

**THE USES AND DISADVANTAGES
OF FEMINIST (POLITICAL) THEORY**

PHILOSOPHIA: THE THOUGHT OF ROSA LUXEMBURG, SIMONE WEIL, AND HANNAH ARENDT by Andrea Nye. New York, London: Routledge, 1994.

THE WOMAN OF REASON: FEMINISM, HUMANISM AND POLITICAL THOUGHT by Karen Green. New York: Continuum, 1995.

SOLIDARITY OF STRANGERS: FEMINISM AFTER IDENTITY POLITICS by Jodi Dean. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1996.

- Leader: The wicked son asks, what mean these customs in which YOU engage, in which the Lord commanded you to observe?
- Assembled: He is regarded as wicked, since he excludes himself from the obligated group, assuming that Jewish duties are meant for others not for him.¹

One could surmise that the folks at Maxwell House (which publishes the widely used Passover Haggadah quoted above), if not Talmudic scholars everywhere, might regard the questions raised in this review as the work of the wickedest son. Two of these three books simply make me shake my head. These are not my people, I think, when I read the assumptions and visions of Andrea Nye and Karen Green. Even though a major endeavor of both of these books—of feminist theory more generally these days—is to explode the notion that there is a unitary feminist agenda that would suit all needs, one seeks some sense of a common ground, if not for purposes of self-edification, then at least as a reason not to criticize one's sister feminists in public. But it's vanished. Yes, it's finally come to this, a millenarian end of the road. Feminist theory seems dead.

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On one hand, there are Nye and Green, valiantly attempting to bolster weak-willed followers who have strayed from the cause. Thou shalt honor thy mother thinkers, they tell us, fresh from the mountaintop where they have consulted among the spirits of great women: Christine de Pisan, Mary Wollstonecraft, Rosa Luxemburg, Simone Weil, and Hannah Arendt. But we aren't listening so well, having been overly influenced by the devil-worshipping lesbian separatists and French postmodernists, Nye complains (p. 8). Guilty. Just call me a craven idol worshiper, as long as she wears black and has a cool haircut, and, especially, as long as that French poststructuralist doesn't say much about women.

On the other hand, there is Jodi Dean, who has written a book on feminist theories of discourse ethics, although what it says about women's experiences in particular could be reproduced in less than a paragraph. Like the most prominent feminist political theorists who discuss the mistakes of identity politicians (Brown), the gender performativity of bodies that matter (Butler), mobile subjectivities (Ferguson), the agonistic feminist lessons of Arendt (Honig), the alchemy of race (Williams), or the gendered semiotics in Rousseau's work (Zirelli), I bet Dean looks good in black. That the reasons to see their work as specifically "feminist"—as opposed to "critical," "thoughtful," or "disruptive"—often remains somewhat murky simply means that they are self-assured about who they are, confident that they can name their place to stand and let it go at that.

Women will remain entrapped in age-old patterns of enslavement and they will lose hard-won freedoms unless they learn and transmit their history. An important part of that history is the extensive body of feminist theory that has been developed over the centuries. Women remain illiterate without a knowledge of this history.²

— Leader: The wise son asks: what mean these customs in which we engage, which the lord commanded us to observe?

— Assembled: He is regarded as wise, since he includes himself among those obligated to observe the traditions of Passover.³

Who are we feminists? What is the best way to think about the divisions and changes in feminist theory's traditions? Don't worry. No erosion charts here on the effects of the various waves of feminist theory—a narrative that seems to accompany every feminist theory and its review. How do these tidal experts know where to begin, anyway? Christine de Pisan? Mary Wollstonecraft? Plato? Susan Okin? The Bible? Julia Kristeva? Locke? Carole Pateman? Hegel? Jessica Benjamin? Freud? Juliet Mitchell? It all seems so daunting, so endless, so repetitive. When do we get to stop? Why can't the philosopher's gray just stay gray like he promised?

To begin where these authors do: it's around the mid-1980s, and we're mostly in the United States—even if Green is located in Australia and at points Nye detects a nasty odor that has blown over from France. In what amounts to the only sensibility that Dean shares with Nye and Green, they all take note of feminist theorists who had pointed out that canonical figures ranging from Machiavelli to Marx to Habermas failed because their ostensibly universal norms are gendered as masculine. So we (eighties feminists in the academy) saw these exclusions as symptomatic of more far-reaching gendered troubles with these texts. It was even worse than we suspected. Not only was Aristotle a sexist jerk, but we decided that the ideals of rationality, universality, and autonomy were someone else's golden calf, someone else's currency. Quick, withdraw them from circulation, or words to that effect, we said then. Mr. Locke, you seem like a gentleman, and yet thanks but no thanks. As Seyla Benhabib has noted, just when the guys are holding out certain goodies to us, the scales fall and we refuse to traffic in that currency, under the impression that it is tied to a regime that expresses only values of regulation and domination.⁴

What chutzpa, to reduce eighty kajillion books and articles published across several disciplines by people of diverse views to these few lines. Feminist political theory is so much more complicated than the above rendition suggests, of course, and that's a problem. How to fill in the various registers of this vibrant, diverse symphony (now in its coda)? Among the authors reviewed here, the challenge to reflect on the competing strains that feminist political theory announces is unevenly handled. By arbitrarily positioning themselves against rather narrowly conceived interlocutors, each of these authors gives us a differently unsatisfying sense of the limits and possibilities of feminist political theory. In brief, it is hard to come away from these books without believing that ever since Plato the relation of gender to politics is a shell game.⁵ At some points "reason" is under "masculinity"; then, poof, it's gone.

Sometimes women own the moral low ground, tricking men into certain patterns of behavior "in order to make dominant the sex that ought to obey." And yet here woman nonetheless proves a civilizing influence at odds with Rousseau's masculine savage. In this narrative, it is the primitive *man* whose "mind could not form abstract ideas of regularity and proportion."⁶ But countering this view is Freud, according to whom "opposition to civilization" is the work of women, and "civilization" is the work of men.⁷ (Shared associations between Rousseau and Freud: women, in addition to being inferior, are also tied to "breasts" and "dependence."⁸)

In her preface explaining the intent of her series *Re-Reading the Canon*, Nancy Tuana explains that for purposes of "canon transformation . . . re-

reading shifts our attention to ways in which woman and the role of the feminine is [sic] constructed within the texts of philosophy. . . . [A]ttention must be paid to the ways in which the definitions of central philosophical concepts implicitly include or exclude gendered traits."⁹ This recalls the caution, "Be careful what you ask for . . ." because you may end up with "the feminine" as one more shifting mark in the canonical shell game. For years, feminists have been insisting that gender is a crucial heuristic for analyzing canonical texts, that it is every bit as important as "freedom," "liberty," or "property" in the shaping and expression of great ideas. When I explore the possibility that "the feminine" now may be every bit as unimportant as "freedom," I mean to suggest a political and intellectual impatience—if every approach can be "feminist," then perhaps the label is meaningless—and not to endorse the deconstructivist's appreciation of semiotic instabilities.

Faced with the range of the crisscrossing and obliterating gendered patterns Nye and Green note, they might want to step back and wonder how it is that thinking about gender is "feminist" or, relatedly, what it means to formulate a specifically "feminist" theory?¹⁰ For whom are they really speaking? They say their work will be of use to women *and* men (Nye, p. 227; Green, p. 2), but does it matter that, on their own account, men tend to disagree with their assessments? Does it matter that women also disagree? Does it matter differently? Why? How? That a theory is developed on behalf of women is too vague a criterion for "feminist." Henry VIII was probably the only monarch who might be forced to concede patriarchal rules were harmful to wives. In the case of Nye and Green, it is genuinely difficult to distinguish their views from those of Locke's antagonist, Robert Filmer, as I show below. (I imagine Green and especially Nye are displeased with this assessment. To be clear: Nye's sexual conservatism is happenstance—a result of her reading of Weil—and Green's more deliberate.)

The above questions and observations are nothing new. Nothing in this review is new. For a long time, feminist theorists have had to grapple with how they might distinguish radical feminist views of sex differences from patriarchal opinions. Indeed, Green herself notes this (p. 24). That the same old problems keep appearing suggests that the conundrum is intransigent. Such doubts cannot be banished, not for want of creativity, but because we are too invested in selling our faith in each other—as women, as feminists. When, at the end of the nineteenth century, it was finally apparent that Christ was not going to reappear, that God does not perform miracles, Nietzsche wisely called a halt to the business of religion. "Can't we have the good taste to do the same for 'feminist theory,' to move on to some other carcass and stop beating this dead horse?" is a question that comes to mind.

Nye considers the writings of Rosa Luxemburg, Simone Weil, and Hannah Arendt. The long chapters on each of these thinkers provide well-researched, engaging explications of their respective *oeuvres*. Nye offers excellent overviews, as well as nuanced assessments, of each author. They will be of tremendous use to anyone who is beginning to delve into the political and intellectual lives of these women. The difficulties are not to be found in the textual exegeses, but rather in the way Nye frames her project as one devoted to discovering something like a woman's approach to doing philosophy. Nye opens with the observation that male philosophers have not solved the problems they said they would solve, and so it is time to give women a chance. A "tradition of women's thought . . . has a claim on our attention" because the "tradition of male philosophers has failed to produce an understanding of divinity, self, value, reality, knowledge viable in the late twentieth century" (p. xx). What is the source of their failures and women's philosophical edge? Nye *says* that she thinks it not biological, but then all she lets us know about are the anatomically paired Rosa Luxemburg and Vladimir Lenin, Simone Weil and Descartes, and Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger. It's not that Arendt went through the experience of giving birth, for instance, and Heidegger did not, that would account for Nye's observation that the "theme to which Arendt returned again and again was not mortality, contingency, and death, but 'natality'" (p. 134). Those familiar with the second part of *Being and Time* know that Heidegger does mention birth as a narrative frame; and *geworfen*, the root of his crucial concept *Geworfenheit* (thrownness), also means 'to whelp.'¹¹ Although Arendt does not lift Heidegger's ideas wholesale, there is enough of a resemblance between the two—and enough reliance on the conventional canon—that Nye's claim that "Arendt found most philosophy from its beginnings in Greece to Heidegger . . . disappointing" (p. 158) will startle anyone familiar with the *Human Condition's* (strategic) adoring fictions that pass as histories of Athenian and Roman political thought and life.

Nye is coy on the source of imputed differences between male and female philosophers, displaying in her conclusion an interest in cultivating the appearance of sobriety and neutrality incongruous with the impetus for her exegeses: "I have not meant to argue that [her trio's] grasp of the human condition is privileged because they are women" (p. 225). This statement contradicts and undermines the heuristic of her project. Nye is equally withholding on the meaning of gender differences—writing that she has "not wanted to align myself with either side of this dispute," which she represents as a debate informed by a "superficial"/"essential" binary: "Are the differences between men and women superficial and irrelevant to social roles and

status? Or are there essential differences between the sexes in personality and experience?" (p. 225) Nye has probably read enough treatises on similar dichotomies to be discouraged from going into that territory, but it leaves her entire project without bearings.

- Leader: The simple son, with complete unconcern, regarded as simple because of his indifference, asks what is all this?
- Assembled: To him you shall respond, know well that the Lord did marvelous things for us, by redeeming us with a mighty hand. It is therefore incumbent upon us to remember and to observe.

Nye doesn't seem to care about the implications of any questions about gendered difference—she dismisses them—but yet she wants us to follow certain women who will lead us out of the desert.

What is all this?

Nye writes: "[W]hat follows is an attempt to trace another tradition, a tradition of women's thought" (p. xx). Why *this* tradition? The possibilities of correlating different traditions with certain ways of thinking are limited only by one's imagination—one might discover a taxi driver philosophy versus that of an Iowa farmer worldview. What might be the causal or other heuristic schema that explains the tradition/philosophy difference between men and women in Nye's book? Perhaps anatomical differences of reproductive organs do not cause one to think a certain way; perhaps the manner in which one is treated causes one to have different ideas. (But doesn't that just beg the question of why people get distinguished for different treatments in the first place?) Perhaps these anatomical differences cause certain psychological dispositions, such that those with penises feel superior and those without penises feel inferior. Perhaps anatomical differences cause certain psychological dispositions, such that those who cannot give birth feel anxious and fearful and those who can give birth feel confident and secure. Perhaps some version or combination of these different psychological dispositions would explain why men tend to have "masculine" ideas and women "feminine" ones. (But doesn't that just end up affirming that these differences are biologically rooted?) Although she might not want to have this happen, the effect of correlating an idiomatically anatomical category (none of the "women" who populate these pages are biological males in drag) with differences in ideas is to reduce the latter to the former.

Nye's gendered philosophia is not held up (sidetracked?) by such questions, but rather proceeds to chart out what Nye perceives to be differences between the boy and girl thinkers. The current problem afflicting feminist philosophers, says Nye, is the tendency to reiterate their discipline's confla-

tion of philosophy with male philosophers. Nye's 1980s and 1990s feminist philosophers appear as high-minded trash inspectors, culling the minutia of Western civilization's mistakes so as to be able to moralize at shrill decibels about what the men got wrong:

So heavy is the weight of male authority—Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Marx, Derrida, Foucault—that in book after book, paper after paper, feminist philosophers continue to analyze, criticize, and appropriate theory devised by men. This avoidance of positive theorizing itself is rationalized in philosophies of postmodernism. . . . Thought is for men; women cannot have a politics because politics is the tactics of men; women cannot construct arguments because logic is a strategy of male domination. (pp. xv-xvi)

Instead of simply reviewing (and hence dramatizing and making central) yesterday's garbage, Nye offers a "new tack": "Leaving aside the critique of masculinity, it may be possible to trace other lines of thought, not protests against male bias, not the passionate complaints of victims of injustice, but a continuing meditation by women on the human condition that develops positive concepts, arguments, and ways of knowing to inform women's and men's ways in the world" (p. xvi). This is a fascinating response that returns us to some of the terrain of pre-postmodern feminists.

More than the notion that the world easily can be divided into masculine and feminine philosophies by looking at who is an anatomical man and woman, what confounds Nye's inquiries is her easy assumption that gender is so obviously *the* crucial taxonomy for recreating a relation to philosophy.¹² Nye's grumpy, frequent jibes at postmodern thought are consistent with the lack of any reflectiveness on the categories (of men and women, feminine and masculine) on which she seeks to base a new philosophy. There is her criticism of a "retreat to an expressive, non-rational 'women's language' embraced by some 'French feminists' " (p. xvi)—the scare quotes marking her irritation, as in, "*those* French feminists"—while, Nye observes, "a new 'textual' feminism" has left "rational discourses to men" (p. 116). But what distinguishes Nye's hopes for "women's thought" from her impatience with a "women's language"? Because of Nye's praise, in her discussion of Weil, of a conventionally gendered private/public dichotomy, the absence of any engagement with the details of deconstructive approaches makes it impossible to distinguish her naively gendered world from that of, say, my grandmother. Where are the unsettling paradoxes or oblique possibilities a deconstructive reading might uncover—something to startle Grandma Moskowitz?

In any case, it doesn't take a degree from the philosophy program at the Sorbonne to point out that Nye uses only one among several characteristics

these women share to explain how their works differ from canonical philosophy. Nye admires the work of all the women "philosophers" she has chosen because they engage in practical questions about politics. Of course many men do this, and many women do not. So, it is impossible to know whether Luxemburg's virtue as a political thinker is that she is a woman, or that, like Gramsci, she wants to use theory to change political institutions. It might be the case that women who philosophize do so in a way different than Descartes. Or, what we may have learned is that political theory is different from philosophy, and that Nye has chosen to encourage people in philosophy departments to do work that is closer to that undertaken by political theorists in political science departments. The difference between philosophy and theory that I have in mind here resembles that offered by Hanna Pitkin: "[P]hilosophy is concerned with those fundamental concepts that grow out of the human condition itself, or out of those cultural patterns that change only slowly and inadvertently, without deliberate planning," whereas "political theory is often concerned with features of our lives which might be different if we chose to change them."¹³ Another way to state this, more bluntly, is that philosophy is about things that do not change (such as logical relations, including mathematical equations and syllogisms), and theory is about things that do change (such as political institutions). Nye points out that Luxemburg entered into the Communist Party's heated debates over nationalism; that Weil considered the role of goodness in daily human life; that Arendt discusses the implications of the Holocaust, the Vietnam War, and racial conflicts. Nye may be discovering that political theorists address questions that are "not the philosopher's questions" (p. xix) because Luxemburg, Weil, and Arendt are not philosophers, and not because they are women. Their questions are not the plumber's questions, either.

Nye's claim goes further than the formal observation that women are more moved by the immediacy of political problems than their male counterparts. She makes, in addition, a series of observations about the particular originality of each of these thinkers. In the case of Luxemburg, the argument is that, rather than be swayed by prevailing intellectual winds of the moment, Luxemburg went back to Marx and arrived at an astute analysis of the failures of communist organizing. Luxemburg challenged those ad hoc retreats from materialism that accompanied subjectivist tweaks of the dialectical materialist method. Gramsci, Bernstein, and Lenin were not as careful in reassessing the economic implications of imperialism, Nye claims, and focused too much on the political possibilities of organizing the class in itself into one for itself: "No Marxist before Luxemburg had examined imperialism and colonialism with such attention" (p. 40). That Luxemburg was an astute theorist is certainly cause for honoring her intellectual achievement, but to make the

further claim that this is her achievement as a woman is not warranted on grounds of her originality alone. Luxemburg said and wrote and did things that others did not, but of course Gramsci, Bernstein, and Lenin were no schlubs themselves (and Luxemburg was not perfect herself). Nye suggests, however, that Luxemburg is somehow smarter, wiser, more compassionate than these other fellows, who are limited by being, well, fellows: "For many of Luxemburg's male comrades, with a vested interest in the certainty of socialist theory, and perhaps also with a masculine suspicion of emotion, there was a tendency to avoid reality in rationalization and temporization" (p. 50); therefore, they were unable to innovate in the ways Luxemburg could. This is a broader point in Nye's work:

It is not just that traditional philosophy has not answered [her trio's questions], it has seldom asked them. . . . Judging from [their] work, the framing and assumptions of a tradition of thinking in this sense would be different from those prominent in the standard history of philosophy. . . . [I]f philosophy is just a bit old and stale and not as nourishing as we might wish, there may be other recipes, other ideas, other ways of thinking. (pp. 227, 234)

This is a strange form of academic gameswomanship. Let's say I decide that Georg Lukacs is really the intellectual visionary of this period. Should it follow that this means his women comrades per se were constitutionally unable to match his scholarly acuity, that I should infer their emotions got in the way of their writing? Does Luxemburg really have to be the very smartest thinker in the early twentieth century in order for her or for women to be taken seriously?

According to Nye, Weil's contributions to philosophia lie in her celebration of the private sphere in which women nurture an understanding of the underside of scientific thinking and an appreciation of the importance of tradition to the maintenance of human relations. This first point is perhaps the hardest one for feminists to accept, and yet Nye glosses over it, almost in passing. One might go along with the project of finding feminist murmurings in the subtexts of those who are not especially interested in what happens to women—the approach among most feminists who write about Arendt¹⁴—but the notion that traditionally patriarchal (hetero)sexist ideas are also protofeminist requires at least some show of concern and engagement, neither of which Nye offers. She writes: "On a Weilian analysis, gender coding that reserves power for men and exempts women from its exercise may be a way to ensure the survival of the fabric of human life. While men are destroying each other in war and commerce, women at home preserve some semblance of human life" (p. 72), and then she leaves it at that. One doesn't need to dig

through piles of books on the nineteenth century “cult of domesticity” to find something to take issue with here. In its current form, there is absolutely nothing that distinguishes Nye’s analysis of Weil from Pat Robertson’s concerns: “Children are often ignored in the rhetoric of the feminist movement, which for so long denigrated motherhood and exalted the role of women in professions, in manual labor, and more recently in armed combat.”¹⁵ Christian evangelist Chuck Swindoll is “concerned about a vanishing masculinity that was once in abundance” and convinced that this is a problem for women as well, since such traditionally masculine men are the kind “most single ladies” and “most wives” would like to “share life with.”¹⁶ Like Nye, in her rendering of Weil, Christian antifeminists do not argue that women’s traditional roles are demeaning, but the opposite. That Nye lets this go so easily, that she actually defends such a view, seems like an indication of bad faith—and it is, I believe—but it is also something more than that, which is an invitation to reflect on the theoretical and practical dimensions of solidarity, discussed below.

At first glance, Arendt seems the oddest and trendiest choice for twentieth-century feminist heroine, although Nye is quick to distance herself from the Arendtian postmodern feminists with whom Arendt seems especially popular (p. 147). It is here, in the very fact of picking the unlikely Arendt as spokeswoman for a feminist philosophical tradition, that Nye may be most true to Arendt and to feminism. But we have to enter into this with our eyes open, seeing that Nye’s use of Arendt, like Arendt’s of history, is strategic: if Nye had reversed her readings to show that Luxemburg was a champion of consciousness and Gramsci of materialism, then we would be reading Nye on how Luxemburg was superior and original because she focused on consciousness. Similarly, there is no reason to extol Weil’s critique of the perversions of language as a symptom of the new disorders of a bureaucratized mass society and pretend that George Orwell didn’t have a thing or two to say on the topic. And it is also wrong to imply that Weil was unique in posing questions like: “Will science bring me liberty or chains?” p. (75) since of course the Frankfurt School’s Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse were contemporaneously discussing these same questions. Finally, Nye overdraws the line between the thought of Arendt and Heidegger. What does it mean for Nye to sacrifice intellectual honesty to the demands of her intellectual vanguard?

An accurate record of the past is unnecessary, but something of weight—beyond Nye’s plaintive exhortations—needs to be produced for the drama to move us. Something about Luxemburg’s, Weil’s, and Arendt’s accounts of politics, tradition, and history is convincing, even when the details of these

histories are apt to be, well, a touch idiosyncratic (especially in the case of Arendt). Maybe the important question is whether creating a women's intellectual history is useful (for feminists? for women? for people?) and not whether Nye makes certain mistakes. Is a piece on "politics" more engaging, do we give it more leeway, pay more attention, than one about "gender"? It is in the belief that histories ought to be constructed that Nye and Arendt share a common pursuit, although Nye is less skillful, and her blunders more glaring. My point is to make clear that the problem with Nye is not exactly that she is "wrong," since thinkers can be wrong about fundamental points and still be useful (e.g., Euclid, Newton, and Marx). So why does Arendt succeed and Nye does not?

Maybe it's harder to "catch" Arendt's slips because ancient Greece happened a long time ago and it's hard to have a handle on precisely what life was like then. Perhaps we puzzle over, rather than dismiss, Arendt's weird concepts like "animal laborans" or her unusual definition of politics because much of the surrounding prose is so magisterially written. Or it could simply be that Arendt seamlessly slips in among the line of male thinkers and gains credibility from the clubby, old-boy network in which she shows off her access to Plato, Kant, and Marx. For whatever reason, Arendt's canonical interventions have the appearance of innovations, not mistakes, whereas Nye's crop up like willful oddities. What exactly is the point of claiming that "[b]etween Luxemburg, Weil, and Arendt, and between them and other thinkers, are no agonistic contests, disputes, no stunning refutations, no foundational reversals" (p. 227)? Thank goodness this is not true! she wrote, in a posture of agonistic refutation. My favorite line in Weil is when she mocks Marx's notion that the working class could lead a revolution:

Marx's revolutionary materialism consists in positing, on the one hand, that force alone governs social relations to the exclusion of anything else, and on the other hand, that one day the weak, while remaining the weak, will nevertheless be stronger. He believed in miracles without believing in the supernatural. From a purely rationalist point of view, if one believes in miracles, it is better to believe in God as well.¹⁷

That's just great critical thinking, with the reader left to marvel at Weil's perspicuity and Marx's clumsiness on this point.

For all the shortfalls in Nye's exposition, there really is something that does seem to tie these theorists together. The transitional epigraphs—a passage by Weil on Luxemburg, one by Arendt on Weil, and another by Mary McCarthy on Arendt—are a nice touch. But are these associations *just* among these thinkers? What would be the gendered way of representing the originality of Gramsci and Orwell's practices and writings? One response might

be that these questions are gratuitous, that we don't need to ask them, that perhaps a feminist philosophia doesn't exist, but who cares? Forget about these quibbles and let's build on what Nye gives us, which is considerable.

For the most part, Green's book could have been written by Nye, and vice versa. Either this is a coincidence, or many feminist philosophers share the view that there is a specifically feminine form of humanism that can be gleaned from books by famous women such as Christine de Pisan or Mary Wollstonecraft. Green anticipates Nye's invitation to study women in order to learn about and construct a "feminist humanism." The main difference is that Green makes explicit the biological account of difference that Nye relies on implicitly. Green states, with admirable bluntness, that there are "commonalities in women's experience which have a biological origins, and biology places *constraints* on possible social forms and their acceptability" (p. 3). The statement of difference here is necessary to authorize Green's investigation of "feminine" versus "masculine" approaches to political conflict resolution and morality, a program of situating a specifically *feminist* investigation that neither Nye nor Dean pursue.

Green's ambition is to "bring order" to feminist theory by addressing the question: "How can society be organized in order to transform patriarchy and promote the good of women, rather than merely the good of men?" (p. 2). Is this a case of uneven development? Australia has free markets, women can vote, divorce, inherit and own property, but they still have "patriarchy"? Green would have done well to explain this concept in more detail—a quick nod in the direction of Kate Millet doesn't do the trick—since Green's proposal for a reorganized society bears a striking resemblance to that put forth by Robert Filmer's classic "Patriarcha." Indeed, although Green begins the book with a call to attack patriarchy, she later offers "feminist" defenses of male domination in general and patriarchy in particular. Green moves through de Pisan, Rousseau, Wollstonecraft, and Beauvoir in order to warn us away from twentieth-century Freudian psychoanalytic theory—it is "open to the charge of being a masculine ideology" (p. 151)—and shepherd us back to the values of early modern women, even if those values seem not so different than those of numerous early modern men.

Green wants to defend a feminist humanism, one she believes inheres in the writings of women (e.g., pp. 8, 129, 135). de Pisan is located as the first feminist (p. 27). Her defense of patriarchy is acknowledged as such and defended by Green, who asserts that a "just 'patriarchy', in which those in authority have responsibilities of a parental kind for those with less power, is compatible with woman's interests" (p. 35). On Green's account, there is

nothing that distinguishes de Pisan's defense of patriarchy from that of male conservatives: "For de Pisan there is little difference between the relationship between mother and child, husband and wife, lover and beloved and that between prince and subject" (p. 42), which means that the Christian, all-male Promise Keepers, Inc., is also a feminist organization. In *Adam's Rib*, a publication of Women of the Promise, Inc., Debbie Johnson quotes from Ephesians 5:22-24: "Wives, submit to your husbands as to the Lord. For the husband is the head of the wife as Christ is the head of the Church."¹⁸

This can't be, we think. Green must aspire to something other than the Promise Keepers, perhaps along the lines of a 'parentarchy' in which fathers and mothers have equal prerogatives. This would be different from historically patriarchal norms, except Green attributes agency to women apparently oppressed by systemic male domination, thereby validating women's so-called consent to and hence endorsement of relations of gendered inequality. After discussing Diane Bell's anthropological work on the aborigines of Warrabri, in which women are presented as agents in the manufacture of male supremacy, Green writes: "Rather than seeing women's position as one of complete annihilation as subjects, it seems more accurate to see it as a constrained, oppressed subjectivity which, nevertheless, works with the means available to establish its cultural values. . . . [T]here is no reason to assume that a constrained consciousness cannot be authentic" (p. 139). And, even more provocatively, "[T]here are goals which women value more highly than the freedom they would have to fight for, at such great expense, against an opposition which has so many advantages, with some basis in nature, and which have been increased by cultural practice" (p. 140).

At this point, Green's argument veers into religious territory. Either we have faith that sex differences are rooted in nature or we do not. Either we believe in granting the heuristic status of "agent" to the practices of the oppressed qua oppressed or we do not. Green uses evidence the same way that someone like conservative cultural critic George Gilder does,¹⁹ inferring back from current practices a prehistoric natural origin, enlisting everyone from the contemporary Nicole-Claude Mathieu to Jean-Jacques Rousseau for her cause. Her statement that she is "agreeing with Rousseau that women have historically had a particular interest in the control of sexuality" (p. 144) is especially ironic, since Rousseau prefaces his *Second Discourse* by stating that his description of the "state of nature" is *not* historical:

The investigations that may be undertaken concerning this subject should not be taken for historical truths, but only for hypothetical and conditional reasonings, better suited for shedding light on the nature of things than on pointing out their true origin, like those our physicists make everyday with regard to the formation of the world.²⁰

Had Green attended to this disclaimer, then she might have recognized the strategic use of the concept of nature in political theory, and been more circumspect about its values and history.

Green's evidence for thinking current sex roles natural comes straight out of a long line of conveniently reinforcing European anthropologies about sexuality (less "ideological" than a Freudian narrative?). Countering the possibility that women might effectively withdraw from the male-dominated sexual economy, she offers tidbits like "celibacy will only be guaranteed if the women of the society are able to prevent men from resorting to rape," this thing Green says men are just driven to do (like watching football and not asking for directions). Green thus sees marriage as women's best bet for controlling men's sexual aggression. Along the same functionalist lines, she writes, "[H]eterosexuality provides a bridge between the sexes which gives them a joint investment in the future of society," and the exchange of women "embodies a compromise between men's desire for sexual access to women and women's desire to limit and control that access in order to maximize male contributions to children's survival" (p. 141). She doesn't bother considering lesbianism as a choice because this is not "traditionally a *reproductive* choice." One obvious retort is, so what? Another is that Green needs to consider Gayle Rubin's argument, which is that the sex/gender system is such that sexuality and reproductive practices are inseparable.²¹ And still another is that even internally, the claim is unpersuasive. The rape of women she describes as a condition of heterosexuality does not sound much like a "reproductive choice," while the availability of sperm banks for lesbian mothers is the most obviously institutionalized form of reproductive choice ever available—you won't find any accidental pregnancies at the Repository for Germinal Choice in Escondido, California. Women with male sexual partners and women with female sexual partners may both have children, which means there is no reason to claim that the dynamics of heterosexuality are those of reproductive choice and those of lesbian sexuality are something else.

Green's observations about the past and the future seem to emanate from someone who wears a white lab coat: "The only solution to the problem [of false consciousness] is to clear away the distortions imposed by the concept of ideology in order to restate a careful and empirically based discussion of our genuine best interests" (p. 128). This statement depends on the quaint notion that some other discipline or method—people who look at facts, while philosophers study ideas—can simply deduce "our best interests." Presumably, this has not happened earlier because previous generations of feminists and other social scientists have been ideological, and Green is not similarly

handicapped. Because Green simply lifts, with a shocking level of credulity and literalism, a number of contested claims from anthropology, sociology, and psychology—without acknowledging the controversial aspects of these narratives—her portrait is both ad hoc and misleading. Because she invites empirical analyses—not something like Gayatri Spivak’s strategic essentialism²²—Green is implicitly inviting us to contemplate a plethora of alternative narratives (in her vocabulary, “hypotheses”) that she does not mention much less consider in any detail. It is one thing to be resistant to Foucault (she is), but another to write as though Hegel, Nietzsche, the Frankfurt School never happened—to name a few philosophical challenges to the proposal of basing politics on an empiricist’s science.

The second problem, symptomatic of broader issues, is that I cannot think of a single reason to characterize most of what happens in this book as “feminist.” Why does Green bother with labeling patriarchy “feminist,” and not just leave it at “patriarchal”? The ideology she defends is gendered—it’s not just good for “individuals”—but that can’t be enough of a reason to characterize it as feminist. Consider the parallels between these two passages. Green writes:

Though the child owes its parents obedience, it is free of the responsibilities that go with parental power. The more power that individuals have the greater their responsibility for the moral and material welfare of those within their charge, and it is in light of these views that de Pisan can both be considered a feminist and consistently judge that women should not scorn their lack of independence. (p. 41)

de Pisan thinks that men are responsible for taking care of women, and that is good for women. But no one ever justified monarchy on the grounds that it would be spiffy if kings could personally benefit from absolutism. Filmer, among others, says the opposite:

As the father over one family, so the king, as father over many families, extends his care to preserve, feed, clothe, instruct, and defend the whole commonwealth. His war, his peace, his courts of justice, and all his acts of sovereignty, tend only to preserve and distribute to every subordinate and inferior father, and to their children, their rights and privileges, so that all the duties of a king are summed up in an universal fatherly care of his people.²³

Is this the care ethic?²⁴ Paternal thinking? Feminist?

What does it mean for a work to claim this label, for this book to be part of a review of recent work in “feminist political theory”? Maybe the question is silly. So what if “feminism” is an afterthought to the overarching project of resuscitating a particular vision of families, one in which men do things

such as hunt and women benefit from their protection and sustenance? That Green identifies this with one label or another maybe is irrelevant. Perhaps, but then what are we to make of Green's own effort to distance her appreciation of what is 'feminine' in Rousseau's work from the possibility of regarding him as a 'feminist' (p. 80, 84)?

The "feminist" moniker prompts a debate from within "our" discourse, as opposed to a defensive dismissal of "theirs." If Green has not dismissed feminism (whatever that means, since presumably the content of that ideology will be filled in by feminists, and Green considers herself to be one), then that makes it that much more difficult for feminists to dismiss Green, which leads to interesting problems of "feminist solidarity" raised in all three of these books, although in fundamentally different ways. Green writes: "To find our identity in our history is not unthinkingly to endorse our historical ways of being, but it is to find an identity, as a sex, which is both clearly ours, and so the basis for a feminist solidarity, and also mutable, and so the basis for feminist difference with regard to its projection into the future" (p. 137). So Green wants an "our" that is feminist, even if "we" end up endorsing patriarchy (in the name, confusingly enough, of challenging it).

Nye's and Green's positions provide the perfect test cases for Dean's "reflective solidarity," a Habermasian-inspired approach to an ethics of conflict resolution, but with some important substitutions. In cases of disagreement, Dean's norm is that "each individual view group expectations from a perspective of a situated hypothetical third" (p. 3), and not the Habermasian perspective of neutrality, which Dean says is a privileging of whatever view happens to be dominant. Although she appropriates Habermas's stress on rationality and communication for feminism, Dean makes some other changes as well, the most crucial being the replacement of "justice" with "solidarity" as the premise and goal for discourse ethics (p. 143).

Dean's critique of Habermas is undertaken as part of an attack on identity politics. Her norm of solidarity acknowledges both the importance of particularist positions (p. 160) and the practice of basing one's views on one's group membership in order to rethink dynamics of exclusion. The norm for group membership ideally should be one in which "we replace ascribed identities with achieved ones and substitute an enforced commonality of oppression with communities of those who have chosen to work and fight together" (p. 179). The formulation is equal parts noble and confounding.

Dean has initiated a timely and theoretically challenging project. Until now, political theorists, for the most part, have approached political conflicts as rooted in one of two sources. On one model, people are represented as disagreeing over certain principles—some want more authority, others more

liberty; some seek rules to protect private property, others a collective system to manage economic relations; some value norms of care, others ethics of rights; and so on. The assumption underlying such debates is that if one could figure out which principle (or balance among principles) ought to prevail, we have at the very least gained important knowledge about the human condition, and at best provided useful guidance to political actors, ranging from citizens to presidents. If we can figure out how to corral people into agreeing on the same principles, they have no need to argue.

A second way of conceiving political conflicts has been to emphasize the selfish dynamics that lead to certain divisive aggregations—men and women, workers and capitalists, blacks and whites, for instance—and to attempt to analyze the institutional practices that can ameliorate the unfair or otherwise troublesome consequences of these divisions. The assumption here is that principles follow from one's subject position. (Feminist standpoint theory, at least in its cruder versions, is not saying anything new to American political scientists brought up on the mantra: "Where you sit depends on where you stand," referring to how politicians arrive at their policy preferences.²⁵) For some, this is a flaw: actors need to overcome their biases and make decisions on behalf of the common good (and not just in its name). For others, these associations are essential, and it is an Enlightenment trick to believe that standpoints rooted in these differences might be overcome. Dean does something else.

Although Dean does not state the matter in quite these terms (for all I know she might disagree with me on this), what I find most valuable about Dean's book is that she focuses on the dynamics of group interactions *per se* and not the substance of what is discussed. According to Dean, the problem is not how to arrive at justice, but rather how to get along, not despite the fact that we disagree, but despite the fact that we belong to different groups. At the same time, her work destabilizes the notion that the groups on which identity politicians base their views are fixed, but without taking the liberal's next step of dismissing such claims altogether. By refiguring the central problem of political conflict from one about principles to one about group membership, Dean helps us see that intergroup conflict and intragroup membership may not be driven by principles or practices. As these books show, one may hold principles in common with one's enemies and disagree vehemently with one's allies. The ways we position ourselves *as* members of this or that group may occur somewhat autonomously from the principles we hold. This means that deliberation is ultimately about negotiating the prerogative to speak on behalf of a certain group (as an American, as a Caucasian, as a woman—all implicitly and paradoxically exclusive of one another), which necessarily

entails divisiveness. For this reason, a heuristic of "solidarity" (as opposed to "truth" or "justice") seems like a good idea.

To reformulate problems of principles (universal or particular) into a problem of solidarity, Dean, similar to Benhabib, also takes us beyond the liberal-communitarian debate, in which neither side actually takes the concept of solidarity (or community, for that matter) as a problem that can be understood *independently of the specific norms advocated by a certain community*. The assumption in Charles Taylor's work, for instance, is that what divides the Francophones from the Anglophones are things like tradition and language.²⁶ The response is to determine the appropriate principles of autonomy and community. Dean's approach invites the participants to engage in processes of self-reflection, for the various advocates to think critically about their investments in the practices and affiliations they advocate. Perhaps this will lead to different norms of autonomy or perhaps not, but the kind of conversation one imagines is markedly different from that envisioned by Habermas or Taylor. In Habermas's account of such a discussion, the participants will rationally appeal to universal norms, putting aside their immediate interests; in Taylor's version, the participants are immutably dug in, and a smart political theorist needs to be called in to assist them in arriving at the right balance of autonomy against community. Dean's reflective solidarity encourages participants to rethink who "we" and "they" are, as "we" come together with "them."

The argument benefits from attention to conceptual subtleties. There is not one monolithic form of "solidarity," but three: "affectational"; "conventional" (based on interests); and, her alternative, "reflective," building from "ties created by dissent" (p. 31). Among the numerous political consequences to which Dean attends—helpful examples abound—is how reflective solidarity will "direct us away from a politics centered on the state" to one that is more squarely fixed in civil society (p. 75), but this should not prompt us to see civil society as marking off the possibility of the state's limits. Rather, Dean rightly recognizes the state's reach into apparently private realms, like the family—a point Dean builds on to challenge certain liberal intuitions about the sharp division between public and private, to suggest that these are themselves constituted by the state (p. 89).

Dean's book is a largely lucid and original statement of the perfectly reasonable belief that it is important to take a principle of difference (as opposed to a goal of objectivity) into account when making ethical and political judgments—that judgments are always situated—and that this does not mean that these differences must be biological or essential in any way. It is on this last point, and in particular Dean's emphasis on what she terms "discourse rights" and the possibility of group identities that one achieves

versus those into which we are born (p. 179), that reflective solidarity seems a thoughtful complement to Iris Marion Young's *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (1990)—and a modulated echo of certain strains in the work of Nancy Fraser and Benhabib. In “What’s Critical about Critical Theory?” Fraser points out how the liberal private/public heuristic Habermas invokes poses problems for feminists.²⁷ But she also shows how discourse ethics can be useful for feminists if they recognize meanings as situated, not universal: “Substantive social meanings and norms are always necessarily culturally and historically specific; they always express distinctive shared but non-universal forms of life. Feminist meanings and norms will be no exception—but they will not, on that account, be particularistic in any pejorative sense. Let us simply say that they will be different.”²⁸ Dean’s minimal discussion of Benhabib’s work is especially perplexing, since both attempt to rethink Habermas for purposes of feminist and related critiques of ethics and politics, and because Dean is very critical of Benhabib’s “The Generalized and Concrete Other”—one of the few essays in *Situating the Self* (1992) in which Benhabib does not explicitly use Habermas.

Dean writes that Benhabib’s distinction between the generalized and concrete other “prevents us from seeing how generalized conceptions of role identity influence our domestic and intimate interactions,” that Benhabib “neglects the fact that norms are always generalized sets of expectations no matter where they come into play” (p. 38). But elsewhere Benhabib pointedly writes the opposite: “Communicative ethics promotes a universalist and postconventionalist perspective on all ethical relations: it has implications for familial life no less than for the democratic legislatures.”²⁹

The specific details of Benhabib’s arguments vary from Dean’s in ways that Dean could have used to clarify and deepen her readers’ understanding of her project. In particular, Benhabib’s Hegelian-informed understanding of “significant others,” composed of “my kin group, my tribe, my city-state, my nation, my co-religionists” (p. 32)—who are presumed to value ongoing relationships over a particular decision—seems one Dean would want to endorse. Benhabib writes: “The emphasis . . . is less on *rational agreement*, but more on sustaining those normative practices and moral relationships within which reasoned agreement *as a way of life* can flourish” (p. 38).

Rules for exclusion of certain individuals or positions from a group’s debates seem the most crucial foundation for such projects, and their disagreements on this point are one especially fruitful difference that Dean might have explored. Benhabib argues that those putting forth inegalitarian arguments should be “excluded *from moral conversation*”³⁰ because they are either irrational or unjust. They are irrational, Benhabib explains, if they expect to have as disputants the kinds of people they believe lack the status

to be on an equal footing with them. They are unjust if they simply assume that “inferior” addressees must accept their views. Dean wants to exclude them for more substantive reasons: “[R]acist and patriarchal norms” ought to be excluded because they preclude “difference” from being a “valued aspect of our lives . . . [and] explicitly deny our accountability toward others who are not like us, disrupting the solidarity of our inter-relationship” (p. 174). There are difficulties with each position, and it would have been useful if Dean had explored their competing strengths and drawbacks. Benhabib claims that “inegalitarian arguments usually . . . require that others ‘see’ the validity of these principles.” And yet, “[T]o woo such assent means admitting the ‘others’ into the conversation,”³¹ which she sees as irrational. Interestingly, then, Green’s inegalitarian arguments survive (as part of a feminist discourse community) both Benhabib’s and Dean’s principles of exclusion because the person making them is *not* an “other” (Benhabib) and she *is* pursuing solidarity with feminists (Dean).

When Green endorses de Pisan’s patriarchy, she knows that it is not a move that will appeal to most feminists—they will disagree with her—but nonetheless, Green identifies as feminist. Likewise, instead of speaking as a woman, Nye might have posed an intragroup challenge to “philosophers” on behalf of the views of “political theorists,” for instance. One response to the often arbitrary-seeming association of a group with a perspective has been to challenge the cogency of such groups in the first place. Yet, once we stop expecting a close articulation of group and standpoint—once we acknowledge that people who sit in the same place may stand on certain issues quite differently—the appropriate response is not a Kantian retreat to deontological ethics. Rather, political theorists might need to take the very form of group membership as a problem worthy of theoretical scrutiny.

It is out of an implicit recognition of the autonomy of group affiliation and perspective that Kathy Ferguson argues for “mobile subjectivities” that—like Dean’s self-reflective ethics of belonging—question the bases on which affiliations are formed:

The political communities into which mobile subjectivities can enter require ironic recognition of the partiality and mutability of both groups and their members. . . . Coalition politics make sense for mobile subjectivities, which can feel empathy with many different perspectives but find themselves at home in none.³²

Such a dynamic requires “acts of irony” that are “subversive of unity, but crucial for solidarity across difference.”³³ Ferguson may well be right, but it

is not clear what to do with this analysis; the assumptions underlying such a program are worthy of further inquiry.

An approach that might precede the framing of Nye's and Green's projects of women's thought, as well as Ferguson's and Dean's postmodernist solidarities, might consider the value of a group consciousness (false or true). Why do we care whether a position is held by members for it to be a worthy view? Is it the same reason that political representation matters—hardly a settled problem in itself?³⁴ Or might we note different justifications for *principles* promulgated in the name of a group than for *laws* passed on behalf of a group? Is the only way to think of bringing these two dynamics into relation Hegelian, or might there be other—less totalizing—ways to consider these questions?

Kaddish for Naomi Ginsberg, 1894-1956

Strange now to think of you, gone without corsets and eyes, while
I walk on the sunny pavement of Greenwich Village.
downtown Manhattan, clear winter noon, and I've been up
all night, talking, talking, reading the Kaddish aloud,
listening to Ray Charles blues shout blind on the
phonograph . . .

This is the end, the redemption from Wilderness, way for the Wonderer, House
sought for All, black handkerchief washed clean by weeping—page beyond
Psalm—Last change of mine and Naomi—to God's perfect Darkness—Death,
stay thy phantoms!³⁵

—Allen Ginsberg

In Greenwich Village, all those folks in black: How to mourn? How to say a prayer for the death of prayer? How to forget how to remember? Nietzsche didn't make a mistake so much as a joke, but perhaps the laugh is on him. God is dead? Tell that to the overwhelming majority of Americans who report that they pray to Him daily. So what if feminist theory is an act of faith, dependent on a community of believers who argue a lot?

Feminist theory is dead. Long live feminist theory.

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NOTES

1. Martin Berkowitz, *American Family Passover Haggadah* (Miami: Sacred Press, 1958), 9. Haggadahs are prepared texts read by participants at a meal celebrating the first night of Passover, the biblical event in which God killed the firstborn Egyptian sons (and inflicted nine other plagues) while God "passed over" the households of the Israelites. The Haggadah I quote from is a version that contains advertisements by Maxwell House, Inc.

2. Josephine Donovan, *Feminist Theory: The Intellectual Traditions of American Feminism* (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1985), xi.

3. Berkowitz, 9.

4. Seyla Benhabib, "Feminism and the Question of Postmodernism," in *Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics* (New York: Routledge, 1992).

5. This resembles Linda Zirelli's point: "Political theory invests ['woman'] with a remarkable if threatening symbolic mobility. Woman is not a being but a signification—wholly arbitrary and fundamentally unstable because dependent for its meaning on the relational structure of language." *Signifying Woman: Culture and Chaos in Rousseau, Burke, and Mill* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), 2. This point also emerges, although not in a semiotic idiom, in Carole Pateman, *The Disorder Women: Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989).

6. Rousseau, *Discourse on Inequality*, trans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett, 1992), 39.

7. Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, trans. James Strachey (New York, London: W. W. Norton, 1961), 59.

8. Rousseau, *Emile* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1943), 12-13, 328, 330; Freud, "Female Sexuality," trans. Joan Riviere, in *Sexuality and the Psychology of Love* (New York: Macmillan, 1963), 186, 195; *Civilization*, 14.

9. Nancy Tuana, *Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt*, ed. Bonnie Honig (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), xii.

10. According to Judith Grant, responding to questions similar to those raised here, feminism's "core concepts" are "woman," experience, and personal politics. *Fundamental Feminism: Contesting the Core Concepts of Feminist Theory* (London, New York: Routledge, 1993), 4. However, Grant defines the concepts so that they accommodate postmodern sensibilities—particular women might make mistakes about their experiences, for instance—which means that the horse (core concepts) begins to tag along behind the cart (e.g., self-identified feminists who give papers influenced by Derrida at political theory panels). We know our work must be feminist because we are.

11. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1962). For an excellent analysis of the relation between the thought of Arendt and Heidegger, see Dana Villa, *Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).

12. For a critique of gendered readings of Hobbes, see Samantha Frost, "Thinking-bodies/Civil Subjects: Equality, Difference, and Citizenship in Hobbes" (paper presented at the Midwestern Political Science Association Meetings, Chicago, April 1997).

13. Hanna Pitkin, *Wittgenstein and Justice: On the Significance of Ludwig Wittgenstein for Social and Political Thought* (Berkeley, London, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), 299.

14. See the essays in *Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt*, especially Mary Dietz, "Feminist Receptions of Hannah Arendt," 17-50. For a review essay on these books, see Ann Lane, "Hannah Arendt: Theorist of Distinctions," *Political Theory* 25 (February 1997): 137-59.

15. Pat Robertson, *The New World Order* (Dallas, London, Vancouver: Word, 1991), 238.
16. Chuck Swindoll, *The Strong Family* (Portland: Multinomial Press, 1991), 26-27.
17. Weil, "Fragments," in *Oppression and Liberty*, trans. Arthur Wills and John Petrie (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1958), 158-59.
18. Adams Rib, in "women of the promise" [database online] (December/January, 1997) [cited May 4, 1997]; obtained from YAHOO.
19. George Gilder, *Sexual Suicide* (New York: Quadrangle, 1973).
20. Rousseau, *Second Discourse*, 17.
21. Gayle Rubin, "The Traffic in Women: Notes on the 'Political Economy' of Sex," in *Toward an Anthropology of Women*, ed. Rayna Rapp Reiter (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975).
22. Gayatri Spivak, "Criticism, Feminism, and the Institution," in *The Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues*, ed. Sarah Harasym (London, New York: Routledge, 1990).
23. Robert Filmer, "Patriarcha," in *Two Treatises of Government, with a Supplement* (New York: Hafner Press, 1947), 260.
24. Joan Tronto, *Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care* (New York: Routledge, 1993).
25. Robert Putnam attributes this phrase to Arthur Clun, in *The Comparative Study of Political Elites* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1976), 97. Thanks to Sam Eldersveld for assistance in tracking this down.
26. Charles Taylor, *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition: An Essay*, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).
27. Nancy Fraser, *Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse, and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989).
28. *Ibid.*, 136; see also 143 n. 48, 181-82.
29. Benhabib, "In the Shadow of Aristotle and Hegel: Communicative Ethics and Current Controversies in Practical Philosophy," in *Situating the Self*, 9.
30. *Ibid.*, 33.
31. *Ibid.*
32. Kathy Ferguson, *The Man Question: Visions of Subjectivity in Feminist Theory* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 178.
33. *Ibid.* Ferguson's formulation here is in keeping with Donna Haraway's "ironic" dream and an "ironic faith" in the "image of the cyborg" "Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s," in *Feminism/Postmodernism*, ed. Linda Nicholson (New York, London: Routledge, 1990), 190-91.
34. See Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley, London, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967).
35. Allen Ginsberg, *Kaddish and Other Poems, 1958-1960* (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1961), 7, 12.

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