
Situational Salience and Cultural Differences in the Correspondence Bias and Actor-Observer Bias

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Two studies examined the correspondence bias in attitude attributions of Koreans and Americans. Study 1 employed the classic attitude attribution paradigm of Jones and Harris and found that both Korean and American participants displayed the correspondence bias in the no-choice condition. This lack of difference might have been due to weak salience of the situational constraints. Study 2 was designed to make the situational constraints of the no-choice condition salient in two ways: (a) by asking participants to write an essay on a topic regardless of their genuine attitude toward the topic or (b) by also making it clear to participants that the essay by the target person was almost a copy of the arguments provided by the experimenter. The results showed that (a) American attributions were unaffected by the two salience manipulations, whereas Koreans' correspondence bias decreased with increasing salience of the constraints, and (b) Koreans were less susceptible to the actor-observer bias.

Many of the classic studies in social psychology such as the Milgram (1963) obedience study, the Latané and Darley (1968) bystander intervention study, and the Darley and Batson (1973) Good Samaritan study are fascinating because they demonstrate the power of situational influences on human behavior, often contradicting lay theories about the relative importance of situational versus dispositional factors. If laypeople intuitively recognized the power of the situation, these classic studies would be mere platitudes (Gilbert & Malone, 1995). Thus, it is lay dispositionist theory of behavior that makes the classic studies classic. This "dispositionism" of lay theory has been documented by innumerable studies. For example, people tend to (a) offer dispositional explanations for behavior instead of situational ones, even when it should be transparent that the behavior is produced by situational factors (the "the correspondence bias" or "the fundamental attribution error" [FAE]) (for reviews, see Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Jones, 1979; Ross,

1977; Ross & Nisbett, 1991); (b) make overly confident predictions about behavior on the basis of a small amount of information concerning dispositions (Kunda & Nisbett, 1986; Newton, Griffin, & Ross, 1988); and (3) describe the self as well as others in terms of internal dispositions rather than context-specific factors (Cousins, 1989; S. T. Fiske & Taylor, 1991). The tendency to see behavior as dispositionally produced is somewhat muted when the actor is the self; thus, there is an "actor-observer bias" that shifts causal attributions toward situational interpretations when the self is the object of judgment (Jones & Nisbett, 1972). But self-perception research shows that people often overattribute dispositions even for their own behavior (Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Ross, 1977). If the laypeople studied to date hold to dispositionist theory, is there anyone who has a different theory of behavior and, as a consequence, might not be surprised by the classic studies of social psychology? Although Gilbert and Malone (1995) jokingly suggested an extraterrestrial as a possible candidate, recent developments in cultural psychology suggest that we might find such people on the planet—in non-Western cultures.

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A Situationist Theory of Causality

Several studies have shown that Asians have a pattern of causal attributions that diverges from that of Americans (Choi & Markus, 1998; Lee, Hallahan, & Herzog, 1996; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; I. G. Miller, 1984; Morris & Peng, 1994). Asians often favor situational explanations for behavior over dispositional ones. For example, Morris and Peng (1994) found that Chinese newspaper accounts explained two-mass murder incidents in terms of situational factors surrounding the target person, whereas American newspapers were more likely to account for the same two incidents in terms of dispositions of the target person. Chinese and American participants in laboratory studies duplicated this divergent pattern of attributions. Lee et al. (1996) obtained similar results. They found that American sportswriters attributed sports outcomes to internal factors of players, whereas Hong Kong sportswriters were more likely to attribute outcomes to external factors. Asians' preference for situational explanations is not limited to explanations for human behavior. When explaining animal behavior, Chinese tend to focus on the surrounding field rather than internal properties of the animals (Morris & Peng, 1994) and the same is true even for ambiguous motion of physical objects (Peng & Nisbett, 1997).

There is also some evidence that there are cultural differences in predictions of behavior. Norenzayan, Choi, and Nisbett (1998) showed that Korean college students tended to use assumptions about base rates (i.e., situational information) in making predictions about others' behavior more than American students did. Differences in lay theory of behavior between Asians and Americans also emerge in how they describe themselves and others. For example, Japanese students, unlike American students, describe themselves in terms of context-specific factors rather than abstract dispositions (Cousins, 1989). The same is true for Korean students (Rhee, Uleman, Lee, & Roman, 1995) and for Hindu Indians (Shweder & Bourne, 1982). Other striking evidence that Asians have a situationist theory of behavior comes from a cross-cultural replication of McArthur's (1972) study in Korea (Cha & Nam, 1985). McArthur (1972) found that American participants, when explaining behaviors such as "while dancing, Ralph trips over Joan's feet," severely underused consensus information such as "most people trip over Joan's feet while dancing with her." Logically, such information should push explanations sharply toward the situational pole, but McArthur found little such tendency. Cha and Nam (1985) replicated the McArthur study for Korean participants and found that their explanations were strongly affected by consensus information.

These studies indicate that Asians have a situation-centered theory of behavior, whereas Euro-Americans

have a person-centered theory (Morris, Nisbett, & Peng, 1995). That culture can influence causal understanding is supported by studies of individual differences within a culture (Dweck, Hong, & Chiu, 1993; Newman, 1993). For example, Newman (1993) demonstrated that idiosyncrasy (a personality variable defined as attitudes and behaviors associated with individualist cultures) predicted the extent to which people made spontaneous trait inferences.

In fact, one leading social psychology textbook compares Americans to personality psychologists and Asians to social psychologists: "Thus, people in Western cultures appear to be like personality psychologists, . . . whereas people in Eastern cultures seem to be more like social psychologists" (Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 1994, p. 185). The psychological evidence for Asians being more situation centered is consistent with other anthropological and ethnographic observations of different thinking styles in East-Asian and European-American cultures (Lloyd, 1990; Nakamura, 1964/1985; Needham, 1962), indicating that European-Americans are more likely to focus on the properties of the object for purpose of prediction and explanation, whereas Asians are more likely to attend to the field or context in which the object is embedded.

Attitude Attribution Paradigm

One limitation of the previous studies is that most of them used naturally occurring behaviors as target behaviors, which, in fact, may differ across cultures. For example, Morris and Peng (1994) used mass-murder incidents and Lee et al. (1996) used sports events, which were not the same in the two cultures studied. We have no independent way of knowing why mass murders occur, why sports events turn out as they do, or that the reasons are the same across cultures. If so, what the previous studies might have shown is that both cultures are equally sensitive to the real determinants of behavior, either situation or disposition, in their cultures. In that case, it could be a mistake to assume that the correspondence bias is weaker in Asian culture. To help resolve this problem, it would be useful to examine a given target behavior and manipulate the degree of situational constraints that observers are told was present. We chose the attitude attribution paradigm in which Jones and Harris (1967) first demonstrated the FAE or the correspondence bias (i.e., assuming that behavior faithfully reflects dispositions). A benefit of the attitude attribution paradigm is that because it has been the primary one to study the correspondence bias (Jones, 1979), cultural comparison in this paradigm may provide more confidence regarding the degree of universality of the correspondence bias.

In a typical attitude attribution study, participants are asked to read an essay or hear a speech presumably written by another person and then to infer the true attitude of the target person toward the topic. In the choice condition, participants are told that the target person wrote the essay (e.g., as part of an exam) under conditions of free choice and could choose which side of the issue to support. In the no-choice condition, participants are told that the target person was assigned to defend one side of the issue (by the teacher or debate coach), regardless of the person's own attitude toward the issue. In the no-choice condition, both the true attitude of the target person and the situational constraints are sufficient causes for writing an essay supporting one side of the topic (cf. Morris & Larrick, 1996). Therefore, inferring that the attitude of the target person "corresponds" to that expressed in the essay is logically valid in the choice condition, but far less justified in the no-choice condition (Jones & Davis, 1965). Because the situational constraints alone are enough for writing an essay, it would be incautious to infer that the target person has the corresponding attitude. Thus, sensitivity to the situational constraints can be judged by seeing the degree to which participants make correspondent inferences in the no-choice condition relative to the choice condition. Since Jones and Harris (1967) demonstrated that participants in the no-choice condition inferred that the target person held attitudes corresponding to the position taken in the essay, it has been replicated in hundreds of studies (for extensive reviews, see Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Jones, 1979).

The robustness of the FAE or correspondence bias on the part of Westerners can be interpreted as a consequence of Western dispositionist lay theory where situational constraints on behavior are often slighted or ignored (A. P. Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, in press; Morris & Larrick, 1996; Ross & Nisbett, 1991). Gilbert and Malone (1995) suggested that (a) lack of awareness of situational constraints and (b) unrealistic expectations about people's behavior under the constraints are among the causes of the FAE. However, these two causes can be interpreted as reflections of Western lay theory. Because of their theory, Western participants are sometimes not even aware that the target person was faced with situational constraints. Moreover, even if they are aware of the constraints, they tend to underestimate their strength and thus have unrealistic expectations about people's ability to overcome them. For example, participants in the no-choice condition might think that most students would not write an essay supporting Fidel Castro, or at least write a very weak essay supporting him (Reeder, Fletcher, & Kenneth, 1989), even when they are asked to do so by their instructor. In other words, they do not believe that the instruction of the debate coach

is a sufficient cause for students to write a pro-Castro essay. If so, when they find that the target person wrote a relatively strong essay supporting Castro, they assume that the person really supports Castro, thereby making a correspondent inference when none is justified. If Asians are more attuned to situational factors or believe more in their power, they might not show this bias or at least their bias might be smaller.

STUDY 1

Method

OVERVIEW

Korean and American participants read an essay either supporting or opposing capital punishment. Participants in the choice condition were told that the essay was written under conditions of free choice. In contrast, participants in the no-choice condition were told that the target person was assigned to support one side of the capital punishment issue by a course instructor. Participants then were asked to infer the true attitude of the target person toward capital punishment. This procedure is typical of the attitude attribution paradigm.¹

PARTICIPANTS

Two hundred and two students (male = 101, female = 101) at the University of Michigan participated in fulfillment of an introductory psychology course requirement. One hundred fifty-nine students (male = 138, female = 21) enrolled at an introductory psychology class at So-Gang University, Seoul, Korea, participated in the study at the request of the course instructor.

PROCEDURE

American participants were run in groups of four to six, whereas Korean participants were run in classroom settings. Participants were given a booklet that contained instructions, the target person's essay on capital punishment, a series of questions measuring the true attitude of the target person, and additional questions. The booklet was translated into Korean and the Korean version was then back translated into English (Brislin, 1970). There were no substantial difficulties either in translation or back translation. The experimenter explained the purpose of the study as "an attempt to understand how accurately people make judgments about another person's personality and attitude based on little information." Participants were told to read the attached essay and then to infer the target person's true attitude toward capital punishment. Participants in the no-choice condition were shown the following instruction that presumably had been given to the target person, John ("Min-Soo" for Korean participants), by the course instructor: "Please write a short essay in favor of (or opposed to)

capital punishment regardless of your own attitude. What is important is your writing skill, not your attitude. Write an essay of 200 words." Participants in the choice condition were shown the following instruction: "Please write a short essay either in favor of or opposed to capital punishment. What is important is your writing skill, not your attitude. Write an essay of 200 words." The reason we used a "writing class" cover story instead of a more common "debate team" cover story was that debate is relatively rare in Korean college classes. After reading all the instructions, participants in the pro-essay condition read an essay in favor of capital punishment. Participants in the anti-essay condition read an anti-capital punishment essay. The essays were presented to participants in handwriting format.

Attitude attribution. After reading the target person's essay, participants inferred the true attitude of the target person toward capital punishment. For this purpose, they were provided with 10 seven-point Likert-type statements designed to measure the target person's attitude toward capital punishment. Five of these statements were phrased in a pro-capital punishment direction and the other 5 were phrased in an anti-capital punishment direction. One illustrative example is the following:

Capital punishment can decrease potential crimes to a substantial degree.

1	---	2	----	3	-----	4	-----	5	----	6	---	7
John would completely disagree												John would completely agree

Own attitude. After inferring the target person's true attitude toward capital punishment, participants were asked to report their own attitude toward capital punishment on the same 10 seven-point Likert-type scales.

Perceived quality of the essay. If the essays were to be perceived as better by participants from one culture than by participants from the other culture, this could be a confounding factor. For example, Jones, Worchel, Goethals, and Grumet (1971) showed that a weak essay could be interpreted by the participants as a sign that the writer did, in fact, believe the opposite of what was written in the essay. To examine this issue, we asked participants to evaluate the target person's essay against their own if they were to write one about capital punishment.² Specifically, they were given the following question: "If you were to write an essay supporting (or opposing) capital punishment in the same situation as John, what would be the quality of your essay compared to John's essay?" Participants were provided with an 11-point scale: 10 meant their essays would be much

better, 5 meant their essays would be equally good, and 0 meant their essays would be much worse.

Results

MANIPULATION CHECK

To check if the manipulation of choice worked as intended, we asked participants to indicate on a 10-point scale the degree of freedom of the target person when he wrote the essay. Participants in the choice condition perceived a higher degree of freedom of the target person ($M = 7.82$) than those in the no-choice condition did ($M = 2.54$), $F(1, 352) = 377.53$, $p < .001$.³

ATTITUDE ATTRIBUTION

Participants' responses on the 5 scales worded in an anti-capital punishment direction were reverse scored. The inferred true attitude of the target person was indexed as the mean of participants' responses on the 10 Likert-type scales. These 10 scales demonstrated a high degree of internal consistency ($\alpha = .95$ for both American and Korean participants). Because gender made no difference in data analysis, it will not be mentioned further. The inferred attitudes are summarized in Table 1.

A 2 (culture) \times 2 (essay content) \times 2 (choice) analysis of variance (ANOVA) was carried out for inferred attitude. There was a main effect of essay content, $F(1, 352) = 1,135.25$, $p < .001$: Participants who read a pro-essay inferred a more positive attitude of the target person toward capital punishment than those who read an anti-essay did. This main effect was qualified by an interaction of essay content and choice, $F(1, 352) = 24.54$, $p < .001$: The tendency to infer that the target person held attitudes corresponding to the position taken in the essay decreased from the choice condition to the no-choice condition. However, this interaction was further qualified by an interaction of culture, essay content, and choice, $F(1, 352) = 8.75$, $p < .005$, indicating that the decrease of correspondent inference from the choice to the no-choice condition was greater for American (3.88 vs. 2.28) than for Korean participants (3.70 vs. 2.92). Of most importance is that participants from both cultures inferred a strongly corresponding attitude for the target person to the essay in the no-choice condition, $F(1, 352) = 169.22$, $p < .001$, for American participants and $F(1, 352) = 246.29$, $p < .001$, for Korean participants. In other words, participants from both cultures displayed the correspondence bias strongly.

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

American participants had a more favorable attitude toward capital punishment ($M = 4.53$) than Korean participants did ($M = 4.03$), $F(1, 352) = 15.79$, $p < .001$.

The correlation between own attitude and the inferred attitude of the target person was significant for neither culture (for Americans, $.06 < r_s < .25$, and for Koreans, $0 < r_s < .23$). In addition, American participants perceived the quality of the target person's essay to be poorer ($M = 7.22$) than Korean participants did ($M = 6.10$), $F(1, 352) = 35.90, p < .001$.

To check whether these differences contributed to attitude attributions, we conducted an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with own attitude and rated essay quality as covariates. We found that the major effects remained significant after controlling the effects of own attitude and essay quality: main effect of essay content, $F(1, 352) = 1164.87, p < .001$; interaction effect of essay content and choice, $F(1, 352) = 18.02, p < .001$; and interaction effect of essay content, choice, and culture, $F(1, 352) = 7.65, p < .005$.

Discussion

The results of Study 1 seem to suggest that Korean and American participants are little different from each other with respect to the correspondence bias. Both groups inferred that the target person would endorse the view in the essay even when they knew that the target person had been assigned to support the view. The fact that American participants displayed the correspondence bias is nothing new to social psychologists. It is just another addition to the list. However, it is surprising that Korean participants exhibited the bias to such an extent because cross-cultural studies on causality suggest we should have found otherwise. How can the present study be reconciled with the previous studies? Do our results indicate that Korean lay theory of behavior is no different from American lay theory and thus both cultures are equally biased in attribution? There are some reasons to believe that this may not be the case.

One explanation for the results of Study 1 is that the situational constraints (no choice in this case) might not be salient enough even for Korean participants. Several studies have demonstrated that the typical East-West differences in attributions are dependent on the salience of the situational information. For example, Norenzayan, Choi, and Nisbett (1998) observed that when a situational constraint was not obvious or salient, Koreans and Americans used dispositional information to the same degree. However, Koreans used situational information more than Americans did when it was made salient.

Another explanation is that the absence of the expected cultural difference might be a methodological artifact. Several scholars have cast doubt on the validity of the attitude attribution paradigm as a tool for studying the correspondence bias (Hilton & Slugoski, 1986; Schwarz, 1994). On the basis of the Gricean approach to

TABLE 1: The Inferred Attitude of the Target Person in Study 1

	American Participants		Korean Participants	
	Choice	No Choice	Choice	No Choice
Pro-essay	6.24	5.51	6.00	5.54
Anti-essay	2.36	3.23	2.30	2.62

conversational logic, they argue that participants in the attitude attribution paradigm assume that all the information provided by the experimenter is relevant (i.e., the maxim of relevance). They therefore assume that they have to use all the information for the task; otherwise, the experimenter would not have given them the information. For example, participants may feel that the essay they read provides relevant information for inferring the true attitude of the target person. Otherwise, why would the experimenter have asked them to read it? Because of this assumption, participants infer that the attitude of the target person corresponds to that expressed in the essay, although they know that the essay was written under conditions of "no choice." Several studies support such a contribution of pragmatics to the correspondence bias (Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Corneille, 1996; A. G. Miller, Schmidt, Meyer, & Collela, 1984; Wright & Wells, 1988).

Markus and Kitayama (1991) argued that people in interdependent cultures feel that they should "read others' minds" when they engage in interpersonal interaction. They should take into account others' expectations about the interaction even if the others do not express them (e.g., Ambady, Koo, Lee, & Rosenthal, 1996). Particularly when the interaction occurs within a hierarchical relationship, a person with a lower status (e.g., a participant) should expect that a person with a higher status (e.g., an experimenter) will give only relevant information. In addition, psychology experiments are relatively rare in Korea and, compared with American students, Korean students may be less likely to expect "deception" on the part of the experimenter. These may imply that the maxim of relevance in the attitude attribution paradigm may be expected to be held more strongly for Korean participants than for American participants and may explain why Korean participants showed the correspondence bias even more strongly.

A second methodological problem concerns the fact that Koreans perceived the essay to be better than Americans did. This might have been the result of Asian modesty inasmuch as the question asked participants to compare the essay with one they thought that they themselves would produce. But if we take the ratings at face value, they raise the possibility that Koreans showed a large correspondence bias because they found the no-choice essays to be so well written as to indicate convic-

tion. The covariance analysis gives no support to this possibility, but no purely correlational analysis can rule it out.

These questions of the salience of the constraints and the methodological concerns make the result of Study 1 tentative, and thus Study 2 was designed to increase still further the constraints placed on the situation by the experimenter to see whether conditions could be created in which Koreans reduced their correspondence bias to a greater degree than that of Americans. This was achieved by placing participants in the same situation as the target before they made judgments about the target's attitude. Study 2 also afforded an opportunity to examine whether increasing salience of situational constraints was associated with greater reduction of the actor-observer bias for Koreans than for Americans.

STUDY 2

Rather than trying to find a way to eliminate possible methodological problems that may be difficult or impossible to remove when different cultures are being examined, we simply compared the standard no-choice condition of Study 1 with two conditions that were identical to it except that further situational constraints were added. Thus, any cultural differences in Study 2 compared with differences in Study 1 can be attributed to differential sensitivity of the two cultures to the increased salience of the situational constraints added to the basic target behavior and context of the no-choice condition.

The manipulation of the salience of the situational constraints was accomplished in two ways. Participants in one condition, the exposure condition, were asked to write essays, either supporting or opposing capital punishment, regardless of their genuine attitudes toward it, before reading the target person's essay. This manipulation was intended to expose the participants to the same situational constraints under which the target person allegedly wrote the essay in the no-choice condition. If participants in this condition were able to realize that their essays were not true reflections of their genuine attitudes, then they should think of the target person's essay in the same way. As a consequence, they should be less vulnerable to the correspondence bias. This manipulation was exactly what Jones and Harris (1967) had tried in their study with the hope of reducing the correspondence bias for their American participants. However, they found that their participants were not responsive to this salience manipulation at all and that they still displayed the bias.

Participants in another condition, the exposure + arguments condition, were also asked to write essays, either supporting or opposing capital punishment, re-

gardless of their genuine attitudes. However, they were given four arguments, either supporting (in the pro-essay condition) or opposing (in the anti-essay condition) capital punishment, and it was recommended that they use them in their essays. Moreover, they were told that the target person also had been provided with those four arguments. Of most importance was that the four arguments indeed appeared in the target person's essay. The purpose of this manipulation was to make the constraints even more salient than in the exposure condition by inducing participants to realize that the target person's essay was almost a verbatim copy of the four arguments. This manipulation was contrived by Snyder and Jones (1974), and those researchers found little indication that their American participants were responsive to this powerful manipulation (Snyder & Jones, 1974, Study 1).

The comparisons between the no-choice condition of Study 1 and the two exposure conditions of Study 2 are the main concerns of Study 2. Because the identical essays were used in both Study 1 and Study 2, any cultural differences in perceived quality of the essays should remain constant across the two studies. In addition, any cultural differences in interpretations based on conversational logic should remain constant.

Study 2 provided an opportunity to explore the actor-observer difference (Jones & Nisbett, 1972) across cultures. Participants went through the exact same situation as the target person allegedly did, upholding a particular view about capital punishment regardless of their true attitudes. The actor-observer difference hypothesis predicts that participants may tend to attribute their own behavior, their essays in this case, to the situational constraints but attribute the target person's essay to his or her true attitude. However, if Asians are truly sensitive to the situational constraints, such an actor-observer difference might be smaller or even nonexistent.

HYPOTHESES

For American participants, we predicted, on the basis of the data of Jones and Harris (1967) and Snyder and Jones (1974), that the salience of the situational constraints would not make any difference in attitude attribution. Specifically, the correspondence bias would be the same in all three conditions (i.e., no-choice condition of Study 1, exposure condition and exposure + arguments condition of Study 2). In contrast, for Korean participants, it was hypothesized that the salience of the constraints would make a significant difference in attitude attribution. The correspondence bias should be smaller in the exposure condition than in the no-choice condition and perhaps, in turn, even smaller in the exposure + arguments condition than in the exposure condition. We also expected that Korean participants

would be less subject to the actor-observer bias than would American participants.

Method

PARTICIPANTS

Seventy-eight (male = 38, female = 40) American students at the University of Michigan participated in fulfillment of an introductory psychology course requirement and 94 students (male = 66, female = 28) at So-Gang University, Seoul, Korea, participated at the request of the course instructor.

PROCEDURE

Participants from both cultures were run in groups of four to six. They were handed a booklet that contained instructions, the target person's essay on capital punishment, a series of questions measuring the target person's true attitude, and additional questions including a manipulation check. The essays used in Study 2 were identical to those used in Study 1. Participants read the instruction that a fellow student in their university, John ("Min-Soo" for Korean participants), had written a pro-capital punishment (or an anti-capital punishment) essay, regardless of his own attitude, at the request of the experimenter. The experimenter then emphasized that participants had to experience the same situation under which John had written his essay so that they could have more accurate judgments about John's true attitude. Specifically, participants in the exposure/pro-essay condition were given the following instructions:

We asked John to write an essay of about 200 words in favor of capital punishment regardless of his own attitude toward capital punishment. . . . We gave 15 minutes to John for writing his essay. . . . Now, we want you to go through the same situation exactly as John did. So, please write an essay in favor of capital punishment regardless of your own attitude. . . . You are also allowed 15 minutes for your essay.

Participants in the exposure/anti-essay condition received identical instructions except that they were asked to write an essay opposing capital punishment. Participants in the exposure + arguments/pro-essay condition were given the following instructions in addition:

In order to help John to write a persuasive essay, we recommended that he use these four arguments in his essay:

- Capital punishment decreases crime.
- Capital punishment reduces taxes necessary for prison facilities.
- Capital punishment teaches youth morality.

- Capital punishment is the only means to punish a murderer.

Participants in the exposure + arguments/anti-essay condition received the same instruction but with different four arguments:

- Capital punishment increases, not decreases, crime.
- Capital punishment is a murder in itself.
- Capital punishment sometimes executes an innocent person.
- Capital punishment is out of date.

For participants in the exposure + arguments conditions it was recommended that they use the four arguments for their essays. It is important to mention that Snyder and Jones (1974) in their Study 5 firmly demanded that their participants use the arguments and that they found substantial decrease of the correspondence bias. However, in their Study 1, they simply invited their participants to use the arguments. Our manipulation was thus close to that of Study 1 in Snyder and Jones (1974). In fact, the four arguments, either supporting or opposing capital punishment, appeared in the essay presumably written by John that participants read later. All participants were allowed 15 minutes to write their essays and then read John's essay. After reading John's essay, participants answered the same questions as in Study 1.

We were also interested in how participants explain their own behavior as well as the target person's behavior. Because both the participants and the target person wrote the essays under the same situational constraints, it could be logically expected that participants would explain their own behavior as well as the target person's behavior in terms of the situational constraints. Participants would be showing an "actor" bias to the extent that they indicated that their own essays were less reflective of their attitude than the target person's essay. To examine this, we asked the following two questions: (a) How much did the target person express his genuine attitude toward capital punishment in his essay? and (b) How much did you express your genuine attitude toward capital punishment in your essay? Participants were given two 7-point scales where higher numbers represented greater expression of actual attitude.

Results

MANIPULATION CHECK

The manipulation worked as intended for participants from both cultures: Both groups perceived a very low degree of freedom for the target ($M = 2.12$ for American participants and $M = 2.07$ for Korean participants, $F < 1$).⁴

TABLE 2: The Inferred Attitude of the Target Person in Study 2

	American Participants		Korean Participants	
	Exposure	Exposure + Arguments	Exposure	Exposure + Arguments
Pro-essay	5.71	5.20	5.23	4.61
Anti-essay	2.92	2.63	3.38	3.66

ATTITUDE ATTRIBUTION

Participants' responses on the 5 scales phrased in the anti-capital punishment direction were reverse scored. The inferred true attitude of the target person was indexed as the mean of participants' responses on the 10 Likert-type scales. These 10 scales demonstrated high internal consistency ($\alpha = .93$ for American participants and $\alpha = .91$ for Korean participants). Because gender made no difference, no further mention of it will be made. The inferred attitudes are presented in Table 2.

We expected that the situational constraints would be more salient in the exposure condition of Study 2 than in the no-choice condition of Study 1 and more salient in the exposure + arguments condition of Study 2 than in the exposure condition of Study 2. To test the effects of these salience differences on attitude attribution, we combined the data of the no-choice condition in Study 1 with those of the two conditions in Study 2.⁵

A 2 (culture) \times 2 (essay content) \times 3 (salience) ANOVA was applied to the measure of the target person's true attitude. There was a main effect of essay content, $F(1, 338) = 419.67, p < .001$. This effect was qualified by an interaction of essay content and salience, $F(2, 338) = 6.59, p < .005$: The degree to which correspondent inferences were made decreased with the salience of situational constraints. However, as expected and as can be seen in Figure 1, this effect was further qualified by an interaction of culture, essay content, and salience, $F(2, 338) = 12.79, p < .001$.

Consistent with our hypothesis, this three-way interaction was due to the fact that an interaction of essay content and salience was significant for Korean participants, $F(2, 338) = 18.71, p < .001$, but not for American participants, $F < 1$. In other words, the degree of the correspondence bias did not differ among the three conditions for American participants but did for Korean participants. Indeed, further analyses showed that the correspondence bias for Korean participants decreased (a) from the no-choice condition to the exposure condition, $F(1, 338) = 35.05, p < .001$, as well as (b) from the exposure condition to the exposure + arguments condition, $F(1, 338) = 4.93, p < .05$.⁶

These results demonstrated that the correspondence bias decreased significantly for Korean participants when the situational constraints were made salient. How-

ever, it is interesting to find that the bias for Korean participants did not completely disappear even in the exposure + arguments condition in which the salience of the constraints was highest, $F(1, 338) = 10.92, p < .001$. This is understandable, however, if one considers that participants in the exposure + arguments condition were given four arguments but were asked 10 questions, most of which were not directly related to those four arguments. Therefore, it might be possible to find stronger effects of the manipulation on attitude attribution if we were to look only at those questions that were directly related to the four arguments. Among the eight arguments (four for the pro-essay condition and four for the anti-essay condition), one argument was identical but reversed in direction. Participants in the exposure + arguments/pro-essay condition received an argument "Capital punishment decreases crime," whereas participants in the exposure + arguments/anti-essay condition received an argument "Capital punishment increases, not decreases, crime." Among the 10 Likert-type scales intended to measure the target person's true attitude, there was a question about whether the target person would agree or disagree with the following statement: "Capital punishment can decrease crime to a substantial degree." The critical analysis was whether Korean participants displayed the correspondence bias in the exposure + arguments condition when we look only at this question. We found that the bias was completely eliminated for Korean participants in the exposure + arguments condition, $F(1, 164) = 1.53, p > .20$. However, American participants still showed the bias for this item, $F(1, 164) = 30.52, p < .001$.

An alternative explanation for the results is plausible. Korean participants might have conformed to the instructions more than American participants did. If this was the case, Korean participants, in fact, might have experienced stronger situational constraints than American participants did even though they were under the same objective constraints. Consequently, Korean participants might have been able to consider the situational constraints more than American participants did. If so, Korean participants should have (a) written more convincing essays although there was no cultural difference in the subjective evaluation of the target essay relative to their own essay and (b) used more arguments among the given four arguments in the exposure + arguments condition than American participants did. To test this alternative explanation, participants' essays were evaluated in terms of their convincingness in reference to the target person's essay by two independent bilingual judges on an 11-point scale with the following anchors: 0 (*much worse than the target essay*), 5 (*equally convincing as the target essay*), and 10 (*much better than the target essay*). The interrater reliability for this judgment was high




Figure 1 Degree of correspondence bias—the difference between the pro-essay condition and the anti-essay condition in the inferred attitude.

($\alpha = .86$). The number of the four arguments that participants used in their essays in the exposure + arguments condition was also counted.

We found that, in contrast to the alternative explanation, American participants' essays ($M = 5.92$) were rated as far more convincing than Korean participants' essays ($M = 3.79$), $F(1, 164) = 91.38$, $p < .001$. Moreover, American participants' essays were much longer than Korean participants'. We also found that American, not Korean, participants used more of the four recommended arguments in their essays ($M = 3.64$ for American participants and $M = 2.64$ for Korean participants), $F(1, 79) = 24.92$, $p < .001$. Thus, American, not Korean, participants conformed more to the experimental instruction. This fact makes the results of Study 2 more striking. Because they were so responsive to the situational constraints, one might assume that it would have been the American participants who would have made attributions in line with them.

PERCEIVED QUALITY OF THE ESSAY

Participants were asked to compare the target's essay with their own essay on an 11-point scale: 10 meant that the target's essay was much better than their own, 5 meant that the target's essay was as good as their own, and 0 meant that the target's essay was much worse than their own.

There was no effect of culture, $F < 1$. Both cultural groups reported that the target person's essay was slightly better than their own essays ($M = 5.82$ for American participants and $M = 5.54$ for Korean participants). This finding indicates that cultural differences in per-

TABLE 3: Correlations Between the Perceived Degree of Attitude Expression of the Target and Participants Themselves

	American Participants		Korean Participants	
	Exposure	Exposure + Arguments	Exposure	Exposure + Arguments
Pro-essay	.53*	-.09	.56**	.54**
Anti-essay	-.14	-.28	.44*	.65***

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

ceived quality of the target person's essay do not account for the results.

ACTOR-OBSERVER DIFFERENCE: EXPRESSED ATTITUDE BY SELF AND THE TARGET

To explore the actor-observer difference, we conducted two types of analyses: comparison of correlations and comparison of means. First, we correlated participants' responses to the following questions: (a) How much did the target person express his genuine attitude toward capital punishment in his essay? and (b) How much did you express your genuine attitude toward capital punishment in your essay? To the degree that participants recognize that their essays did not express their true attitudes, they should recognize that the target person's essay did not express his true attitude. Table 3 summarizes the correlations in all the conditions.

As can be seen in Table 3, a significant positive correlation was obtained in all the conditions for Korean participants ($.44 < r_s < .65$). In contrast, it was found only in one out of four conditions for American participants.

Moreover, in the other three conditions, the weak trend was for American participants to report that the less their own expressed attitude was a reflection of their true attitude, the more the target person's expressed attitude reflected his true attitude. Across all four conditions, the correlation between the degree to which participants reported that their own essays reflected their views and their estimates of the degree to which the target's essay reflected his views was .00 for Americans and .56 for Koreans ($p < .0001$).

Second, we compared the means of participants' responses to the two questions. Because the salience manipulation did not make any difference, we collapsed the two exposure conditions and applied a 2 (culture) \times 2 (content) repeated-measure ANOVA. Overall, participants reported that the target person might have expressed his attitude in the essay ($M = 4.04$) more than they themselves did ($M = 3.80$), $F(1, 167) = 2.86$, $p = .09$. However, this was qualified by culture, $F(1, 167) = 6.52$, $p < .05$: American participants reported that the target's essay reflected his views ($M = 4.42$) more than their own essays reflected their views ($M = 3.81$), $F(1, 167) = 8.27$, $p < .005$, whereas Korean participants did not show any such bias ($M = 3.66$ for the target and $M = 3.77$ for self), $F < 1$. This effect was further qualified by essay content, $F(1, 167) = 6.89$, $p < .005$. Consistent with the correlational analysis, Korean participants did not display any indication of the actor-observer difference either in the pro-essay or in the anti-essay condition. American participants showed the typical actor-observer difference in the anti-essay condition ($M = 4.55$ for the target and $M = 3.53$ for self), $F(1, 167) = 12.30$, $p < .001$, but not in the pro-essay condition ($M = 4.29$ for the target and $M = 4.12$ for self), $F < 1$.

Discussion

When the situational constraints were made salient, Korean participants, unlike American participants, were able to recognize their influence on behavior. As a consequence, they became less vulnerable to the correspondence bias. Moreover, the bias for Korean participants was actually eliminated in the exposure + arguments condition when attitude inferences were examined at a very specific level. These findings are consistent with our hypothesis that European-Americans' theory of behavior can render them blind to situational influences on behavior, whereas in the same circumstances, Asians' theory of behavior makes them well attuned to them. We also found that Korean participants were less prone to the actor-observer bias than were American participants. American participants reported that their essays did not reflect their genuine attitudes because they had been forced to write it in a given direction, and in this respect their perceptions were identical to those of Koreans.

However, the Americans felt that the target person's essay reflected his genuine attitude although he had been forced to do the same thing. In contrast, Korean participants explained the target person's behavior in the same way they did their own.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

We can conclude the following from Study 1 and Study 2.

First, both Korean and American participants displayed the correspondence bias in the no-choice condition of the standard attitude attribution paradigm. We are not alone in finding such effects for Asians. Since conducting our research, it has been brought to our attention that Masuda and Kitayama (1998) and Krull et al. (1996) have found large correspondence bias effects for Japanese and Chinese, respectively, in the Jones and Harris paradigm. Although Masuda and Kitayama (1998) lacked a European-American comparison group, this does not detract from the conclusion that the correspondence bias is readily obtainable with Asians. However, it is not clear why Asian participants are subject to the correspondence bias. It might be due to issues of conversational logic or to the lack of salience of the situational constraints.

Second, when the constraints were made salient by putting the participants in the same situation as the target person, Korean participants were readily able to incorporate their experiences in their inferences about another's attitude, and thus the correspondence bias was markedly reduced. In contrast, American participants were little influenced by the salience manipulations.

Third, when participants were put in the same situation as the target person, Korean participants apparently understood that both they themselves and the target person were subject to situational constraints and hence they did not show any actor-observer difference. In contrast, American participants displayed the typical actor-observer difference; they claimed that their own behavior was due to the situational constraints but the target person's behavior was due to his attitude.

Susceptibility to the Situation

The present study raises an interesting and paradoxical possibility: Asians may be less susceptible to some important situational influences than are European-Americans. Nisbett and Wilson (1977) observed that people often are not aware of the influences on their choices, judgments, and behavior of a variety of situational factors. For example, in Latané and Darley's (1968) bystander intervention study, hardly any participants were aware that their behavior was influenced by the presence of others. Nisbett and Wilson (1997) conjectured that this effect of bystanders on

helping behavior might have not occurred if those participants had been aware of such an influence.

If Nisbett and Wilson were right, then contrary to common sense, Asians may be less vulnerable to situational influences because they believe their mental processes and behavior are strongly influenced by situational factors. For example, the effect of bystanders on helping might be rare in Asia. This reasoning also implies that Americans, contrary to their beliefs in personal autonomy and control, might actually be more subject to situational influence because they are not aware of it or do not recognize how important it can be.

Cognitive Dissonance

According to the attributional analysis of dissonance (Ross, 1977), people show the dissonance effect because they are not aware that their counterattitudinal behavior was caused by the situational constraints. For example, participants in the Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) experiment might feel that the small monetary incentive (i.e., \$1) did not cause them to say something contradicting their true opinions, but, failing to recognize the causal role of the social situation, they had to infer that they must have opinions corresponding to those they told to others. Had they been aware of the role of the situation, the dissonance effect might have not occurred. If this is true, we should expect that the forced-compliance effect may be less prevalent in Asian cultures. Asians may be well aware that their behavior is sometimes caused by situational constraints, and thus they do not need to seek internal causes, thereby generating the dissonance effect. At least two studies failed to obtain dissonance effects for Asians in the forced-compliance paradigm. For example, Choi, Choi, and Cha (1992) failed to replicate the dissonance effect in the Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) forced-compliance paradigm for Korean participants, and Hiniker (1969) failed to find the dissonance effect in the same paradigm for Chinese.

We raised a question at the outset as to who would not be surprised by the classic studies in social psychology. Given the results of the present study and others, the answer to this question appears to be: Asians. At least, they would not be surprised by the studies for the same reason that their fellow Americans were. If those classic studies had been conducted, by some accident, in Asia, they might have not drawn the kind of attention they have received in Western culture. Rather, they might have been criticized because of their "obviousness!"

NOTES

1. In addition to this typical procedure of the attitude attribution paradigm, we varied the age of the target person (i.e., 18-year-old high school student vs. 50-year-old adult). This manipulation was based on the finding by Choi and Markus (1998) that Korean participants, like American participants, showed dispositionalist explanations for a de-

viant behavior of a high-status person, whereas unlike American participants, Korean participants showed situationist explanations for deviant behavior of a low-status person. However, because this manipulation did not make any difference, no further mention is made of it.

2. One of the causes of the correspondence bias is unrealistic expectations about people under situational constraints (Gilbert & Malone, 1995). It implies that participants themselves may believe that they would not conform to the constraints. Therefore, if they find out that the target person's behavior is far more conforming than their own, it may contribute to the correspondence bias. To investigate this, we used this relative judgment instead of an absolute one.

3. Some participants in both cultures did not correctly report low choice (i.e., below the middle point) in the no-choice condition and high choice (i.e., above the middle point) in the choice condition. The percentage of errors was higher for Korean participants (30% for the choice and 26.5% for the no-choice condition) than for American participants (14.1% for the choice and 4.8% for the no-choice condition). However, because it made virtually no difference to conclusions whether we include them or not, we included all participants in subsequent data analysis.

4. As in Study 1, some participants in both cultures did not correctly report low choice in the exposure and the exposure + arguments conditions. However, the small-group condition of Study 2 apparently was sufficient to eliminate differences between Americans (14.1%) and Koreans (9.5%) who were wrong. Again, because it made virtually no difference to conclusions whether we include them or not, we included all participants in subsequent data analysis.

5. Because the no-choice condition for Korean participants in Study 1 employed large classroom settings, it was necessary to examine whether it could be used as a control condition for Study 2 where all participants were run in groups of four to six. For this purpose, we replicated the no-choice condition for Korean participants in Study 2, running them in groups of four to six as well. As we found no differences between the two no-choice conditions (for the pro-essay condition, $M = 5.54$ for Study 1 and $M = 5.33$ for Study 2, and for the anti-essay condition, $M = 2.62$ for Study 1 and $M = 2.74$ for Study 2), the no-choice condition in Study 1 was used as the control condition as it was for American participants.

6. When we used the new no-choice condition instead of the one in Study 1, we still found that, for Korean participants, the correspondence bias decreased from the no-choice condition to the exposure condition, $F(1, 128) = 15.29, p < .001$, and from the exposure condition to the exposure + arguments condition, $F(1, 128) = 5.43, p < .05$.

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