to decrease enthusiasm for economic individualism, then the observed effects would have underestimated the interaction effect. In short, as do most survey analyses that incorporate interaction terms, experiments ideally will investigate the direct effects of the relevant variables by including them separately in the design, as well as in combination. The implementation of this design improvement is described in detail in the next section.

Finally, despite the improvements, there is one noticeable weakness of the Economic Equality Experiment: "American identity" was not measured. The survey instrument accompanying the experiment had extremely limited space, and national identity (or patriotism) was not included for two reasons: First, studies suggest that American patriotism is high but varies little across the population (Pei 2003; Smith and Jarkko 1998); second, patriotism measures tend to be confounded with ideological conservatism (Huddy and Khatib 2007), an overlap that would make separating the effects of identity from conservatism quite difficult, if not impossible. This said, as this study was being put into the field, Huddy and Khatib (2007) introduced a measure of

American identity that is not confounded with conservatism. A replication of the Economic Equality Study, carried out with University of Michigan students and including the Huddy and Khatib measure, will be discussed in future work.

The Economic Equality Experiment

Study Administration and Sample

The company Polimetrix administered the survey-experiment[88] via the Internet in February 2007. Participants were told that they would be participating in a survey. After completing the study, participants were thoroughly debriefed as to the goals of the research project and the experimental manipulations.

Polimetrix specializes in "matching" samples of participants pulled from their large panel to census data in order to ensure a representative sample. The sampling and matching procedures were as follows. First, a random sample of 300 Americans was drawn from the U.S. census and then randomly assigned to one of the six treatment groups. A *larger* sample was then randomly drawn from the Polimetrix panel; those who agreed to participate were randomly assigned to one of the six treatment groups. After completing the experiment, the data from participants in each Polimetrix treatment group were "matched down" to the appropriate treatment group in the census sample in order to increase the representativeness of the experiment.[89]

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[88] The study is formally considered a "survey-experiment" because it includes both an experimental manipulation as well as survey questions that were administered to a probability sample.

[89] The sample drawn from the Polimetrix panel was partially adjusted for a response model and was larger than necessary so that each of the six treatment groups could be "matched down" to the appropriate census group. The matching variables used were age, gender, race, education, and party affiliation.

The experiment had a 3x2 design. Participants were presented with a pride induction, a shame induction, or no induction, and then participants either did or did not read a pro-economic equality opinion stimulus. The basic experimental design, including the size of each cell, is represented below in Table 6.1. The experimental manipulations were followed by a post-test which contained the various dependent measures. Demographic information, such as gender, and general political attributes, such as partisanship and political ideology, were measured prior to the study by Polimetrix.

Table 6.1: Experimental Design

	Letters to the Editor	No Letters
Pride	50	50
Shame	50	50
No Emotion	50	50

Half of the participants received five excerpts from real pro-equality letters to the editor from U.S. newspapers;[90] the other half did not receive any excerpts. To enhance the experiment's internal validity, the letter excerpts were selected and edited so that they focused tightly on the writer's commitment to economic equality; other information, such as references to policy proposals or specific political leaders, was left out. The letters were not intended to be perceived by participants as representative of U.S. opinion but rather to communicate that a large portion of the American electorate supports economic equality. In order to increase the perceived authenticity of the letter excerpts, several steps were taken. The abbreviated names of letter writers and the newspapers from which

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[90] Two of the excerpts were actually made up of parts of two different letters.

the excerpts were drawn[91] were retained. In addition, the layout and design of the excerpts were intended to evoke the online versions of the newspapers in question. See Appendix A for the letters as they appeared to participants.

As in the previous study, this study tests for emotional mediation via experimental arousal of the presumed mediator. Thus, the letters / no letters factor was crossed with a second factor: whether pride, shame, or no emotion was induced preceding participant exposure to the letter excerpts. The emotion inductions in this experiment took the form of a pair of "thought exercises" in which participants were asked to think about aspects of themselves and past events that made them feel proud or ashamed (see Appendix A for exact wording).[92] The inductions were expected to motivate increased commitment to the value espoused in the opinion stimuli that followed.

A brief word about emotion inductions is in order. In many respects, emotion inductions are similar to emotion primes; they are intended to arouse a specific emotion, and they often precede a stimulus with the expectation that they will emotionally color the participant's reaction to the stimulus. However, as the name suggests, "inductions" tend to be lengthier and more conscious exercises that are intended to arouse the target emotion to a greater degree than primes. That was expected to be the case in this study.

The emotional mechanisms presumed to be at work were slightly different than those at work in the study described in Chapter 5. Recall that, in the Economic Individualism Experiment, all participants endorsed economic individualism, and their

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[91] In cases where two letters from different newspapers were combined, obviously only one name and newspaper was chosen to be associated with the letter excerpt.

[92] The choice to use a thought-exercise, as opposed to a written exercise (e.g., Lerner et al. 2003; Valentino et al. 2008), was deliberate. While written exercises are preferred under normal circumstances (they are likely to generate stronger emotions because of the greater mental effort involved in putting one's thoughts to paper, as well as because of the increased likelihood that participants will seriously engage with the task if they perceive themselves to be potentially held accountable via a written record), it was determined that such a record of response to the shame inductions would create substantial privacy concerns.

support for that value was made salient during the course of the study. In contrast, it was assumed that most of the participants in the Economic Equality Experiment came to the study feeling ambivalent about economic equality, in other words, not being sure where they stood with respect to the value because of conflicting beliefs (and feelings).

It was hypothesized that participants in the Economic Equality Experiment who received the pride induction would apply their pride to the social situation that the opinion stimulus presented in a manner similar to that in the preceding experiment. Only now, participants would be rewriting the past somewhat: emphasizing evidence (i.e., their set of beliefs supporting economic equality) congruent with the feeling of pride. Pride would then reinforce those beliefs, consistent with SEI Theory. On the other hand, I hypothesized that participants who received the shame induction would emphasize evidence (i.e., their set of beliefs opposing equality) congruent with the feeling of shame. Shame would then mark those beliefs as disvalues, again, consistent with the theory.

After each emotion induction, participants answered a short question regarding the relevant emotion. These follow-up questions were intended to encourage participants to take the thought-exercises seriously, to provide a manipulation check regarding whether the inductions had successfully aroused the emotion in question, and to provide a rough measure of the variability of responses among participants to the inductions.[93]

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[93] Participants in the pride condition had a mean level of pride of .78 on a 0 to 1 scale, with 0 representing no pride reported in response to either induction, and 1 representing extreme pride in response to both. Participants in the shame condition had a mean level of shame of .48, again with 0 representing no shame reported in response to either induction, and 1 representing extreme shame in response to both.

<u>Dependant Variables</u>

Economic Equality Scale There are several extant scales that measure beliefs regarding economic equality, i.e., equality of results; however, these measures are problematic as value measures for a number of reasons. A scale by Kluegel and Smith (1986) measures a mix of factual beliefs, self-interest tied to equality, and values; often these various components are in the same question, leading to double-barreled items. The General Social Survey has asked a number of questions regarding economic equality over the years; however, most focus on factual beliefs, not value beliefs. Finally, Verba and Orren (1985) take an original approach to the topic of economic equality by asking respondents to indicate what they believe the average annual salary to be for various occupations (e.g., grade school teacher, plumber, star center of an NBA basketball team) and then to indicate what *fair* average salaries would be. Such a measure has the advantage of being highly specific rather than hypothetical (Converse and Presser 1986). That said, it is so specific to an era—in terms of both the occupations and salaries listed—that comparability over time is difficult. The measure is also restricted to notions of *income* inequality, leaving beliefs regarding overall earnings, or wealth, untapped.

Given the weaknesses of past measures, I created an original measure[94] of the value economic equality for the purpose of this study. The scale includes eight Likert-type agree/disagree items. The "top" of the scale is intended to represent endorsement of the value economic equality, and the "bottom" of the scale to represent opposition to equality (or endorsement of *in*equality). Each of four related themes contains one pro-equality and one anti-equality item, creating a balanced scale.

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[94] Although note that some of the themes in the scale and wording of the items are loosely drawn from items found in the General Social Survey, the American National Election Studies, and Kluegel and Smith's Egalitarianism Scale (1986).

The first four items are the purest measures of belief in economic equality. These items address the respondent's notions of economic fairness and his or her vision of what an ideal society would look like (Rokeach 1973; Hochschild 1981). The items are abstract and do not depend on the respondent's perception of "facts on the ground." The second set of four items is somewhat more concrete. These items ask respondents for their opinions on the gap between the rich and the poor and whether inequality is a problem. In focusing on the here-and-now, they were intended to question respondents about their commitment to economic equality in a second, more accessible way.[95] It was thought that these questions would make the scale more reliable, and, in fact, they did; these items were more closely correlated with the overall value scale. The additively combined items create a continuous scale with a Cronbach's alpha of .88 and a mean of .48. The Economic Equality Scale, as well as all of the dependent variables that follow, ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 representing the pro-equality, or more liberal, response. Exact question wording for all dependent variables is available in the Appendix B.

Policy Opinion Scales I used two additional scales to gauge whether participants would apply hypothesized value changes to the realm of government policy, i.e., whether they would be more willing to advocate governmental means to the end of greater equality. The Public Policy Scale additively combined two questions on actual policy items being considered by Congress at the time of the experiment: adjusting the minimum wage and healthcare spending.[96] The alpha for this scale was .74 and the mean

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[95] One important problem with value questions that focus on actual circumstances is that participants' perceptions of those circumstances will affect their answers. For example, a supporter of economic equality might argue that the gap between the rich and the poor is *not* too big if she believes that incomes in the U.S. are approximately equal. To help equalize information about economic inequality, all participants read information stating that economic inequality in the U.S. has recently been on the rise.

[96] The healthcare item was modeled on questions on federal spending that have often appeared in the American National Election Study (ANES); the minimum wage question is original to this study.

.61. The Tax Policy Scale additively combined two questions on tax policy: whether wealthy Americans pay an appropriate amount of taxes and whether the federal government should amend the estate tax. The alpha was .71 and the mean .52.[97]

Electoral Opinion Scales Two variables were used to gauge the link between relative commitment to economic equality and the ballot box. Participants were asked a standard question regarding approval of President Bush as well as a question intended to tap their expected vote choice in the 2008 presidential election.

Hypotheses and Exploratory Investigations

We can investigate several hypotheses related to the Social-Emotional Influence model and its political import with data from the Economic Equality Experiment.

The first hypothesis (H1) examines group influence: *In response to the letters to the editor, participants will become more committed to economic equality*.

The second hypothesis (H2) examines emotional mediation of the above group influence: *When an emotion is induced preceding the letters to the editor, participants' commitment to economic equality will be strengthened (relative to the effect of the letters)*. Increased commitment to economic equality will be expressed directly via the Economic Equality Scale and indirectly via endorsement of government intervention in the economy to promote equality.

The third hypothesis (H3) examines the political relevance of social-emotional influence. It is expected that, controlling for partisanship and political ideology (as well

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[97] An additional tax policy question asked participants whether poor Americans ought to be taxed more or less (with wanting to tax the poor less being the liberal response); unfortunately, answers to this question did not "hang together" well with the other two tax items, the reason being that liberals and conservatives alike tended to believe that the poor should pay fewer taxes.

as demographic factors), *the Economic Equality Scale will be closely associated with both relative (dis)approval of President Bush's performance in office and expected vote choice in the 2008 presidential election.*

Finally, we take advantage of the relatively large and representative sample to explore potential interactions with age. While previous work has suggested that socialization is more prevalent among the young (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb 1991; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2007; Sears and Valentino 1997), the findings in Chapters 4 and 5 in fact suggest that influence may be more likely among older than younger adults. Thus, *I explore whether social-emotional influence varies by age in the sample.*[98]

Data Analyses

The first two hypotheses were tested with ordinary least squares regression. The effects of pride and shame were investigated separately. The effects of the stimuli on three dependent variables were examined: the Economic Equality Scale, the Public Policy Scale, and the Tax Policy Scale. The first model investigated was: $DV = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Letters + \beta_2 Pride + \beta_3 Shame + \beta_4 Letters \times Pride + \beta_5 Letters \times Shame + \beta_6 Ideology$[99] $+ \varepsilon$.

This basic model allows us to estimate the "main effects" of the letters and the pride and shame inductions separately, and then test whether the pride and shame

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[98] Interactions were also explored with respect to political ideology. As discussed in Chapter 2, when participants' pre-existing value and attitude commitments are strong *and* they disagree with the opinions expressed in the stimuli, individuals may resist being influenced or even polarize, becoming more committed to their original views. This said, I could find no evidence of ideological polarization in these data. In some instances, conservatives reacted to the stimuli somewhat differently than did moderates and liberals, but the differences were not pronounced or consistent across the dependent measures.

[99] ANOVAs were conducted to check whether the experimental groups differed with respect to demographic and political variables possibly correlated with the dependent variables. Randomization with respect to political ideology failed (p=.08), and so that variable was included as a control variable.

inductions *when combined with the letters* had an effect over and above the additive effect of the two variables (i.e., an emotion induction and the letters). The coefficients that represent these important interactive effects are β_4 and β_5.

If the relationships among the experimental groups are as expected, then graphed results should resemble Figure 6.1a or 6.1b. H1 predicts that the "letters" line (dashed with triangular markers) will be above the "no letters" line (solid with circular markers). H2 predicts that the difference between the two lines will increase (by b_4 or b_5) when an emotion is induced.

Extant research suggests no particular hypotheses regarding the direct effects of pride and shame on this set of dependent variables. Thus, the pattern in Figure 6.1a shows one possible set of results should there be no direct emotional effects and should the two hypotheses be upheld. Figure 6.1b shows another possible set of results should there be small direct emotional effects and, again, should the two hypotheses be upheld.

Figures 6.1a / 1b: Expected Relationships

Contrary to these expectations, however, the initial cut at the results largely revealed null findings. P-values for the coefficients of interest (b_1, b_4, and b_5) were generally high. The exception was the Tax Policy regression analysis. Here, participants expressed more egalitarian views with respect to taxes if they received the pro-equality letters to the editor ($b_1 = .11$, $p \leq .10$). This analysis also revealed a direct effect for shame ($b_3 = .14$, $p \leq .05$). No interaction effects were observed.

While the stimuli appeared to have minimal effects on participants' views *on average*, further analyses revealed differential effects among age groups in the sample. I first divided up participants according to three standard age categories: 35 and under (young adults); 36-64 (middle aged adults); and 65 and older (retirement age adults). Regression analyses revealed a number of significant age interactions. Closer analysis revealed that patterns of results for the two older groups were similar to one another and distinct from the youngest age group. Or, in other words, the youngest age group (35 and under) reacted to the stimuli differently than did older participants.

The above model (DV = $\beta_0 + \beta_1$Letters + β_2Pride + β_3Shame + β_4Letters x Pride + β_5Letters x Shame + β_6Ideology + ε) was re-estimated with respect to the three dependent variables for the two age groups separately. Below, regression results with respect to the younger group are presented first, followed by those for the rest of the sample.

Note that the raw experimental group means according to age group reveal roughly the same pattern of results as do the regression analyses (in which ideology is held constant); those means are available in Appendix C.

Results are presented in Table 6.2 for those 35 and under and with respect to the

Equality and Public Policy Scales. (Findings with respect to the Tax Policy Scale were

non-significant for all variables except for political ideology in this age group.)

Table 6.2: Experimental Results for Participants 35 and Under

	Economic Equality Scale	Public Policy Scale
Constant	.530 (.068)***	.700 (.093)***
b_1 Letters	-.098 (.088)	-.219 (.123)^
b_2 Pride	-.047 (.089)	-.047 (.119)
b_3 Shame	-.125 (.084)	-.248 (.114)*
b_4 Letters x Pride	.044 (.116)	-.002 (.155)
b_5 Letters x Shame	.242 (.113)*	.393 (.159)*
b_6 Ideology	.494 (.079)***	.509 (.108)***
N	73	65

Table entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
^ $p \leq .10$ * $p \leq .05$ ** $p \leq .01$ *** $p \leq .001$ (two-tailed test)

We find that b_1 is consistently negative across the two equations and is significant

in the Public Policy equation. Participants in this age group not only were not persuaded

by the stimuli on average, but, compared to the control group, became *less* egalitarian in

response to the opinion stimulus. Thus, H1 is not supported. However, we do see

evidence for social-emotional influence when shame (b_5), although not pride (b_4), is

aroused in participants. The Letters/Shame interaction is large, positive, and significant at

the $p \leq .05$ level in both equations. Thus, H2 is supported with respect to shame. Finally,

participants who received a shame induction but *no* letters to the editor were less

supportive of equality than the control group (see b_3), although this effect is only

significant ($p \leq .05$) in the Public Policy equation. These patterns are more easily seen if

we examine the graphed results in Figures 6.2a and 6.2b.

Figures 6.2a / 2b: Economic Equality and Public Policy Scale Results for 35 and Under[100]

The patterns are very similar across the two graphs: Relative pro-equality views in

the pure control group become more *anti*-equality (contrary to expectations) when the

letters are presented; however, participants opinions' move back toward equality when

shame is aroused in combination with the presentation of the letters. We also see an

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[100] In this set of graphs and the set below, political ideology is set to the scale mid-point (i.e., moderate).

opposite pattern among those who received no letters; exposure to the shame induction

alone caused movement in an *in*egalitarian direction.

One difference between the Economic Equality and Public Policy analyses

emerged: The experimental stimuli influenced participants' stances on egalitarian policy

more than their stances on the abstract value economic equality. This pattern also

emerged among the older participants. This difference is in keeping with previous

research on values, which suggests that they are more stable than attitudes generally.

Results with respect to participants over the age of 35 are presented next. Table

6.3 displays results for the Economic Equality and Tax Policy analyses among this age

group. (Results with respect to the Public Policy Scale were similarly patterned but not

statistically significant.)

Table 6.3: Experimental Results for Participants over 35

	Economic Equality Scale	Tax Policy Scale
Constant	.430 (.031)***	.439 (.045)***
b_1 Letters	.077 (.045)^	.147 (.067)*
b_2 Pride	.014 (.045)	.019 (.066)
b_3 Shame	.084 (.045)^	.160 (.065)*
b_4 Letters x Pride	-.032 (.066)	.041 (.097)
b_5 Letters x Shame	-.069 (.065)	-.095 (.097)

b_6 Ideology	.589 (.048)***	.686 (.071)***
N	200	182

Table entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
^ p ≤ .10   * p ≤ .05   ** p ≤ .01   *** p ≤ .001 (two-tailed test)

Here, H1 is supported: b_1 is positive and statistically significant in each of the equations (respectively: b_1 = .08, p ≤ .10; b_1 = .15, p ≤ .05). H2 is not supported, however. There is no evidence for social-emotional influence; b_4 and b_5 are not statistically significant. Also in contrast to younger participants, older participants became more *pro*-equality on average compared to the control group when their sense of shame was aroused. Let us look at these results graphed in Figures 6.3a and 6.3b.[101]

Figures 6.3a / 3b: Economic Equality and Tax Policy Scale Results for Over 35s

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
[101] Given that results were non-significant in the Tax Policy analysis with respect to the younger group, we can conclude that reactions among older participants are clearly driving the group-influence Tax Policy results for the whole sample reported previously.

Again, the patterns are very similar across the two graphs, and they are almost

mirror opposites of the patterns of reactions among the younger age group. Relative anti-

equality views in the pure control group shift to become more *pro*-equality (in line with

expectations) when the letters are presented. However, this persuasive effect does not

increase when pride or shame is aroused. In fact, the gap between the two lines closes as

the shame stimulus moves participants who received no letters in the pro-equality

direction but does not similarly move participants who did receive the letters.

Finally, our last set of analyses examine whether relative commitment (or

opposition) to economic equality affects individuals' electoral preferences. We expect

that economic egalitarians will be more likely to support political candidates who

champion egalitarian government policies. In order to test this hypothesis, I regressed two

measures of candidate evaluation and choice (approval of President Bush and preference

in the 2008 presidential election) onto a model that included the Economic Equality

Scale, party and political ideology, and several demographic control variables: age,

gender, race, ethnicity, income, and education.[102] The model investigated was as follows:

$$DV = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Equality Scale} + \beta_2 \text{Party} + \beta_3 \text{Ideology} + \beta_4 \text{Age} + \beta_5 \text{Gender} + \beta_6 \text{Black} +$$

$$\beta_7 \text{Hispanic} + \beta_8 \text{Income} + \beta_9 \text{Education} + \varepsilon.$$ [103] Note that all variables were placed on the 0

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[102] Age is a continuous variable representing the respondents' age at the time of the survey. Black and Hispanic are dummy variables representing self-identification in response to the question "What racial or ethnic group best describes you?" Income is a five-category item representing incomes under $25,000 and then from $25,001 - $50,000, $50,001 - $100,000, $100,001 - $200,000, and above $200,000. (Note that those who chose to answer the question placed themselves in only the first three categories.) Education is made up of six categories ranging from "No high school degree" to "Postgraduate degree."

[103] As with the similar analyses in Chapter 4, I checked to see whether the experimental manipulations may have affected the regression results. The treatments may have constituted "missing variables," i.e., absent variables correlated with both the independent and dependent variables, or they may have primed (or otherwise interacted with) the Economic Equality Scale. I first checked whether the experimental manipulations had direct effects on the dependent variables. As it turns out, inducing pride reduced approval of the President (b = -.13, p = .01) and reduced support for the Republican candidate in 2008 (b = -.11, p = .02). However, the inclusion of the treatment variables did not substantively alter the coefficients on the other variables. With respect to interaction effects, the above equation was re-estimated with two

to 1 interval. In addition, the dependent variables, the Equality Scale, party, and ideology were all coded so that the more Democratic/liberal positions take on higher values.

Results are displayed below in Table 6.4. As expected, the Economic Equality Scale is closely linked to disapproval of President Bush ($b_1 = .57$, $p \leq .001$). Note that it has a bigger impact on the dependent variable than both political party ($b_2 = .35$, $p \leq .001$) and ideology ($b_3 = .21$, $p \leq .01$).

Table 6.4: OLS Regression Results for Electoral Variables

	Bush Approval	Party Preference in '08 Presidential Election
Constant	.450 (.086)***	.440 (.080)***
Equality scale	.574 (.084)***	.391 (.079)***
Party	.350 (.063)***	.556 (.059)***
Political Ideology	.207 (.079)**	.295 (.075)***
Age	-.045 (.065)	.086 (.060)
Gender	.034 (.030)	.036 (.028)
Black	-.104 (.056)^	-.082 (.051)
Hispanic	-.065 (.051)	-.008 (.047)

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additional variables included: a dummy variable representing receipt of a treatment and a Treatment x Economic Equality interaction term. I found no evidence of priming or other interactive effects.

Income	.095 (.040)*	-.008 (.038)
Education	-.015 (.058)	-.021 (.054)
R^2	.608	.722
N	239	236

Table entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
$^\wedge$ p ≤ .10   * p ≤ .05   ** p ≤ .01   *** p ≤ .001 (two-tailed test)

The next dependent variable we examine is the participant's candidate preference with respect to the 2008 presidential election. Because the study occurred very early in the election cycle (long before the nominees would be decided), participants were asked to indicate whether they would rather see a Democrat or Republican win the Presidency in 2008, or whether it depended on the particular candidates. The "depends" option, which was quite popular, was coded as .5, in-between Republican (0) and Democrat (1).

The analysis reveals that the Equality Scale is in fact closely associated with one's preference in the 2008 presidential election. Not surprisingly, the most important predictor in this analysis was partisanship; with no specific candidates named, partisans reported that they would like to see a candidate from their own party elected (b_2 = .56, p ≤ .001). However, the Economic Equality Scale still had a large and highly significant coefficient (b_1 = .39, p ≤ .001),[104] again larger than political ideology (b_3 = .30, p ≤ .001).

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[104] The fact that the 2008 presidential election variable had just three categories raised the possibility that OLS regression would lead to biased results. Thus, I repeated the analysis with maximum likelihood ordered probit regression but found no substantive differences between the two analyses.

Discussion and Conclusion

Looking back on the results for the Economic Equality Experiment, patterns emerge that complement the findings in Chapters 4 and 5. First, older participants tended to be influenced when they were exposed to information suggesting that the nation values economic equality (i.e., the pro-equality letters to the editor); this influence took place with respect to two of the three dependent variables. However, influence among older participants did not increase as expected when pride and shame were aroused.

Second, mirroring the findings from the Economic Individualism Experiment, younger participants in the Economic Equality Experiment were *not* influenced when exposed to the value stimulus on its own; these participants even showed some evidence of polarizing away from the dominant group values expressed in the stimuli. This said, and again mirroring the Chapter 5 findings, younger participants *were* susceptible to influence when a sense of shame was aroused; two of the three dependent variables revealed evidence for influence when shame was induced. No such evidence emerged, however, when pride was induced.

My first hypothesis with respect to explaining the pattern of results among the younger participants was that this group was more economically conservative than the older participants, and that they therefore polarized against the "liberal" letters accordingly (until a sense of shame was aroused, that is). However, the best evidence we have on hand suggests otherwise: Overall, the younger participants were more liberal and Democratic than the older ones, and, in any case, conservatives across the sample did not show evidence of polarization in the "no emotion" condition.

The better interpretation, reflecting on the pattern of results in this chapter as well as those in Chapters 4 and 5, may be that younger adults simply are less susceptible to group influence than others—unless pride, embarrassment, or shame are explicitly aroused. In the experiments described in Chapters 5 and 6, self-conscious emotions were aroused experimentally; in the real world, such emotions among younger people are likely to be aroused by active peer judgments, i.e., through overt admiration or shaming.

Let me suggest that self-conscious emotions may arise more easily in mature adults when they perceive themselves to be in-step or out-of-step with their peer group. As a result, they quickly get into line with peers. That said, in this experiment, the emotion inductions unexpectedly had no additional influence effect among older participants. Why this may be the case is taken up in the conclusion.

Are previous socialization studies wrong to suggest that young people are more susceptible to social influence? Perhaps not. Socialization scholars are most insistent that heavy socialization—from parents, teachers, and peers—occurs among children and teenagers (Bandura 1977; Easton and Dennis 1965, 1967; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2007). In contrast to childhood, young adulthood may be a time during which many individuals strike out on their own, trying to find their own voice.

A second possibility is that these results reflect the *zeitgeist* of the current time period. Young adults today are more liberal than in any other time period since the 1970s, and they are especially *socially* liberal (Nagourney and Thee 2007). Social liberalism is associated, among other things, with an individualistic bent, a tendency *not* to conform (Altemeyer 1996; Feldman 2003a). Or, it may be that both life stage and the liberal

zeitgeist of the times together dampen social-emotional influence among the young—that is, until their self-conscious emotions are explicitly aroused.

Next, let us consider the direct effects we uncovered with respect to shame. Shame alone tended to push older participants in an egalitarian direction and younger participants in an *anti*-egalitarian direction. Why might this be?

One possibility, in keeping with the hypothesis that younger adults are at a more autonomous life stage and older adults a relatively more social one, is that the different age groups called to mind different types of thoughts in response to the shame inductions. Many of those 35 and under are trying to establish themselves in the world, both financially and socially, and are either in school or working their way up in a career. On the other hand, many of those who are over 35 are likely to be more focused on raising and providing for children (and perhaps other family members).

Given these differences, we might expect that the younger age group's main source of shame is the failure to achieve social status or a career goal, and such thoughts may have aroused feelings of frustration or anger, in addition to shame. On the other hand, we might expect that the older age group's main source of shame is failure with respect to social responsibilities, resulting in feelings of guilt (again, in addition to shame). While frustration and anger are likely to discourage pro-social sentiments (Lazarus 1991), guilt appears to motivate pro-social behavior (Carlson and Miller 1987).

Finally, the last analysis demonstrated the political import of the value economic equality. Those who were more committed to economic equality were much more likely to disapprove of President Bush's performance in office and to say that they would vote for a Democrat for President in November. The strong link between economic equality

and electoral behavior suggests that, as the effects of social-emotional influence

accumulate with respect to our values, electoral behavior is affected as well.

Appendix A: Stimuli

Pride Inductions

First, please think of a specific aspect of yourself that makes you feel especially proud.

For example, some people might feel proud of a personality trait or a physical trait. Others might feel proud of a particular skill they have. Still others might feel proud of an aspect of their identity or family history.

Stop and take a minute or two now to reflect on what about yourself makes you feel proud. Form a detailed image of it in your mind: In what way are you admirable, impressive, and/or talented?

When you have a detailed image in mind, click on Next to proceed.

When you think about this aspect of yourself, how proud do you feel? Not at all proud, A little bit proud, Moderately proud, Very proud, Extremely proud

_____

Next, we'd like you to reflect back on a past event in your life.

Think of a specific moment in your life when you did something that, upon reflection, makes you feel really proud of yourself. Maybe you did something especially nice for someone, maybe you were "the life of the party" at a social event, or maybe in achieving a particular goal you exceeded the expectations of peers, friends, and/or family.

Stop and take a minute or two now to reflect on something you did in the past that makes you feel especially proud. Form a detailed image of the event in your mind: What

exactly did you do that makes you feel proud? Where did the event occur? Who, if

anyone, was there?

When you have a detailed image in mind, click on Next to proceed.

How proud are you of your accomplishment or actions on this occasion? Not at all proud,

A little bit proud, Moderately proud, Very proud, Extremely proud

Shame Inductions

First, please think of a specific aspect of yourself that makes you feel ashamed

sometimes. For example, some people might feel ashamed of a personality trait or a

physical trait. Others might feel ashamed of their lack of skills in a certain area. Still

others might feel ashamed of an aspect of their identity or family history.

Stop and take a minute or two now to reflect on what about yourself makes you feel

ashamed sometimes. Form a detailed image of it in your mind: What exactly about

yourself do you feel is problematic or sub-par?

When you have a detailed image in mind, click on Next to proceed.

When you think about this aspect of yourself, how ashamed do you feel? Not at all

ashamed, A little bit ashamed, Moderately ashamed, Very ashamed, Extremely

ashamed

_____

Next, we'd like you to reflect back on a past event in your life.

Think of a specific moment in your life when you behaved in such a way that you felt

ashamed of your actions. Maybe you treated someone unfairly, maybe you acted in an

inappropriate manner at a social event, or maybe in failing to achieve an important goal you disappointed respected peers or loved ones.

Stop and take a minute or two now to reflect on something you did in the past that made you feel ashamed. Form a detailed image of the event in your mind: What exactly did you do that made you feel ashamed? Where did the event occur? Who, if anyone, was there?

When you have a detailed image in mind, click on Next to proceed.

How ashamed are you of your actions on this occasion? Not at all ashamed, A little bit ashamed, Moderately ashamed, Very ashamed, Extremely ashamed

Letters to the Editor[105]

From **The New York Times**

To the Editor:

There is no moral justification for chief executives being paid hundreds of times more than ordinary employees. Social policies that reduce inequality should be strengthened and expanded.

- R. Hutchinson

From **The Baytown Sun** (Texas)

To the Editor:

The American dream is that everyone can achieve a comfortable life for themselves and their family. Instead, we live in an American nightmare in which those with wealth and privilege are enjoying greater riches, never repaying their debt to the society that has allowed them to flourish.

Whatever happened to America the just, the beautiful — America the hope of humanity? I miss that country.

- K. Cummings

From **The Sacramento Bee**

To the Editor:

Regarding Daniel Weintraub's recent commentary (Jan. 31) in which he suggests that we should ignore the growing gap between rich and poor:

Weintraub's cavalier attitude toward the actual living conditions of the poor is inexcusable. He disregards the obscene and increasing wealth and power of those at the very top, contrasted with the deteriorating situation of a growing poverty class. Before our country sinks deeper into these inequities, Americans need to work together to tackle the very serious problem of inequality.

- E. Scotten

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[105] Newspapers were selected to reflect geographic diversity. Note that I had intended to indicate next to the masthead the state from which a newspaper came if it was not obvious from the paper's name. Due to miscommunication with the designer, *The Register-Guard* is not labeled as being an Oregon newspaper.

From The New York Times

To the Editor:

I appreciate your "Class Matters" series, highlighting the pervasive effects of social class on individual lives. It is a stain on our society — and a mockery of the American Dream — that class origin has come to function more and more as a fixed and unequal condition. I hope that the reaction of my fellow readers to the growing social class divisions in America will be not fatalistic acceptance but revived commitment to the ideal of a classless society.

- D. Satz

From The Register — Guard

To the Editor:

I believe that the main political division in this country is not between liberal and conservative or left and right. I think it's between those who believe in people cooperating with and taking care of each other and those whose philosophy is each for himself and the devil take the hindmost. The socially responsible majority needs to unite and strive to assure that not just a few but all American citizens can participate in the good life.

- P. Spencer

Appendix B: Measures

Economic Equality Value Scale

In an ideal society, incomes should be about equal, with every family making roughly the

same amount of money.[106]

In an ideal society, there should be a range of incomes from very low to very high.

A fair and just nation will try to make sure that the nation's wealth is shared equally by

all citizens.

It is only fair that those who work hard and are skilled make more money than those who

are lazy or have little to contribute.

Economic inequality in America is an important problem that we need to address.

Economic inequality is not something that we, as a nation, ought to worry about.

The gap between how much rich people earn and how much poor people earn in the U.S.

is too big.

The fact that some Americans earn a lot more than others do is a good thing, not a bad

thing.

Public Policy Scale

The U.S. House of Representatives and Senate recently voted to raise the federal

minimum wage, from $5.15 to $7.25 per hour. Opinions differ as to whether this new

wage is appropriate: Some think the new wage is too high, some think the new wage

is too low, and some think the new wage is about right. What do you think the federal

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[106] Answer categories for all of the statements were: Strongly agree /Agree / Slightly agree / Neither agree nor disagree / Slightly disagree / Disagree / Strongly disagree. All survey items included a "not sure" option.

minimum wage should be? Choose the answer below that comes closest to your view.

$5.15, $6.25, $7.25, $8.25, $9.25, $10.25, More than $10.25

With regard to the issue of healthcare, would you like to see federal government spending

on healthcare for low-income Americans *increased a lot, increased somewhat, kept*

about the same, decreased somewhat, or decreased a lot?

Tax Policy Scale

Do you think that wealthy families today pay too much in taxes or not enough, or is their

tax burden about right? (Too much / About right / Not enough)

Currently, the federal government issues an "estate tax" on estates worth $2 million or

more at the time of a person's death. The estate tax rate is approximately 45%. Do

you think that this 45% estate tax rate should be increased, kept as it is, decreased, or

repealed altogether? Please choose the answer below that comes closest to your view.

(Increase estate tax rate / Keep estate tax rate at 45% / Decrease estate tax rate to 30%

/ Decrease estate tax rate to 15% / Repeal estate tax altogether)

Bush Approval

Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling his job as

president? (Strongly approve / Approve / Neither approve nor disapprove / Disapprove /

Strongly disapprove)

Party Preference in '08 Presidential Election

Would you rather see a Democrat or a Republican win the Presidency in 2008?

(Democrat / Depends on the candidates / Republican)

Political Ideology

Thinking about politics these days, how would you describe your own political

viewpoint? (Very liberal / Liberal / Moderate / Conservative / Very conservative)

Political Partisanship

Partisanship was assessed with a standard branching question, resulting in seven

categories: Strong Democrat, Weak Democrat, Lean Democrat, Independent, Lean

Republican, Weak Republican, Strong Republican.

Appendix C: Additional Empirical Results

Raw Means for Economic Equality Scale (Two Age Groups)

	Control	Pride	Shame
35 & under			
Letters	.519	.478	.571
No letters	.609	.460	.466
Over 35			
Letters	.480	.492	.463
No letters	.438	.430	.485

Raw Means for Public Policy Scale (35 & Under)

	Control	Pride	Shame
Letters	.592	.502	.694
No letters	.781	.630	.506

Raw Means for Tax Policy Scale (Over 35)

	Control	Pride	Shame
Letters	.527	.664	.553
No letters	.436	.439	.561

Chapter 7

Conclusion

America's attachment to liberty must…be evaluated in light of the elementary fact that no society is, or can be, absolutely free. A society professing special reverence for liberty is thus bound to experience a profound tension between the forces of social cohesion and the ideal of unfettered freedom.[107]

The Import of Identity

In the last several decades, many political scientists have become preoccupied with identity. The literature and evidence discussed in this dissertation suggests that that preoccupation is well-placed. However, most political scientists interested in identity have focused on the role it plays in inter-group dynamics, most often prejudice or discrimination as manifested in the political arena (e.g., Horowitz 1985; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Mendelberg 2001). The Social-Emotional Influence model focuses on *intra*-group dynamics, suggesting that phenomena of equal political consequence play out within the boundaries of identity groups.

This study has also sought to expand traditional notions in political science of what a politically relevant identity group may be. Group identity is not just race or religion or gender or class. Any given citizen will also subjectively identify with some combination of family, friends, school, neighborhood, place of work, political party,

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[107] From Herbert McClosky and John Zaller's *The American Ethos: Public Attitudes toward Capitalism and Democracy* (1984). Page 21.

generational peers, nation, etc. While those groups that generate a stronger sense of identity are likely to wield more influence over the individual, I argue that all of these groups will generate some degree of social-emotional influence over their members' politically relevant values and accompanying attitudes or beliefs.

The evidence presented in this dissertation supports the contention that citizens' identifications with a variety of groups opens them up to value socialization by those groups. In Chapter 3, we reviewed evidence suggesting that social groups in the U.S. develop distinct levels of commitment to politically relevant values. Controlling for income, education, and overlapping group memberships, value commitment varied according to citizens' generation, race or ethnicity, religion, social class, and, to a lesser extent, gender. In Chapter 4, we found that a sample of American Catholics were influenced by the views of Catholic peers with respect to social conservatism only if they highly identified as Catholics; we also learned that strong Catholic identifiers were the most likely to recoil from the views of out-group members (American Evangelicals).

In Chapters 5 and 6, the relationship of identity to influence was more complicated. Those college students who took part in the Economic Individualism Experiment and who identified strongly with college peers either resisted group influence or actively differentiated themselves from group values. However, priming pride or embarrassment reversed students' resistance to influence. In Chapter 6, younger Americans resisted influence as well unless their sense of shame was aroused.

I have put forward a tentative explanation for these unexpected results: Young adults may embrace social autonomy more than do older adults. Such a hypothesis has a certain face validity: Younger people are more likely to "do their own thing," whereas

older adults are more likely to play it safe and "go along with the crowd." Particularly in an experiment in which no strong sense of social jeopardy is experienced (in Chapters 5 and 6, participants read opinion poll information and letters to the editor), self-confident young people may well choose to do their own thing. However, the motivation among this group to resist influence was curbed in three of the four conditions in which self-conscious emotions were experimentally aroused. I argue that the emotion primes and inductions inserted into the experiments an otherwise missing sense of social and emotional consequences for these younger participants' thoughts and actions.

The specific discrepancy that arose between the findings in Chapters 4 and 5 with respect to identity—in Chapter 4, strong Catholic identifiers were the most likely to be influenced, while, in Chapter 5, strong college identifiers were the least likely to be influenced (when no emotions were aroused)—may be at least partially resolved by appealing to such a generational divide. If autonomy is truly valued by young adult peer groups, then it will be most expressed by highly identified members of such groups. This, of course, does suggest that, where autonomy is valued, high identifiers will be pushed and pulled between doing their own thing and following the crowd.

Enter Emotion

Political scientists have much more recently taken up the study of emotion and its political effects. In this growing literature, the focus has been thus far on "basic" emotions, like enthusiasm or anxiety, that are older (in evolutionary terms) and likely more central to human survival but also less relevant to human social—and, by extension, political—life than other types of emotions. This project expands the field's focus to the

set of cognitively rich self-conscious emotions that play key roles in the way in which we relate to others. In this dissertation, we have looked at pride, embarrassment, and shame.

In formulating the Social-Emotional Influence model in Chapter 2, I argued that pride, embarrassment, and shame help to explain why it is that social groups are able to successfully socialize their members. SEI Theory posits that these self-conscious emotions mediate identity group influence over individuals' values and other attitudes. People feel pride when they are approved of by their peers, and embarrassment or shame when they are derogated by peers. Together, these emotions motivate value conformity. In Chapters 4, 5, and 6, we reviewed experimental evidence suggesting that these emotions mediate group influence over politically relevant values. Data presented in Chapter 4 showed that pride is associated with holding dominant group values and suggested that pride and shame mediate group influence. Chapters 5 and 6 provided clearer evidence for such mediation, although results in Chapter 6 were inconsistent.

In Chapter 6, it was shame alone that encouraged value conformity, and it did so only among the younger participants. Among the older participants, influence did not increase as expected when pride or shame was induced. The failure of pride and shame to consistently mediate influence may be linked to the nature of the experimental manipulations of emotion, particularly to the thought-exercise inductions in Chapter 6.

As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, emotion primes and inductions, under many conditions, have distinct advantages with respect to theory testing. In short, it is thought that they increase internal validity by ensuring that the emotion itself is causing an experimental effect. However, the science of emotion primes and inductions relies on the idea that experimental participants will seamlessly import the primed or induced emotion

into a second experimental situation, an assumption that may not hold for all emotions, especially cognitively rich emotions, such as self-conscious emotions. Self-conscious emotion primes and inductions inevitably conjure up thoughts of identity and values that may introduce error into the study and even compete with the subject under study. These potential problems are of particular concern with respect to open-ended inductions, like those in Chapter 6, in which participants draw on a wide variety of experiences. It may be for these reasons that the Chapter 6 inductions were not tremendously successful.

In sum, whereas emotion primes and inductions may be the gold standard in experimental tests of the effects of more basic emotions, they may be less effective with respect to the more cognitively rich social and self-conscious emotions. The effects of such emotions are inevitably quite context dependent and, therefore, it is possible that we will test them with greater success by evoking them within a relevant context.

How might we better test the effects of pride, embarrassment, and shame within the context of Social-Emotional Influence Theory in the future? Experimentally arousing these emotions via more natural influence situations may be the best direction in which to head. For example, we might imagine a two-by-two experiment in which confederates exert some social influence (e.g., exhort the importance of voting) and then increase that social influence via explicit emotional pressure (e.g., mildly derogating those who refuse to vote). One could verify that emotions, as opposed to accompanying cognitive reactions, were causing influence by measuring both the self-conscious emotional reactions and the cognitive reactions of participants and then employing statistical mediation tests (e.g., see Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008). Such an experiment would

have the added advantage of demonstrating that pride and shame naturally arise and vary in response to social influence situations.

Stones Left Unturned

In seeking to build a new theory of influence from the ground up, I left a number of complications unaddressed as I described and tested the nuts and bolts of that theory. It is my belief that further refinements of Social-Emotional Influence Theory are necessary, and it is my intention to make such refinements a part of future work.

First and foremost, the theoretical and empirical work carried out thus far limits our attention to what occurs inside an identity group in isolation from others. What do we make of the fact that citizens are embedded in multiple identity groups simultaneously? We might extrapolate the version of Social-Emotional Influence Theory described herein to make predictions about the effects of multiple groups impinging on each citizen's values. Citizens' identifications with multiple identity groups helps to explain why perfect value conformity within any given group is impossible. A person who belongs to two or more groups with competing values can conform only to one. To which group will the individual conform? We might expect that subjective identification and self-conscious emotions are key not only to explaining influence in general but to explaining the results of competition between groups for influence. Whichever group can generate the most loyalty among its members and/or make salient members' sense of pride, embarrassment, and shame will succeed in generating the greatest amount of value conformity. At the same time, multiple group memberships place limits on the extent to which groups can

emotionally pressure deviating members to conform. A group that shames deviant members ceaselessly will be in danger of losing those members to competing groups.

Second, there is the important question of whether positive and negative self-conscious emotions operate exactly in parallel as I suggest they do. For example, perhaps pride is the weaker causal force. Not only did pride fail to cause influence in Chapter 6, but the pride and embarrassment primes in Chapter 5 led to somewhat lopsided results as well, with embarrassment creating the most influence. In addition to differences with respect to relative strength, are there more qualitative differences among these emotions that we ought to consider? For example, could it be that higher status individuals are more able to resist group influence in any given instance because they have a reserve of pride to draw on? One might imagine that influential group members or leaders may move past social influence to become confident trend setters. On the other end of the social hierarchy, what about individuals who are in danger of experiencing an excess of shame due to low social status? Such individuals might be greater champions of group value conformity because of a greater need for self-pride.

A third path of inquiry leads to another source of variable effects: inter-individual differences. There is a long tradition in the social sciences of studying conforming and nonconforming personalities. Such research is often carried out under the heading of authoritarianism (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford 1950; Altemeyer 1996; Feldman 2003a; Stenner 2005). Might it be the case that a "conforming personality" stems in part from a tendency to experience higher levels of pride, embarrassment, or shame in response to social influence situations?

Fourth, and finally, the theory of influence described in this dissertation has left out a discussion of what drives influence at the individual level: the approval, or admiration, and disapproval, or contempt, of one's peers. While there is little doubt that such admiration and contempt is real and generates the pride and shame reactions that are an essential part of social-emotional influence, we know little about why such judgments occur. Can Social-Emotional Influence Theory help to explain *why* group members tend to view value conformists with admiration and value deviants with contempt? It may be the case that the link that is created in the individual's mind between pride and group values, and shame and group disvalues not only cause her to conform but also cause her to judge *others* positively or negatively accordingly. Once pride is associated with a particular value in an individual's mind, we might expect that that individual will judge others as worthy of pride and admiration when they express or embody said value. And once shame is associated with a particular disvalue in an individual's mind, we might likewise expect that that individual will judge others as worthy of shame and contempt should they come to express or somehow embody group disvalues.

In short, I am suggesting that social-emotional influence is part of a larger, endogenous system of value-based prejudice and conformity. Individuals learn from other group members to associate pride with group values and shame with group disvalues. Once that mental association is made, individuals not only conform themselves, but they also actively pressure other group members to conform. And so the cycle perpetuates itself. Such an expanded theory again emphasizes the importance of intra-group phenomena. Not only does prejudice take place within group boundaries (as well as across them), but also value conformity within group boundaries can inspire out-

group prejudice. As Sumner writes in his description of ethnocentrism: "Each group nourishes its own pride and vanity…and looks with contempt on outsiders. Each group thinks its own folkways the only right ones, and if it observes that other groups have other folkways, these excite its scorn" ([1907] 2002, 13).

Normative Implications

Before we end our discussion of social-emotional influence, it bears asking whether the phenomenon represents a positive or negative aspect of social and political life. Perhaps the most notable aspect of social-emotional influence is its role in generating shared norms and values within groups. Accordingly, it is from this aspect that most of the advantages and disadvantages of social-emotional influence stem.

First, norms and values are of tremendous value to overall group success. As Elster (who focuses on social norms) argues:

> There is no question that these norms serve an ulterior purpose. Even if on any given occasion they may work against the general interest, these cases are infrequent. On the whole, they are immensely beneficial. Civilization as we know it would not exist without them (1989a, 117).

A shared set of norms and values encourages group members to strive toward the same set of goals, enabling coordination of their actions and preventing discord.

Societies with strong shared norms and values can flourish even without organized and codified governmental structures, as Miller (1990) describes in his work on the Icelandic Sagas. And where systems of law are built on shared values, those laws will be imbued with greater legitimacy by the public. As Tocqueville writes, "Laws are

always shaky unless they are supported by mores. Mores are the only robust and durable power in any nation" ([1835] 2004, 315). Rousseau goes so far as to argue in *On Social Contract* that morals and customs represent a distinct type of law in and of themselves. These laws are "engraved…in the hearts of citizens" and form the true constitution of the state "upon which the success of all the other laws depends" ([1762] 1988, 118).[108]

Because shared norms and values are enforced informally through social-emotional influence, laws based on them will be more likely to be followed when narrow self-interest argues in favor of breaking them (whether due to the power of a given individual or organization or the absence of external sanctions). In the American context, consider that the President and Congress, as well as the legal community, respect and follow the decisions of the Supreme Court despite the fact that the Court on its own wields no financial or military might. Or consider that our most powerful elected officials voluntarily leave office when they lose an election, as do our generals when they are asked to retire. In other words, our strong embrace of our Constitution and democratic institutions helps to ensure a smoothly functioning government.

Further, most ordinary citizens abide by the law regardless of the presence or absence of law enforcement officials or potential witnesses. We generally do not take what is not ours and restrain our violent impulses; we recycle, wait patiently in lines, and pull over to the side of the road when we hear an ambulance siren blaring in the distance. Such cooperative actions would be far less likely without a sense of pride and shame.

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[108] Of course, laws imposed on a populace with a conflicting set of values leaves individuals in the population in an unhappy condition. They must either follow the law and experience the shame of value deviance, or remain in good standing with the group while risking state sanction. Resistance among nineteenth century southern whites to Reconstruction can be viewed through this lens, as can current-day resistance among some Mormon fundamentalists to laws against polygamy.

Without these emotions, our political choices would border on the Hobbesian: either a war of all against all or a pact among all to submit to a military dictatorship.

While social-emotional influence may be essential to group cooperation, it can cause great harm as well. Its greatest harm is inevitably tied up with its greatest benefit: Social-emotional influence imbues shared norms and values within a group with a sense of subjective validity, i.e., right or truth. As Sumner writes, "[M]ores have the authority of facts" ([1907] 2002, 76). This leads to two main problems: value-based prejudice and value inertia within the group.

We have already touched on value-based prejudice. Holding a value implies that one knows how others (and oneself) ought to behave. When others obviously flout our values, we are likely to feel disapproval and contempt. Expression of these emotions may range from a raised eyebrow to ostracism or even violence. Those who feel contemptuous will always feel as though the value offender "deserves what he or she got," but whether or not that is actually the case is difficult to judge. Furthermore, because social-emotional influence causes groups to coalesce around distinct sets of shared norms and values, it vastly increases the occurrence of value-based prejudice across group boundaries.

A second problem is that social-emotional influence tends to maintain over time whatever values are adhered to by a majority of individuals within a group. Unfortunately, norms and values sometimes develop that direct action toward an end that is harmful to subgroups within a society, or even to the entire society itself. Once such values have become entrenched, the mechanisms of social-emotional influence can make them difficult to undo. Those who criticize a group's dominant values are likely to be

viewed with suspicion and contempt, making it unlikely that such criticism will be considered and discouraging further criticism.

This scenario in many ways resembles the "tyranny of the majority" Mill so worried about in *On Liberty*: "[T]here needs protection…against the tyranny of prevailing opinion and feeling, against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them" ([1859] 1980, 63). Mill wished not only to defend the freedom of the individual for his or her own sake; he also argued that liberty of opinion and modes of living were necessary to understanding truth and making societal progress. Mill's book *On Liberty* was, in and of itself, a project to persuade fellow citizens that they ought to value such liberty and reject social coercion: "The object of this essay is to assert one very simple principle….That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community…is to prevent harm to others" (68).

The good news with respect to both value-based prejudice and inertia in the American context is that Americans have self-consciously adopted two related values that counteract social-emotional influence: tolerance and individual autonomy. We are more likely than citizens of many cultures to follow the credo "live and let live," especially where behavior does not harm others. We carve out space for dissenters. We often try to resist obvious attempts to influence us without reasoned argument. The result is not the eradication of social-emotional influence but a lessening of it and, therefore, of its effects, both good and bad. Of course, the irony here is that tolerance and freedom are themselves strongly held values that are likely maintained in part via social-emotional influence.

There are benefits and drawbacks of social-emotional influence to consider at the individual level as well. Social-emotional influence implies that citizens do not have a tremendous amount of control over the value formation process. Once they are embedded within a social group, some degree of value conformity is difficult to avoid. One reason for this lack of control is a lack of conscious awareness of group pressure acting on the individual. As Sumner argues, "We learn the mores as unconsciously as we learn to walk and eat and breathe" ([1907] 2002, 77). A second reason for this lack of control is the combination of the automaticity and power of emotions. It is difficult to escape the feeling of pride when respected peers admire you, or to escape the feeling of embarrassment or shame when those same peers look askance at your behavior. I have argued that once these emotions occur, they become associated with relevant values and disvalues, marking them as subjectively valid and invalid.

Such lack of control implies that one is likely to adopt at least some values that undermine one's interests. In fact, this is the very point of social-emotional influence: to give group members a reason to ignore their selfish or idiosyncratic desires in favor of group conventions. Consider the working class guy whose peers are economically conservative and who champions low tax rates for the wealthy as a result, or the gay man who has been socialized by his family to feel ashamed of homosexual sex, or the woman who has internalized conservative religious ideals that mandate the wearing of cumbersome clothing. At the individual level, our power over our own values rests to a significant extent in choosing with whom to associate. These are choices we should make carefully. Of course, where individuals do not have the power to associate with whom they choose, personal autonomy is limited even further.

But despite such problems, we should not consider social-emotional influence to be only burdensome at the individual level. Pride is, in and of itself, a pleasant reward of group life. Recent evidence suggests that perceiving social acceptance and social status stimulate the same reward centers in the brain that monetary awards stimulate (Saxe and Haushofer 2008). More important, while embarrassment and shame may be uncomfortable emotions, they, along with pride, help to better knit us into the cooperative social groups we value for both our personal happiness and survival by efficiently ensuring that we are respected by peers. It is likely for this reason that these emotions arose and continue to be fostered generation after generation.

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