CHANGING VALUES IN JAPAN AND THE WEST

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In a series of recent articles Scott Flanagan (1979, 1980, this volume) has explored the nature of value change in advanced industrial society. Avoiding a classic weakness of the area specialist—a tendency to view one's own area as unique and rely on *sui generis* explanations—Flanagan sets out to interpret Japanese phenomena using explanatory concepts originally developed in a Western context (Inglehart, 1971, 1977). Furthermore, responding to anomalous results in the Japanese data, he proposes a basic reinterpretation of the Materialist/Post-Materialist value change hypotheses, a reinterpretation that he claims is applicable not only to Japan, but to all advanced industrial societies. Though I disagree with much of his analysis, I think his work makes an important contribution to our understanding of political change.

This article will focus on those points where I disagree with Flanagan. But—it is worth emphasizing—our areas of agreement clearly outweigh those of disagreement. Starting from quite different bodies of evidence, we converge in concluding that value change *has* been taking place among the publics of advanced industrial societies during the past few decades. Furthermore, we agree that one important aspect of these changes has been a shift from Materialist (or "austerity" and "authoritarian") values toward Post-Materialist (or "hedonistic" and libertarian") values. Moreover, though we emphasize different causal paths, we agree that this shift can be traced to the prosperity of recent decades; and that these changes reflect, at least in part, a deep-rooted process of

AUTHOR'S NOTE: *The author is indebted to the following for stimulating comments on an earlier version of this article: Russell Dalton, Shinsaku Kohei, Rex Leghorn, Ichiro Miyake, Sigeki Nisihira, Tadao Okamura, Jacques-René Rabier, Tatsuzo Suzuki and Joji Watanuki. This research was partly supported by grant SOC-7914619 from the National Science Foundation.*

COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES, Vol. 14 No. 4, January 1982 445-479
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intergenerational change. In short, we agree on most of the basic features of the process of value change that was hypothesized to be taking place.

This broad area of agreement contributes an interesting footnote to the sociology of knowledge. In societies having relatively stagnant economies and slow rates of value change during the past few decades, such as Britain and the United States, debate has focused on the question "Are political values really changing?" (Marsh, 1975; Taylor, 1977). Recent time-series evidence indicates that the answer is "Yes" (Inglehart, forthcoming; Yankelovich, 1981).

Among those who (like Flanagan) are concerned with societies that have experienced rapid economic growth (such as Japan and Germany), there has been more research on value change, and this research has led to the emergence of a widespread consensus that value change *has* taken place. In these circles, debate tends to focus on the question: Precisely what *kind* of change has been taking place? (Ike, 1973; Watanuki, 1977; Hildebrandt and Dalton, 1977; Herz, 1979; Kmieciak, 1976; Grevan, 1979; Greiffenhagen and Greiffenhagen, 1979; Kaase and Klingemann, 1979; Baker et al., 1981). If societal priorities had remained unchanged, there would be little need to analyze them: the conventional wisdom, or common sense, would probably be adequate guides. But if basic values *have* been changing, it is important to determine exactly what has been happening.

A long-standing stereotype about political development depicted political change as something that takes place in the Third World; industrial societies were assumed to have reached some sort of end-state. The classic literature on political development holds that the process of modernization encompasses a shift from ascriptive status to achieved status, and toward increasingly impersonal, affectively neutral, secular, rational, and materialistic social relations (Weber, 1925; Almond and Coleman, 1960). We suggest that this pattern of rationalization and secularization may apply only to a first *phase* of modernization—the transition from agrarian to urban industrial bureaucratized society. Advanced industrial society is also undergoing massive change. It is taking place now and its outlines are not as clear as those that can be discerned in processes already completed, but one major component seems to be a shift in prevailing value priorities. As we will see, the long-term result can be curvilinear; in certain respects, value change in advanced industrial society seems to bring a *reversal* of changes that took place in the shift from agrarian to industrial society.

Flanagan agrees that societal values are changing, but challenges my thesis that the process can be described as a shift from Materialist to

Post-Materialist priorities. He also raises questions concerning the relationship of prosperity to value change, and the methodology used to measure values. But the key issue involves the dimensionality and origins of the value change process: Are we dealing with an overarching Materialist/Post-Materialist dimension, or with two separate dimensions, reflecting two unrelated processes? If Flanagan's interpretation is correct, the Materialist/Post-Materialist dimension does not exist.

A relatively minor problem concerns differences in terminology. I use the labels "Materialist" and "Post-Materialist" to describe opposite poles of the values dimension in question, while Flanagan uses my older labels "Acquisitive" and "Postbourgeois"—terms I have not used since 1971. The term "Materialist" refers to emphasis on *both* economic and physical security—the needs most directly related to physiological survival. From the start, both types of security factors were considered crucial to the emergence of Post-Materialist values, but the earlier terminology evoked mainly the economic aspect. This difference in labels is not trivial. Flanagan suggests that changing emphasis on economic priorities is unrelated to other aspects of value change. But as I will demonstrate below, emphasis on economic and physical security tends to be linked, and a distinctive Post-Materialist outlook manifests itself mainly among those who are free from *both* types of insecurity. Hence, I will continue to speak of Materialist and Post-Materialist values.

A more basic difference between Flanagan and myself concerns the *methods* used to measure value priorities. My twelve-item value priorities battery was first administered in a 1973 nine-nation European Community survey, as follows:

> There is a lot of talk these days about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD A.) On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Would you please say which *one* of these you, yourself, consider most important?

CARD A

A. Maintaining a high rate of economic growth.
B. Making sure that this country has strong defense forces.
C. Seeing that the people have more say in how things get decided at work and in their communities.
D. Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful.

And which would be the next most important?

(HAND RESPONDENT CARD B.) If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most desirable?

CARD B

E. Maintaining order in the nation.
F. Giving the people more say in important governmment decisions.
G. Fighting rising prices.
H. Protecting freedom of speech.

And what would be your second choice?

Here is another list. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD C.) In your opinion, which one of these is most important?

CARD C

I. Maintain a stable economy.
J. Progress toward a less impersonal, more humane society.
K. The fight against crime.
L. Progress toward a society where ideas count more important than money.

What comes next?

Now would you look again at all of the goals listed on these three cards together and tell me which one you consider the *most* desirable of all? Just read off the one you choose.

And which is the next most desirable?

And which one of all the aims on these cards is *least* important from your point of view?

These questions deal with basic, enduring concerns, rather than current political issues; and they are set in a long-term time frame that refers to national priorities for the next ten years. This is done to encourage the respondents to respond with reference to basic values, rather than to transient situational factors. Items A, G, and I deal with economic security and are designed to tap emphasis on the sustenance needs; items B, E, and K deal with physical security, and are designed to tap emphasis on the safety needs. While these two types of needs are not identical, both are "Materialist," in that they are directly related to physiological survival. We hypothesized that they would tend to go together, with only those who feel secure about the satisfaction of *both* needs being likely to give top priority to belonging, self-expression, and intellectural and esthetic satisfaction—needs the remaining items are designed to tap.

Flanagan argues in the preceding article that this an inadequate way to measure values: most people are favorable to *all* of these items, so their ranking of them taps mere "salience," he asserts:

> Since these items are all positively valued, they qualify as valence issues. All that varies is the relative importance or salience that the respondent attaches to each, not a position for or against them.

In the space of a single sentence, Flanagan shifts from "relative importance" to "salience"—apparently not recognizing the crucial difference between the two. And sure enough, he attempts to operationalize value priorities as if they *did* represent nothing more than issue salience. Instead of having respondents rank-order a variety of basic goals, Flanagan proposes to measure value *"priorities"* by one's response to the question "What is the most important problem facing the Japanese government?"; and value *"preferences"* by a group of items that ask whether one is for or against more discipline, frugality, and so on.

Flanagan is clearly wrong in assuming that one's ranking of a set of positively valued goals is somehow superficial. Though nearly everyone values both liberty *and* order, or economic growth *and* the quality of life, the crucial social and political decisions come precisely when one must decide which of two such highly cherished values must be given priority over the other—for they can, and do, come into conflict. Flanagan argues that "if law and order becomes a campaign issue, its salience ranking will most certainly rise." Its "salience" might; but its *ranking* would *not*—unless the respondent decided now to value order more highly than a goal previously given higher priority, such as freedom of speech. In fact, the distribution of value types defined by the four-item values index remained remarkably stable over the period 1970-1979, despite the drastic economic and political changes that took place during the 1970s (Inglehart, forthcoming), and the scores generated by the twelve-item index seem stabler still (Dalton, forthcoming). Far from reflecting mere "salience," the rank-ordering of various desirable goals measures precisely what our theoretical framework implies must be measured: the individual's value *priorities.*

The term "priorities" implies a rank-ordering: Hence Rokeach (1968, 1973, 1974) in his superb and influential studies of human values, also measures the individual's *rank ordering* of important, generally cher-

ished goals. Though Flanagan purports to measure value priorities, he fails to obtain a ranking; indeed, he seems unaware of the fundamental difference between a rank-ordering of basic goals, and issue salience, as tapped by the "most important current problem" question that he himself uses as an indicator of value priorities.

Flanagan's methodology has an even more serious defect, however; it does not measure *values.* His discussion displays a fundamental confusion about the nature of values, as is suggested by the fact that he uses the term "issues" and "values" interchangeably throughout the article. Values are normally considered to be a relatively central and enduring aspect of one's outlook. As Rokeach puts it (1973: 5-6), "a value is enduring. If values were completely stable, individual and social change would be impossible. If values were completely unstable, continuity of human personality would be impossible." Values occupy a more central position than attitudes in one's personality makeup and cognitive system, and are therefore determinants of attitudes as well as behavior. Attitudes, in turn, are more central than one's beliefs or preferences on specific issues: an attitude is a coherent system of beliefs. It is not easy to measure something as deep-rooted and central as one's values. This is why, in order to measure Materialist/Post-Materialist values, we developed a set of twelve goals, providing multiple indicators of emphasis on given needs, that theoretical considerations implied would be chosen in a specific pattern.

If values are relatively central, they should be relatively resistant to change: change in one value would require change in many related beliefs and attitudes, in order to avoid cognitive dissonance. A recent study by Dalton (forthcoming) based on a two-wave German panel survey carried out in 1976 and 1979, indicates that the underlying dimension tapped by a multi-item Materialist/Post-Materialist values battery does indeed show impressive stability over time. Using LISREL analysis, Dalton demonstrates that although responses to certain items are relatively unstable, the latent variable tapped by the battery as a whole shows a temporal correlation of .70 from 1976 to 1979. This figure is far higher than that for most attitudes included in the panel study, and roughly on a par with the .73 correlation for party identification—which theoretically *should* be highly stable, being a clearly labeled, frequently reinforced aspect of one's identity that, in the German context, is deeply rooted in religious, social class, and regional affiliations. It is remarkable that without an organizational infrastructure such as political party, church, and labor union working to maintain them, Materialist/

Post-Materialist values nevertheless show a comparable degree of stability.

By contrast, Flanagan purports to measure value "priorities" by using one's response to the question "What is the most important problem facing the Japanese government?" It has been demonstrated that responses to this type of question change dramatically from one month to the next (Smith, 1980): for instance, for the American people in January the most important problem may be the Iranian hostages, in February it may be unemployment. Far from probing into an individual's values, the answers may reflect little more than the respondent's awareness of what has recently received heaviest coverage in the press and on television (precisely the sort of transient "salience" that Flanagan mistakenly attributes to our ranking of basic goals). That Flanagan finds no correlation between responses to value "priorities" as measured in this way, and his indicator of value "preferences" is anything but surprising: if the former tap fleeting perceptions that change from month to month, they would corresponded to one's inner values only by sheer coincidence.

Flanagan's indicator of value "preferences" seems to come closer to tapping values. It is based on agreement or disagreement with a number of general and basic concerns. Its chief defect is that it is an atheoretical collection of items, interesting in themselves, but not a coherent group of items designed to tap a specific dimension. In constructing his index of value "preferences," Flanagan seems to have done an admirable job of utilizing what happened to be available in the Japanese surveys; he has not made an improvement on the methodology one would use to measure value priorities.

Another criticism made by Flanagan in the article is entirely spurious. He asks, "Do the various components of the acquisitive-postbourgeois scale really cluster as neatly as Inglehart suggests, into only two important behavioral types?" He then demonstrates that, with the four-item index, less than half of the respondents fall into one of the two polar value types, and concludes that the scale does not provide an adequate explanation of intergenerational value change—as if those who fall into the various intermediate categories were somehow left unaccounted for. In fact, this finding simply reflects the fact that the Materialist/Post-Materialist dimension is a continuum, not a dichotomy. It can, most conveniently, be described in terms of its two polar types, but there was never the slightest expectation that everyone would fall into one of the two extreme categories. In my initial article on the

subject, I discuss four intermediate categories; in more recent work, as many as ten. Instead of a perfect bimodal distribution, we find our respondents distributed at various points along the continuum—a perfectly normal finding in empirical research. The question, then, is *not* "Does everyone fall into one of the two polar types?" Of course they don't. The relevant question is, "Do our respondents show a tendency to polarize along a Materialist/Post-Materialist dimension?"

A genuine disagreement, therefore, concerns the question whether a Materialist/Post-Materialist dimension even exists. Any culture is multidimensional. Change can occur in sexual norms, tastes in food or music, political party preferences, trust in government, religious outlook, and numerous other aspects of life. In previous publications, I have discussed the relationship of the Materialist/Post-Materialist continuum to several other dimensions of human values (Inglehart, 1976: 263-266; Inglehart, 1977: 45-50). The question, obviously, is not whether the Materialist/Post-Materialist dimension is the *only* dimension along which change can occur, but whether such a dimension exists and, if so, whether significant change has been taking place in the predicted direction.

Flanagan argues that the process I have described as a shift from Materialist to Post-Materialist priorities can more accurately be viewed as two independent processes of value change. The items dealing with "rising prices" and "order" in my original four-item battery were designed to tap emphasis on economic and physical security, respectively. Flanagan finds that emphasis on these two items is unrelated among the Japanese public. Taking an inductive approach, he therefore reasons that relative emphasis on these two goals reflects two independent processes based on two different sets of causal factors. He terms these respective processes: (1) a shift from Materialist to Nonmaterialist values, and (2) a shift from Authoritarian to Libertarian values. My own reasoning, by contrast, is deductive, derived from a theoretical framework described elsewhere (Inglehart, 1977). This framework implies that emphasis on economic security and on physical security tend to go together—and that those who feel insecure about these physiological needs have a fundamentally different outlook and political behavior from those who feel secure about them. The latter are likely to give top priority to nonmaterial goals such as self-expression, belonging, and intellectual or esthetic satisfaction.

The reasons why economic and physical security were expected to go together, very briefly are: (1) From a macrosocietal perspective, war tends to produce *both* economic and physical insecurity—both hunger

and loss of life; hence, those generations that have experienced war are likely to feel less secure about both; (2) From a microsocietal perspective, poor individuals tend to be exposed to both economic and physical insecurity—both poverty and relatively high crime rates. The more affluent strata have resources that shield them, to some extent, from *both.*

Hence I explore the consequences of rising levels of economic and physical security. Satisfaction of the physiological needs, I argue, leads to growing emphasis on nonphysiological or "Post-Materialist" goals. If, as Flanagan argues, emphasis on the two types of physiological needs is unrelated, the concept of an overarching Materialist/Post-Materialist dimension would be empirically groundless. But is he right?

Even the Japanese data he cites do not really support his allegation that emphasis on "maintaining order" and "fighting rising prices" are unrelated. In the article, Flanagan reports that among those members of the Japanese public who chose "prices" as one of their two top priorities in the initial four-item values battery, "only" 54% selected "order" as their second choice—as opposed to 46% who chose "more say in important government decisions" or "protecting freedom of speech." The word "only" as used here is misleading. It reflects the fact that among this group, more people chose the *one* remaining Materialist goal than chose *both* of the two Post-Materialist goals combined. Contrary to Flanagan's claim, this does reflect a substantial degree of constraint: the random probability model he refers to would predict that only 33% of this group would choose "order," as compared with 54% that actually did so. Even in Japan, emphasis on the two types of Materialist goals tends to go together.

When we turn to various Western nations, this linkage is even stronger. In a 1974 sample of the West German public, among those whose top priority was a Materialist item ("order" or "prices"), 67% ranked the other Materialist item in second place. Among those whose first choice was Post-Materialist, only 31% chose a Materialist item as their second-ranking priority (for details of fieldwork in the 1974 surveys, see Barnes et al., 1979: 589-591).

When dealing with the original four-item battery, however, constraint tends to be masked by the fact that once one has chosen a Materialist item as one's top priority, only one of the three remaining items is Materialist. This sharply reduces the likelihood that the second choice will be consistent with the first. This limitation is much less severe when dealing with the twelve-item Materialist/Post-Materialist battery introduced in 1973. In the 1974 German survey, for example, among

those who chose "order" as their top societal priority from the original four items, only 9% gave top priority to one of the three Post-Materialist goals in a supplementary group of eight items (these three goals respectively were "more say on the job," "a friendlier, less impersonal society," and "a society where ideas count more than money"). Similarly, among those whose first choice was "prices," only 10% gave top priority to one of the three Post-Materialist goals in the next set of items. In other words, among those whose initial choice was Materialist, only 9% or 10% ranked a Post-Materialist item highest among the next set of items.

By contrast, among those whose initial choice was "more say in the government," 36% subsequently chose one of the three Post-Materialist goals; and among those whose initial choice was "free speech," the figure was 40%. In short: those who chose a Post-Materialist goal in the first group of items were almost *four times* as likely to give top priority to Post-Materialist goals in the second set of items, as were those who chose a Materialist item. Furthermore there was no significant difference between those whose initial choice emphasized economic security and those who had emphasized physical security. The two groups were virtually identical in their subsequent tendency to give top priority to Materialist rather than Post-Materialist items.

This pattern applies to each of the thirteen Western societies in which the 12-item Materialist/Post-Materialist values battery has been administered. With almost incredible consistency in nation after nation, emphasis on the six items designed to tap economic and physical security *does* go together, forming a coherent Materialist cluster; in every case, emphasis on the five items designed to tap belonging, self-expression, and intellectual satisfaction also goes together, forming a clearly defined Post-Materialist cluster. A single item (one intended to tap esthetic priorities but which also unintentionally taps a concern for urban crime) shows neutral polarity in every one of the societies studied.

Figure 1A summarizes the results of factor analyses based on data from nine Western European nations surveyed in 1973. (The factor loadings from surveys in each of these nine nations plus the United States are presented separately in Inglehart [1977: 42-46], but the basic pattern is virtually identical from country to country.) This degree of cross-national consistency is remarkable and unusual. An attempted cross-national replication of an Authoritarian Personality battery, for example, showed different response structures in each of four Western societies studied (Inglehart, 1970). Furthermore, the Materialist/Post-Materialist dimension proves to be exceedingly robust. Factor analyses of survey data collected in the nine European Community countries in



Figure 1: Materialist/Post-Materialist Values Dimension

NOTE: Mean factor loadings from the nine European Community publics, surveyed in September 1973 and in October-November, 1978. Based on principal component analyses of rankings of the twelve goals.

late 1978 *also* reveal the same pattern, as is shown in Figure 1B. Again, the pattern is remarkably uniform across all nine nations. As Table 1 demonstrates, in nation after nation all five Post-Materialist items show positive polarity; and all six Materialist items show negative polarity in every country but Luxembourg, where we find one anomalous loading.

Analysis of the priorities of candidates to the European Parliament, based on interviews conducted in 1979, also reveals the same basic pattern (see Table 2). European politicians *also* tend to respond to the Materialist items in one way, and to the Post-Materialist items in the opposite way. The similarity between elites and mass public even extends to the structure of the second dimension (compare Inglehart, 1977: 45-50). Since we are dealing with an elite sample, the constraint found here is higher than among the general public. And elites respond to the item concerning "more beautiful cities" in the way we originally expected: it *does* cluster with the Post-Materialist items (apparently because fear of urban crime is a less important part of the outlook of elites). On the other hand, "freedom of expression" shows the expected polarity but its correlations are relatively weak. Among candidates for the European Parliament, emphasis on freedom of expression is almost universal—hence it does not discriminate between Materialists and Post-Materialists as effectively as at the mass level. On the whole, however, the structure of elite responses is strikingly similar to that of the general public. Cross-nationally, across time, and at both mass and elite levels, response to these items shows the same structure. Consistently, the Materialist/Post-Materialist dimension is the main underlying theme. Does this mean that the data cannot be sliced in any other way? Of course not. In the foregoing, we use principal component analyses to test the hypothesis that these twelve items tap a common underlying Materialist/Post-Materialist dimension. Milkis and Baldino (1978) subject the 1973 data to varimax rotation—a technique that breaks down the first dimension into four subclusters corresponding, roughly, to the groups of items designed to tap (1) economic security, (2) physical security, (3) belonging, and (4) self-expression.

Taking a similar approach but using a different methodology, Herz (1979) applies multidimensional scaling to the 1973 data and obtains the two dimensional solution depicted in Figure 2A. Like Milkis and Baldino, Herz obtains four clusters of items; the boundaries he draws around these clusters are shown in Figure 2A. Herz discusses each of these four clusters in detail, and concludes that the Materialist/Post-Materialist dimension has no empirical basis.

He fails to see the forest for the trees. When we project his twelve points onto the main axis of his two dimensional solution, (as shown in

TABLE 1
The Materialist/Post-Materialist Factor in Nine Nations, 1978

	Country:								
Goal:	France	Belgium	Netherlands	Germany	Italy	Luxemburg	Denmark	Ireland	Britain
More say on job	.57	.55	.65	.63	.53	.58	.62	.61	.62
Less impersonal society	.61	.55	.56	.64	.55	.65	.60	.56	.57
More say in government	.53	.42	.58	.46	.64	.45	.57	.56	.48
Ideas count	.45	.43	.52	.56	.51	.46	.57	.57	.52
Freedom of Speech	.46	.47	.31	.49	.50	.47	.41	.36	.36
More beautiful cities	.12	.16	.15	.30	.01	.28	.28	-.15	.15
Strong defense forces	-.41	-.21	-.44	-.42	-.43	.05	-.43	-.24	-.39
Fight rising prices	-.35	-.44	-.26	-.24	-.39	-.46	-.26	-.26	-.23
Stable economy	-.47	-.49	-.49	-.43	-.33	-.33	-.53	-.42	-.38
Fight against crime	-.55	-.31	-.46	-.38	-.52	-.55	-.45	-.45	-.45
Economic growth	-.46	-.56	-.57	-.51	-.30	-.51	-.50	-.29	-.34
Maintain order	-.58	-.34	-.57	-.46	-.54	-.53	-.62	-.38	-.48

NOTE: Loadings of given items in first factor of principal components analysis.

TABLE 2
Value Priorities of Candidates to the European Parliament

I. Materialist/Post-Materialist (24%)		II. Cities and Crime (14%)	
More say on job	.660	Fight against crime	-.717
Less impersonal society	.478	Maintain order	-.611
More say in government	.472	More beautiful cities	-.571
Society where ideas count	.408	Society where ideas count	-.428
More beautiful cities	.315	More say in government	-.309
Freedom of expression	.254		
Controlling inflation	-.436		
Fight against crime	-.442		
Stable economy	-.450		
Economic growth	-.566		
Maintain order	-.588		
Adequate defense forces	-.660		

NOTE: Principal components factor analysis.

Figure 2B) the result is an almost perfect replication of the Materialist/Post-Materialist dimension depicted in Figure 1. Underlying Herz's four subclusters we find an overall pattern in which the six Materialist items are situated toward the bottom of the figure and the five Post-Materialist items are grouped toward the top, with one item (once again, "more beautiful cities") located near the center, exactly as in Figure 1.

In various ways, Herz, (1979), Milkis and Baldino, (1979), and Flanagan all fall into an analytic fallacy that might be described as the *reductio ad varimax.* On a purely empirical basis, it is perfectly possible to break down the Materialist/Post-Materialist dimension into the two components Flanagan proposes or the four subclusters Herz proposes; going farther still, one could subject the items in any given subcluster to varimax rotation and discover that there are "really" two or more dimensions underlying it, until one comes up against the limit that, since there are only twelve items, one can obtain no more than twelve dimensions. For certain purposes, such reductionism is perfectly appropriate, but to conclude that it refutes the Materialist/Post-Materialist hypothesis is preposterous. If one's hypotheses dealt with attitudes toward physical security, for example, one might focus on that particular cluster; or if one were studying mass attitudes toward crime, one might analyze the responses to that specific item without reference to the other items. But none of the authors discussed here is investigating attitudes toward crime. They are addressing the theoretically derived question whether these twelve items tap an underlying Materialist/Post-Materialist dimension. The answer is an unequivocal "Yes."



Figure 2A: Structure of Value Priorities of Nine Western Publics in 1973

NOTE: Two-dimensional Multidimensional scaling solution, with cluster boundaries shown in Herz (1979: 292).

Figure 2B: The Previous Multidimensional Scaling Plot Projected onto its Main Axis

NOTE: Compare with Figures 1A and 1B.

Flanagan seems mistaken in arguing that the Materialist/Post-Materialist dimension does not apply to Western society, and mistaken in arguing that emphasis on economic and physical security do not go together among the Japanese public. But he is correct in perceiving value change as multidimensional. Moreover, when we focus specifically on Japan, the Materialist/Post-Materialist concept must be modified in one important respect, for the Japanese case constitutes a striking contrast to the thirteen Western societies we have studied. Two cross-cutting processes of value change *have* been taking place in Japan, though they are not those described by Flanagan. Instead, one seems linked with the decline of the traditional sense of group obligation, rooted in preindustrial Japanese culture; and the other reflects a shift from Materialist to Post-Materialist values that is roughly—but not precisely—similar to what has been taking place in the West. The former has been described as a process of "individuation" (Maruyama, 1965; Ike, 1973). As Ike (1973: 1203) puts it, "In Western culture, which has long stressed individualism, youth may seek a sense of belonging, whereas in Japanese culture, which has emphasized the group, youth may yearn for individuation and privatization."

Individuation in Japan reflects the gradual decline of an extreme subordination of the individual to the collectivity that may be traced, in part, to the samurai tradition of feudal obligation; and in part to the imperatives of a system of rice culture that depended on communal cooperation to maintain irrigation systems and share water resources, to a degree unknown in modern Western agriculture (Beardsley et al, 1959). In both cases, strong group ties were closely linked with physical survival. While a similar subordination of the individual to the community may have existed in Medieval Europe, the rise of individualism took place relatively long ago in the West—long before the formative years of anyone now living and available to be interviewed in a representative survey. The modernization of Japan is much more recent; it remained a predominantly rural society as recently as 1950. A large share of the Japanese public spent their formative years in a rural setting.

One major consequence is that while a shift from Materialist to Post-Materialist values can be found in modern Japan, it does *not* encompass a heightened emphasis on "belonging"—the need that Maslow (1954) identified as taking next priority after the needs for economic and physical security had been met. On the contrary, for the Japanese, "belonging" is an aspect of a traditional value system that was inculcated so heavily that in some respects it *interferes* with the self-realization

sought by Post-Materialists. While contemporary Japanese continue to cherish warm interpersonal relations, there has been a growing resistance to the traditional subordination of the individual to the group. Thus, the rank-ordering of the social needs that Maslow viewed as universal actually seems to reflect a Western perspective. For Western Post-Materialists, who have grown up in societies where the individual has been free from the grip of communal ties since time immemorial, the need for roots is a major preoccupation. For Japanese Post-Materialists, self-realization demands a wider margin of individual freedom from group constraints than the traditional society allowed.

Thus, while my original four-item value priorities index shows the same relationships with age and education in Japan as it does in the West (Watanuki, 1977), one of the newer items, designed to tap emphasis on belonging, shows a strikingly different pattern. This item, dealing with "a less impersonal, more human society," was included in the 1976 Japanese survey cited by Flanagan. A literal back-translation from the Japanese version reads "a society with harmonious human relations." Throughout Western society, the various versions of this item are substantially more apt to be chosen by the young, the affluent, and the well-educated than by their opposite numbers. In Japan, this item is just as likely to be given relatively high priority by the old, the less educated and those in rural settings (Miyake, 1978).

While emphasis on having "more say in government decisions" is a relatively new component of Japanese culture, "harmonious human relations" connotes the traditional pattern of avoiding conflict by repressing individual differences. As Nakane (1973: 13) puts it, "In the ideal traditional household in Japan. . . opinions of the members of the household should always be held unaminously regardless of the issue, and this normally meant that all members accepted the opinion of the household head." But on the other hand, "In practice, any decision should be made on the basis of a consensus which includes those located lower in the hierarchy. Such a consensus—reached by what might be termed maximum consultation—might seem a by-product of the post-war 'democratic' age; yet it is not at all new to the Japanese, representing as it does a very basic style of the traditional group operation" (Nakane, 1973: 149). Thus, "harmonious social relations" also has quite positive connotations: it ranks among the most frequently chosen items in Japan, second only to emphasis on "Economic stability" (though it ranks fifth among the same eight items, in the West). It attains widespread emphasis because it appeals to traditionalists as well as modernists—indeed, it is slightly *more* popular among the former

group. To highly-educated Japanese, this item evokes connotations of conformism and authoritarianism that would probably never cross a Westerner's mind. For example, Watanuki (1977: 10) perceives this item as reflecting preindustrial Japanese values and comments that "emperor worship and unconditional obedience to the superior cannot be restored any more." In keeping with Watanuki's interpretation—but in striking contrast to the pattern observed throughout Western society—emphasis on this item tends to be linked with emphasis on *Materialist* goals.

In short, Japan constitutes a remarkably distinctive case. Industrialization, urbanization, the attainment of prosperity, and other aspects of modernization have taken place so recently and so rapidly that even while the rest of Japan is moving into the front rank of advanced industrial society, important segments of the population are still undergoing the retreat from preindustrial values. The transition from preindustrial to industrial values has been superimposed on the shift from Materialism to Post-Materialist priorities. When they are lumped together, the former process can conceal the latter.

Table 3 illustrates this point: these are the data on which Tables 8, 9, and 10 of Flanagan's most recent article are based. As Table 3 indicates, there was no net increase in the percentage of the Japanese public emphasizing the goal "work hard and get rich," from 1953 to 1978. Accordingly, Flanagan's cohort analysis in Table 9 shows no indication of an intergenrational shift away from Materialism: there couldn't be one, because there is not net shift of *any* kind. But Table 3 does reveal sizeable shifts away from emphasis on the goals "Resist all evils in the world" and "Give everything in service of society"—two key elements of a Japanese value system that can be traced far back into the preindustrial era.

Conversely, Table 3 reveals strong increases in the proportion of the Japanese public emphasizing the goals "Live a life that suits your own tastes," and "Live each day as it comes"—a pattern that places the gratification of the individual above the moral imperatives of the society. The shift from emphasis on goals "e" and "f" to goals "c" and "d" is massive: in 1953, 39% of the Japanese public still conformed to traditional morality, as represented by the former goals, while only 32% endorsed individual hedonism. By 1978, only 18% emphasized the former, and 61% stressed the latter. This change seems to reflect the process of "individuation" discussed by Maruyama and others. Flanagan labels the opposite poles of this process "authoritarian" and "libertarian"; in a general sense these terms are not inappropriate—except that they fail to capture the warm paternalism and mutual obliga-

TABLE 3
Value Change Among Japanese Public, 1953-1978

"There are all sorts of attitudes toward life. Of these listed here (SHOW CARD) which one comes closest to your feelings?"

	1953	1958	1963	1968	1973	1978
(a) Work hard and get rich	15%	17	17	17	14	14
(b) Study earnestly and make a name for yourself	6	3	4	3	3	2
(c) Don't think about money or fame; just live a life that suits your own tastes	21	27	30	32	39	39
(d) Live each day as it comes, cheerfully and without worrying	11	18	19	20	23	22
(e) Resist all evils in the world and live a pure and just life	29	23	18	17	11	11
(f) Never think of yourself, give everything in service of society	10	6	6	6	5	7

SOURCE: For sampling details and a full report of findings see Research Committee on the Study of the Japanese National Character (1979). The 1978 survey was carried out in both Japan and the United States.

tions that characterize the functioning of the traditional Japanese group—assimilating it to the Authoritarian personality concept familiar in the West.

Regardless of how it is labeled, however, this shift in priorities is primarily based on intergenerational population replacement, as Flanagan demonstrates convincingly. He concludes that there *is* an intergenerational shift from "authoritarian" to "libertarian" values, but *not* from Materialist to Post-Materialist values.

We disagree on the latter point. For an intergenerational shift away from Materialism *did* take place during recent decades in Japan, as in the West—but it is obscured in these data by a cross-cutting shift toward individuation: in the early surveys, Materialism is overshadowed by traditional *Pre*-Materialist values, while in the later ones it is overshadowed by the rise of individualism and Post-Materialism. The result is a misleading impression of no change. But when we examine an uncontaminated measure of Materialism, rather than the obviously multidimensional set of alternatives offered here, we find a clear-cut shift away from Materialism.

Fortunately, an uncontaminated indicator of Materialism *does* exist—and is available from the same Japanese National Character

TABLE 4
Emphasis on Money as "Most Important Thing to Teach a Child" Among Japanese and American Publics

"In bringing up children of primary school age, some think that one should teach them that money is the most important thing. Do you agree or disagree?"

I. Percentage agreeing among Japanese public, 1953-1978:

1953	1958	1963	1968	1973	1978
65%	*	60	57	44	45

II. Japan versus United States, 1978:

	U.S.A.	Japan
Agree	5%	45
Disagree	93	40
Undecided, Don't know	2	15

SOURCE: For sampling details and a full report of findings see Research Committee on the Study of the Japanese National Character (1979). The 1978 survey was carried out in both Japan and the United States.
*This item not asked in 1958.

surveys on which Table 3 is based. Table 4 shows responses, from 1953 to 1978, to the question: "In bringing up children of primary school age some think that one should teach them that money is the most important thing. Do you agree or disagree?"

It would be difficult to design a simpler or more straightforward indicator of a Materialistic outlook. And, it appears, Materialism does exist among the Japanese—and has declined substantially during the past 25 years. This decline in emphasis on money, as the highest priority—from a position endorsed by a 65% majority of the Japanese, to one endorsed by less than half—accords poorly with Flanagan's claim that "there has only been a very slight long-term decline in the proportion of the population that places primary emphasis on acquisitive values." This claim appears to hold up when we examine Table 3, in which the decline of Pre-Industrial values cuts across, and largely obscures, the shift from Materialist to Post-Materialist values. It is contradicted by the evidence in Table 4.

Moreover—contrary to Flanagan's claims—the decline of Materialism definitely seems based on intergenerational population replacement. Table 5 shows a cohort analysis of responses to this question. In any given year, the young are less likely to emphasize money than are the

TABLE 5
Cohort Analysis: Percentage of Japanese Public Agreeing that Money is the Most Important Thing" to Teach a Child

Age Group:	1953	1958	1963	1968	1973	1978	change within given cohort, 1953-1978
20-24	60%	-	43	34	22	18	
25-29	66	-	55	49	36	26	
30-34	63	-	58	58	42	37	
35-39	62	-	56	59	43	43	
40-44	65	-	63	59	46	49	
45-49	66	-	62	62	46	56	- 4
50-54	72	-	68	65	49	51	-15
55-59	72	-	72	67	60	56	- 7
60-64	77	-	76	66	59	62	0
65-69	78	-	72	73	59	62	- 3
							mean: -6
Spread between youngest and oldest:	+18	-	+29	+39	+37	+44	

old. Does this simply reflect an inherent idealism of youth that will disappear as they grow older? Apparently not—for when we follow given age cohorts as they age during this 25-year period, we find no indication whatever of increasing Materialism. Quite the contrary, we find a tendency for a given cohort to place *less* emphasis on money as it ages: the five cohorts for which we have data throughout this 25-year period show an average shift of six points *away* from giving top priority to money. Almost certainly, this was a period effect, in which the sharply rising prosperity of the postwar era produced a diminishing emphasis on money within each age cohort, quite independently of generational change or aging effects. As closer examination of Table 5 indicates, this period effect operated rather strongly from 1953 to 1973 and then reversed direction, so that from 1973 to 1978 each age cohort came to place slightly *more* emphasis on money. This pattern reflects changes in the economic environment rather faithfully: the extraordinary rise in prosperity that took place in Japan from 1953 to 1973 was mirrored in a gradual deemphasis on money within each age cohort; and the economic uncertainty that followed the oil shock of 1973 was accompanied by a partial reversal of this trend.

But these period effects are dwarfed by the intergenerational differences. While period effects seem to account for a mean net shift of

6 percentage points away from emphasizing money, we find a difference of 44 points between the youngest and oldest groups in 1978. Since these data show no evidence whatever that aging leads to increasing emphasis on money, there is a strong *prima facie* case for attributing this 44 point difference entirely to intergenerational change. It is conceivable that a life cycle tendency toward increasing Materialism with increasing age *also* exists, but is totally concealed by stronger period effects working in the opposite direction: the complexities of distinguishing between aging effects, cohort effects, and period effects are such that we cannot totally exclude this possibility (Glenn, 1976; Knoke and Hout, 1976). But belief in such an aging effect must depend on faith alone; it is totally unsupported by empirical evidence.

Indications of intergenerational change, on the other hand, seem incontrovertible. In 1953, even the *youngest* group showed overwhelmingly Materialistic priorities—because at that point, *all* of the adult age cohorts had spent their formative years during World War II or earlier. These cohorts show only modest changes as they age during the ensuing quarter-century. It is only from 1963 on, when the postwar cohorts begin to enter the adult population, that we find a clear rejection of money as the top priority among the younger cohorts. By 1978, there was a tremendous difference between the priorities of younger and older Japanese. This shift of the Japanese public, from a heavy majority giving money top priority to a minority doing so, seems to reflect intergenerational population replacement above all, with only a minor component due to period effects. The time series data are unambiguous: from 1953 to 1978 there was an intergenerational shift away from Materialism among the Japanese public.

How Materialistic are the Japanese? By one standard, we would expect them to be more Materialistic than any of the Western publics we have studied, since they emerged only very recently from a grinding Asiatic poverty unknown in the modern West. As recently as 1950, the average annual per capita income in Japan was $200. Though Japan *today* ranks among the world's wealthiest nations, a large share of its population grew up during times of severe deprivation. Thus it is not surprising to find that, in some respects, the Japanese public seems relatively Materialistic. As Flanagan points out, Japan manifests a smaller proportion of Post-Materialists than any Western society, as measured by my original four-item values index. Similarly, in response to the question in Table 4, in 1978, 45% of the Japanese public still felt that "money is the most important thing"—as compared with only 5% of the American public surveyed in that year.

But, on the other hand, we have argued that certain *Pre*-Industrial values have survived in Japan to a far greater extent than in the West. It has been suggested that the historical growth of Materialism tends to be curvilinear, initially repressed by cultural norms necessary to the functioning of preindustrial society, but gaining widespread acceptance during the phase of capital accumulation and rapid industrialization; and then declining with the emergence of advanced industrial society (Inglehart, 1977: 242-243; 1979: 306-308). Insofar as this is true, we would expect the Japanese to be *less* Materialistic than Westerners—not as a consequence of postwar affluence, but through the persistence of traditional antimaterialistic norms.

Table 6 provides some relevant comparisons of societal goals endorsed by the Japanese and by eight Western publics. In one respect, we find similarity, rather than contrast: the top-ranking goal both in Japan and in most Western countries was "a stable economy." By this standard, the Japanese are among the most materialistic of all publics, with only the Germans emphasizing economic stability more heavily than the Japanese.

But when we examine the second-ranking goal, we find evidence of another phenomenon. For the Japanese, the second most frequent choice is "a society with harmonious human relations." The Western version, "a friendlier, less impersonal society," is ranked fifth among these eight items (taking the average of the eight Western publics). From the viewpoint of Western society, this is unambiguously a Post-Materialist item, emphasized mainly by the younger, more affluent strata. As we have seen, it has an ambivalent status in Japan. Clearly, it does not represent a *Materialistic* orientation; but its widespread popularity seems to reflect the persistence of *Pre*-Materialist values, more than the inroads of Post-Materialism.

Interestingly enough, the goal of having "more say in how things are decided at work and in your community" receives *less* emphasis in Japan than in any Western country. The key phrase probably is "*more* say." The Japanese already carry out an enormous amount of consultation and consensus-building; few seem to want still more.

The goal that ranks second among Western publics—"the fight against crime"—unquestionably does reflect a Materialist concern. And it receives substantially less emphasis in Japan than in any Western country. Here again, we have an indication that the Japanese are less Materialistic than Westerners. But let us go on to inquire why. On one level, the Japanese lack of concern for crime is readily understandable: it reflects the fact that Japan has a significantly lower crime rate than

TABLE 6
Societal Priorities in Western Publics and Japanese Public

Goal:	Western Nations								Western mean:	Japan
	Britain	Germany	Netherlands	Austria	USA	Italy	Switzerland	Finland		
Maintain a stable economy	48%	74	31	55	52	32	56	51	50	59
The fight against crime	38	47	48	37	42	59	29	35	42	20
More say on the job	29	17	34	20	21	25	24	16	23	12
Economic growth	25	22	14	33	15	37	7	29	23	9
Friendlier, less impersonal society	11	13	29	9	11	18	23	40	19	37
Society where ideas count	16	11	26	10	21	16	19	10	16	22
Strong defense forces	20	8	5	9	32	6	17	11	14	5
Beautiful cities and countryside	12	8	13	27	6	8	24	8	13	36
TOTAL:	199%	200	200	200	200	201	200	200	200	200

SOURCE: Eight-Nation study, fieldwork carried out in 1974-1976 in eight Western nations; and 1976 Japanese election survey sponsored by NSF and NHK. Based on the top two priorities among these eight items, except in Japan, where a maximum of three choices were coded, but the mean number of responses was 2.56. These Japanese data have been standardized to a base of 200% to permit comparison with the West.

virtually any Western society (about one-tenth of the prevailing rate for major crimes in the United States). But if we push the explanation a step further and ask *why* Japan has such a low crime rate, we would probably trace it to the persistence of a much stronger sense of group affiliation—and consequently, more effective social control—in Japan than in the West. Once again, we reach the conclusion that Japan is less Materialistic than the West—but that it may be due to the persistence of preindustrial values, more than to the rise of Post-Materialism.

Table 6 reveals another striking contrast between Japan and the West: "more beautiful cities and countryside," which was the *least* emphasized item in the West as a whole, is the third-ranking item in Japan. Again, the finding itself is not particularly surprising. In Japan, the third-largest industrial power in the world is packed into an area about the size of Montana: a concern for its environmental impact is understandable (and the Japanese version of this item translates as "make efforts to preserve the environment of this community"). Among the Japanese public, emphasis on this item is positively linked with a concern to preserve "Economic stability" but *negatively* related to emphasis on "Economic growth." The corresponding item, "more beautiful cities," had ambivalent polarity throughout the West. Their relatively high emphasis on this goal, therefore, does little to clarify whether we should view the Japanese as more Materialistic or more Post-Materialistic than Westerners.

Table 7 provides some additional comparisons between the goals emphasized by the Japanese and by ten Western publics. Despite the fact that the Japanese stress "a stable economy" very heavily, few of them consider their salary the most important feature of their job. This may be related to the career pattern typical of a large Japanese corporation: one starts off with a modest salary, but works in a warm, paternalistic setting with a strong likelihood of continuous job tenure until retirement. In any case, the Japanese emphasize economic security more than their absolute level of pay—but are primarily concerned with such nonmaterial aspects as "working with people you like" and "a feeling of accomplishment." By this standard, the Japanese are among the *least* materialistic publics. But of the last two goals, "working with people you like" has an obvious relationship to the stress on "harmonious human relations" discussed above; and a "feeling of accomplishment" may also involve this consideration, to some extent. Insofar as this is true, the nonmaterialistic outlook of the Japanese might, once again, be traced to the persistence of preindustrial values, rather than to the inroads of Post-Materialism. This interpretation is consistent with

TABLE 7
Job Values in Japan, the United States, and Western Europe

"Here are some of the things people usually take into account in relation to their work. Which one would you personally place first?

—— A good salary so that you do not have any worries about money

—— A safe job with no risk of closing down or unemployment

—— Working with people you like

—— Doing an important job which gives you a feeling of accomplishment"

A Good Salary		A Safe Job		People you Like		Feeling of Accomplishment	
Germany	38%	Ireland	30%	Denmark	34%	United States	50%
Britain	37	Italy	29	Japan	30	Japan	38
France	36	Germany	28	Netherlands	26	Netherlands	29
Belgium	34	Japan	23	Belgium	20	Luxembourg	29
Italy	33	Belgium	23	Britain	16	Denmark	27
Ireland	30	Luxemburg	22	Ireland	16	France	26
Luxembourg	25	France	21	Italy	14	Britain	25
Netherlands	23	Britain	20	France	14	Ireland	24
Denmark	21	United States	19	United States	14	Italy	23
United States	16	Netherlands	18	Luxemburg	13	Belgium	22
Japan	7	Denmark	16	Germany	11	Germany	22

NOTE: Data from European Community 1973 Survey and from the 1978 Japanese National Character Survey.

the hypothesis that a certain curvilinearity exists in the long-term processes of value change, for emphasis on "working with people you like" and "a feeling of accomplishment" are, very strikingly, characteristic of Post-Materialists in Western countries (Inglehart, 1977: 54-57).

Clearly, the Japan-Western comparison is complex. Items that have one consistent meaning throughout the West sometimes have a quite different significance in Japan. On the whole, we would conclude that the Japanese tend to be *less* Materialistic than most Westerners; but that this reflects the persistence of preindustrial values more than the rise of Post-Materialism.

The remaining area of disagreement between Flanagan and myself is more apparent than real. What Flanagan perceives as an alternative theory of value change based on "functional constraints," is not only compatible with my own interpretation, but an aspect of it that I have taken some pains to stress. In outlining the role of "functional constraints," Flanagan is simply tracing, at the system level, the changes that give rise to individual-level value change. Though I focus mainly on

individual-level variables (since I am dealing with survey data), I do not view them as emerging from a vacuum. On the contrary, the opening pages of *The Silent Revolution* (Inglehart, 1977: 4-11) are devoted to a discussion of almost exactly the same system-level factors that Flanagan stresses, and of the linkages between system-level and individual-level phenomena.

There is one significant divergence between Flanagan and myself, however—and once again, it seems to reflect a significant contrast between Japan and the West. Flanagan claims that value change is associated with national affluence, but *not* with individual affluence. This may seem to be a puzzling assertion, since values are an attribute of individuals (which both Flanagan and I measure at the individual level), and accordingly one wonders how "national affluence" could possibly reshape individuals' values, except by virtue of the fact that, at another level of analysis, it is reflected in the presence of affluent individuals. What Flanagan means by this is that values vary markedly from one age cohort to another—reflecting the changing fortunes of the nation as a whole during their respective formative years—but do not vary *within* the various socioeconomic strata of a given age group. The changing experiences of the nation as a whole *do* lead to intergenerational value change, he argues, but the experiences of given individuals (*apart* from the fact that they are members of a given cohort) do *not* influence their values. This argument has a certain internal inconsistency. If affluence affects the values of those individuals making up a given age cohort, why wouldn't it have the same impact on the more affluent members of a given cohort? In support of his claim, Flanagan presents evidence that, although there are massive intercohort value differences in Japan, there are no significant intracohort differences according to income and occupation, once we control for education.

By controlling for education, Flanagan is not merely holding constant the cognitive indoctrination of values he mentions, he is also controlling away much of the variance in socioeconomic status that existed during one's youth and childhood—precisely what my theory of value change implies must *not* be controlled away. In doing so, he automatically minimizes the impact of an individual's formative experiences. However, in one respect he *does* have a valid and interesting point: the evidence Flanagan presents, together with additional Japanese data, indicate that the value differences linked with socioeconomic status *are* surprisingly small in Japan.

Flanagan's assumption that they are equally small in the West, however, is unfounded. Throughout the United States and Western

Europe, those with higher incomes, more education, and better jobs are two or three times as likely to have Post-Materialist values as those who are less fortunate (Inglehart, 1977: 73-89). Of the three socioeconomic status variables, education is the strongest predictor of values, because it (far more than one's *present* income) reflects the relative prosperity of the family during one's youth and childhood—the period of life, we hypothesized, when one's values are most malleable. Education is *also* an indicator of exposure to specific forms of indoctrination which may also help shape one's values, just as Flanagan claims. But to attempt to separate these influences by controlling away *all* the variance linked with education is to perform surgery with a meat ax. Fortunately, there are other ways to distinguish between current influences and the impact of security during one's formative years—and they point to the conclusion that one's formative experiences are the major factor in deciding whether one has Materialist or Post-Materialist values.

For example, Inglehart (1977: 78-81, 1979: 324-326) finds that, although there is a fairly strong linkage between education and income on one hand, and one's value type on the other, the socioeconomic status of the respondent's *father* is at least as strong a predictor of the respondent's values as the respondent's *own* socioeconomic status. This is a truly extraordinary finding. For obvious reasons, one's *own* social characteristics normally explain one's attitudes far better than someone else's characteristics. Furthermore, our measure of the father's socioeconomic status is based on recall data that almost certainly are contaminated by far more measurement error than is the respondent's report of current income and education. Nevertheless, data from two sets of cross-national surveys, carried out in 1971 and 1974, demonstrate that one can predict the respondent's values with the former variable at least as well as with the latter. This strongly suggests that early experiences play a crucial role in shaping one's values.

Taking another approach, Dalton (1977) also attempts to sort out the relative impact of formative experiences, versus current income and education, in shaping one's value priorities. Using the age cohort as the unit of analysis, he undertakes to explain the variance in value priorities across eleven age cohorts in each of eight nations. As an indicator of a given cohort's formative experiences, he uses Gross Domestic Product per capita when a given age cohort in a given nation is 8 to 12 years old. In multiple regression analysis, this indicator proves to be the most powerful predictor of each group's values in adult life: the partial correlation with values is .47. Dalton tested several possible formative periods, using economic conditions when a given cohort was in the age

spans from 8 to 12 years; from 13 to 17; and from 18 to 22. The *earliest* of these formative periods gives the most powerful explanation of values. The generation unit's mean educational level is a decidedly weaker explanatory variable (partial r = .35); life cycle effects rank next (partial r = .25); and current income explains little additional variance. Similar results are obtained by Herz (1979; cf. Inglehart, 1980).

Other evidence, however, initially seemed to indicate that Post-Materialist values are a shallow surface phenomenon. In research carried out in Great Britain, Marsh (1975) found that—despite their comparatively high incomes—Post Materialists are relatively dissatisfied with their lives in general (including their income) and, above all, with the kind of society and political institutions under which they live. He interpreted this dissastisfaction as evidence that the Post-Materialists are actually more acquisitive than the Materialists: The fact that they support social change and vote for the parties of the Left reflects mere lip service to fashionable causes, he argued; it does not reflect their true personal values.

To test this hypothesis, Marsh developed an index of "Personal Post-Materialism" in subsequent research. He finds product moment correlations of +.22 and +.21 between it and my two respective indices of societal Post-Materialism (Marsh, 1977: 180). While his discussion emphasizes the fact that the correlation is "only" .21 and the two value domains are therefore "discontinuous," the crucial point is that the correlation is *positive* and not negative as he argued earlier. Furthermore, a product moment correlation of .21 is of quite respectable strength. In survey research, one rarely obtains attitudinal correlations much above the .3 range unless the relationship is inflated by response set or obvious similarity of face content. In this case, Marsh obtains correlations of +.21 and +.22 between two types of indices based on items that not only have no obvious similarity of face content, but were designed with the expectation that they would show *negative* correlations.

Flanagan reports in his article that "Marsh finds only very modest correlations between his personal values and the public value priority scale." In fact, Marsh's findings provide further validation of the Materialist/Post-Materialist hypothesis. After reviewing the evidence, Marsh himself (1977: 192) concludes that "strong support exists for Inglehart's basic thesis." Flanagan apparently remains unconvinced.

In keeping with our hypotheses, we find not one but two types of individual-level variation in the West: (1) the postwar age cohorts are more apt to have Post-Materialist priorities because they were raised as

a group under conditions of greater economic and physical security than the older cohorts; and (2) within given age groups, those raised in relatively prosperious families are more likely to have Post-Materialist values than those raised in less secure circumstances.

In Japan the former pattern is pronounced, but the latter is relatively weak. Why? A key factor is probably the fact that Japan is an exceptionally homogeneous society, with less inequality of income distribution than most Western societies. One consequence is that in response to standard public opinion survey questions about subjective social class, fully 90% of the Japanese regularly identify themselves as Middle Class—a finding that seems almost incredible from a Western perspective. In part, this may be one more indication of the strength of group solidarity in Japan, which spans the gap between workers and management in a given enterprise; but, it may also reflect an important reality of postwar Japanese society. A large share of the Japanese work force still consists of people working on the production line, doing jobs that require limited skills and pay relatively modest wages: by objective standards they might be categorized as working class. But the annual per capita income in Japan has risen from about $200 in 1950 to about $8,000 in 1980. Even controlling for inflation, the increase is enormous. Compared with the standard of living their parents knew, or the standard of living they experienced when they were young, the overwhelming majority of the Japanese *do* have a middle class standard of living. Their diet, clothing, housing, transportation, and leisure pursuits all tend to be on a level that was attainable only by the upper middle class a generation ago.

CONCLUSION

Up to this point, this article has focused on disagreement with Flanagan's analysis. I have argued that the methodology he uses to measure value priorities reflects a basic confusion about what values are. His indicators of "value priorities" fail to obtain a ranking of *priorities*. Still worse, they do not measure *values*: his "most important problem facing Japan" approach, by its very nature, tends to reflect whatever the mass media are currently emphasizing, rather than the underlying priorities of the respondent himself.

His indicator of value "preferences" also fails to obtain a rank-ordering. It does (for the most part) deal with basic concerns rather than current issues, so it may provide an indication of one's underlying values, but it is hardly an ideal way to go about it.

More substantively, Flanagan's claim that the Materialist/Post-Materialist dimension fails to stand up empirically, is contradicted by one of the most massive bodies of empirical evidence I am aware of in comparative social research. In keeping with the hypothesis that the needs for *both* economic and physical security must be met before one gives top priority to nonmaterial goals, we find that all six of the twelve items designed to tap these two types of goals *do* cluster together empirically, showing the theoretically predicted polarity. Moreover, five of the six items designed to tap Post-Materialist concerns show the opposite polarity in virtually every case, in surveys conducted in more than a dozen Western countries, at various time points both before and after the current energy crisis erupted, and among both mass and elite samples. The interitem correlations fall well short of 1.00; like any scale found in the realm of empirical research, it can be broken down into its constituent elements. But the *reductio ad varimax* merely demonstrates that your computer is working: it does not alter the fact that throughout Western society, people have a consistent and (in the context of survey research) pronounced tendency to give high priority to the six Materialist items as a group, and low priority to the five Post-Materialist ones—or vice versa.

A Materialist/Post-Materialist dimension manifestly does exist. And throughout the West, the latter pole is given signficantly higher priority by those who spent their pre-adult years in relative economic and physical security—in other words, by the young (especially those raised in the postwar era) *and* the relatively affluent strata of a given age group. Furthermore, there is little difference between the items designed to tap economic and physical security, respectively: *both* types of items are given relatively high priority by the young and the affluent among Western publics.

All this clearly contradicts what Flanagan has asserted about value change in advanced industrial society. Nevertheless, the areas of agreement between us outweigh those of disagreement. Working primarily on Japanese materials, he concludes that two major processes of value change have been taking place; in reference to Japan, this perception seems entirely correct. A number of additional changes are probably going on as well, but among the evidence on which he focuses, two distinct cross-cutting shifts seem apparent. We disagree (and probably will continue to disagree) in our interpretations of them. Flanagan views *both* as phenomenon resulting from the emergence of advanced industrial society, and accordingly concludes that both are taking place in the West as well as in Japan. Thus, the Materialist/Post-Materialist dimension actually taps two independent processes, he

argues, and must be decomposed in order to analyze each one separately.

By contrast, I view only one of the two processes—the shift from Materialist to Post-Materialist priorities—as common to advanced industrial societies. The second process, which Flanagan views as an "authoritarian/libertarian" component of the Materialist/Post-Materialist dimension strikes me as distinctively Japanese. Following Maruyama and others, I would describe it as a process of "individuation," and trace it to the decline of a preindustrial sense of group obligation that still persists in Japan to a far greater degree than in the West. In this respect, the situation in Japan is more complex than in the Western societies. The decline of preindustrial values is superimposed on the rise of Post-Materialism in Japan; it can—as we have seen—obscure the latter unless we take care to disentagle the two. Ironically, Flanagan—who argues that we should break down the Materialist/Post-Materialist dimension into two distinct components—himself uses an indicator that lumps two distinct processes together; the trend that is thus submerged in Table 3, emerges clearly when we disentangle it in Tables 4 and 5.

The fact that the decline of traditional prematerialist values is superimposed on the rise of Post-Materialist values in the Japanese case, makes it readily understandable why Flanagan would interpret the Materialist/Post-Materialist dimension as tapping two independent processes of value change. Two processes *were* occurring in Japan during the period 1953-1978, and this alters the structure of the Materialist/Post-Materialist dimension in that country. While emphasis on economic and physical security go together in Japan, as elsewhere, emphasis on the belonging needs does *not* constitute part of a Post-Materialist cluster in the way it does throughout the West. While younger and better-educated Japanese *do* show a clear-cut preference for having "more say in important government decisions" and "protecting freedom of speech" (Watanuki, 1977: 34), they may see emphasis on such goals as "harmonious human relations" as implying a paternalistic constraint on individual self-expression. Thus, the twelve-item Materialist/Post-Materialist values battery cannot be used in unmodified form in Japan: certain items that show Post-Materialist polarity with remarkable consistency throughout the West have neutral or even reversed polarity in the context of Japanese society.

This is an important finding. It implies that the nonphysiological part of the Maslovian need hierarchy is contingent on culture. In Japan, as elsewhere, the physiological needs seem to take first priority. But those who have satisfied them do not automatically turn to the belonging

needs as the next item on the agenda. The assumption that they *would* do so may seem quite plausible from the perspective of Western society, in which the rise of individualism began centuries ago, and has developed to such an extent that a sense of atomization and anonymity has become a problem. This assumption seems far less valid within a society in which traditional modes of survival depended on a relatively extreme subordination of the individual to the group, and where this tradition is still very much alive. In such a setting, those who have satisfied the needs for economic and physical security may feel that self-expression and self-realization require *less* emphasis on certain aspects of group ties.

Flanagan and I converge in finding evidence of intergenerational value change in Japan. We converge also in concluding that at least two distinct processes of change are occurring in Japan. Finally, though we interpret these two processes differently, we agree that the Japanese evidence requires revision of some of the items used to measure Materialist/Post-Materialist values in Japan. Peace and prosperity, in the long run, apparently encourage both Japanese and Western publics to give heightened emphasis to nonmaterial goals. They do not necessarily turn to the same goals.

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