

This article examines the relationship between participation in the Catholic Church and the consciousness and protest behavior of the most strategic sector of the Peruvian labor force. It explores two ideal models of church influence: traditional and liberation. Although Liberation Theology has some of its deepest roots in the writings and practice of Peruvian priests, the association between participation in church ritual in general in Peru and the consciousness and behavior of workers suggests that the overall influence of the Peruvian Church is best described by the traditional model. Participation in Church ritual and its associated religiosity increase fatalism, retards *concientizacion*, reduces protest participation, and integrates workers into the hierarchy and discipline of the industrial enterprise. The article agrees with Gramsci (1971) that the control of consciousness is as significant an area of political struggle as the control of production, and that the two are related. Through its influence on social consciousness, the church can indirectly affect political action and national patterns of production and distribution. Church acculturation may affect economic growth rate by reducing worker-management and worker-state conflict. It seems equally likely that the conservative effect of church acculturation increases distributional inequality.

THE CHURCH, SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS, AND PROTEST?

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Gramsci (1971) argued that the socialization of consciousness is as significant an area of political struggle as the control of the forces of production. Through the control of consciousness, one controls, or at least influences political action and the patterns of production and distribution. In this article I examine the relationship between accultur-

AUTHOR'S NOTE: *This is a revision of a paper presented at the International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Albuquerque, New Mexico, April 1985. Dr. Heraclio Bonilla collaborated with the author on the collection of the data. Financial assistance was provided to Kenneth P. Langton by the Ford Foundation, National*

COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES, Vol. 19 No. 3, October 1986 317-355
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ation in the Catholic Church and the consciousness and protest behavior of the most strategic sector of the Peruvian labor force. The article explores two ideal types of churches that are the subject of considerable debate in the literature: traditional and liberation. After examining the relationship between participation in the Church and workers' worldview and behavior, I consider which model of church influence (traditional or liberation) is most likely to have caused these patterns of consciousness and participation. I examine the implications of these findings for distributional inequality and economic growth.

THE CHURCH, MACRO-MICRO LINKS

Military organization and such dependency relationships as vertical trade, partner concentration, state strength, and multinational corporate penetration all have been examined as predictors of distributional inequality and economic growth (Weede and Tiefenbach, 1981a, 1981b; Bornschie, 1981). Some scholars suggest that religious organization in general, and the Catholic Church specifically, could be added to the list of predictors.¹ The Church can influence inequality by attempting to impose its policies externally on political institutions, market relations, communication, education, and modes of participation. There is a rich but as yet inconclusive literature on the relation between Church and political and economic policy in Latin America (Bruneau, 1982; Levine, 1981; Smith, 1982; Berryman, 1984). The Church may also affect distribution and economic growth by structuring the attitudes and behavior of its participants. There is a compelling analogy here between the Church and military institutions. Paraphrasing Weede and Tiefenbach's (1981b: 394) hypothesis regarding the influence of military service, there should be better economic performance in societies with "widespread [participation in the Church because this] may enforce societal discipline and provide some incentive for productive and cooperative relations among classes instead of an impoverishing class struggle" (see also Lijphart, 1979: 453).² To continue the analogy, one is struck by the potential similarity in learning experience that military and church clients encounter. Both institutions invoke classical condi-

Science Foundation (SES 8309563), and the Wenner Gren Foundation (#4171). I wish to thank Daniel Levine, Cynthia McClintock, Octavian Petrescu and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments. The author alone is responsible for the views expressed in this article.

tioning and operant and vicarious learning to guide the day-to-day thoughts and behavior of their members.³

If the learning that occurs through participation in church activities or assimilation of church dogma were to increase fatalism, discourage the attitudinal militancy of future workers, and illuminate the moral and real-life risks of labor management or labor-state conflict, the subsequent tranquility in labor relations might promote economic growth (Clutterbuck, 1984).⁴ By the same token, exposure to the hierarchical organization of the Church may later ease the integration of workers into the discipline and hierarchical decision structure of corporate enterprises. In addition, many Third World countries lack collective bargaining mechanisms for resolving labor conflict. Socialization experiences that reduce workers' willingness to use protest as a form of "political bargaining" with management or the state could increase distributional inequality (Woy-Hazelton, 1983; Becker, 1983; Payne, 1965; Stephens, 1980).

The traditional church of obedience is often compared with another ideal type: the church of liberation.⁵ Although the learning processes may be the same, what is learned is quite different. The institution is increasingly engaged in consciousness raising. This will lead to less fatalism, more *concientizacion* and action against the oppressive forces in society (Freire, 1970; Ruether, 1972; Gutierrez, 1973). This should decrease distributional inequality and could increase economic performance in the long run, although growth rate may slow in the short term.

When we collected the data for the larger study of which this analysis forms a part, we did not investigate individual churches to see if their message and ritual was one of tradition or liberation. However, we can examine the association between workers' participation in church ritual in general and their worldview and protest behavior, and infer with some confidence what type of church could have caused these patterns.

The literature provides strong guidance for interpreting these relationships. As we shall see, the practices and worldviews of the traditional and liberation churches are quite different and could be expected to lead their parishioners in very different directions. If we find, for example, that church participation and its associated religiosity is related to increased fatalism, and decreased social consciousness and protest, it would be reasonable to infer that church participants have been exposed to a more *traditional* church. On the other hand, if exposure to church ritual increases consciousness and protest, this is the

type of evidence we would expect to find if *liberation* doctrine and practice were more influential.

In this article I shall examine the relationship between participation in the Church and its associated religiosity, on one hand, and the subsequent (1) fatalism, (2) social consciousness, (3) willingness to engage in labor and political conflict, and (4) integration into the hierarchy and discipline of the industrial workplace among the most mobilized sector of the labor force in Peru. We shall see which model of church best fits these patterns of consciousness and protest. In the conclusion I will discuss the implications of these findings for distributional inequality and economic growth.⁶

THE CHURCH IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Although there is considerable speculation and research on the Church and politics, we know surprisingly little about its influence on the political attitudes and protest behavior of workers either in the United States, Europe, or Latin America. Before examining the impact of the Peruvian Church, it will be useful to place the Catholic Church in perspective first by comparing its influence on its participants to that of other denominations on their members.

The models presented by all church hierarchies to their parishioners and the messages delivered by all clergy are potentially important in establishing religious principles that guide everyday life. A recent national study in the United States investigated the influence of "fundamentalist religiosity" (Miller and Wattenberg, 1984). Although members of Pietistic, fundamentalist, and southern Baptist Churches had the highest religiosity, Catholics were about as likely as members of other protestant sects to score high. Catholics' religiosity was significantly stronger than the religiosity of Mormons, Jews, or those with no professed religion. Religiosity, in turn, was associated with political conservatism, support of school prayers, and opposition to abortion and equal rights for women.

Other research has examined the relation between participation in church ritual and denomination, on the one hand, and political tolerance of groups such as communists, atheists, and so on. Piereson, Sullivan, and Marcus (1980) found no difference in tolerance among Catholics, Protestants, and Jews. Recent national research discovered, however,

that when Protestants were separated by denomination, there was considerable variation in tolerance. Those with no religious affiliation were most tolerant, followed closely by Congregationalists, Jews, and Episcopalians. Catholics were in the middle of the rankings (Beatty and Walter, 1984: 332). More significant to the focus of this article was the finding that formal participation (attendance) in church ritual led to more intolerance *in every denomination*. For example, Catholics thought atheists or communists should not be allowed to do at least one of the following: (1) speak publicly in the community, (2) teach in a university, or (3) have their books in the local library. Catholics who frequently attended church would forbid between two and three of these acts.

Regular participation in the Church also was associated with conservative attitudes among industrial workers in Santiago, Chile. On the whole, these workers were more likely to believe that Chile should become a socialist country than nonindustrial workers (Smith, 1982: 217-218). Industrial workers who were regularly practicing Catholics, however, were least supportive of socialism (36%), followed by industrial workers who were nonpracticing Catholics (55%), and those industrial workers with "no religion" (77%).

A comparative study of four European nations and the United States found no significant difference between Catholics and Protestants in protest participation. Those professing no religion had the highest protest potential (Marsh and Kaase, 1979). A subjective sense of religiosity did, however, inhibit unconventional political activity. Moreover, the link between churches and political culture was suggested by the correspondence between positive affect toward the clergy and proestablishment attitudes (Inglehart, 1979). In the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands, positive attitudes toward the clergy, big business, state officials, and the police formed a common factor that was associated with support for the sociopolitical order (Barnes and Kaase, 1979).

This literature review suggests that although there are denominational differences in political conservatism and tolerance, Catholics are not at the extreme ends of the continuum. In addition, the strongest predictors of political attitudes and behavior that cut across all sects are *church attendance* and *subjective religiosity*. We shall turn now to a closer examination of the traditional and liberation models of the Latin American Church and their hypothesized relationship to consciousness and protest.

THE TWO CHURCHES, SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS, AND PROTEST

Although there has been an outpouring of books and articles on the liberation and traditional church and their supposed effect on their parishioners' attitudes and behavior, these models are ideal types. Each national church and each diocese contains some elements of tradition and liberation. Here we are interested in the patterns of consciousness and protest behavior we might expect to find if one or the other of these philosophies dominated church teaching and practice.

THE TRADITIONAL CHURCH

Some observers feel that liberation theology has been more of a media event than a force for change among the bulk of believers in Latin America. The church leadership has changed neither its essentially authoritarian attitudes nor the organizational structure that is necessary to stimulate change. It still exposes peasants and workers to a fatalistic worldview that finds the cause of poverty either in luck or God, or places the blame squarely on the individual shoulders of lazy or uneducated parishioners ("pecado personal"). It opposes class conflict and supports a corporatist integration of the classes that reduces group awareness among workers and the poor. The leadership expects and teaches deference to religious authority. It extolls the virtue of hierarchy, and the superiority of the system and the organization over that of the individual. This reduces the member's inclination to blame the system for social inequities or to advocate the participation of those at the bottom of the command hierarchy (parishioner and worker) in communal decision making. The Church's traditional opposition to militant confrontation and group conflict spills over into the economic and political world as it dampens workers' enthusiasm for confronting either their employers or the state (Morris and Adelman, 1980; Vallier, 1970; Pike, 1964; Vekemans, 1964; Smith, 1970; Mutchler, 1971; Crahan, 1975; CELAM, 1969: 22). If church socialization reduces participation in protests and demonstrations, it may, on the other hand, ease the integration of citizens into the industrial labor force by acculturating them to the obedience, discipline, and hierarchy of the workplace.

THE LIBERATION CHURCH

Although the church may have resisted change, those elements that advocate a theology of liberation have gained greater voice.⁷ In some dioceses the Church no longer supports established order, and directly and indirectly it has both innovated and supported social change (Bruneau, 1974, 1982; Smith, 1982; Levine, 1981). Although the precise influence of the liberationists within the Church is ambiguous, as is their influence on the laity (Bruneau, 1982), the major themes of liberation theology are well known.

Gustavo Gutierrez, the Peruvian priest whose seminal book *Teologia de la Liberacion* (1971) launched the current interest in liberation theology, recently described liberation as "the suppression of oppressions" in order to lift up the poor and build a free community (*Que Hacer*, February 1985: 24). The process of lifting up the poor and creating a freer society, according to liberation theologians, engages at least five elements: (1) fatalism, (2) system-self blame, (3) group consciousness, (4) hierarchical organization of the church (ecclesia versus ecclesiastical) and society, and (5) action. Each component is discussed below.

Fatalism versus Conscientization. Liberation means *concientizacion*, an understanding of history that rejects fatalism and recognizes that humans are not only acted upon by, but that they can act on, their environment. Great wealth and poverty are not facts of nature, luck, or God's will; they are the result of people's greed and injustice. This is not the fatalism of the "faithful remnant," which suffers oppression while placing their trust in God, awaiting his deliverance (Miguez Bonino, 1975). It is a church-induced shift in the individual's conception of the alterability of the environment that Morris and Adelman (1980) argue is required for major social change.

Self versus System Blame. Beyond the rejection of fatalism comes the recognition that people are not necessarily poor because they are lazy (or the rich personally virtuous) but because society has been structured by the rich and the powerful so that the poor remain poor. They will remain poor, Gutierrez says (*Que Hacer*, February, 1985: 24), unless they shift their eyes from self ("pecado individual") to the system ("pecado social"), and organize to change the structure of society (Brown, 1978; 62).⁸

Individual versus Group Awareness. Effective organization against oppression requires awareness of "common interest."⁹ Poor people and workers at the bottom of the socioeconomic hierarchy benefit the least and their lack of group consciousness contributes to their powerlessness. Liberationists say the Church can play an important role by (1) affirming the existence of social divisions and by (2) educating the oppressed regarding their common economic and social interests. Some theologians argue that recognition of common interest or class identification is just the first step in a cumulative process through which social consciousness is formed. The miner who identifies with the working class may not be aware of the place of his class in the social hierarchy, the differences between the lower and higher classes, or the political parties, leaders, and movements that these classes support. Group awareness helps the worker to translate common interest or class identification into a useful guide for understanding the social and political meaning of stratification (Leggett, 1968; Ossowski, 1966).

Hierarchy versus Egalitarian Involvement in Decision Making. Group awareness and system blame will not lead to a free and participatory society if workers do not believe that they should be involved in decisions affecting the nature of their religious community, the economic and political system, and their own workplace.

The decisions of the Second Vatican Council and the Roman Synods did encourage a greater voice for both clergy and the laity in church decision making. However, even when new structures were adopted, the actual decision process did not necessarily change (Cartaxo Rolim, n.d.) when individual dioceses lacked resources or the support of their Bishops. On the other hand, Bruneau (1982) does report instances of church decentralization in Brazil. He finds base communities that are less hierarchical, encourage critical reflection on the environment, and are action oriented. Smith (1982) also notes the greater flexibility and informality of some of the church leadership in Chile since Vatican II. Others have observed in Peru the free dialogue in the summer theology courses initiated by Gustavo Gutierrez at the Catholic University, as well as bottom-up participation in some of the base communities in the urban slum areas around Lima (Klaiber, 1977; Kirby, 1981; Gudorf, 1984).

Liberation theologians also argue that workers must have an expanded role in the management of the workplace. Solidarity with the poor "must be an effort to forge a society in which the worker is not

subordinated to the owner" (Gutierrez, 1976: 20). The poor must be equal participants in the decisions that affect their economic and political well being. Hierarchical organization and autocracy within the traditional church is barren ground for forming workers' belief in democratic decision making. Fusfeld (1978: 8) proposes that we conduct research on the external factors that affect the success of worker-managed enterprises that some theologians advocate. We need to identify the potential incompatibility between democratically managed economic and political institutions and the decision environments found in the family, school, church, and other social institutions.

In the democratization of the workplace two types of worker involvement are at issue; one in which the worker cooperates with owners, union leaders, technicians, the military, the state, and so forth. This form of codetermination is closer to the reformist stance adopted by the church.¹⁰ The other type of participation is closer to Marx and Engels' conception of proletarian consciousness in which the worker has exclusive control over economic decisions, particularly in the work place. Workers exposed to the traditional church should be least supportive of worker participation in economic decision making, whereas those exposed to the liberation church would favor shared decision making or even worker control.

Passivity versus Action. Liberation theology grew out of "social awareness and the desire to act" (Sanders, 1973: 168). Gutiérrez said that "it became crystal clear that in order to serve the poor, one had to move into political action" (cited in Brown, 1978: 62). "Any claim to nonintervention in politics . . . is nothing but a subterfuge to keep things as they are" (Gutierrez, 1973: 266). "All . . . the theologies of hope . . . revolution, and of liberation, are not worth one genuine act of solidarity with the exploited social classes" (Gutierrez, 1973: 308). The world is in conflict, the major forces are polarized. One must take sides. One is either for the oppressed or for the oppressors. "When the church rejects the class struggle, it is objectively operating as a part of the prevailing system" (Gutierrez, 1973: 275).

It would seem that if the poor and the workers were to cast off their fatalism, and begin to blame the system for social injustice, develop a group awareness, and believe that their group should be involved in decisions affecting their economic status, they would be more likely to engage in labor and political protest. This is particularly true in Third World countries where the traditional demand channels such as the

electoral system are often suspended, or are not structured to process workers' demands in a timely manner, or the agenda and viable electoral candidates are controlled by the wealthy or the military.

I have included the major elements in our discussion of the liberation and the traditional church in the path diagram in Figure 1. At the left of Figure 1 is participation in church ritual and its associated religiosity (C). At the far right is protest activity (P): participation in strikes, work stoppages, and political demonstrations. Although a priest may mobilize and directly lead workers into protest activity ($C \rightarrow P$), the linkage between church and confrontation is less often direct and more likely to be mediated by the Church's influence on parishioners' fatalism and social consciousness (group awareness, system blame, belief in worker participation in work place decisions). In a church dominated by liberation theology, parishioners will be socialized to a less fatalistic worldview. That is, the relationship between acculturation in a liberation church (C) and fatalism (F) will be negative (Figure 1) and positive in the traditional church. Fatalism is a worldview, a motivational orientation that is prior to the more specific cognitive beliefs included in social consciousness. Fatalistic workers who believe that people like themselves can do nothing about poverty, that what happens in their life is dictated by luck or God are least likely to be class aware, to blame the system, or to desire worker participation in decision making. In other words, fatalistic workers are least likely to have high social consciousness. The relationship between parishioners' fatalism and social consciousness will be negative regardless of the type of church. Those who have strong consciousness are more likely to protest. However, this relationship ($SC \rightarrow P$) will also be mediated by workers' perception of the immediate environment at the time that they are about to act. If they believe that the act will be effective in the current situation (E), they will protest. The major influence of social consciousness will be to shape these perceptions of the situation ($SC \rightarrow E$, Langton and Petrescu, 1984).

One element in the model that has not been discussed is "political religiosity." This concept reflects the common notion in the literature that the models presented by all church organizations to their parishioners, and the messages delivered by all clergy, are potentially important in establishing religious principles that guide everyday life. I am particularly interested here in *religion as a guide to political life*, a yardstick by which one measures which political tendencies or movements to support (Langton and Rapoport, 1976). Presumably both the




Figure 1: The Relationship Between Religious Acculturation in the Traditional and Liberation Church and Protest

traditional and liberation church would inculcate beliefs that could be used as a measure of political life (Kirby, 1981). Therefore, the relationship between church (C) and political religiosity (PR) should be positive in both cases. The difference is in the message. The religious principles and dogma of the liberation church may create a political lens that focuses positively on social consciousness (PR → SC, Figure 1). In the traditional church there should be a negative relationship.

THE PERUVIAN CHURCH

Up to this point I have talked generally about the influence of the traditional and liberation church. How would one characterize the Peruvian Church? Morris and Adelman (1980: 494) classified 107 countries by the degree to which the predominant religion encouraged or "was consistent with the concept of individual control over personal fate." Peru ranked with those "countries in which the predominant religion [Catholicism] promotes moderately fatalistic attitudes towards man's capacity to alter his destiny."

Historically the Peruvian Church was linked through its colonial heritage to an oligarchy composed of the large landowners, merchants, and top state and military officials. Its critics charged that the hierarchical structure of the Church encouraged servility and a fatalistic

and docile poor, whereas church doctrine and behavior served to legitimate oligarchic interests (Gorman, 1982: chap. 8; Chang-Rodriguez, 1957; Prada, 1940; Bains, 1972). Although there were instances of individual priests denouncing injustice and aiding Indian rebellions (Klaiber, 1977), church ideology continued to encourage a placid acceptance of the dominant structures into the 1950s (Cotler, 1978: 308-309).

The intensification of class conflict in Europe, the increased interest of Rome in the "worker question," the growing number of foreign priests in Peru, the integration of the Peruvian economy into the world market, the mobilization of workers and the poor by protestant sects and the left, the abortive guerrilla movement in the 1960s, and the unresponsiveness of the increasingly divided oligarchy to the pressing needs of the society, all contributed to the alienation of important sectors within the church and the military. Cardinal Landazuri responded first (Episcopado Peruano, 1959) with what has become the public role of the church: (1) denunciation of injustice and (2) offers to mediate between the contending forces, be they guerrillas and the state, or strikers and management (Sanders, 1982: 157-158; *Expreso*, August 31, 1984, Lima, Peru; *El Diario*, August 31, 1984, Lima Peru).

In 1986, the military reacted to the unresolved problems by overthrowing the civilian government and attempting to dismantle the power base of the old oligarchy. This presented the Church with new challenges. The cardinal and many of the bishops supported the social reforms instituted by the military government between 1968 and 1974 (Wils, 1979: 204; Werlich, 1978: 343-355). However, the Church was moving in two directions. The National Office of Social Information (ONIS) was organized by progressive priests to work in the popular sectors and disseminate liberation theology to the urban poor. At the same time, a large part of the church hierarchy remained estranged from class mobilization and was open to more communitarian or corporatist political and economic arrangements (Stepan, 1978: 58). *Cursillos de Cristiandad* were organized by church officials and laity among military officers and professionals to promote reform from above (Cotler, 1978). The vision of society was quite different in the *Cursillos*, however. The emphasis was on Christian-democratic communitarianism, class reconciliation and the integration of the classes into a corporatist whole. Not surprisingly, cursillistas and Christian Democrats assumed important positions in the military government, which attempted to impose corporatist structures on the society (Cotler, 1978: 318).

The split in the Church between the more conservative and progressive officials has continued. Cardinal Landazuri has been attacked for his continued support of the pastoral direction of liberation theology (*Que Hacer*, February 1985: 19; *New York Times*, February 1, 1985). A minority of bishops are active supporters of this doctrine while others, such as the Archbishop of Arequipa, have publicly attacked the new theology (*Que Hacer*, October 1984: 17). It was reported that conservative bishops fought for a public condemnation of the theology but that the bishops were split 18-18 with 17 abstentions (*New York Times*, February 1, 1985). A working consensus was finally reached distinguishing an acceptable liberation theology from one that uses "Marxist analyses."¹¹

The division among the bishops is reflected among priests. Mooney and Soderland (1977) surveyed priests from the northern diocese of Chiclayo and from the archdiocese of Lima. About 60% favored a progressive church that would strengthen base communities, in contrast to an alternative model stressing the traditional preaching of the Gospel and administration of the sacraments as the primary clerical duties (p. 21). Fewer (39%) were optimistic that the Church would move "very far" in this direction or that it would decentralize its authority structure (20%) "very far."¹² The most pessimistic were members of ONIS, the group that had fought the hardest within the Peruvian Church for the decentralization of authority and the expansion of base communities as an expression of liberation doctrine.

The divisions within the Church make it unclear what general influence, if any, it will have on workers' attitudes. If we examined a Lima slum that had been organized into a base community by priests espousing liberation theology, we might expect different results than in a conservative parish (Kirby, 1981). We are interested here, however, in the *aggregate* effect of church exposure and religiosity on workers. Having said this, it is not clear how often liberation theology moves from learned treatises or clerical debates to the grass roots. Nor is it self-evident that local church organs, whether innovative or conservative, will have a significant effect on workers' attitudes or behavior. In Brazil, the innovative or traditional character of the parish was only modestly related to parishioners' "social Catholicism" (sociopolitical attitudes most reflective of liberation theology). Even in São Paulo where the effects were the strongest, the Kendall Tau C correlation did not exceed .17 for the lower class (Bruneau, 1982: 121-124).¹³

The Church must compete with many other and often more salient institutions in the contemporary environment such as political parties, media, military, unions, work place, schools, friends, and so on.¹⁴ Compared to occupational socialization that covers most of an adult's life span, the average worker spends a short period in the church environment. If we add to limited exposure the lack of church resources and personnel, cumbersome organization, the often greater appeal of church innovations to the higher classes (*cursillos*, Christian family movement), and the continued appeal of traditional or indigenous religions (Bruneau, 1980: 537), we then understand why the influence of the church may lie deeply within the funnel of causality where its influence, at best, is indirect (see Figure 1).

MINERS, PROTEST, AND THE PERUVIAN STATE

If the Church influences the attitudes and behavior of mine workers, this could have important consequences for the unstable Peruvian economy, as well as for the fragile democratic institutions to which Peru has returned after a long period of military rule. Peru has limited industrial development; the state is dependent on the export earnings and taxes from the mining industry. Miners, therefore, hold a strategic position, as they do in most Third World countries that depend on mineral exports (Magill, 1974; Petras and Zeitlin, 1967; Konings, 1978; Bates, 1971; Whitehead, 1981; Luchembe, 1982; Zapata, 1982). Work stoppages in this vital export industry have in the past forced the government to revise its budget estimates, and they are frequently met with the mobilization of the national police and the armed forces (Kruijt, 1982; *Latin American Regional Reports*, Andean Group, December 14, 1984; *El Diario*, Lima, November 8, 1984; Clutterbuck, 1984).

Strikes and demonstrations are often begun in Peru as a form of "political bargaining" to force the state to intervene in labor-management conflicts and impose settlements that meet at least some of labor's demands (Woy-Hazelton, 1983; Stephens, 1980; Becker, 1983; Payne, 1965). It is not uncommon, for example, for thousands of miners to launch a hunger strike or to march from the central Andes to the coastal capital of Peru to press their economic and political demands directly on

the government (*Latin American Regional Reports*, Andean Group, March 4, 1983; *El Comercio*, Lima, November 27, 1985; *Expreso*, Lima, January 8, 1986). Conflict between the miners and the state has yet to be institutionalized and continues to alternate between periods of compromise and confrontation (Sulmont, 1981; Kruijt, 1982; Laite, 1980).¹⁵

Labor protest also has an important impact on the stability of civilian (as well as military) governments, particularly in third world countries. In 1980 the military returned Peru to civilian rule, elections, and liberal parliamentary democracy. The evolution or survival of these institutions depends in part on the willingness and ability of popular forces to use them. When these traditional demand channels are blocked or workers perceive them to be blocked, labor conflict increases. If the civilian executive does not intervene before the confrontation and disorder escalate, it risks a military coup.

THE DATA AND THE VARIABLES

In 1979 three-hour interviews were completed with a random sample of 494 workers from three underground mines in the central Andes of Peru. The miners were adult males between 18 and 58 years of age, of Indian or Mestizo heritage, whose formal education ranged from none to secondary school. Trained Peruvian anthropologists and sociologists conducted interviews in Spanish or Quechua in the miners' homes. Due to refusal, illness, or absence from the work place,¹⁶ 8% of the sample was not interviewed.

The mines in which the interviews were conducted are controlled by the largest Peruvian-owned mining company. It is a modern, professionally managed corporation, typical of the late capitalist business organization. These corporate characteristics are similar to those found in the private mines to the south, and in the evolving control mechanisms of the state-owned mines (Centromin) of the former Cerro de Pasco Corporation (Kruijt, 1982).

THE VARIABLES

Church Acculturation. This measure was constructed from the miner's responses to two questions: (1) how often he attended church or

participated in a church directed activity, and (2) how religious he considered himself. The strong dependence of religiosity on church participation was suggested by their high intercorrelation (.77). A 4-point index was constructed from the two items. Those who participated in church activities once a week or more often and considered themselves very religious, or somewhat religious scored the highest. Workers who never attended church and felt that they were not very religious ranked lowest.

Fatalism. To lift up workers and the poor, according to liberation theologians, the Church must: decrease (1) fatalism and (2) self-blame; and encourage (3) group awareness and (4) the belief that people should participate in decisions that affect their economic and political life. Because fatalism is a worldview, a general motivational orientation that is prior to more specific cognitive beliefs such as group awareness and self-system blame, it was measured separately. The cognitive elements of *concientizacion* are included in the Social Consciousness measure.

Fatalism is the respondent's general belief that the environment is not alterable by people like himself. People are acted upon, they cannot change social conditions. A 3-point index was constructed from two questions that asked the worker to agree or disagree on a 5-point Likert response scale: (1) there will always be poverty in spite of all the efforts of people like him to prevent it, and (2) that most people do not realize to what extent their lives are controlled by luck or by God. The two indicators are strongly correlated (.92).

Social Consciousness. This is a 4-point index composed of four questions that assess workers' level of *concientizacion*: (1) class identification, (2) awareness of the place of their class in the social hierarchy, and the political parties, movements, and leaders that are associated with their group, (3) self-system blame, and (4) belief in worker control over decisions (wages and schedules) in the work place. These items and the rationale for the social consciousness measure are discussed in greater detail in Langton (1984a). Workers who identify with other workers, who recognize the relation of their group to the social hierarchy, who blame the system for the maldistribution of resources, and who believe that their group should be involved in decisions affecting their economic status will be considered for the purposes of this analysis to have the highest social consciousness.

Political Religiosity. This is a direct measure of the degree to which people merge their confessional and political roles. Respondents were asked: When they decided which political parties or candidates to support, was it important to them to know how religious the candidates were, or what the candidates thought about religion, or what they thought about the relationship between church and politics? Responses were classified as high or low political religiosity.

Act Effectiveness. This is a measure of the worker's perception of the current environment as he is about to decide whether to participate or not in a protest. In six different protest situations we measured the worker's belief that participation in that setting would influence the authorities in question. The six influence scales were aggregated into a cumulative Act Effectiveness Index. Those who scored highest felt that their protest would be effective in each of the six situations. See Langton (1984c) and the Appendix for a more detailed discussion.

Protest Participation. Six types of confrontation activity were examined. They included: (1) stopping work to force the government to grant a cost-of-living wage increase, (2) striking to influence the state to intervene in support of unpaid workers in a distant mine, (3) participating in a political demonstration in Lima, (4) joining a national strike to force the state to support miners who were dismissed in a legal strike in southern Peru, (5) demonstrating in front of mine administration offices in support of greater worker participation in decisions affecting work conditions in the mines, and (6) halting work in order to force mine administrators to negotiate a wage increase. The different types of participation were combined into a cumulative index in which those who participated the most scored the highest (see Appendix).

THE INFLUENCE OF THE CHURCH

Eighty-eight percent of the miners identify themselves as Catholics. Only 16% participate in church activities on at least a weekly basis.¹⁷ This is somewhat higher than weekly church attendance for the general population in Great Britain (13%), Germany (4%), or Catholic Austria (4%), but less than Catholic Italy (22%) and Venezuela (38%),¹⁸ or the United States (30%).¹⁹ However, male industrial workers in every

country except the United States (22%) participate substantially less than Peruvian Workers.²⁰

Only 12% of the Peruvians consider themselves to be "very religious," whereas 38% are "somewhat" religious and 50% "not very." The proportion who are very or somewhat religious (50%) is comparable with the general population in Great Britain (42%), West Germany (37%), and Austria (42%), but lower than Italy (68%), the United States (74%), or Venezuela (86%).²¹ Again, the religiosity of industrial workers in Great Britain (very religious and somewhat religious: 32%), Germany (24%), and Catholic Austria (23%) was lower, whereas the religiosity of workers in Catholic Italy (56%) and the United States (55%) is comparable to Peruvian workers.

The most religious miners (higher church participation and religiosity) are 47% less likely to be in the highest reaches of the social consciousness index,²² and they are less disposed to protest ($\text{Gamma} = -.45$)²³ than the least religious miners. These direct relationships can be deceiving, however. Relationships that appear in simple bivariate analyses often drop out when other variables are added to the model. In the multivariate path analysis that will be reported later in the article, the direct links between Church (C, Figure 1) and social consciousness and protest are statistically insignificant. The Church's impact on consciousness and protest is indirect through its influence on workers' fatalism and political religiosity.

THE CHURCH AND FATALISM

The faithful remnant who see poverty as a natural and unchangeable feature of the environment and who place their fate in God and luck are well represented in the Peruvian culture. Fifty three percent of the most mobilized sector of the labor force have learned a worldview telling them that there will always be poverty in spite of all the efforts of people like themselves, and that their lives are largely controlled by luck or by God. If there is a dominant ideology in Peru, fatalism is likely to be one of its salient characteristics.

Does exposure to the Church induce a shift in the worker's belief in the alterability of the environment? Apparently not. The more workers attend church activities and adopt the associated religiosity, the greater their fatalism (.44).

Although it is possible that some of those who are most fatalistic seek out the Church, it is more plausible that influence flows from the Church to the participants' worldview. Catholics are usually introduced to church ritual at a very young age. As adults they normally attend the Church in their area; they do not travel to other towns or villages seeking out more congenial church cultures.²⁴

THE CHURCH AND POLITICAL RELIGIOSITY

Fatalism lies deep within the worker's cognitive structure and reflects the long-term effects of church and life-cycle socialization. Political religiosity, the conscious use of religion as a yardstick for making political decisions, may represent shorter-term forces. This cognitive merger of religion and politics is not necessarily the result of overt instruction by church officials. Some clerics carefully avoid conscious political instruction. Not all social and political issues are salient to the Church. In addition, a worker does not need instruction in order to join religion and politics. He can establish the linkage deductively. In this case the Church's role is latent. It is more manifest when either conservative or progressive officials use the pulpit or other church directed activities to lead the laity to the appropriate link between doctrine and praxis. The formative role of the clergy is suggested by the strong correlation (.56) between church acculturation and political religiosity.

FATALISM, POLITICAL RELIGIOSITY AND SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Workers who see the environment as impervious to their influence develop a social consciousness consonant with their worldview. Fatalistic workers are less likely to be class aware, or to blame the system for the maldistribution of wealth, or to believe that workers should be involved in decisions that affect their economic status (-.65).

Although the relationship between political religiosity and fatalism is not significant (Figure 1), political religiosity does affect social consciousness. Earlier I said that both the traditional and liberation church could promote the politicization of religious beliefs; we saw that there is a strong positive correlation between church participation and

political religiosity. The differences between the two churches is in their interpretation of political life. Liberation doctrine and practice is presumed to create a political consciousness that encourages group awareness, system blame, and a belief in the worker's right to participate in economic decisions. This is not the aggregate effect of the message among miners. Those most likely to use religious beliefs as a measure of politics are least likely to have high social consciousness (-.60).

PATHWAYS TO PROTEST


The bivariate analysis suggests that the Peruvian Church inculcates a fatalism and political religiosity that reduces miners' social consciousness. Before we turn to the path analysis and explore the effect of this acculturation on protest behavior, we might briefly consider other environments besides the Church that could influence consciousness and protest, although space does not allow us to examine them in detail.²⁵ We already know, for example, that military service regards workers social consciousness and reduces their protest participation (Langton, 1984a). A more detailed analysis of the respondents' occupational history after leaving home and before entering the mine might also be revealing. By the same token, we have rich data on the miner's occupational history within the mine as well as the autocratic or participatory climate of his family of origin, peer group, school, and the attitudes of his spouse—all of which could alter his social consciousness or willingness to engage in protests.²⁶

I did examine the influence of miners' demographic characteristics on the model. Not surprisingly, Peruvian mine workers are a much more homogeneous group than the heterogeneous samples of national populations. Eighty-five percent have not gone beyond elementary school. Because of the rigors of mining, 80% are younger than 40 and 70% have worked in the mine less than 11 years. Seventy-four percent come from families whose father worked in agriculture. Despite the homogeneity, I examined the relationship between the respondent's education and origin (father's occupation: agriculture—nonagriculture) and each variable in Figure 1. Education and origins were not significantly related to protest,²⁷ social consciousness, fatalism, or political religiosity. Education does have a slight effect on recruitment into the church culture. Those with more education attend church more often and are more religious. However, the relation is weak (.11).

Figure 2 shows a path diagram of the relationships among church, fatalism, political religiosity, social consciousness, perceived effectiveness of the act, and protest. I used a least-squares structural equation model to identify the paths. The analysis confirms that church influence lies deep within the funnel of causality. The most direct and strongest predictor of protest is the worker's perception in the actual protest situation that the act will influence (E) the authorities in that setting (Langton and Petrescu, 1984). Social consciousness also influences protest directly, but most of its effect is through act effectiveness (E) as it shapes the worker's perceptions of the situation. Further back in the funnel are those orientations and beliefs that shape social consciousness and which, in turn, are directly influenced by the Church. The aggregate effect of the Church is to inculcate fatalism and a type of political religiosity that reduces *concientizacion* (SC) and worker participation in protest activity.

INTEGRATION INTO THE INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY

Bowles and Gintis (1976) argue that the major function of secondary and higher education in the United States is to integrate workers into the



NOTES: All path coefficients are significant at the .05 probability level. The Multiple correlations are: Social Consciousness—.49, Act Effectiveness—.42, and Protest—.78.

Figure 2: Path Diagram of the Relations Between Church Acculturation, Fatalism, Political Religiosity, Social Consciousness, Act Effectiveness, and Protest

capitalist economy. Although institutions such as the school, church, and the military do not exercise total control over their members, manifest and latent socialization in each organization can emphasize deference to authority, as well as the superiority of the organization or the system over the individual. This may help ease workers into the hierarchical command structure and fixed schedules of the industrial workplace.

We asked workers three open-ended questions about their first impressions when they began to work in the mine. What were their reactions to the hierarchy of the work place, the fixed schedules, and the machines and technology? Some found it difficult to adjust; other saw bosses and orders as part of the "natural order."²⁸

Other institutions in Peru besides the Church help integrate workers into the economy. Prior service in the military adjusts workers to the hierarchy and discipline of the corporate enterprise (Langton, 1984a). Even though these experiences may dilute the impact of the Church, its influence is still apparent.²⁹ Workers socialized by the Church made an easier transition into the hierarchy of the mine than those with low attendance and who were not very religious (Table 1). They also found the rigid work schedule to be more acceptable. Combining attendance and religiosity into a church acculturation index in Table 1, however, underestimates the influence of the Church.³⁰ Workers learn more about hierarchy, obedience, and deference through direct contact with the clergy rather than through their associated religiosity. When participation in Church activities was examined separately, those who attended the most were 49% more likely to adjust easily to the hierarchy of the mine than those who rarely attended. They were also 41% more

TABLE 1
Association Between Church Acculturation and Adjustment
to the Hierarchy and Fixed Work Schedule of the Mine

Church Acculturation	Hierarchy			Fixed Schedule		
	Transition			Transition		
	Easy	Difficult	N	Easy	Difficult	N
High 1	63%	37%	110	73%	27%	112
2	55%	45%	112	61%	39%	112
Low 3	51%	49%	205	58%	42%	205

NOTE: Categories 1 and 2 of the Church Acculturation index are collapsed into the "High" category.

likely to adapt to fixed schedules than infrequent participants. The Church had no influence on workers' adjustment to mine technology.

The church also integrates workers into the market economy by acculturating them to their appropriate role in economic decision making. Workers were asked who should be involved in setting wages and determining how fast they should work. The responses were organized in a 3-point index: (1) workers only, (2) mixed (workers in cooperation with owners, state, technicians, the military, and so forth), and (3) no workers should be involved. Of those most socialized by the Church, 43% believed workers should not be involved in these decisions at all; only 11% of the least religious would exclude workers (-.49).³¹

CONCLUSION

Scholars have long suggested that there is a macro relationship between religious organization and distributional inequality and national economic growth. Although cross-national analysis of aggregate data is inconclusive, one possible explanation for the association is the dampening effect that church life has on the consciousness and conflict behavior of those members of the labor force who are included in its ranks. In this article I examined one aspect of this macro-micro linkage by investigating the relationship between acculturation in the Catholic Church and the subsequent fatalism, political religiosity, social consciousness, protest behavior, and integration into the industrial enterprise of mine workers, the most strategic sector of the Peruvian labor force.

Research on the Church in Third World countries generally focuses on its impact on other political and social institutions or on domestic policy. But it is also an important formal organization that directly touches the lives of the masses who are exposed to its structure and message. Marx understood this potential influence when he accused religion of being the opiate of the masses. He recognized, as have others, that norms often associated with traditional, hierarchically organized mass organizations such as the church or the military may suppress aspirations, foster acceptance of the status quo, and mute an awareness of social divisions that could direct the less privileged toward change-oriented policies and political movements. What was not anticipated by earlier critics was the growing support among clerics and laity for new

doctrine, structure, and pastoral direction. Liberation theology and praxis is the most recent reflection of this ferment. Acting as a guiding catalyst, the church would help liberate the poor by changing their fatalistic worldview. Consciousness would be raised as the less privileged began to look to the system rather than blame themselves for the maldistribution of wealth. They would develop a group awareness, and begin to believe that they should be involved in decisions that affect their economic status. Liberation would create the willingness to act against oppressive forces that foster distributional inequality in society.

About 37% of the mine workers attend a church-directed activity at least once a month, and adopt a personal religiosity strongly associated with this participation. After examining the relationship between this church involvement and miners' beliefs and behavior, we can say with considerable confidence that these patterns of consciousness and protest reflect the workings of a traditional, conservative Church. It increases fatalism and a type of political religiosity that retards *concientizacion* and protest. It also eases workers into the hierarchy, discipline, and subordination of the workplace.

These findings suggest that the Church induced decrease in *concientizacion*, strikes, and political protest may indeed contribute to income inequality. This may be particularly true in Third World countries similar to Peru where most workers are not included under collective bargaining agreements (Woy-Hazelton, 1983). The absence of collective bargaining is often combined with the absence of elections, or an electoral system and government bureaucracy that is not structured to process labor's demands in a timely manner. This means that labor protests and threats of violence are still a necessary part of workers' political bargaining strategy to force the state to intervene in labor-management disputes and impose settlements that meet some of labor's demands. Socialization experiences that reduce workers' willingness to use protest as a form of political bargaining could increase distributional inequality. Church acculturation might also increase national growth rate (Clutterbuck, 1984), at least in the short term, by fostering more tranquil labor relations. It discourages attitudinal militancy, strikes, and demonstrations while integrating workers into a passive role in the corporate hierarchy.³²

For those elites who want political order and labor discipline the data must be reassuring. It may be even more comforting when other effects of church acculturation are examined. For example, we found that political religiosity in Chile was negatively associated with support for

the political left (Langton and Rapoport, 1976). Although space does not allow a detailed exploration of that relationship, political religiosity appears to have an even stronger negative effect on support for the left among Peruvian workers. The policy implications may seem obvious: Support religious schools and the traditional church leaders.

These policies would be on infirm footing, however. Although the conservative patterns reported in this article do support our impressions in the field that miners' contacts with the Peruvian Church are primarily in traditional settings, the patterns found in this study merely skim the surface of institutional socialization.³³ We know little about the independent effort of curriculum, teachers, or peers in religious schools. Nor are we any better informed about the systematic effect on believers' political attitudes and behavior of *cursillos*, base communities, sermons from the pulpit, clerical contact, or the vicarious, operational, or classical conditioning that is part of church life. Moreover, this study relies on cross-sectional data. Longitudinal data would tell us whether or not the aggregate influence of the Church has remained the same or changed over time.

Although the Peruvian Church has a conservative influence on workers, this does not mean that when Liberation Theology is practiced it cannot have a progressive impact. One needs only to read case studies of experiments in Nicaragua, El Salvador, or Brazil to appreciate the importance of this pastoral message. More quantitative research needs to be done, however, on the relationship between the pastoral message and practice, on one hand, and parishioners' political beliefs and action. We should examine not just the liberation experiments, we should also *compare* the affect of actual practices in liberation and traditional churches on parishioners' consciousness and behavior.

We must also move beyond the Church in our institutional analysis. It is quite possible that the differences in consciousness we may find across traditional and less traditional parishes could be due to the effect of other institutions, such as parties, job, selective military recruitment, and so on. Although this is a challenging research agenda, a comparative analysis of acculturation in the Church, parties, and the military, for example, would bring us closer to the actual influence of the Church on consciousness and protest.

Future research notwithstanding, the findings in this study carry a somber message for those Peruvian workers who want more control over their economic status and a more equitable distribution of wealth. Most do not see the electoral process as an effective channel for

expressing their demands (Langton and Petrescu, 1982). Like workers in most Third World countries controlled by powerful, entrenched elites, miners consider the withholding of labor and support as the most effective means of forcing the state to intervene and resolve their economic problems. Participation in church life has an indirect but chilling effect on this bargaining strategy.

What can workers and friends of the Church who want to see it change its philosophy, structure, and pastoral direction expect in the future? There is no one answer for as I pointed out earlier, theology and praxis can vary substantially from one diocese to the next. Local practice is not unaffected, however, by the policy of the international Church. What is the position of the Latin American Bishops Conference (CELAM), of the Vatican and Pope John Paul II on liberation theology and its emphasis on decentralization and more democratic decision making?

The evidence is ambiguous and reflects the divisions in the Church. The high point of institutional sympathy (or tolerance) for liberation theology may have been between the Medellin Conference of Latin American Bishops in 1968, which has been interpreted as committing the Church to the liberation of the poor, and the 1979 Puebla Conference, which reaffirmed support of structural change necessary to assist the poor. Some observers argue, however, that Medellin was a "fluke." Its progressive documents reflected, in part, the decentralization encouraged by Vatican II and the work of a minority of liberal advisors who, unsupervised by their busy administrators, created conference position papers that were more progressive than the views of a majority of the Bishops (Crahan, 1975). The subsequent isolation of some of the progressives and the hostility of CELAM (Andean Group, *Latin American Regional Report*, January 25, 1985: 1) toward liberation theology lend force to these observations.

The Vatican continues, critics say, to place institutional preservation before transcendent values except possibly in the area of human rights. Church officials argue that preservation is necessary to the realization of these values. Critics respond that the real issue is bureaucratic power. From an institutional point of view this is not surprising, for liberation theology threatens the organizational power of church leaders by questioning traditional doctrine and calling for a decentralized decision structure. The recent call to Rome of prominent liberation theologians, the unsuccessful attempt by the head of the Vatican's Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith to coax Peruvian leaders into condemning Gutierrez's writing, the recent imposition of "penitential silence" on

liberation theologian Leonardo Boff (*New York Times*, May 9, 1985: 5), and the Vatican's order to the Nicaraguan priests (and to priests in other countries) to step down from their government posts or refrain from functioning as priests (*Central American Report*, March 15, 1985: 79-80), reflect the attempt by Rome to restore doctrinal orthodoxy and respect for the traditional hierarchy (*Ann Arbor News*, January 26, 1985: A7).³⁴

During the 1985 Roman Synod, progressive Bishops prevented a complete roll back to pre-Vatican II times. The traditionalists appeared to win the day, however, as they promoted "a highly Roman, hierarchical view of the Church . . . as a gift of God and as having structures and nature that are basically unchanging." The Church is not a "civil democracy" nor a communal society of believers that liberationists advocate; it is a "mystery" say the conservatives (*New York Times*, December 5, 1985: 1).³⁵ The drive for greater control and uniformity in doctrine was reflected in the Synod's call for a universal catechism to insure "sound doctrine" throughout the Church (*New York Times*, December 19, 1985: 1). Vatican II is to be interpreted as consistent with tradition rather than liberalization of church structures.

Pope John Paul II addressed many of the concerns of conservative and progressive church members during his recent trip to Peru and Latin America. He expressed clear concern for the poor, denounced social injustice, and said bread and work are "rights" (*New York Times*, February 10, 1985: 4E; *Que Hacer*, February 1985, No. 33: 13-14). On the other hand, he seemed to take issue with the central tenets of liberation doctrine and practice. His clearest message questioned the liberationists' appeal for decentralization and more democratic participation within the Church. The Pope reaffirmed that Roman Catholicism is a hierarchical organization (*New York Times*, February 10, 1985: 4E). He appealed to believers to submit to church discipline and accept with docility its magisterium, or teaching authority (*New York Times*, January 29, 1985: 3; Hebblethwaite, 1983: 200). Bishops must maintain close relations with Rome, he told the Peruvians, and the faithful must work harmoniously with their Bishops and obey their directives (*Que Hacer*, February 1985, No. 33: 15).

Pronouncements on other aspects of liberation are more ambiguous. Liberationists argue that for the poor to lift themselves they must be aware of common interests, the implications of social divisions, and must blame the system rather than themselves for the "social sins" of oppressive elites. John Paul responds that the poor must look "essentially to the Word of God and not to the . . . criteria of the human

sciences . . . that frequently reduce the poor to sociopolitical categories or economic abstractions" (Message in Piura, Peru, *Que Hacer*, February 1985, No. 33: 11). Too much emphasis has been put on the social and political causes of oppression (social sins). More attention must be given to personal sin, which lies at the root of all evil. Beware of ideologies, the Pope says, which promise "an illusory, earthly liberation" (*Que Hacer*, February 1985, No. 33: 11; *New York Times*, December 12, 1984: 3).

Action against oppression is at the core of liberation theology. This often means collective action and group or class struggle. "When the Church rejects the class struggle," says Gutierrez (1973: 275), "it is objectively operating as a part of the prevailing system." The Pope responds that "the class struggle, whoever the person that leads it or on occasion seeks to give it a theoretical justification, is a social evil" (*New York Times*, December 12, 1984: 3). The appropriate pastoral direction, he told Peruvians, is not collective or political action that only divides society. He appealed instead to each individual, in particular the rich and powerful, to have faith in Christ, empathy for the poor, and a willingness to work harmoniously for the improvement of the larger society (*Que Hacer*, February 1985; No. 33: 7-16).

The noted Catholic theologian, Hans Kung, argued: "If we want to be Christian we cannot demand freedom and human rights for the Church externally and not grant them internally" (Kung, 1983: 28). This speaks to the Church's dilemma. It can seek to change society in two ways. It can try to influence the policies of external institutions or groups such as the state, military, or business leaders; and it can socialize the faithful. No matter what proclamations the hierarchy makes about poverty or injustice, no matter what battles it enters into in the name of human rights, without internal reform of its own hierarchy and pastoral direction, it will continue to integrate the faithful worker into a subordinate, passive role in society and an unequal share of its wealth.

APPENDIX

PROTEST PARTICIPATION INDEX

A central objective of this study was to measure the influence of the external settings in which workers made their participation decisions. This could have

been done by randomly assigning workers to different experimental settings, at the expense of realism. A different test would have been to follow the same people across many real life situations, cataloging the variety or constancy of the situational characteristics, and measuring their cognitions and participation in each situation. Then the investigator could determine the degree to which the behaviors are explained by an individual's cognitions and situational characteristics. One problem with following the same people across different natural settings is that this reduces severely the number of workers who can be included in a study and limits the systematic control of variables if the model to be tested is complex. The laboratory, on the other hand, permits careful control of setting, but at the expense of realism.

One method of presenting situational stimuli is to use a pictorial, verbal, or written description of a realistic situation. The subject is presented with a number of such situations in which cues (for example, support of union officials for the political act) that are realistic for the culture are varied across the settings. In each situation, the participation decision and perceptions of the external situation are recorded. Situational inventories permit a controlled presentation of the situational stimuli and of related variables to large numbers of people; they are somewhere between the laboratory and the natural setting in experimental control and realism. Their use in political analysis is rare.

The research reported in this article used situational inventories in a modified survey format to examine the effect of situations and cognitions on the decisions of Peruvian miners to participate. These were verbal descriptions of 11 different situations that, we had learned in the pretest, miners had directly encountered themselves or had heard of others experiencing. Each situation was realistic for the culture and included numerous characteristics (risk, government involvement, economic condition of the individual or group, group versus solitary situation, presence of union officials, and so forth). Bowers (1973) found that using situational inventories rather than observations in natural settings did not significantly enhance or diminish situational or psychological effects beyond the extent to which this would occur in real life.

After the miner was exposed to each situation, his perceptions of the most salient features of the objective situation were measured as well as his perceptions of the effectiveness of the intended act in that setting. The Act Effectiveness Index cumulated these perceptions of the effectiveness of the intended act in each of the protest situations.

The miner was also asked if he would participate in each situation (strike, demonstrate, and so forth). This measure of behavioral intention, which followed exposure to each situation, formed the individual indicators that were cumulated in the Political Participation Index. The miners' past participation in similar situations was also measured and was significantly correlated with their participation decisions in current situations.

There are three common methods used to measure political participation: behavioral intention (as in the current design), recall of past political partici-

pation (which is the method used in most survey research and is also measured in this study), and observations of behavior in natural settings. Liska (1974) reviewed a number of studies using these different behavioral measures to see how each affected the strength of attitude-behavior relationships. He found that, although the magnitude of the relationships differed somewhat, no systematic differences were associated with the three measures of behavior (for further discussion of the design of the Peru study, see Langton and Petrescu, 1984).

NOTES

1. See Adelman and Morris, 1966; Morris and Adelman, 1980; Novak, 1984; Wilber and Jameson, 1980; Bruneau, 1980; Weber, 1930; Tawney, 1947; Cutright et al., 1976; Huntington, 1968; and Finn, 1981.

2. Others, of course, have argued or implied that church presence or Catholicism may be negatively related to modernization via its effect on fertility (Cutright et al., 1976), by philosophy or collusion (Novak, 1984; Vallier, 1970), or in its traditional organization (Bruneau, 1980). Morris and Adelman (1980) maintain that economic modernization and social change in Third World countries require a "new mentality," a major adaptation of religious values to emphasize the alterability of the environment in place of the traditional fatalism. Huntington (1968) argued that the Church and the military were two institutions in Third World countries that had the national organization and penetration necessary to promote development. However, the Church lacked the technological expertise and capacity to generate order and the military lacked the necessary ideology.

3. For example, classic conditioning can be invoked when unconditioned stimuli such as God, church, religious and patriotic symbols are paired with neutral stimuli (demonstrations, conflict, system-self blame, rich-poor-income distribution, inalterability of the environment). The latter gradually became conditioned stimuli capable of guiding day-to-day thoughts and behavior outside the Church. Operant learning (direct reward and punishment) is invoked when the recruit or parishioner is threatened with retribution when he disobeys state or religious authority or moral laws. Vicarious learning occurs when the subject sees or hears about what happened to others in the organization who trespassed institutional norms (disobeyed an order, had an abortion, joined a condemned political party or movement, engaged in class conflict, or married across religious lines). Vicarious learning also occurs when the new recruit or parishioner observes again that the "natural" order of social relations includes rank and hierarchical organization: from God to Pope, Cardinal, Bishop, Priest to parishioner, or from General, Colonel, Major, and so on, to private.

4. See Clutterbuck (1984: chaps. 7-11) for an introduction to the cost of strikes to the workers, firm, community, and the state.

5. Daniel Levine (1981) contrasts the "ecclesiastical" Church, which stresses rank and obedience to authority, with the "ecclesial" Church, which incorporates much of the theology of liberation. There has been an outpouring of books, articles, and dissertations on "liberation theology." The currents are diverse enough that the plural, "liberation

theologies" may be more apt. Most approaches are philosophical or theoretical in nature. For sympathetic treatments see McGovern, 1980; chaps. 5-9; Gutierrez, 1973, 1977; Miguez Bonino, 1975; Brown, 1978; Oliveros, 1977; Segundo, 1976; Boff, 1979; and Kirk, 1980. Critical analyses of liberation theology can be found in Schall, 1982; Novak 1984; J. Gutierrez, 1977; and Quade (1982). For literature on the Bible and liberation see Gottwald (1983).

6. A macro analysis of the presumed link between labor militancy, growth rate, and distribution requires unavailable time-series data and it is beyond the scope of this article. For the purposes of this analysis I shall assume, as do many macro analysts, that these links exist to some degree as I examine the relationship between church acculturation and protest as one part of this macro-micro linkage (Weede and Tiefenbach, 1981b; Cutright, 1965, 1967; Adelman and Morris, 1971; Huntington and Nelson, 1976; Sunshine, 1972). Huntington and Nelson (1976) suggest that the relationship between political participation and distributional equality may be negative during the early stages of economic and political development.

7. Those advocating a more progressive role for the Church were aided by the writings of theologians such as Gutierrez (1971) and Segundo (1976), the educational philosophy of Freire (1970), the encyclicals that have shifted back and forth between castigating those who use wealth selfishly to defensive admonishment about "communist threat" (Brown, 1978), the 1967 *Populorum Progressio* of Pope Paul VI, Vatican II, the 1968 Latin American Bishops Conference in Medellin that committed the Church to the liberation of the poor (CELAM, 1970) and the Puebla Conference that reaffirmed the Latin American Bishops' support of structural changes necessary to aid the poor (CELAM, 1979). The 1985 Synod of Bishops also appeared to reaffirm the teachings, if not necessarily the practice of Vatican II (*New York Times*, December 9, 1985: 1).

8. For discussion of this shift from personal to sociological categories see Wuthnow (1986) and Levine (1986).

9. It is perhaps here that Marxism has had its greatest impact on liberation theology. It is also a source of competing theologies. Some adopt a Marxist worldview complete with economic determinism, historical materialism, inevitable class struggle, and so on. Most liberation theologians, however, use Marxism as a framework for analysis (Brown, 1978; Miguez Bonino, 1975; Gutierrez, 1973). For example, it teaches that no system of thought is neutral, it can be used to affect change or defend the status quo. Fatalism and self-blame reflect such systems of thought (Kirk, 1980).

10. Although one cannot yet speak of either an international or national church position (Floridi and Stiefbold, 1973) on worker self-management, the encyclicals of Popes John XXII, John Paul II, and Vatican II suggest a reformist stance that does not reject the wage system or capitalism, but wishes to "humanize" it by improving work conditions and permitting some degree of employee participation (Skalicky, 1975; Hebblethwaite, 1983). It seems to suggest a form of codetermination in which employees and owners "cooperate actively and loyally in the common enterprise" (John XXIII, 1961: 91). The ambiguity of the workers' role in the enterprise was commented on by Bishop Franic of Split, Yugoslavia as he discussed the final formulation of the Vatican II text on *the Church in the Modern World*: "The text speaks so timidly of the participation of workers in the life of the enterprise, without which all structural reforms would remain ineffective" (Caprile, 1965: 158; cited in Skalicky, 1975).

11. The Episcopal Conference of Peruvian Bishops issued a pastoral message on October 1984 that accepted the September 1984 "Instruction on Some Aspects of the

Theology of Liberation" from the Vatican's Doctrinal Congregation. The Peruvian Bishops observed that the theology of liberation "was born in our country" as a valid ecclesial response to poverty and injustice. On the other hand, the message said that an acceptable theology of liberation does not consider praxis (action) as "fundamental," nor does it argue that one must choose sides (between the oppressed and the oppressors?) (Peruvian Bishops, 1985: 512, B. 46, 47). The message took clear issue with the liberationists' central appeal for more decentralized authority. It reminded priests and organizations of the faithful that they are under the "vigilance" and "authority" of the Church. It cautioned theologians that they "will collaborate loyally . . . with the magisterium of the church. They will . . . welcome its words and directives with filial respect" (Peruvian Bishops, 1985: 514, D. 70). The message affirmed the hierarchy's authority to approve or censure all publications or audiovisual material that expounds doctrinal or pastoral subjects (p. 514, A.58-59).

12. Mooney and Soderland (1977). These percentages were recalculated from Table 9, p. 26 and Table 8, p. 25.

13. The problem of estimating the effects of base communities (*CEBES*) is compounded by the lack of consensus in the literature regarding their central characteristics (Levine, 1986).

14. The relative advantage of the Church compared to other social institutions in influencing political and social attitudes of workers may vary inversely with the repressive nature of the regime. Authoritarian governments generally proscribe independent parties, unions, and the media before they move against the Church. Therefore, the Church's comparative advantage may be at its maximum under autocratic regimes.

15. Becker (1982) argues that the miners' militancy declined between 1967 and 1969, whereas Kruijt (1982), taking a longer historical view (1962-1974) describes a cycle of strikes, repression, relative quiet, and strikes as characterizing state-mine labor relations in Peru. See Becker (1985) for an interesting discussion of trade-union militancy and labor "elites" in the mines in southern Peru.

16. For further discussion of sample characteristics, types of data collected, other analyses of this data and other data connected to this research project see Langton (1984a, 1984b, 1984c, 1985), Langton and Petrescu (1984), Bonilla and Salazar (1983).

17. Subsequent analysis will be for Catholics only.

18. Baloyra and Martz (1979). This figure may be slightly inflated for Venezuela as it includes those who responded more than weekly (2%) plus "los domingos, varias veces al mes" (36%); p. 223, question number 81 provides the base for these data.

19. The percentages for attendance and religiosity for the national samples in Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Austria, and the United States come from the data set for the "Eight Nation Study." See Codebook (1979) for a discussion of the studies, sampling, the variable lists, and frequencies.

20. International Labor Office codes 710-859, 870-999 (Codebook, 1979: 477-479). I do not have comparative data for industrial workers in Venezuela. The percentage of male workers who attend church at least weekly in each country are: Great Britain (6%), Germany (1%), Austria (1%), Italy (12%), and the United States (22%). If we assume that most Peruvian workers only attend mass then the data are roughly comparable with the "Eight Nation Study" and the Venezuelan study, which asked specifically about church attendance. The question in Peru was broader, however, and allowed *other church directed* activities such as participation in *Cursillos* and base communities (*CEBES*).

Because church influence was only one of our concerns in the Peruvian study and we were interested primarily in its aggregate effect, we aggregated the responses during the interviews. To the extent that miners were attending Cursillos and CEBES at least weekly (field observations suggest that is not the case), then the Peruvian attendance data is somewhat inflated when compared with the cross-national data.

21. In the Venezuelan study respondents were asked: Would you say that religion is indispensable in one's life, important, or not very important? The presumption is that the respondent is referring to his or her own religiosity. Eighty-six percent responded indispensable (33%) or important (53%); see Baloyra and Martz (1979: 223).

22. Catholics are slightly more likely than other denominations or those with no religion to blame themselves rather than the system (Gamma -.16) for social injustice and to believe that workers should not participate in workplace decisions (-.18). However, the relationships could have occurred by chance at $p > .05$.

23. Unless noted otherwise, the correlations reported in the text are gammas and significant at $p \leq .05$.

24. As I note later there is a weak selection effect. More educated workers are slightly more likely to attend church and they are slightly more religious.

25. Readers interested more specifically in the macro and micro determinants of strikes in the United States and Europe should consult the *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* (1982) or Hass and Stack (1983). For an excellent source on the aggregate relationship between strikes and changing economic and political conditions in Peru see Stephens (1980, 1983). What often distinguishes strikes in the US and Europe from those in Peru and many Third World countries is that in the latter strikes are often initiated with the express purpose of involving the state in the resolution of the conflict.

26. Elsewhere I show that in the United States and Peru the prior participatory environments in the family, peer group, and school structure the later effects of job environment on workers' political confidence (Langton, 1984b).

27. Nor was age or years worked in the mine significantly associated with protest. There was a weak relationship (.13) between higher education and perceiving protest as an effective act (Act Effectiveness, Figure 1). This is excluded from the path analysis.

28. See Langton (1984a) for a more detailed discussion of workers' responses. There is not a significant relationship between education, year the worker entered the mine, or whether he came from an agricultural background and his adjustment to the mine. This suggests the important mediating role of other institutions such as the Church, the military, or schools (participatory versus autocratic) in integrating the miner into the work place. Elsewhere I shall examine the anticipatory socialization that might occur when members of the miner's family have worked in the mines before the miner himself has entered the mines (DeWind, 1977).

29. Military service was not a voluntary experience for most miners. Of those who served, 90% were inducted either through the draft or a levy. I will examine the additive and interactive effect of the Church and the military on consciousness and protest in a future article.

30. Although attendance is the most appropriate measure in this case, the combined measure (attendance and religiosity) is the most appropriate and powerful predictor of church acculturation at all other points in the analysis.

31. There is also a modest negative relationship between church acculturation and workers' belief that they should be involved in economic sector decisions (entire mining

and industrial community, -20) or in the political system writ large (which social group or groups should make political and economic decisions for the society as a whole? -28).

32. If labor militancy influences wage movements independent of market conditions as will sometimes be the case in a system of "political bargaining," then discouraging confrontations can also have a crucial effect on the trade-off between unemployment and wage-price inflation (Hibbs, 1976).

33. We also collected and analyzed data on miners' indigenous religious beliefs and practice (belief in mine spirits, participation in *confradías*, etc.). Although space does not permit an in-depth examination of these relationships; traditional beliefs and practice were independently associated with higher fatalism and lower social consciousness.

34. The Vatican's Sacred Congregation for Catholic Education issued a draft directive in April 1985 that no Catholic university can consider itself "a purely private institution." Catholics who teach theological courses must have a "mandate from the competent ecclesiastical authority." Some experts in church law have interpreted this to mean that a church authority (usually a Bishop) must approve the hiring of theology professors and he can also seek the professor's removal for contradicting church doctrine (*Newsweek*, November 11, 1985: 82).

35. The Peruvian Bishop of Callao appeared to echo this view in his recent inaugural address to the International Congress Over Evangelization and Reconciliation. He said that the new currents in the Church do not represent a "new church" that is born of the people, because the Church is born of God (*La Cronica*, Lima, Peru, January 17, 1986; cited in *Resumen Semanal*, DESCO, Lima, Peru, Vol. 9, No. 352, January 17-23, 1986: 5).

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