

“Citizen Force” or “Career Force”?

IMPLICATIONS FOR IDEOLOGY IN THE ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY

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In the years of debate which preceded the return to an all-volunteer staffing of the armed forces, a number of problems or objections were raised. Some questions were concerned with costs, others had to do with whether a sufficient number of volunteers could be obtained, and perhaps the most profound set of issues centered around the societal and political impact of moving to an all-volunteer force. We will discuss below our concern about a “separate military ethos” resulting from a military force made up of career men rather than “citizen soldiers.” Such issues and problems were discussed at length by the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force and by others.¹ One of our purposes in the present study has been to tap levels of public awareness and concern over some of these issues. The main purpose, however, has been to show some of the implications for the all-volunteer force if certain

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assumptions made by the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force were faulty.

Recently Janowitz and Moskos (1974) demonstrated that the assumptions made by the President's Commission concerning the racial composition of the all-volunteer force were greatly in error.² The Commission had expected the racial as well as other aspects of the demographic composition of the all-volunteer force to remain quite similar to that of the "mixed force" made up of a mix of conscripts, draft-motivated volunteers, true volunteers, and a career force of reenlistees.³ Janowitz and Moskos (1974) presented data on the racial composition of the armed forces that show that a clear racial imbalance (compared to the population as a whole) was developing—contrary to the Commission's expectations.⁴

Our own concern is not with racial imbalance but with the possibility of a "pro-military" ideological imbalance. This imbalance could result from increases in the proportion of career-oriented military personnel under all-volunteer conditions. The President's Commission of 1970 had assumed that the make-up of the all-volunteer force in terms of career-orientation would not differ greatly from that found in the mixed force.⁵ For example, it was believed that the turnover rate of first-term enlisted men would be about three-quarters of that found under non-voluntary conditions, i.e., about 65% of first-term enlisted men would not reenlist after their first tour of duty in an all-volunteer force. This would result in only a slightly larger proportion of the total force (48% compared to 40%) consisting of reenlistees which the Commission referred to as the "career force."

Janowitz and Moskos reported that "in fiscal year 1973, the reenlistment rate among first-term Army enlisted men was 52.0% for blacks compared with 35.1% for whites."⁶ The point we want to stress here is that even in the fiscal year *preceding* the official start of the all-volunteer force, Army enlisted men who had entered primarily as conscripts or draft-motivated volunteers several years earlier were already reenlisting at the maximum rate the Commission expected would exist in an all-volunteer force. Indeed, among black Army first-term personnel the reenlistment rates considerably exceeded the 35% expected by the President's Commission. Since reenlistment rates clearly affect the overall proportion of reenlistees versus first-termers, we conclude that the President's Commission may have greatly underestimated the relative size of the "career force" which might develop under all-volunteer conditions.

In this paper we will argue that as the proportion of career-oriented men in the all-volunteer force increases, that force will be less likely to

match the values, perceptions, and preferences concerning the military held by civilians. To put it another way, our findings suggest that an enlarged proportion of career men will increase the danger of what has been called a "separate military ethos."

RESEARCH FINDINGS⁷

The findings in this paper are based on survey data collected from two samples: (1) a representative national cross-section of 1855 civilians age 16 and older, and (2) a sample of 2522 Navy personnel stratified so as to be representative of major Navy entities (ships and shore stations). Sixteen-page, self-completed questionnaires, identical except for certain personal background measures, were administered to both samples during late 1972 and early 1973.

PUBLIC VIEWS OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

The results from the questionnaires and also from an interview segment administered only to civilians indicated strong majority support for the concept of the all-volunteer force, and relatively little concern about some of the issues which have been raised as potential problems. The nationwide civilian sample supported the all-volunteer approach rather than the draft by nearly a two-to-one margin. There was also very strong support for the higher military pay levels considered to be necessary under a volunteer system.

When asked about issues related to the types of people who would staff the military services, there was a slight tendency for people to favor "citizen-soldiers" over "career men," but the views seemed rather mixed. Civilian responses to open-ended interview items about the all-volunteer force left a dominant impression that most people have not thought much about the question of what kinds of servicemen will, or should, staff an all-volunteer armed force.

The make-up of an all-volunteer force has been of considerable concern to us, however. The findings we will present here are admittedly speculative, but represent an attempt to come to grips with an important question: to what extent are the attitudes found among military men representative of civilian values, perceptions, and preferences concerning


the military—and is the answer different for career military men versus non-career men?

Military Views Linked to Career Orientation

We begin by focusing on young Navy men—specifically, first-term enlisted men. We will separate them into two groups of interest to us, those who intended to reenlist and those who did not. Those who planned to reenlist reflected at least some degree of “career orientation.” We will also present data from two other groups for comparison purposes. The first group consists of civilian young men age 19-24—the age-mates of first-term enlisted men. The second group consists of later-term Navy enlisted men—the enlisted portion of what the President’s Commission called a “career force.” One reason for looking at later-term enlisted men is that they constitute the group most likely to be in positions of authority and direct supervision over incoming junior enlisted men. We would expect that, to most first-term enlisted men, it is the more senior enlisted personnel—especially non-commissioned officers—who represent the military establishment and its values.

Figure 1 presents mean scores for first-term enlisted men who did plan to reenlist and for those who did not, as well as for young civilian men and later-term enlisted men.⁸ By far the most striking finding, seen across a wide range of our measures, is that the “career-oriented” first-termers were remarkably similar in ideology to their later-term colleagues, with virtually all scores averaging on the “pro-military” side of the ledger. On the other hand, those young men who planned to leave the military were rather similar to their civilian peers in most matters of ideology about the military; both groups tended to be critical—sometimes quite strongly.

While the pattern described above dominates Figure 1, there are some distinctions worth noting. When we compare civilian young men with the first-termers who planned to leave the military, it appears that the first-termers were more critical of the *military organization*—perhaps reflecting their own dissatisfaction and eagerness to leave. The largest and most consistent differences involved the area of *civil-military relations*; the young Navy men who were viewing the military from inside—even though they were planning to leave—saw the role of the military in society as a bit more positive, and were less critical of military spending and influence. Indeed, these Navy men preferred a slight increase in levels of military influence, whereas the opposite was true for the young civilian men, on the average. In a number of other respects, including views about Vietnam



NOTE: Center line shows midpoint on each measure; other lines show 1/2 S.D. for all civilians on each measure. Measures marked with an asterisk have been reversed; the "pro-military" side of the chart indicates a low score for the measure.

Figure 1: Mean Scores of Civilian Men 19-24 and Three Navy Groups

and amnesty, the non-career-oriented first-termers were indistinguishable from their civilian counterparts.

Turning now to those first-termers who planned to reenlist, it bears emphasizing that in practically every area measured, these career-oriented young men were substantially different from their civilian peers and also from their first-term counterparts who planned to leave the military. The

question naturally arises: why did the career-oriented young men in the Navy hold views so clearly different from their civilian age-mates and also their service-mates who planned an early return to civilian life?

Attitude Change or Self-Selection

In our earlier analyses of these data we considered two alternative explanations of the findings outlined above:

- (1) During the first tour of duty, those individuals most likely to reenlist may undergo *attitude changes* in a more pro-military direction. This may occur through a process of socialization as a result of exposure to the more experienced Navy men who tend to hold such views, or through exposure to positive experiences in the Navy, or both.
- (2) By the time they reach their late teens, some individuals may be more favorable than others in their view of the military services and mission. These differences, which exist prior to enlistment, may be among the factors influencing the *self-selection process* involved in the decision to reenlist.

While the only really adequate test of these two competing explanations would involve a longitudinal design, we felt we could gain some insights by looking separately at first-termers who had served about one year, those who had served two years, and those who had served three or four years. If self-selection accounts for the differences between the attitudes of the career Navy men and others, there should be consistent differences in attitudes between those who did and did not plan on reenlistment—i.e., the differences for those in their first year should be just as large on the average as the differences found for those in their second, third or fourth years of service. On the other hand, if the attitude change explanation is correct, we *might* expect to see smaller differences among those in their first year—assuming that the process of attitude change requires more than a few months to be completed.

Our basic finding was that the differences between first-termers who planned to reenlist, and those who did not, were evident quite early. Those who had served about one year showed differences just as large on the average as those who had served several years longer. This finding is fully consistent with the self-selection explanation—the view that reenlistment is heavily influenced by rather deeply rooted perceptions and ideology related to the military life-style and mission. The alternative explanation, based on attitude changes during the first tour of duty, is not ruled out entirely. Indeed, both explanations could be true to some degree. But

whatever the pattern of causation, our analyses in this area demonstrate that it does *not* require years and years of service experience for first-term enlisted men to develop the strongly pro-military attitudes found among later-termers. For those who planned to reenlist, the same attitudes were clearly evident as early as the first year of service.

CAREER FORCE, CITIZEN FORCE, OR MIXED FORCE?


One of the arguments raised in the debate about the all-volunteer force was the danger of a "separate military ethos" brought about by a military force made up largely of career men. The findings summarized above suggest some basis for concern in this area. To the extent that new recruits into an all-volunteer force consist increasingly of the sort of career-oriented personnel we have been studying here, it seems inevitable that the military will indeed grow more separate from civilians—at least when it comes to views about the military and its mission.

In thinking about this problem of ideological representativeness, one can pose two "ideal" or "pure types" of military forces: the "citizen force" and the "career force." These types can be seen as the two ends of a continuum. In other words, the opposite of a "career force" made up primarily of career-oriented personnel would be a "citizen force" made up very largely of "citizen soldiers" (or sailors, etc.) who view their tour of military duty as a temporary activity—a part of their citizenship.

Neither type has existed in pure form in the United States. There has always been a career component of "professionals" in a primary citizen force and a citizen component of "in-and-outers" in a primarily "career force." In particular, it would not be accurate to describe the U.S. military of the recent past as a citizen force. Rather, it was what the President's Commission termed a "mixed force," consisting of some conscripts, some draft-motivated enlistees, and a goodly number of so-called "true volunteers."

In this section of the paper our analysis becomes more speculative. We will attempt to illustrate some implications, for ideology in the military, of different possible locations of the all-volunteer force along the continuum from citizen force to career force. We present data for our total Navy sample—officers as well as enlisted men—as a real-world example of a mixed force. We treat the career-oriented portion of our Navy sample as an example of a career force.⁹

The findings are presented in Figure 2. In this case, we have contrasted the two Navy groups with the mean scores for the total civilian population on each measure. (In other words, the mean scores of the Navy groups have been charted according to the extent to which they *differ* from the total civilian sample. The differences are expressed as proportions of the



NOTE: Center line shows mean scores for all civilians; other lines show 1/2 S.D. for all civilians on each measure. Measures marked with an asterisk have been reversed; the "pro-military" side of the chart indicates a low score for the measure.

Figure 2: Total Navy and Career Navy Contrast With Mean Scores of All Civilians

standard deviation for all civilians.) It is worth adding that the total civilian sample was appreciably more favorable to the military than were young men age 19-24; thus, this part of our analysis is focused on how representative the Navy groups are of civilians in general, not just civilian young men.¹⁰

Comparing the “Mixed Force” and the Public

Figure 2 reveals some interesting things about the aggregate similarities and differences in the values, perceptions, and preferences of the total Navy—our “mixed force”—and civilians as a whole. In evaluating the military organization, the total Navy was virtually identical to the civilian sample in perceptions of job opportunities and fair treatment in the services, held a slightly more positive view of the level of racial and sexual discrimination within the military organization, but showed relatively lower satisfaction with the competence of military leaders and with the concept of unquestioning military obedience.

In terms of the use of military force, the only difference between the total Navy and civilian samples was a higher level of support for military interventionism among Navy men. Attitudes about military supremacy, the Vietnam war, and a My Lai-type situation showed no differences.

When we turn to issues of civil-military relations we see considerable differences between the total Navy and civilian samples. Although the perception of the role of the military was the same, there were great differences in views about the level of money that society should provide for the military. On the other side of the issue, the Navy men were much more likely than civilians to rate the military as having little influence vis-à-vis civilian leaders. There was also more support for high military influence in the Navy sample than among civilians, although this difference was not as great as that dealing with perceptions of actual influence levels. These differences resulted in the view among military men that the influence of the military leaders is very inadequate. There was also more support, among members of the “mixed force,” for having the military consist of “career men” rather than citizen soldiers.

These comparisons show that the total Navy in early 1973 was rather similar to civilians as a whole in their views about the military organization and the use of military force. Presumably, the considerable similarity between the total Navy and civilians reflects the “civilianizing” effect of large numbers of non-career enlisted men and officers. The differences that did exist were concentrated primarily in the areas of civil-military relations.

In many ways these findings parallel those concerning veterans and non-veterans.¹¹ If one leaves the military service with anything, it is a perception that is the opposite of a belief in a "military-industrial complex"—or at least a feeling that the military is a very *junior* partner in such a power elite. We think that this is also a reflection of a differentiation, more pronounced among those civilians who had had personal experience in the military, between attitudes about the military organization and those about the use of military force. The military organization is *not* seen as an autonomous creator of the policies that lead to the use of the military force it makes possible.

Comparing the "Career Force" and the Public

The other comparison available in Figure 2 is that between the public as a whole and our representation of a "career force" as a pure type. As mentioned above, an all-volunteer force could fall anywhere along a continuum from a "citizen force" to a "career force." Where it lies will be determined by the proportion of its members who are career-oriented. Here we are concerned with examining what a force consisting only of career-oriented members would look like in terms of values, perceptions, and preferences concerning the military.

In virtually all the aspects of the military we have examined, the career-oriented portion of the Navy sample was clearly more "pro-military" than the other groups examined. The members of the career military viewed all aspects of the military—military organization, the use of military force, and civil-military relations—very differently than did the population as a whole. This was especially true for civil-military relations, as is shown in Figure 2.

Thus we conclude that, to the extent that an all-volunteer force consists primarily of career-oriented men (and women)—and thus approximates in reality our "career force"—the attitudes found among its members as a whole will be very discrepant from those found among civilians as a whole. If this is the future of the all-volunteer force, it will be considerably less representative in this respect than was the mixed force of the past.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The research summarized here, based on a sampling of Navy men and civilians in late 1972 and early 1973, has shown large and important

ideological differences between career servicemen and others—both non-career servicemen and civilians. We think these differences have important implications for the all-volunteer force of the future.

Under present conditions, an all-volunteer force is likely to recruit and retain personnel from only part of the ideological range found in the civilian population. The very individuals who are needed to broaden the ideological balance are probably the least likely to enlist—or reenlist. Present conditions in the services are changing, and such changes may help to obtain a representative cross-section of volunteers. But if the nation's leaders value the concept of the citizen soldier or sailor, they would do well to broaden the incentives in ways that are especially attractive to those presently underrepresented among volunteers. And, in spite of the additional costs involved, it would be wise to seek out some kinds of enlistees who are likely to serve for one term only and then return to civilian life.

What Kinds of Recruits and How to Recruit Them?

Career Navymen—and those most likely to become career men—tended to be more *zealous* about the military than their civilian age-mates. This is one of the strongest and most consistent findings in our research. There is much to indicate that these differences were due, at least in part, to processes of selection—the more “pro-military” were likely to reenlist in the Navy. These findings on *reenlistment*, which held true for a Navy cross-section in late 1972, are more and more likely to apply to *first enlistments*, now that we are in an all-volunteer system.

How should military recruiting efforts respond to this finding that its enlistees and especially its career men are likely to come from only a limited ideological range? One approach is to embrace this state of affairs enthusiastically, recognizing that the more pro-military individuals are likely to be less troublesome and more in agreement with traditional military values and practices than some of their less gung ho contemporaries. Indeed, the idea of concentrating recruitment efforts on those most favorably disposed toward the military is one of the specific recommendations in a recent report to the Army that introduced the concept of the “quality man”—an individual who, among other things, says that he places high importance on patriotism, is proud of being an American, would be among the first to defend the country if it were attacked, and is generally more favorable toward military service.¹²

The approach of aiming recruitment efforts toward the more gung ho is understandably tempting to recruiters and perhaps to many others in the

military. And it may appear to be successful in the short run. But in our view such a recruiting approach would be unwise in the long run. It would tend to reenforce and heighten the tendencies we have already observed for career military men to be less than fully representative of the cross-section of civilian viewpoints. By strengthening support for some unnecessary and perhaps counterproductive military traditions and practices—or at least reducing resistance to them—this approach could gradually widen the gap between the military and the civilian world. We suspect that this gap would eventually reduce the supply of recruits below an acceptable level. Such a gap would also increase the risk of developing a “separate military ethos.”

An alternative approach, and the one we recommend, is to develop recruitment efforts designed to obtain a broader and more fully representative cross-section of individuals among first-termers and also among career personnel in the military. The primary advantage of such an approach is that it tends to avoid the problems and pitfalls mentioned above. An additional advantage is that extending recruiting efforts beyond the more gung ho may help to attract some of our brightest and most ambitious young people to a period of military service. (We have found that pro-military attitudes are somewhat *negatively* related to education, and findings in other studies of young people suggest that those who go to college are more likely to express critical views of the military *in its present form*. Thus an effort to increase recruiting among those presently more cautious about military service is likely to involve some of the most able of our young adults.)

How could the military services go about implementing this approach of seeking a broader and more representative cross-section in its recruits? Two types of strategy may be distinguished, and we recommend both. First, the extrinsic incentives to enlistment—those rewards or inducements which are not directly linked to actual performance in the work role—should be geared toward a broader cross-section of individuals, especially those who have relatively high educational abilities and interests. We will say more about this approach in a moment. The second strategy is to modify intrinsic characteristics of military work roles so as to make them more broadly attractive. Elsewhere we have offered a number of specific recommendations for improving Navy work roles and effectiveness.¹³

Probably the most obvious extrinsic incentive that comes to mind when considering any work role—military or civilian—is pay. The higher the level of pay, the more attractive the work role is assumed to be. In discussions

about the feasibility of converting to an all-volunteer force, primary attention was directed to increasing military salaries, and efforts were made to estimate exactly how much money would be required to induce enough men to enlist under volunteer conditions.¹⁴ The recent pay increases were surely a *necessary* condition to the establishment of an all-volunteer military force, but in our view the higher salaries do not constitute *sufficient* conditions—and in some respects the emphasis on pay increases may have led us to overlook other important incentives to military service.

Educational Incentives to Enlistment

One set of incentives which are worth greater attention and emphasis are the educational benefits available to servicemen during and after their tour of duty. Although the young men (and women) bound for college represent a group especially high in ability and ambition, military recruiting policy has to a large degree treated them as unlikely prospects.¹⁵ And in its recent report to the Army, the Opinion Research Corporation advised that, "While college students do not express strong opposition any longer to the military as an institution, enlistment still does not appeal to them. Noncollege men remain the Army's major market."¹⁶ But in that same report it is noted that educators rate "interference with education" as a primary deterrent to military service, and feel that this drawback could be offset by greater emphasis on the GI Bill as a source of support for a college education.

In sum, under present conditions the typical high school student planning for college tends to view military service as an unwise interruption of his educational development. Given no change in present conditions—or, worse yet, given any reduction in educational benefits for veterans—it is probably quite accurate to conclude that noncollege men will remain the primary source of military personnel. But we think it would be unwise to leave present conditions as they are. On the contrary, *we recommend that the educational benefits available to those in service and veterans be retained and enhanced, and that these benefits be publicized more widely.* In particular, we would suggest the establishment of specific "pay your way through college plans" that stress the opportunity to qualify for veterans' benefits, amass substantial savings, and accumulate some college credits during a tour of military service following high school.

But why should the military deliberately seek out individuals who are likely to serve only one term and then go on to college as civilians? Some of the advantages in terms of high ability levels and broader perspectives have been noted above, and these help to balance out the costs of higher turnover among those who enter the military in order to work their way through college. But it should be added that a considerable degree of turnover is necessary and desirable in an organization that has only limited positions of leadership at the top. The "college in exchange for service" formula is a means of attracting able individuals who can learn quickly, serve effectively, and then leave to make room for other fresh recruits. Moreover, high rates of turnover among these individuals would not be a sign of organizational failure, and those who left would not be spending their final years of service frustrated and disillusioned because the military had not lived up to their expectations. We agree with Friedman that some proportion of "in-and-outers" is desirable in the military services, and we view the use of educational incentives as a particularly effective means for ensuring this sort of turnover.¹⁷

The "college in exchange for service" approach need not require that military service precede college. On the contrary, there would be substantial advantages for some to complete college first and then enter the service. This would help meet military needs for skilled and educated personnel. Moreover, it seems likely that the broadening and liberalizing effects of higher education, plus the maturity of additional years, would make the college graduates less malleable, more confident and self-reliant, and better able to handle responsibilities than those recruited at an earlier stage of education and maturity.¹⁸

We view the characteristics listed above as distinct advantages to the military services, but this viewpoint is not universally shared. Some military leaders have stated a preference for the young and impressionable high school graduate rather than the older, cautious, more questioning college graduate. This brings us back to the fundamental question: who ought to staff the military services? If our aim is to recruit individuals guided by the "My country, right or wrong" principle, then perhaps it would be just as well to avoid a greater emphasis on educational incentives. On the other hand, if we want at least some of our men and women in uniform to raise questions, disagree on occasion, and perhaps even refuse to follow orders that they hold to be contrary to conscience or international law, then educational incentives—particularly those involving college prior to military service—may be of great value.

It is gratifying that the idea of increased use of educational incentives, which was supported by our earlier work¹⁹ and reinforced by the findings

presented here, has also been put forward by Janowitz and Moskos as one of the approaches for reducing racial (and social class) imbalance in the military.²⁰ It is fortunate indeed that educational incentives can potentially deal with these problems of race and class while at the same time helping to insure—voluntarily—a mix of “in-and-outers” along with career personnel that is closer to a citizen force, not an ideologically isolated career force.

NOTES

1. Sol Tax, ed., *The Draft: A Handbook of Facts and Alternatives* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Jerald Bachman and J. Johnston, “The All Volunteer Force, not whether but what kind?” *Psychology Today* 5 (October 6, 1972): 113-116, 128; J. Johnston and J. G. Bachman, *Youth in Transition*, Volume V: *Young Men and Military Service* (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1972); J. G. Bachman, “Values, Preferences and Perceptions Concerning Military Service: Part I” (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1973); J. G. Bachman, “Values, Preferences, and Perceptions: Part II” (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1974); David Bowers and Jerald Bachman, *Military Manpower and Modern Values* (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1974); John D. Blair, “Civil-Military Belief System Among Military Men and Civilians,” Ph.D. dissertation in progress, Department of Sociology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, forthcoming.

2. Morris Janowitz and Charles Moskos, Jr., “Racial Composition in the All-Volunteer Force: Policy Alternatives,” *Armed Forces and Society*, 1-1 (Fall 1974): 109-123.

3. U.S. President’s Commission, *The Report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970).

4. Janowitz and Moskos, “Racial Composition.”

5. President’s Commission, *Report*.

6. Morris Janowitz, “The U.S. Forces and the Zero Draft,” *Adelphi Papers* 94 (1973): 1-30.

7. This paper summarizes findings from several more detailed data analyses: Bachman (1973, 1974), Bowers and Bachman (1974), Blair and Bachman (1975), and Blair (forthcoming). This paper is a shortened version of a paper presented at the Conference on the Social Psychology of Military Service, Chicago, Illinois, April 1975.

8. As a matter of convenience, the measures shown in Figure 1 are organized according to the conceptual categories followed in earlier reports (Bachman 1973, 1974). A more detailed description of the measures, including a listing of items and rules for index construction may be found in Appendix B of Blair and Bachman (1975).

9. Of course, the extent to which an all-volunteer force will empirically approximate a career force is unknown at this time. However, we are presently

replicating this study with a sample from the All Volunteer Army. This should give us some idea of what proportion of current Army personnel fit the definition of "career-oriented" which we have used, and how that compares with our Navy sample where 42% of the enlisted men and 72% of officers, or 46% of the total sample, were "career-oriented." (We have required only a stated intention to reenlist as the minimum definition of career-orientation.)

10. If the end of the bar is more than .10 standard deviation from the middle line for the total Navy or more than .13 standard deviation for the career Navy, it indicates a statistically significant difference between the mean of the Navy group and that of the total civilian sample.

11. J. D. Blair and J. G. Bachman, "The Public View of the Military," paper presented to the Conference on the Social Psychology of Military Service, Chicago, Illinois, April 1975.

12. Opinion Research Corporation, "Attitudes and Motivations Toward Enlistment in the U.S. Army," conducted for N. W. Ayer and Sons, Inc. and the U.S. Army (Princeton, N.J.: Opinion Research Corporation, Inc., 1974).

13. Bowers and Bachman, *Military Manpower*.

14. President's Commission, *Report*.

15. Martin Binkin and J. D. Johnston, "All-Volunteer Armed Forces: Progress, Problems and Prospects," report prepared for the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress, First Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973).

16. Opinion Research Corporation, "Attitudes and Motivations," p. viii.

17. M. Friedman, "Why Not a Volunteer Army?" in Sol Tax, ed., *The Draft: A Handbook of Facts and Alternatives* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).

18. We have discussed elsewhere a possible approach for offering G.I. Bill benefits in advance, coupled with loans, as a means of paying for college in advance of military service (Johnston and Bachman, 1972; Janowitz and Moskos (1974) have also suggested mechanisms for accomplishing this.

19. Johnston and Bachman, *Youth in Transition*.

20. Janowitz and Moskos, "Racial composition."

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