


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School of Information
University of Michigan

Information diffusion in networks

outline



- factors influencing information diffusion
 - network structure: which nodes are connected?
 - strength of ties: how strong are the connections?
- studies in information diffusion:
 - Granovetter: the strength of weak ties
 - J-P Onnela et al: strength of intermediate ties
 - Kossinets et al: strength of backbone ties
 - Davis: board interlocks and adoption of practices
- network position and access to information
 - Burt: Structural holes and good ideas
 - Aral and van Alstyne: networks and information advantage
- networks and innovation
 - Lazer and Friedman: innovation

factors influencing diffusion

- network structure (unweighted)
 - density
 - degree distribution
 - clustering
 - connected components
 - community structure
- strength of ties (weighted)
 - frequency of communication
 - strength of influence
- spreading agent
 - attractiveness and specificity of information


Strong tie defined

- A strong tie
 - frequent contact
 - affinity
 - many mutual contacts




“forbidden triad”:
strong ties are
likely to “close”

- Less likely to be a bridge (or a local bridge)



school kids and 1st through 8th choices of friends

- snowball sampling:
 - will you reach more different kids by asking each kid to name their 2 best friends, or their 7th & 8th closest friend?



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how does strength of a tie influence diffusion?

- M. S. Granovetter: *The Strength of Weak Ties*, AJS, 1973:
- finding a job through a contact that one saw
 - frequently (2+ times/week) 16.7%
 - occasionally (more than once a year but < 2x week) 55.6%
 - rarely 27.8%
- but... length of path is short
 - contact directly works for/is the employer
 - or is connected directly to employer

strength of tie: frequency of communication

- Kossinets, Watts, Kleinberg, KDD 2008:
 - which paths yield the most up to date info?
 - how many of the edges form the “backbone”?





image source: Kossinets et al. “The structure of information pathways in a social communication network”, KDD 2008

the strength of intermediate ties

- strong ties
 - frequent communication, but ties are redundant due to high clustering
- weak ties
 - reach far across network, but communication is infrequent...
- Onnela J. et.al. PNAS 2007;104:7332-7336
 - use nation-wide cellphone call records and simulate diffusion using actual call timing
 - in simulation, individuals are most likely to obtain novel information through ties of intermediate strength


Localized strong ties slow infection spread.



source: Onnela J. et.al. PNAS 2007;104:7332-7336

how can information diffusion be different from simple contagion (e.g. a virus)?

- simple contagion:
 - infected individual infects neighbors with information at some rate
- threshold contagion:
 - individuals must hear information (or observe behavior) from a number or fraction of friends before adopting
- in lab: complex contagion (Centola & Macy, AJS, 2007)
 - how do you pick individuals to “infect” such that your opinion prevails
 - try it out in NetLogo:
 - <http://projects.si.umich.edu/netlearn/NetLogo4/DiffusionCompetition.html>



diffusion of innovation

■ surveys:

- farmers adopting new varieties of hybrid corn by observing what their neighbors were planting (Ryan and Gross, 1943)
- doctors prescribing new medication (Coleman et al. 1957) (see lab to play with data set)
- Christakis and Fowler (spread of obesity & happiness in social networks) 2008

■ online behavioral data:

- Lerman (spread of Flickr photos & Digg stories) 2007
- Backstrom et al. (joining LiveJournal groups & CS conferences) 2006
- + others e.g. Anagnostopoulos et al. 2008





image source: Christakis & Fowler, 'The Spread of Obesity in a Large Social Network over 32 years', NEJM 357(4):370-379, 2007

Open question: how do we tell influence from correlation?



■ approaches:

- time resolved data: if adoption time is shuffled, does it yield the same patterns?
- if edges are directed: does reversing the edge direction yield less predictive power?

Example from reading: adopting new practices

- Davis, corporate governance in the 1980s




FIG. 1—Diffusion of poison pills and golden parachutes among 1986 Fortune 500 firms, 1980–89.

Source: Corporate Elite Networks and Governance Changes in the 1980s; Gerald F. Davis, Henrich R. AJS Volume 103 Number 1 (July 1997): 1– 37.

differences


- poison pills
 - diffused through interlocks
 - geography had little to do with it
 - more likely to be influenced by tie to firm doing something similar & having similar centrality
- golden parachutes
 - did not diffuse through interlocks
 - geography was a significant factor
 - more likely to follow “central” firms
- why did one diffuse through the “network” while the other did not?

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Burt: structural holes and good ideas

- Managers asked to come up with an idea to improve the supply chain
- Then asked:
 - whom did you discuss the idea with?
 - whom do you discuss supply-chain issues with in general
 - do those contacts discuss ideas with one another?
- 673 managers (455 (68%) completed the survey)
- ~ 4000 relationships (edges)



	Percent Social Isolates	Mean Network Size	Mean Network Constraint	Mean Number Cited as Discussion Partners	Mean Network Constraint Cited Discussn. Partners	Mean Path Distance (min-max) for the 476 connected managers in graph
VP or Director (25)	0%	12.6	29.8	4.9	70.2	3.3 (2.7-4.2)
Senior Manager (41)	5%	8.5	37.3	3.8	78.1	3.7 (2.9-6.4)
Manager III (121)	11%	6.4	50.2	3.7	77.9	4.0 (3.0-6.4)
Manager II (199)	27%	4.1	65.0	2.8	83.1	4.3 (2.8-6.4)
Manager I (287)	44%	3.4	73.6	2.4	83.4	4.6 (3.4-7.4)
Mean (673)	29%	5.0	60.5	2.9	81.0	4.2 (2.7-7.4)

Figure 2. Supply-Chain Discussion Network
(excludes 193 social isolates)

Source: Structural Holes and Good Ideas; R. Burt, American Journal of Sociology, 2004




Figure 1. The Small World of Markets and Organizations


Source: Structural Holes and Good Ideas; R. Burt, American Journal of Sociology, 2004

results


- people whose networks bridge structural holes have
 - higher compensation
 - positive performance evaluations
 - more promotions
 - more good ideas
- these brokers are
 - more likely to express ideas
 - less likely to have their ideas dismissed by judges
 - more likely to have their ideas evaluated as valuable

networks & information advantage

Betweenness



Constrained vs. Unconstrained



Source: M. van Alstyne, S. Aral. Networks, Information & Social Capital (formerly titled 'Network Structure & Information Advantage'), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=958158

slide: Marshall van Alstyne

Aral & Alstytne: Study of a head hunter firm

- Three firms initially
- Unusually measurable inputs and outputs
 - 1300 projects over 5 yrs and
 - 125,000 email messages over 10 months (avg 20% of time!)
 - Metrics
 - (i) Revenues per person and per project,
 - (ii) number of completed projects,
 - (iii) duration of projects,
 - (iv) number of simultaneous projects,
 - (v) compensation per person
- Main firm 71 people in executive search (+2 firms partial data)
 - 27 Partners, 29 Consultants, 13 Research, 2 IT staff
- Four Data Sets per firm
 - 52 Question Survey (86% response rate)
 - E-Mail
 - Accounting
 - 15 Semi-structured interviews

Source: M. van Alstytne, S. Aral. *Networks, Information & Social Capital* (formerly titled 'Network Structure & Information Advantage'), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=958158

slide: Marshall van Alstytne

Email structure matters

New Contract Revenue					Contract Execution Revenue				
Coefficients ^a					Coefficients ^a				
Unstandardized Coefficients					Unstandardized Coefficients				
	B	Std. Error	Adj. R ²	Sig. F Δ	B	Std. Error	Adj. R ²	Sig. F Δ	
(Base Model)			0.40				0.19		
Best structural pred.	12604.0***	4454.0	0.52	.006	1544.0**	639.0	0.30	.021	
Ave. E-Mail Size	-10.7**	4.9	0.56	.042	-9.3*	4.7	0.34	.095	
Colleagues' Ave. Response Time	-198947.0	168968.0	0.56	.248	-368924.0**	157789.0	0.42	.026	

a. Dependent Variable: **Bookings02** a. Dependent Variable: **Billings02**
 b. Base Model: YRS_EXP, PARTDUM, %_CEO_SRCH, SECTOR(dummies), %_SOLO. b. N=39. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

Sending *shorter* e-mail helps get contracts and finish them.

Faster response from colleagues helps finish them.

Source: M. van Alstyne, S. Aral. Networks, Information & Social Capital (formerly titled 'Network Structure & Information Advantage'), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=958158

slide: Marshall van Alstyne

H5: Recruiters with larger personal rolodexes generate no more or less output

	Revenue \$	\$ for completed searches	Completed searches	Multitasking	Duration	Duration controlling for multitasking
Size of rolodex (Q50)	-10.2 (60.3)	-22.9 (32.6)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.013 (0.021)	-0.013 (0.016)

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, Standard err in paren.

Instead, a larger private rolodex is associated with:


- Less information sharing
- Less DB proficiency
- Lower % of e-mail read
- Less learning from others
- Less perceived credit for ideas given to colleagues
- More dissembling on the phone

Source: M. van Alstyne, S. Aral. Networks, Information & Social Capital (formerly titled 'Network Structure & Information Advantage'), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=958158

slide: Marshall van Alstyne

diverse networks drive performance by providing access to novel information

- network structure (having high degree) correlates with receiving novel information sooner (as deduced from hashed versions of their email)
- getting information sooner correlates with \$\$ brought in
 - controlling for # of years worked
 - job level
 -



Network Structure Matters

New Contract Revenue					Contract Execution Revenue				
Coefficients ^a					Coefficients ^a				
Unstandardized Coefficients					Unstandardized Coefficients				
	B	Std. Error	Adj. R ²	Sig. F Δ	B	Std. Error	Adj. R ²	Sig. F Δ	
(Base Model)			0.40				0.19		
Size Struct. Holes	13770***	4647	0.52	.006	7890*	4656	0.24	.100	
Betweenness	1297*	773	0.47	.040	1696**	697	0.30	.021	

a. Dependent Variable: **Bookings02** a. Dependent Variable: **Billings02**
b. Base Model: YRS_EXP, PARTDUM, %_CEO_SRCH, SECTOR(dummies), %_SOLO. b. N=39. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

Bridging diverse communities is significant.

Being in the thick of information flows is significant.


Source: M. van Alstyne, S. Aral. Networks, Information & Social Capital (formerly titled 'Network Structure & Information Advantage'), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=958158

slide: Marshall van Alstyne


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networks and innovation: is more information diffusion always better?



linear network



fully connected network



- Nodes can innovate on their own (slowly) or adopt their neighbor's solution
- Best solutions propagate through the network


Tortoise, Hare: David Eppstein. http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Tortoise_and_hare_algorithm.svg



source: Lazer, David and Friedman, Allan, The Parable of the Hare and the Tortoise: Small Worlds, Diversity, and System Performance: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=832627>

networks and innovation


- **fully connected network** converges more quickly on a solution, but if there are lots of local maxima in the solution space, it may get stuck without finding optimum.
- **linear network** (fewer edges) arrives at better solution eventually because individuals innovate longer



source: Lazer, David and Friedman, Allan, The Parable of the Hare and the Tortoise: Small Worlds, Diversity, and System Performance: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=832627>

lab: networks and coordination

- Kearns et al. Science 313 (5788), pp. 824 – 827, 2006:
 - network structure affects convergence in coordination games, e.g. graph coloring
 - try it out in NetLogo:
 - <http://projects.si.umich.edu/netlearn/NetLogo4/GraphColoring.html>



to sum up

- network structure influences information diffusion
- strength of tie matters
- diffusion can be simple (person to person) or complex (individuals having thresholds)
- people in special network positions (the brokers) have an advantage in receiving novel info & coming up with “novel” ideas
- in some scenarios, information diffusion may hinder innovation