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earlier rejection of Inglehart is most telling. A fuller treatment of the stuff of the “silent revolution”—the explosion in the number of college graduates, the increased power of the media, and the growth in citizens’ political sophistication and skills (Inglehart, *Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics* [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977])—would have complemented the macrolevel discussion.

Part 4 is a tidy survey of recent peace movement activity and organization in Britain, the Netherlands, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany. The major organizations, such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the Dutch Interchurch Peace Council, and movement leaders, including E. P. Thompson and Mient Jan Faber, are introduced briefly. Important concerns of the allied movements—including the role of Communists in the West German movement, the role of Protestant churches in the Dutch movement, and the “relative underdevelopment” of the French movement—are raised and discussed.

Examinations of the “crisis perceptions” of NATO polities in the early 1980s, Western European public opinion—solidly sympathetic to the movements—and some speculations on the future of the movements make up the book’s fifth, and final, part. The authors close with some interesting insights into the growing nationalism of the movement in the FRG and with the provocative suggestion that the greatest political space for future NSM activity is on the right.

Krise und Protest is not an easy read. Diligent readers will, however, be rewarded with von Bredow and Brocke’s synthesis of social movement theory and with their evenhanded analysis of a controversial subject.

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Anthony James Joes, *From the Barrel of a Gun: Armies and Revolutions*. Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1986. Pp. xiii + 224. \$25.00, cloth; \$14.95, paper.

Anthony Joes has written an interesting and provocative comparative analysis of the role of the military in regime change. His central thesis is that institutional and, in particular, military factors are para-

mount in explaining the success of revolutionary efforts. Revolutions are only possible when state forces are paralyzed—by internal decay or outside pressure. Using this framework, most of the book is devoted to particular case studies.

The book has four sections. Part I (two chapters) is devoted exclusively and appropriately to the first modern revolution, the Russian. This section is one of the book's strongest. Part II, "Armies Versus Civilians," examines the Hungarian and Iranian revolutions. This section is less satisfying in that its overall conclusion is somewhat circular—unarmed civilians are able to beat heavily armed regimes because the regimes lack legitimacy. However, the Hungarian case is well developed. His discussion of the Hungarian police is particularly interesting; this reader would have preferred a similar analysis for the other regimes. The discussion of the Iranian revolution, however, is marred by some common inaccuracies. First, the assumption that Shias have traditionally been reluctant to recognize the authority of secular governments (p. 51) is belied by history: recognizing the authority of secular governments is what Iranian Shias, until the revolution, had always done. Second, it is unfortunate that an author so concerned with military institutions should neglect religious institutions. The clergy's institutional ability to organize and mobilize was critical to the revolution. Third, his assertion (p. 79) that scholars agree that the number of Savak victims has been greatly exaggerated depends, of course, on the numbers asserted and the scholars consulted. Finally, the passing observation that Muslim women are virtually indentured servants (p. 81) is not supported by even a casual glance at the extensive literature on this subject. There is something about Iran that brings out sweeping generalizations in normally careful scholars; unfortunately, this author is no exception. Writing on the Iranian revolution has in any event been overtaken by events and by new research.

Part III, "Armies Versus Professional Rebels," includes a chapter on the Chinese revolution, which, like the Russian chapter, is a good synthesis of issues and events. Presentation of the Cuban and Nicaraguan cases is quite adequate, although brief. Part IV, "Armies Versus Governments," examines French Algeria, Brazil, Indonesia, and Portugal. The lessons from Algeria and Indonesia are not as clear as they could be, but the Brazilian chapter is full of enthusiasm.

The strengths of the work lie in the fact that the author draws attention, carefully and repeatedly, to his key variables and that he does so through genuinely comparative cases. What is equally unusual, his conclusions are in fact drawn from his cases. The writer also demonstrates

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an impressive mastery of widely different geographical areas and presents them in a clear, crisp style.

The weakness of the book lies in the underdeveloped nature of the central thesis—that revolutions are won or lost ultimately, and therefore fundamentally, by military might and morale. In practice, this too often means turning to single events to explain revolutions; history is reduced to chance. If Somoza had not handled the 1972 earthquake relief money so poorly, if the shah had not had cancer, if not for a series of “if on-lies,” the regime would have survived. These counterfactuals are provocative but hard to prove or disprove. Concomitantly, Joes tends to dismiss, without real examination, alternate explanations, primarily the social structural, only to invoke them later when no one’s watching. He concludes, for example, that the Whites’ defeat in the Russian revolution was ultimately due to their reluctance to recognize communal aspirations and to introduce land reform (p. 49). His work would have been stronger had it included, even if only critically, some of the leading recent works that directly address this topic (e.g., Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979]). There are also minor flaws. Occasionally, the author’s unavoidable biases rise, avoidably, to the surface. His history is too full of heroes and villains (Nasser is a “dictator,” Mossadegh is “wily,” peasants are “sullen”).

While this book will add little new to our broad theoretical understanding of armies and revolutions, it will still be useful reading to those interested in the topic. On the practical side, this book would be most useful in an undergraduate course, especially if used in conjunction with more theoretical writings. It follows an important political issue through different cases. The geographical and historical mix is unusual, including cases from the second world (Hungary), almost always omitted, and from the colonial world (French Algeria). There is enough descriptive history for the student to follow the story and enough analysis to force him to think politically. Finally, the author reiterates the important point that history might have been otherwise, that the outcomes we study were not inevitable. Any book that gets this across to students would be useful.

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