

achievement to state the reviewer's opinion that the book would have profited from more rigorous editing; the elimination of some material (especially in the first two chapters) of interest only to specialists would have ensured a wider readership.

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#### UNITED STATES

BARRY M. BLECHMAN and STEPHEN S. KAPLAN. *Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument*. Pp. xviii, 584. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1978. \$19.95. Paperbound \$8.95.

This excellent study is an analysis of the United States' use of its armed forces to achieve political objectives, and an evaluation of how effective this use has been. On the basis of a stringent definition, 215 incidents—ranging from a naval vessel visiting a friendly port through forcefully establishing a military presence—are identified in which the United States utilized its armed forces for political objectives, including both reassuring allies and warning opponents, between 1 January 1946 and 31 December 1975. A representative sample of 15 percent (33) of these were subjected to aggregate analyses. The result of these analyses are presented in four chapters of the book. Also included are five chapters written by specialists that present five, carefully selected, paired case studies. David K. Hall analyzes U.S. actions concerning the Laotian War of 1962 and the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971; William B. Quandt, the crises of Lebanon in 1958 and in Jordan in 1970; Jerome N. Slater, the episodes involving the Dominican Republic in 1961 and 1966; Robert M. Slusser, the Berlin Crises of 1958–1959 and 1961; and Philip Windsor, Soviet menaces toward Yugoslavia in 1951 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Belchman and Kaplan synthesize the results of the aggregate analyses and the case studies in a thoughtful, balanced, and policy-relevant concluding chapter.

The study has many strengths. It builds on the existing literature, particularly *Deterrence in American Policy* by Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, carefully noting points of agreement and disagreement. The aggregate analyses and the case studies nicely complement each other, the former providing a broad structure and the latter, contextual detail. A high level of intellectual rigor is maintained throughout the book. Precise definitions are used, logical reasoning is stressed, and conclusions are firmly based on the evidence. The study takes the political objectives of U.S. policymakers as a given without endorsing or rejecting them; it is a carefully circumscribed, technical, and professional analysis. The presentation is crisp and clear and happily free of jargon.

The study concludes that in the short run the use of armed force has had a high probability of contributing to achieving U.S. objectives. In the longer run (3 years later), this probability is greatly diminished. The discrete use of force has had little impact on broad economics, political and social trends. Delaying changes, however, has been useful to the United States in allowing opportunities for structuring the changes and for rallying domestic support to accept them. Not surprisingly the use of force is shown to be more effective in reinforcing the behavior of allies, neutrals, and opponents than in altering their behavior. These conclusions are just a small sample of the richness of the book. It is must reading for those interested in contemporary foreign and military policy.

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LOIS A. CRAIG et al. *The Federal Presence: Architecture, Politics and Symbols in U.S. Government Building*. Pp. 580. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978. \$37.50.

In 1972 the National Endowment for the Arts began a survey of the quality of federal government architecture. It probably was not an easy assignment. Before