

ends' which is *unproblematical* for freedom because all rational beings simply 'see' that end (at the age of reason). The whole Kantian 'universalizing' operation is completely impersonal: there is no person (Lycurgus) bending backwards to be impersonal, nonauthoritarian, persuading — without convincing. In Kant, one is not made free (in time): one simply knows 'ought' and takes oneself to be free (able to perform ought's commands) *ab initio* — much as Meno's slave just 'has' astonishing geometrical knowledge. Of course — and Rousseau would reasonably insist on this — Kantianism works only if there are universal, reason-ordained 'objective ends' which we 'ought to have' (*Religion*). Rousseau would have worried about every term in that sentence: whether 'reason' ordains anything (morally), whether there are 'ends' that all rational beings 'see' (as facts of reason). Negatively, Kant and Rousseau are companions-in-flight from self-loving particular will; positively, they offer the still viable *contrasting* possibilities once that flight is over — rational, universal, cosmopolitan morality valid for persons versus educator-shaped, general, politan *civisme* valid for a *citoyen de G n ve* or *de Sparte*. (Try to imagine Kant as *citoyen de K nigsberg*: That will measure very precisely the distance from Switzerland to Prussia.)

If time permitted, one could point out the subtlety and fineness of Barnard's discussion of the distinction between the "citizen" and the "patriot" in Rousseau, the carefulness of his treatment of the difference between authority and authoritarianism. And with even more time, one could take up the parallels and discontinuities between Rousseau and Herder that Barnard illuminates in his final chapter, where he shows that Rousseau gives primacy to *politics* and Herder to *culture*. But by now, it will be clear that Barnard's book is essential reading for anyone interested in Rousseau and Herder — and even in Kant as the bridge between them.

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FREEDOM AND THE END OF REASON: ON THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF KANT'S CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY by Richard Velkley. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990. Pp. xxi, 222. \$29.95.

Even while philosophy professors warn us that frivolous and ironic thoughts could never enter the mind of Immanuel Kant, it is sometimes hard to banish from our own minds the suspicion that a large part of his moral

philosophy is really an elaborate joke. So much of what Kant threw out reason's front door—proof of God's existence, of immortality, of a moral order in nature—comes in through the back door as necessary postulates for moral reasoning that it seems to make a mockery of his attack on philosophical dogmatism. Our image of Kant as reason's stern judge and disciplinarian would shine much more brightly if, like Heine, we could dismiss these postulates as a consolation prize offered to upright, but weak-minded individuals like Kant's servant Lampe.

Of course, we cannot accept Heine's suggestion without seriously distorting Kant's critical philosophy. Nevertheless, most scholars still treat Kant's repeated efforts to solve the problem of the highest and final good as an attempt to clean up and decorate the moral landscape devastated by *The Critique of Pure Reason*. In *Freedom and the End of Reason*, Richard Velkley corrects this widespread view of Kant's moral teleology. By means of a careful interpretation of Kant's precritical writings—in particular, his notes on Rousseau (1764)—Velkley demonstrates that Kant's concern about a moral end for human reason not only preceded his critiques of reason but contributed to the need for those critiques in the first place. Velkley argues that Kant's critical philosophy rests on “moral foundations.” He tries to show that Kant's famous insistence on the primacy of the practical is “constitutive of his whole conception of theoretical inquiry after 1765” (p. 5).

Velkley argues that the key moment in the development of Kant's critical philosophy lies in his encounter with Rousseau's moral philosophy in the mid-1760s. Well before Hume's skepticism awoke Kant from his dogmatic slumber about causation, Rousseau's critique of the Enlightenment had forced him to reconceptualize the nature and ends of human reason. Rousseau, Velkley argues, forced Kant to confront “a crisis in the modern period concerning the end, status, and meaning of reason” (p. 1). He taught Kant that the instrumental conception of human reason favored by early Enlightenment thinkers brought human beings neither the happiness that it promised nor the autonomy and dignity that it sought to rescue from traditional religious authority. To resolve this crisis, Kant provided reason with a new, specifically moral end derived from the distinctive possibilities of human freedom. In doing so, Kant created a specifically moral teleology, a teleology, unlike all earlier versions, that opposes its ends to those created by natural or divinely created needs. To develop and defend that moral teleology, Kant had to subject our capacities to know nature and its ends to a rigorous critique. In this way, Velkley suggests, Kant's response to Rousseau's critique of the Enlightenment gave birth to Kantian critical philosophy.

The considerable strengths of this study lie mostly in its careful and perceptive reconstruction of Kant's encounter with Rousseau. Kant recorded that encounter in a series of posthumously published notes. The most famous of these records Kant's confession that "Rousseau set me straight" about the superior worth of the good will to any refinement of one's theoretical abilities. But the great majority of these extensive notes are unfamiliar and unexplored territory—at least among English-speaking scholars. Velkley draws from them an impressive and subtly nuanced account of Kant's response to Rousseau's challenges.

Questions necessarily arise, however, when we examine the broader claims that Velkley derives from his reconstruction of Kant's encounter with Rousseau. Velkley insists that the ideas inspired by that encounter are "constitutive of his [Kant's] whole conception of theoretical inquiry after 1795." But there are at least three different ways in which Kant's concern about the moral end of reason might *constitute* his critiques of reason. That concern might have provided the original impetus to seek a new philosophical approach; it might shape and structure the way in which Kant's applied that approach; or it might provide the goal toward which Kant thought he was moving by applying it. Velkley clearly means to assert all three of these claims. But he presents very little evidence to justify the second, the claim that moral teleology structures the arguments about epistemological and moral idealism presented in Kant's first two critiques.

The failure to justify this claim is important, since it limits our interest in Velkley's conclusions. Those philosophic scholars—and they are the vast majority—who have ignored Kant's moral teleology could easily acknowledge Velkley's contribution to Kant's intellectual biography without altering the way that they read and evaluate his most important arguments. With regard to *The Critique of Pure Reason*, Velkley merely points out that Kant expresses concern about the moral end of reason in its final sections (the "Canon" and "Architectonic" of Pure Reason)—sections that readers, exhausted by the weight and bulk of its arguments, rarely reach. He offers no arguments to demonstrate that the structure of the more familiar arguments that precede these sections depends on Kant's commitment to a moral teleology.

Why must we take notice of Kant's own hopes and aims unless they either structure the arguments that interest us or yield otherwise unavailable insights? What if we were to discover that Newton's account of gravity first suggested itself to Newton as a solution to one of the arcane mystical puzzles that so fascinated him? Would this discovery alter our understanding of that account? Not unless we found some structure of argument in it that was

dependent on Newton's mystical preoccupations. Most contemporary philosophical scholars are probably inclined to throw Kant's concerns about moral teleology into the historical dustbin along with Newton's mysticism. Velkley has not yet provided them with a reason to refrain from doing so.

Indeed, there are hints — sadly, only hints — that it is precisely to expose the inadequacies of Kant's resolution of the crisis of modern reason that Velkley works to reconstruct the teleological origins of Kant's critical philosophy. In his final paragraph, Velkley asks whether "we best understand the nature of 'reason' and its 'end' by starting from human contradictions that cannot be resolved in any final way, without destroying the texture of human life itself." This question leads him "to wonder if philosophy is not better understood as the comprehension, rather than as the 'resolution,' of the basic problems of human existence" (p. 168). With this challenge to Kant and his successors, we come upon the most important reason that Velkley offers for the extrabiographical significance of his account of Kant's early teleological arguments. Unfortunately, that challenge, as presented here, represents little more than a recommendation for further thought.

Nevertheless, Velkley's reconstruction of Kant's encounter with Rousseau is sufficiently interesting to reward the reader of this thoughtful and impressively researched book. By leaving aside stale debates about "influence" in favor of an account of how one philosopher creatively responded to the challenges posed by another, Velkley provides a useful model of how scholars should deal with encounters between great minds.

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THE PRESENCE OF THE PAST: ESSAYS ON THE STATE AND THE CONSTITUTION by Sheldon S. Wolin. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989. \$29.95.

The Presence of the Past offers a set of meditations on the American civic order — and its discontents — by an aroused citizen (who happens, of course, to be a world-class political theorist) seeking to engage his fellow citizens in a common conversation. Wolin has spent much of his career articulating the importance of "politicalness" — "our capacity for developing into beings who know and value what it means to participate in and be responsible for the care and improvement of our common and collective life" (p. 139). This book