

The Civil-Military Interface in a Metropolitan Community

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The issue of civilian control of the military in the United States was made more complex by the transformation of the military from a conscription system to an all-volunteer force in the early 1970s. This transformation did not alter the constitutional position of the armed forces under civilian control. It did, however, make problematic the means by which civilian control would be maintained effectively.

One of the themes in the scholarly debate on the maintenance of civilian control of the American military has focused on two models, which Huntington refers to as "objective" versus "subjective" control.¹ The objective model assumes an apolitical professional military, relatively isolated from civilian institutions, responsible to a formal chain-of-command. That chain-of-command is controlled by civilian decisionmakers, both elected, such as the President in his role of Com-

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mander-in-Chief, and appointed, such as the Secretaries of Defense and of the military departments, with checks and balances built into the system through the powers of the Congress to declare war and to amend and approve the defense budget. In Huntington's preferred system, as long as the federal administration is responsive to the electorate, the chain-of-command functions effectively, and the system of checks and balances between executive and legislative branches operates smoothly, control of the military by the citizenry can be maintained.

The alternative model supplements objective with subjective control.² Recognizing that informal organization is an important predictor of actual behavior, this model proposes a military force integrated with its host society rather than isolated from it, so that civilian control can be achieved through political sensitivity rather than neutrality on the part of the military. In addition to counting on the effective functioning of the formal processes of the objective model, it is asserted that there must also be informal processes which will insure that civilian sensibilities are incorporated within the military.³ The informal processes of control can operate through social networks that span the boundary between civilian and military institutions and bring military personnel into direct contact with the civilian community.

It is our position that the combination of objective and subjective models is probably more amenable to meeting the problems of American civil military relations in a post-Vietnam War era of all-volunteer armed forces than is just the objective model.⁴ But in order for this model to function, the armed forces must be integrated with their host civil society. The question to be addressed in this paper is how well the military is woven into the fabric of society. A survey conducted in Detroit, Michigan, in 1973, constitutes our data base. The survey included attitudes toward the military, politics, and foreign affairs, behaviors that might bring the respondents into contact with the armed forces, the military service of our respondents, the degree to which they associated with veterans or people on active military service, and sources of information about the military.

The survey was conducted by the Detroit Area Study of the University of Michigan during the spring, summer, and fall of 1973, as the armed forces were in the transition phase of zero-draft, moving from a conscription to an all-volunteer military. Between May and October, 576 interviews were conducted in an area including about 85% of the population of the Detroit Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, covering portions of Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb Counties.⁵ The respondents were persons eighteen years of age or more, residing in housing units.

THE PUBLIC OPINION CONTEXT

Any analysis of informal subjective linkages between the defense establishment and civilian society must take into account the attitudes of the public toward the military. Our survey was conducted late in the Vietnam War, at a time when attitudes concerning American involvement were becoming more negative.⁶

In both 1971 and 1973, the Detroit Area Study asked respondents whether the U.S. had made a mistake in sending troops to fight in Vietnam. In 1971, 69% of the sample indicated that a mistake had been made. The repetition of the question in 1973 revealed a remarkable stability of opposition. Sixty-eight percent of our respondents felt that a mistake had been made.

Equally clear as the low level of public support for the war is the fact that its unpopularity was rooted not in a moral repugnance for war generally, but in a recognition that the war was not being won.⁷ In both 1971 and 1973, the question eliciting evaluations of whether or not sending troops to Vietnam was a mistake was followed, in the Detroit survey, by simple probes of "Why would you say it was (was not) a mistake?" and "Is there any other reason why you think it was (was not) a mistake?" Only a small proportion raised morality or legitimacy questions regarding U.S. involvement, and in fact there was a slight decline in the already small proportion of the samples mentioning these themes between 1971 and 1973. The major concerns of those opposing the war were that this particular struggle was an internal war (this theme gained slightly in importance between 1971 and 1973), that people were being killed or injured, and that the U.S. was not winning (the importance of these latter two declined in the two year period).

Among the minority of respondents who felt that sending U.S. troops to Vietnam was not a mistake, half felt that the war was important to American interests, and 22% felt that the United States had to send troops. In the consideration of the majority both of the supporters and of the opponents of U.S. involvement, the issue was not one of ethics, but of how the American interest was best served in the international arena.

Although a majority of our sample felt that American involvement in Vietnam had been a mistake, it was clear from the responses to other questions that a majority also felt that the United States should play an active and aggressive role as a world leader, intervening with military force when necessary and appropriate to protect national interests. Our respondents were asked whether the United States should play a major role in maintaining order in the world; fifty-five percent felt that it

should. They were asked whether it was a good policy for the United States to try to help poor countries in the world raise their standard of living; seventy-four percent approved of such a policy. Only 31% of the sample agreed with the statement that "Stationing some of our American troops and planes in Europe is of no help to the United States;" more than two-thirds disagreed. Fifty-seven percent felt that stopping the Communists is more important than staying out of war. Clearly, our sample was not as opposed to the military institution as it was to the Vietnam War.⁸

Next, our Detroit respondents were asked how well the government was doing its job with regard to a set of *specific* issues. For each of these, a majority of our sample indicated dissatisfaction. More than 63% of our respondents disagreed with the statement that "In general, the way our officials in Washington are handling our foreign affairs is satisfactory." Fifty-six percent agreed that "The government is not doing all it could to avoid another war." Fifty-one percent agreed that "The government is not doing all it should to avoid the spread of Communism." Almost 68% felt that "The government did not act as quickly as it could have to arrange the release of our prisoners of war from Vietnam."

The articulation of attitudes toward government and attitudes toward the role of the military in international affairs was further clarified by multivariate analysis of our attitude data. Modigliani, through factor analysis of a series of surveys dealing with military and political attitudes, found two factors that were stable across surveys: isolationism-interventionism and administration distrust.⁹ We hypothesized that the factors he identified would appear in our Detroit attitude data as well, although we differ from him somewhat in interpreting the first factor. Following Modigliani's procedure, we subjected the matrix of product-moment correlations among fourteen attitudes measured by our Detroit survey to a principal components factor analysis with a varimax rotation, and a ceiling of four set on the number of factors to be extracted.

Administration distrust (or lack of support), which emerged as the second factor in Modigliani's analysis, appeared as factor 1 in our data. The major items loading on this factor are: feelings about the way Washington officials handle foreign affairs; whether the government is doing all it can to keep us out of war; whether the government acted as quickly as possible to arrange the release of Vietnam POWs; whether the people have made too many sacrifices to support defense; whether the government is doing all it should to prevent the spread of Com-

munism; whether U.S. troops should be maintained in Europe; whether a mistake was made sending U.S. troops to Vietnam.

The second factor included attitudes regarding the importance of stopping the Communists as against staying out of war, support of the Vietnam War, women bearing arms, the role of the United States in maintaining world order, and the conversion to an all-volunteer army. It is tinged with Modigliani's isolationism-interventionism dimension, but it seems to include a more traditional vs. innovative dimension with regard to the military institution. Interventionism is associated in our data with the retention of military conscription and the exclusion of women from combat. We shall have occasion to refer to these clusters of attitudes in the analyses to follow.

THE IMPACT OF MANPOWER FLOW

Prior to the conversion to an all-volunteer force, one crucial factor which integrated the military into American society was the personnel flow associated with the Selective Service System, complemented by a large reserve force of citizen-soldiers. Through the vehicles of conscription, draft-motivated enlistment, and reserve service, some portion of the citizenry served in uniform for some period of time without making a career commitment to the military, and without giving up their primary self-images as civilians. On entering active service, they served to input civilian sensibilities to the uniformed forces, and upon reentering the labor force, they established a linkage from the military back to the civilian sector.¹⁰ Personnel turnover is lower under all-volunteer conditions than it was under conscription, i.e., there is a higher proportion of careerists, and a smaller proportion of soldiers who serve only one or two tours. However, a significant number of Americans do return from the military to civilian life each year, thus retaining at least a vestige of this linkage process. The impact of service on the individual, however, affects the way this linkage operates. If military veterans were to become authoritarian as a function of their service,¹¹ or were to suffer economically in the civilian labor market because they had been in the armed forces,¹² the quality of the linkage attributable to manpower flow would be changed.

Roughly 20% of our respondents (n = 117) had served in the armed forces. In comparing the attitudes and economic status of veterans and non-veterans, the most striking finding was the absence of differences between the two groups.¹³ Similarly, in analyzing the effects of dif-

fering experience within the military, most dramatic was the extent to which there were not many—at least with regard to the two attitude dimensions discussed above.

We did find relationships between branch of service and government support, perhaps manifesting the traditionalism of the navy and the non-traditionalism of the air force. And we found, not surprisingly, that enlistees saw the U.S. military playing a more active role in world affairs than did conscripts. We did not find, however, that military service or its components made the veterans in our Detroit sample any more or less traditional or interventionist with regard to the role of the military, or supportive of or opposed to the way the federal government conducts its business. Despite potential effects of self-selection and/or adult socialization within the military institution, the lives of veterans seem not, on the whole, to have been changed by military experience in the areas we have studied. We have a basis in these data for some confidence that when our Detroit area veterans began their military service, they brought with them the perspectives of their fellow citizens, and this perspective persisted through their return to civilian life.

STRUCTURAL LINKAGES WITH THE MILITARY

Janowitz has suggested that the linkages between the American armed forces and their host society can become attenuated in an era of a highly specialized all-volunteer force, and that “institution-building” is required to articulate the military with the larger society.¹⁴ Among the potential tools for building this interface are financial benefits, in particular educational benefits, and organizational ties, in the context of both economic enterprise and voluntary associations.

For people in service, military fringe benefits contribute to the sense of community of the military installation, and hence to esprit de corps and military effectiveness. They serve another purpose in the field of civil-military relations. Every person who leaves the armed forces becomes a part of the recruiting and public relations systems of the military—either positive or negative. Benefits that continue into post-service life create a lasting link between the veteran, his dependents, and the military, thus adding a dimension to the role of the veteran in civil-military relations.

The respondents in our Detroit sample were asked about veteran's benefits that they had personally received, either from serving in the

armed forces themselves, or as military dependents. It is noteworthy that beyond the very fact of having served, relatively diffuse but low-intensity contact with the armed services is reported through the medium of service-related benefits. Somewhat more than a quarter (28.4%) of the veterans report taking advantage of G.I. Bill education benefits, and almost a quarter report taking advantage of G.I. mortgage loans (24.1%) and G.I. insurance benefits (23.3%). However, while most veterans take advantage of at least one form of benefit, the great majority of them seem to utilize no more than one.¹⁵

If military benefits are used as mechanisms for integrating civilian and military sectors of American society, the problem of the military buying, or appearing to buy, the support of the American people must be considered. It would be reasonable to expect people receiving continued benefits from the military to be more favorable to the military establishment. Likewise, people benefiting from government programs because of their military service might be expected to be more favorable to the government as well.

Correlations were computed between number of benefits received and our attitude measures regarding the role of the military and trust in government. Only two of these fourteen correlations were significant at $p < .05$, and neither relationship was large. Neither were they both in the direction of more support for American participation in the international arena among people receiving more benefits. One was in an interventionist direction, but the other was isolationist.

ORGANIZATIONAL CONTACTS

Our respondents were also asked about other aspects of social life that might bring them into contact with America's armed forces. There has been much discussion in the social science literature of the allegedly central role played by the "military-industrial complex" in the economic life of the United States.¹⁶ Particularly in an era when the world of work is seen by many as central to the social life of the nation, it was natural to inquire about occupational contact with the military. When asked whether they had ever worked as federal civil servants for any branch of the Department of Defense, only 3.1% of our respondents answered affirmatively, although almost 15% indicated that they had ever had a civilian job that brought them into contact with military personnel. This latter figure is undoubtedly influenced by the presence in the Detroit area of the U.S. Army Tank Automotive

Command (TACOM) which deals extensively with contractors in the automotive industry. Interestingly, among respondents with civil-service experience, veterans were less likely than non-veterans to have worked for DOD agencies. Non-veterans were also more likely to have worked in civilian jobs bringing them into contact with armed forces personnel. The civilian labor force, then, is one vehicle for non-veterans to have contact with the military institution.

When we changed our perspective from the world of work to the world of voluntary association, we found that these structures, which are also thought to play an integrative role in modern society,¹⁷ account for very little contact between civilians and the military. When asked whether they had even been members of any volunteer or social organization, such as the Red Cross or the USO, that brought them into contact with members of the armed forces, 4.5% of the sample responded affirmatively. Among the veterans in our sample, 10.3% reported memberships in veterans organizations that might help them maintain at least symbolic contact with the military establishment.

PATTERNS OF COMMUNICATION

One of the concerns raised by critics of the military during the Vietnam era was the degree to which the Pentagon controlled the information that reached the public.¹⁸ Our data do not allow us to evaluate how much of the military information contained in the media originated in office of the Department of Defense Chief of Information. We can, however, explore the degree to which the members of our Detroit sample depended on the mass media for their information about military matters, as well as the degree to which their information sources were related to their attitudes about the military.

If information about the armed forces is transmitted via a one-step flow from the media to the mass public without intervening interpretation by social groups, the origin and effects of the information presented in the media become crucial. To the extent that this information originates within the defense establishment, with the media serving merely as vehicles of transmission, then there is indeed reason for concern for the ability of civilian society to monitor its military institutions. With this concern in mind, we analyzed the sources used by our Detroit respondents for information about the military.¹⁹ We found that slightly less than one out of four Detroiters get most of

their information on the military from friends and acquaintances. A roughly equal proportion get their information from the non-printed media, and almost half depend on the printed media.

We also analyzed the relationships between the sources that our respondents used for military information, and the wide range of attitude data we had collected. For the most part, we found source of military information unrelated to attitudes. Indeed, we found statistically significant relationships with regard to only two of fifteen attitudes analyzed. Moreover, the two relationships that were significant were opposite in direction from what would be expected on the basis of a model of public opinion dominated by a military-industrial complex. In brief, while most people are dependent on the mass media for their information on military affairs, there is no evidence in these data that this dependence has made them pro-military, or, for that matter, anti-military. We find no evidence for a mass-society model of civil-military relations.

SOCIAL NETWORKS AND MILITARY CONTACTS

Our analysis to this point, focussing on attitudes, financial benefits, bureaucratic organizations, and the mass media, emphasizes formal relationships. We now turn our attention to informal interactions among people and the changing social configurations resulting from these interactions.²⁰ The need for network analysis stems from the growing realization that the categories and formal roles that are common to sociological analysis do not explain much of the complexity and processual nature of modern urban life. It is assumed that individuals are able to exercise a greater amount of control over the properties of their social networks than over their formal and ascribed roles. The microstructure of interpersonal ties spanning the civil-military interface is seen here as a voluntaristic aspect of the structure of civil-military relations, differing in this regard from the mass media, the military institution itself, the civilian labor market, and the system of veteran's benefits, the presence and content of which are quite independent of the preferences of individual respondents in our survey.

Respondents in our sample were asked to "think of the three adults you most enjoy spending time with." They were then asked whether each of these friends were presently serving or had served in the armed forces. If no friend with military experience was revealed, respondents

TABLE 1
 Distribution of Number of Three Best Friends With and
 Without Military Experience^a

<i>Without Military Experience</i>			<i>With Military Experience</i>	
<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>		<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>
22	3.8	0	254	44.1
89	15.5	1	233	40.5
226	39.2	2	74	12.8
239	41.5	3	15	2.6
576	100.0%		576	100.0%

a. This table includes respondents who named fewer than three people.

were asked to identify the person they were closest to who was then or had ever been in the armed forces. For each respondent, we attempted to identify at least one friend with military experience, and one friend without such experience.

Looking at the data for the total sample, presented in table 1, we see that respondents were much more likely to name friends without military experience than to name friends who were or had been in the military. About 40% of our respondents named only one friend out of three who had served in the military and an additional 15.4% named more than one friend with military experience. On the other hand, 15.5% of respondents named only one friend who had never been in the military while 80.7% named more than one friend without military experience. Very few respondents named as friends members of the current military force. Only two respondents named more than one friend who was then in the armed forces, while twenty-two named one friend who was then serving.

Fifty-six percent of the total sample named military contacts within the circle of three first-named friends. Ninety-six percent named civilian contacts without military experience. An additional 39% who had not named anyone with military experience among their three closest friends were able to identify a military contact as fourth named friend, and 2% whose three closest friends all had military experience identified a civilian without military experience as fourth-named friend. Of 238 fourth friends thus named by respondents who had initially named triads composed wholly of veterans or wholly of non-veterans, 94%

were people with military experience, as compared to 25% of the first three named friends. Since 20% of our respondents were veterans, fourth-named friends were almost five times more likely to be veterans than were our respondents themselves.

Of the 224 fourth-named friends with military experience, thirty-four were currently in the armed forces. From this information on three or four friends and from responses to an additional question asking respondents for the number of people they knew currently in the military in addition to these already mentioned friends, a composite civil-military contact measure was created. The measure is the number of persons the respondents knew who were in the military at the time of our survey. Almost half of the respondents (49.1% out of 576) knew no one currently in the military and only slightly more than one-tenth of the respondents (13.7%) could name four or more friends and/or acquaintances then in the armed forces. While longitudinal data on civil-military isolation and comparative data on, for example, isolation between respondents and members of the "medical establishment" are not now available, it seems safe to say that this measure indicates a substantial amount of estrangement between citizens and active duty military personnel.

For the purposes of the subsequent analysis, our civil-military contact measure was collapsed into five categories: zero contacts (49.1%); one contact (20.1%); two contacts (9.7%); three contacts (7.3%); four or more contacts (13.7%). This decision was made both because the measure in its raw form is highly skewed and not appropriate for multivariate analysis, and because we suspect that the raw measure is not actually an interval-level scale. Rather, we feel that respondents who tell interviewers that they know 100 or 200 people currently in the military are really saying that they know "a great many" people in the military, and that the measure is more appropriately ordinal, ranging from "none" to "many." As the univariate distribution shows, more than three times more respondents reported no contacts than many contacts, reflecting the isolation of a large portion of the Detroit population from informal contact with active duty and former military personnel.

THE CORRELATES OF MILITARY CONTACT

In addition to the issue of isolation of the military from civilian contact generally, there is a specific problem of some elements of the population

being systematically isolated from the military even in a context of otherwise widespread contact between the armed forces and the society they defend. We find that men know more people in the military than do women, and younger people have more military contacts than older people. No significant racial difference is found in our data. Divorced, separated, or widowed respondents have significantly fewer contacts with people in the military than do married respondents, who in turn have fewer military contacts than do single respondents. Among those respondents who have children, those with three or more children have more current military contacts than those respondents with one or two children. However, respondents with no children have the highest contact score. Controlling for age changes the relationship between marital status and civil-military contact. While young singles have the highest contact score followed by young marrieds, older married respondents are more tied to the military than their "unattached" age mates, perhaps reflecting military service of their offspring, or their offspring's friends, or their friends' offspring.

Looking now at socio-economic factors, we find that the mean contact score for persons with more than a high school education is significantly higher than the score for persons with less than twelve years of formal schooling. The zero-order relationships between education and contact and between age and contact are for the most part maintained when the other variable is controlled. In terms of the respondent's subjective social class identification, we find that respondents who identify with the middle or upper class have significantly more ties on the average with the military than respondents who identify with the working or lower class. The correlation between family income and contact is also significant and positive. Interestingly, there is no significant difference in contact scores between persons in white collar as opposed to blue collar occupations or persons in the labor force as opposed to outside of the labor force, although the means are in the expected direction.

In the past the armed forces have consisted primarily of young, male bachelors, especially at the enlisted ranks, and our data on civil-military contact suggest that it is precisely these groups in the civilian population that experience a disproportionate amount of contact with military personnel. Trends toward increased utilization of women and increased marriage rates among military personnel may be reflected in future changes in the distribution of civil-military contacts. For the present, those commentators who have urged that the all-volunteer force be socially representative of the larger population may view these

data with some displeasure. A logical extension of the argument that the armed forces should be representative of the civilian population for civilians to maintain control over the military is that civil-military contact should be evenly distributed throughout the population, and our data show less contact with older people, and with lower social strata.

MILITARY SERVICE AND SOCIAL NETWORKS

The armed forces have been viewed as a major socialization agency for the approximately 20% of American adults who have been directly involved with them. While adult socialization is generally viewed as less intense than childhood socialization, the total institutional aspects of the military and the particular demand of the military "mission" have led researchers to expect profound differences between veterans on a variety of dimensions. Such differences should be especially pronounced on issues involving the civil-military interface. While there has been research on the kinds of peer and buddy relations that develop within active-duty military units,²¹ we know little about the ways in which the military experiences of veterans affect their involvements with each other and the standing military force. Some recent work suggests that the return to old patterns of social interaction was especially difficult for the Vietnam veteran returning home.²² These data, however, are restricted to a single time frame and are gathered from non-representative samples. While we would expect here that veterans will have more ties that cross the civil-military interface than non-veterans, we must remember that in our earlier analyses we found few reliable differences between veterans and non-veterans in attitudes about the military role.

When looking at contact scores for our Detroit sample, we again find virtually no difference between veterans and non-veterans. This relationship is explored further in table 2. Age is introduced here as a control variable because this variable has been shown to be a reasonably good predictor of contact, and the variances differ between veterans and non-veterans. The gender control is introduced because we expect such differences to confound contact patterns among non-veterans. Further, little is known about gender difference in civil-military relations. We find that male veterans in the "middle" age group (age thirty-one to fifty) have slightly higher contact scores than do the non-veterans. However, we find that the young, male, non-veteran group has by far the

TABLE 2
Civil-Military Contact Scores: Veteran Status by Sex by Age

	<i>Age Group</i>		
	<i>18-30</i>	<i>31-50</i>	<i>51 +</i>
Male Veteran	1.52	1.25	.84
Male Non-Veteran	2.23	1.03	.89
Female Non-Veteran	1.39	1.08	.77

highest contact score. These are men who were of military age during the Vietnam War, who did not serve in the armed forces themselves, but who had peers who did serve. While the veterans in this age group have a lower mean score, the level of contact maintained in no way suggests disassociation from the military. Rather, the main effect attributable to age is manifested in this table among all three groups. At the same time, the lower mean score among Vietnam-era veterans as compared to male non-veterans suggests some variance in the ways the veterans reacted to their military service. In this next section, we shall discuss variation in contacts among veterans.

COMPONENTS OF MILITARY EXPERIENCE

We are able to differentiate among veterans whose experiences would predispose them to maintain more or less contact with military personnel. The literature on adult socialization suggests several components of military experience that will be used here. In five out of six cases, the direction of relationships bears out our expectations about the impact of these measures on civil-military contact.

In particular, we find that recency of discharge is positively related to civil-military contact. This recency effect is similarly reflected in our age data above.

Military rank is also positively related to the maintenance of civil-military ties, a finding that is not surprising given the general benefits of high status and the fact that the conditions of officers' service are more volunteristic than those of enlisted personnel.

The salience of military service in civilian life—measured by respondent's perceptions of how useful job skills learned in the military

have been in civilian employment—is likewise positively related to our contact measure. Like military rank, this measure taps one of the ways in which military service can provide rewards to respondents.

Veterans who felt that they “wanted to go” when drafted, or who enlisted for reasons other than draft avoidances have higher contact scores than veterans who felt that they “did not want to go” when drafted or who enlisted because they didn’t want to be drafted. The impact of receptiveness to entry on contact is somewhat less pronounced than that of the previous measures, and the correlation only approaches significance.

We find that the longer veterans served in the military the higher their contact scores; the strength of this relationship is, however, sensitive to the skewness (the coding scheme) of the duration measure.

Finally, we find that intensity of combat experiences lowers contact scores although this relationship is not significant. While we had expected veterans who had been in highly intense or involving military situations to have higher contact scores. It seems that the memories of combat may be unpleasant enough to discourage (or, at least, not encourage) further contact with military personnel.

The matrix of correlations among these six measures of components of military experience and with race, age, and education suggests some multi-collinearity. The interrelationships among some of these items suggest that we look at the net relationships between our measures of components of military experience, race, age, and education and our measure of civil-military involvement. In the full model as well as the more parsimonious model shown in table 3 the effects of race, recency of service, and rank are shown to be the major predictors of contact. The general pattern that we see emerging is that socialization and anticipatory socialization are more important than are the effects of social position in explaining patterns of civil-military contact for male veterans. While four measures of social position explain about 8% of the variation in contact for the total sample and three measures (sex excluded) are about as useful in explaining contact for male veterans, a two-variable model using socialization measures explains a somewhat larger proportion of the variation in contact for the male veteran group. It is interesting to note that while contact scores for blacks and whites do not vary for the total sample, black veterans are somewhat more tied to military personnel than are white veterans.

TABLE 3
Results of Regressions of Contact on Aspects of
Military Experience and Demographic Factors, for Male Veterans

	<i>Standardized Partial Regression Coefficient</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>
Race (1=white; 2=black)	.22 ^a	.10
Education (1=primary school . . . 6=post-graduate work)	.04	.11
Age (1=18-20 . . . 7=71±)	.25	.23
Recency (Discharged in: 1919-1973)	.51 ^a	.25
Rank (1=private . . . 13=captain)	.22 ^a	.11
Salience (Skills used: 1=not at all . . . 5=great deal)	.13	.10
Receptiveness (1=negative; 2=positive)	.12	.10
Intensity (1=never in combat . . . 5=wounded)	.01	.10
Duration (0-19 years)	-.09	.11
$R^2 = .23$	$F = 3.01$	$N = 101$
		$p = .0034$

Race	.22 ^a	.09
Recency	.32 ^a	.09
Rank	.26 ^a	.09
$R^2 = .18$	$F = 7.83$	$N = 109$
		$p = .0001$

a. $p < .05$

PATTERNS OF ARTICULATION

A general measure of the degree to which our Detroit sample is structurally linked to the defense establishment can be derived from the combined distributions of friendships, voluntary association memberships, veterans benefits, and other contact points suggested above. In table 4, we have cumulated the military experience of our respondents, their intention to join the armed forces, the benefits they have received as veterans or dependents, employment as civilians working for the Department of Defense or in other occupations that brought them into contact with military personnel, and participation in voluntary organi-

TABLE 4
 Distribution of Linkages Between Detroit Civilians and the
 American Defense Establishment, for Total Sample,
 Veterans, and Non-Veterans (in percentages)

<i>Number of Linkages</i>	<i>Total Sample %</i>	<i>Veterans %</i>	<i>Non-Veterans %</i>
0	3.1	--	3.9
1	48.6	0.9	60.8
2	26.2	31.6	24.8
3	10.8	25.6	7.0
4	5.9	20.5	2.2
5	2.9	12.0	0.7
6	1.2	4.3	0.4
7	0.7	3.4	--
8	--	--	--
9	0.3	0.9	0.2
10	--	--	--
11	--	--	--
12	0.2	0.9	--
Total	99.9	100.1	100.0
N	576	117	459
\bar{X}	1.9	3.5	1.5

zations that brought them into contact with military personnel, as well as the social contacts just reported. Distributions of this cumulated score are presented for the sample as a whole, and broken out by veteran status.

These data suggest that for more than half the total sample, there is at most a single link between the respondent and the defense establishment. In the great majority of cases, this link is a friend or acquaintance who served at one time, but is no longer in the active duty force. The isolation from the military is greatest among non-veterans. Here, almost two-thirds have had no links to the armed forces other than a person who is no longer serving. The permeability of the civil-military boundary is significantly different for those who have served than for those who have not. Among veterans, the modal pattern is to have one linkage in addition to one's own prior service, and over half the veterans report three to five linkages, generally reflecting their own military service, friends who have served, and veterans benefits utilized.

The distribution of linkages in the sample is similar to the distribution of social network contacts, which of course comprise a major component of our cumulated score. Males and the more highly educated have more linkages than do females and respondents with less education. Using this combined index, we did not find significant differences based on age. Where the young have more ties to the military through social networks, older people are tied to the military through other vehicles.

STRUCTURAL LINKAGES AND ATTITUDES

The impacts of social networks upon the attitudes discussed earlier were analyzed. The structure of social networks did not explain variations in attitudes. What we found, for the most part, were effects of age, race, and education.

Results of an analysis of sex, education, race, age, and network contacts are presented in Table 5 for all attitudes that yielded significant results. The net effect of contact on attitude is non-existent. Age, education, and race help, at times, to explain variation in one or the other attitude measure. The gross relationship between age and attitude toward the volunteer army that had appeared in earlier analyses disappears in the full model. Older people cannot be characterized as isolationist or interventionist. They tend to think that the Vietnam War was a mistake. They tend to agree with U.S. policy toward arranging the release of American POWs and in trying to avoid war, but they disagree with the U.S. policy on the issue of stationing troops in Europe. The more highly educated accept the volunteer army concept, want to help poor countries raise their standards of living, think that the government is trying to avoid the spread of Communism, think that the Vietnamese war was a mistake for the United States and think the government should spend less on the military. This suggests something of an isolationist stance although these data are far from conclusive on this point. In more cases than not, the full model explains a statistically significant amount of the variation in attitude toward the military role. More importantly, however, only one model explains 5% of the variation in any attitude item.

In sum, we have found that for the most part the residents of the Detroit metropolitan area do not have many interpersonal ties to current members of the armed forces. The contact that does exist between citizens and active duty personnel is, furthermore, not evenly distributed

TABLE 5
 Results of Regressions of Attitudes about the Military Role and Trust in Government on Demographic Factors
 and Contact: Standardized Partial Regression Coefficients and Coefficients of Determination

	Sex ^a	Race ^b	Educ. ^c	Age ^d	Contact ^e	R ²	N	Sig.
Approve Volunteer Army ^f	-.05	-.09*	.10*	-.03	.03	.03	542	.002
Men Should Bear Arms	-.05	-.06	-.07	.16**	.03	.04	546	.001
US Should Play Major Role	.02	.05	-.08	-.02	.07	.01	547	.18
US Should Help Poor Nations	-.06	-.01	.09*	.01	-.00	.01	547	.18
Too Many Defense Sacrifices	-.03	.11*	-.05	.03	.03	.02	539	.09
Should Spend More on Military	.01	.12*	-.16**	-.00	.09	.05	426	.001
European Troops Helpful	-.08	-.01	.12**	-.11**	-.00	.04	519	.001
Stopping Communists Important	-.00	-.06	-.23**	.02	.02	.05	522	.001
Foreign Affairs Satisfactory	-.03	-.02	.03	.03	.03	.01	520	.74
Government Avoids War	.01	-.03	-.01	.11*	.06	.01	516	.22
Govt. Avoids Communism Spread	-.06	-.03	.18**	-.04	-.01	.05	510	.001
P.O.W. Release Quick	-.01	-.08	.03	.16**	-.07	.04	535	.001
Troops in Vietnam Is Mistake	.05	.11*	.17**	.15**	-.00	.04	535	.001
Favor N. Vietnam Aid	.11**	.23**	.12**	-.05	-.03	.09	510	.001

* p < .05 ** p < .01

a. coded: 1=male; 2=female

b. coded: 1=white; 2=black

c. coded: 1=primary school . . . 6=post-graduate work

d. coded: 1=18-20 . . . 7=71±

e. coded: 0-3=0-3; 4=4 or more

f. All attitude variables coded 1-4 except:
 approve volunteer army (1-5)
 should spend more on military (1-3)
 troops in Vietnam is mistake (1, 5)
 favor N. Vietnam aid (1, 5)

throughout the civilian population. Rather, we find that young people, males, and people at the upper end of the socio-economic distribution have a disproportionate amount of contact with military personnel. Interestingly, preliminary research that attempts to differentiate a military policy public from either a foreign policy public or a domestic policy public finds that the military policy public tends to be characterized in the same way: it is younger, more likely to be male, and better educated than the population as a whole and than the foreign policy public.²³ In addition, these latter data suggest that the military policy public is smaller than the foreign or domestic policy publics, comprising no more than one-fifth of the population.

The most surprising finding given the model suggested here is that interpersonal ties to the armed forces have virtually no effect on attitudes about the military role. In no way can we say that our respondents' social networks help to translate social positions into civil-military attitudes. We began this discussion with a summary of the competing arguments made about the armed forces' retrenchment and isolation from civilian society. While increased contact between citizens and soldiers may have implications for the internal organization of the military and may help to "civilianize" the military, the kind of interpersonal contact discussed here does not seem to "militarize" the public, in the sense of increasing civilian trust in government policies affecting the military or predicting isolationist or interventionist sentiments.

ATTITUDES TOWARD WOMEN IN COMBAT

Recent data are available from two surveys of U.S. Army personnel, as well as from our Detroit respondents, regarding women in combat.²⁴ In a 1974 survey of 724 army personnel at four installations, about 60% of the respondents felt that women should not serve on the front line, about 50% did feel that they would not make good front-line combat soldiers, and over half felt that if women were assigned to combat units, the army would become less effective. Additionally, three-quarters of the sample felt that women should not serve in combat infantry specialties.

The November 1974 Quarterly Survey of Army Personnel, conducted by the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center, asked a world-wide sample of male and female officers and enlisted personnel ($n = 12,564$) "Would you feel as secure in combat with a female commander as you

would with a male commander provided both have equal qualifications?" Over half (54.7%) of the sample responded negatively.

Respondents in our survey were asked the degree to which they agreed with the statement that "If anyone should bear arms, it should be men rather than women." Roughly three-fourths of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement. Though there does not seem to currently be majority support for the "right to fight" of women, the broad sweep of social change is in the direction of gender equality. A citizenship revolution has followed on the heels of the industrial revolution; blacks participate increasingly as full citizens; the young have received greater legal and political rights; and greater legal equality, including extension of the franchise, has been granted to women. Even in the mid-1970s, however, we find much of the debate on the Equal Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution focusing on the loss of a protected status by women.

Interestingly, the indications from our data are that attitudes toward women in combat are very specifically linked to military service and citizenship rather than reflecting a more general propensity for or against discrimination. In the course of our Detroit survey, our respondents were asked, "Do you feel that the government is moving much too fast, too fast, much too slow, too slow, or just about right in its efforts to eliminate sexual discrimination in employment?" There was a tendency to feel that progress toward reducing sex discrimination was about right or too slow. The correlation between this question and attitude toward women bearing arms was not significant. The sex discrimination question was significantly related to a similar question concerning racial discrimination ($r = .399$). Moreover, while the sex discrimination question was significantly correlated with both sex ($r = .175$) and race ($r = .208$) of respondent and the racial discrimination question was significantly related to race of respondent ($r = .353$), feelings about women bearing arms were not related to sex of respondent, and only minimally ($r = .08$) to race of respondents.

THE DECLINE OF THE MASS ARMY

The conversion to an all-volunteer force in the United States has been accompanied by a change in the social definition of the armed forces. During the era of the mass army, the services comprised a major social institution. Through the conversion to an all-volunteer force,

however, the U.S. military is losing its institutional characteristics, and military service is coming to resemble other occupations in society, in terms of nature and conditions of work, employer-employee relations, compensation, and presumably, deference, respect, and legitimacy.²⁵

Our data from Detroit bear on two major aspects of the structure of civil-military relations at the termination of conscription and the mass army. The first of these was a consideration of the processes that link this particular group of civilians to the military establishment. The analysis suggests that many of the linkages that were found to exist were indeed reflections of conscription and the mass army. The very facts that 20% of our sample were veterans, and that 95% of our respondents identified someone they know who have served in the military attests to the magnitude of the flow of personnel from the armed forces to the civilian sector. The all-volunteer force will be smaller than the mobilization forces of the world wars, Korea, and Vietnam, and the average length of service will be longer. Thus, the flow of military personnel back into civilian society will be reduced in the current era, as will the magnitude of this linkage between the two sectors. The massive Selective Service System, designed to root the mass army firmly in the local community, has been dismantled.

Also under attack are the benefits that have provided a major linkage between veterans in the civilian population, and the military establishment. The educational provisions of the G.I. Bill of Rights, which attracted a good deal of quality manpower to the armed services, have been markedly cut back. With the establishment of income equality between civilian and military occupations, fringe benefits such as post-exchanges and commissaries, which are used by retired military personnel as well, are increasingly coming under attack. And the increase in personnel costs thought to be associated with the all-volunteer force has caused military planners to seek other areas in which money might be saved. Among these are programs for educating officers at civilian universities. Thus, another bridge between the services and civilian institutions has been weakened.

While many linkages that have existed in the past may be waning as a function of structural change in the armed forces, two sectors of the population that have historically had weak links to the military are gaining in this regard. For most of America's past, blacks have been underrepresented in the military. This changed with the Vietnam War and the end of the mass army. Our Detroit data reflect no under-

representation of blacks among veterans relative to the population of the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. Neither are there differences in linkages to the military as a function of race. Indeed, since linkages seem to be largely determined by patterns of service, and since blacks were somewhat overrepresented in the services in the early 1970s relative to the civilian population, it would not be surprising to find in the future that the black community were more highly linked to the military than was the white community.

We have consistently found fewer linkages between females and the military than between males and the military. However, there is a trend toward increased utilization of women in the force-in-being, and again, to the extent that patterns of service produce structural linkages, we would anticipate stronger ties here in the future.

A final issue to be raised with regard to linkage structures is the role of the reserves. Were the citizen-soldiers who make up reserve units truly integrated into the force-in-being, they would serve as an important bridge between the civilian and military worlds. The reserve structure was allowed to atrophy during the Vietnam era, and military policymakers have only recently begun to face the issue of involving regular and reserve components in a total force structure. In the absence of motivations to join the reserves provided by conscription, however, our reserve forces are grossly under strength.

The second aspect of civil-military relations we have considered in Detroit is the public view of the military. We have not found a problem of legitimacy of the military institution. Indeed, there seems to be support for a strong military posture, although not for unnecessary military adventures. Interestingly, attitudes toward the military institution are not as highly structured or related to each other as one might have expected, although there was a pattern of statistically significant relationships among attitudes.

Attitudes about the way the civilian government and other civilian institutions were doing their jobs, on the other hand, do suggest a problem of legitimacy in this area. To the extent that evolving forms of military organization lose their unique institutional qualities in the all-volunteer era, and the defense establishment comes to be regarded as simply another government agency, there is a latent problem of legitimacy here.

Most interestingly, while we did find in Detroit a widespread but not dense set of linkages between civilians and the military, with most individuals having few connections to the armed forces, and we found

generally favorable attitudes toward the military, we did not find, at the individual level, any association between linkages and attitudes. The set of processes that linked an individual to the military establishment did not give us a basis for predicting that person's attitudes about military affairs. Rather, we found, in the aggregate, a diffuse set of linkages between Detroiters and the military, and diffuse support for the military institution. While the present data are not adequate to test the hypothesis, we suggest that there are processes here that are holistic and collective, and not reducible to individual-level measurement of attitude and behavior. The linkages between the military and the civilian population in the early 1970s created a general climate of trust of the uniformed forces, one of the manifestations of which was a positive orientation toward the maintenance of military strength.

If this interpretation is correct, and if the structures of linkage and attitude organization manifested in Detroit reflect more general patterns in America, then it behooves social scientists and policy-makers to attend to changes in the structure of civil-military linkages, and in military organization itself that occur as functions of the transition to an all-volunteer force. To the extent that past linkages are maintained, or are replaced with new forms of civil-military contact, and to the extent that the nature of the military is not greatly altered, past patterns of subjective control of the military by the civilian sector are likely to maintain, and the legitimacy of the military institution would not appear problematic. If, on the other hand, the distribution of linkages becomes less widespread than our Detroit data suggest, or if the number of actual linkages declines much below the rather minimal ties we found in Detroit, or if structural change in the military makes it less responsive to civilian control through bridges that cross the civil-military interface, then indeed the institution may come to face the problem of legitimacy that was incorrectly thought to have occurred as a result of the Vietnam War.

NOTES

1. See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1957).
2. Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*. (New York: Free Press, 1960).
3. Morris Janowitz, *Military Conflict*, (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1975), p. 279.
4. Arthur D. Larson, "Military Professionalism and Civilian Control," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 2 (1974): 57-72.

5. John Siebs, "Sampling Memorandum for the 1973 Detroit Area Study" (Ann Arbor: Detroit Area Study mimeo., 1974). A multistage-stratified-clustered sampling design was used to sample 109 blocks (Sampling fraction = 1/10700), and approximately eight housing units per block were selected for interviews. Within each household, the person to be interviewed was randomly selected. Of 849 households included in the sample, thirty two were vacant and nine were errors in the household listing from which the sample was drawn. Of the remaining 808 houses constituting the actual sample, our interviewers encountered 176 refusals, and in fifty six cases interviews were not conducted because the appropriate respondent was absent from the home, or for other reasons. Thus, our response rate was $576/808 = 71.3\%$. While this is a lower rate than desirable and results should be interpreted in that light, it does not reflect an anomaly. Rather, it is a manifestation of a long term decline in response rates noted by several survey organizations. The 1970 Detroit Area Study, for example, reported a response rate of 69% with a somewhat different definition of eligible population, and the 1975 Detroit Area Study, with a sampling frame similar to our own, had a response rate of approximately 71%.

6. For a discussion of this issue, see David R. Segal and John D. Blair, "Public Confidence in the U.S. Military," *Armed Forces and Society* 3 (1976): 3-11.

7. The 1971 survey is reported in Howard Schuman, "Two Sources of Anti-War Sentiment in America," *American Journal of Sociology* 78 (November 1972): 513-36.

8. More extensive analyses of the public opinion data are presented in David R. Segal "Civil-Military Relations in the Mass Public," *Armed Forces and Society* 1 (1975): 215-229.

9. Andre Modigliani, "Hawks and Doves, Isolationism and Political Distrust," *American Political Science Review* 66 (September 1972): 960-98.

10. For a discussion of these processes see Jerald G. Bachman, John D. Blair, and David R. Segal, *The All-Volunteer Force* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977).

11. K. Roghmann, *Dogmatism and Authoritarianism* (Meisenheim; Anton Hain, 1966); B. Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972).

12. See J. C. Miller and R. Tollison, "The Implicit Tax on Relevant Military Recruits," *Social Science Quarterly* 51 (1971): 924-31.

13. This analysis is discussed in detail in David R. Segal and Mady Wechsler Segal, "The Impact of Military Service on Trust in Government, International Attitudes, and Social Status," pp. 201-211 in Nancy L. Goldman and David R. Segal, eds., *The Social Psychology of Military Service* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976).

14. Morris Janowitz, "The All-Volunteer Military as a 'Sociopolitical' Problem," *Social Problems* 22 (February 1975): 432-49.

15. For a more extensive discussion of these findings, see Segal, "Civil-Military Relations in the Mass Public."

16. For example Steven Rosen, ed., *Testing the Theory of the Military-Industrial Complex* (Lexington: D. C. Heath, 1973).

17. Stephen Cutler, "Membership in Voluntary Associations and the Theory of Mass Society," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1973.

18. J. W. Fulbright, *The Pentagon Propaganda Machine* (New York: Random House, 1971).

19. These findings are presented in greater detail in David R. Segal, "Communication about the Military," *Communication Research* 2 (1975): 68-78.

20. Jeremy Boissevain and J. Clyde Mitchell, eds., *Network Analysis: Studies in Human Interaction* (The Hague: Mouton, 1973).

21. See Alexander L. George, "Primary Groups, Organizations, and Military Performance," in Roger W. Little, ed., *Handbook of Military Institutions* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1971), pp. 293-318.

22. See for example Robert Jay Lifton, *Home From the War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973).

23. Bernard C. Cohen, "The Military Policy Public," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 30 (Summer 1966): 200-211.

24. David R. Segal, Nora Scott Kinzer and John C. Woelfel, "The Concept of Citizenship and Attitude Toward Women in Combat," *Sex Roles* (October 1977).

25. See Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "Social Control of the Military," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, August 1975, and "Trends in Military Social Organization," paper presented at the conference on "The Consequences and Limits of Military Intervention," Center for Continuing Education, University of Chicago, June 1976. Also David R. Segal, "Convergence, Commitment, and Military Compensation," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, August 1975, and "Worker Democracy in Military Organization," paper prepared for the Regional Meeting of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, October 1976.

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