

to be applied to the study of the administrative process generally, including formal organizational arrangements. Attention of students of public administration should be directed not only to the psychological factors influencing the decision-making process, but also to the institutional arrangements which help to maximize the possibilities of developing and maintaining rationality and responsibility in the making of administrative decisions. *Exclusive* concentration on psychological factors affecting human behavior may obscure the valid emphasis in democratic theory on methods for placing the responsibility for decision-making on government agencies.

As an insider's account of the evolution of rationing regulations, this book is a useful addition to the growing literature of wartime administrative history and clinical studies of administrative situations. It is not, and was not intended to be, a complete study of rationing administration. It is of prime importance for those who still hold to the notions of administration criticized by the author and for those who have not recognized the significance of human behavior factors in the study of administration.

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Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System. A Report of the Committee on Political Parties, American Political Science Association. (New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc. 1950. Pp. xi, 99. \$1.00.)

The thesis of this rambling discourse is that our two-party system is made up of "two loose associations . . . with very little national machinery . . . and cohesion," and the resultant irresponsibility is dangerous in an era of grave domestic and foreign problems. In three chapters and ninety-nine pages, the Report analyzes the need for party reform, presents proposals, and meditates on the prospects for action. Its goal is a party system that is "democratic, responsible and effective."

Students of the American party system cannot help but be disappointed with this study. It has many defects. First, it presumes to be scientifically based, and is not. The introduction claims that the Report "sums up the facts" and "rests on the results of scientific analysis." The extent of its scientific basis is two tables on the unrepresentativeness of national conventions. No truly scientific analysis of the cause-and-effect relationships in the political process has yet been made. The ASPA Committee operates with hypotheses which have never been verified, and considers these as "facts." It produces no evidence as to what actually causes irresponsibility, the lack of intraparty democracy, or pressure-group control. Is poor citizen interest due to the direct primary (p. 30), party irresponsibility (p. 65), exclusion of electors from program formulation (p. 69), the necessity for

periodic registration (p. 76), or the failure to hold elections on Saturday or Sunday (p. 77)? Is "internal separatism" really a "corollary of federalism"? Hypotheses should be verified, not acted upon.

Further, the Report is internally inconsistent. Can one square the assertion that "there is no real ideological division in the American electorate" (hypothesis-"fact," p. 20) with the proposal for programmatic reform to present policy alternatives for the voters? Again, if it is true that "the whole weight of tradition in American politics is against very rigid party discipline" (hypothesis-"fact," p. 21), how can the sanctions for disloyalty and rebellion advocated (p. 23) be successful? If the closed primary has failed to produce a membership concept, why nationalize it?

The conclusions of the Committee are unrealistic and naive. One reads the Report wondering if we have gotten any closer to the roots of the classic problems of localism, pressure-group dominance, oligarchy, and public apathy. These problems are perceived as too simple; the causes, too evident; and the remedies, too easy. Proposed cure is formalistic, not functional. Merely overhauling party machinery and the ballot will never achieve reform. Other than institutional determinants for the ailments of our political system exist. We might well study individual motivation, values, and attitudes, as well as the group structure of our society before we pose as reformers.

In sum, the profession has assumed the role of political engineering before proving the causes and facts of the party system. There are, significantly enough, no supporting studies to the Report. There is in fact scant evidential support for most of the Committee's proposals. Democratic, responsible, and effective parties, and "program-conscious" voters who participate, are indeed good goals, but it is a bit absurd to believe that it can be hatched out of thin air. Would that the committee of sixteen esteemed political scientists had spent their time mapping out a blueprint for knowledge and not for action.

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The Economics of Collective Action. By JOHN R. COMMONS. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1950. Pp. xii, 414. \$5.00.)

This book will be disappointing reading for those who look for clarity of expression and thoroughness of thought.

Born in 1862, the late Professor Commons lived through the transformation of the American economy from the individualistic agrarian state to the present conglomeration of power groups in which individual action is controlled by "collective action." Intimately involved in industrial relations and in the making of social legislation, Commons was strongly