

San Francisco Bay Area Edge Cities: New Roles for Planners and the General Plan

Patrick S. McGovern

ABSTRACT

Edge-city development on the urban fringe of U.S. metropolitan centers has provoked heated debate over metropolitan policy. This article reports on qualitative research of two edge cities in the San Francisco Bay Area—Walnut Creek and San Ramon—investigating the empirical issues of their growth and analyzing the broader issues of metropolitan planning. I specifically examine the roles of California general plan law and local land use planners in the development of the two edge cities, where planners used the general plan as early as the 1950s to set aside areas of each community for economic diversification. This study finds that the California General Plan law failed to provide regional coordination for edge city growth, particularly on issues of transportation, infrastructure, housing, and environmental quality. In addition, it finds public land use planners took a proactive role in maintaining long-term visions, forming relationships with developers and becoming involved in the physical planning of these new urban centers. The larger issues raised by these case studies are the uncoordinated metropolitan impacts of edge-city development under a state-mandated, locally implemented, general plan, along with the shift of public planners from their traditional regulatory role to consensual roles with developers.

Patrick S. McGovern is an assistant professor of urban and regional planning at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor; patmcgov@umich.edu.

Journal of Planning Education and Research 17:246-258.
© 1998 Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning

Most central cities now share their economic and cultural base with suburban centers containing major office complexes and regional retail centers. The daytime labor forces in these edge cities often equal the residential populations. Over the past decade, the growth of edge cities has dramatically changed the landscape of U.S. metropolitan areas. I evaluate two edge cities in the San Francisco Bay Area, Walnut Creek and San Ramon, focusing on the significance of the California general plan law and the development of new political and professional roles for planners. The two communities were examined in depth in 1994 to evaluate the consequences of California's mandatory general plan legislation and planners' input into large-scale developments.

Following the historic tradition of many urban reform movements (Hall 1988, 16-19), the national debate over edge cities was first framed by a journalist, Joel Garreau in *Edge City: Life on the New Frontier* (1991). Garreau coined the term *edge cities* and applied it to 181 cities in U.S. metropolitan areas (Garreau 1994a). He defined an *edge city* as having 5 million square feet of office space, 600,000 square feet of retail space, an increased workday population that marks the community as a major employment center, and a perception of it as a distinct place in a community that was not a city 30 years earlier (Garreau 1991, 6-7).

At the local level, these new cities are remarkable planning successes in economic development and urban design. Their regional impact is less positive. They are linked to urban abandonment and problematic transportation and affordable housing consequences. The new centers represent a further fragmentation of metropolitan regions and increasingly challenge the economic, social, and cultural vitality of the central cities. At the same time, they centralized urban growth that occurred in the suburbs. This links both successes and negative consequences to the implementation of California's system of mandatory comprehensive land use planning at the local level.

Planners in the 1970s used what was then a cutting-edge legal device, the general plan, to shape new edge cities over three decades. The consequences of that policy in these cases highlight serious questions about the poor linkage between local land use planning and metropolitan urban issues in California. They also raise the issue of the responsibility of local land use planners to the broader metropolitan community. The implications of this analysis also raise important policy questions of the appropriate role of land use planners in large-scale developments and the effectiveness of local control of land use planning in an increasingly regional world.

■ THE CHOICE OF A QUALITATIVE METHODOLOGY

I chose a qualitative approach to one mature example of each of two major edge city templates, rather than a quantitative analysis of large numbers of edge city demographics, real estate development statistics, or urban form features. The goal of the research




Figure 1. The BART service area, including San Ramon and Walnut Creek.

was to first identify a set of urban forms that could be categorized as edge cities, to then trace the story of their evolution, and to finally place the role of planners in that political economy of large-scale urban development (McGovern 1994).

The Contra Costa County Interstate 680 Corridor (see Figure 1) was chosen because of the rapid appearance of large back-office centers in five physically well-defined urban centers during the 1980s. The area grew from 3.8 million square feet of office space in 1980 to 32.5 million by the end of the decade (Sedway 1992, 31). The five suburban communities along the corridor that developed major employment and commercial centers during the 1980s include Walnut Creek, San Ramon, Concord, Pleasant Hill BART,¹ and Pleasanton. All are connected by either a freeway system or the Bay Area

Rapid Transit (BART) rail system to San Francisco and Oakland, as shown in Figure 1. Each of those communities also developed a well-defined urban form.

Site visits, photographs, and reviews of planning records were used in all five cities to complete the selection process. Once the two cases were chosen, more extensive site visits and document searches were conducted. Those documents included general plans, planning department files for edge city buildings, municipal board meeting records, and various other planning reports on the site or the projects.

To learn the story of the development of these edge cities, I conducted interviews with planning professionals, government officials, developers, environmentalists, politicians, and others who directly participated in the process in each community. In addition, I consulted local newspapers to verify dates and

actors. Because the largest local newspaper, the *Contra Costa Times*, was published by a vocal proponent of growth in the region, it provided thorough—though opinionated—coverage of the area’s development.²

This approach, while limited by the number of cases investigated, presents different results than earlier, more quantitative work on local general plan implementation. That quantitative work found that local planners in California often were overpowered by development interests and spend most of their time on routine regulatory tasks (Dalton 1989, 32; Burby, et al. 1993, 5-7). Those studies are based on analyses of formal actions by planners and their governing boards, as well as formal applications by developers. The research approach used here revealed new consensual roles of planners outside the formal approval process examined by that earlier work. This qualitative approach has penetrated the informal arena of planning, revealing both new roles and enhanced power for planners in determining the final form of edge cities. This work thus complements the earlier research with more in-depth case studies of both formal and informal actions of planners involved in the development of an edge city.

■ THE CHOICE OF WALNUT CREEK AND SAN RAMON

The case studies, Walnut Creek and San Ramon, are among the five cities in Contra Costa County and the adjacent community of Pleasanton in Alameda County identified by Garreau as edge cities (Garreau 1991, 305-336). The urban form of most edge cities in the U.S. is either low-rise campus office parks or high- to mid-rise office centers in suburban downtowns. The five edge cities identified by Garreau in the study area have examples of each type.

Walnut Creek, Concord, and Pleasant Hill each have high-rise, downtown urban centers located near BART stations and freeways. The high-rise centers consist of six- to ten-story office towers, renting Class A office space to professional and corporate tenants. The two sprawling campus developments at San Ramon and Pleasanton consist of three- to five-story

complexes, which house corporate headquarters and back-office operations. Both are located along freeways with no transit service, although a BART extension to the Pleasanton center was under construction at the time of this research.

Among those five candidates, Walnut Creek and San Ramon were the two most fully developed and prototypical edge cities in the region. Walnut Creek was selected as the template for the high-rise, transit-oriented office. Although Concord has development of similar scale, growth was scattered between a downtown project and an emerging high-rise corridor. The remaining candidate, Pleasant Hill BART, had its construction delayed by litigation through most of the 1980s, and was only beginning to take shape at the time of this research.

San Ramon was selected as the most typical suburban office campus center. It is located along an interstate highway and houses back-office operations for major regional and national corporations. The alternative campus office park, Hacienda Business Park in Pleasanton, was built late in the study period and still contained large parcels of vacant land and uneven development at the time of this research.

Along with providing contrasting urban forms, the subjects provide a comparison of different planning settings. Walnut Creek was the product of a suburban city government planning department, while San Ramon revealed the role of a county government planning an unincorporated area that later became a city.

An application of Garreau’s criteria to the two case studies in Table 1 demonstrates that these communities meet his criteria. First, both communities easily exceed the requirements for retail and commercial space. As seen in Table 1, the number of employees commuting to jobs in each community during the work-day approaches the resident population (Census 1990). Last, both Walnut Creek and San Ramon were transformed from tiny rural outposts 30 years ago into well-known urban centers in the Bay Area region, meeting the last two criteria:

	GARREAU DEFINITION	SAN RAMON	WALNUT CREEK
OFFICE SPACE	5 million sq. ft. or more	7.9 million sq. ft.	9.2 million sq. ft.
RETAIL SPACE	600,000 sq. ft.	1.5 million sq. ft.	5.1 million sq. ft.
WORKDAY EMPLOYMENT/ RESIDENT POPULATIONS	Workday employment population increased/ Close to resident population in size	35,000 workday population/ 40,000 resident population (1990 Census)	40,000 workday population/ 60,000 resident population (1990 Census)
PERCEPTION	Perceived as a single place/ Not a city 30 years ago	San Ramon "Bishop Ranch"/ 1960 population: 250	Walnut Creek "Golden Triangle"/ 1960 population: 9,900

Table 1. Comparison of Edge City parameters as defined by Garreau (1991) to San Ramon (1986) and Walnut Creek (1989).

Garreau's criteria provide a baseline for framing research on edge cities. A general review of the cities he identifies suggests other important characteristics. Those would include proximity to interstate highways, rail transit, or regional airports, all of which are essential to the kind of back-office or corporate headquarters locations he describes (Cervero 1989, 73-82; Stanback 1991, 5-14). Thus, his exhaustive survey shows no examples of edge cities in rural locations. Moreover, edge cities are only feasible in locations with the communication and electronic infrastructure for telephone, fax, computer, and satellite linkages between distant corporate locations (Office of Technology Assessment 1995, 10-12). Although Garreau's work responds to the rapid change in the physical appearance of edge cities, his criteria do not include specific characteristics of urban form. Urban design characteristics of mass, building height, scale, and amenities would certainly provide useful additional descriptors for the phenomenon of edge cities (Lynch 1960; McGovern 1994). Last, any description of edge cities must discuss the presence, or absence, of local comprehensive land use planning. In both of the case studies examined here, state mandated, locally implemented general land use plans were critical factors in the building of edge cities. State mandated general plans are not required in other edge city locations, raising the question of how this scale of development was planned in those communities.

The bulk of the edge city growth in these two communities occurred in the short period between 1982 and 1986. The new jobs, office space, and retail space represented more regional relocation than actual growth of the Bay Area economy. Most of the office jobs were relocated from buildings in the San Francisco financial district or downtown Oakland, as were many of the new retail uses.

This short burst of urbanization subsided by the late 1980s, when growth control politics prevailed in both communities and when it became apparent that the region's suburban office market had been saturated. Those factors, together with the general recession in California, stopped employment and retail growth. Nevertheless, both edge cities continued to expand through the early 1990s with the addition of cultural, entertainment, medical, and educational facilities, competing with San Francisco and Oakland on new levels. When viewed together with other Bay Area edge city developments in the Silicon Valley, the Peninsula area, and Marin County (Garreau 1994b), it becomes clear why the central cities of the region, particularly Oakland, have suffered substantial erosion of their employment and retail bases and are now facing the loss of other important urban functions.

■ ROLE OF THE CALIFORNIA GENERAL PLAN LAW

The California general plan law was an essential element in the planning of these edge cities. Planners used general plans to designate and maintain districts for regional employment uses and economic diversification over three decades in the locations that became edge cities. Ironically, the California

general plan law was a series of efforts to address urban sprawl in Los Angeles and San Francisco (Weiss 1987, 72-76). In 1927, following the adoption of the federal Standard Enabling Acts, California adopted legislation enabling voluntary general plans for county and city governments and mandating plans only for those few jurisdictions with planning commissions (California Statutes 1927, Ch. 874, Sec. 4).

The unprecedented scale of suburban growth at the end of World War II again created pressures to control sprawl, which resulted in cosmetic legislation for mandatory general plans, providing neither a deadline for adoption nor a mechanism to monitor compliance (California Statutes 1947, Ch. 807, Sec. 10, 35). Despite that lax enforcement, many rapidly growing communities voluntarily adopted plans in the 1950s. Among them were Walnut Creek's city plan and Contra Costa County's plan for the unincorporated San Ramon Valley.

Significantly, these two communities involved both an independent planning commission and a governing board in comprehensive plan writing in the 1950s, at a time when the planning profession was still locked in a debate over whether the plan should be written exclusively by an independent commission or by elected officials (Hoch 1994, 26-30). T.J. Kent, a prominent California planner and academic, had been a proponent of having the elected council or board write the plan, as well as of limiting the coverage of the plan to physical planning issues. He argued those ideas in his book, *The Urban General Plan* (1964), which was widely read by planners and planning students during the 1960s, particularly in California. Walnut Creek and Contra Costa County wrote comprehensive physical land use plans with little specific economic development and no social planning, following Kent's model.

Kent's view prevailed in California with the revisions of the general plan law in 1971. In response to new public concerns about continuing urban sprawl and environmental quality, the general plan legislation was again amended, this time to require each local jurisdiction to have a general plan "consistent" with its zoning ordinance (California Government Code, Secs. 65030, 65302, 65302.2). The effect of the amendment was to require a plan before zoning and building permits could continue to be issued (Curtin 1991, 27-28). The historic focus of the California general plan on land use planning was clarified with the new amendments, setting out mandatory elements for each city and county general plan. Those elements included land use, circulation, housing, and conservation, along with a 20-year time frame. Planners were required to provide all the elements of a city within the plan for each community, rather than coordinating uses at a metropolitan level. Thus, a complete plan reserved land for economic diversification, with a commercial and industrial downtown, even in residential or rural communities.

In addition to the new state mandate, pressures from local boosterism and the development community were often passed on to planners by elected officials (Lotchin 1992, 168-169). The result is a curious mix of boosterism and state-

mandated, comprehensive planning. Influenced by this mix of forces, local planners and economic developers used the general plan to rationalize economic growth. Given the limitations on local property tax revenues resulting from the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978, employment and commercial uses became lucrative sources of revenue for local governments. The general plan legitimized the idea that each local community was on its own in seeking development and tax revenue. General plans became documents of boosterism and visions of urban centers for even the smallest communities, exacerbating the fragmentation of land use regulation, which had already led to metropolitan sprawl (see Walnut Creek 1989; San Ramon 1986).

Legislation designed to rationalize urban land use and remediate sprawl had the opposite result. The effort to standardize planning practices and require designating land for a full range of uses did not solve the uncoordinated sprawl the legislation sought to address. Instead, it exacerbated it. Particularly in older suburbs, the general plan encouraged planning of a miniature metropolis in each locality with little consideration of regional consequences. The legislation provided neither metropolitan nor state coordination or review of general plans. Indeed, county plans and those of incorporated cities within the counties might conflict. Interpretation of an appropriate general plan was left to local land use planners and their governments.

The results in Walnut Creek and the San Ramon Valley

were typical of jurisdictions around the state. Planners designed a complete urban center in each community with all the elements of a city, partially in an effort to remedy the one-dimensional residential character of post-World War II suburbs. The only consideration of metropolitan consequences focused on economic competition with nearby cities. Thus, the general plan law was used in the 1950s to designate districts for metropolitan employment centers in the small suburban downtown of Walnut Creek, and an undeveloped agricultural parcel in the San Ramon Valley.

As development boomed in Contra Costa County in the 1970s through the early 1980s, planners patiently stood by the general plans they had drafted in the 1950s. Planners used the plans to define the parameters of the container into which edge city development would later fit. That container would include location, permitted uses, density, design, and infrastructure requirements. The California general plan law enabled planners to create a vision of that container and keep it in place for three decades. In the long run, those grand visions of comprehensive planning would have little relationship to the metropolitan realities of the San Francisco Bay Area.

■ THE CASE STUDIES

Suburbanization of the Contra Costa County area lagged behind the region and state because it was isolated from the central Bay Area by the East Bay Hills. Both Walnut Creek

and the San Ramon Valley had to wait until the late 1960s for the completion of interstate highways and improvements to the Caldecott Tunnel in the Berkeley Hills to fully participate in the post World War II suburban construction boom.

San Ramon: Bishop Ranch

Contra Costa County planners and local residents of the unincorporated San Ramon Valley used that delay to make early plans for an employment node, in hopes of bringing jobs and tax base to the area. Beginning in the early 1950s, the county government, based 25 miles away in Martinez, planned for both residential suburban growth on the agricultural floor of the San Ramon Valley and a new employment center at Bishop Ranch (Figure 2).

The San Ramon case reveals a county planning staff trying to use planning technology to organize a




Figure 2. Downtown San Ramon and Bishop Ranch.

rambling collection of disparate communities and landscapes, ranging from an urban ghetto in Richmond to the rural San Ramon Valley and the industrial Sacramento Delta. County planners tried to create a regional vision that would rationalize land use and economic development in its various component subregions. In each of the subregions, the county either had primary jurisdiction for unincorporated lands or acted as a coordinator for the planning visions of incorporated cities

The San Ramon Valley was first formally addressed by local plans in 1958. Contra Costa County planners used a collection of smaller area plans to create a county general plan, which included the San Ramon Planning Area General Plan (Contra Costa County 1958). That plan proposed a light manufacturing center on 464 acres in the Bishop Ranch parcel, with the following justification:

The proposed general plan for the San Ramon Planning Area envisions the development of a well-balanced community in which the residents will find the necessary places to live, to shop and conduct business, and to earn their livelihoods....This 464 acre area, developed with manufacturing facilities employing an average of fifty workers per acre, would provide jobs for some 23,200 workers. This is roughly twice as many industrial workers as could be anticipated in the projected ultimate population of the San Ramon Planning Area plus the Alamo-Danville Planning Area...(12).

This initial plan for the Bishop Ranch site envisioned an employment center providing jobs for a local community of middle-income industrial workers as well as an equal number of commuting workers from outside the planning area. County planners and local residents agreed that the Bishop Ranch site should contain an employment center to provide jobs in an isolated area undergoing residential growth, to reduce traffic, and to economically diversify its tax base. The county's original vision was somewhat regional because it anticipated that the San Ramon Valley would eventually incorporate into a new city, which would coordinate with other cities in the county and the Bay Area. While they did not usurp the economic decisions of corporate capital, planners certainly exercised continuous control over the location of development and its uses, in an effort to follow a specific metropolitan vision.

Over the long run, their plans for economic diversification in the San Ramon Valley were sufficient to attract regional employers relying on a mix of commuters and local residents. The quality of those quantitative projections for Bishop Ranch is one of the successes of the general plan process. The numbers closely estimated the actual number of employees now working in the Bishop Ranch development. County planners were also sufficiently flexible to fine-tune their

expectations for types of employment as the Bay Area economy evolved. The crucial failures of the plan and its predictions of 1958 were in evaluating the type of workers, their incomes, and their mismatch with an upscale housing stock. The planners could not foresee the changes in regional employment and real estate markets that occurred the late 1970s. With that knowledge unavailable, the plan did not adequately address traffic issues, simply proposing a four-lane freeway along the existing Highway 21 corridor.

County planners kept their idea of an employment center at Bishop Ranch alive against strong demand for residential development through the 1970s. In 1977, County planners wrote a new San Ramon General Plan to redefine the uses at Bishop Ranch, as well as the overall composition of this new community, stating:

As a further and important ingredient in establishing the balanced community, some 800 acres have been designated for controlled manufacturing uses. This would provide for local employment and thereby decrease commuting and would increase considerably the tax base...(Contra Costa County 1977, 12).

The 800-acre parcel still included the Bishop Ranch site and adjoining areas, but specified a new use, "controlled manufacturing." County planners were encouraged in their vision for the San Ramon Valley by the purchase of the Bishop Ranch site by the Western Electric Company in 1969, which had plans to build a telephone factory on the site (Contra Costa Times, 5-24-81). At the time it purchased the site, Western Electric had a monopoly over the manufacture and sale of telephones in the United States. The completion of Interstate 680 adjacent to Bishop Ranch in 1971 also buoyed county planners, along with commencement of BART service that year with a station at Walnut Creek only a few minutes away on the new freeway. Planners believed that an ideal light industrial employer and the necessary metropolitan transportation infrastructure were both in place. However, shortly after the writing of the 1977 plan, settlement of a federal anti-trust action against AT&T eliminated Western Electric's monopoly on telephones and its need for the new plant (Oswald 1993). As a result, county planners were forced to adjust their expectations for Bishop Ranch to meet changing economic and corporate conditions and await new development proposals for the site.

Besides the employment uses at Bishop Ranch, the 1977 plan proposed a broad mix of housing densities, including low density and multiple unit, a major diversification of the community from its existing single family detached housing grid. The housing designations, the provisions for schools and parks, and the provision of small scale office and controlled manufacturing employment all described a community that would be middle and working class, family oriented, and self

sufficient. The creation of a new, "balanced" city was underway (Contra Costa County 1977, 8-12).

The realization of the Bishop Ranch plan did not occur until the mid-1980s, after the purchase of the site by a regional residential developer, Sunset Development Company. Implementation of plans for Bishop Ranch was simplified because the entire site was developed by the family-owned company that had an established relationship with the county planners (Rauber 1987, 19; Steidtmann 1985, 15). Nevertheless, Sunset did not receive a blank check. Sunset initially proposed a mixed-use residential and commercial project for the site (Oswald 1993; Hirsch 1993). County planners rejected that initial proposal, emphasizing the site's general plan designation as an employment node. They also noted that, in the county's view, good planning required separation of housing and employment uses. County officials and members of a local planning advisory council suggested to Sunset that it check the needs of expanding corporate headquarters in San Francisco. Sunset Development tested that corporate office market by building two speculative 50,000-square-foot office buildings, which were quick successes. Major back-office centers for Chevron Research, Pacific Bell, and Toyota quickly followed as corporate tenants at Bishop Ranch. The result was a clear victory for the county's vision for the site and for the general plan process.

The ultimate role of county planners was to designate the uses for Bishop Ranch and stubbornly stick to that decision over more than two decades. Once the private sector produced a developer who met the economic and design expectations of the county, planners were content to facilitate and fine-tune the development. Thus, their role was to set the stage over several general plans, steadfastly limit the kinds of development and its location, and then ultimately let the market build the project.

Role of the County Planning Department

The San Ramon case study illustrates a complex historical shifting of the roles of a county planning department and a new city planning department, with the intervention of the Proposition 13 tax limitation initiative and the subsequent financial pressures on the relationships between county government and its cities.

To implement their vision for Bishop Ranch, county planners sought out the developer and tenants that eventually came to the site. The County Community Development Department took a major risk to protect its vision for the San Ramon Valley by turning down the first Sunset Development Company proposal for Bishop Ranch. Not only could that decision have further stalled the building of Bishop Ranch, but it occurred the year following the passage of Proposition 13 and the appearance of new financial uncertainties for the county. That level of intervention in the development process, particularly with regional and national corporate development, was new for planners in Contra Costa County.

It was in the informal processes of negotiating implementation of large-scale development that county planners exercised their most important new role. The use of informal meetings to review preliminary ideas for projects became a primary forum for the interaction between county planners and private developers. The meetings would occur before formal application for building permits, and represented a belief in the development community that developers had to make sure their project fit the county's vision for the region before moving beyond conceptual sketches and ideas. Developers and planners alike recall a regular procedure, beginning in the 1970s, of bringing drawings, ideas, and preliminary projects to informal meetings to see what the planners thought. Planning staff would look at the preliminary proposals and make suggestions, usually framed in terms of "why not try this" (Oswald 1993; Cutler 1993). Planners would fall back on the general plans as authority for the expected use of parcels like Bishop Ranch. The informal review would cover the full range of issues from land uses to architectural design.

When asked how county planners controlled development in Bishop Ranch, the project planner for the San Ramon Valley at that time replied:

If you are asking if we had strong institutions in place that gave us great power, the answer is no. If the question is, through our planned unit development ordinance did...[planners] exert undue pressure on the development community to assure it was a class act, the answer is yes, without a doubt...(Cutler 1993).

That "undue pressure" was exerted in several ways in Contra Costa County. First, the county planning staff developed professional relationships with planners and designers in the development community, in part through the informal meetings used to persuade them to change projects. Second, the planning director exercised personal control over the permit process, through manipulation of the bureaucratic process and formation of long-term working relationships with developers in the area. He could either hasten the progress of a desirable project through the permit process, or let a disfavored project sit on his desk for months (Oswald 1993). Last, the planned unit development (PUD) designation gave the county broad discretion over the final form of projects (Cutler 1993; Oswald 1993; Bottarini 1993).

When Sunset Development proposed its mixed-use residential project for Bishop Ranch, it was not met with a simple rejection of its plans. It was met with "suggestions" that it try to find employer tenants for office projects. Once Bishop Ranch was underway, county planners "suggested" certain kinds of architectural design, landscaping, urban design amenities, and infrastructure. Although this new approach to large-scale development relied on general plans and planned unit development districts, it was implemented through

informal meetings, persuasion, and subtle bureaucratic maneuvers.

At the same time, the passage of Proposition 13 had created a new planning environment. Developers quickly realized that their best strategy in that new environment was to propose projects without infrastructure or service costs to local government. While it probably eliminated a good number of planning jobs, Proposition 13 ironically enhanced the power of planners in their relationships with developers. Added to their implementation powers under the general plans, post-Proposition 13 planners could summarily reject a new project that would burden existing infrastructure and services. A secondary consequence of this change was that the addition of infrastructure to the development package then drove up the scale of projects, since developers had to build sufficiently large projects to justify those costs.

This relationship departed from traditional models of planning practice in several ways. In the past, planners had spent most of their time reviewing complete project plans and issuing building permits. If these projects had been trapped in that regulatory model, they would have moved up a rigid hierarchy of approvals, ultimately controlled by elected politicians. Planners could not control the outcome in the political arena, where the development community could bring greater economic and political power, as well as technical and legal expertise.

Planned unit development authority allowed planners to negotiate with developers for an entire large-scale development as a package, and to present the result to the Board of Supervisors as an agreed plan. This gave planners both comprehensive control over large projects and the flexibility to step aside from zoning. The general plan became more important than zoning in the PUD approval process because it regulated at the same scale. Negotiating projects of that scale changed the role of planners and adapted the approval process to larger scale developers.

The Contra Costa County planners escaped that regulatory box and formed professional alliances with developers on a project-by-project basis. They moved the approval process from the regulatory-political arena into an informal, professional exchange of opinions.

Walnut Creek: The Golden Triangle

Walnut Creek also used the delay in suburban growth, before the Interstate highway and tunnel were completed, to plan for economic diversification. Those plans were first focused on the downtown core. The edge city development emerged on a triangular shaped parcel next to the BART station, identified as the *Golden Triangle* (Figure 3).

The city's 1953 *Preliminary General Plan* included proposals for commercial development of the downtown, and expressed concern for making Walnut Creek competitive as a suburban city:

The rapidity with which the land area described above approaches the population indicated will depend to a very large extent on the development of employment opportunities in the area. Although at present the area's economic base is provided by its agriculture and its functioning as a bedroom for the San Francisco bay area, it can not [sic] be expected that significant population growth will occur unless and until suitable employment is provided within this broad planning area [Central Contra Costa County]... (Walnut Creek 1953, 6).

Thus, local government used the general plan mechanism to formalize a vision of becoming much more than a successful "bedroom community."

Planning downtown employment and commercial development in the core area continued in Walnut Creek with the drafting of an optional element of the general plan, the 1966 Core Area Plan. That plan proposed a central core with metropolitan "drawing power" to effectively compete with surrounding communities for employment and tax base. It was the first plan to include the new BART station, which would appear in the early 1970s.

Compared to Bishop Ranch, Walnut Creek developers exercised greater control over the choice of the Golden Triangle site and its uses. Although developable land remained in other areas of the downtown core, the suburban office market dictated locating adjacent to BART to maximize transportation access. That focal point of rail and highway transit was Walnut Creek's market advantage.

Once the market chose its location from the larger envelope created by the comprehensive planning process, Walnut Creek planners shaped the physical form of the Golden Triangle. While the Walnut Creek Community Development Department followed more traditional bureaucratic processes, the role of planners was central in shaping the final urban form.

The 1971 General Plan continued to refine the idea of Walnut Creek's destiny as the center of Contra Costa County, declaring:

During the next 20 years Walnut Creek is expected to emerge, together with the cities of Concord and Pleasant Hill, as a sub-regional center of the Bay Region....Increasing emphasis will be placed on office and banking activities in the Core Area as evidenced by this type of floor area representing 85% of the growth in the Core Area in 1969-70 fiscal year....Development and expansion of major public-oriented facilities such as the Civic Center, the Walnut Creek Rapid Transit Station, and the Kaiser Center will stimulate intensive high-rise development nearby...(Walnut Creek 1979, 1-8).




Figure 3. Downtown Walnut Creek and the Golden Triangle.

That plan contained a specific land use goal: "To enhance Walnut Creek's subregional position as the administrative and professional office center of Central Contra Costa County" (Walnut Creek 1979, 2-3). Thus, the relationship Walnut Creek planners saw with the region was one of competition for office uses. That competition fueled the continued plans to forge an urban center in this small suburban town, and reflected a new community boosterism in the regional arena.

The Walnut Creek plan was implemented by national and regional developers eager to take part in the region's unprecedented boom in suburban office space. Those developers built a series of major high-rise office projects that transformed the Golden Triangle into an edge city between 1982 and 1986. In 1984 alone, the Golden Triangle saw the construction of three eight- to ten-story office buildings, with 1.1 million square feet of space (Contra Costa Times 6-17-84).

The Walnut Creek developers differed from their counterparts in San Ramon in several respects. The Walnut Creek projects involved multiple developers building office towers to compete for tenants. Rather than corporate back offices, the tenants for these towers would rent smaller blocks of space for corporate and professional uses. Most of the Golden Triangle was built by corporate developers from outside Contra Costa County, with regional investment and speculation interests and without ties to local politics or the community. Their motivation was to find alternative centers for San Francisco area office growth; enhancing Walnut Creek's downtown or

the Bay Area was not a motivating force.

Experienced in urban high-rise office development, the developers used standardized plans designed for larger cities, which resulted in conflicts over urban design. These developers expected little regulation of form or design by local planners. The initial design was for bulky "plain Jane" (Binger 1993) towers inappropriate for the scale of downtown Walnut Creek or its urban design guidelines. Walnut Creek planners were able to use the long-standing general plan and their discretionary authority in elective use zoning districts to gain control over developers and complete their vision. The comprehensive downtown plan, prepared in the early 1950s and updated in the 1970s, envisioned a high-rise office core connected to the new BART station by a revitalized older downtown, creating a planning envelope that controlled the location, design, and uses of the new high-rise edge city. In the Walnut Creek case, that container also included replacement housing.

Role of the City Planning Department

Along with general plans, Walnut Creek used elective use districts and a design review ordinance to guide new development. Their primary goal evolved from simple economic diversification to the development of a complete, vital urban center. The planners

focused on urban design, housing, and traffic issues—playing a strong role in controlling the shape of this new urban center.

The Walnut Creek case reveals an interaction between planners and developers like that in San Ramon. However, the process was more adversarial than San Ramon's and did not include the same reliance on preliminary informal reviews of conceptual designs. Rather, plans, drawings, and applications were formally submitted before planners negotiated with developers (Binger 1993; Guyer 1993). Once proposals were submitted through the usual bureaucratic process, planners and developers met to negotiate before going to the City Council for approval.

Thus, Walnut Creek staff would reject proposals and return them to the developers, recommending changes. Rather than relying on persuasion alone, Walnut Creek planners argued with developers that they had credibility with the Council based on an earlier track record of successful downtown revitalization (Binger 1993; Guyer 1993). This decision-making process reflected the reality of elective-use development zoning for the downtown, which required City Council approval of all projects. The procedures minimized the role of the planning commission to that of preparing cases for the City Council. As a result, the dynamics of the negotiations between planners and developers were both more adversarial and more regulatory than in San Ramon.

Despite the more adversarial climate, the goal was to reach consensus on projects before the City Council approval

meeting. Neither planning staff nor developers wanted to engage in an adversarial hearing process at the Council level. Thus, the approach was to work out their differences by focusing on the physical form and bulk of the major high-rise projects. Planners took control of the design of those buildings—and the urban form of the edge city—by using the existing urban design ordinance to persuade developers to step the buildings, reduce bulk, link the plazas, and create public spaces. They were successful in reducing and relocating parking, a major economic consideration for suburban California office projects. Planners went so far as to provide developers with a list of suggested architectural firms to design their buildings. In addition, the planners also required agreements from developers to voluntarily replace housing that was displaced by the Golden Triangle. Ultimately, developers agreed to those exactions rather than risk confrontation at a public hearing. Thus, planners worked to shape the physical form and determine the placement of buildings within the district. The process in Walnut Creek was more constrained negotiation, with a broader focus on urban design. The result was that planners were able to control the construction of an urban center that radically altered the urban form of downtown Walnut Creek.

■ NEW ROLES FOR PLANNERS

This history of the rapid urbanization of two suburban communities into edge cities demonstrates a new set of roles for land use planners. They were the first actors in a 30-year planning process to propose the location of the new centers. Early use of the comprehensive planning process provided greater long-term control over implementation. Planners exercised significantly greater influence over the planning and development of these major urban centers, without becoming specialized economic or community developers. As a result, the urban form that finally emerged was shaped not only by the financial resources of the private development community but by the vision of planners.

Suburban land use planners had been viewed as minor actors in the process of suburban growth during the late 1950s and through the 1960s, particularly in rapidly growing areas like California (Hoch 1994, 28-43). The evidence found in these case studies belies that pattern. Planners played an important part in the political economy of land use and urban form. They played a greater role than they had in the past in persuading the development community to make concessions in the location of development, the uses of the sites, and the physical form of the projects. Additionally, in the Walnut Creek example, they required both urban design amenities and replacement housing.

From the outset, the approach taken by planners was to avoid political controversy. Planners interviewed for this research recalled that planning in Contra Costa County had been considered a technical and uncontroversial process through the 1970s. Although they were given tasks that

reflected a serious pro-growth agenda, real politics was handled by the planning director in each office. Staff planners were left outside the day-to-day world of political give and take to draw technical general plans for these communities, supported by a general consensus on the goal of economically diversified growth (Cutler 1993; Guyer 1993; Jerome 1993).

In a curious way, planners gained control of an increasingly politically driven process by avoiding politics. Planners, together with independent planning commissions, drew comprehensive land use plans so far into the future that opposition was hard to focus. Planners then shifted control of future implementation to themselves through the introduction of discretionary planning devices such as the planned unit development and elective use districts. Thus, planners were able to enhance their authority within local government with little direct political conflict. Years later, when the pro-growth sentiment gave way to growth control, the planners were able to use their new authority to prevail in negotiations with developers. They could suggest to developers that the plans and designations might be the best results they could expect in a new political environment questioning growth. Over time, planners patiently gained control of then little-valued functions of government—like general plans, zoning regulations, and land use approvals—that would later determine both the shape of new cities and their economic survival in times of fiscal restraint.

By the time the edge-city projects emerged, planners were adept at using planned unit developments and elective use districts, along with general plans, to maintain control over large-scale development. Those devices required approval by the governing boards, the City Council in Walnut Creek, and the Board of Supervisors in Contra Costa County, minimizing the traditional role of the planning commissions and increasing the importance of the professional planning staff. By the 1970s, the longevity of the general plan, together with the new state mandate for consistency, made it more difficult to change uses and locations. It also notified developers of acceptable uses and locations long before the project approval stage. As a result, the general plan had an incalculable effect as an automatic screening device that probably eliminated many projects before the proposal stage. Planners were thus able to control large-scale development with the acceptance of the general plan, and to provide themselves increased authority in their implementation role through the new zoning devices.

Using the new planning devices together with an avoidance of adversarial politics, planners were able to change several aspects of their role in these communities.

First, rather than maintaining their previous adversarial relationship with developers, public planners and developer staff planners or consultants cooperated in deciding the location, form, and uses of the new edge cities. While a developer could seek a general plan amendment, a zoning change, or approval of a specific plan before the city council or board of supervisors, by the 1980s that increasingly brought

fatal public scrutiny to major projects. If instead that project could be negotiated with public planners through mechanisms like a specific plan or planned unit development and jointly recommended to the council or board by both the planning staff and the developer, the political process became much more predictable. That shift was hastened by the larger scale of the corporate developers and the involvement of professional planners or consultants, who had no direct financial stake in the project, in development firms. As a result, the relationship became a negotiation between professional equals rather than between investors and regulators. The larger issues of edge-city planning were worked out cooperatively, which was unprecedented.

Second, public planners shifted from the pattern of responding to complete project proposals from developers as *fait accompli* to actively shaping these new urban centers in advance—and even courting development that fit their visions for the community. Planners became proactive and visionary, taking the initiative in planning urban centers. They changed the uses in those centers over time to accommodate shifts in the national and regional economies and to build a niche for each community's economic growth in those economies. Their plans were efforts to maximize the quality of local development in the rapidly changing economy and landscape of the San Francisco Bay Area. They no longer accepted major development without question for the sake of local economic growth. They moved from a reactive role to a participatory one.

Third, the edge-city public planners became more involved in physical design, rather than being regulators or technical plan checkers. They intervened in the design process at different levels in both Walnut Creek and San Ramon. These planners had a vision of what Walnut Creek and San Ramon would eventually look like and what their place would be in the San Francisco Bay Area, and they challenged developers to fit projects into that vision.

The sum of the new aspects of planning practice was synergistic. Planners became interdisciplinary visionaries, adding cooperation, forecasting, and physical design to their professional toolboxes. These new roles did not replace the older roles of regulation and technical review but were layered on top of them. Thus planners developed and refined their competence, as evidenced by an unusual number of younger planners in these two offices who quickly moved into major planning leadership positions. At a broader level, the metropolitan form that resulted was the product of those visions.

It is difficult to find precisely analogous roles in the growing literature on planner roles. Charles Hoch's (1994) work uses the broad categories of comprehensive plan makers, regulators, negotiators, community organizers, and research analysts. The San Ramon and Walnut Creek planners were certainly comprehensive plan makers, although the plan was a means rather than an end for them. These plan makers emerged as patient professionals who could focus their vision on creating

comprehensive plans for later implementation. In the implementation phase, they acted as negotiators, but with a different cast of stakeholders than in past studies (Hoch 1994; Forester 1987). Rather than negotiating between developers and the public, these planners negotiated with developers for a shared professional vision of new communities. Public opinion was not a major element of edge city planning in either community. Indeed, the public had to be coaxed into a small advisory committee in San Ramon, and could not be persuaded to come to the final approval meeting for the Walnut Creek edge city. The political consequences of that rarified level of visionary planning came quickly after the construction of the edge cities in the form of growth control and environmental battles.

■ THE LESSONS OF SAN RAMON AND WALNUT CREEK

Three important sets of findings about edge cities emerge from this research. First, despite business and popular literature explaining their appearance as short-term shifts in suburban office markets or regional retailing, the Walnut Creek and San Ramon edge cities were also the result of carefully crafted comprehensive land use plans spanning three decades. They anticipated suburban growth and worked to complete those communities with regional urban centers in defined locations. That finding certainly raises the need for further research to determine the history and influence of comprehensive planning in other U.S. edge cities.

The second finding of this research is that the California general plan requirement, then ahead of its time politically and designed to remediate urban sprawl, was an essential planning device in this long-term process. While the discretionary devices of planned unit development and elective use districts were important to the final implementation, the general plans helped planners nurture a vision over decades, until the right market conditions and the right proposals came together. The general plans explain the rational form of these centers and their logical placement within the urban fabric. The large number of edge cities around the country in states with less stringent requirements indicates that state-mandated comprehensive plans are probably not a prerequisite for edge-city development. However, one would at least expect to find a relationship between the presence of comprehensive land use planning and an edge city's urban form, location, and uses. Nevertheless, within the confines of California planning regulation, these edge cities are success stories of the general plan. At the local level, they organized employment and commercial growth into well-defined urban centers.

The long-term regional consequences of that general plan process have been more problematic for the metropolitan Bay Area region. Edge-city growth has contributed to the fragmentation of metropolitan life, gridlock in regional transportation systems, urban abandonment, and environmental degradation. The employees moved to the Walnut Creek and San Ramon back-office centers were largely lower-middle-income adminis-

trative and clerical workers who had no need to be in more costly downtown San Francisco locations. They arrived just as a tremendous inflation in Bay Area housing costs raised entry-level housing prices in those communities well beyond their means. That mismatch triggered increased reverse and cross commutes on the regional interstate highway system, increasing congestion and air pollution. Over time, that mismatch also triggered a market for lower-cost housing in the California Central Valley to the east of the Bay Area, generating more urban sprawl and longer commutes. In addition, the growth of the employment and retail base in these edge cities was, at least in part, at the cost of further abandonment of downtown Oakland (see Greenbelt Alliance 1988).

Locally implemented general plans encouraged the planning of many separate urban centers, with little concern for regional consequences. These case studies are clear evidence of the need for regional planning and coordination of local general plans in California. The use of these plans in Walnut Creek and San Ramon certainly attest to the effectiveness of comprehensive land use planning for local economic growth. What was lacking in this story was a mechanism by which voters and their representatives could decide where they wanted urban centers to be at the metropolitan level. The San Ramon and Walnut Creek planners had type of a regional vision, that they successfully sized up the economic and social changes in the region and repositioned their communities to compete more effectively for a diversified economic niche in that region. However, their vision was not one of coordination and cooperation with other cities or counties in the Bay Area. It was a competitive, locally focused vision where decisions were made by a small number of planners and local officials on behalf of the public—without discussion of regional consequences. Those regional consequences have been among the most serious negative externalities of edge-city growth.

The solutions lie in metropolitan-scale planning. Since the creation of new metropolitan planning agencies in California is not a realistic political prospect at this time, an immediate solution to the further fragmentation of its urban centers may lie more in incentives for cooperation among cities and counties at the subregional level. Informal cooperation between local governments has already started to emerge in the region as a result of federal funding for traffic, environmental quality, and air pollution. This research demonstrates the urgent need for more regional coordination of planning functions.

The third and final findings of this research concern the new roles of public land use planners in the building of edge cities. In the two case studies here, the planners developed new approaches to implementing large developments, and they formed different relationships with their counterparts in the development community. The roles of planners in the development process, and in the politics of their own local governments, were enhanced by those changes. Those new roles include consensus building and collaboration with

developers, becoming more important actors in the development process, and shaping the physical form of new cities. The techniques to implement the new roles included a plethora of informal and nonadversarial alternatives to traditional approval processes.

One would certainly not expect to find planners playing identical roles in all edge cities. Nevertheless, increased scale of development along with the use of professional planners and the increased interest in less adversarial alternatives on the public side would suggest that further research might turn up many of the same elements of this new role in other cases. Furthermore, recent historical research reports that similar urban planning, political change, and economic development took place during the same time periods in six other communities in California, New York, Michigan, Illinois, and Missouri (Teaford 1997). Thus, the need for additional research to determine the extent to which edge-city development has changed the professional roles of public planners is clear.

Additionally, while the shifts found here provide important benefits in fostering collaborative professional roles and in stripping away unneeded regulation, they are also problematic. The danger of an informal, collaborative process is that developers frequently have greater resources than public planners, and may be better equipped to manipulate that process. It would be a mistake to junk a predictable regulatory structure and public scrutiny because of the effectiveness of alternative approaches in the building of these two edge cities. While the new informal and collaborative processes seen in Contra Costa County should certainly become part of the toolbox of land use planners, the underlying regulatory systems, controlled by the voters and open to public debate, must remain the foundation of land use regulation.

In the case of these large developments, the planners departed from their traditional roles as regulators and suspended their professional responsibilities to the larger community. The use of discretionary planning devices, like PUDs and elective use zoning, allowed planners to negotiate projects without the usual routine of hearings and approvals. Planners knew the process was looser and the stakes were higher. Despite that knowledge, they did not attempt to fashion new due process or disclosure processes to protect the public. The result was a major transformation of both communities with major input from publicly employed planners, but minimal input from the public itself.

At a metropolitan level, the replacement of standardized regulatory and bureaucratic processes with local informal and collaborative project reviews presents even greater problems. These edge cities have had a profound effect on the economic, cultural, and social life of the San Francisco Bay Region. The urban fabric and economic calculus of the central Bay Area, particularly in Oakland, have been radically altered by the shifting of wealth and urban activity to the edge. Metropolitan questions of affordable housing, social diversity, and regional

environmental policy have been lost in the excitement over these new centers. These legitimate regional concerns were not reflected in a local suburban growth consensus nor in the collaboration between planners and developers that built these edge cities. Not only does this research demonstrate the need for a new level of metropolitan coordination of planning, but the political divisions in this region require that any effective metropolitan planning effort must include an enforceable regulatory mechanism.

While the new Walnut Creek and San Ramon edge cities suggest an encouraging new role for the planning profession and a new ability to control and focus the development of large-scale urban centers, that role is not without serious questions. Those questions revolve around the consequences of this kind of land use planning at a metropolitan level. Planners must step back from the excitement of building new cities and carefully evaluate their regional obligations as land use planners.

■ NOTES

1. Pleasant Hill BART is an unincorporated area near Pleasant Hill, where development is concentrated around the BART station.
2. The composition of the narrative interviews included four developers or developer consultants, eight planners, five politicians, two environmentalists, and two newspaper writers. One interviewee was both a former politician and a current developer consultant. The Bishop Ranch office park was developed by a single developer, reducing the number of possible interviewees for that case. The local newspaper also presented pro-development analyses and histories of the edge cities, to balance planner views.

■ REFERENCES

- Altshuler, Alan. 1965. *The City Planning Process*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell.
- Binger, Gary. 1993. Interview of former planning director, City of Walnut Creek, currently director of the Bay Area Association of Governments. Tape recording. Telephone interview conducted by author in Oakland, California, March 30.
- Bottarini, Richard. 1993. Interview of former planning director, City of San Ramon, currently planning director, City of Pleasant Hill. Tape recording. Personal interview conducted by author in Pleasant Hill, California. January 20, 1994.
- Burby, Raymond, Philip Berke, Linda Dalton, John M. DeGrove, Steven P. French, Edward Kaiser, Peter J. May, and Dale Roenigk. 1993. Is state mandated planning effective? *Land Use Law and Zoning Digest* 45(10):3-9.
- Cervero, Robert. 1989. *America's Suburban Centers*. Boston, Mass.: Unwin Hyman.
- Contra Costa County Planning Department. 1958. *San Ramon Valley: Planning Area 9*. Martinez, Calif.
- Contra Costa County Planning Department. 1977. *San Ramon Valley Area General Plan*. Martinez, Calif.
- Contra Costa Times*. 1978-1994. Walnut Creek, Calif.
- Curtin, Daniel. 1991. *Guide to California Land Use Planning*. Point Arena, Calif.: Solano Press.
- Cutler, James. 1993. Interview of assistant director, Contra Costa County Community Development Department. Tape recording. Personal interview conducted by author in Martinez, California. August 6.
- Dalton, Linda. 1989. The limits of regulation: Evidence from local plan implementation in California. *Journal of the American Planning Association* 55(2):151-168.
- Dehaesus, Anthony. 1993. Former director, Contra Costa County Community Development Department. Tape recording. Telephone interview conducted by author in Walnut Creek, California, July 20, 1993.
- Forester, John. 1987. Planning in the face of conflict: Negotiation and mediation strategies in local land use regulation. *Journal of the American Planning Association* 53(3):303-314.
- Garreau, Joel. 1991. *Edge City: Life on the New Frontier*. New York: Doubleday.
- Garreau, Joel. 1994a. Edge cities in profile. *American Demographics* 16(2):24.
- Garreau, Joel. 1994b. *Understanding Edge Cities*. Washington, D.C.: Edge City Ventures.
- Greenbelt Alliance. 1988. *A Regional Greenbelt Policy for the Bay Area*. Policy Paper. San Francisco, Calif.
- Hall, Peter. 1988. *Cities of Tomorrow*. Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell.
- Hirsch, Jerome. 1993. Interview of former member of the San Ramon Valley Planning Council. Written notes. Personal interview conducted by author in Danville, California. January 17, 1994.
- Hoch, Charles. 1994. *What Planners Do: Power, Politics and Persuasion*. Chicago, Ill.: American Planning Association.
- Jerome, Randall. 1993. Interview of former Project Planner, Walnut Creek Community Development Department, currently Planning Director, City of Pittsburgh. Tape recording. Telephone interview conducted by author in Pittsburgh, California, February 28, 1994.
- Guyer, Dwayne. 1993. Interview of former Project Planner, Walnut Creek Community Development Department, currently Assistant Planning Director, El Cajon, California. Tape recording. Telephone interview conducted by author in El Cajon, California. February 8, 1994.
- Kent, T.J. 1964. *The Urban General Plan*. Chicago, Ill.: American Planning Association.
- Lotchin, Roger W. 1992. *Fortress California 1910-1961: From Warfare to Welfare*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lynch, Kevin. 1960. *Image of the City*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- McGovern, Patrick. 1994. Contra Costa County edge cities: The new political economy of planning. Ph.D. dissertation. University of California-Berkeley.
- Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress. 1995. *The technological reshaping of metropolitan America*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Oswald, Peter. 1993. Interview of vice president, Sunset Development Company, developers of Bishop Ranch. Written notes. Telephone interview conducted by author in San Ramon, California. March 18, 1993.
- Rauber, Paul. 1987. Citizen Leshner and the battle of Walnut Creek. *Express* 9(32)May 22:1,14-20. Berkeley, Calif.
- Sabatier, Paul. 1975. Social movements and regulatory agencies: Toward a more adequate—less pessimistic—theory of clientele capture. *Policy Sciences* 6(3):301-342.
- San Ramon City Planning Department. 1986. *San Ramon General Plan*. San Ramon, California.
- Sedway & Associates. 1992. Concord/Pleasanton—I-680 Corridor, California. In *Market Profiles*, ed. Urban Land Institute, 27-34. Washington, D.C.: Urban Land Institute.
- Stanback, Thomas M. 1991. *The New Suburbanization*. San Francisco, Calif.: Westview Press.
- Steidtmann, Nancy. 1985. Citizen Leshner. *Bay Area Business Magazine* 4(3) October:14-18.
- Teaford, Jon. 1997. *Post Suburbia: Government and Politics in the Edge Cities*. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins.
- U.S. Census Bureau. 1990. *1990 Census of Population: Social and Economic Characteristics, California*. September 1993. Washington, D.C.
- Walnut Creek Community Development Department. 1966. *Core Area General Plan/Civic-Cultural Plan*. Walnut Creek, Calif.
- Walnut Creek Community Development Department. 1979. *General Plan, City of Walnut Creek*. Walnut Creek, Calif.
- Walnut Creek Community Development Department. 1989. *1989 General Plan*. Walnut Creek, Calif.
- Walnut Creek Planning Department. 1953. *The Preliminary Plan for Walnut Creek*. Walnut Creek, Calif.
- Weiss, Marc A. 1987. *The Rise of the Community Builders: The American Real Estate Industry and Urban Land Planning*. New York: Columbia University Press.