<u>The Long Decline of the Republican Party in New England</u>

A Thesis
Submitted to
The University of Michigan
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Honors Bachelor of Arts

Department of Political Science

Tom Duvall
March 2010

Table of Contents

Author's Note

I was born and lived in Connecticut until the age of 11. On my bus ride to school, we would first pass by the Methodist church at the end of my street that was white and had the traditional look of what New England was supposed to look like. Just before we got to school, we passed the much larger Catholic Church that everybody I knew went to. This project was a way to examine that change in New England and understand how the region and its politics were so different than its traditional image. Our politics were highly contested on the local level, but almost uniformly Democratic on the national level and I wanted to examine how the region changed from being the most Republican in the country to the most Democratic.

I would like to acknowledge and thank Professors Jowei Chen and Andrei Markovits for their help and guidance in this process. I would also like to thank all of my friends and family for their help and their patience with me. New England is a spectacular area of the country and I feel privileged to have spent so much time there. Though my fandom of the Boston Red Sox may be my main connection to the region at this point, I will always feel deeply connected to the area.

Abstract

Realignment has long been studied as an important phenomenon within American politics. Studies have focused on the national level differences within the parties and particularly on realignment in the South in the second half of the twentieth century. However, examination of that realignment leads to the question of if there has been corresponding realignment in the northern states, and if so, why it has occurred. This paper will argue that New England has been undergoing a steady realignment towards the Democratic Party since the Civil War and its aftermath of Republican dominance. This growth has occurred in different states at different times due to demographic changes and alterations of parties' political platforms.

Immigration was the key factor throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as Catholic immigrants became strong Democratic voters as they were excluded from and opposed by the strongly nativist Yankee Republican establishment. Through continued immigration, they ultimately became a majority of the population and exercised their power to elect Democrats with the Al Smith campaign in 1928. From that point onwards, the Democratic Party has been ascendant in the region, as the New Deal coalition expanded and as the Republican Party became dominated by its southern wing. The effect was to alienate the secular and highly educated voters of the region and turn them into increasingly strong Democratic voters. The Republican Party today is now a reduced shell of its former self, reduced to running personalistic campaigns with no likelihood for widespread success in the region.

Introduction

      The history of American elections is of parties competing against each other with each gaining support from specific regions. The modern Republican coalition is based around the South and West, while the Democrats have control in the Far West, Northeast, and the Midwest. In 1896, William McKinley won a Republican victory by almost perfectly inverting the coalition of today with victories in the areas controlled by the modern Democratic Party. The most Republican area in the country in that election was New England with not a single county in any of the six states voting for the Democrat Williams Jennings Bryan. In 2008, however, New England had flipped to become the most Democratic region in the country with only five counties in the six states voting for Republican nominee John McCain. This transition is one that deserves careful study and a comprehensive look at how it has occurred.

Average Democratic Vote in Presidential Elections in New England versus the National Trend
1856-2008

$y = 0.1086x - 213.01$
$R^2 = 0.5357$

      This graph shows the relationship between the Democratic vote in New England for the presidency versus that of the entire country. The Democratic share of the vote

steadily increases, despite the peaks and troughs of candidates with certain appeal or more fairly dislike in the region like William Jennings Bryan in 1896 and Barry Goldwater in 1964. The R-squared value for the linear regression is .5367, implying a moderately strong positive linear increase in the Democratic vote throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Percentage of New England Congressional Seats Held by Democrats 1854-2008

$$y = 0.4999x - 931.19$$
$$R^2 = 0.8188$$

The growth of the Democratic Party can be seen even better with this graph of the growth of the Democratic Party in the Senate and House of Representatives in the region[1]. Republicans were immediately dominant after their founding in 1854 with 38 of 41 total House and Senate seats within the region and have had a steadily decreasing presence since then until 2008 where they are down to three Senate seats throughout the region. Democratic dominance also extends to the state level as Democrats control all twelve state legislature houses within the region, though they split the current governorships with the Republicans.

---

[1] See Appendix II for the complete list of congressional delegations from each state 1854-2008

The question brought up by all of this data is how there was such a strong transformation throughout this entire region to create periods of such strong single-party dominance. There was clearly a strong transition and this thesis will attempt to explain how and why this occurred. It will argue that New England has been in a constant state of realignment towards the Democrats since the Republican Party was founded and became dominant in 1854, culminating in the Democratic dominance that exists today. This realignment was created by the changing demographics from mass Catholic immigration into the region and the national realignment of the parties that has occurred within the twentieth century to make the Democratic Party uniquely appealing to New England. These ideas can be best examined through a comprehensive approach to the political history of New England in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to gain a full understanding of why realignment has occurred within the region.

Literature Review

Realignment theory is the tool used by political scientists to describe these periods of change nationally and within specific regions. The idea was first originated by V.O. Key in 1955 as a way of explaining the cycles of political control within American history. He described the importance of "a systematic comparative approach, with a focus on variations in the nature of elections" as "fruitful in advancing understanding of the democratic governing process. (Key 3) Certain elections can be classified by such a system as critical elections where "there occurs a sharp and durable electoral realignment between parties" in which different groups in the electorate shift their partisan allegiances. (16) Key focused on the election of 1928 in New England towns which created durable shifts towards the Democratic Party by motivating urban Catholic voters

to turn out and vote. This stood in contrast to the 1896 election where the composition of the electorate was similar to 1892, but many voters who had previously gone Democratic went for the Republican candidate over the party's new platform

The theory was refined by Walter Dean Burnham in his 1970 work *Critical Elections*. The book introduced the idea of periodicity into realignment theory and separated out elections into critical elections where coalitions shifted and converting elections which finish the realignment from the crucial elections. He describes realignment as a response to political crises that upends the existing political system and creates a "cycle of oscillation between the normal and the disruptive". (Gamm 21) Burnham and subsequent scholars have identified the major realigning elections in American history which defined their subsequent eras and reformed the major party coalitions. They occur in thirty-two to forty year cycles and commonly-agreed upon years include 1800, 1832, 1860, 1896, and 1932. They stand in contrast to secular realignments which are more long-term shifts in voting behavior that occur gradually, rather than during a single election. (Paulson 2000, p. xvii) Critical realignments are meant to produce lasting coalitions until the next critical election, but there are periods of party decay within these eras, creating distinct sub periods with strong third-party movements. (Clubb 27)

Another view on realignment which attempts to explain ticket splitting from the 1960s to the present is called dealignment. Extended periods of split party rule have existed since 1968, creating a period of time without single party dominance on the national level. (Nelson 2) Voters have become increasingly apathetic and less likely to identify with a specific party and interest groups have a far stronger role in the

nomination and political processes. (Paulson 2000) Albert Nelson divides the period between 1960-2000 into a period of Democratic liberalism, followed by conservative consolidation, dealignment from the existing parties and then a shadow realignment where the party platforms shifted to establish a new equilibrium in a more conservative direction. (Nelson 91) Arthur Paulson (2000) argues this idea from a different perspective by arguing for a slow realignment that occurred first on the presidential level and took decades to filter down to the Congressional and state levels as the parties have become more polarized. (20)

New England as a Region

When trying to answer a question about a political region, it is always important to define the region. New England consists of the six states of Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. It can be difficult sometimes to make generalizations about all six states, but they roughly break down in a north-south divide with Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine being more rural and agricultural and Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island being more industrial. This has had massive impacts on the history and demography of the region and has resulted in divergent paths of development.

It is a region with a governing structure unlike any other area of the country. The basic unit of governance is the town, dating back to the Puritan settlers who first came to the area. The county is a unit with no distinct purpose as there is no county government and all governance takes place on the state level or at the town level. (Kopp 5) This devolution of power has led to a strong belief in the importance of direct democracy and town meetings in deciding issues for the community. In four of the six states, the lower

house of the state legislature was originally apportioned by town where each town received a seat, enshrining into statewide practice the importance of those subdivisions. (Kopp 6) This tradition faltered with the growth of industry and the subsequent urbanization that occurred, causing the cities of the region to be controlled by great political machines, relying on ethnic loyalty and patronage to secure the necessary votes to stay in power.

The identity of New England is built around the idea of the Yankee, which is still present to this day. It was important in the 1820's and centered around traditional notions of town life, borrowed from the traditional English model with a commons, churches, and white picket fences. This past was seen as the ideal model and romanticized as how life ought to be lived. (Conforti 149) Inside the town was the ideal Yankee, an Anglo-Saxon Protestant who lived on his wits and was known for his "commercial shrewdness and a restless mobility". (Conforti 151) Part of this Yankee identity came with an embrace of Pilgrim heritage and their traditional Puritan ideological traditions of liberty and independence that future New Englanders sought to embrace.

Identity within the region was also based on a purposeful opposition to the South. Southern plantation owners were compared to an aristocracy and their immorality and lack of industry made them inferior to New England. (Kermes 53) Slavery was an important part of this narrative as later residents of New England reshaped their history to remove slave ownership and contrast with the lazy southerners who were forced to rely on slave labor. Jedidiah Morse was a late 18th century geographer from Connecticut who traveled the South and wrote about it in his *Geographies*. There, he writes of southerners as having a "profane" public culture and that their churches were "composed of the

mingled effusions of piety, enthusiasm, and superstition" that were characteristic of an "ignorant" "poorer sort of people". (Conforti 106)

This identity put forward by Morse was based on the original ideas of supremacy put forward by the original Puritan settlers of the region. New England was supposed to be the "city on a hill" that served as the model for the rest of America to follow. The New England village with the town commons and a meetinghouse was supposed to be the embodiment of the republican ideal and was supposed to be copied throughout the rest of the nation. (Kermes 180) This ideal was spread throughout the rest of the country by immigrants who migrated to western New York and the Ohio River Valley as well as major publishers from New York and Philadelphia who printed depictions of New England to get readers to adopt that model. New England Societies were founded throughout these areas to continue the spread of these ideas and in recognition of their shared group consciousness as New Englanders. (Conforti 94) The region was to be a model for the entire United States and a leader for the rest of the states to follow.

Perhaps the most important aspect of this superiority came from its divine origin. Protestantism and the idea that New Englanders were God's chosen people was strongly emphasized as a part of identity. New England and Americans were compared with Israel and the Jews as those who had to leave their old land to find a new land where they could reap God's benefits. (Kermes 189) Piety was put at the center of everyday life with the Protestant virtues of self-discipline, soberness, and hard work emphasized. With this strong Protestant emphasis came the corresponding anti-Catholicism. The original Puritans crossed the Atlantic because the Anglican Church was deemed too Catholic in

its rituals and the Puritans sought to preserve true Christianity in order to re-export it back to England. (Conforti 16)

The effect of all of these forces was and is to create a common New England identity rooted in its Puritan ancestry. However, manifestations of the past that have been used to justify cultural and political actions in the centuries that followed are normally only vaguely based in the past. Narratives of regional history are constructed in response to new economic, social, and political circumstances in the region by the people of the region to deal with periods of change and assert their place in the world. (Conforti 6) Interpretations have been conflicting as between those who have argued on different sides of the same issue for the Puritan tradition of order against those who argued for the moral activist tradition of the Puritans. Yet, the effect is to create the common identity and history that has shaped the development of the region.

To weave together the principles of realignment and New England culture, this paper will seek to provide a survey of the political history of New England in order to trace the fall of the Republican Party within the region. It will start in 1850 and progress to the present day, focusing on the key factors that influenced the politics of the region during that time.

1850 to the Civil War

In 1850, American politics was in a state of flux. The Whig Party had been the traditional opponent of the Democratic Party, picking up the mantle of opposition from the Federalist Party which had previously held this position. Both of these parties were centered in the Northeast and were based on strong protective tariffs to protect domestic industries and investment in internal improvements. The party was beginning to fail

around 1850 because its lack of internal cohesion due to its start as being an anti-Jacksonian Party and the more important issue of slavery in the territories.

Slavery had begun to develop as an important political issue in the early 1800s. Slavery had existed in New England, though slaves were never more than three percent of the total populace. (Conforti 118) Part of the issue was one of representation as the three-fifths compromise that had been necessary to pass the constitution meant that slaveholding states had a structural advantage in gaining seats in the House of Representatives, leading one newspaper to talk about "rotten…Negro buroughs". (Conforti 119) The New England states had been hurt by the emigration of its populace to New York and the western states, a lack of immigration, and a birth rate not sufficient enough to maintain population, causing their share of representation to decline from 33% of the House of Representatives in 1790, to only 12% in 1850.[2] The larger part of the issue came from the idea of moral activism inherited from the region's Puritan ancestors. This idea was used by radicals to argue for the abolition of slavery as a blot upon the morality of the nation. Many abolitionists came from the region, including notably Harriet Beecher Stowe and William Lloyd Garrison. Slavery would not take center stage in the politics of the region until the 1850s, but it was lurking as an issue as abolitionism grew as a political force.

At the same time, manufacturing emerged as an industry within the state. The War of 1812 closed off European markets with a British sea blockade, creating the need for domestic industry which was fulfilled in southern New England. Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts had the necessary fast-flowing streams to power mills and

---

[2] 1790 had 19 of 65 total seats with 7 for CT, 17 for MA, 4 for NH, 2 for RI, and 2 for VT. Maine did not become a state until 1820. 1850 had 4 for CT, 11 for MA, 6 for ME, 3 for NH, 2 for RI, and 3 for VT, out of 234 total.

western states had far more fertile soil for a comparative advantage in agriculture. (Noonan 71) Canals and railroads were able to bring grain from the east at a price that farmers in the region were not able to match. (Lockard 230) By the 1830s, the manufacturing industry had grown in the region and the railroad was developed to allow for easy transfer of goods and materials throughout the country, leading to an over one hundred and fifty five-fold increase in investment in manufacturing throughout the state of Connecticut. (Noonan 72)

With this new manufacturing presence came the need for a new workforce to work in these factories as well as an opportunity for immigrants to find easy work. There had been a small Catholic presence up to this point. Though the first parish in the region was established in Boston in 1789, the Catholic population was small one until the 1840s. (Silk and Walsh 2008, 43) At that point, the Catholic community grew quickly as 120,000 immigrants entered the post of Boston by 1850 with over half of them from Ireland, compared to only 2,000 in 1820. In Connecticut, the population grew from 10,000 in 1840 to 80,000 in 1890 and in New Hampshire from only 1,000 in 1835 to over 100,000 by 1900.

This population was notable for being almost entirely Irish in the first wave of immigration. The Irish Potato Famine caused more than 750,000 Irish to immigrate to America between 1841-1850. (White 6) In 1847, more than 37,000 new Irish immigrants settled in Boston alone. (Lawler 25) The effect was to make the cities into majority immigrant populations in a short period of time. By 1855, 55 percent of Boston was made up of immigrants and other industrial cities had similar amounts with 72% foreign born in Lawrence, 60% in Fall River, and 54% in Lowell. (White 7) The new immigrants

lived in awful conditions and were treated poorly by their employers. They lived in squalid conditions in over-packed tenement houses where alcoholism and violence became rampant. (Lawler 2008) Employers kept wages low because of the abundance of labor and jobs that would have paid eight to ten dollars a week in New York City got only five dollars a week in Boston. (Lockard 122) One account of the times talked of a "Holyoke manager [who] found his hands 'languorous' in the early morning because they had breakfasted. He worked them without breakfast and was gratified to find that they produced three thousand more yards of cloth each week." (Lockard 122)

An already marginalized group's lot was made worse by the strongly nativist reactions from the general population. New England had previously had a homogenously English and Protestant citizenry prior to these waves of immigration. The first Catholic diocese was established in the region only in 1808 in Boston and that was mainly for French-Canadian immigrants. (Lawler 24) Anti-Catholicism was also an important factor in the cultural DNA of the region and the huge shock of waves of immigration created a massive backlash against the new immigrants.

The main reaction was political and an embrace of the Know-Nothing Party. This emerged at a time where the Whig Party was dissolving over the issue of slavery and there was an opportunity for a new party to attain major-party status in opposition to the Democrats[3]. The Know-Nothing Party was first organized in New York City in 1843 as the Native American Party after the Whig Party would not embrace nativism. (Noonan 187) The party attracted a great deal of support across the region, especially in Connecticut and Massachusetts from dissatisfaction with the Democratic and Whig

---

[3] After the Compromise of 1850, the Whig Party split on the issue of slavery, leading to massive infighting at their presidential convention of 1852 and for President Millard Fillmore to not receive his own party's nomination.

Parties about the issue of slavery along with a deep seated nativism. (Noonan 188) This

new electoral coalition of former Whigs and new nativists who rejected the influx of new

foreigners was a powerful one that would prove successful in the short term. Their first

big electoral test was in June of 1854 in the New Haven mayoral race where the Know

Nothings captured the mayoralty and the city council, something especially significant

given that New Haven had the highest percentage of foreigners of any city in the state.

(Noonan 191) Later that year, the party swept the 1854 elections in Massachusetts and

Connecticut, winning every Congressional seat, governorship, and almost every seat in

the state legislature in the former and the entire congressional delegation in the latter.

(Lawler 26) The Party was also relatively effective in its legislative agenda as residency

requirements for naturalization were extended, six Irish-only militias were disbanded, and

literacy tests were passed a prerequisite for voting. (Milburn and Doyle 1983, 16)

However, with their 1855 national convention, the Know Nothing Party would be

brought down by the same divides over slavery that helped destroy the Whig Party.

Delegates assembled in Philadelphia from all over the country to attempt to create a

national platform, including dealing with the issue of slavery. The resultant platform was

pro-slavery and supported the Kansas-Nebraska Act. The effect was to lead to a walk out

of 53 of the 136 delegates from the northern states and a split in the party. (Noonan 227)

In order to maintain opposition to the Democratic Party, which had adopted firmly pro-

immigrant sentiments in their party platform, the members of the Know-Nothing Party

began to combine with the new Republican Party which had yet to gain traction within

the region.

The Republican Party was founded in 1854 and by 1856 was the second party in American politics. Its rapid rise came because it tapped into strains that had existed within American politics for a long time and was largely made up of former members of the Free Soil Party, Know-Nothing Party, and Whig Party. Slavery was at the heart of its appeal as the trigger for its creation was the Kansas-Nebraska Acts and the resultant furor it set off in the north. Their platform was also based on free markets with government help for internal improvements and a Homestead Act to facilitate westward expansion.

The biggest boost to the new party's fortunes came with the Civil War. Abraham Lincoln captured the presidency in 1860 with overwhelming majorities in each New England state. The effect of the war was to make the Republicans the default option for voters as the Democrats were seen as traitors, making Republican support an integral part of regional identity. (Hand 18) Remembrance of the sacrifices of the civil war became part of the Republican platform, but also an important part of the environment in each town with war memorials and plaques set up in every town to remember their dead.

Post-Civil War Era to 1896

The result was to create a Republican dominance within the region that would last until approximately 1930. Republicans would win over 85% of all congressional races from 1866-1930 and over 94% of all presidential elections between 1866-1924[4]. No Democratic candidate for president would get above 50.7% in a state during this time period.[5] The Republican Party had almost complete dominance over every lever of power and government. Its power was especially concentrated in small town and rural

---

[4] Democrats won 184 of 1303 House and Senate elections during that time period. Independents are counted by the party who they caucused with. Democrats' six presidential election victories were Connecticut in 1876, 1884, 1888, and 1892 and the split race in 1912 resulted in Democratic plurality victories in Connecticut and Massachusetts.

[5] See Appendix I for complete presidential election results

New England where their appeals were the most successful. Republicans were able to

feed on sentiments like that of former Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles who returned

to Hartford after eight years and thought the city was "greatly altered... A new and

different people seem to move in the streets. Few comparatively are known to me."

(White 7) The main threat to this hegemony was the growing immigrant populations in

the cities that turned to the Democratic Party as a source of electoral representation and

power.

        The Democratic Party had taken steps to secure the immigrant vote long before

this time by specifically opposing the Know-Nothings and welcoming immigration. The

Connecticut Democratic Party Convention of 1855 passed a resolution saying:

> That those just and equitable laws providing for the naturalization of those born in
> other lands, established in accordance with the principles of the signers of the
> Declaration of Independence, and continued to this day without any interruption,
> save that caused by the bigoted Federalists under the administration of John
> Adams, have contributed to the growth of this republic and to the fraternization of
> its inhabitants; and that these laws are essentially part of that wise American
> policy which, founded on a comprehensive and philanthropic basis, has signalized
> our beloved country as the home of the exile and the oppressed, and will make her
> as renowned for her power and greatness, as she is distinguished for her freedom
> and enterprise

This proclamation clearly put them on the side of the immigrants and strongly repudiated

nativism, securely making the Democratic Party the party of the immigrant. (Noonan

204) Politicians made an effort to reach out to these new immigrants and in return

received a strong sort of loyalty from them and the fellow members of their ethnic group.

(Dahl 33)

        This new Republican hegemony that gained ascendancy within the region took

steps to maintain its majority by passing legislation to make it harder for immigrants to

vote. In 1868, Republicans gained control of the Connecticut State Legislature and

passed laws requiring naturalized to bring in documents showing their citizenship status,

requiring voters to register in person, polling place to close at 5:00 PM and to make it even more difficult to become a citizen. (Milburn and Doyle 1983, 16) In Rhode Island, the Constitution adopted in 1842 allowed only property owners to vote or non-property owners if they were a "male native citizen". This was finally removed in 1888, but not for city council races, which gave the Republican Party an important check on the otherwise strongly Democratic cities until 1928 when the provision was completely removed. (Lockard 174)

The trend of immigration continued and by 1885, the Irish finally captured their first big office with the mayoralty of Boston with Hugh O'Brien. The political climate in the city had grown very harsh as the Protestants had their pre-existing dislike of the Irish, but were also afraid of the patronage that could be parceled out by the Irish. (Lawler 29) The fears were founded as Boston was the site of one of the first urban ethnic machines, where patronage became an accepted fact of life, greatly upsetting the 'good government influences of the old Yankees. Mayor and later Governor James Curley was one of the biggest practitioners of this kind of politics as it was said about him that "with quick coups and an iron hand, he has usurped the power of all public officials and centered it in himself." (Lockard 129) However, outside of the cities, the Republican Party was still dominant and the overall political picture was heavily tilted in their favor. The graph below shows the average House vote for Democratic candidates from 1867 after the Civil War to 1892 and the relative stability that existed.

Average Democratic House Vote from 1867 to 1892

1894 to 1928

The post-war stability was disrupted in this period as the relative positions of the parties changed. The election of 1892 was characterized by the rise of populism in the west and the free silver movement. Agrarian in nature, it stood strongly for free coinage of silver and had an anti-urban platform. (Paulson 2000, 48) In 1894, the Democratic Party began to embrace populism and in 1896, William Jennings Bryan was their presidential candidate and gave a full defense of populist policies. Opposition from the New England states was clear as all six states opposed free silver as a part of the Democratic platform in 1896, out of only fourteen in the whole country. (Paulson 2000, 61) The effect was electoral disaster in New England. Though only lasting for a few election cycles, Democratic numbers within the region plummeted. The graph below shows the Democratic presidential vote from 1892 to 1916:

Democratic Presidential Vote by State 1892-1916

The electoral devastation wrought by Bryan took twenty years to overcome for the Democrats in the region and irrevocably separated the Democratic Party from small-town New England populations. (Lockard 312) The election also had massively negative effects all over the region. In Boston, the Democratic Party share of the Congressional vote was 54% in 1892, but fell to 34% in 1894 and 29% in 1896. (Ware 97) In 1892, Democrats controlled 9 of 39 congressional seats in the region, but that was narrowed to just John Fitzgerald's Boston congressional seat in 1894 and 1896. The effect was to reinforce the Yankee/non-Yankee divide in the region's politics and give the Republican Party a boost.

The Republicans ran into their own problems in 1912 as the primary campaign of Teddy Roosevelt against President William Howard Taft split the party. Progressives organized around Roosevelt's campaign to call for reforms in the electoral process to make it more open and for regulations on businesses. (Hand 84) In the short term, the

effect was to fracture the Republican vote and allow Woodrow Wilson to win a plurality victory in every state in the region but Vermont. In the long term, the Progressives began to act as a faction within the Republican Party and helped to create the beginnings of a bifactional system within the Republican Party which acted to simulate a two party system. (Milburn and Doyle 1983, 119) New Hampshire showed a great degree of bifactionalism as the new party primary weakened the power of the party organization, but not to the extent where it was still not dominant over the Democrats. Bifactionalism developed in states where there either was a dominant faction in the state for many years and various opposition groups sprang up to oppose it as in Vermont or in states like New Hampshire where the opposition party was strong enough to have a chance against a badly divided party so the need for effective control of the party apparatus after the primary was important. (Lockard 57)

This new reality of electoral coalitions was reflected in the platforms of the respective parties. The Republicans sought restrictions on immigration and in 1921, Congress limited entry of foreigners to only three percent of 1920 population of immigrants living in the United States in an effort pushed by Massachusetts Republican Henry Cabot Lodge. (White 8) Democrats opposed this move and called themselves "unalterably opposed to any further restriction of immigration". (White 8) Democrats were also focused on social welfare policies and workplace reform laws to institute a specific work day and to ban child labor to help out their industrial working class base. (White 9) The Republicans opposed this from their fundamentally conservative viewpoint which sought to maintain the status quo.

Al Smith and the New Deal Realignment

In 1928, the Democratic Party nominated New York Governor Al Smith for the presidency. He was a strong representative of the urban Catholic elements of the party and was the son of an Irish immigrant. (White 10) Overall, he lost in a landslide to Herbert Hoover and carried just eight states. Yet, the effect that he had on galvanizing the Catholic electorate helped to make reshape New England politics. Rhode Island and Massachusetts voted for a Democrat for President for the first time since Reconstruction, besides the year of the split electorate in 1912 and Connecticut almost followed them. Support for the Democratic presidential candidate went up at least 7% in each state, with a high of 25% in Massachusetts as per the table below:

Year	CT D	MA D	RI D	NH D	VT D	ME D
1928	45.57	**50.24**	**50.16**	41.02	32.87	30.96
1924	27.53	24.86	36.46	34.72	15.67	21.83

Smith had immense personal popularity and drew crowds in Boston, Hartford, and Providence larger than that of any presidential candidate ever and rivaling the welcome given to Charles Lindbergh with 750,000 people in Boston and 100,000 and 40,000 in Hartford and Providence respectively. (White 11) The *Boston Evening Globe* said "No Boston crowd before ever went so mad. No other man ever called up such fervent joyous tumult of emotion from the deep wells of the heart of the city as this best loved son of American city life." (White 11) This campaign had the effect of cementing the tie between immigrant groups and the Democratic Party and galvanizing the immigrant groups to come out and vote. (Lockard 197) The race grew beyond just Smith and his policies into a fight for "the feeling that the clamorous life of the city should not be acknowledged as the American ideal". (Frier and Overlan 1992) Irish areas in Boston,

Providence, and Hartford gave Smith 91, 71, and 60 percent of the vote respectively, while rural Protestant areas in those states gave only 18, 21, and 25 percent of the vote. (White 10)   Hoover's ultimate victory was seen as a "victory for American ideas and ideals as opposed to European theories and fads". (Hand 105)

 The long term problem for the Republicans was that the voters who came out for Al Smith also voted for Democrats down the ticket as well. Winooski, Vermont, a heavily French-Canadian mill town, had a massive majority for Al Smith, but also had an almost equally large majority for the Democratic gubernatorial candidate. (Hand 105) The graph from V.O. Key's <u>Theory of Critical Elections</u> shows the divergence that occurred in 1928 between the highest performing Democratic towns in Massachusetts versus the worst performing towns during that year. They key point is that this divergence stays steady until 1948 when the influence of ethnic politics begins to fade, reflecting the ethnic basis of this divergence (Key 6):

FIGURE B
PERSISTENCE OF ELECTORAL CLEAVAGE OF 1928 IN MASSACHUSETTS:
MEAN DEMOCRATIC PERCENTAGE OF PRESIDENTIAL VOTE IN TOWNS
WITH SHARPEST DEMOCRATIC GAINS, 1920-1928, AND IN TOWNS
OF WIDEST DEMOCRATIC LOSSES, 1920-1928

This realignment that first began in 1928 was cemented in the 1930s as the Great

Depression and the New Deal helped to bring new voters to the Democratic fold and

bring out existing voters in previously unseen quantities. One contemporary source

wrote that "The Democrats did not simply win a routine victory in 1932; they weakened

mightily, if they did not destroy, the coalition that had ruled the country." (Gamm 193)

According to an analysis of Boston neighborhoods done by Gerald Gamm, the

New Deal coalition was not fundamentally different in its make-up than that of previous

political campaigns. Irish and Yankees voted at similar rates for their candidates and at

similar rates of turnout, while Blacks and Italians greatly increased their turnout for

elections. (198) The great Democratic shift in the 1930s was not simply a reaction to one

event or one election, but was a combination of Al Smith, the Great Depression, the New

Deal, and World War II which together effected enough voters to create massive partisan shift. (201)

The shift was immense within the region and led to unprecedented victories for the Democrats. They captured the Connecticut Senate, Rhode Island State House, and the Massachusetts Senate for the first time since Reconstruction. In 1936, only Maine and Vermont were able to resist the national tide for Roosevelt as he won the other 46 states, including New Hampshire for the first time in a non-divided election since the founding of the Republican Party. The average Democratic House vote went up in each of these states by as high as 18% in Connecticut and even by 13% in Vermont:

Democratic Share of the House Vote by State 1926-1940

Democrats instituted social welfare programs after taking control of the states. In Rhode Island, the legislature created a forty-eight hour work week for women and children, mandatory school attendance, and extension of aid for mothers to the foreign-born. (White 14) The effect on the state and national levels was to allow the Democrats

to be able to govern, instead of merely campaign on programs and give them an opportunity to institute their social welfare policies. (Ware 174)

Assimilation and the end of Ethnic Politics

The New Deal coalition created an opportunity for the Democrats to take control, but also created the circumstances where Republicans were able to fight back against the tide of immigrants that had overwhelmed them.

Ethnic identity was also at its heart a class identity. Robert Dahl came up with a three part structure for ethnic group assimilation and political identities in his 1974 work Who Governs?. The first step is a working class group low in the socioeconomic structure with a high degree of homogeneity because of the population's similar backgrounds. The second step is a more heterogeneous group with more white collar workers and with ethnic politicians gaining control, as long as they avoid socioeconomic issues. The final step is a highly heterogeneous group mixed into the upper and middle classes with a low sense of common identity, but still with some sense of ancestral tie to a political party. (35) Dahl argues that in the 1930s, the Irish began to enter the third stage of this progression as they progressed economically to the point where they were able to escape their previous urban slum lifestyle.

Economics is the most important factor in this process as wealthier ethnics were able to leave the cities and join the previously Yankee suburbs. Urban machines were losing their traditional power and politicians were making less explicitly ethnic appeals. Urban Catholics left the institutions and neighborhoods that had shaped their political and social lives in favor of a suburban lifestyle that de-emphasized traditional Catholic teachings. (Lawler 2008)

Another important factor was the challenge to Irish hegemony by Italian immigrants. Irish immigrants came in and controlled the Democratic Party and used it as a vehicle to advance Irish politicians. The number of Italians was far smaller, though they had a similar miserable living conditions and discrimination, resulting in similar voting patterns. Al Smith and the New Deal had a similar galvanizing effect on Italians as he did Irish, causing unprecedented turnout across the major cities. On the Italian North End of Boston, political participation tripled between 1924 and 1940 among men and was eight times greater among women. (Gamm 75) Their growing portion of the populace created new influence as the Rhode Island legislature officially made Columbus Day a state holiday in 1936, "less in tribute to Columbus' discovery of America than to its discovery that every fifth voter in the state was Italian-American." (Gamm 88) Given their limited mobility in the Democratic Party, Republicans reached out and began running Italian candidates, with successful gubernatorial runs in 1956 in Rhode Island and 1960 in Massachusetts. (White 15) Italians also turned against the Democratic Party during World War II after Roosevelt declared war on Italy, leading to sharp declines in Italian support. The effect was to make ethnic politics a less successful enterprise for either party as the old ethnic divides lost their salience and new issues came to the forefront.

This effect was made clear in the 1962 and 1964 Rhode Island Governor's Elections where Republican John Chafee beat his Irish and Italian Democratic opponents to win the governorship. This occurred despite the knowledge within the populace about their ancestries and he was even able to win by a 61 to 39 margin in 1964 while Lyndon Johnson was beating Barry Goldwater in the state by an 81 to 19 margin. (White 17)

This change is not to say that the old ethnic lines have disappeared, just that other issues became more salient to the electorate. A study by James Gimpel discovered the relation that still exists between ethnicity and voting patterns. Though the relation is nowhere near as strong as it was, it is still discernible. The relationship for Italians and Irish are more skewed because of their new geographic variance, but smaller white ethnic groups like the Portuguese and French-Canadians show a pattern of continued Democratic support. (17) One idea put forward was that even though their living situations have changed, political voting patterns are passed down by parents. The socialization model says that political identity acts a product of family tradition and habits, accounting for a continued Democratic vote. (5)

The change was made especially evident by the presidential election of 1960. The graph below shows the presidential voting patterns of the region from 1948-1960.

Republican Presidential Vote in New England 1948-1960

By 1948, the strong Democratic surge of the New Deal has subsided as suburbanization grew as a political force. This trend continued for the two elections of Dwight Eisenhower to the point where Democrats were willing to nominate a Catholic in order to be able to retain those voters. Connecticut State Democratic Party Chairman John Bailey authored a study that argued for a Catholic candidate to be able to win the states with large Catholic concentrations by appealing to their sense of ethnic solidarity. (Phillips 70) He said that "There is, or can be, a Catholic vote," and the way to make the most of it, he insisted, was to put Massachusetts' Jack Kennedy on the ticket." (Time) Their ploy was successful and produced the gains seen below with a very strong relation between Democratic vote and the Catholic population of the state:

Democratic Gain 1956-1960 Based on Percentage Catholic

$y = 3.0719x - 7.5204$

$R^2 = 0.9777$

This election victory was not a great change, but got Democrats back to the same coalition they were able to succeed with in New England in 1948. Republicans received the same percentage of the vote in urban and rural counties in the two elections, but the much more Catholic suburbs gave Democrats a greater percentage of the vote. (Phillips 71) This coalition would soon be altered by the national groundswell that would occur in 1964 and alter politics within the country and the region and create the modern parties within the region

The Sixth Party System

The New Deal coalition that led to strong Democratic gains all over the country and enabled Democrats to take control of New England was made up of Southern whites, blacks, Catholics, and the working class. This coalition would be challenged and shifted in the years that followed its formation by Roosevelt in 1932. Its first issue was its inherent instability with its competing interests. In 1936, black voters voted for a Democratic candidate for the first time, as they began to respond to the New Deal in the same way as poor urban whites. (Ware 221) Outreach had begun as early as 1924 with a party platform plank that called for "all public institutions for colored persons [to] be directed and staffed by their own people", a highly progressive platform for the time. (Ware 219) Democratic members of Congress began to represent increasingly black constituencies, especially after internal migration after the civil war where previously Southern rural blacks migrated to northern cities, increasing the pressure on Democrats to support black issues. (Ware 221) The effect of this new push for civil rights was to give an opening to Republicans in the south and give them an opening in the South which had voted uniformly Democratic since Reconstruction. In 1948, the Solid South cracked and

Dixiecrat candidate Strom Thurmond won the Deep South states. Though Eisenhower and Nixon each won a few southern states, the Democratic Party downplayed civil rights issues in an effort to keep southern whites in their political coalition. However, after President Kennedy supported civil rights in 1962, the spark was created to a full realignment of politics in the region.

Republican politics after the New Deal Democratic landslide were dominated by the Eastern moderate tradition. The two previously ascendant factions of Western progressivism and Midwestern conservatism had been discredited after the Party's landslide defeats, allowing for the rise of a new liberal wing. 1936 was the last year that the conservatives had control of the party, leading to the landslide defeat of Alf Landon from Kansas, where he was only able to win the Republican stalwarts of Maine and Vermont. (Rae 29) The 1940 Republican National Convention was a key moment as Wendell Wilkie was nominated in a heated battle. Though Wilkie was ultimately unsuccessful, he attracted a new cadre of middle-class Republicans who would control the party for the next few decades. (Rae 32) This was reinforced by the nomination victories of Thomas Dewey and Dwight Eisenhower who helped further the internationalist tendency within the party and its brand of reforming the New Deal, rather than repealing it. During the party convention of 1952, Eisenhower was able to defeat the conservative Robert Taft by relying on strong support in New England, the Mid-Atlantic, Pacific Coast, and the Upper Midwest, where this brand of moderate Republicanism was most popular. (Rae 38)

The defeat of Nixon, who was popular in both the moderate and conservative factions, led to revolt within the Republican Party. The Republicans had lost 7 of 9

presidential elections, had much lower partisan identification, and had lost the House of Representatives in 1954 with no real chance of recapturing it. (Reiter and Stonecash 10) Conservatives who had never accepted the New Deal were upset by the repeated electoral defeats and the lack of opposition by the party establishment towards the political consensus that had developed. (Rae 47) The 1964 convention was the site of the ultimate battle that decided this conflict and ended up with the grassroots takeover of the party by Barry Goldwater. Though his campaign was ultimately spectacularly unsuccessful, it resulted in the takeover of the party by a conservative and southern faction that still controls the party. Goldwater presented an unapologetic anti-welfare state agenda that combined with opposition to civil rights policies and fervent anti-Communism.

This transformation of the national party had profound implications within New England. The moderate candidacies of Thomas Dewey and Dwight Eisenhower were incredibly popular within the region. The New Deal fissures were continued with a divide between the suburban and rural areas and the labor heavy cities that voted based on economic issues. (Gimpel and Schuknecht 220) Vermont was still the most Republican state in the country in 1952 and 1956 and Eisenhower swept the region in both years. However, Goldwater performed far worse than any Republican had ever performed in the region. This graph shows the support gained by Democratic presidential candidates from 1952-1968:

Democratic Presidential Performance in New England (1952-1968)

The election of 1964 was a major shockwave in the region. Every state in the region voted for Johnson by overwhelming majorities, the first time that each state in the region voted for a Democratic president since the foundation of the Republican Party.

The significance of this event was limited and the effects were not as seismic further down the ticket. This disconnect occurred because the state Republican parties were forced to differentiate themselves from the national party. Rather than running on the national platform, they embraced a more moderate platform and distance from the increasingly southern and conservative party.

Democratic Share of the House Vote 1960-1966

The Republican Party within the region has never recovered. The increasingly

conservative nature of the national Republican Party has created an atrophied regional

party within the six regional states that has been slowly dying over the past fifty years.

Yet, there is a fundamental stability in the region from the politics of the New Deal.

Unlike in most of the rest of the country, the New Deal coalition never broke in New

England. The Democratic voting blocs that made up the New Deal coalition of blacks,

Jews, Catholics, and lower income workers stayed Democratic. Urban areas are still the

most Democratic areas of each state and the rural areas are the most conservative.

However, there has been a great change in the relative population proportions of each

location and in the Republican constituencies that existed at that time, leading to the

period of sustained Democratic dominance that we see today.

The first reason is the increasing rise of the south in Republican politics. Barry

Goldwater's brand of conservatism appealed strongly to the states of the Deep South,

with limited appeal further north. (Rae 76) Goldwater himself had very strong anti-

Northern attitudes saying in 1964 that that eastern seaboard should be allowed to "float

out to sea". (White 86) This antipathy was political and cultural and focused on distaste

towards southern vehemence on civil rights, government intervention into the economy,

and the role of religion in public life. New England has never been a racially diverse area

of the country, especially in the northern states which are all at least 96 percent white,

and it avoided the racial animus that characterized the politics of much of the country

during the civil rights era. (Silk and Walsh 41) Even in Vermont, with the fewest blacks

of any state in the union, a historical commitment to civil rights created intense

opposition to Goldwater and he was able to depicted as a strong segregationist. (Hand

248) The region was ardent segregationist George Wallace's worst region of the country

with only four percent total within the region, with many towns below one percent.

(Phillips 102)

The rise of the South came along with the rise of the Religious Right in the 1980s.

The Republican Party made a strong effort to attract social conservatives who focused on

social issues like abortion, illegitimacy, and welfare, beliefs that were far more prevalent

in the south. (Reiter and Stonecash 11) The South was defined by its strong evangelical

presence where religion permeates public life and guides public thinking on public policy

issues. (Silk and Walsh 75) This stands in sharp contrast to the far-more secular politics

of New England where religion has essentially been removed from its role in public life.

After the presidential election of 1960 with Catholic acceptance on the highest stage,

Catholic politicians began to follow the Protestant model of nonsectarian public life and

began to distance themselves from the positions taken by the Vatican. (Silk and Walsh

49) Secularism in the public life of the region had become so prevalent that former Vermont Governor Howard Dean got into trouble on the national campaign trail when talking about religion, which he explained by saying, "I'm a New Englander, so I'm not used to wearing religion on my sleeve and being open about it." (Silk and Walsh 43)

Religion still retains some of its partisan identification effect, but as a cultural artifact, rather than policy-based support. Catholics who attend church more than once a week are less likely to support abortion rights with 29 percent support against 61 percent for lower-intensity Catholics and are also less supportive of gay rights with only 56 percent support compared to 67 percent support from less intense Catholics. However, they are also more likely to describe themselves as liberal with 33 percent self-identifying as that compared to 29 percent nationally and with 52 percent self-identifying as Democrats compared to 45 percent nationally. (Silk and Walsh 58) This same support is true among Protestants as 42 percent of low-intensity Protestants call themselves Republicans compared to 34.5 percent of all New Englanders, despite their generally more socially liberal views. (Silk and Walsh 57) Religion is not a determinant of policy or politics, but a marker of old divisions within the electorate.

This is evidenced by the issue of abortion. When the issue first gained national salience, Catholics were firmly against the practice. Ted Kennedy, the most prominent Catholic officeholder at the time, said abortion was "not in accordance with the value which our civilization places on human life." (Silk and Walsh 49) However, by the election of 1996, he was attacking his Republican opponent for being pro-life and declared himself entirely in favor of a woman's right to choose. Polls showed that by 1982, differences in opinions on social issues between Protestants and Catholics could be

accounted for by different educational levels, rather than looking at their religions. (White 20) Gay marriage shows this as well as gay marriage is currently legal in four of the six New England states, despite their strong Catholic leanings and concerted opposition from the Catholic Church. The region is therefore unique in how religiosity plays an inverse role in politics as the most committed are the most Democratic, contrary to the rest of the country. This is because of the historic nature of the committed Catholic vote which is made up of those who are still in urban areas and live in Catholic neighborhoods. (Silk and Walsh 55) The low percentage of evangelicals in the region also contributes to this phenomenon by removing a potential pool of conservative voters.

Another major factor that governs politics within the region is education and income. For over a century after the beginning of industrialization within the region, manufacturing was the most important industry in the region, especially textiles. This industry declined strongly throughout the twentieth century and especially after World War II, creating blue collar unemployment as firms went to places with cheaper workforces. Those positions were replaced by new high-tech jobs that required the strongly educated workforce that exists in the region. MIT and Yale are the sixth largest employers in their respective states through their research and the economic activity generated around their activities. (White 29) Professionals had been strongly conservative before 1960 and firmly anti-regulation and anti-union. (Judis and Teixeira 47) However, this is now shifting for a few reasons. One is their increased support for culturally liberal attitudes with far more liberal attitudes towards homosexuality and the death penalty. (White 38) Another is their exposure to the increasingly liberal university structure which questioned traditional institutions at a time when identity movements

were challenging the status quo. A final explanation is their greater salaries which enable them to focus more on non-economic issues like environmental protection, which they support in far greater numbers than those with only a high school education. (White 38) As a result, the areas that are experiencing the strongest shifts towards the Democrats are those with a higher percentage of college graduates. (Speel 77)

The national effect of education on voting patterns is significant. The following graph shows the unmistakably positive relationship between the percentage of population with bachelor's degrees by state and the white vote for Barack Obama in 2008:

New England is a highly educated region of the country with five of the six states being in the top twelve for the highest percentage of the population with advanced degrees and with Massachusetts first at 13.7% of the total population. Education has been the key variable that has challenged traditional Republican dominance among professionals and effectively altered their voting patterns.

These trends were exacerbated by structural change set up by the Supreme Court in *Reynolds v. Sims*. This 1964 Supreme Court case applied the principles from *Baker v.*

Carr two years earlier to state legislature apportionment to decide that seats must be apportioned under the principle of one-man, one-vote. The strong presence of towns in New England meant that the lower houses had been constitutionally set up to provide representation for each town in Connecticut, Massachusetts, Vermont, and New Hampshire. The effect was to grossly over-represent small towns and disadvantage cities. In practical terms, this created a permanent Republican dominance of the lower house, granting an effective veto over the state legislative process, with no fear of Democrats being able to take control. (Lockard 293) By the time of the decision, in Vermont, a majority of house delegates represented 9 percent of the population and the representative from Burlington represented more people than the 107 representatives from the 107 smallest towns in the state. (Hand 246) Once fair districts were enforced, the effects in some states were drastic. The Connecticut state House of Representatives went from 187 Republicans and 111 Democrats in 1964 to 117 Democrats and only 60 Republicans by 1966. The effect was to further enshrine Democratic dominance and remove a source of potential Republican strength and future candidates for higher offices.

In response to this increasingly difficult political environment, Republican candidates began to embrace a new kind of appeal. Rather than embracing the conservative party platform, they were forced to run as individuals because the party brand was so toxic in the states. The Republican candidate for Governor in Rhode Island in 1980 said that "Running in Rhode Island as a Republican is like being the Ayatollah Khomeini at the American Legion Convention". (White 72) Providence Mayor Buddy Cianci first ran as a Republican in 1974, but saw that "there were more busboys and

waiters and waitresses than there were people" at a Republican Party event, helping to get him to leave the party and run as an Independent.

The effect of this strategy is to hurt the party overall by not building the necessary infrastructure for sustained success and through constant triangulation off of the party. Former Connecticut State Senate Minority Leader Republican George Gunther called former Republican Senator, later Independent Governor Lowell Weicker a "political prostitute" for taking "the Republican label only at convention time, and then throw[ing] it away." (White 79) Weicker and former Rhode Island Republican Senator Lincoln Chaffee returned the sentiments by trashing their parties, with each concluding their autobiographies with a strong critique of the Republican Party. Weicker called their programs "outrageous and dangerous" and accused them of "gutting the constitution", while Chaffee called the party "extreme and divisive". (Weicker 222, Chaffee 185) This approach can lead to short term popularity and electoral success, but is a process that proves unsuccessful during wave elections. The election of 1958 saw 11 Republican members of Congress lose and 2006 saw Republicans lose 5 more seats and end up with only one House seat which they would lose in 2008. As Chaffee put it, "I was a casualty of the system working in 2006, and while defeat is never easy, I give the voters credit: They made the connection between electing even popular Republicans at the cost of leaving the Senate in the hands of a leadership they had learned to mistrust". (Chaffee 245)

Because of the continued losses, the party began to enter a death-spiral in the region. The Vermont Republican Party was dominant in the 19th and early 20th centuries and acted as an all-encompassing ideological umbrella party for all interests. (Hand 33)

It also attracted the best political talent as it was the only path for advancement for ambitious politicians. The same effect occurred in New England as the Democratic Party grew dominant in the southern states of the region. They have become an ideologically diverse party with factions, rather than existing as part of the two-party system. Their control also gives strong advantages of incumbency and control of patronage systems, discouraging challenges. One Democratic Massachusetts legislator said:

> In my district, people do not want to run against me for the following reasons: politics is a popularity contest at the legislative level; I am very good at my job; and I do what I have to do to get elected. I have had Republican opponents. But no one of substance wants to run against me because they do not think they can beat me; and they have trouble picking a fight with me on most major issues unless they want to get into a Reagan-Kennedy type of debate. That kind of ideological discussion, however, counts for virtually nothing when you are trying to get Joe Jones's daughter into college or fixing a pothole. (White 75)

The dominance on the Democratic side is reinforced by the self-immolation caused on the Republican side. The party is seeking to become more conservative and the increasingly small portion of the electorate that votes in Republican primaries is conservative beyond the mainstream of politics in the state and will nominate candidates who they support ideologically, rather than those more moderate candidates who would be better positioned to win. An example is Lincoln Chaffee in his race in 2006. He was challenged from the right, he was challenged by Providence Mayor Steve Laffey. Laffey was a strong conservative who received millions of dollars from national conservative groups to challenge Chafee, who described his dilemma in his autobiography as "Every 'Rockefeller' vote I cast in 2005 and 2006 had a chilling effect on the Republican base that I needed to help finance my campaign. Further compounding my problems, every one of my votes in favor of the president's federal judges, non-lifetime appointees, as well as a host of other votes I had cast, turned off the independent and Democratic voters

I needed to support me in 2006." (Chafee 142) Chaffee was able to win the primary, but only by eight points at a great cost in time and money and ultimately lost in the general election.

Afterword

The idea brought forth in this thesis is that the story of New England politics has been one of a gradual transition towards the Democratic Party throughout the region. It occurred first through emigration of working-class Catholics embracing the Democratic Party because of their socioeconomic pitch. They were fully mobilized with Al Smith in 1928 and began to take over the southern New England states during the 20s and 30s. Moderate Republicanism seemed liked it could be a viable alternative to create a Republican dominance in the region, but the national party embraced a Western and Southern brand of conservatism in the form of Barry Goldwater that was entirely alienating to New England. This has led to a nationalization of elections which has led to increasing Democratic performance with total dominance in southern New England and better performance in northern New England which has finally tipped them to the Democratic side.

This performance is especially visible after the 2008 election cycle. Every House seat, electoral vote, and all twelve legislative chambers were won by Democrats. Republicans controlled three Senate seats and three governorships, all of which were seen as vulnerable. The transition in New Hampshire was especially rapid. Since 2002, Democrats flipped the governorship, both House seats, a Senate seat, and both houses of the legislature for the first time since the Civil War. In the 2006 Connecticut Senate race, Republican Alan Gold came in third with only ten percent of the vote, behind

Independent Joe Lieberman and Democrat Ned Lamont. The problem with this story is the special election that took place in January 2010. Democratic Senator Ted Kennedy died in Massachusetts and his seat was picked up in a special election by Republican Scott Brown. The story of uninterrupted Democratic dominance seems challenged if a Republican can win such a high-profile seat in such a strongly Democratic state.

However, a closer examination shows that Scott Brown succeeded in the same way that Republicans have been succeeding in the region for a long time, by running as an individual and not as a Republican. In his acceptance speech, he promised to be a "different kind of Republican" and in his speech he differentiated himself from the national party by calling himself a "Scott Brown Republican". (Silva) This shows that he is not only distinguishing himself from the national party, but even from every other Republican in the state to run as an individual, recognizing that only a strong personal brand can let him survive as a Republican within the state. His ultimate victory came from voter anger, the poor economic times, his excellent campaign, a disastrous campaign run by his opponent, and a special election situation, enabling him to get 51.1 percent of the vote and defeat Martha Coakley.

Brown's success is similar to that of other Republicans within the region. They are able to succeed by running on platforms as moderate and independent problem solvers. This appeal was successful in the same way that Lincoln Chafee, Edward Brooke, and Lowell Weicker were. It is likely, however, that Brown will be defeated in 2012. In his special election, he received 1.16 million votes with turnout approaching a midterm election, and slightly exceeding John McCain's totals in the state from 2008 and Mitt Romney's race for Governor in 2002, which had been the two most previously

successful Republican campaigns in the state. What these numbers suggest is a limit for Republican performance in the state, meaning that a successful Republican candidate must run not only against the strong Democratic tide, but that Democratic turnout must be depressed below that natural limit of a potential voter pool that Republicans must turn out.

This election, rather than showing a resurgent Republican strength, shows the weakness of the party within the region. The victory of a Republican in Massachusetts became major national news because of how shocking it was to have a Republican victory in a federal race. The level of shock shown proves how heavily Democratic the state has become and is likely to remain for the future. Brown's victory also means that each New England state has a Republican Governor or Senator. It shows that the Republican Party is not dead in the region, but atrophied and reduced to a brand of personalistic politics that will likely keep it out of power. Absent massive change in the regional electoral coalitions that make up each party, the region is likely to stay that way. Wave years in 1958, 1982, and 2006 drove out many Republicans as nationalized anti-Republican elections drove away voters from their individual representatives in favor of the national Democratic party that better supported their ideals.

Appendix I-Presidential Election Results

Year	CT D	CT R	CT I	MA D	MA R	MA I	RI D	RI R	RI I	NH D	NH R	NH I	VT D	VT R	VT I	ME D	ME R	ME I
2008	**60.59**	38.22	1.19	**61.8**	35.99	2.21	**63.13**	35.21	1.66	**54.13**	44.52	1.35	**67.46**	30.45	2.09	**57.71**	40.38	1.91
2004	**54.31**	43.95	1.74	**61.94**	36.78	1.28	**59.42**	38.67	1.91	**50.24**	48.87	0.89	**58.94**	38.8	2.26	**53.57**	44.58	1.85
2000	**55.91**	38.44	5.65	**59.8**	32.5	7.7	**60.99**	31.91	7.1	46.8	48.07	5.13	**50.63**	40.7	8.67	**49.09**	43.97	6.94
1996	**52.83**	34.69	12.48	**61.47**	28.09	10.44	**59.71**	26.82	13.47	**49.32**	39.37	11.31	**53.35**	31.09	15.56	**51.62**	30.76	17.62
1992	**42.21**	35.78	22.01	**47.54**	29.03	23.43	**47.04**	29.02	23.94	38.91	37.7	23.4	**46.11**	30.42	23.47	**38.77**	30.39	30.84
1988	46.87	*52*	1.15	53.23	45.38	1.39	**55.64**	43.93	0.43	36.33	*62.5*	1.18	47.58	*51.1*	1.32	43.88	*55.3*	0.78
1984	38.83	*60.7*	0.44	48.43	*51.2*	0.35	48.02	*51.7*	0.32	30.95	*68.7*	0.39	40.81	*57.9*	1.27	38.78	*60.8*	0.39
1980	38.52	*48.2*	13.32	41.75	*41.9*	16.35	**47.67**	37.2	15.13	28.35	*57.7*	13.91	38.41	*44.4*	17.22	42.25	*45.6*	12.14
1976	46.9	*52.1*	1.04	56.11	40.44	3.45	**55.36**	44.08	0.56	43.47	*54.8*	1.78	43.14	*54.3*	2.52	48.07	*48.9*	3.02
1972	40.13	*58.6*	1.3	**54.2**	45.23	0.57	46.81	*53*	0.19	34.86	*64*	1.16	36.47	*62.7*	0.87	38.48	*61.5*	0.06
1968	49.48	44.32	6.2	**63.01**	32.89	4.1	**64.03**	31.78	4.19	43.93	*52.1*	3.97	43.53	*52.8*	3.72	**55.3**	43.07	1.63
1964	**67.81**	32.09	0.1	**76.19**	23.44	0.37	**80.87**	19.13	0	**63.64**	36.36	0	**66.3**	33.69	0.01	**68.84**	31.16	0
1960	**53.73**	46.27	0	**60.22**	39.55	0.23	**63.63**	36.37	0	46.58	*53.4*	0	41.35	*58.7*	0	42.95	*57.1*	0
1956	36.26	*63.7*	0.02	40.37	*59.3*	0.31	41.74	*58.3*	0	33.84	*66.1*	0.05	27.81	*72.2*	0.03	29.13	*70.9*	0
1952	43.91	*55.7*	0.39	45.46	*54.2*	0.32	49.05	*50.9*	0.06	39.08	*60.9*	0	28.23	*71.5*	0.32	33.77	*66.1*	0.18
1948	47.91	*49.6*	2.54	**54.66**	43.16	2.18	**57.59**	41.44	0.97	46.66	*52.4*	0.93	36.92	*61.5*	1.54	42.27	*56.7*	0.99
1944	**52.3**	46.94	0.76	**52.8**	46.99	0.21	**58.59**	41.26	0.15	**52.11**	47.87	0.02	42.93	*57.1*	0.01	47.45	*52.4*	0.11
1940	**53.44**	46.3	0.26	**53.11**	46.36	0.53	**56.73**	43.17	0.1	**53.22**	46.78	0	44.92	*54.8*	0.3	48.77	*51.1*	0.13
1936	**55.32**	40.35	4.33	**51.22**	41.76	7.02	**53.1**	40.18	6.72	**49.73**	47.98	2.29	43.24	*56.4*	0.37	41.52	*55.5*	2.99
1932	47.4	*48.5*	4.06	**50.64**	46.64	2.72	**55.08**	43.31	1.61	48.99	*50.4*	0.59	41.08	*57.7*	1.26	43.19	*55.8*	0.98
1928	45.57	*53.6*	0.8	**50.24**	49.15	0.61	**50.16**	49.55	0.29	41.02	*58.7*	0.33	32.87	*66.9*	0.26	30.96	*68.6*	0.41
1924	27.53	*61.5*	10.93	24.86	*62.3*	12.88	36.46	*59.6*	3.91	34.72	*59.8*	5.45	15.67	*78.2*	6.11	21.83	*72*	6.14
1920	33.03	*62.7*	4.25	27.84	*68.6*	3.61	32.78	*64*	3.25	39.39	*59.8*	0.77	23.25	*75.8*	0.93	29.8	*68.9*	1.28
1916	46.66	*49.8*	3.54	46.61	*50.5*	2.85	46	*51.1*	2.92	49.12	*49.1*	1.82	35.22	*62.4*	2.35	46.97	*51*	2.04
1912	**39.16**	35.88	24.96	**35.53**	31.95	32.52	39.04	*35.6*	25.4	39.48	*37.4*	23.09	24.43	*37.1*	38.44	**39.43**	20.48	40.09
1908	35.92	*59.4*	4.65	34.04	*58.2*	7.75	34.16	*60.8*	5.08	37.56	*59.3*	3.12	21.82	*75.1*	3.1	33.29	*63*	3.71

Year	CT D	CT R	CT I	MA D	MA R	MA I	RI D	RI R	RI I	NH D	NH R	NH I	VT D	VT R	VT I	ME D	ME R	ME I
2008	**60.59**	38.22	1.19	**61.8**	35.99	2.21	**63.13**	35.21	1.66	**54.13**	44.52	1.35	**67.46**	30.45	2.09	**57.71**	40.38	1.91
2004	**54.31**	43.95	1.74	**61.94**	36.78	1.28	**59.42**	38.67	1.91	**50.24**	48.87	0.89	**58.94**	38.8	2.26	**53.57**	44.58	1.85
2000	**55.91**	38.44	5.65	**59.8**	32.5	7.7	**60.99**	31.91	7.1	46.8	48.07	5.13	**50.63**	40.7	8.67	**49.09**	43.97	6.94
1996	**52.83**	34.69	12.48	**61.47**	28.09	10.44	**59.71**	26.82	13.47	**49.32**	39.37	11.31	**53.35**	31.09	15.56	**51.62**	30.76	17.62
1992	**42.21**	35.78	22.01	**47.54**	29.03	23.43	**47.04**	29.02	23.94	38.91	*37.7*	23.4	**46.11**	30.42	23.47	**38.77**	30.39	30.84
1988	46.87	*52*	1.15	**53.23**	45.38	1.39	**55.64**	43.93	0.43	36.33	*62.5*	1.18	47.58	*51.1*	1.32	43.88	*55.3*	0.78
1984	38.83	*60.7*	0.44	48.43	*51.2*	0.35	48.02	*51.7*	0.32	30.95	*68.7*	0.39	40.81	*57.9*	1.27	38.78	*60.8*	0.39
1980	38.52	*48.2*	13.32	41.75	*41.9*	16.35	**47.67**	37.2	15.13	28.35	*57.7*	13.91	38.41	*44.4*	17.22	42.25	*45.6*	12.14
1976	46.9	*52.1*	1.04	**56.11**	40.44	3.45	**55.36**	44.08	0.56	43.47	*54.8*	1.78	43.14	*54.3*	2.52	48.07	*48.9*	3.02
1972	40.13	*58.6*	1.3	**54.2**	45.23	0.57	46.81	*53*	0.19	34.86	*64*	1.16	36.47	*62.7*	0.87	38.48	*61.5*	0.06
1968	**49.48**	44.32	6.2	**63.01**	32.89	4.1	**64.03**	31.78	4.19	43.93	*52.1*	3.97	43.53	*52.8*	3.72	**55.3**	43.07	1.63
1964	**67.81**	32.09	0.1	**76.19**	23.44	0.37	**80.87**	19.13	0	**63.64**	36.36	0	**66.3**	33.69	0.01	**68.84**	31.16	0
1960	**53.73**	46.27	0	**60.22**	39.55	0.23	**63.63**	36.37	0	46.58	*53.4*	0	41.35	*58.7*	0	42.95	*57.1*	0
1956	36.26	*63.7*	0.02	40.37	*59.3*	0.31	41.74	*58.3*	0	33.84	*66.1*	0.05	27.81	*72.2*	0.03	29.13	*70.9*	0
1952	43.91	*55.7*	0.39	45.46	*54.2*	0.32	49.05	*50.9*	0.06	39.08	*60.9*	0	28.23	*71.5*	0.32	33.77	*66.1*	0.18
1948	47.91	*49.6*	2.54	**54.66**	43.16	2.18	**57.59**	41.44	0.97	46.66	*52.4*	0.93	36.92	*61.5*	1.54	42.27	*56.7*	0.99
1944	**52.3**	46.94	0.76	**52.8**	46.99	0.21	**58.59**	41.26	0.15	**52.11**	47.87	0.02	42.93	*57.1*	0.01	47.45	*52.4*	0.11
1940	**53.44**	46.3	0.26	**53.11**	46.36	0.53	**56.73**	43.17	0.1	**53.22**	46.78	0	44.92	*54.8*	0.3	48.77	*51.1*	0.13
1936	**55.32**	40.35	4.33	**51.22**	41.76	7.02	**53.1**	40.18	6.72	**49.73**	47.98	2.29	43.24	*56.4*	0.37	41.52	*55.5*	2.99
1932	47.4	*48.5*	4.06	**50.64**	46.64	2.72	**55.08**	43.31	1.61	48.99	*50.4*	0.59	41.08	*57.7*	1.26	43.19	*55.8*	0.98
1928	45.57	*53.6*	0.8	**50.24**	49.15	0.61	**50.16**	49.55	0.29	41.02	*58.7*	0.33	32.87	*66.9*	0.26	30.96	*68.6*	0.41
1924	27.53	*61.5*	10.93	24.86	*62.3*	12.88	36.46	*59.6*	3.91	34.72	*59.8*	5.45	15.67	*78.2*	6.11	21.83	*72*	6.14
1920	33.03	*62.7*	4.25	27.84	*68.6*	3.61	32.78	*64*	3.25	39.39	*59.8*	0.77	23.25	*75.8*	0.93	29.8	*68.9*	1.28
1916	46.66	*49.8*	3.54	46.61	*50.5*	2.85	46	*51.1*	2.92	49.12	*49.1*	1.82	35.22	*62.4*	2.35	46.97	*51*	2.04
1912	**39.16**	35.88	24.96	**35.53**	31.95	32.52	39.04	*35.6*	25.4	39.48	*37.4*	23.09	24.43	*37.1*	38.44	**39.43**	20.48	40.09
1908	35.92	*59.4*	4.65	34.04	*58.2*	7.75	34.16	*60.8*	5.08	37.56	*59.3*	3.12	21.82	*75.1*	3.1	33.29	*63*	3.71
1904	38.15	*58.1*	3.73	37.24	*57.9*	4.84	36.18	*60.6*	3.22	37.79	*60.1*	2.14	18.84	*78*	3.19	28.49	*67.4*	4.07
1900	41.07	*56.9*	2.01	37.85	*57.6*	4.56	35.04	*59.7*	5.22	38.42	*59.3*	2.25	22.86	*75.7*	1.41	34.84	*61.9*	3.27
1896	32.54	*63.2*	4.22	26.32	*69.5*	4.21	26.39	*68.3*	5.28	25.88	*68.7*	5.46	16.66	*80.1*	3.26	29.21	*67.9*	2.89
1892	**50.06**	46.8	3.14	45.22	*51.9*	2.91	45.75	*50.7*	3.54	47.11	*51.1*	1.78	29.26	*68.1*	2.65	41.26	*54.1*	4.69
1888	**48.66**	48.44	2.9	44.04	*53.4*	2.54	42.99	*53.9*	3.13	47.84	*50.3*	1.82	25.65	*69.1*	5.3	39.35	*57.5*	3.16
1884	**48.95**	48	3.05	40.33	*48.4*	11.31	37.81	*58.1*	4.12	46.34	*51.1*	2.52	29.18	*66.5*	4.3	39.97	*55.3*	4.69
1880	48.5	*50.5*	0.99	39.58	*58.5*	1.89	36.87	*62.2*	0.89	47.24	*51.9*	0.82	28.15	*69.8*	2.04	45.32	*51.5*	3.22
1876	**50.7**	48.33	0.97	41.9	*57.8*	0.3	40.23	*59.3*	0.48	48.05	*51.8*	0.12	31.38	*68.3*	0.32	42.65	*56.6*	0.71
1872	47.59	*52.4*	0	30.69	*69.2*	0.11	28.06	*71.9*	0	45.61	*53.9*	0.45	20.62	*78.3*	1.09	32.14	*67.9*	0
1868	48.51	*51.5*	0	30.23	*69.8*	0.01	33.51	*66.5*	0	44.76	*55.2*	0.02	21.43	*78.6*	0	37.59	*62.4*	0
1864	48.62	*51.4*	0	27.78	*72.2*	0	37.76	*62.2*	0	47.44	*52.6*	0	23.9	*76.1*	0	40.93	*59.1*	0
1860	21.5	*53.9*	24.64	20.23	*62.8*	16.97	38.63	*61.4*	0	39.26	*56.9*	3.84	19.41	*75.9*	4.73	29.42	*62.2*	8.34
1856	43.57	*53.2*	3.25	23.08	*63.6*	13.31	33.7	*57.9*	8.45	45.71	*53.7*	0.58	20.84	*78*	1.2	35.68	*61.3*	2.98

Bold means a Democratic Victory

Italics means a Republican Victory

Appendix II-Congressional Delegations from New England

Year	RI Seats	RI Ds	NH Seats	NH Ds	VT Seats	VT Ds	ME Seats	ME Ds	CT Seats	CT Ds	MA Seats	MA Ds	Total Seats	Total Ds
1854	4	2	5	0	5	0	8	0	6	1	13	0	41	3
1856	4	1	5	0	5	0	8	1	6	2	13	0	41	4
1858	4	0	5	0	5	0	8	0	6	0	13	0	41	0
1860	4	1	5	0	5	0	8	0	6	2	13	0	41	3
1862	4	0	5	2	5	0	7	1	6	2	12	0	39	5
1864	4	0	5	0	5	0	7	0	6	0	12	0	39	0
1866	4	0	5	0	5	0	7	0	6	2	12	0	39	2
1868	4	0	5	0	5	0	7	0	6	2	12	0	39	2
1870	4	0	5	3	5	0	7	0	6	1	12	0	39	4
1872	4	0	5	1	5	0	7	0	6	1	13	0	40	2
1874	4	0	5	2	5	0	7	0	6	5	13	4	40	11
1876	4	0	5	1	5	0	7	0	6	5	13	1	40	7
1878	4	0	5	0	5	0	7	0	6	2	13	1	40	3
1880	4	0	5	0	5	0	7	0	6	1	13	1	40	2
1882	4	0	4	0	4	0	6	0	6	3	14	3	38	6
1884	4	1	4	0	4	0	6	0	6	2	14	2	38	5
1886	4	0	4	1	4	0	6	0	6	3	14	4	38	8
1888	4	0	4	0	4	0	6	0	6	1	14	2	38	3
1890	4	2	4	2	4	0	6	0	6	3	14	7	38	14
1892	4	2	4	0	4	0	6	0	6	3	15	4	39	9
1894	4	0	4	0	4	0	6	0	6	0	15	1	39	1
1896	4	0	4	0	4	0	6	0	6	0	15	1	39	1
1898	4	0	4	0	4	0	6	0	6	0	15	3	39	3
1900	4	0	4	0	4	0	6	0	6	0	15	3	39	3
1902	4	1	4	0	4	0	6	0	7	0	16	4	41	5
1904	4	1	4	0	4	0	6	0	7	0	16	3	41	4
1906	4	1	4	0	4	0	6	0	7	0	16	3	41	4
1908	4	0	4	0	4	0	6	0	7	0	16	5	41	5
1910	4	1	4	0	4	0	6	4	7	1	16	4	41	10
1912	5	2	4	3	4	0	6	2	7	5	18	7	44	19
1914	5	1	4	1	4	0	6	2	7	0	18	4	44	8
1916	5	2	4	1	4	0	6	0	7	1	18	4	44	8
1918	5	1	4	0	4	0	6	0	7	1	18	5	44	7
1920	5	1	4	0	4	0	6	0	7	0	18	3	44	4
1922	5	2	4	1	4	0	6	0	7	1	18	4	44	8
1924	5	2	4	0	4	0	6	0	7	0	18	4	44	6
1926	5	1	4	0	4	0	6	0	7	0	18	4	44	5
1928	5	1	4	0	4	0	6	0	7	0	18	4	44	5
1930	5	1	4	1	4	0	6	0	7	2	18	6	44	10
1932	4	2	4	2	3	0	5	2	8	3	17	7	41	16
1934	4	2	4	2	3	0	5	2	8	6	17	9	41	21
1936	4	4	4	1	3	0	5	0	8	8	17	6	41	19
1938	4	2	4	1	3	0	5	0	8	3	17	6	41	12
1940	4	4	4	0	3	0	5	0	8	6	17	7	41	17
1942	4	4	4	0	3	0	5	0	8	1	16	5	40	10
1944	4	4	4	0	3	0	5	0	8	5	16	5	40	14
1946	4	4	4	0	3	0	5	0	8	1	16	5	40	10
1948	4	4	4	0	3	0	5	0	8	5	16	6	40	15
1950	4	4	4	0	3	0	5	0	8	3	16	6	40	13
1952	4	4	4	0	3	0	5	0	8	1	16	7	40	12
1954	4	4	4	0	3	0	5	0	8	1	16	8	40	13
1956	4	4	4	0	3	0	5	1	8	0	16	8	40	13
1958	4	4	4	0	3	1	5	3	8	7	16	9	40	24
1960	4	4	4	0	3	0	5	1	8	5	16	9	40	19
1962	4	4	4	1	3	0	4	1	8	7	14	8	37	21
1964	4	4	4	2	3	0	4	2	8	8	14	8	37	24
1966	4	4	4	1	3	0	4	3	8	7	14	8	37	23
1968	4	4	4	1	3	0	4	3	8	5	14	9	37	22
1970	4	4	4	1	3	0	4	3	8	5	14	9	37	22
1972	4	4	4	1	3	0	4	3	8	4	14	10	37	22
1974	4	3	4	2	3	1	4	2	8	5	14	11	37	24
1976	4	3	4	3	3	1	4	2	8	5	14	11	37	25
1978	4	3	4	2	3	1	4	1	8	6	14	12	37	25
1980	4	2	4	1	3	1	4	1	8	5	14	12	37	22
1982	4	2	4	1	3	1	4	1	8	5	13	12	36	22
1984	4	2	4	0	3	1	4	1	8	4	13	12	36	20
1986	4	2	4	0	3	1	4	2	8	4	13	12	36	21
1988	4	1	4	0	3	1	4	2	8	5	13	12	36	21
1990	4	2	4	1	3	2	4	2	8	5	13	13	36	25
1992	4	2	4	1	3	2	4	2	8	5	13	11	36	23
1994	4	3	4	0	3	2	4	1	8	5	13	11	36	22
1996	4	3	4	0	3	2	4	2	8	6	13	13	36	26
1998	4	3	4	0	3	2	4	2	8	6	13	13	36	26
2000	4	3	4	0	3	2	4	2	8	5	13	13	36	25
2002	4	3	4	0	3	3	4	2	7	4	13	13	35	25
2004	4	3	4	0	3	3	4	2	7	4	13	13	35	25
2006	4	4	4	2	3	3	4	2	7	6	13	13	35	30
2008	4	4	4	3	3	3	4	2	7	7	13	13	35	32

Appendix III: State Legislature Results 1936-2008

Year	Senate		House		Senate		House		Senate		House	
	CT R	CT D	CT R	CT D	RI R	RI D	RI R	RI D	MA R	MA D	MA R	MA D
2008	12	24	36	114	4	33	6	69	5	35	16	142
2006	12	24	44	107	5	33	13	62	5	35	19	141
2004	12	24	52	99	5	33	15	60	6	34	21	136
2002	15	21	57	94	6	32	11	63	6	34	23	135
2000	15	21	51	100	7	43	13	87	6	32	22	136
1998	17	19	55	96	8	42	12	85	8	32	29	128
1996	17	19	55	96	8	42	16	84	8	31	29	130
1994	17	19	60	91	10	40	16	84	10	30	33	121
1992	17	19	65	86	11	39	15	85	9	31	35	122
1990	16	20	64	87	5	45	11	89	15	25	37	118
1988	13	23	63	88	9	41	17	83	8	32	32	128
1986	11	25	59	92	12	38	20	80	8	32	33	127

Year	Senate CT R	CT D	House CT R	CT D	Senate RI R	RI D	House RI R	RI D	Senate MA R	MA D	House MA R	MA D
2008	12	24	36	114	4	33	6	69	5	35	16	142
2006	12	24	44	107	5	33	13	62	5	35	19	141
2004	12	24	52	99	5	33	15	60	6	34	21	136
2002	15	21	57	94	6	32	11	63	6	34	23	135
2000	15	21	51	100	7	43	13	87	6	32	22	136
1998	17	19	55	96	8	42	12	85	8	32	29	128
1996	17	19	55	96	8	42	16	84	8	31	29	130
1994	17	19	60	91	10	40	16	84	10	30	33	121
1992	17	19	65	86	11	39	15	85	9	31	35	122
1990	16	20	64	87	5	45	11	89	15	25	37	118
1988	13	23	63	88	9	41	17	83	8	32	32	128
1986	11	25	59	92	12	38	20	80	8	32	33	127
1984	24	12	85	66	12	38	21	77	8	32	34	126
1982	13	23	64	87	21	29	15	85	7	33	29	129
1980	13	22	68	83	7	43	18	82	7	32	31	128
1978	10	26	48	103	5	45	16	84	6	34	30	129
1976	14	22	60	91	5	45	17	83	6	34	44	192
1974	7	29	33	118	4	46	17	83	7	33	45	190
1972	23	13	93	58	13	37	27	72	8	32	51	184
1970	17	19	78	99	9	41	24	75	13	27	62	177
1968	12	24	67	110	13	37	24	76	13	27	68	172
1966	11	25	60	117	15	35	33	66	14	26	69	166
1964	13	23	183	111	16	30	24	76	13	27	69	169
1962	13	23	183	111	19	27	24	73	14	26	90	150
1960	12	24	179	115	15	28	21	78	15	25	84	154
1958	7	29	139	140	21	23	29	71	16	24	95	145
1956	31	5	249	30	25	18	37	63	22	18	108	132
1954	16	19	184	92	22	22	33	67	21	19	113	127
1952	22	14	221	58	26	18	42	58	25	15	122	116
1950	17	19	190	87	22	22	32	67	22	18	116	124
1948	13	23	180	92	22	22	35	64	20	20	118	122
1946	27	9	227	45	27	15	43	55	24	16	144	96
1944	15	21	196	76	24	20	32	67	23	17	137	102
1942	21	12	196	69	25	18	41	59	26	14	141	97
1940	13	22	184	88	25	19	41	59	25	15	143	96
1936	9	26	167	100	26	15	46	54	26	14	135	104

Year	Senate VT R	VT D	House VT R	VT D	Senate NH R	NH D	House NH R	NH D	Senate ME R	ME D	House ME R	ME D
2008	7	23	48	95	10	14	175	224	15	20	55	95
2006	7	23	49	93	10	14	161	239	17	18	60	89
2004	9	21	60	83	16	8	250	147	16	19	73	76
2002	11	19	74	69	18	6	282	117	17	18	67	80
2000	13	16	82	62	13	11	255	142	16	17	69	81
1998	13	17	67	77	12	12	244	153	15	19	69	81
1996	13	17	57	89	15	9	248	147	15	19	69	81
1994	18	12	61	88	18	6	282	110	18	16	75	75
1992	16	14	57	87	13	11	254	138	15	20	60	91
1990	15	15	75	73	13	11	268	125	14	21	54	97
1988	14	16	76	74	16	8	281	119	15	20	54	97
1986	11	19	75	74	16	8	268	132	15	20	65	86
1984	12	18	78	72	18	6	297	102	11	24	66	85
1982	17	13	83	65	15	9	237	158	10	23	59	92
1980	16	14	86	64	13	10	238	160	17	16	67	84
1978	20	10	79	69	12	12	224	174	19	13	73	77
1976	21	9	74	75	12	12	219	175	21	12	62	89
1974	18	12	75	65	12	12	233	167	19	14	59	91
1972	23	7	91	58	14	10	263	137	22	11	78	73
1970	22	8	95	52	15	9	249	149	18	14	80	71
1968	22	8	98	50	14	9	253	141	18	14	85	66
1966	22	8	93	55	10	13	241	155	23	10	95	54
1964	18	12	177	64	16	8	220	177	29	5	70	80
1962	21	9	152	33	19	5	252	145	29	5	110	41
1960	23	7	190	52	18	6	258	137	30	3	111	40
1958	22	8	200	45	18	6	262	137	21	12	93	58
1956	24	6	212	32	18	6	272	115	25	8	100	51
1954	22	7	217	24	18	6	259	134	27	6	116	32
1952	29	1	216	22	18	6	276	122	31	2	126	24
1950	29	1	216	22	18	6	263	133	31	2	126	24
1948	27	3	219	24	17	7	254	145	28	5	125	26
1946	27	3	219	24	19	5	272	127	30	3	127	24
1944	23	7	219	22	15	9	236	162	31	2	137	14
1942	28	2	206	28	15	9	276	167	32	1	137	14
1940	22	8	197	37	15	9	229	194	30	2	127	22
1936	22	8	204	39	16	8	188	176	29	4	124	27

Bibliography

Aistrup, Joseph A. *Southern Strategy Revisited Republican Top-down Advancement in the South*. Lexington, Ky: University of Kentucky, 1996. Print.

Bauman, Kurt J., and Nikki L. Graf. "Educational Attainment 2000." US Census, Aug. 2003. Web.

Black, Earl, and Merle Black. *The Rise of Southern Republicans*. Cambridge: Belknap, 2002. Print.

Bullock, Charles S., Donna R. Hoffman, and Ronald K. Gaddie. "Regional Variations in the Realignment of American Politics, 1944-2004." *Social Science Quarterly* 87.1 (2006): 494-518. Web.

Burnham, Walter Dean. *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics*. New York: Norton, 1970. Print.

Ceaser, James W., and Robert P. Saldin. "A New Measure of Party Strength." *Political Research Quarterly* 58.2 (2005): 245-56. Print.

Chafee, Lincoln D. *Against the Tide How a Compliant Congress Empowered a Reckless President*. New York: Thomas Dunne, 2008. Print.

Christie, George. "Agriculture in New England." *Historic New England*. Web. <http://historicnewengland.org/educators/ResourceCenter/NE_Agriculture.pdf>.

Clubb, Jerome M. *Partisan Realignment Voters, Parties, and Government in American History*. Boulder, Colo: Westview, 1990. Print.

Conforti, Joseph A. *Imagining New England Explorations of Regional Identity from the Pilgrims to the Mid-twentieth Century*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2001. Print.

"CQ Press Voting and Elections Collection." Congressional Quarterly, 2010. Web. <http://www.cqpress.com/product/CQ-Voting-and-Elections-Collection.html>.

Cunningham, Maurice T. "Massachusetts Republicans: The 2004 Challenge to Democratic Legislative Hegemony." *New England Journal of Political Science* 3.1 (2008): 30-48. Print.

Dahl, Robert A. *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City, Second Edition (Yale Studies in Political Science)*. New York: Yale UP, 2005. Print.

Desmond, Humphrey J. *The Know-Nothing Party*. Washington: New Century, 1904. Print.

Dionne, E. J. *They Only Look Dead Why Progressives Will Dominate the next Political Era*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996. Print.

Frier, Ted. *Time for a Change the Return of the Republican Party in Massachusetts*. [Massachusetts]: Lafayette Graphics/Davis, 1992. Print.

Gamm, Gerald H. *Making of New Deal Democrats Voting Behavior and Realignment in Boston, 1920-1940*. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1989. Print.

Gimpel, James G., and Jason E. Schuknecht. *Patchwork Nation Sectionalism and Political Change in American Politics*. New York: University of Michigan, 2003. Print.

Gimpel, James G., and Wendy K. Tam Cho. "The Persistence of White Ethnicity in New England Politics." *Political Geography* 23 (2004): 987-1008. Web. <http://cho.pol.uiuc.edu/wendy/papers/white.pdf>.

Hand, Samuel B. *The Star That Set The Vermont Republican Party, 1854-1974*. New York: Lexington, 2002. Print.

Heffernan, Nancy Coffey. *New Hampshire--crosscurrents in Its Development*. Grantham, N.H: Thompson & Rutter, 1986. Print.

Hopkins, David A. "THe Rebirth of Regionalism: Geographic Polarization in Federal and State Elections." *American Political Science Association Annual Meeting*. 31 Aug. 2008. Web.

Kaliner, Matthew, and Jason Kaufman. "History Repeats Itself, Until It Doesn't: The 'Re-Accomplishment of Place' in 20th Century Vermont." Proc. of American Political Science Association Annual Meeting. 29 Aug. 2008. Web. <http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/8/0/4/4/pages280443/p280443-1.php>.

Kermes, Stephanie. *Creating an American Identity New England, 1789-1825*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Print.

Key, V. O. "A Theory of Critical Elections." *Journal of Politics* 17.1 (1955): 3-18. *JStor*. Web.

    <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/stable/pdfplus/2126401.pdf>.

Kopp, Christopher. *New England as a Political Region: A Case Study of Gubernatorial*

    Elections. Regional Research Institution, 1998. Web.

    <http://www.rri.wvu.edu/pdffiles/kopp.pdf>.

Kuzenski, John C., Laurence W. Moreland, and Robert P. Steed, eds. *Eye of the Storm the South*

    and Congress in an Era of Change. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2001. Print.

Lawler, Philip F. *The Faithful Departed The Collapse of Boston's Catholic Culture*. New York:

    Encounter, 2008. Print.

Litpak, Dolores A. *European Immigrants and the Catholic Church in Connecticut, 1870-1920*.

    New York City: Center for Migration Studies, 1987. Print.

Lockard, Duane. *New England State Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1959. Print.

Mathews, Lois K. *The Expansion of New England*. New York: Russell & Russell, 1962. Print.

Mayhew, David R. *Electoral Realignments A Critique of an American Genre*. New York: Yale

    UP, 2002. Print.

Mchone, J. G. "The Ice Age in Connecticut." *Glacial Geology of Connecticut*. Wesleyan

    University. Web.

McKee, Clyde. "Connecticut's Hybrid Political Culture." *New England Journal of Political*

    Science 3.1 (2008): 98-103. Print.

Milburn, Josephine F., and Victoria Schuck, eds. *New England Politics*. Cambridge, Mass:

    Schenkman Pub., 1981. Print.

Milburn, Josephine F., and William Doyle, eds. *New England Political Parties*. New York:

    Schenkman, 1984. Print.

Mulkern, John R. *The Know-Nothing Party in Massachusetts*. Rensselaer: Hamilton Printing

    Company, 1990. Print.

Nelson, Albert J. *Shadow Realignment, Partisan Strength and Competition 1960-2000*.

    Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2002. Print.

Paulson, Arthur C. *Realignment and Party Revival Understanding American Electoral Politics at the Turn of the Twenty-first Century*. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. Print.

Paulson, Arthur. *Electoral Realignment and the Outlook for American Demcoracy*. Boston: Northeastern UP, 2007. Print.

Phillips, Kevin P. *The Emerging Republican Majority*. New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1969. Print.

"POLITICS: The Catholic Issue." *Time*. 18 Apr. 1960. Web. <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,874023,00.html>.

Rae, Nicol C. *The Decline and Fall of the Liberal Republicans From 1952 to the Present*. New York: Oxford UP, 1989. Print.

Reiter, Howard L., and Jeffrey M. Stonecash. "Partisan Realignment in the Northeast." *American Political Science Association Annual Meeting*. 29 Aug. 2008. Web. <http://convention3.allacademic.com/one/apsa/apsa08/index.php?cmd=Download+Document&key=unpublished_manuscript&file_index=1&pop_up=true&no_click_key=true&attachment_style=attachment&PHPSESSID=e49ab4494735ef1d2555faf84c6a5c6e>.

Sabar, Ariel. "New Hampshire Turning 'blue'" *Christian Science Monitor*. 8 Jan. 2008. Web. <http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0108/p01s02-uspo.html?page=1>.

Schaller, Thomas F. *Whistling Past Dixie How Democrats Can Win Without the South*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006. Print.

Silk, Mark. *One Nation, Divisible How Regional Religious Differences Shape American Politics / Mark Silk and Andrew Walsh.* Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Pub., 2008. Print.

Solomon, Barbara M. *Ancestors and Immigrants: A Changing New England Tradition*. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1956. Print.

Stavely, Keith W. F. *Puritan Legacies Paradise Lost and the New England Tradition, 1630-1890*. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell UP, 1987. Print.

Sterne, Evelyn S. *Ballots & Bibles: Ethnic Politics and the Catholic Church in Providence*. Ithica: Cornell UP, 2004. Print.

Walsh, Andrew, and Michael Silk. *Religion and Public Life in New England Steady Habits, Changing Slowly*. Walnut Creek, Calif: AltaMira, 2004. Print.

Ware, Alan. *Democratic Party Heads North, 1877-1962*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006. Print.

Weeden, William B. *Economic and Social History of New England 1620-1789*. Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin and Company, 1899. Print.

Weicker, Lowell P. *Maverick A Life in Politics*. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1995. Print.

White, John Kenneth. *Fractured Electorate Political Parties and Social Change in Southern New England*. Hanover, NH: University of New England, 1983. Print.