

is happening behind the "Iron Curtain," Gunther's product can hardly be favorably compared to his previous reports on Europe. As the title indicates, the author's major interest lies with the states behind the "Iron Curtain." However, not only Italy, but Turkey, Germany, France, and England are also assigned their own chapters—possibly to puff up the size of the book.

To be handled successfully, the subject would require balanced treatment, informed analysis, and highly specialized training; unfortunately, much of what is written by Gunther lacks depth, either because he strains unduly after the "Who's Whos" of the leaders or because he has failed to heed the ever potent factors of background which are perhaps nowhere more prominent than in these countries. Thus Bulgaria, Rumania, and Albania are squeezed into one chapter, and Gunther admits: "We did not visit Bulgaria, Rumania, or Albania. I don't like to write about places I did not see with my own eyes, but each of these three states should have at least a brief word" (p. 114)—and "a brief word" certainly it is.

The over-all result is that the book is often structurally faulty, and the characterizations—even the important portraits of the leading personalities—are apt to be indistinct. To cite a few examples: the Slovaks live "to the south" of the Czechs (p. 217). The statements that Beneš "became violently prejudiced against the British" and "journeyed to Moscow several times, and formed a close connection with Stalin" (p. 218) are assumptions which need considerable elucidation in order to put them into proper focus. It is true that "Prague itself revolted against the Germans" while Patton was held up on orders from the Supreme Allied Command (p. 218), but what about General Vlassov's army's role during this revolt? Gunther admits that the first Czech government included four Czech and four Slovak parties, but also claims that "it included *all* parties of any importance" (p. 218). His statement should have been clarified by pointing out that the most powerful pre-World War II party, the Agrarian, had been banned, with others. When the Communist coup d'état was on the way and the "bourgeois

parties woke up with a start, and demanded that the eight police chiefs be reinstated," the issue was *not* (as Gunther claims, p. 221) "brought to parliament" but to the Cabinet's and Beneš' attention and action. Furthermore, nothing is said about the role played by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin, who arrived in Prague at this critical time.

In short, Gunther's style, emphasis, and treatment are better suited to a series of popular articles than to a broader canvass. The book has value, but the reason is not that Gunther tells us anything new or that he tells it well, but that he has popularized for the nonspecialists a subject of current interest and a great debate.

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LIPSON, E. *Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 1815-1939*. Fourth ed. Pp. x, 500. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1947. \$8.00.

Mr. Lipson's analytical narrative of *Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* is an extension of his familiar *Europe in the Nineteenth Century*. Interest attaches chiefly, therefore, to the new chapter, covering the years 1914-39 and constituting the last two-fifths of the volume. Though (somewhat unfortunately) listed in the table of contents as a single chapter, it consists of eight parts which are really chapters in themselves: The War of 1914-18, The Peace Treaties, The League of Nations, Soviet Russia, National Socialist Germany, Fascist Italy, Other European States, and Economic Nationalism. It is significant that the author, whose interest has always been strongly in the economic field, should have ended his work with a study of autarchy and the end of *laissez faire*. The narrative stops abruptly on the threshold of the Second World War and has very little to say of the military aspects even of the First. Obviously, in so brief an account of so crowded an era something has to be slighted, and perhaps military history is that which can be minimized with the least injury. Economic history, national political history, and diplomatic history, in that order of emphasis, are the themes of the book.

As a good liberal and internationalist, Mr. Lipson naturally regrets the recent trends towards fascism, communism, and militaristic nationalism. "A protracted war," he says, "is usually inimical to the survival of the principles of Liberalism and Internationalism. The concentration of all activities in the hands of the State for the prosecution of the war does not favor the maintenance of individual liberties; and the animosities which are stirred up by the conflict poison the atmosphere of international good will" (p. 393). This generalization he applies to the Napoleonic Wars and to the First World War; unhappily, it begins to look as though it must be applied to the Second as well.

The chief defect of this intelligent and well-balanced history is its rigid periodization. Thus the remarks about the unchangeable Turk (pp. 273-76), made in connection with the Young Turk movement of 1908-14, read somewhat strangely in the light of Kemal's revolutionary reforms a few years later (pp. 448-50). Again, the apprehensions expressed over the spread of fascism would be natural enough from the standpoint of 1939, but why should they remain in a book published in 1947, even though the narrative itself was not carried beyond the earlier date? Should not the history of any period of the past have all the light that our knowledge of the present can throw upon it?

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GEYL, PIETER. *Napoleon: For and Against*. Pp. 477. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949. \$5.00.

Pieter Geyl is a distinguished Dutch historian—professor of modern history at the University of Utrecht. He has recently made himself known to American historians and sociologists by his magisterial article on Arnold J. Toynbee's *Study of History* (the six-volume edition) in the *Journal of the History of Ideas*, January 1948—the best and most adequate critique of Toynbee as a social philosopher and historian that the reviewer has read anywhere.

The present book is an exposition of the opinions about Napoleon's personality, policies, and achievements held by the chief

French historians of the Napoleonic era. Among those whom the author selects for study are Adolphe Thiers, Edgar Quinet, Hippolyte Taine, Henri Houssaye, Albert Vandal, Frédéric Masson, Émile Bourgeois, Albert Sorel, Edouard Driault, Alphonse Aulard, Louis Madelin, and Jacques Bainville.

The volume starts off with the genesis of the Napoleonic Legend and the earlier works on Napoleon from Bignon to Thiers. Then come the writers who took a critical view of the Legend: Barni, Quinet, Lanfrey, d'Haussonville, and Taine. The attitudes of the eulogists are then considered on the basis of the volumes by Houssaye, Arthur-Lévy, Masson, and Vandal. The interpretations of Napoleon's foreign policy by Bourgeois, Sorel, and Driault are next considered; and the volume comes to an end with the leading later authorities on Napoleon, chiefly Aulard, Madelin, Bainville, and Gabriel Hanotaux.

Aulard regards Napoleon as the man who frustrated—"derailed"—the French Revolution and set up a despotism. Bainville, a contemporary French royalist, portrays Napoleon's career sympathetically as "tragic greatness in the grip of fate." Hanotaux admires Napoleon's statecraft, at least down to 1807. Madelin brings recent scholarship to the defense of Napoleon's domestic and foreign policy alike.

The analysis of the views of the French historians relative to the problem of Napoleonic foreign policy is interesting and enlightening. Sorel, the great student of Revolutionary and Napoleonic foreign policy, portrays Napoleon as rarely the aggressor but almost invariably the defender of France and the French system against reactionary continental powers and British envy and aggression. Driault takes the same general stand, holding that England was the main aggressor and that Napoleon fought England not because he desired to but because she was the chief power seeking to frustrate him and the extension of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic system. Émile Bourgeois forcibly contends that the dominating end of Napoleonic foreign policy, right down to Leipzig, was control over the Near East, to which aim English policy was the dominant obstacle.