

The Dynamics of Protracted Terror Campaigns:
Domestic Politics, Terrorist Violence, and Counterterror Responses

by

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To my Mom and Dad. They know why.

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Abstract

The Dynamics of Protracted Terror Campaigns: Domestic Politics, Terrorist Violence, and Counterterror Responses

Existing literature does not explain why protracted terror-counterterror conflicts are sometimes characterized by escalating, tit-for-tat retaliation, but exhibit little responsive violence at other points. I argue that the expectations of local constituents and local political dynamics are primary determinants of conflict escalation and de-escalation. State and non-state constituents form expectations about the efficacy of violent and political approaches to a protracted conflict through *Retrospective Projection*, which combines evaluations of the past, present, and future. Demands for violence are most likely when the expected benefits of a military (militant)-based strategy exceed confidence in existing political alternatives. Demands for retaliation by local publics create incentives for state and non-state actors to use violence as a tool of *Constituent Service*.

I evaluate the argument with extended case studies of Northern Ireland's 'Troubles' and the Second Intifada, supplemented by four qualitative cases: Sri Lanka, Chechnya, Iraq, and Pakistan. The extended case studies combine qualitative discussion and quantitative analysis using vector autoregression (VAR) to empirically describe dynamic associations between violence and political attitudes. Consistent with the argument, constituent expectations about the efficacy of violent and political alternatives

influence the timing of demands for retaliation, and demands for violence determine the timing and form of armed retaliation by state and non-state actors. Demands for violence occur where military-based strategies appear more effective than political alternatives, prior to 2002 in the Second Intifada and in the 1970s during the ‘Troubles,’ and retaliatory violence is most likely in these same periods. Military failures and political alternatives that weaken constituent support for violence encourage de-escalation.

Effective counterterror policies are those that shift the balance between expected military efficacy and political optimism, constraining violence by reducing demands for violence. There is a place for military-based counterterrorism, but the case studies underscore the benefits of strategies that encourage confidence in political alternatives. Law-enforcement counterterrorism and influence operations appear especially valuable because they erode support for violence and shape attitudes towards political compromise at the local level. Local political dynamics and constituent expectations must inform counterterror policy applied in regional protracted terror conflicts and used against transnational terrorist threats.

Chapter 1

Introduction and Motivation: When and Why does Violence Beget Violence?

Motivation

In January of 2002, Israel assassinated Raed al-Karmi, the leader of the Palestinian Tanzim militia believed to be responsible for deadly attacks on Israeli civilians. In the immediate aftermath of the assassination, Palestinian militant groups called off their month-old ceasefire and launched several retaliatory suicide bomb attacks inside of Israel, including the “Passover bombing,” in March of 2002. Israel responded to the surge in Palestinian violence with Operation Defensive Shield (ODS), a massive ground incursion that reoccupied West Bank cities and imposed nearly permanent curfews and border closures on the Palestinian Territories. In March and April of 2004, Israel again used targeted killings against Palestinian leaders, assassinating Ahmed Yassin and Abd-al-Aziz al-Rantisi, both leaders of Hamas with extensive involvement in attacks on Israeli targets. Again, the Palestinian militants promised revenge. But this time, none came. In fact, the next suicide bomb did not occur until August 2004, nearly five months after the targeted killings. When the Palestinian response finally came, the Israeli reaction was also muted, and involved relatively little change in the prevailing level of Israeli counterterrorism. The conflict dynamics that characterize violence in each of these two examples are decidedly different. In the first, violence by each side results in

immediate, violent retaliation that follows a tit-for-tat pattern. In the second, retaliation is muted and delayed.

Examples from other protracted terror conflicts show similar variation in the form and timing of responsive violence. In 1987, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) killed a large number of Protestants with a bomb at a Remembrance Day event in Enniskillen. Despite widespread outrage, no major Loyalist response followed the attack. An IRA bomb on Shankill Road in 1993, however, triggered a more immediate response in the Greysteel Massacre, in which eight Catholic civilians were killed. In Iraq, the Sunni attack on the Shiite al-Askariya mosque in 2005 triggered widespread sectarian retaliation, but mass casualty suicide bomb attacks in the lead up to the 2010 election, resulted in little organized Shiite response. In each protracted conflict, therefore, violent retaliation is episodic and restraint seems as likely as conflict escalation. The observation that retaliation is not automatic, even in conflicts characterized by intense violence, is significant because it suggests that the cycles of sequential, repeated retaliation that are predicted by much conventional wisdom on protracted terror-counterterror conflicts are not guaranteed. In some cases, responsive violence does follow a conventional tit-for-tat pattern. In others, however, responsive violence is better described as ‘tit-for-some tats’, ‘tit-for-many tats’, ‘no tit-for-tat’, or even ‘tit-for-no tat.’ Widespread variation in the timing and form of retaliation leads to the questions of when and why violence begets violence and why this varies across conflicts and over time.

Existing literature approaches these questions by considering autonomous, strategic, and political drivers of violence and support for violence. These explanations, summarized in Table 1.1, explain the timing and form of violent retaliation in many

conflicts, but have some important shortcomings. For example, autonomous explanations anticipate tit-for-tat retaliation similar to the sectarian violence that occurs in Iraq or Northern Ireland during its ‘Troubles’ (1969-1998). Autonomous explanations cannot explain the many instances where violent retaliation does not occur, for example, the lack of British retaliation for Irish Republican Army (IRA) attacks on the mainland or Pakistan’s limited military response to militant violence prior to 2009. Strategic approaches suggest that violence begets violence according to a strategic framework. Putin’s use of targeted drone strikes and suicide bombs in Chechnya, the Palestinian Territories, and Sri Lanka are examples of violence used to signal actor type. However, signaling explanations do not address why hard-liners, including Hamas, Islamist groups in Chechnya and Iraq, and states like Israel and Russia, often use restraint instead of violence. Finally, political explanations focus on internal political competition and partisanship as drivers of support for and the use of violence, but do not address why political factors matter in some instances and not others. For example, political explanations anticipate the IRA’s close attention to constituent demands and its decision to stop the use of suicide bombs after backlash, but are less able to describe why and how Chechen militants and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka use violence even when there is limited local support. The inability of existing literature to explain when political factors affect support for and the use of violence, when they do not, and why this variation exists is a significant shortcoming that makes designing counterterror policies able to eliminate protracted conflict violence more difficult.

To address the short-comings in existing explanations, I propose an alternative argument, which I call *Retrospective Projection* and *Constituent Service*, that identifies

local political dynamics and local constituent expectations as primary drivers of conflict escalation and de-escalation. This approach can explain more of the variation in the timing and form of violence observed across conflicts and over time and, as a result, also offers better insight into the types of counterterror policies most likely to reduce, control, and eliminate violence in protracted terror conflicts.

Table 1.1
Summary of Existing Literature

Theory	Core Predictions
Retrospective Projection & Constituent Service	Political response balances military efficacy and political optimism. Retrospective evaluations, current assessments of the threat, expectations about political opportunities drive radicalization, violence, and de-escalation. Violence follows constituent demands.
Autonomous	Response is rule-based, reflexive Tit for Tat: Violence begets violence (Axelrod 1984) Operational: Cost-benefit analysis (Enders and Sandler 1993) Rally: Incumbent-based, patriotic (Mueller 1973) Repression → Radicalization: Repression causes radicalization
Strategic	Response is part of a strategic game Signaling: Violence reveals type (Arce and Sandler 2007) Elite Opinion: Response relies on heuristics (Berinsky 2004)
Political	Response is explicitly political Internally-directed signals: Signal aims at domestic audience ‘Pretty Prudent Public’: Violence reveals approval (Jentleson 1992) Casualty Tolerance: Tolerance depends on objectives, partisanship (Aldrich et al. 2006) Ripeness: De-escalation initiated by the leader (Zartman 2001)

More specifically, I argue that the expectations of local state and non-state constituents about the relative efficacy of political and military (or militant) approaches to the protracted conflict are a primary determinant of the timing and form of violent

retaliation.¹ I suggest that state and non-state constituents demand violence when they expect military strategies to more effectively advance or protect their interests than political alternatives and argue that violent retaliation closely follows constituent demands. I call the process through which constituent demands for violence emerge *Retrospective Projection* because it combines retrospective evaluations of past outcomes and assessments of the current threat to form expectations about the relative efficacy of military (militant)-based and political counterterror strategies. These expectations shape the attitudes of state and non-state constituents towards violence as a political tool. According to Retrospective Projection, expectations about the efficacy of violent and political strategies are based on the severity of the external threat, the intractability of the conflict, past military and political outcomes, and political opportunities. Demands for violence are most likely when the expected efficacy of violence as a political tool exceeds confidence in political strategies. In the Israeli example, demands for violent retaliation after Palestinian violence are based on the failure of past political settlements and the relative efficacy of Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) offensives. In Russia, support for military counterterrorism is low because the Russian military is unable to control Chechen violence and because Russians prefer stability to continued deployment even if this requires Chechen independence (Speckhard and Ahkmedova 2006). Constituent demands for violence are not reflexive, but calculated responses to the political and security context.

I use the term *Constituent Service* to describe the relationship between demands for violence and the use of retaliatory violence by state and non-state actors. Under a

¹ By local constituents, I refer to the voting public on the state side or the relevant non-state public on the non-state side (e.g. the Palestinian population in Gaza and the West Bank in the Palestinian example).

Constituent Service interpretation, state and non-state actors use retaliatory violence according to constituent demands and to serve constituent interests. Retaliation is most likely when strongly supported by local constituents. Violence is encouraged and constrained from the bottom-up. In this interpretation, the timing and form of Palestinian retaliation to Israeli violence reflects the demands of Palestinian constituents, and Loyalist responses to Catholic violence match the preferences of hard-line Protestant supporters. In both cases, violent retaliation occurs only when its use is demanded by local constituents.

Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service take a bottom-up approach to the questions of when and why violence begets violence that uses constituent demands and local political dynamics to explain why the timing, form, and likelihood of retaliatory violence, escalation, and de-escalation vary so extensively across conflicts and even over the course of a single dispute. The more systematic and rigorous consideration of when, why, and how domestic constituent expectations and demands affect trends in support for violence and violent retaliation offered by Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service provides a more comprehensive explanation of when conflict escalation and de-escalation are most likely and identifies the types of counterterror interventions most likely to support a lasting cessation of violence.

This dissertation focuses primarily on protracted terror-counterterror conflicts in which the majority of violence is contained in a limited geographic area. These conflicts often involve nationalist, ethnic, or religious issues and are characterized by repeating cycles of violence and peace. In some cases, the conflicts are purely domestic. In other conflicts, there are regional or transnational elements. For example, violence in the

‘Troubles’ takes on a regional character when it spills into Britain and into Continental Europe. Violence in Iraq and Pakistan similarly extends outside the domestic sphere, with global support networks, foreign recruits, and transnational goals. The argument evaluated in this dissertation—that constituent demands shape the timing and form of non-state violence and the outcomes of counterterror interventions—seems to apply with some caveats, to a wide set of enduring violent conflicts in which state and non-state actors interact repeatedly, compete for support of the local population, and have some set of local constituents to whom they are accountable. Even regionally-based off-shoots of al-Qaeda appear to consider the preferences and tolerance of local populations. Internal communications between Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and other al-Qaeda leaders show that the preferences and tolerance of local Iraqis do constrain the types of violence that Zarqawi’s group is able to use. Research on Taliban and al-Qaeda cells operating in Afghanistan similarly suggests that both groups are successful because they do consider the cultural traditions of local supporters (Atran 2010). The generalizability and relevance of the argument and findings to US counterterror policy are explored further in the conclusion.

The remainder of this chapter discusses existing literature focused on the dynamics of protracted terror-counterterror campaigns and the core questions of when and why violence begets violence in these types of conflicts to set the stage for a more rigorous explanation of the theoretical argument in the next chapter. It highlights the key insights of existing work as well as the shortcomings and identifies the ways this dissertation addresses these shortcomings. Subsequent chapters of this dissertation derive from Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service a set of propositions that I

evaluate qualitatively and quantitatively, using two extended case studies, the Second Intifada and Northern Ireland's 'Troubles,' and four qualitative extensions to assess the generalizability of the argument and its findings. The final chapter offers policy implications.

Existing Literature: What Do We Know and What's Missing?

Existing literature on the political and violent dynamics of protracted conflicts, uses arguments based on tit-for-tat retaliation, the relationship between state repression and radicalization, signaling interpretations of violence, and violence as a tool of political competition to explain why violence begets violence at certain points in these violent campaigns, for example prior to 2002 in the Second Intifada, in the 1970s in the 'Troubles,' before 2007 in Iraq. However, this literature is less successful in anticipating and describing instances where violence does not beget immediate retaliation, including cases where retaliation follows only some precipitating attacks, as is true of Israeli retaliation against Palestinian militants; conflicts where retaliation is infrequent, as in the example of Chechnya during the Second Chechen War; and instances where violence by one actor leads to demands for political settlement from the adversary, similar to those observed among Tamils after the 2008 state offensive (Wu and Axelrod 1995). This final type of violent dynamic, cases where restraint follows a precipitating attack, is remarkably common in protracted terror-counterterror conflicts. In the Palestinian Territories after 2002, Chechnya, and among Tamils in Sri Lanka after 2008, state violence triggers demands for conflict settlement rather than support for new violence.

Throughout the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israel has responded to only some Palestinian attacks, particularly those against civilians (Kuperman 2001). In Sri Lanka, restraint is even more extensive in the 2004-2008 period, when LTTE provokes little formal state response (Hogland 2005; Uyangoda 2010).

Existing literature struggles to explain these many instances of restraint and, as a result, offers only a partial answer to the questions of when and why violence begets violence. This incomplete description of the dynamics of protracted conflicts is a challenge to counterterror policymakers interested in designing counterterror strategies that can control, reduce, and eliminate violence across political or security contexts. A discussion of literature relevant to protracted terror conflicts highlights the shortcomings of existing literature and reveals the benefits of an approach focused on constituent expectations and local political dynamics.

Autonomous Responses: Rule-based Violence and Radicalization

The simplest answer to the question of what drives support for and the use of violence is that these responses are automatic and reflexive, occurring according to some kind of pre-defined decision rule. Rule-based responses are intuitively appealing, but provide limited guidance to counterterror policymakers because they apply in a limited set of contexts and lack consistent empirical support. Autonomous arguments are used to explain both political and violent responses to a new external threat. The tit-for-tat argument proposes that violence begets violence in consistent, and eye-for-an-eye patterns intended to deter (Axelrod 1984; Rasler 1996). The responsive relationship between suicide bombs and targeted killings in the Israeli-Palestinian example is one

frequently cited example of a rule-based, tit-for-tat response. Israel consistently responds to suicide bombs with assassinations and home demolitions (David 2002; Wu and Axelrod 1995).

Capability-based arguments suggest a different type of rule-based response in which the state and non-state actors make choices about the use of violence based on resources, opportunities, and objectives to maximize security provided (states) or damage caused (non-states). Formal models consider how state and non-state actors allocate resources across available strategies or tactics to achieve their key objectives (Powell 2007a, 2007b; Bueno de Mesquita 2007; Ganor 2005; Catignani 2008). Other work proposes and verifies empirically the existence of substitution behavior by state and non-state actors based on resources and the external constraints (Enders and Sandler 1993; Brym and Araj 2008; Frisch 2006; Ganor 2005). Improved airport security in the 1970s, for instance, leads to a decline in the number of hijackings, but an increase in the use of bomb attacks (Enders and Sandler 1993; Arce and Sandler 2007). IRA violence during the ‘Troubles’ is similarly guided by operational considerations, and the IRA substitutes between attack types based on access to British targets and the ability to distinguish between Loyalist militants and Protestant civilians. Even substitution responses are autonomous, rather than strategic, because the type and timing of the violent reaction follows a pre-set rule.

Autonomous approaches can also explain political responses to the episodic, retaliatory violence that characterizes protracted conflicts. For example, literature on “rally ‘round the flag’” effects focuses on how external crises, deployments, and the initiation of war affect public attitudes. Basic rally arguments propose that external

shocks and foreign threats produce surges in public support to the incumbent, as an expression of patriotism or public approval of state policies (Mueller 1973; Baker and O’Neal 2001). Simple interpretations of the repression-radicalization relationship propose an automatic response in which state repression leads immediately to radicalization and additional violence (Storm 2009; Brockett 2001; Rasler 1996). The Palestinian response to Israeli incursions at the start of the Second Intifada and Catholic backlash against British violence in the early 1970s are examples where state repression does seem to trigger widespread radicalization.

Empirical evidence of autonomous explanations is mixed. Although tit-for-tat, operational, rally, and repression-radicalization arguments accurately explain instances of conflict escalation where constituent demands for and the use of violence is likely and although the statements of military and militant commanders often appeal to tit-for-tat justifications, rule-based explanations of conflict dynamics cannot explain cases where the anticipated, reflexive response does not occur, or occurs only sometimes. For example, although statements of military and militant group commanders use tit-for-tat logic to describe their retaliatory violence, empirical evidence of tit-for-tat retaliation is more limited. Palestinian military commanders promise retaliation in kind, “ ‘an eye for an eye, a nose for a nose’ ” (Coker 2003, quoting Rantisi) after targeted killings of their key leaders, but empirical studies find little evidence of an immediate response (Jaeger and Paserman 2008). There is equally little empirical evidence of tit-for-tat responses by the LTTE in Sri Lanka or by Chechen militants, even at their peak of strength (Lyall 2009; Bloom 2005). Mixed evidence of tit-for-tat retaliation also exists on the state side. Israel uses disproportionate responses after attacks that kill Israeli civilians, but often

does not respond to other types of Palestinian attacks (Kuperman 2001). The British Army rarely responds violently to IRA attacks, but Russia and Sri Lanka use retaliatory violence that far exceeds the initial non-state attack.

Capability-focused explanations are challenged by seemingly suboptimal uses of violence by state and non-state actors. Despite recognizing that suicide bombs against Israeli targets do little to advance their political goals, Palestinian commanders continue to employ these attacks through the 1990s and the Second Intifada because of their symbolic significance, domestic popularity, and relevance to the competition between Palestinian groups (Friedman 2008). Asymmetries in information and domestic political pressures also lead to suboptimal resource use on the state side (Bueno de Mesquita 2005b). For example, Israeli political leaders have frequently relied on military counterterrorism to assuage domestic demands or consolidate support, even when these operations have ambiguous or counterproductive operational effects (Russett and Barzilai 1990). Until 2009, the Pakistani military had the resources and ability to launch aggressive military operations against insurgents operating in the FATA that might have increased domestic security, but relied instead on political accommodation to avoid alienating domestic supporters (Fair and Shapiro 2009). Although suboptimal uses of violence may reflect random miscalculations by state and non-state actors, deviations occur too frequently to be tactical errors. Instead, these deviations suggest that decisions regarding the use of violence incorporate factors other than capability constraints.

Empirical studies of rally effects and case study investigations of the relationship between repression and radicalization also cast doubt on the existence of purely autonomous political responses, suggesting instead that political responses to violence

reflect the underlying preferences and demands of local constituents. Most empirical investigations suggest that rally ‘round the flag responses are context dependent and conditional on the type of threat or deployment (Lai and Reiter 2005; Baker and O’Neal 2001). In the United States, rallies have followed only certain types of crises, external threats, and deployments. The clearest example of a strong rally response is that following 9/11. Much smaller rallies follow other, less severe external threats, including terrorist attacks in Kenya, the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing (Schubert, Stewart, and Curran, 2002), the Iran Hostage Crisis (1979), and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) (Gaines 2002). Outside of the US, evidence of rallies following severe security crises is similarly mixed. Although Putin’s approval rose sharply at the start of the Second Chechen War, his popularity rating fell to a four-year low in the aftermath of the Beslan school attack, suggesting a sharp punishment for his security failure (*Moscow Times* 2004). The political effect of the March 11 subway attacks in Spain also diverges from the expectations of a rally argument, contributing to the removal of Spain’s incumbent leadership (Olmeda 2005). In Sri Lanka, repeated, sequential violence associated with the civil war between Tamils and Sinhalese has both positive and negative effects on the political support of incumbent leaders. President Kumaratunga receives a boost in popularity after an attempt on her life, but President Premasada’s party loses support in the aftermath of his assassination (Bloom 2005).

Arguments that state repression leads immediately to radicalization can explain political responses to violence and retaliation in some cases, but not those where repression appears to discourage and deter the use of violence (Brockett 1983; Tarrow 1989; Lichbach 1987). State counterterrorism by the Pakistani government provokes

widespread radicalization among Pashtuns, but Russian drone strikes appear to weaken Chechen support for militant groups, and Tamil constituents defect to the state during the 2008 offensive (Lyll 2009; Fair and Shapiro 2009). Studies that rely on bivariate correlations do suggest a positive association between support for militant violence and the direct experience of state repression (Hayes and McAllister 2004; Speckhard and Akhemedova 2006; Brym and Araj 2008). Multivariate analyses, however, find very little evidence of lasting radicalization following counterterror violence or political hardening after terrorist attacks on the state side. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, terrorist violence leads to a temporary increase in support for the harder-line Likud party, and Israeli counterterrorism has a similar, temporary radicalizing effect on Palestinian-political attitudes, increasing support for Hamas (Jaeger et al. 2008). Neither response, however, marks a permanent change in constituent attitudes. In contrast, an empirical analysis of the effects of Russian air strikes on Chechen villages suggests that Russian counterterrorism weakens support for militant groups (Lyll 2009).

The significant variation in the likelihood, intensity, and duration of demands for and the use of violent retaliation challenge the notion these reactions are automatic and reflexive and instead suggest that both political and violent responses are measured and calculated expressions of real demands by local supporters. More recent formal models use characteristics of the political context to describe when demands for violence and radicalization are most likely to follow state repression or terrorist violence. However, while they advance existing literature by incorporating more attention to local context, they do not address all short-comings associated with autonomous explanations of conflict dynamics. These models identify domestic characteristics that mediate the

relationship between repression and radicalization, implicitly recognize that support for the use of violence is largely conditional, and offer insight into instances where the expected automatic response does not occur. For example, work based on formal models suggests that non-state publics are most likely to radicalize following state repression when the non-state group is strong, when economic conditions are weak, or when constituents expect little accommodation from a hard-line state actor (Rosendorff and Sandler 2004; Kaplan et al. 2005; Siquiera and Sandler 2006; Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare 1994; Ganor 2005; Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2005b; DeNardo 1985). Applied to the ‘Troubles’ example, strong Catholic support for IRA violence in the 1970s reflects the group’s military strength, but the gradual erosion of the IRA’s operational capabilities explains Catholic disillusionment that emerges starting the 1980s.

Similar factors affect constituent demands for violence on the state side, where voters elect hard-line security-oriented parties when they expect aggressive approaches to better protect their interests, but support moderate political actors when they prefer accommodation (Berrebi and Klor 2008). The political shift from Labor to Likud in Israel immediately after the start of the Second Intifada is one example of this type of response. Swings in political support in Sri Lanka similarly reflect security concerns and attitudes towards violence. However, while these models do begin to incorporate important local political dynamics, they lack rigorous empirical tests that confirm and measure the effect of mediating factors on demands and support for violence. By focusing more explicitly on the nature and importance of these domestic factors, Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service explain when and why retaliation occurs automatically at some points and not at others.

Strategic Approaches: Violence as a Signal

Strategic approaches to the question of when and why terrorist and counterterror violence leads to demands for and the use of retaliatory violence propose that violent and political responses occur according to a strategic framework as part of a game with the adversary. The most common type of strategic explanation is the signaling argument, that violence is used to reveal type or resolve, to influence bargaining outcomes, or to affect adversary behavior (Kydd and Walter 2006; Fearon 1994; Lapan and Sandler 1993). For example, non-state groups may use attacks on specific targets to signal their goals and objectives to the state rival. While the IRA focuses largely on military, state, and financial targets to communicate their political intentions, militant groups in Iraq often use attacks on civilians to suggest unwillingness to compromise (De la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca 2007). The Sri Lankan military offensive in 2008 can similarly be read as a signal to Tamils and LTTE members that the state is unwilling to tolerate additional violence or accommodate Tamil demands. Britain's lack of military response throughout the 'Troubles,' in contrast, signals a weaker commitment that contributes to Protestant insecurity and support for violence. Signaling arguments explain the strategic value of violence. However, they offer limited insight into when and why violence begets violence and are of less use to counterterror policymakers as a result.

Formal models that consider violence as a signal identify conditions under which violence is most likely. These models suggest that a state's decision to use counterterror violence and 'reveal' itself as a hard-line actor depends on the nature and strength of the adversary, the specific political or military context, and how it expects the targeted population to respond (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007; Arce and Sandler 2007;

Defiguero and Weingast 2001). A large-N study of when states use violence against internal challengers, for example, finds that violence is most likely when the state fears many future separatist claims and sees an advantage in building a hard-line reputation (Walter 2006). Russia's violent response to Chechen separatists can be understood in this frame, as an attempt by Russia leaders to take a hard-line stance that would prevent future violence. Empirical studies of Israeli military responses during the Second Intifada also suggest evidence of violent signaling. Israel responds more consistently to violence claimed by Fatah, Israel's negotiating partner, than Hamas, a signal intended to build a hard-line reputation able to influence future negotiations (Jaeger and Paserman 2006).

Non-state groups also use violence to signal their type or to reveal information about their objectives and military strength, leading to variation in the timing and intensity of violence across conflicts. Non-state groups facing weak states or states that appear willing to compromise may be more likely to intensify their use of violence than those facing strong states (Pape 2003). Non-state groups may also use violence to compete with rival non-state actors for relevance and primacy. The 'spoiler effect,' a variation on signaling arguments suggests that violence is likely during peace negotiations by hard-liners who use violence to signal their intention to continue violent resistance (Kydd and Walter 2002).² The spoiler effect is used to explain violence by Hamas around peace negotiations in the 1990s and the lead up to the recent direct talks in 2010, as well as violence by IRA splinter factions during the Good Friday negotiations.

However, while signaling arguments can explain much of the variation in the use of violence across cases and over time, there are still instances when observed violence

² Violence can also be used as an internally-directed signal aimed at the domestic audience. I consider domestic signals in more detail below.

diverges from the expectations of a signaling arguments. For example, signaling arguments do not explain why hard-line groups ever choose restraint or why a single group may send many different violent signals over the course of a single conflict. Restraint by Israel and Hamas towards the end of the Second Intifada, by the LTTE in 2002, and by sectarian militias in Iraq after 2007, appear to violate the hard-line reputations built by these groups. Much of the signaling literature also lacks empirical tests of whether violent signals actually affect the beliefs or behavior of the target audience. Sri Lanka's massive military offensive in 2008 appears to have an effect on the attitudes and behavior of Tamil populations, but there is no empirical evidence that documents or quantifies this effect. Changes in the nature and intensity of violence by Pakistani militant groups in 2009 seem to signal a change in militant group resolve and to affect constituent support for state counterterrorism as a result, but there is little empirical evidence to link violent signals with political attitudes or place bounds on the size and duration of the response. As a result, signaling arguments only indirectly answer the question of when and why violence leads to additional violence and offer few powerful recommendations about the types of policies most likely to contain or reduce terrorist violence. Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service, described in detail in the next chapter, incorporate and build off signaling approaches, explaining when, why, and how violence is able to serve as an effective signal with attention to constituent demands.

Political Explanations: Violence and Domestic Politics

The third set of explanations often used to describe the dynamics of protracted terror-counterterror campaigns argues that support for violence and the use of violence

are explicitly driven by political factors, such as internal political competition, partisanship, or elite cues. By focusing on the importance of domestic political drivers of violence and support for violence, these arguments are able to explain much of the observed variation in conflict dynamics and begin to incorporate the domestic political characteristics that form the core of Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service. However, existing political explanations do not explicitly address how, when, and why constituent demands affect support for and the use of violence and so offer an incomplete specification of the relationship between local political dynamics and trends in violence.

Literature focused on the internal political drivers of violence considers how and when violence can be used to consolidate political support or ensure political survival. For example, on the non-state side, the ‘spoiler’ and ‘outbidding’ arguments suggest that internal political competition between non-state groups can contribute to conflict escalation when rival groups use violence as a political tool to attract and retain support (Kydd and Walter 2002; Bloom 2005). Case studies suggest the use of violence as a tool of internal contestation and outbidding not only in the Palestinian territories, but also in Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland (Bloom 2005; Bloom and Horgan 2008; Pearlman 2009). However, empirical evidence calls into question the size and significance of internal political drivers of violence. Although Fatah and Hamas gain from their use of violence at some points during the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, at others, Fatah’s more political orientation is an advantage (Clauzet et al. 2008; Jaeger et al. 2008; Pearlman 2009).

In addition to affecting the use of violence, political factors also appear to influence support and demands for violence among non-state constituents. In many cases, support for the goals of militant groups directly influences the demand for and tolerance

of violence. Palestinians support the use of violence because they share the goals of leading militant groups. In Chechnya, where civilians do not support the goals of Islamist militants, support for militant violence is low. In Pakistan's FATA, Pashtun populations have limited support for the more extreme goals of Taliban and al-Qaeda militant groups, but tolerate violence as a political tool to achieve their objectives (Bloom 2005; Fair and Shapiro 2009; Lyall 2009). Collateral damage caused by militant groups within their sympathetic population is another political factor that influences support for violence on the non-state side. As evidenced in Sri Lanka, Chechnya, and Iraq, this type of collateral damage often weakens political support for non-state groups (Fair and Shapiro 2009; Lyall 2009; McCartan et al. 2008; Bloom 2005). Public opinion polls in Iraq, for instance, show a clear, negative association between the collateral damage and attitudes towards militant violence (ABC, NHK, "Iraq Poll February 2009," March 16, 2009).

On the state side, violence may also respond to competitive political pressures. Diversionary theories of war posit that leaders use external deployments of force to consolidate internal political support (Levy 1988; Smith 1996). Empirical analysis of the Israeli example shows that right-wing political leaders are more likely to employ military counterterrorism in the lead up to elections than at other points in the conflict, hoping to benefit from their ownership of the security issue (Russett and Barzilai 1990). The 2009 Gaza War, coming in the lead up to Israeli elections can also be interpreted as an attempt by right-leaning politicians to advance their political position. However, more extensive empirical tests find only mixed support for the benefits of diversionary war. Although some leaders benefit temporarily from the deployment of force, others lose support after violence. In Britain, for example, the Northern Ireland conflict is often a liability for the

country's political leaders and Prime Minister. This is especially true during the Labour administrations in the 1970s and under Major when public criticism of the government's Northern Ireland policies are widespread (Cunningham, 1991).

Literature that considers the political drivers of demands for violence on the state side identifies factors such as partisanship, elite cues, leader approval, and expected success as important determinants of constituent attitudes towards the use of force. For example, the “pretty prudent public” argument suggests that political responses to violence express approval or disapproval of the leader's behavior based on individual assessments that are on average rational and incorporate relevant information (Jentleson 1992). However, while there is some empirical evidence to support this argument, there are many cases where domestic publics do not respond politically to external threats, or respond based on leader opinions and elite consensus rather than their independent expectations (Berinsky 2004). During the ‘Troubles,’ for example, the Northern Ireland conflict rarely ranks as an important political concern and has limited effects on vote decisions of British voters. Studies of casualty tolerance and the effect of force on leader tenure suggest that similar political factors—support for the objectives of the deployment, elite opinions, partisanship, conflict duration—directly mediate the relationship between violence and vote intention, but also find that these factors do not always have the same effect on political attitudes and outcomes (Berinsky 2004; Larson 2000; Gelpi, Reifler, and Feaver 2007; Gartner and Segura 1998; Alrich et al. 2006; Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2000; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995). In Israel, casualties appear to strengthen support for right-wing parties, while in Britain and Russia, they have more negative effects on support for the incumbent (Berrebi and Klor 2008).

Political explanations show that attitudes towards violence are conditional on domestic political factors, but do not define which domestic political determinants matter most or why and when they matter.

Political explanations begin to incorporate the importance of domestic political context to the dynamics of protracted conflicts and explore the explicitly political function of violence. However, political explanations do not provide a clear theoretical framework that can explain which determinants have the strongest effect on the use of violence or why political factors affect the use of and support for violence in some cases but not others. Even political explanations do not clearly define the relationship between violence and domestic politics and offer only limited guidance for counterterrorism policymakers. Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service address these shortcomings, suggesting that the political factors that are most essential to demands for violence are those affecting expectations of military efficacy and political optimism and these same factors influence the use of violence through Constituent Service.

Conflict Management and Resolution

A final body of existing literature relevant to the questions of when and why violence begets violence in protracted terror-counterterrorism conflicts focuses on conflict de-escalation, management, and resolution. Conventional arguments about conflict de-escalation argue that political settlements are most likely at a point of ‘ripeness,’ when leaders on both sides of the conflict prefer political settlement to continued costly violence. This literature suggests that ripeness follows a “mutually hurting stalemate” or “precipice point” that reveals the prohibitive cost of continued conflict and a shared

acceptance of the need for and benefits of a political compromise (a “way out”) (Zartman 2001; Haas 1990; Pruitt 1997; Mor 1997). In these interpretations, ripeness is a top-down, leader-initiated process that is driven by political characteristics and incentives, including regime type, the core issues of the conflict, the balance of power between rival groups, and the intensity of the violence. Conflicts with tractable core issues, those that are driven by security rather than ideological concerns, and those with low-intensity violence are more likely to de-escalate and more conducive to effective mediation than intractable, intensely violent confrontations (Lebow 1981). The settlement of the Northern Ireland conflict can be explained using the concepts of ripeness and the mutually hurting stalemate. The sectarian conflict becomes ‘ripe’ for settlement when leaders on both sides of the conflict recognize that violence is unlikely to achieve political goals and that a political compromise will be less costly than continued conflict. The consistent failure of settlement attempts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reveals the challenge posed by the greater intractability of this conflict’s core issues. Because the violent threat is more severe and the motivating issues indivisible, the conflict never reaches ‘ripeness’ and both sides continue to prefer violence to political alternatives.

Literature on conflict management identifies political and conflict characteristics that appear to determine the success of third party interventions and negotiated settlements. Empirical studies of mediation timing suggest that ripeness for political settlement emerges with a lag, as changes in the political and security context affect the attitudes and expectations of political elites on each side of the conflict (Bercovitch 1986; Bercovitch and Diehl 1997; Regan and Stam 2000; Rasler 2000). This literature focuses on systemic and conflict-level factors that appear to influence the timing and success of

conflict de-escalation, including balance of power, regime type, the root causes of the conflict, and the number of past mediation attempts. Systemic and conflict-level approaches help policymakers identify the types of conflict that are easiest to resolve, but they are of less use to leaders hoping to use counterterror policy to de-escalate violence in a protracted conflict because systemic and conflict-level characteristics are difficult to influence with traditional policy tools.

More recent work uses domestic politics to explain variation in the form and timing of political settlements. Leaders appear to bargain at the negotiating table with the constraints of their domestic public in mind, especially when the preferences of local constituents and elites diverge (Putnam 1988; Frenley 1998; Mor 1997). This observation clearly applies in the Northern Ireland and Israeli-Palestinian cases. During the negotiations leading to the Good Friday Accords, both Catholic and Protestant politicians are constrained by the necessity of domestic approval. In the Israeli-Palestinian case, the strongest limitations Mahmoud Abbas faces (both in 2003 as Prime Minister and today) are created by internal constituencies who remain unwilling to compromise. In fact, the lack of internal Palestinian support for accommodation is a major reason Abbas resigns as Prime Minister in 2003 (*Amman Al-Ra'y* 2003). Case study analyses show further that bargaining and compromises between internal political interest groups and veto players influence the likelihood of de-escalation (Stedman 1991).

Conflict management literature that considers how domestic dynamics affect the form of political settlement move towards the bottom-up approach proposed by Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service, but still do not consider explicitly how domestic preferences may directly trigger the onset of conflict de-escalation. What is it

about the political and security context in 1994, for example, that facilitates a more lasting IRA and Loyalist ceasefire and supports serious negotiations that were impossible in previous decades? Neither systemic nor domestically-focused explanations of conflict management answer this question or anticipate when exactly conflict de-escalation and ripeness are most likely. This is a significant limitation from a policymaker's perspective because it makes it difficult to identify the optimal form and timing for an intervention. By using constituent expectations and demands to identify the types of political and security events and specific conflict dynamics that support de-escalation and intervention, Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service contribute to the formation and implementation of more effective counterterror policies.

Summary

Existing explanations of when and why violence begets violence offer insight into the violent and political dynamics of protracted terror conflicts, but cannot explain the significant variation in the timing, form, intensity, and likelihood of demands for violence and violent retaliation observed in protracted terror-counterterror conflicts across cases and over time. Existing work cannot explain why Palestinian militants respond severely to the targeted killing of Raed al-Karmi and not those of Yassin and Rantisi in 2004 or why Iraqi Shiite militias retaliate for attacks in 2005 and rely on restraint after 2007. From a policy perspective, the inability of existing studies to explain variation in the timing of constituent demands for violence, the form of violent retaliation, and the success of de-escalation is significant because a limited understanding of the factors that drive and encourage the use of violence complicates the design and implementation of

effective counterterror policies that are able to consistently control and de-escalate terrorist violence. Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service uses constituent expectations and demands to offer a more comprehensive answer to the question of when and why violence begets violence that can explain the variation in conflict dynamics cited at the start of this chapter and identify optimal counterterror strategies for each context.

Contribution

The explanation of conflict dynamics proposed in this dissertation, Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service, uses constituent expectations and local political dynamics to provide a more comprehensive answer to the questions of when and why violence begets violence in protracted terror conflicts than offered by existing literature. According to Retrospective Projection, constituent expectations about the efficacy of violent and political approaches to the conflict incorporate the nature of the current threat, past outcomes, and forecasts for the future. Demands for violent retaliation occur when the expected efficacy of violence as a political tool exceeds confidence in political strategies, and violence closely matches constituent demands in timing and form, employed as a tool of constituent service.

Qualitative analysis and quantitative tests of the theoretical argument support the bottom-up explanation of conflict escalation and suggest the importance of local political dynamics, such as conflict tractability and political competition, to the timing and form of constituent demands for violence and violent retaliation. In each of the case studies included in this dissertation, confidence in political strategies and optimism about the potential for a political settlement serve as constraints on violence, and constituent

expectations determine the timing of de-escalation. Increasingly negative expectations about the efficacy of a military-based strategy limit constituent demands for violent retaliation and the use of responsive violence by state and non-state actors after 2002 during the Second Intifada and after 1980 during Northern Ireland's 'Troubles.' However, while new political opportunities support and institutionalize de-escalation in Northern Ireland through ceasefires in 1994 and the Good Friday Accords, the lack of political alternatives and more intractable conflict sustains tolerance for violence and prevents a political solution in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For policymakers, the qualitative and quantitative results suggest that counterterror policies that affect the balance between military efficacy and political optimism encourage de-escalation by reducing demands for violence. British efforts to create a framework for negotiations in the 1990s and law enforcement-based counterterrorism serve these functions in the 'Troubles,' but similar changes do not occur in the Palestinian Territories.

This dissertation makes theoretical, empirical, and practical contributions to existing literature on protracted terror-counterterror conflicts specifically and conflict resolution and management more generally. Theoretically, Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service address remaining shortcomings in the literature on the dynamics of protracted conflicts as well as that focused on conflict management and conflict resolution. First, the argument offers a more complete answer to the question of when violence begets violence than provided in previous literature by focusing explicitly on constituent expectations and demands as drivers conflict escalation and de-escalation. Existing literature does not ignore the importance of local political dynamics, but it never considers constituent preferences in a rigorous or systematic way. As a result,

Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service can explain what existing literature cannot, specifically why the timing and form of violent retaliation vary across cases and over time and what this variation means for counterterror interventions.

In addition, Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service identify constituent expectations and local political dynamics as a primary determinant of when conflict de-escalation occurs and a causal mechanism that explains how ‘ripeness’ emerges.

Although existing literature on conflict management shows that the likelihood of ripeness and conflict settlement increase over time, it is unable to anticipate precisely when de-escalation is most likely. The qualitative and quantitative results in this dissertation suggest that ripeness and de-escalation are most likely when local publics expect political alternatives to more effectively address their political and security goals than continued violence. As a result, states interested in anticipating the emergence of ripeness must attend closely to non-state constituent expectations. This dissertation identifies specific changes in the political and security context that signal imminent ripeness. These signals, including rising political turnout, the emergence of new moderates, protests against non-state groups, and forced conscription, are considered in detail in the conclusion.

This dissertation makes important contributions to the limited existing empirical literature on protracted conflicts by empirically testing the implications of Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service and placing quantitative bounds on the associations between domestic politics and violence. I use a vector autoregression approach (VAR) that naturally corresponds to my theoretical argument and better captures the rich dynamic response relationships suggested by Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service than approaches used in previous work. The impulse response functions (IRF)

that serve as the VAR's key metric are an efficient way to describe empirically the dynamic associations between political attitudes and violence and quantify the size, speed, and duration of the response to an external shock (Brandt and Freeman 2006; Stock and Watson 2001).³ The dataset used in the empirical analysis also includes more nuanced definitions of terrorism and counterterrorism than previous literature. I use separate codes for militant and civilian deaths and codes for specific types of counterterror operations. These measures allow for more sensitive empirical tests that offer additional insight into the use of and demands for violence (Jaeger and Paserman 2006, 2008; Berrebi and Klor 2006, 2008).⁴ Finally, the method employed in this dissertation is relevant because it provides counterterror policymakers a forecasting tool that measures conflict dynamics and identifies policy tradeoffs.

The results of this dissertation are practically relevant and inform the development and implementation of counterterror policies aimed at encouraging lasting de-escalation of protracted conflicts and preventing individual radicalization in a wider set of contexts. First, the results suggest that counterterror strategies able to alter the balance between expected military efficacy and political optimism can reduce and control conflict violence by eliminating constituent demands for violence. In each example, conflict de-escalation is a bottom-up process that works through constituent expectations. This observation suggests the necessity of building locally-focused counterterror policies that directly affect the attitudes of local constituents. A comparison of the cases included in this dissertation show that counterterror programs that increase confidence in political strategies with the creation of local political opportunities or influence operations that

³ A full description of the VAR method is included in Chapter 3.

⁴ A full description of the data and its advantages is included in Chapter 3.

increase the perceived efficacy of political engagement are often more effective in promoting lasting de-escalation than policies that include only military-based counterterrorism. Effective programs may include social service provision, economic incentives, infrastructure development, and information campaigns used to shape the attitudes of non-state publics. Counterterror strategies that rely exclusively on military operations can often contain violence, but are rarely able to support a permanent de-escalation. Finally, the cases included in this dissertation suggest that the outcomes of counterterror policy depend on the dynamic expectations of non-state constituents, making response timing a necessary consideration for counterterror policymakers.

Next Steps

The discussion in this chapter motivates the argument, places the contribution of this dissertation in the context of existing scholarship, and underscores the need for empirical and theoretical attention to the effect of constituent demands and local political dynamics on the timing of escalation and de-escalation in protracted conflicts. The next chapter describes the theoretical argument in detail, generating testable propositions that guide the quantitative and qualitative analyses that comprise the body of this dissertation.

Chapter 2

Explaining Conflict Dynamics: Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service

Introduction

The immediate retaliation that followed the assassination of Raed al-Karmi in the Palestinian Territories and the consistent tit-for-tat violence used by Iraqi militant groups before 2007 are anticipated by autonomous, strategic, and political explanations of violence.⁵ Existing literature offers less insight into frequent periods of restraint in each conflict. In this chapter, I use local political dynamics to explain periods of conflict escalation *and de-escalation*, and identify micro-level processes that drive both the timing and form of violent retaliation and the potential for long-term restraint. I argue that constituent expectations about the benefits of violence and the efficacy of political strategies shape constituent demands for retaliation, and these demands determine when retaliation occurs.⁶ Figure 2.1 shows mechanisms that connect constituent expectations with their demands for violence and violent retaliation by state and non-state actors.


The Argument: Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service

The core of the argument is that constituent expectations and demands are primary drivers of violence in protracted terror-counterterror conflicts because state and non-state actors are directly accountable to local supporters and use violence as a tool of

⁵ See Chapter 1, Page 1 for additional discussion of both events.

⁶ ‘Constituents’ refers to voters for the state, and relevant local populations on the non-state side.

Figure 2.1
Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service



Under Retrospective Projection, political responses to violence are based on constituent expectations about the efficacy of violence and political approaches. These expectations combine evaluations of past military and political outcomes with assessments of the current threat to form beliefs about military efficacy and optimism about the potential for a political solution. The balance between military efficacy and political optimism determines when local constituents demand violence. Demands for violence occur when expected military efficacy exceeds political optimism and constituents expect counterterror strategies that include military components to more effectively advance political interests than approaches that only use political tactics. Violence follows constituent demands because it serves as a tool of Constituent Service.

Constituent Service to address and match constituent demands and preferences. Local constituents on the state and non-state sides of the conflict demand violence when they think that it will work, that is, when they expect strategies that include military (militant)-based components to be more effective in achieving political goals than approaches that rely only on political accommodation or compromise. Constituent demands for violence reflect their assessments of the existing threat, their expectations about the likely success of military (militant) violence employed as a political tool (*military efficacy*), and beliefs about the potential for political settlement (*political optimism*).

I call the process through which political demands for violence emerge *Retrospective Projection* because it incorporates retrospective evaluations, current assessments, and prospective forecasts. Under Retrospective Projection, constituents form expectations about the relative benefits of political and military approaches by considering the severity and intractability of the external threat, past military and political outcomes, and existing political alternatives. Demands for violence are most likely when violence is severe, the conflict intractable, and when expected military efficacy exceeds political optimism because, at these points, individuals expect violence to better address their political and security objectives and interests than existing or potential alternatives. Demands for violence appear as support for hard-line groups in non-state cases, and shifts towards hard-line political parties on the state side.

According to Constituent Service, violent retaliation in protracted terror-counterterror conflicts is explicitly driven by local constituent preferences and political dynamics, and so is most likely when local supporters demand, or at least tolerate, the use of violence as a political tool. As a result, it is also most likely when expectations about military efficacy are relatively higher than confidence in political strategies and when support for military or militant violence is relatively more widespread.⁷ Constituent Service suggests that retaliatory violence matches political demands not only in the timing, but also in size and, where relevant, in form. Larger responses and more popular types of counterterrorism follow more significant political reactions, as state and non-state actors use violence to address or assuage constituent demands. As an example, because of their popularity, targeted killings in Israel serve an important political function and are used primarily after severe attacks on Israeli civilians that trigger political

⁷ Military strategies and military efficacy are defined to include non-state militant responses.

reactions (David 2002). Finally, the political importance of the conflict and external security threat also affect responsiveness. State and non-state actors are most responsive to the security demands of their constituents when conflict-related violence is highly relevant to important local supporters (Page and Shapiro 1992).

Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service also offer insight into the political benefits of responsive violence by state and non-state actors. Only retaliatory violence that matches constituent demands and produces observable security and political gains has positive political implications because constituents are unlikely to reward violence that violates their preferences or does not produce desired outcomes. Reputation affects the political benefits of retaliatory violence for state and non-state actors. Political actors with extreme constituents are more likely to benefit from violence than are those with moderate supporters due to differences in the demands placed on each group or party. However, Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service predict that any political implications associated with responsive violence will be small because constituent attitudes towards violence are prospective and incorporate expectations about the future behavior of relevant groups or parties (Nannestad and Paldam 1997; Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000).⁸ This interpretation differs from outbidding and signaling arguments that expect consistent political gains from retaliation.⁹

Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service receive theoretical grounding from literature on voting behavior and policy responsiveness. Literature on voting behavior offers theoretical and empirical support for the mechanisms behind

⁸ The logic for this assertion is that if violence reacts to constituent demands, then the violent retaliation itself is already incorporated into constituent expectations and is unlikely to provoke additional political responses.

⁹ See Bloom 2005; Arce and Sandler 2007; Kydd and Walter 2002 for examples.

Retrospective Projection. For example, studies that assess the effect of economic conditions on voting decisions show that past economic outcomes, expectations about future economic growth, and current conditions all influence vote choice (Fiorina 1981; Mackuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992; Lewis-Beck 2000). This literature also notes that policy failures, for example sharp increases in inflation or unemployment, tend to have larger effects on constituent attitudes than the responsive policies taken to address subsequent constituent demands. Retrospective Projection expects this same distinction in political responses to protracted conflict violence due to the prospective nature of political attitudes (Nannestad and Paldam 1997; Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000).

Literature on policy responsiveness offers some empirical support for the Constituent Service interpretation of violence. There is qualitative and quantitative evidence that the behavior of state and non-state actors is often congruent with local preferences because state and non-state actors attend to constituent interests and match policy responses to constituent demands (Shapiro and Page 1998; Page and Shapiro 1992; Manza and Cook 2002; Aldrich et al. 2006). State and non-state actors are most attentive and responsive to the demands of their local supporters on domestic and international issues of high political importance where constituents are well-informed and have strong, consistent preferences. This finding appears to generalize to protracted terror-counterterror conflicts, which are often highly relevant to affected constituents because of the intensity and consistency of conflict violence and the political importance of the conflict's core issues.

Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service extend existing literature on voting behavior and policy responsiveness by applying these arguments to the context of

protracted terror conflicts, focusing more explicitly on the micro-level processes that shape constituent expectations and demands for violence, and considering violence as an explicit political tool. Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service identify three primary domestic determinants that influence both demands for and the use of violence through their effect on constituent expectations and because they mediate the relationship between state and non-state actors and local supporters. A more detailed discussion of these three determinants—the severity and intractability of the threat, expected military efficacy and political optimism, and political institutions and competition—leads to a set of propositions about when demands for violence and retaliation are most likely in enduring conflicts. Table 2.1 defines these determinants and summarizes their predicted effect on constituent support for and the use of retaliatory violence.

Severity and Intractability of the Conflict

The intensity and intractability of the violence in an extended conflict affects constituent expectations about the necessity of violence and the potential for compromise and influences the likelihood of strong local constituent demands for violent retaliation. High support for violence is more likely in intractable conflicts because the zero-sum issues that characterize and motivate these types of conflicts make political compromise and political approaches appear dangerous or impossible and military solutions more appealing and necessary (Coleman 2000; Bar-Tal 2007; Bercovitch 1986).¹⁰ As an example, the perceived intractability of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict encourages negative expectations about the potential for a political settlement that lead to more

¹⁰ Intractable conflicts are defined as those with zero-sum, indivisible motivating issues. The questions at the center of these conflicts appear existentially important and all-encompassing to involved parties, making political compromise more difficult (Bar-Tal 2007).

consistent constituent support for armed counterterrorism and militant violence than observed in Britain during the Troubles, where the conflict is of limited ideological or political significance.

The severity of the external threat presented by conflict violence affects the size and content of political responses to escalating violence because it influences constituent expectations about the future threat and the practical necessity of aggressive retaliation. More severe and direct threats are more likely to trigger a political response of some kind because they have larger effects on constituent assessments of their own personal security and the required security strategy. Severe and direct threats also have immediately observable implications for the well-being of individual constituents that are likely to contribute to larger political responses (Gelpi, Reifler, and Feaver 2007; Mueller 1973). The severity of a threat can be assessed in several ways, including the number, type, or location of fatalities or attacks (Gelpi, Reifler, and Feaver 2007; Gartner and Segura 1998). For instance, civilian deaths present a more severe and direct threat to state and non-state constituents than military fatalities because they have immediate effects on the lives of local populations. Militant and military deaths, in contrast, present a more peripheral threat with limited political implications. Political responses and demands for retaliation are more likely, therefore, after civilian fatalities than military deaths.

Table 2.1
Retrospective Projection & Constituent Service: What Matters?

Determinant	Definition	Effect on demands for violence and violence
Severity of Threat	Intensity of violence Varies by fatality type <i>Civilian > Military/Militant</i>	Larger response follows more severe threat. Demands for violence occur when military efficacy is high.
Intractability	Intractable conflicts appear zero-sum	Demands for violence more likely when conflict is intractable.
Expected Military Efficacy	Expected success of violence as a political tool	Demands for violence occur when <i>military efficacy</i> exceeds <i>political optimism</i> .
Political Optimism	Confidence in political opportunities and potential for political settlement	Demands for violence occur when expected <i>military efficacy</i> exceeds <i>political optimism</i> .
Political Competition	Rivalry over security policy Bipartisan vs. Contestation	Larger response when competition high. Demands for violence when military efficacy is high.
Political Institutions	Form and strength of institutions Regime or Democracy Type	Democracy encourages political response. Democracy encourages responsiveness. Weak institutions encourage disaffection. Low clarity encourages disaffection.
Duration	Conflict length How much time has passed?	Demands for violence fall over time.

In addition to suggesting a more severe security challenge, civilian deaths also present a lower ‘clarity’ threat due to the inherent difficulty of defending against attacks on civilian populations. In this dissertation and related literature on the voting behavior of individual constituents, ‘clarity’ of responsibility refers to the ease with which voters can allocate blame or accountability for policy successes and failure to specific political parties or leaders (Powell and Whitten 2003). While military deaths are clearly

attributable to failures of military and political leadership and so have high clarity, civilian deaths imply a more diffuse threat that results from a more systemic political failure. As a result, political responses after civilian deaths may include not only demands for violence, but also disaffection that rejects all status quo responses. Fatality type directly affects the perceived severity of the threat and the perceived necessity of a political response, but expectations about the benefits of military and political strategies have more direct effects on the likelihood, timing, and size of demands for violence.

Expected Military Efficacy and Political Optimism

The balance between perceived military efficacy and political optimism determines constituent beliefs about the optimal conflict approach and directly affects subsequent demands for and use of violence. Demands for and the use of violence are most likely, according to Retrospective Projection, when expected military efficacy exceeds optimism or confidence in political alternatives, and local supporters expect violence to address their interests or objectives more effectively than political alternatives. Although expected military efficacy and political optimism are most usefully evaluated in relative terms, they are defined independently. Expected military efficacy reflects constituent expectations and beliefs about the ability of violence to serve as a political tool, while political optimism combines attitudes towards existing political opportunities with beliefs about the potential for a lasting political solution. Expected military efficacy is shaped most directly by the actual operational performance of a military or militant group, but also incorporates retrospective evaluations of past successes and failures and beliefs about the type or goals of the adversary (Gelpi, Reifler,

and Feaver 2007; Gartner and Segura 1998; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Mueller 1973). Political optimism is encouraged by the creation of new political opportunities, the emergence of new leaders, and other changes in the political context that make a political solution appear more likely or more appealing. However, past political failures and the collapse of earlier ceasefire agreements undermine and weaken political optimism. In Northern Ireland, the rise of Sinn Fein as a viable political actor in the 1980s and the party's involvement in peace talks in the 1990s promotes interest in political alternatives among Catholics, but the challenge to the status quo implied by the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 weakens Protestant enthusiasm about political approaches to the conflict (Adams 2003). Assessments of military efficacy and political optimism combine retrospective, contemporaneous, and prospective assessments about the political and security context.

Perceived military efficacy and political optimism are dynamic and evolve over the course of the conflict when external events alter the domestic political or security context and affect constituent expectations about the likely benefits of political and military strategies. As a result, constituent demands for violence are also likely to be dynamic, varying across cases and over time. Shifts in the balance between expected military efficacy and political optimism that increase relative confidence in political alternatives can encourage de-escalation by reducing demands for violence. Unsuccessful negotiations and failed settlements, for example, can increase the perceived efficacy of violence because they cast doubt on the future benefits of any political strategy. In Pakistan, the consistent violation of ceasefire arrangements by Taliban commanders increases support within Pakistan for military alternatives after insurgent violence (Fair

and Shapiro 2009). However, declining or low military efficacy does not always imply rising political optimism. During the most recent offensive in Sri Lanka, the LTTE's military efficacy fell sharply, but did not result in political optimism because Tamils remained outside the government. Instead, political optimism requires fundamental political reforms or institutional developments that directly influence constituent expectations and their beliefs about political alternatives. Although the balance between military efficacy and political optimism is only one of several domestic drivers of support for violence, it is often the most important determinant of when demands for violence occur because it incorporates the effect of other domestic characteristics, including threat severity and political competition.

Political Institutions and Competition

Political institutions and competition affect the demand for and use of violence because they define policy alternatives, create incentives for political responses, and shape the relationship between both state and non-state actors and their local supporters. On the state side, the incentives for political responses to violence, including those that demand retaliation, and the accountability of the state to local supporters are highest in robust democracies where leaders require a wide support base for political survival and so face political pressure to attend to constituent demands (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2000). The incentives for political responses to violence and the pressure on state actors to adhere to the demands of local supporters are weaker in democracies that include bicameral legislatures, coalition governments, and power-sharing executives. These institutional features make direct attribution of responsibility more difficult by creating

overlapping lines of accountability that often increase the chances for disaffection (Powell and Whitten 1993; Whitten and Palmer 1999; Kiewiet 1981; Anderson 2000; Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000). Finally, although even autocrats are accountable to their core supporters and dependent on some group of constituents for continued power and authority, they also tend to have greater flexibility and independence in their use of violence and reaction to constituent demands. This greater policy independence limits the ability of domestic constituents to constrain the violent behavior of their leaders and the incentives for political responses by local constituents (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2000).

On the non-state side, the strength (or even existence) of political institutions and the political objectives of the non-state group create the incentives for political responses to violence and responsiveness by the non-state actor to supporter demands. Support and demands for violence are more likely in conflicts where the non-state public lacks political alternatives, since the absence of political opportunities increases the perceived efficacy and necessity of militant-based responses. Even without robust political institutions, non-state groups are accountable to and constrained by the preferences of the local constituents on whom they depend for political support, resources, and safe haven (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2000; Paul 2009; Bloom and Horgan 2007; Jaeger et al. 2008). This is especially true for groups with strong political goals and those that rely exclusively on local populations for resources and support. Groups with abstract political goals and external sources of support may have more flexibility in their use of violence and be less responsive to local demands (De la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca 2007).

Political competition encourages political responses to violence on the state and non-state sides when rival parties or non-state groups exploit the security issue to

distinguish themselves from rivals, building a specific security policy reputation and competence. A party or non-state group constructs a hard-line reputation with repeated, aggressive military responses to violent attacks and consistent operational gains against the enemy and earns ownership of the security issue through repeated evidence of competence, judged retrospectively and relative to rivals (Belanger and Meguid 2008; Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik, Bennet, and Hansen 2003). Israel's right-wing Likud party develops a hard-line reputation with its consistently aggressive responses to Arab terrorism and 'owns' the security issue because it appears better able to control terrorism than the Left-leaning political leaders. Differences in party reputation and issue ownership encourage political responses to violence because constituents come to expect very different policy responses from rival political actors and use political affiliation to express their preferences and demands (Berrebi and Klor 2008). Constituent demands for violence are expressed as political shifts to the harder-line political party or non-state group. More intense political competition over the security issue in Israel drives large political responses to violence, but an intentionally bipartisan approach limits the incentives for these responses in Britain during the Troubles (Aldrich et al. 2006). Inter-party competition increases political responses to violence, demands for violence are still driven most directly by the balance between military efficacy and political optimism.

Time

Time as an independent variable also influences the likelihood of constituent demands for violence and the intensity of violent responses by state and non-state actors, through its effect on constituent expectations about the nature of the threat and the

efficacy of military and political approaches to the conflict. According to Retrospective Projection, time erodes support for violence and gradually reduces demands for and the use of violent retaliation by undermining expected military or militant efficacy. Specifically, the continuation of violence with no sign of political gains implies the failure of violence as a political tool, erodes constituent confidence in violence as a political tool, and reduces demands for violent retaliation. Constituent demands for violence and the intensity of violent retaliation are most likely, therefore, in the initial stages of a conflict, but decline over time as confidence in military efficacy falls and as constituents come to expect additional violence. Constituent expectations about military efficacy are dynamic on two levels. First, expectations about military efficacy and political optimism are dynamic because they incorporate evaluations of the past and present with forecasts about the future. Second, the balance between military efficacy and political optimism is dynamic because it is affected by and evolves with the passage of time itself. While time and conflict endurance have autonomous effects on military efficacy and encourage demands for violence, more substantial political reforms are required to advance political optimism.

Literature on conflict mediation and management offers theoretical and some empirical support for the importance of time to conflict escalation and de-escalation. This literature suggests that conflict de-escalation and settlement often follow a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ that makes the costs of continuing the conflict greater than those associated with accommodation, and a ‘way out,’ or appealing alternative (Zartman 2001; Pruitt 1997, 2001). Related literature suggests that the likelihood of ripeness increases over time, often in a nonlinear pattern (Regan and Stam 2000; Bercovitch 1986). The

conditions of ‘ripeness’ identified by conflict management literature align closely with Retrospective Projection. A military stalemate reduces perceived military efficacy, while the appealing way out creates viable political opportunities that encourage political confidence. Retrospective Projection advances beyond existing conflict management literature by identifying constituent expectations as a causal mechanism that explains precisely when and how ripeness emerges and why stalemates are often associated with de-escalation. The answers to these questions make a theoretical contribution to literature on conflict management and inform policymakers involved in conflict resolution.

Propositions

Retrospective Projection argues that the expectations of local state and non-state constituents about the efficacy of military strategies and the potential for political solutions are based on assessments of the past, present, and future, and determine when local constituents demand violence. Constituent Service suggests these demands directly affect the size and form of violent retaliation. Constituent expectations about the relative efficacy of political and military strategies incorporate evaluations of past outcomes, the severity and nature of the existing threat, and the intensity of political competition between rival parties or groups. Variation in the timing and form of violence reflects changes in constituent expectations about military efficacy and political optimism, the evolving nature of the threat and the influence of domestic political context. Demands for violence, manifested as shifts to hard-line parties or radicalized support for militant groups, occur after severe threats, when expected military efficacy exceeds political optimism, and constituents expect violence to better advance their political goals than

alternatives.¹¹ Violent retaliation matches constituent demands and violence is used as a political tool to address constituent demands. As a result, conflict escalation and de-escalation are bottom-up processes, driven by local political dynamics and constituent expectations about political opportunities and the efficacy of violence. This argument leads to a set of more specific propositions that can be applied to specific protracted terror-counterterror conflicts and evaluated empirically. Table 2.2 identifies the distinct implications suggested by this argument compared to existing literature.

When does violence beget demands for violent retaliation?

P1. Political responses to violence are more likely after civilian/leader deaths (severe threats) than military fatalities (more peripheral threat)

P2. Demands for violence are most likely when expected military efficacy exceeds political optimism.

P3. Disaffection and political alienation are most likely after civilian deaths

P4a. Demands for violence are more likely when the threat is intractable.

P4b. Demands for violence are more likely when political competition over security policy is intense.¹²

When does violence beget retaliatory violence?

P5. The likelihood, size, and duration of counterterror (terror) responses rises with the size of the political response.

P6 (states only). ‘Exceptional’ and ‘popular’ counterterror responses are most likely after attacks that result in large political responses.

P7 (non-state only). Extreme or ideological groups are more likely to respond violently to counterterrorism than moderate groups.

¹¹ Throughout, I define ‘radicalization’ as increased support for hard-line parties and groups and demands for violent retaliation.

¹² Propositions 4a and 4b are most effectively evaluated by comparisons of cases with high and low intractability and high and low political competition.

What are the political implications of responsive violence?

P8. Retaliatory terror and counterterror responses have weaker political implications than precipitating acts of violence.

P9. Violent responses only increase support for perpetrating groups or incumbent parties where they match constituent preferences and appear to have positive performance outcomes.

**Table 2.2
Expectations of Competing Explanations**

Theory	Violence? Demand for Violence?
Retrospective Projection & Constituent Service	Demand for violence (increase in support for hard-line parties/groups) occurs after severe threats, when military efficacy exceeds political optimism. Violence follows demands.
Rally	Demand for violence based on patriotism and benefits incumbent.
Repression → Radicalization	Repression leads immediately to radicalization, demands for violence, use of violence
Tit-for-Tat	Violence always begets violence.
Operational	Violence depends on cost-benefit analysis.
Signaling	Violence used consistently by hard-liners to signal type and consolidate political support.
Political Factors: Pretty Prudent Public/Casualty Tolerance	Demand for violence based on approval/disapproval of leader. Elite opinions, support for objectives, outcomes matter.

Discussion

Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service suggest that the expectations and demands of local constituents about the relative efficacy of violent and political strategies drive support for and the use of retaliatory violence and directly affect conflict escalation and de-escalation. Expectations about the benefits military and political approaches combine retrospective evaluations of past outcomes, contemporaneous assessments, and prospective beliefs about future violence. Constituent demands for violence follow severe threats, when expected military efficacy exceeds political optimism. The incidence and intensity of retaliatory violence closely follows constituent

demands and preferences because violence is used as a tool of constituent service by state and non-state actors who are accountable to local populations. Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service use local constituent expectations and demands, therefore, to explain why Hamas and Fatah respond violently to targeted killings in 2002 and not in 2004, why Iraqi militant groups reduce their use of violence after 2007, and why paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland only sometimes retaliate for sectarian attacks. In each case, variation in the timing of demands for violence and the use of violent retaliation depend on local political dynamics and evolving constituent expectations about armed and political approaches to the conflict.

The argument builds off and advances existing literature by identifying local constituent expectations and demands as the primary determinants of conflict escalation and the drivers of observed variation in the likelihood of violence and radicalization across cases and over time. In this interpretation, de-escalation is a bottom-up process that requires a shift in the balance between military efficacy and political optimism, specifically a decrease in expected military efficacy and a simultaneous increase in political optimism. This observation has some important implications for the formation of counterterror policy able to permanently de-escalate violence that are relevant to states facing an internal non-state threat and those, like the US, involved in counterinsurgency and counter-radicalization campaigns at a more global level.

Chapter 3

Approach: Case Selection, Data, and Empirical Method

Introduction: Objective and Summary

To evaluate Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service and the propositions just outlined, I use a comparative case study approach that combines qualitative and quantitative analysis. I conduct extended case studies of the Second Palestinian Intifada (September 29, 2000-December 31, 2004) and the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland (July 14, 1969-May 23, 1998) and supplement the results of these analyses with four qualitative case studies. In the quantitative portion of each case, I apply vector autoregression (VAR) to an extensive dataset that includes measures of violence, political attitudes, and economic conditions for state and non-state actors in each conflict. I use impulse response functions to empirically describe the dynamic associations between political attitudes and violence in each case. Qualitative case information assists in the interpretation of the results and adds robustness to empirical findings, especially where quantitative data is limited. The four supplementary cases—the Second Chechen War, the Sri Lankan Civil Wars, Iraq since 2003, and Pakistan since 2001—qualitatively explore the generalizability of Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service to a wider set of current, on-going conflicts that have direct relevance to national and international security challenges.

In this chapter, I discuss the research approach and empirical method. I justify the selection of the cases considered in this dissertation, describe the structure and sources of the data, and explain the operationalization of the key covariates. I then discuss the empirical strategy, vector autoregression, including why it is an appropriate way to assess Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service, its output metrics, and challenges.

Case Selection

Choosing the Cases: Criteria and Selection

I use a comparative case study approach that balances the costs and benefits of a larger-N study with those of a single case study. I conduct two extended case studies that combine qualitative and quantitative analysis. The focus on two cases facilitates a comprehensive investigation and detailed comparison of the two conflicts. I select cases that differ on the primary domestic determinants identified by Retrospective Projection as decisive in the formation of constituent attitudes towards violence, including the severity and intractability of the conflict, expectations about the relative efficacy of military and political approaches, and the nature of political institutions and competition. This approach offers insight into the mechanisms that drive distinct relationships between politics and violence in each example. I include four additional, qualitative analyses to further address the issue of generalizability and to connect the results of the extended analyses to the wider set of protracted conflicts, offering some insight into the challenges posed by radicalization, violence, and extremism at a transnational level (Achen and Snidal 1989).

I select cases from the ‘universe’ of conflicts defined by the motivating question and theoretical argument, specifically geographically-limited extended terror-counterterror campaigns, characterized by enduring, repeated, cyclical patterns of violent escalation and attempts at political settlement. Many of these conflicts have ethnic or religious roots and violence that occurs in a limited geographic region with few transnational incidents. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Sri Lankan Civil War, Northern Ireland’s ‘Troubles’, and the activities of Basque nationalists in Spain are typical examples from this universe of cases. Because Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service rely heavily on the existence of political contestation and leader accountability, I also limit the universe of cases to those in which the state actor has some characteristics of a democracy. Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service are relevant to autocratic contexts because even authoritarian leaders are accountable to internal constituents in certain ways. However, accountability is more immediate in democracies, where political attitudes of domestic voters have direct implications for political leaders, and more complicated and indirect in autocracies, where leaders depend on some core group of supporters for their political position rather than the larger mass public. I focus in this dissertation on the application of Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service to democratic contexts, and reserve an investigation of non-democracies for future work.

Using these criteria, I identify twelve relevant cases: Israel-Palestine, Northern Ireland, Russia-Chechnya, Sri Lanka, Spain-ETA, Algeria (civil war in the 1990s), Peru-Shining Path, Turkey and PKK, Colombia-FARC, Pakistan (since 2001), Afghanistan (since 2001), and Iraq (since 2003). Although this list is not exhaustive, it does include a representative set of protracted violent terror-counterterror conflicts. The final selection

of cases is based on methodological guidelines and concerns related to feasibility and availability of data. First, I choose cases that differ on the key dimensions identified by the argument and just described: the severity and intractability of the security threat, expected military efficacy, political optimism, political institutions, competition, and ultimate outcome. A comparison of cases with different values on these independent variables facilitates the identification of the specific mechanisms that connect violence and domestic politics in extended campaigns (Campbell 1975). Second, although it is never desirable to choose cases solely because they are easily researched, the existence of reliable and comparable data on violence and public opinion for state and non-state actors is also a requirement in the selection of the two extended case studies. When selecting cases for qualitative analysis, I weight cross-case differences most heavily, choosing conflicts with sufficient differences from each other and the extended case studies to offer some robust insight into the generalizability of Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service. Using these criteria, I select Northern Ireland's 'Troubles' and the Second Palestinian Intifada for extended analysis and Russia-Chechnya (with focus on the Second Chechen War), Sri Lanka, Iraq since 2003, and Pakistan after 2001 for the qualitative investigation. A brief discussion of the defining characteristics of each chosen case, summarized in Table 3.1, highlights their basic similarities and differences and their suitability for an evaluation of Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service.

Table 3.1
Summary and Comparison of Political Determinants

	Second Intifada	Troubles	Second Chechen War	Sri Lankan Civil War	Pakistan	Iraq
Root Causes	Religious, ethnic, nationalist	Religious, nationalist	Nationalist, religious after 1997	Ethnic, nationalist	Ethnic, nationalist	Religious, ethnic, nationalist
Failed Settlements	Yes, Oslo (1992), Camp David (2000)	Yes, Sunningdale (1974), AIA (1985)	Yes, ceasefire in 1996	Yes, multiple failed ceasefires in 1980s, 1990s	Yes, multiple failed ceasefires	Yes
Repeated Violence?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
International?	Limited, only in 1970s	Limited	No	Diaspora provide support	Yes	Yes
Severity	High	High in NI; Low in Britain	High in Chechnya; Low in Russia	High	High	High
Intractability	High	Moderate, Low in Britain	Low	Moderate	Moderate	High
Efficacy of Violence	Moderate, falls after 2002	Low	Low	Falls for Tamils over time; Increases for Sri Lanka after 2008	Falls over time for Pashtuns; Rises for state supporters	Falls over time
Political Optimism	Low	Moderate, rises through 1980s	Low, rises after 2003	Low in 1980s, 1990s; Rises 2000s; Falls post-2004.	Falls after 2008 among state supporters; Rises among Pashtuns.	Rises after 2006
Political Competition	High	Moderate in NI; Low in Britain	Low	High in Sri Lanka; Moderate among Tamils	Moderate	High

Justifying Case Selection: Quantitative Cases

The cases selected for quantitative analyses, the ‘Troubles’ and the Second Intifada, share important similarities and differences that make them appropriate for the comparative case analysis conducted here. Both are representative extended terror conflicts that occur in democratic contexts and are motivated by nationalist and religious grievances. In both examples, violence presents a pervasive and consistent threat and the conflict itself is directly institutionalized in domestic political competition. Both conflicts have also experienced cyclical periods of intensified violence punctuated by attempts at political settlement. The existence of comparable data—counts of fatalities, terror attacks, counterterror operations, and political attitudes—on each conflict also support and facilitate this analysis.

However, there are also extensive differences between the two cases on each major theoretical dimension. The severity and intractability of the security threat are greater in the Second Intifada than in the ‘Troubles.’ In terms of severity, more individuals are killed in Israel and the Palestinian Territories between 2000 and 2004 than in the entire 30 years of the ‘Troubles.’ Considering intractability, the potential for political compromise is consistently greater in Northern Ireland. Constituents on each side of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict see their dispute as an existential one and consider certain issues non-negotiable. Although the sectarian dimension of the ‘Troubles’ appears zero-sum at some points, over time, cross-sectarian engagement, conflict fatigue, and on-going attempts at political settlement encourage flexibility in the attitudes of many Protestants and Catholics (McAllister 2004; Bruce 1992b).

State and non-state constituents in each case also have very different expectations about the likelihood of future violence and the efficacy of military versus political approaches. Israelis and Palestinians expect continued and increasing violence and perceive military responses as the more effective approach, given the clear failure of past attempts at settlement. In Britain and Northern Ireland, however, the failure of military-based strategies is apparent early in the conflict and confidence in political alternatives grows throughout the 1980s as political opportunities become more robust. As a result, demands for settlement emerge more quickly during the ‘Troubles’, especially among moderates and in Britain, than is true of the Second Intifada. Conflict fatigue spreads more gradually and weakly in Israel and the Palestinian Territories.

Finally, political institutions and competition in Israel and the Palestinian Territories are far more likely to encourage large political responses to violence, radicalization, and retaliatory violence than is the case in Northern Ireland or Britain. On the state side, more extensive inter-party differences on security policy in Israel increase the intensity of political competition, associated inflammatory rhetoric, and the incentives for political responses to violence compared to the British example, where both parties intentionally employ a bipartisan approach. On the non-state side, the lack of political institutions and alternatives to violence in the Palestinian Territories contribute to more robust support for violence than exists in Northern Ireland, where political opportunities are weak in the 1970s, but strengthen over time. Political competition is closely associated with violence in Northern Ireland and the Palestinian Territories. Variation between the two cases on these key dimensions facilitates an identification of key causal

mechanisms that drive and define the relationship between domestic politics and violence in extended conflicts.

One criticism of the selection of the ‘Troubles’ and the Second Intifada for the quantitative analyses in this dissertation is that because these two cases already dominate empirical research on terrorism, future work can be most informative if it considers a wider set of conflicts (Cragin 2009). However, the analysis presented here advances previous work on these specific conflicts and on extended terror campaigns generally, creating a framework and method that can be applied to other cases in the future. First, Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service address the lack of attention to micro-level processes that plagues existing literature by focusing explicitly on the domestic political dynamics that can explain trends in radicalization and violence over the course of a protracted conflict. Second, the data used in this dissertation, described below, includes more sensitive measures of violence than exploited in previous work. For instance, I code militant and civilian deaths as separate types of violence and use a refined measure of counterterrorism that considers both violent and non-violent activities. Using this data, I am able to carry out more nuanced and rigorous empirical tests that advance existing research in their certainty and breadth. Finally, this dissertation uses vector autoregression and impulse-response functions to empirically describe the dynamic relationships between political attitudes and violence. Because the VAR approach captures both endogeneity and the dynamic covariate relationships without as many rigid structural assumptions as alternative approaches, it produces a more realistic set of estimates of the violent and political dynamics in these conflicts than previous work.

Justifying Case Selection: Qualitative Cases

I choose cases for the qualitative analysis to maximize generalizability and policy relevance. The four cases included in the qualitative chapter—Sri Lanka, Russia-Chechnya, Iraq since 2003, and Pakistan after 2001—have ongoing implications of international security and share core similarities and differences with each other and the cases chosen for quantitative analysis. As shown in Table 3.1, each conflict has religious, ethnic, or nationalist roots and intense, pervasive, and repeated violence that takes on direct political relevance. However, each case is distinct from the Israeli-Palestinian and Northern Ireland examples in some significant way. For example, Russia's democracy is much weaker than that in either extended case, reducing the influence of political competition, but increasing clarity and the role of elite opinion. In Sri Lanka, the government is more willing to use massive military operations against Tamil populations than Israel's leaders (who are more concerned with international opinion) increasing the severity of the state threat and hardening Tamil support for violence. In Iraq, retaliatory violence rarely comes from the weak Iraqi state, but instead from rival militias and insurgent groups. In Pakistan, armed non-state insurgents exploit local sympathy to advance a broader agenda, but are not embedded in local populations as is true of militants in Northern Ireland or the Palestinian Territories.

The cases also differ on the core domestic dimensions mentioned previously: the severity and intractability of the conflict, expected military efficacy, confidence in political alternatives, and political institutions and competition. Conflicts in Sri Lanka and Iraq are more intractable than those in Russia, Pakistan, and Northern Ireland, but

somewhat less zero-sum than in the Israeli-Palestinian case. The availability of political opportunities and the apparent efficacy of violence as a political tool also vary significantly across cases. Violent counterterrorism is more effective in controlling terrorism, and as a result more domestically popular, in Israel and Sri Lanka than in Northern Ireland, Pakistan, or Russia. On the non-state side, militant violence achieves limited political goals in the Palestinian Territories that make it more popular than the somewhat less effective militant activities in Chechnya, Sri Lanka, and Iraq. Political opportunities available to non-state constituents are limited across cases, but are somewhat more appealing in Chechnya, than in Iraq and Pakistan, where weak state actors exacerbate violence. The political goals of militant groups also differ across cases with implications for conflict dynamics. The political orientation of the IRA creates incentives for responsiveness and constituent constraints on 'Troubles'-related violence, but the more abstract political objectives of militants operating in the FATA and Islamists active in Chechnya reduce the constraining effect of local political dynamics in these conflicts. Finally, political competition incentivizes larger political responses to violence and more frequent violent retaliation in Sri Lanka and Iraq than in Pakistan or Russia.

Significant variation in attitudes towards violence and the timing and outcome of violent retaliation in qualitative cases facilitate a test of the true generalizability of Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service. If the theoretical argument has a wider applicability, then constituent expectations in each conflict should respond to changes in the domestic political and security context in predictable ways and serve as a primary causal mechanism that drives conflict escalation and de-escalation.

Summary

The cases selected for use in this dissertation are well-suited to address the dissertation's motivating questions and objectives. The two cases chosen for extended empirical investigation facilitate deep analysis of individual conflicts, cross-case comparison, and some generalization to a broader set of extended terror campaigns. Similarities and differences between the two cases ensure their comparability, complementarity, and their value as empirical tests of the theoretical argument. The inclusion of four qualitative cases tests the generalizability of empirical findings and extends the argument and its implications to recent and on-going conflicts that are directly relevant to US counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategy more generally.

Data: Sources and Operationalization

Each case combines quantitative data on the use of violence and political attitudes with qualitative information relevant to the proposed hypotheses. Despite some limitations common to the study of public opinion and terrorism, the quantitative dataset used in this dissertation is more comprehensive than those used in previous work on the Second Intifada or Northern Ireland's 'Troubles' and includes more sensitive definitions of terrorism and counterterrorism than existing work. The dataset constitutes one of the major contributions of this project because it includes unique information and facilitates more extensive, robust empirical tests than previous work.

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The data on the Second Intifada incorporates instances of violence, including attacks and fatalities, with trends in voting intention and government approval for both the Israeli and Palestinian sides of the conflict. Violence data includes daily observations of Israeli and Palestinian-initiated operations and fatalities between September 29, 2000 and December 31, 2004 taken from B'tselem, an independent Israeli human rights organization considered objective by Israelis and Palestinians, and the Institute for Counterterrorism (ICT), an independent Israeli think tank.¹³ B'tselem provides detailed fatality data, including information on the date, location, and circumstances of all conflict-related Palestinian and Israeli deaths. Israeli deaths are identified as civilian or military. I code Palestinian fatalities into three comparable categories, civilian, militant, and police, defining only those who died “while participating in hostilities” as militants.¹⁴ Militants are further identified by group affiliation with Fatah or Hamas, based on information on counterterror fatalities provided by the ICT Arab-Israeli conflict database. Data on Israeli-initiated operations also integrates information from B'tselem and ICT. From B'tselem, I collect data on successful and unsuccessful targeted assassinations and punitive home demolitions. From the ICT database, I extract over 1,000 counterterror actions for the period of interest, including targeted killings, initiated military operations, and counterterror raids. Each record reports date, fatalities, location, and type of operation. Finally, I code targeted killings of important political and military leaders according to Zussman and Zussman (2006). Palestinian-initiated operations also come

¹³ Despite some disagreement over when the Second Intifada ended, I choose the 2004 end date due to both data limitations and substantive rationales, including Arafat's 2004 death and the Israel's Gaza disengagement.

¹⁴ Given the nature of the conflict, it is difficult to definitively distinguish militants and civilians. The assumption used here will be reasonable though imperfect.

from the ICT database. Attacks are classified by type of operation, target, location of attack, date, casualties, and perpetrating terrorist organization. Key operation types include bombings, suicide bombings, assassinations/shootings, and prevented attacks.

Data on Israeli and Palestinian political attitudes includes information on voting intention and organizational affiliation. The data on Israeli voting intention comes from Berrebi and Klor (2006). Their data include the proportion of support for the Likud and Labor parties and economic trends in Israel for the period from 1992 through January 2003. I supplement this data for the period after January 2003 using comparable voting intention polls conducted by major Israeli polling organizations including New Wave and TNS/Teleseger. I gather relevant economic controls (GDP/capita, unemployment) from the Israeli Bureau of National Statistics. Data on Palestinian political attitudes combines the results of two sets of surveys, one set conducted by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC) and the other by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR). Both surveys cover general social and political issues and ask individuals to identify their primary political or organizational affiliation, but are conducted in different months, increasing the total number of data points. Descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 3.2 to 3.4.¹⁵

I use this data to operationalize ‘violence’ and ‘demands for violence,’ the key variables needed for empirical tests of the theoretical argument. In both the Israeli and Palestinian cases, I use fatalities, rather than attacks or operations, as the primary measure of violence. This choice is based on preliminary qualitative and quantitative analyses and previous work on conflict dynamics that identify fatalities as the key drivers of political

¹⁵ Poll dates are listed in Appendix A1 and A3.

responses to violence and the intensity of violent retaliation (Berrebi and Klor 2006; Jaeger et al. 2008; Gartner and Segura 1997). When measuring Israeli counterterror

Table 3.2
Descriptive Statistics, Israel during the Second Intifada, Months

Variable	All, N=52				Pre-ODS & ODS, N=19				Post-ODS, N=31			
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Demolitions	12.7	14.5	0	59	1.2	2.3	0	9	20.5	14.0	3	59
IDF Killed	6.1	7.4	0	36	7.4	9.9	0	36	5.2	5.0	0	20
Israeli Civilians Killed	12.4	14.0	0	89	15.6	18.7	0	89	10.3	9.4	0	37
Israelis Killed	18.5	18.8	1	120	23.0	25.0	1	120	15.5	12.5	2	57
Military Operations	12.1	9.2	0	39	8.8	10.8	0	39	14.4	7.2	2	30
Palestinian Civilians Killed	37.0	32.8	3	175	46.1	48.0	9	175	30.8	14.1	3	70
Palestinians Killed	60.4	46.2	4	253	64.9	65.8	13	253	57.4	26.7	4	138
Likud-lead	28.2	11.0	-8	51	25.3	16.2	-8	51	30.2	4.4	20	41
Support for Labor (%)	24.5	6.4	12	41	23.8	9.3	12	41	25.0	3.3	18	30
Support for Likud (%)	52.7	6.4	32	63	49.1	8.1	32	63	55.1	3.1	50	60
Support for 'Other' Parties	22.8	6.5	13	43	27.1	6.6	13	43	19.9	4.5	14	29
Targeted Killings	1.8	1.5	0	6	1.8	1.7	0	6	1.8	1.3	0	4
Total Suicide Bombs	2.0	2.0	0	11	2.4	2.6	0	11	1.7	1.3	0	5

Table 3.3
Descriptive Statistics, Palestinian Territories, Months

Variable	All, N=51				Pre-ODS & ODS, N=19				Post-ODS, N=32			
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Targeted Killings	1.8	1.4	0	6	1.8	1.8	0	6	1.8	1.3	0	5
Total CT Operations	27.9	14.0	8	69	27.2	15.6	9	69	27.8	12.9	8	56
Total Suicide Bombs	2.0	2.1	0	13	2.7	2.8	0	13	1.7	1.3	0	6
Fatah and AMB-claimed fatalities	6.6	9.6	0	57	9.6	13.1	0	57	4.3	5.9	0	23
Fatah-claimed Fatalities	1.9	3.8	0	20	4.6	5.1	0	20	0.1	0.6	0	3
AMB-claimed Fatalities	4.6	8.3	0	54	5.0	12.1	0	54	4.3	4.9	0	23
Hamas-claimed Fatalities	7.7	10.7	0	50	11.1	13.9	0	50	5.9	7.9	0	25
Fatah Leader Assassinations	0.2	0.4	0	2	0.3	0.5	0	1	0.0	0.2	0	1
Fatah Militants Killed	4.4	4.9	0	25	3.5	3.4	0	14	4.9	5.7	0	25
Hamas Leader Assassinations	0.4	0.7	0	3	0.4	0.8	0	3	0.4	0.7	0	2
Hamas Militants Killed	8.5	9.9	0	40	4.4	4.2	0	12	11.4	11.4	0	40
Israelis Killed	18.9	17.7	1	98	24.1	23.2	5	98	15.5	13.0	1	57
Palestinians Killed	61.2	45.8	7	240	64.9	64.3	13	240	56.7	29.1	7	162
Palestinian Civilians Killed	37.6	33.0	2	175	44.9	46.2	9	175	30.7	15.8	2	76
Support for Fatah	29.0	3.7	24	40	31.6	2.9	28	37	27.2	3.1	24	40
Support for Hamas	19.4	2.4	10	24	18.1	2.3	10	21	20.5	1.6	17	24
Support for No Group	29.5	3.7	22	37	28.2	3.9	22	37	29.9	3.5	22	34
Support for 'Other' Groups	22.0	2.7	16	28	21.8	3.0	16	27	22.2	2.5	16	29
Fatah-lead	9.6	5.3	3	27	13.5	4.3	9	27	6.8	3.6	3	22
GDP	0.1	0.3	0.0	1.0	0.2	0.4	0	1	0.0	0.0	0	0

Table 3.4
Descriptive Statistics, Second Intifada, Weeks

Variable	All, N=222				Pre-ODS & ODS, N=83				Post-ODS, N=139			
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Targeted Killings	0.4	0.7	0	4	0.4	0.7	0	4	0.4	0.6	0	3
Total Successful Pal. Attacks	2.8	2.5	0	15	3.5	3.1	0	15	2.4	2.0	0	10
Total CT Ops	6.4	5.0	0	35	6.7	5.9	0	35	6.3	4.4	0	27
Military Operations	2.8	3.2	0	26	2.2	3.9	0	26	3.2	2.6	0	17
Demolitions	3.0	4.9	0	38	0.2	0.7	0	5	4.6	5.6	0	38
Palestinian Civ. Killed	8.7	11.7	0	125	11.4	17.5	0	125	7.0	5.6	0	31
Palestinians Killed	14.1	15.8	0	154	16.0	22.4	0	154	13.0	9.9	0	58
Israelis Killed	4.3	6.6	0	35	5.5	7.6	0	35	3.7	5.9	0	35
IDF Killed	1.4	2.9	0	26	1.8	3.7	0	26	1.2	2.3	0	13
Hamas-claimed Fatalities	1.8	4.8	0	33	2.3	5.8	0	33	1.4	4.0	0	22
Fatah-claimed Fatalities	1.5	3.4	0	27	2.3	4.3	0	27	1.0	2.6	0	22
Israeli Civilians Killed	2.9	5.2	0	30	3.6	5.7	0	30	2.5	4.9	0	30
Hamas Leader Assassinations	0.1	0.3	0	2	0.1	0.3	0	2	0.1	0.3	0	2
Fatah Leader Assassinations	0.0	0.2	0	1	0.1	0.3	0	1	0.0	0.1	0	1
Fatah Militants Killed	1.0	2.1	0	13	0.8	1.5	0	9	1.1	2.3	0	13
Hamas Militants Killed	2.0	4.0	0	25	1.0	2.1	0	9	2.6	4.8	0	25
AMB-claimed Fatalities	1.1	3.0	0	25	1.2	3.6	0	25	1.0	2.6	0	22
Fatah-claimed Fatalities	0.4	1.3	0.0	13.0	1.1	2.0	0	13	0.0	0.3	0	3

responsiveness, however, I consider not only fatalities claimed, but also operation type (targeted killing, home demolition, military operation) because a careful reading of the case suggests that each type of operation is used in specific political and violent contexts.

I operationalize ‘demand for violence’ using measures of relative vote share, based on vote intention polls. For the Israeli case, I focus on Likud-lead (Likud support-Labor support) as a measure of Israeli demands for armed responses to Palestinian terrorism. This is an appropriate metric because during the Second Intifada the key issue separating Likud and Labor is the security issue, with Likud taking the harder line approach. I supplement this with a measure of political fragmentation that includes support for smaller opposition parties with those who express no political affiliation. Although this aggregates many political attitudes, it captures the ‘disaffection’ or rejection of the status quo associated with low clarity threats by Retrospective Projection. For the Palestinian case, I use Fatah-lead (Fatah support minus Hamas support) as the primary measure of Palestinian political attitudes. A decline in Fatah-lead suggests a demand for violence in this case. I consider absolute support for each group following

targeted killings to test more explicitly for rally effects. The measure of disaffection in the Palestinian case includes only ‘unaffiliated’ Palestinian voters, in order to be consistent with previous work. The data series for political support in both the Israeli and Palestinian cases have missing months. I impute these months by averaging the months before and after the missing observation. Alternate imputation techniques, including weighting missing observations, do not have significant ramifications on the quantitative results or their substantive implications.

Finally, I use qualitative data to assess and operationalize expectations and attitudes of Israeli and Palestinian publics towards the use of violence and the potential for political settlement. I code both expected military efficacy and political optimism on a continuum from low to high, but am most interested in the balance between the two concepts, that is whether expected military efficacy exceeds or falls short of political confidence. I rely on several types of qualitative data, including public opinion polls on security-related issues and the statements and testimonies of key political and military leaders on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides of the conflict. To evaluate constituent expectations about the benefits of violence, I use selected questions from the Israeli National Election Studies taken in 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2006 on issues related to national security, the use of violence, and vote intentions. Surveys conducted as part of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Poll project and by the Jaffee Center for Security Studies as well as those executed quarterly by the JMCC and PCPSR provide additional information on attitudes towards violence, including the conditions under which Israelis and Palestinians support armed retaliation and the types of violence they find most acceptable. These same polls provide insight into constituent support for negotiations,

attitudes towards political settlement, and the terms of settlement acceptable to parties on each side.¹⁶ By tracking these attitudes over time, I can also observe changes in the balance between political optimism and expected military efficacy.

I supplement polling data with other types of qualitative information, including interviews with Israeli and Palestinian political and military leaders, justifications issued by Palestinian and Israeli commanders following acts of violence, and strategic planning documents used by actors on both sides of the conflict. I collect much of this information using systematic searches of newspaper databases, specifically Lexis-Nexis and the *New York Times* archive, concentrating on the periods following major instances of violence and other key political events. I locate strategic documents and internal communications through the Israeli Defense Force website, general Internet searches, and from secondary sources written by conflict experts. Publications by B'tselem on home demolitions and live fire guidelines provide insight into Israeli military practices and the attitudes of Israelis towards these practices.¹⁷ I also use this qualitative data to assess the severity and intractability of the conflict, to evaluate the importance of political institutions and competition to constituent demands, and to offer a insight into the quantitative results.

Northern Ireland's 'Troubles'

The Northern Ireland case incorporates fatality data with data on political attitudes and voting intentions. The violence data includes daily observations of fatalities perpetrated by Loyalist and Republican groups, British soldiers, and local police, covering the period July 14, 1969 through May 23, 1998, (signing of the Good Friday

¹⁶ List of questions and polls provided in Appendix A2 and A4.

¹⁷ Appendix A9 lists search key words and criteria used to gather this information.

Agreement). Information on fatalities comes from Malcolm Sutton's, "An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland," available on website of a conflict specific archive, Conflict Archive on the Internet: Conflict in Northern Ireland 1968 to Present (Sutton 1994; CAIN, <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/>). Each entry includes the name, age, religious and organizational affiliation of the individual killed, the context, location, means of death, and the perpetrating organization. I also collect data on terror attacks perpetrated by both pro-state and anti-state groups from the Global Terrorism Database, compiled by the START center (<http://www.start.umd.edu/start/>). However, as in the Palestinian case, I rely on fatalities rather than numbers of attacks as the key metric of violence.

To measure counterterror responses, I incorporate data on violence by state security forces with information on legal and policy responses used by Britain during the conflict. I collect and code these events using conflict chronologies to compile a list of policy and political responses, defined as significant policy changes, legislative actions, or law enforcement activities employed to stem terrorist violence. To be included in the list, an event had to involve a clear and explicit policy or legal change in the approach to the Northern Ireland question. Some examples include the 1974 Prevention of Terrorism Act, the media ban placed on Sinn Fein in 1988, and the start/stop of internment. The full list is included in Table 3.8 at the end of this chapter.

Voting intention measures on the British side combine Gallup Polls with Ipsos Market and Opinion Research Institute (Ipsos-MORI) data. Ipsos-MORI provides monthly data on British voting intentions, from August 1979 through the present. I supplement this data with Gallup opinion polls covering the period 1969-1979.¹⁸ I also

¹⁸ For the 1969-1979 period, I only have quarterly data and so must impute missing months. I experiment with several different approaches, including allowing the value to stay the same over the four-

include several economic variables identified by previous work as relevant to British vote intention decisions. From Ipsos-MORI, I include the Economic Optimism Index (EOI), which is based on the relative proportions of respondents reporting that they believe the economy will improve or get worse over the next twelve months. I also include monthly change in unemployment and change in the retail price index from the British Office for National Statistics (Lanoue and Hedrick 1998; Norpoth 1987). For the Northern Ireland side, data on political attitudes includes electoral outcomes and turnout (<http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/>) for five major parties in local and Westminster elections since 1973, focusing on the returns for five major parties, Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), Sinn Fein, Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), and the Alliance party.¹⁹ While election results offer some insight into trends in political support, the small number of observations necessitates a more creative empirical strategy. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3.5 to 3.7.

I use this data to operationalize demands for violence, violence, and policy-based counterterrorism. To measure violence, I use number of fatalities, coded by type (civilian/militant/military), nationality, and religion. The decision to use fatalities rather than number of attacks has larger implications in the Northern Ireland case than in the Second Intifada example due the large number of IRA and Loyalist attacks that did not cause fatalities. Initial qualitative and quantitative tests show that operations that cause no

month period and allowing it to increase or decrease an even amount in each period. In order to prevent observing changes that do not exist, I choose to leave the value unchanged in missing months. This makes it more difficult to find political responses. I test alternate specifications that use averaged vote intention measure and find few substantive differences in the final IRFs.

¹⁹ I do not include European Union elections since they attract a limited set of voters and concern a different set of issues than those relevant in local and national elections. I also considered separating Westminster and local elections, but found similar results for each subset of the data. Following McAllister (2004), I pool election results.

Table 3.5
Descriptive Statistics, Politics and Violence in Britain, Months

Variable	All (N=347)				Heath (N=44)				Labour (N=61)				Thatcher (N=136)				Major (N=76)			
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
British Civilans Killed	0.19	1.31	0	22	0.23	1.01	0	6	0.59	2.87	0	22	0.07	0.41	0	3	0.13	0.50	0	3
British Army Killed	1.45	2.93	0	20	4.95	4.86	0	18	1.61	1.86	0	8	1.19	2.70	0	20	0.24	0.51	0	2
NI Civilians killed	3.34	5.32	0	49	7.32	8.83	0	49	6.56	6.92	0	26	1.74	1.76	0	12	2.28	3.89	0	25
British claimed-deaths	0.85	2.32	0	23	3.61	5.18	0	23	0.85	1.05	0	5	0.54	1.23	0	9	0.12	0.59	0	4
Policy Changes	0.23	0.52	0	4	0.16	0.43	0	2	0.34	0.75	0	4	0.19	0.41	0	2	0.21	0.47	0	2
Conservative-lead	-5.10	13.21	-39	20	-3.71	5.06	-8	8	1.50	10.26	-16	15	0.55	9.09	-24	20	-16.83	12.10	-39	5
Support for Other Parties	24.31	6.95	11	46	30.80	3.89	25	34	30.33	3.31	25	35	22.29	7.18	11	46	19.83	3.75	13	30
Change in Inflation (Seasonally adjusted)	8.17	5.71	1.2	27	8.58	1.57	5.8	13.2	16.01	5.70	7.4	26.9	7.96	4.58	2.4	21.9	3.31	1.70	1.2	9.3
Change in Unemployment, Seasonally Adjusted	2.57	27.62	-70	92	1.12	14.84	-25	25	7.74	13.22	-14	37	5.90	32.32	-50	92	-2.55	31.34	-70	72

Table 3.6
Descriptive Statistics, Politics and Violence in N. Ireland, Months

Variable	All (N=347)				Pre-Direct Rule (N=35)				Post-Direct Rule to Heath (N=14)				1974-1985 (N=136)				Post-ALA (N=61)				Major (N=14)			
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Support for Other Parties	24.31	6.95	11	46	30.23	3.92	25	34	33.36	2.41	25	34	27.23	6.67	11	46	19.33	5.33	12	31	19.83	3.75	13	30
British Civilian Deaths	0.19	1.31	0	22	0.17	1.01	0	6	0.29	0.83	0	3	0.33	1.97	0	22	0.00	0.00	0	0	0.13	0.50	0	3
British Army Deaths	1.45	2.93	0	20	4.23	5.09	0	18	5.00	4.28	0	13	1.44	2.55	0	20	1.05	2.31	0	12	0.24	0.51	0	2
NI Civilian Deaths	3.34	5.32	0	49	6.74	9.85	0	49	6.50	4.43	0	13	3.78	5.38	0	26	2.00	1.97	0	12	2.28	3.89	0	25
Catholic Civilian Deaths	2.28	3.99	0	27	4.89	6.70	0	27	5.36	3.82	0	12	2.38	3.45	0	19	1.21	1.18	0	4	1.68	2.57	0	15
Prot. Civilian Deaths	1.06	2.31	0	22	1.86	3.95	0	22	1.14	1.61	0	6	1.40	2.50	0	14	0.79	1.58	0	11	0.59	1.62	0	10
IRA Militants Killed	0.41	0.99	0	8	1.03	1.56	0	7	0.93	1.00	0	3	0.33	0.78	0	4	0.43	1.23	0	8	0.29	0.80	0	5
Loyalist Militants killed	0.09	0.36	0	3	0.03	0.17	0	1	0.21	0.58	0	2	0.08	0.30	0	2	0.11	0.32	0	1	0.12	0.52	0	3
Loyalist-claimed violence	1.96	3.21	0	19	2.86	5.13	0	17	4.71	3.43	0	10	2.07	3.49	0	19	1.18	1.13	0	5	1.83	2.70	0	15
IRA-claimed violence	3.75	4.68	0	34	6.77	8.02	0	34	8.14	3.82	3	15	4.40	4.49	0	34	3.54	3.36	0	16	1.39	2.26	0	10
British Army-claimed Deaths	0.85	2.32	0	23	3.69	5.76	0	23	2.14	2.18	0	8	0.68	1.05	0	6	0.56	1.43	0	9	0.12	0.59	0	4
Policy Changes	0.23	0.52	0	4	0.23	0.60	0	3	0.14	0.53	0	2	0.24	0.57	0	4	0.25	0.47	0	2	0.21	0.47	0	2
Change in Inflation (Seasonally adjusted)	8.17	5.71	1.2	27	7.70	1.54	5	10	9.67	1.51	8	13	12.51	6.27	4	27	5.88	2.42	2	11	3.31	1.70	1	9
Change in Unemployment, Seasonally Adjusted	2.57	27.62	-70	92	5.74	15.01	-25	25	-4.93	11.56	-16	19	15.95	23.38	-15	92	-14.66	25.29	-50	48	-2.55	31.34	-70	72

Table 3.7
Election results in Northern Ireland (Westminster, Local)

	% Total Support	DUP	UUP	SDLP	SF	Alliance
1973		17	4.1	13.4		3.2
Feb-74		32.3	8.2	22.4		6.4
Oct-74		36.5	8.5	22.4		14.4
1975		30	12.8	20.6		11.9
1977		36.6	10.2	18.2		8.9
1979		26.4	26.6	17.5		8
1981		34	20	17.9		7
1983		29.5	24.3	17.8	11.8	3
1985		37.8	11.7	21.1	11.4	7
1987		31.3	17.7	21	11.2	8.7
1989		34.5	13.1	23.5	10	8
1992		29	17	22	12	6.5
1993		21.1	18.8	21.4	15.5	13.6
1997		32.7	13.6	24.1	16.1	6
1998		18	21	22	17.6	6

fatalities have correspondingly small political implications and that once again, fatalities appear to be the key drivers of political and violent dynamics. As in the Second Intifada case, I consider British counterterror responses with a more sensitive measure that includes non-violent activities. In addition to claimed fatalities, I also use the policy change variable because these strategic revisions appear to be an important part of the British counterterror strategy.

To measure demands for violence, I rely on a political metric that considers relative vote share for leading political parties. For the British side of the conflict, I focus on Conservative-lead (Conservative support minus Labor support) as an expression of British preferences for a more aggressive approach to the Northern Ireland conflict. Although differences between the two parties on the security issue are smaller than in the Israeli example, the Conservative Party did adopt a harder line approach towards the IRA than did Labour.²⁰ I also consider support for all opposition parties (the largest being the Liberal Democratic party) as a measure of fragmentation that captures the rejection of status quo predicted by the argument.

For the Northern Ireland side of the case, I measure demands for violence quantitatively using electoral outcomes, but qualitatively consider more direct demands for violence that immediately increase support for militant groups using qualitative data. I construct measures of relative vote share for Catholic and Protestant parties separately to capture the deep sectarian polarization that characterizes Northern Ireland's political landscape. On the Catholic side, I calculate an SDLP-lead variable, which compares the proportion of total Catholic vote won by Sinn Fein and the Social Democratic Labor

²⁰ The Conservative-lead variable corresponds to that used in previous work on determinants of British political support.

Party (SDLP). Similarly, on the Protestant side, I compute the relative proportion of Protestant vote won by the UUP and the DUP (UUP-lead). Declining values for SDLP-lead and UUP-lead represent increasing support for aggressive political approaches.

The election results suggest two potential measures of disaffection. First, election turnout is a clear measure of political engagement or apathy that reflects constituent satisfaction with available political options. On the Catholic side, low Catholic turnout in the 1970s reflects widespread disaffection from the existing political alternatives. As McAllister notes, “The evidence...suggests that Sinn Fein has mobilized support from new voters and from those who might otherwise abstain” (McAllister 2004, 136). A second measure of disaffection is support for the Alliance party, a non-sectarian opposition party that draws equal support from each religious community. According to many political analysts, votes for the Alliance party express dissatisfaction with the status quo approaches offered by mainstream parties. One analyst notes, “as confrontational politics are demonstrated ever more clearly to be unproductive, the party stands to garner more support steadily from the disillusioned fringes of both the SDLP and the UUP” (Grogan, *Irish Times* 1994).

As in the Israeli-Palestinian case, I use public opinion data, interviews, internal memos, and other relevant case information to assess expected military efficacy and political optimism during the ‘Troubles’. Again, I code these concepts on a scale from low to high, but am most interested in their relative levels and how constituent expectations and beliefs about violent and political approaches vary over time. To make this assessment, I rely on public opinion polls, interviews with both political leaders and local constituents and officials, and statements of military and political leaders. I collect

relevant public opinion and political attitude information from the British Election Studies (1970-1998), British Social Attitudes surveys (1983-1998), Northern Ireland Elections Studies (1992, 1998), Northern Ireland Social Attitudes surveys (1996-1998), and the Northern Ireland Life and Times series (1989-1994). To supplement these serial surveys, I use one-time surveys, including the 1978 study on Political Attitudes in Northern Ireland, the 1999 survey of SLDP members, and newspaper polls on support for peace, settlement options, and paramilitary violence. These studies are available through the UK data archive (<https://www.data-archive.ac.uk/>) and include information on support for British withdrawal, opinions on the best possible solution to the Northern Ireland conflict, attitudes towards police and army personnel, support for and beliefs about militant groups, support for political reform, and expression of political grievances. On the Northern Ireland side, I tabulate results by religion to capture the sectarian polarization. This data offers insight into when and why Northern Ireland's voters support violence and when they prefer political approaches.

I supplement these polls with a range of other qualitative data sources used to offer additional insight into the domestic political and security context and to assist in an interpretation of the results. In addition to interviews by key leaders and military commanders, I include memoranda between government officials, parliamentary transcripts from debates in Northern Ireland and Britain, training manuals used by non-state and state military forces, and counterterror legislation. I collect this information through targeted searches of newspaper databases and the archives of British newspapers, particularly the *Guardian* and *Observer*.²¹ The parliamentary debate transcripts are available through Hansard (<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/pahansard.htm>),

²¹ The list of search terms used to gather this information is included in Appendix A9.

UK-government sponsored database. The CAIN database also includes primary source documents, such as statements, newsletters, and intercepted communications released by the groups themselves, as well as interviews by former or imprisoned group members.

Limitations and Challenges

As is the case in any study of terrorism and counterterrorism, the certainty of the findings is limited by the uncertainty inherent in the nature of the conflict itself. In this section, I describe several sources of uncertainty that may affect the empirical findings of this dissertation and discuss the steps I take to limit any sources of bias.

The first set of challenges relate to the numbers and coding of conflict fatalities and attacks. It is unlikely that the data in either case accurately reports all instances of violence or correctly identifies the perpetrating organization of each attack. Fatality numbers are distorted by reporting challenges or intentional over/under estimation by terrorist groups or state actors. State and non-state groups have incentives to misreport fatalities and attack claims. Non-state groups leave dead fighters and perpetrated attacks unclaimed for security reasons. They also claim attacks that they did not perpetrate to increase morale or attract recruits. State actors have similar incentives to leave certain incidents unreported, especially those that are unsanctioned or unofficial. This type of mis-counting should be most significant on the non-state side, since state records of casualties incurred are more complete and correct. In addition, it may be difficult to distinguish between militant and civilian deaths in unconventional conflicts when militants intentionally hide among the civilian population. It will also be difficult to ascertain the organizational affiliation of deceased militants and to identify the

perpetrating group for non-state attacks. To address these issues, I use conservative coding criteria and cross-check data across several sources where possible

The second set of challenges concerns the use of polling data on voting intentions, attitudes towards violence, and leader approval as measures of demands for violence, expected military efficacy, and political optimism. First, attitudes reported in opinion polls and surveys are influenced by question framing and are unstable and unreliable over time (Traugott 2005; Martin, Traugott, and Kennedy 2005). ‘Undecided’ respondents present a special challenge, since their ‘undecided’ political attitudes do not accurately reflect the relevance or intensity of their demands to political leaders or non-state organizations (Lavine 2001). Sampling challenges exacerbate the unreliable nature of polling data, particularly in less developed and hostile areas, like the Palestinian territories or Catholic ghettos in the 1970s, where violence prevents the collection of a representative sample. Second, the data used in this analysis is at the national, and not individual, level. As a result, it offers insight into aggregate shifts in political attitudes rather than individual-level changes. I rely on qualitative analysis and first-hand reports from conflict participants themselves to get at these micro-level processes. Finally, public opinion data are collected episodically, with increased frequency only around elections. This limits their utility as continuous measures of political support during extended conflicts. As described above, I address this problem by imputing missing observations in most instances and rely on a different empirical approach where the only available observations are the election results themselves. Imputing missing observations is an imperfect solution that can introduce bias and can miss unexpected data fluctuations. To

avoid bias, I experiment with several different imputation techniques and choose a conservative approach that is unlikely to produce incorrect substantive findings.

A final issue concerns the potential for bias and framing in the qualitative case information. Although public statements and internal communications issued by state and non-state actors reflect constituent demands and offer insight into the state and non-state strategies, they are also framed to appeal to specific audiences and achieve specific objectives. It will be difficult to disentangle this endogeneity between constituent demands and the public reactions of political leaders. Furthermore, policy statements may not always be entirely accurate representations of policy intention. For instance, terrorist groups have an incentive to promise revenge, even if they have little intention or ability to retaliate on a massive scale. Political leaders may call for a political solution, but make no real policy steps to achieve one. I will not be able to fully address the reliability of qualitative information, but pay careful attention to frames and the direction of biases in the discussion.

Summary

The data used in this dissertation includes more comprehensive and sensitive measures of terrorism and counterterrorism than used in previous analyses of either conflict and also incorporates political support and economic data. The dataset includes some unique variables, including separate counts for Palestinian civilian and militant deaths, daily counts of Israeli home demolitions and military operations, and British ‘policy changes.’ This allows for a more nuanced investigation into conflict dynamics in

each case than provided in existing empirical work and facilitates simultaneous consideration of political and violent responses.

Empirical Method

The dissertation uses vector autoregression (VAR) to quantify the size, timing, and duration of the dynamic empirical associations between terrorism, counterterrorism, and public opinion in the two extended terror campaigns selected for in-depth analysis. The impulse response functions (IRF) produced by the VAR models serve as empirical tests of the dissertation's theoretical propositions because they empirically describe the dynamic associations between the violence and political support covariates. By comparing these dynamic associations across possible break points, I also explore the evolution of the relationship between domestic politics and violence over the course of the conflict. I supplement the VAR results with graphical analysis where data limitations prevent more rigorous investigation (the Northern Ireland case). The next two subsections describe each method, advantages, and limitations.

Vector Autoregression

Vector autoregression (VAR) is an econometric technique that uses a system of simultaneous, linear equations to model dynamic associations between multiple covariates and incorporates endogeneity without requiring as many a-priori assumptions about parameter restrictions as alternative approaches that rely on multiple equation linear or count models and require a more rigid structural form. Each equation in a VAR system includes the variable's own lags, the lags of all other variables in the model, and a

serially uncorrelated error term (disturbance).²² Instead of relying on the pre-specification of a more rigid structural form, the VAR “focuses on the causal relationships implied by the estimated reduced form of what is essentially an unknown structural model and on certain of that model’s dynamic processes” (Freeman, William, and Lin 1989, 843). The VAR approach is well-suited to empirical tests of the theoretical argument because the method naturally captures the dynamic response relationship between political attitudes and violence and the endogeneity between terrorism, counterterrorism, and domestic politics that are inherent in the Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service arguments. The more flexible form facilitates empirical evaluations of the dissertation’s hypotheses, and offers “the ability to analyze more complex, simultaneous causal relationships between the actors’ behaviors, systematically incorporate beliefs about conflict dynamics, and gauge the degree of uncertainty about causal inferences” with less chance of misspecification from incorrect assumptions than alternative specifications (Brandt and Freeman 2006). This is important in cases like that considered here, where the argument does not suggest the types of assumptions needed for more precise pre-imposed parameter restrictions.

The VAR’s flexible functional form is one of the approach’s key advantages. However, the cost of this flexibility is relatively higher uncertainty associated with coefficient estimates and causal inferences than exists in alternative approaches. This uncertainty results from the high correlation among the regressors of the model’s flexible reduced form (Freeman, Williams, and Lin 1989). VAR models offer less precise and more uncertain estimates than would a structural model. However, in many instances,

²² The reduced form VAR can be generalized to include any number of variables and lags as $y(t) = \mu + \Gamma_1 y_{t-1} + \dots + \Gamma_p y_{t-p} + \varepsilon(t)$ or alternatively as $\Gamma(L)y_t = \mu + \varepsilon_t$ where $\Gamma(L)$ is a matrix of polynomials in the lag operator (Greene 2003; Lütkepohl 2005).

terrorism being one, reduced certainty accurately reflects the state of the world and our ability to forecast responses.

The most useful output metric from the VAR is the impulse-response function (IRF), which empirically describes dynamic covariate associations. The IRF is a more appropriate way to interpret covariate relationships in the reduced form VAR than are the VAR coefficient estimates. Although the VAR coefficients are efficient, they are not necessarily uniquely identified (Stock and Watson 2001). The response functions, in contrast, are uniquely identified and can be used to map the response of each variable following random shocks in each other covariate. The IRF “reveals the combined impact of contemporaneous and lagged relationships between covariates” and allows for “inferences about the direction, magnitude, and duration of shocks in key variables” (Sattler, Freeman, and Brandt 2008, 1220-1221). As a result, IRFs “provide a better, more intuitive representation of the dynamics of the series in the model than the AR representation” and offer insight into the behavior of the multivariate process over the course of the time series (Brandt and Freeman 2006, 21).

Although IRFs can be interpreted casually under certain conditions, IRFs are still an effective and useful output metric when the assumptions needed for causality do not apply. Even when not interpreted causally, IRFs describe and quantify the dynamic empirical *association* between covariates in an interdependent system. Under this weaker interpretation, IRFs identify the direction, significance, and duration of the variables’ dynamic covariations and facilitate comparisons across covariate pairs and over time. The *associational* understanding of the IRF is also sufficient for evaluations of many of Retrospective Projection’s key propositions, which consider the dynamic relationships

between violence and political attitudes. At the conclusion of this section, I offer a brief tutorial on the interpretation of IRFs to facilitate the reader's understanding of the results.

The flexibility that characterizes the VAR approach does not mean that VARs are completely without structure. For the simple, reduced form VARs used in this dissertation, identifying structure derives from the ordering of variables and the number and linear additivity of included lags. In addition, VARs assume that the disturbance terms are correlated across equations in the system and that all variables are endogenous, but not co-integrated. With these assumptions, even simple reduced form VAR estimations produce results that are “statistically efficient, in spite of the potential correlation of disturbances,... relatively simple and numerically stable” (Diebold 1998, 181). Beyond this baseline, recent extensions of the VAR approach have moved towards the inclusion of more extensive parameter restrictions. In structural VARs, for instance, some parameter restrictions are explicitly imposed, while other parameters retain their flexible form of entry to the VAR system. Bayesian structural VARs also use a partially identified specification, but rather than applying frequentist knife-edge restrictions as in structural VARs, Bayesian structural VAR applies restrictions via prior distributions in a standard Bayesian manner (Brandt and Freeman 2006). Because the theoretical argument in this dissertation does not support any firm beliefs regarding the values or distribution of parameters, I rely on the basic reduced-form VAR specification. I discuss the implications of this choice below in more detail.

As the primary sources of the VAR system's identifying structure, variable ordering and lag length have significant empirical implications. Variable ordering affects the VAR results because it determines how and when shocks in each covariate enter and

echo through the system. It does this by placing constraints on the error covariance matrix used to draw the random shocks that produce the dynamic impulse-response associations measured by IRFs. Cholesky decomposition, which splits the symmetric error covariance matrix into an upper and lower triangular matrix, is used to impose a recursive structure on the VAR. In this structure, a shocked variable is considered to covary simultaneously with each variable that follows it in the initial specification and the triangularized array that results from the Cholesky decomposition, but to influence those that come before it only in the subsequent period. Using the language of causal ‘mover’ and ‘moved’, the variable listed first in the initial ordering is the most ‘mover’ while that listed last is the most ‘moved.’ The resulting IRFs forecast the speed, size, and duration of changes in each covariate following the shock to the impulse variable over the specified response period holding all else constant (Brandt and Freeman 2006).

The selection of lag length determines how many past periods are considered when specifying the dynamic associations between covariates. Lutkepohl (2005) identifies several different selection criteria: Akaike (AIC), Schwartz-Bayesian (SBIC), Hannan Quinn Information Criteria (HQIC) or the final prediction error (FPE). The choice of selection criteria involves a tradeoff between consistency and forecast error variance. Reliance on the HQIC or the SBIC yields consistent choices of the lag order that produce the correct lag structure asymptotically. Reliance on the AIC or FPE recommends lag orders that are too high, on average, but minimizes forecast error variance. As with any econometric technique, the results of a VAR estimation and the IRF graphs produced by these estimates will not be accurate if underlying assumptions of the VAR approach are incorrect. As noted above, the major identifying assumptions

underlying the VAR model are its variable ordering and lag length. If either of these is incorrectly specified, then the resulting IRFs will be incorrect. IRFs may also be affected by omitted variable bias if any of the omitted residual factors included in the shocks that produce the IRFs are correlated with included covariates (Stock and Watson 2001).

I make several empirical and theoretical decisions in specifying the VAR models used in the dissertation. Models for each case incorporate measures of violence (fatalities and operations) and political support (vote intention, political affiliation, and electoral outcomes). I include relevant economic and event controls. For both political and violent responses, I rely primarily on monthly observations. I use weekly data for violent responses during the Second Palestinian Intifada because the finer-level of analysis better captures the more immediate nature of violent reactions by state and non-state actors. The appropriate level of aggregation in each case is also driven by empirical concerns. Because the fatality data is technically event counts, to use the linear approximations that comprise the VAR system most appropriately, I must ensure that each series has a large variance and relatively high mean values (Greene 2003; Sprecher and DeRouen 2005; Cameron and Trevedi 1998, 2). This is less of a concern in the Israeli-Palestinian case, where a much higher level of violence means high fatality counts and few zero observations, except for rare events like targeted killings. In the British case, where the level of violence is more limited and dispersed, questions about the fit of the linear approximation are most relevant for evaluations of the violent response dynamics. I compare fitted values from single-equation linear and negative binomial specifications with violence measures as the dependent variable to determine if the use of the linear approximation is likely to bias the final results. I find little difference between the linear

and negative binomial specifications across cases.²³ In the British example, where the incidence of zero observations is more problematic, neither linear nor count models offer a great fit of the data, but linear models do not perform noticeably worse than negative binomial ones.²⁴ Finally, because the VAR approach assumes that variables are not co-integrated, I test my times series data for co-integration and find no evidence that co-integration will affect the empirical results.

Variable ordering and lag length can have important implications for impulse-response relationships. To identify the lag structure, I use the four selection criteria noted previously. Fortunately, the recommendations of the four selection criteria are similar for the VAR specifications used in this dissertation. Where they are not, subsequent tests confirm that the empirical results and substantive implications do not differ significantly with small changes in lag length. In choosing lag length, I also consider degrees of freedom to ensure that the number of parameters in the VAR specification is sufficiently smaller than the number of observations to allow for accurate forecasts. This is especially important in the Israeli case, where the observation period is considerably shorter. The appropriate lag length does vary across cases and time periods. I offer sample specifications that include lags in Appendix A10 and report the lags included in each model in the results tables presented in each case chapter.

Decisions about the ordering or sequencing of variables in the VAR specification are based on the theoretical argument. Specifically, although Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service arguments propose interdependent and bidirectional associations

²³ To test the linear approximation, I compared linear models to count models. Although there are differences in p-values, the magnitude and direction of relationships holds across specifications.

²⁴ For other recent work in international relations using VAR for event count data see Sprecher and DeRouen (2002).

between covariates, they also suggest a more specific sequencing of these relationships in which demands for violence (or political settlement) follow an external threat and affect the timing and form of violent retaliation, in that order. Political attitudes are influenced by the experience of violence and observed retaliation and have a direct effect on the subsequent violence. Returning to the language of ‘mover’ and ‘moved,’ the argument suggests that violence covariates, specifically fatalities incurred, are the most ‘mover’ and political support covariates the most ‘moved.’ The VAR specifications reflect this ordering. The chosen ordering affects the interpretation of the results because the VAR ordering specifies the relative ‘immediacy of influence’ between sets of covariates. By defining the experience of violence or fatalities incurred as the first ‘mover,’ the VARs used in this dissertation imply that changes in the severity and intensity of the violent conflict influence political attitudes more quickly than political attitudes affect the intensity or incidence of external violence. In other words, an escalating terror (or counterterror) threat alters the political attitudes of state (or non-state) constituents more quickly than changes in these same political attitudes affect terror (or counterterror) violence and subsequent counterterror (or terror) reactions.

A variable ordering that defines violence covariates as the first ‘mover’ and political attitudes as more ‘moved’ does not imply that changes in the political attitudes of the target constituency never influence terrorist violence or counterterror operations, but simply that the speed of influence is slower in this direction. Differences in the ‘timing of influence’ are important because their imposition is what gives a causal chain to the empirical results. For robustness, I compare these models with alternative variable orderings that place political support covariates as the first ‘mover,’ but find that these

alternatives fit the data no better, and often worse, than the theoretically-derived specification. The lack of large differences in fit across orderings and lag length increases confidence in the results by reducing concerns of misspecification.

A final important methodological concern relates to the identification of structural breaks in the data. As noted previously, Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service suggest that external events that trigger changes in constituent expectations about military efficacy and political optimism lead to fundamental changes in constituent support for violence and in the relationship between violence and political attitudes. Analyses that do not accommodate these break points will produce results that misrepresent the association between domestic politics and violence by averaging across periods with fundamentally different dynamics. I allow the theoretical argument to suggest potential breaks, focusing on major changes in political and security context that may affect constituent expectations, demands for violence, or the responsiveness of state and non-state actors. I then assess these potential points quantitatively using a one-step recursive Chow forecasting test to generate empirical evidence with which to confirm or reject the existence of structural breaks.

The empirical tests correspond to a series of recursive one-period Chow forecast-tests. The forecasting line is created by specifying a VAR with the minimum number of periods needed to produce reasonable estimates, generating a forecast for the next period, and then repeating this process, adding one additional period at a time, across and beyond the break point. Evidence of a break occurs when the actual value falls outside the confidence intervals of the forecast line for several periods. Importantly, a structural break may occur even if actual values move back inside forecast confidence intervals

after some number of additional periods. Because the forecast process incorporates additional data at each step, the forecast line should eventually right itself, even after a break, and its confidence interval should again encompass the actual values. I save the more detailed discussion of the break points selected and the results of the forecasting tests for each quantitative case study. To preview this discussion, the only significant break in the Israel-Palestinian conflict occurs at ODS, while key break points in the Northern Ireland example occur primarily at administration changes, although the implementation of direct rule and the Anglo-Irish Agreement appear to influence sectarian violence in Northern Ireland. I also incorporate several additional control variables chosen based on qualitative case analysis and previous empirical work. Controls include events that may affect the level or size of certain relationships for a limited number of periods, without affecting the longer-term relationship. The inclusion of controls, described in the case chapters, facilitates comparison to previous studies, but the controls have few substantive ramifications on the impulse response functions.

Interpreting IRFs

Because the interpretation of the impulse-response graphs is central to the discussion and assessment of the empirical results in each of the extended case studies, I offer a brief discussion of some sample graphs, shown in Figure 3.1, that the reader can use as a guide going forward. Each IRF represents the change in the response covariate following a shock in the specified impulse variable at time $t=0$. The horizontal axis on each IRF graph marks the passage of time, in weeks or months, following a shock, and the vertical, y-axis shows the actual size, in fatalities or percentage points, of the change

in the response variable. When the response line begins above or below '0' at time $t=0$, this indicates an immediate or contemporaneous response that begins in the same period as the initial shock. In most cases, the results present the change in the response variable following a one standard deviation shock in the impulse variable. In the few cases where standard deviation shocks do not appear appropriate, I use median-value shocks. These exceptions are noted in the tables and the text. In the discussion of the empirical results, I include multiple impulse-response functions in a single graph. This facilitates comparisons across attack types or time periods. I do not include confidence intervals on these graphs, since the addition of overlapping confidence intervals makes the IRFs themselves difficult to see and interpret. The confidence intervals are included in the tables that are presented alongside the graphs. Statistically significant results are highlighted in dark gray, and those results that approach but fall short of significance in light gray. When a single IRF includes statistically significant responses in both positive and negative directions, I place an outline around the second significant response.


Returning to the interpretation of the IRFs, Figure 3.1 shows several sample IRFs that represent some of the more common responses observed in the empirical chapters. I refer to response months, since this is the most frequently used response period in the empirical results. Figure 3.1a shows an example of a non-response. The IRF falls entirely along the x-axis indicating that there is no increase or decrease in the response variable following a shock. Figure 3.1b shows a classic tit-for-tat response. In this case, a shock of one unit in the impulse variable results in a one-unit increase in the response variable in the first post-shock month, but no response in any subsequent period. The response is immediate and temporary. Figure 3.1c shows a delayed, temporary positive response. A

shock in the impulse variable results in an increase in the response variable, but this response does not begin until the second post-shock month, when it increases the response variable 0.5 percentage points/fatalities. The response variable then returns to its equilibrium level, at the x-axis in the final period. This type of lagged response is common in studies of terror/counterterror dynamics. It may take several weeks for a state or group to coordinate and execute a violent response. Figure 3.1d shows a response that has a longer duration, lasting through the four-month response period. The response occurs immediately, in the same period as the shock, increases gradually to one fatality/percentage point, and remains at an elevated level.

When a response variable falls permanently or temporarily after the initial shock, the IRF will be negative. Figure 3.1e shows a temporary negative response in which the response variable declines immediately by one fatality/percentage point and remains negative over the first two response months before returning to equilibrium. Figure 3.1f also shows a longer lasting negative response. The response starts in the first post-shock month at -0.8 fatalities/percentage points, but remains negative over the entire response period. Negative IRFs are most common when measuring the non-state response to counterterrorism. Counterterrorism may temporarily reduce the military strength of non-state groups or deter new recruits, resulting in a short-term decrease in violence. More successful counterterrorism may result in the longer-term decrease observed in Figure 3.1f. Finally, Figure 3.1g shows a response that includes a negative and positive component. The initial response is negative, but the response becomes positive in the third post-shock month before returning to equilibrium in month four. This type of

reaction is also common in protracted terror conflicts. Although counterterrorism may initially degrade non-state capabilities, groups often rebuild and launch new attacks.

Figure 3.1
Sample IRFs



3.1a-3.1g Clockwise from top-left

Graphical Analysis

Graphical analysis is used only to explore the relationship between violence and political outcomes in Northern Ireland and maps trends in pre-election violence (total over six months prior to the election) onto electoral results between 1973 and 1998. I use

relative vote share of the two leading parties in each sectarian community as a measure of constituent attitudes towards violence. Shifts towards the harder-line DUP and Sinn Fein can be considered demands for a more aggressive approach to the conflict and an expression of tolerance for militant violence, due to the closer relationship between harder-line parties and militant groups. The results from this analysis offer insight into the relative political implications of violence aimed at different targets and the incentives for violent responses, but because they are only suggestive, these results are most meaningful when supported by qualitative assessments and the more rigorous empirical findings presented for the British, Israeli, and Palestinian cases.

Summary

The VAR approach, supplemented by simpler graphical analysis, naturally captures the dynamic relationships between terrorism, counterterrorism, and domestic politics and incorporates endogeneity with fewer assumptions than previous work. The impulse-response functions produced by the VAR estimation empirically describe the dynamic relationships between terror, counterterror, and political covariates and can be used to evaluate the propositions. By segmenting each conflict into distinct sub-periods, the empirical analysis maps the evolution of the relationship between violence and politics, identifies how specific domestic political and security events affect political and violent conflict dynamics, and offers insight into when and how de-escalation and ‘ripeness’ emerge in protracted conflicts. The graphical analysis used for the Northern Ireland case is less precise, but still offers suggestive insight into the political implications of violence that can be supported with qualitative information. The empirical

approach described also has several limitations, including the high uncertainty and sensitivity to specification. I use qualitative case information to offset this uncertainty where possible, but also recognize that, to some extent, the uncertainty observed in the VAR results accurately reflects the political and violent dynamics in protracted conflicts.

Discussion

This chapter has described the case selection, data, and empirical strategy used to evaluate Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service. By combining quantitative analysis with qualitative case information on two specific extended terror conflicts, the Second Palestinian Intifada and the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland, the dissertation empirically describes the political and violent dynamics of the two conflicts and offers insight how and why demands for violence, violent retaliation, and de-escalation occur in protracted campaigns. The two cases are chosen for their similarities and differences on key dimensions of Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service, and for their general comparability to other extended conflicts. The dissertation advances previous work on the two conflicts by applying a dynamic VAR technique to a more comprehensive and sensitive dataset. Both the data and the empirical method facilitate rigorous empirical evaluations of the theoretical propositions and offer empirical results that describe the dynamic relationships between violence and public opinion in the Second Intifada and ‘Troubles’ cases. Qualitative case information supports empirical findings, addresses challenges created by uncertainty, and facilitates an extension of the theoretical argument to a wider set of conflicts in the final chapters.

Table 3.8
Policy Changes by the British in Northern Ireland

Date	Policy Change
14-Jul-69	Deployment of troops to Northern Ireland
27-Aug-69	Callaghan visits Northern Ireland.
28-Aug-69	British Army commander put in charge of Northern Ireland's security.
1-Apr-70	UDR formed.
3-Apr-70	'Get Tough' policy
30-Apr-70	B Specials disbanded.
3-Jul-70	Falls Road Curfew
2-Aug-70	Rubber Baton Rounds introduced.
9-Aug-71	Internment begins.
12-Nov-71	RUC armed.
23-Jan-71	Prime Minister Heath visits Northern Ireland.
24-Mar-72	Direct Rule begins.
1-Nov-73	Conviction of 8 IRA militants who admit planting bombs in London in March 1973
21-Nov-73	Sunningdale Agreement reached.
7-Feb-74	Heath calls general elections which he loses (Elections held 2/28/1974).
18-Apr-74	Wilson visits Northern Ireland and announces commitment to Stormont.
1-May-75	Constitutional Convention formed through election.
28-May-74	Direct Rule resumes
9-Jul-74	End of Internment
29-Nov-74	Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) (introduced 11/25)
5-Dec-74	PTA extended to Northern Ireland
11-Dec-74	Debate on reintroduction of capital punishment
22-Oct-75	Conviction of Guildford Four
4-Nov-75	Announcement of the end of special status for IRA prisoners
17-Nov-75	Secretary of State for Northern Ireland announces 'Way Forward' strategy.
6-Dec-75	Balcombe Street siege
5-Mar-76	End of Constitutional Convention
3-Mar-76	Macguire 7 are convicted.
25-Mar-76	Ulsterization and police primacy are announced.
26-Mar-76	PTA of 1976
10-Sep-76	Change in Secretary of State for Northern Ireland
10-Feb-77	Conviction of Balcombe St Gang
10-May-77	Paisley and Unionist leaders arrested (due to involvement in UWC strike).
3-Jun-77	Jailing of 8 UVF members
7-Jun-77	Announcement of an increase in the size of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and Ulster Defence Regiment
20-Feb-79	Shankill Butcher sentence
29-Aug-79	Thatcher in Northern Ireland to talk about security

Date	Policy Change
30-Aug-79	British government decides to increase the size of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) by 1,000 officers to 7,500. This reflects a continuation of the policy of 'Ulsterisation' or 'police primacy'.
1-Dec-79	Richard Lawson, then a Lieutenant-General, succeeds Timothy Creasey as General Officer Commanding of the British Army in Northern Ireland.
26-Mar-80	End of Special Category Status
6-Oct-81	New prison policy announced following IRA hunger strikes.
6-Nov-81	Anglo-Irish council established
23-Dec-82	Thatcher visits Northern Ireland.
5-Jan-83	INLA is made illegal.
7-Mar-83	New anti-terror bill implemented in Northern Ireland.
13-Jul-83	Debate over reintroduction of capital punishment
24-Dec-83	Thatcher visits Northern Ireland.
22-Mar-84	New PTA approved
7-Mar-85	Conviction of two men for planning 1981 bombings in London
27-Jun-85	Douglas Hurd, then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, announces that certain community groups would receive no further government funding because of their alleged 'close links with paramilitary organizations.'
15-Nov-85	Anglo Irish Agreement (AIA) passed
16-May-86	Tom King, then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, informs the House of Commons of the decision to dissolve the Northern Ireland Assembly.
23-Jun-86	NI assembly dissolved
6-May-87	Announcement about recruitment of an extra 500 full-time Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) reservists
19-Oct-88	Broadcasting ban on organizations associated with paramilitary groups and proscribed groups themselves. The organizations affected: Sinn Fein (SF), Republican Sinn Fein (RSF), and the Ulster Defense Association (UDA).
20-Oct-88	New legal powers of prosecution granted to authorities for terrorist crimes. Allows a court to draw an inference from an accused person's decision to remain silent when questioned by the police.
22-Mar-89	New PTA approved
24-Jul-89	Significant changes in political leadership of Northern Ireland
3-Nov-89	Peter Brooke, then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, expresses openness to talks with Sinn Fein (SF) in the event of an end to violence.
11-Apr-90	Charles Haughey, then Taoiseach (Irish Prime Minister), made the first official visit to Northern Ireland by a Taoiseach since 1965.
11-May-90	Announcement of political talks to consider alternative to AIA
21-Aug-90	John Wilsey, a Lieutenant-General in the British Army replaces John Waters as army General Officer Commanding (GOC) in Northern Ireland.
31-Oct-90	Talks initiative suspended in wake of proxy bomb attacks.
29-Nov-90	Significant changes in political leadership of Northern Ireland.

Date	Policy Change
7-Feb-91	Legality of broadcasting ban upheld
23-Jul-91	Merger of Royal Irish Regiment and Ulster Defence Regiment
26-Aug-91	The Northern Ireland Emergency Provision Act comes into force.
9-Dec-91	Peter Brooke, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, announces freeze on spending on capital projects in Northern Ireland due to cost of bomb damage.
20-Jan-92	Major in Northern Ireland for security talks.
10-Aug-92	UDA is banned.
10-Mar-93	The Labour Party votes against the extension of the PTA. In previous years the party had abstained. PTA still renewed.
23-Mar-93	New security measures implemented in Northern Ireland
15-Dec-93	Downing St Declaration sets groundwork for peace process.
16-Sep-94	British broadcast ban lifted
9-Mar-94	New committee on IRA affairs formed
30-Mar-94	Major in Northern Ireland
12-Jan-95	End of patrols and raids in Northern Ireland announced.
15-Jan-95	The British government announces ban on ministers engaging in contacts with Sinn Fein (SF), the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP), or the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP), would end.
12-Jun-95	Anti-terrorism legislation is renewed for another year at Westminster. Patrick Mayhew, then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, announces that an independent review into emergency legislation would be established.
28-Apr-96	Michael Ancram, then Political Development minister at the Northern Ireland Office (NIO), said that the Irish Republican Army (IRA) must restore its ceasefire and Sinn Fein (SF) must agree to be bound by the six 'Mitchell Principles' before it could join all-party talks.
11-Oct-96	Major refuses to allow SF into Stormont talks
18-Dec-96	Major in Northern Ireland
26-Apr-97	Sinn Fein (SF) lost a court action to try to force the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) to broadcast the whole of its election video.
2-Jul-97	In London, six members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) were each given prison sentences of 35 years for conspiracy to cause explosions in London.
26-Jan-98	UDP is expelled from talks due to links with UFF violence.
20-Feb-98	SF is expelled from talks after Continuity IRA (CIRA) car bomb.
10-Apr-98	Good Friday Agreement (GFA) reached.
22-May-98	Referendum passes GFA in Northern Ireland.

Chapter 4

Tired of Violence, but Fearful of Peace: Demands for Military Counterterrorism during the Second Intifada

Introduction

For Israelis, the physical, economic, and psychological cost of Palestinian suicide bombs against Israeli population centers—shopping malls, open-air markets, and public transportation—is one that remains long after Second Intifada’s violence subsided. Popular accounts of the Second Intifada similarly emphasize the devastating importance of suicide bombs, describing the negative effects that suicide bombs have on Israeli political confidence and the escalatory effect they have on Israel’s counterterror strategy. According to many such accounts, the Second Intifada is best characterized as a constant cycle of Palestinian attacks, Israeli demands for retaliation, and responsive counterterror violence (Berrebi and Klor 2008; Catignani 2005b).

However, a closer analysis that focuses more explicitly on micro-level drivers of violence on the Israeli side shows that neither constituent demands for nor violence Israeli retaliation certainly follow Palestinian attacks. Instead, Israelis demand violence by increasing their support for the Likud party only after severe threats and when they expect military-based counterterrorism to better advance Israeli political goals than politically-focused alternatives. Demands for violence and violent retaliation are most likely prior to Operation Defensive Shield (ODS), a 2002 Israeli offensive considered a

turning point during the Second Intifada, and after civilian fatalities, the more severe threat to Israeli voters. Political and violent responses following IDF deaths and in the post-ODS period are smaller and less likely, suggesting a decline in the expected efficacy of armed counterterrorism. Not only the size, but also the form of observed responses accord closely with constituent demands. Targeted killings and home demolitions, more observable and popular forms of counterterrorism, are most likely after civilian deaths, where Israeli demands for violence are also most significant.

Demands for violence and violent retaliation do occur in the Second Intifada, but they occur far less consistently than expected by the rally ‘round the flag and repression-radicalization arguments discussed previously. Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service explain the timing of Israeli constituent demands for violence and the form of retaliatory counterterrorism more completely than previous work. Expectations about the efficacy of violence as a political tool and beliefs about the potential for a political settlement motivate demands for violence by Israeli voters, and violence follows constituent demands in size and form. In the Israeli case, disappointment with the results of military-based counterterrorism erodes confidence in violence as a political tool after ODS, but the lack of viable political alternatives prevents more extensive political pressure for a lasting settlement. Retaliatory violence is also more common at the start of the conflict, and has positive political implications when it matches constituent demands. This chapter applies Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service to the case of Israel during the Second Intifada. I use qualitative case analysis to define the characteristics of the political and security context likely to affect Israeli voters’ attitudes and empirically evaluate case-specific hypotheses about the timing of radicalization and violence.

Conflict Background²⁵


The conflict between Israelis and Palestinians over ownership and control of land that currently comprises Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip dates back at least to Israel's statehood in 1948, if not sooner. The conflict is a seemingly intractable one, with ethnic, religious, and nationalist roots and zero-sum disagreements that complicate attempts at settlement and encourage violence by state and non-state actors. The conflict has followed a cyclical pattern since at least the 1970s, oscillating between periods of confrontation and relative calm. For example, several years of widespread protest, civil disobedience, and escalating violence during the First Intifada from 1987-1992 were followed by the 1992 signing of the Oslo Accords. The Oslo agreement represented a serious attempt to establish a viable Palestinian state through the Palestinian Authority and an autonomous Palestinian security force. However, continued violence during the 1990s undermined the implementation of the Oslo Accords and contributed to military build-up and escalation that set the stage for the Second Intifada in 2000.

The proximate trigger of the Second Intifada, a visit by then Defense Minister Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount, sparked Palestinian protests and a harsh Israeli crackdown that initially exacerbated and intensified Palestinian violence. Israeli Prime Minister Barak, facing extensive criticism for his willingness to accommodate many Palestinian demands at Camp David, called early elections held in February 2001. He lost the election to the hawkish Likud candidate, Ariel Sharon, who promised and employed a more aggressive military-based counterterrorism strategy, including major offensives, targeted assassinations of key Palestinian leaders, and demolitions of the homes of

²⁵ For a complete coverage of events during the Second Intifada Pressman 2003; Frisch 2006; BBC, "Al-Aqsa Timeline," http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3677206.stm.

suicide bombers. Despite an aggressive military approach, Palestinian violence continued to rise in 2001 and 2002 (see Figure 4.1), culminating in string of deadly suicide bombs in Israel in March 2002, including the “Passover Bombing,” which killed 30 civilians in Netanya. The Israeli response, Operation Defensive Shield (ODS) (March 28, 2002-May 5, 2002), marked a strategic revision and turning point in the conflict. ODS involved a large ground incursion in the West Bank and the re-occupation of West Bank cities that had been autonomous under the Oslo Accords. ODS achieved some operational gains against Palestinian terrorists, but did not finally eliminate the Palestinian threat. After ODS, Israelis grew increasingly tired of continued violence and supportive of containment-based counterterrorism, including measures such as curfews, checkpoints, the separation barrier, and the proposed withdrawal from Gaza (UN OCHAOPT, <http://www.ochaopt.org/>; Jaeger and Paserman 2008). Israeli civilian and military fatalities fell in 2003 and 2004 (Figure 4.1). After overcoming initial resistance from members of his own Likud party, Sharon initiated a withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, leading to an extended period of relative calm that lasted until the 2009 Gaza War.

Figure 4.1
Israeli Civilian and Military Fatalities by Quarter, 2000-2004



Source: B'tselem

Civilian and military fatalities follow similar patterns, peak in 2002 and decline over 2003 and 2004. However, military fatalities consistently fall below civilian deaths.

Operationalizing the Argument: Israel

In this section, I use qualitative information on the Second Intifada to apply Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service to the Israeli example. This discussion focuses on how the prevailing political and security contexts influence the attitudes and expectations of Israeli voters and how constituent demands affect counterterror responses over the course of the Second Intifada. The section concludes with a set of hypotheses specific to the Israeli example.

Severity and Intractability of the Conflict

According to Retrospective Projection, the consistently high severity and intractability of the Palestinian threat encourage strong, positive Israeli expectations about the likelihood of future violence, pessimism about the potential for a lasting political solution, and beliefs that military-based counterterrorism is necessary to advance political goals. The seeming intractability of the issues at the center of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict increase support for violence and encourage radicalization because intractability undermines confidence in the potential for a lasting political settlement. As Sharon argues in 2002, “the simple fact is, the Arabs don’t recognize our right to exist in our homeland” making military action the only way to ensure Israeli survival (Bennet, *New York Times* 2002). Public opinion surveys offer evidence that the intractability of the conflict’s core issues increases and sustains support for military counterterrorism. At the individual level, there is a strong correlation between the belief that a conflict is zero-sum or intractable and tolerance of violent attacks on the enemy (Bar-Tal 2007). Studies of Israeli militancy confirm consistent support for military operations as acceptable and

even necessary due to the intractable nature of the threat. Throughout the Second Intifada, more than two-thirds of Israeli voters express unconditional support for military counterterrorism (*National Resilience Project 2004*). In 2003, 41% of Israeli voters also agree that military confrontation is the only way to reach an acceptable settlement.²⁶

In addition to its intractability, the severity of Palestinian violence also affects constituent expectations about the necessity of military counterterrorism and the likelihood of additional violence in the future. Figure 4.1 confirms the severe threat that Palestinian terrorism poses to Israeli civilians over the course of the Second Intifada. The level of civilian casualties is particularly significant in the first half of the conflict when suicide bombs inside of Israel present a consistent threat to Israeli security and disrupt the daily lives and livelihood of Israeli voters. Public opinion polls show that this violence has significant political implications that affect expectations and voting behavior. In 1999, a period of relative calm, only 17% of Israelis identify security issues as the most important challenge facing the Israeli government. By 2001, only five months into the Second Intifada, this percentage rises to 47%. Also in 2001, 63% of those surveyed report that escalating Palestinian violence would directly influence their vote decision in domestic elections, most often increasing the likelihood of votes for right-wing parties. Although the intensity of the Palestinian threat does decline after 2002, even in 2003 two-thirds of Israeli voters report that Palestinian violence will influence their vote choice in that year's elections.²⁷ Successful Palestinian terrorism throughout the 2000-2004 period incentivizes political responses to violence by Israeli voters throughout the conflict. These responses should be strongest when violence itself is most intense, prior to 2003.

²⁶ Author's tabulation using Israeli National Election Study, 2003.

²⁷ Author's calculations from Israeli National Election Studies, 1999-2006.

The severity of the external security threat varies more extensively across fatality types because deaths of military and civilian personnel have distinct effects on Israeli expectations and beliefs. Attacks on civilians inside of Israel, and especially suicide bombs, have particularly significant political implications because they immediately affect the lives of Israeli voters, create expectations for future violence, and undermine Israeli optimism about the potential for a lasting political solution by revealing an increasingly efficient Palestinian actor who is unlikely to accept a political compromise. Statements by Israeli political analysts confirm the effect of civilian fatalities on Israeli political attitudes. One notes in early 2003 that suicide bombs and Israeli civilian deaths are “Sharon’s best campaign weapon” (Wente, *Globe and Mail* 2003). However, while political responses to civilian deaths are consistent and likely, Retrospective Projection expects Israeli demands for violence only where expected military efficacy is high.

Because they are difficult to defend against and present a systemic threat to the government’s efficacy as a security provider, civilian deaths are also likely to result in political disaffection that reduces government approval among Israeli voters. There is qualitative case evidence to support this expectation. Escalating violence against civilians in late 2001 and 2002 results in a sharp drop in Sharon’s popularity. In February of 2002, only 49% of Israelis feel that Sharon’s government is in control of the security situation (Bennet, *New York Times* 2002). A 2003 pre-election report notes, “hard times demand a strong government, Israelis realize, but they appear destined to give the main political parties, Labour and Likud, little more than 50 seats in the 120-seat Knesset” (*Globe and Mail* 2003). Under Retrospective Projection, political responses to civilian deaths reflect

threat severity, but the likelihood of new Israeli demands for violence is based on expected military efficacy.

Fatalities of IDF personnel have a very different set of political implications and provoke very different political responses from Israeli voters. Military fatalities retain substantial political importance in the Israeli example because of the severity of the Palestinian threat, the country's reliance on military force to protect its political interests, and the military's privileged position in Israeli society. However, unlike civilian fatalities, which suggest a systemic threat that undermines confidence in political alternatives, IDF deaths suggest a tactical failure that directly challenges military efficacy. According to Retrospective Projection, the tactical threat suggested by military deaths reveals military incompetence that is unlikely to lead immediately to demands for additional violence. Instead, the political response is most likely to be one that punishes the incumbent for the military failure. Violence that does occur in this context reasserts military efficacy and is driven by tactical considerations more than it directly addresses a constituent demand. In an editorial published in *Ma'ariv* in 2001 following a string of IDF deaths, the writer expresses this interpretation, “ ‘only firm action, perhaps, will be able to dull the level of hostility...The right to speak and perhaps even the duty to speak, is now the Israeli Defense Force's’ ”(*Ma'ariv* 2001 in Dunn, *Sydney Morning Herald* 2001).

The intractability and severity of the Palestinian threat affect the expectations of Israeli voters about future violence, their beliefs about the likely outcomes of political and military approaches to the conflict, and the timing and form of their demands for retaliation. In the Israeli case, intractability and the severity of violence encourage

consistent political responses to violence, strong support for armed counterterrorism, and demands for military retaliation when the perceived or expected efficacy of militant violence is high. Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service also expect variation in political responses to violence across fatality type. Political responses, demands for violence by Israeli voters, and disaffection are more likely after civilian deaths, due the immediacy of the associated threat, the implied efficacy and uncompromising nature of Palestinian militants, and the lower clarity of civilian fatalities.²⁸ However, although the intractable nature of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the severity of the Palestinian threat encourage political responses to violence and demands for retaliation, the timing and strength of political responses to violence are also directly influenced by the expected efficacy of violence as a political tool and attitudes towards political alternatives.

Expected Military Efficacy and Political Optimism

The intractability of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict encourages Israeli support for violence throughout the conflict, but attitudes about the relative efficacy of military and political approaches evolve with changes in the political and security context. Specifically, although weak political alternatives and past military success encourage expectations of military efficacy and constituent demands for violence in the pre-ODS period, the continuation of conflict violence erodes Israeli confidence in and support for military counterterrorism after ODS.


²⁸ 'Clarity of responsibility' refers to the ease with which voters can assign blame for specific policies or outcomes (Powell and Whitten 1993). Civilian fatalities tend to have low clarity because they are difficult to defend against and imply a systemic failure. Military deaths have higher clarity and imply a tactical threat that can be addressed by armed responses.

Prior to ODS, Israeli beliefs about the efficacy of military-based counterterrorism are relatively positive, based on past military successes against Palestinian terrorists and Arab armies and pessimism about the likelihood of a lasting political settlement following the collapse of the Camp David summit in 2000. Public opinion polls taken after the First Intifada show widespread confidence in the ability of aggressive military reactions to protect Israeli security that encourages constituent demands for violence in the aftermath of Palestinian attacks (Barzalai and Inbar 1996). In fact, despite rising Palestinian violence in the late 1990s, in 2000 a majority of Israelis report that the military is considerably stronger than it had been in the previous year (Arian 2003). Support for military approaches is reinforced by severely pessimistic expectations about the potential for a political agreement among Israelis following the collapse of the Camp David Summit. Reports of political analysts confirm that the failure at Camp David erodes confidence in negotiations because it suggests Palestinian intransigence and the likely futility of future attempts at political solutions. As one commentator describes “explanations [for why negotiations failed] vary from... ‘the Palestinians don't want peace’...[to]... ‘the Palestinians will never accept the existence of a Jewish state in Israel’ to ‘Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat is not capable of making peace’” (Kimche, *Jerusalem Post* 2001). Public opinion polls further suggest that falling optimism about a lasting political settlement in the aftermath of Camp David leads directly to increasing support for military operations as vital and necessary. While less than 30% of Israelis support a military-based counterterror strategy just prior to the Camp David Summit in July 2000, by October, over 65% of Israelis accept the need for military operations and almost half believe that military approaches are the only way to achieve

an acceptable settlement (*National Resilience Project 2004*; Truman Center Peace Index Polls 1-2). In this pre-ODS context, Palestinian violence is likely to trigger rightward political shifts and demands for military counterterrorism as necessary retaliation.

Continued Palestinian violence after ODS, however, undermines Israeli confidence in the ability of military-based strategies to effectively eliminate Palestinian terrorism and weakens Israeli support and demands for violent retaliation. As shown in Figure 4.2, while 33% of Israelis believe that the military Intifada will result in a ‘success’ for Israelis in July 2001, only 16% agree in November 2002. Also in November of 2002, 85% of Israeli voters support the cessation of military operations (Truman Peace Index Polls November 2002). By this point in the conflict, many Israelis share the belief that “fighting violence with violence is limited in its outcome. For every missile the IDF fires into a Palestinian headquarters...the response will only be more extreme” (Newman, *Jerusalem Post* 2001).

Figure 4.2
Intifada as success for Israel?



Source: Truman Center Peace Index

The percentage of Israelis believing that Intifada will be a success falls with intensifying use of violence in 2001 and 2002, and rises when containment-based counterterrorism and changes in Palestinian leadership suggest some potential for longer-term political solution.

However, in this case, declining confidence in the efficacy of violence as a political tool does not lead immediately to demands for a political solution. Although Abbas's appointment as Prime Minister stimulates some renewed interest in political solutions, political optimism never exceeds expected military efficacy. There is a clear realignment or softening in Israeli attitudes towards political strategies that further incentivizes a shift in Israeli counterterror policy. Abbas's more visible commitment to controlling militant violence and resuming political negotiations encourages additional Israeli confidence in the potential for a political settlement because it suggests the emergence of a more moderate Palestinian leadership that might be amenable to limited compromise (*New York Times* 2003; *Sunday Times* 2003). As one Likud leader comments " 'I'm very encouraged, ...I believe that this new leadership that speaks differently, it might be that they mean differently' " (Bennet, *New York Times* 2003, quoting Silvan Shalom). Public opinion polls offer additional evidence of this realignment in Israeli political attitudes. For example, Figure 4.2 shows an increase in Israeli optimism about the ultimate outcome of the Second Intifada that is at least partially based on a decline in the external threat after 2003 and small political advances towards longer-term cessation of hostilities. Also between 2002 and 2003, the percentage of Israelis supporting negotiations rather than a purely military strategy jumps from just over 40% to almost 60% (Arian 2003). However, even with this realignment in Israeli political attitudes, Israeli constituent support for a less violent form of counterterrorism and political engagement is largely conditional on the continued ability of such a strategy to protect personal and national security. There is little evidence of Israeli constituent pressure for political compromise with Palestinians.

As described by Retrospective Projection, constituent expectations about military and political approaches to the conflict reflect retrospective evaluations of past military and political outcomes and assessments of current opportunities and alternatives. Expectations about the efficacy of military and political approaches to the conflict evolve with changes in the external political and security context. Before ODS, the recent failure of the Camp David Summit and past experience with successful military-based counterterrorism leads to expectations of military efficacy that exceed political optimism and encourage constituent demands for violence. After ODS, clear evidence that military strategies have failed to contain terrorism or achieve a final political solution erode confidence in a purely military strategy, realign Israeli political attitudes towards violence, and limit both demands for and the use of violence. However, even as increasingly negative expectations about the success of a military strategy constrain demands for violence, the lack of strong political alternatives prevents the emergence of strong political optimism among Israeli voters or pressure for compromise and accommodation. Endemically low political optimism may be one reason the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues without a final political solution.

Political Institutions and Competition

Retrospective Projection predicts that Israel's political institutions also affect constituent expectations and political responses to Palestinian violence through their influence on clarity of responsibility and political competition. Israel's political system has several institutional features that reduce clarity of responsibility and encourage disaffection. The proportional representation system used to elect the Knesset contributes to low clarity of responsibility for security failures because it results in a fragmented

parliament that includes many small parties and often necessitates coalition governments that make attribution of responsibility difficult. Between 2001 and 2003, for example, the Knesset is controlled by a Labor-Likud coalition that diffuses responsibility for security policy failures across the two parties. While Sharon and his Likud party exercise primary control over security and counterterror activities, the coalition arrangement gives Labor party leaders some role in policy formation and some responsibility for policy failures. According to Retrospective Projection, low clarity of responsibility increases the likelihood of disaffection as a political response to violence. Trends in Israeli political support confirm an increase in fragmentation during the Second Intifada. The Likud and Labor parties combine to win 56% of the vote in 1999, but they win only 42% in 2003.²⁹

Political competition also has strong effects on political responses to violence by Israeli voters because the leading Likud and Labor parties use the security issue as a point of contestation and distinction. Throughout the Second Intifada, the contrasting approaches to national security adopted by the Likud and Labor parties increase the likelihood and size of political responses to violence because Israeli voters expect different counterterror strategies depending on political leadership. One Knesset member describes “the Likud is not prepared to accept territorial compromise, while Labor has indicated it would consider exchanging land for peace in the West Bank and Gaza, in negotiation with the Arabs” (Walker, *Sunday Morning Herald* 1988). The Likud Party’s strong reputation for military efficiency and aggressive military approaches gives Likud candidates a political advantage when escalating Palestinian violence sparks new Israeli demands for military-based counterterrorism (Berrebi and Klor 2006, 2008). In 2001, as Palestinian violence escalates, for example, 56% of respondents identify Likud as the

²⁹ Author’s calculations based on Israeli National Election Studies, 1999-2003.

‘best party to deal with terrorism,’ while only 18% chose the Labor party as better suited to address the terrorist threat.³⁰ In contrast, left-leaning parties, build an accommodating reputation to gain political advantage when optimism about a political settlement increases (Berrebi and Klor 2006).

Although the distinct security reputations held by each party are based in real policy differences, each party also relies on political rhetoric to influence expectations and consolidate support. Prior to the 2003 election, one commentator notes that as “Sharon [tries] to steer the campaign toward diplomatic and security issues...by describing as ‘irresponsible’ [the Labor candidate’s] willingness to renew talks with the Palestinians” (Hirschberg, *Irish Times* 2003), Labor party leaders argue that Sharon’s hard-line policies compromise Israeli security by “preferring the idea of the Greater Land of Israel to all our well-being” (Hirschberg, *Irish Times* 2003). The outcome of the election reveals the influence of constituent expectations and retrospective evaluations. One analyst observes that even as Israelis support a settlement, “the repercussions of [Camp David’s] collapse remain paramount in the Israeli psyche,” allowing Likud to retain political support (Horovitz, *Irish Times* 2003).

Political competition and associated competitive rhetoric does not cause Israeli voters to demand violence, but contribute to the politicization of violence and shape voter expectations about the likely political implications of different electoral decisions. The influence of political competition on political responses to violence may even vary over the course of the conflict as constituent expectations and preferences evolve and change following military or political advances or disappointments. Competition between political parties also influences the timing of military counterterrorism employed by

³⁰ Author’s tabulation from Israeli National Election Study, 2001.

Sharon over the course of the conflict. While political competition with ultra-nationalists forces Sharon and the Likud party to pursue a more aggressive stance to avoid being “portrayed by Israel's far-right as being soft on the Palestinians” (Hirschberg, *Irish Times* 2003), competition with the more moderate Labor party encourages political pragmatism. Sharon’s attempts to balance the competitive challenges provide evidence for the Constituent Service interpretation of violence.

Counterterrorism as Constituent Service

Constituent service arguments applied to the Israeli example suggest that military counterterrorism is employed according to constituent preferences and demands. As a result, armed responses are most likely following Palestinian terrorism that triggers Israeli demands for an aggressive, violent military response. In addition, the form of Israeli counterterror responses should also match constituent preferences, with more popular operations such as targeted killings following larger political reactions. A comparison of public statements made after civilian and military deaths shows congruence between constituent demands and state response. Government reactions to civilian deaths promise strategic changes in counterterror approach intended to address disaffection and disapproval. After a string of suicide bombs in 2002, Sharon promises to “crush the Palestinian terrorist infrastructure, in all its parts and components” (Sharon, March 29, 2002, “A New Phase in the War against Terrorism”). In contrast, responses to IDF deaths offer assurances that the IDF remains a viable military force and emphasize tactical improvements. As one military commander notes, recent IDF fatalities require “exacerbation and diversification of the IDF's activities,” but not “a strategic change in

Israel's attitude towards the PNA [Palestinian National Authority]" (Ben-Menahe and Oren, *Voice of Israel* 2002).

The timing of major Israeli offensives during the Second Intifada offers another qualitative perspective on the use of violence as a tool of constituent service. Although military responses are used to address the tactical threat implied by Israeli military deaths, more significant and punishing Israeli military offensives in the Palestinian Territories, including ODS and airstrikes on Arafat's compound, occur after attacks on civilians, rather than military personnel, and often directly match constituent demands. For example, the initiation of ODS in 2002 followed a string of suicide bombs in Israel and widespread domestic political pressure for a massive retaliation. Foreshadowing the offensive days before its initiation, Benyamin Netanyahu, an Israeli political leader, appeals to domestic constituents and promises a response that will address their demands, arguing that Israel must " 'stop the bickering among ourselves, fight the war that has been forced upon us, and vanquish an enemy that is determined to annihilate us' " (Netanyahu, *Jerusalem Post* March 2002, cited in Althaus and Zedan, *Houston Chronicle* 2002).

The Israeli use of air strikes on Arafat's Ramallah compound is also more likely after civilian deaths and addresses explicit demands by Israeli voters. Data on Israeli counterterror operations shows at least 14 significant offensives against Arafat's compound, although many of these sieges/blockades lasted for months at a time. Over 50% of these Israeli operations are precipitated by attacks on civilians, but only two follow attacks on IDF units.³¹ Strikes on Arafat's compound often react directly to the explicit demands of Israeli voters following new violence against Israeli voters. For example, one Israeli argues " 'Israel would be well-advised to banish PA Chairman

³¹ This is based author's analysis of operations reported in ICT database referenced previously.

Yasser Arafat immediately and permanently to some remote site in the desert' ”
(Lithwick, *Jerusalem Post* 2002). Constituent demands do appear, therefore, to guide the use, timing, and severity of military offensives.

Finally, there is evidence that constituent preferences shape the form of military-based counterterrorism in the Israeli case. Constituent Service arguments predict that highly popular counterterror tactics, including targeted killings and home demolitions, are most likely where Israeli demands for violent retaliation are most consistent and largest, specifically after civilian deaths, because these types of observable responses clearly communicate the state's violent responsiveness and commitment to constituent security. As one political analyst notes, “No other Israeli policy...enjoys the support received by targeted killings. Since the approval spans the Israeli body politic, it is well received by a coalition government representing diverse Israeli views” (David 2002, 7-8). Israeli political leaders similarly assert that targeted killings and home demolitions are reserved to address severe threats including attacks on civilians (David 2002).

Constituent service interpretations of counterterror violence argue that counterterror responses closely match constituent demands in timing, size, and form. More significant Israeli counterterror responses occur where Israelis demand aggressive violent retaliation, but restraint is more likely after ODS when Israeli voters appear to lose confidence in violence as a political tool. Finally, different types of operations may have very different political ramifications based on constituent demands and expectations. Domestically popular targeted killings and home demolitions are most useful following severe security threats that result in significant political responses and demands for violence, while traditional military operations may suffice in other contexts.

Propositions to Hypotheses

The discussion above applies Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service to the Israeli case. It describes how Israeli beliefs about the nature of the security threat and expectations for political and military solutions affect political responses to violence and the likelihood of violent counterterrorism. The discussion facilitates the operational translation of the theoretical propositions into hypotheses specific to the Israeli case that can be evaluated empirically. These hypotheses, summarized in Table 4.1 and 4.2, present a constituent-driven, and dynamic interpretation of the relationship between political attitudes and violence on the Israeli side of the Second Intifada.

When does Palestinian terrorism beget Israeli demands for violence?

H1. *Political responses and demands for violent retaliation are more likely after civilian fatalities than IDF deaths.*

H2. *Demands for violence that increase support for Likud are more likely prior to ODS (high military efficacy).*

H3. *Disaffection and fragmentation are most likely after civilian deaths.*

H4a. *Demands for violence that increase support for Likud are encouraged by the conflict's intractability.*

H4b. *Demands for violence that increase support for Likud are encouraged by political competition.*

When does Palestinian terrorism beget Israeli retaliation?³²

H5. *Armed responses are most likely where there are demands for violence—prior to 2002 and after civilian deaths.*

H6. *Counterterror responses to civilian deaths include exceptional operations, such as home demolitions and targeted killings, that are not used after military deaths.*

³² There is no Israeli analog to H7 which applies only to non-state actors.

What are the political implications of responsive counterterrorism?







H8. Counterterror responses have weaker political implications than Palestinian attacks.

H9. Only targeted killings have strong political implications for the incumbent leader.

Table 4.1
Demands for & the Use of Violence: What Matters? Israel
What encourages demands for and the use of retaliatory violence?

Determinant	Level in Israeli Example	Demands for and the use of violence
Severity of Threat	High, esp. after civilian deaths and pre-ODS	↑
Intractability	High	↑
Expected Military Efficacy	High prior to ODS, but falls after	Pre-ODS ↑ Post-ODS ↓
Political Optimism	Consistently low (some improvement after 2003)	Pre-ODS ↑ Post-ODS ↔
Political Competition	High	↑
Political Institutions	Coalition government reduces clarity of responsibility.	↔ Likelihood of fragmentation rises
Duration	Continued conflict leads to conflict fatigue and falling support for violence.	↓

Table 4.2
Expectations of Competing Explanations: Israel
How do expectations of competing interpretations differ?

Following terrorist attack	Israel
Retrospective Projection & Constituent Service	<i>Demands for violence and use of violence</i> Before ODS*  After ODS  *especially after civilian deaths
Rally	<i>Support for incumbent</i> 
Repression → Radicalization	<i>Demands for violence and use of violence</i> 
Tit-for-Tat	<i>Demands for violence and use of violence</i> 
Signaling	<i>Use of violence</i> 

Empirical Results

This section presents the results of the VAR analysis, incorporating qualitative information where appropriate. A detailed description of the data and the method are included in chapter three. To summarize, the data combines Israeli and Palestinian fatalities, counterterror operations and trends in vote intention, including relative vote share for the Likud party (Likud-lead) and a measure of political fragmentation that includes unaffiliated voters with supporters of smaller (non-Likud and non-Labor) parties.³³ The vote intention measures are used to capture Israeli demands for violence.

Demands for violence are operationalized as shifts in political support towards the hard-

³³ Although unaffiliated voters and supporters of smaller parties are distinct, they share a rejection of status quo approaches offered by Likud and Labor and the challenge they pose to the state's political mandate. I combine them in the empirical analysis to limit the number of covariates in the VAR specifications.

line Likud party and away from the more accommodating Labor party. Qualitative case information suggests that perceived military efficacy, defined as constituent beliefs about the success of violence as a political tool, exceeds political optimism, or beliefs about the potential for a political resolution, prior to ODS, but falls after ODS. I verify this empirically in this section of the chapter. The tests of H1-H3 and H8-H9 rely on monthly data and link terror and counterterror violence with political attitudes. The tests of H5-H6 use weekly data that measures more immediate counterterror responses to terrorist violence. The test of H4 is largely a qualitative and comparative one. I address it briefly here and in more depth in subsequent case chapters.

Identifying Structural Breaks

According to Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service, events that alter constituent expectations about military efficacy, the severity of the external threat, or the opportunities for political settlement may lead to structural breaks in the political and violent responses to terrorist violence. The discussion above identifies two potential break points in the Israeli example, Operation Defensive Shield and the Palestinian *hudna*. ODS weakens Israeli expectations about military efficacy among Israeli constituents because it suggests that even severe and punishing military counterterrorism cannot eliminate Palestinian violence. The Palestinian *hudna* in 2003 marks a high point in political optimism during the Second Intifada because it suggests political pragmatism within the Palestinian political leadership and some potential for a political settlement. According to Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service, changes in constituent


expectations after each potential break may fundamentally alter the relationship between terrorism, political attitudes, and counterterror responses.

As described in the previous chapter, before conducting empirical tests of the hypotheses, I test these two potential break points for evidence of a structural break using a recursive forecasting strategy that corresponds to a series of Chow forecast-tests. The forecasting line is created by specifying a VAR with the minimum number of periods needed to produce reasonable estimates, generating a forecast for the next period, and then repeating this process, adding one additional period at a time, across and beyond the break point. Evidence of a break occurs when the actual value falls outside the confidence intervals of the forecast line for several periods.³⁴

The results, shown in Figure 4.3, reveal evidence of a structural break at ODS, but no evidence of a break at the Palestinian *hudna*. While the actual values for ‘Likud-lead’ and ‘Palestinians killed’ fall within forecast confidence intervals both before and after the *hudna*, the actual values around ODS fall outside these confidence intervals. This result suggests that ODS fundamentally changes the dynamic relationship between political support and violence. Based on this assessment, I specify and report separate VAR models for the pre- and post-ODS periods. I add controls for Barak’s prime ministership and the *hudna*. I include the controls to be consistent with previous work, but find that they have few ramifications for the IRFs.

³⁴ A structural break occurs even if actual values move back inside forecast confidence intervals after some number of additional periods. Because the forecast process incorporates additional data at each step, the forecast line should eventually right itself, even after a break, and its confidence interval should again encompass the actual values.

Figure 4.3
Forecasting Structural Breaks: Israel



***Pre/Post ODS:** The confidence intervals for the ‘Palestinians killed’ and ‘Likud-lead’ covariates do not contain the actual values at the ODS break point and immediate after (March- July 2002). This offers evidence of a structural break.*

***Pre/Post Hudna:** The confidence intervals for the ‘Palestinians killed’ and ‘Likud-lead’ covariates contain the actual values at and after the Hudna (July/August 2003). There does not appear to be a structural break at this point.*

*Overview*³⁵

The empirical results offer significant support for Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service. Israeli constituents demand violence only after civilian fatalities and only prior to ODS, when expected military efficacy exceeds political optimism. After ODS, as perceived military efficacy declines, and following IDF deaths, political responses are small and often insignificant. Civilian deaths in the pre-ODS period are also likely to result in political fragmentation. Israeli counterterrorism closely matches

³⁵ I do not present traditional tables of coefficients, standard errors, or p-values in the discussion of the empirical results in this chapter or subsequent ones. As noted previously, the coefficient estimates produced by the VAR are less meaningful as output metrics than impulse-response functions. Furthermore, because VAR models include multiple equations and multiple lags of each covariate, tables of raw coefficient estimates would be long and difficult to interpret. Instead, I present graphs and tables of impulse-response functions to empirically evaluate the hypotheses.

constituent demands in size and form. Armed counterterror responses are most likely and largest where there are demands for violence, after civilian deaths and prior to ODS.

Targeted killings and home demolitions, the most popular forms of Israeli counterterrorism, occur only following civilian fatalities. Finally, only targeted killings increase support for the ruling Likud party. Rather than responding with incumbent-based rallies or unconditional demands for military counterterrorism, Israeli voters react to Palestinian violence based on their expectations of military efficacy, the severity of the external threat, and the availability of more appealing political alternatives. Israeli leaders use violence to satisfy the demands of their supporters.

When Does Palestinian Terrorism Beget Israeli Demands for Violence?

Trends in Israeli political responses to Palestinian violence are consistent with Retrospective Projection. While conventional rally and repression-radicalization arguments predict immediate constituent demands for violent retaliation and consistent rightward shifts in Israeli political attitudes following most Palestinian violence, the VAR analysis reveals a more dynamic set of political responses to violence that vary based on constituent expectations about the efficacy, costs, and benefits of military-based counterterrorism. Demands for violence that increase support for Likud occur only prior to ODS, when military-based counterterrorism is expected to be more effective than political accommodation, and after civilian fatalities, which suggest a more severe and direct threat to the well-being of Israeli voters. As a result, hard-line Israeli parties gain from Palestinian terrorism in the Israeli example only when constituents expect violence to serve as an effective political tool, prior to ODS and after civilian fatalities.

Israeli civilian deaths are associated with an immediate increase in relative support for the Likud party prior to ODS, a response that demands military-based counterterrorism based on the expected efficacy of this type of aggressive response at this point in the conflict. As shown in Figure 4.4, a shock of ten civilian deaths in any month prior to ODS is associated with an increase in relative support for the Likud party of 3.8 percentage points over the first two post-shock months.³⁶ Sharon's landslide victory in 2001, coming only four months into the Intifada is one example of this response. As former Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens noted after the 2001 election " 'it is clear that a tidal wave is sweeping over Israel, sweeping away the 'peace now' conception' " (Hockstader, *Washington Post* 2001). While Israeli constituent demands for violence prior to ODS reflect relatively higher expected military efficacy in this period, they are temporary and accompanied by an increase in political fragmentation. Figure 4.4 shows that the same increase of ten Israeli civilian deaths before ODS is associated with an additional 2.6 percentage points in support for 'other' parties within the first post-shock month. This fragmentation occurs because significant attacks on civilian populations pose a systemic threat that undermines the legitimacy of both major political parties, especially during periods of coalition government. One political analyst blames low turnout in the 2001 election on "disaffection with both candidates" following escalation in Palestinian violence (Philips, *The Daily Telegraph* 2001).


After ODS, however, the response to Israeli civilian deaths is small and statistically insignificant, reflecting the erosion of Israeli confidence in military strategies.

³⁶ In most cases, I use standard deviation shocks when presenting the IRF results. However, the range of Israeli civilian fatalities is rather large, making the standard deviation shock less useful in interpreting a typical response to an attack on Israeli civilians. I use median shocks instead in this case. See discussion in chapter 3 about interpreting IRFs for additional details. Appendix A12 shows the distribution of Israeli fatalities by month.

As one Israeli political analyst notes after ODS, “The human devastation of the latest round of this... conflict has pressed home... the truism that there is no military solution to the conflict” (Chazan, *Jerusalem Post* 2002). In this context, Israeli citizens are unlikely to respond to new attacks on civilians with demands for military counterterrorism that they believe will have few security benefits. This lack of post-ODS response deviates substantially from conventional wisdom that expects continued demands for violence, but is consistent with Retrospective Projection because it results immediately from constituent expectations and assessments of military and political strategies.

Political responses to IDF fatalities are distinct from those to civilian deaths, but continue to match the predictions of Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service. Political responses to IDF deaths prior to ODS react directly to the threat these attacks pose to military efficacy, punishing the Likud party for its security policy failure. Figure 4.4 shows that a median increase of four IDF fatalities contributes to a temporary decline in Likud-lead of one percentage point within the first post-shock month. The response suggests not constituent demands for violence, but political punishment for tactical failures and perceived military weakness. Following a series of deadly ambushes against IDF forces, one commentator notes that as a result of these military failures “Sharon’s credibility rating has dropped sharply.... Many Israelis have begun to mutter the once unthinkable: Israel is losing the war” (Hammer, Gutman, and Zedan, *Newsweek* 2002). This negative response is temporary, however. After ODS, a combination of low expected military efficacy and weak confidence in political strategies prevents any kind of political response to military fatalities.

Figure 4.4
Political Response to Israeli Deaths³⁷



Political Response to Israeli Civilian Deaths (Median Shock, 10 Civilian Deaths)						Political Responses to IDF Deaths (Median Shock, 4 IDF Deaths)				
Pre-ODS (2 lags)						Pre-ODS (2 lags)				
Response Month	Likud-lead			Support for 'Other' Parties			Response Month	Likud-lead		
	Response	95% CI		Response	95% CI			Response	95% CI	
0	1.15	0.48	1.83	1.08	0.34	1.82	0	-0.58	-0.99	-0.17
1	1.20	0.24	2.17	1.58	0.57	2.58	1	-0.83	-1.54	-0.13
2	1.62	0.56	2.68	1.09	-0.14	2.32	2	-0.61	-1.38	0.17
3	0.89	-0.36	2.14	-0.29	-1.58	1.00	3	0.65	-0.26	1.57
4	0.58	-0.67	1.83	-0.10	-1.93	1.73	4	0.11	-1.50	1.73
Post-ODS (3 lags)						Post-ODS (3 lags)				
Response Month	Likud-lead			Support for 'Other' Parties			Response Month	Likud-lead		
	Response	95% CI		Response	95% CI			Response	95% CI	
0	-0.17	-0.64	0.30	-0.35	-0.98	0.29	0	0.01	-0.45	0.48
1	-0.17	-0.59	0.26	-0.20	-0.85	0.44	1	-0.13	-0.64	0.38
2	-0.08	-0.50	0.34	-0.30	-0.92	0.33	2	0.41	-0.11	0.92
3	-0.03	-0.49	0.44	-0.20	-0.73	0.33	3	0.40	-0.15	0.96
4	-0.05	-0.52	0.43	-0.14	-0.59	0.32	4	0.57	0.00	1.14

Political responses to military and civilian deaths before and after ODS are consistent with Retrospective Projection. Constituent expectations about the efficacy of violence, confidence in political alternatives, and the perceived severity of the threat define political responses to violence over the course of the Second Intifada. Demands for military retaliation increase support for the Likud party only after civilian fatalities prior to ODS when expected military efficacy exceeds political optimism. In the post-ODS period, simultaneously low military efficacy and weak political optimism result in small,

³⁷ In the tables, the dark gray shaded cells have statistical significance at the 95% level. The light gray shaded cells fall slightly short of, but close to, statistical significance. The outlined cells are also statistically significant at the 95% level, but in the opposite direction from the original, dark gray-shaded response. In chapter 3, I provide a discussion of how to interpret VAR IRF functions.

insignificant political reactions after all types of fatalities. Small political responses create some political pressure on Israel's leadership to limit their use of military counterterrorism. However, there is little evidence of the larger, more enduring political moderation necessary to support final de-escalation. According to Constituent Service arguments, different political reactions to violence in the pre- and post-ODS periods and by fatality type should shape the timing and form of Israeli counterterrorism.

When Does Palestinian Terrorism Beget Israeli Retaliation?

Israeli counterterror responses after civilian and military deaths closely match constituent demands in form and intensity both before and after ODS suggesting the importance of constituent demands as a primary driver of conflict escalation and de-escalation in the Israeli example. Retaliatory violence is most likely after Palestinian attacks that trigger demands for violence from Israeli voters, in the pre-ODS period and particularly after civilian deaths. Violent reactions do not occur where there are not demands for violence, limiting the likelihood and size of violent retaliation after ODS and following military deaths. Figure 4.5 illustrates the more significant increase in Israeli counterterror operations after civilian deaths and in the pre-ODS period. An increase of five Israeli civilian deaths in any week is associated with a temporary increase of about two military operations and ten additional Palestinian fatalities over the first post-shock month prior to ODS, but no significant response after ODS. The response to a similar standard deviation shock in military deaths prior to ODS (about three IDF fatalities) is smaller, only one additional military operation and five additional Palestinian deaths over the first post-shock month. The post-ODS response to military fatalities is small and

insignificant. Violent responses to civilian and military deaths are temporary and the level of Israeli counterterrorism returns to equilibrium by the end of the first post-shock month.

Statements by Israeli political leaders confirm that military offensives are applied as tools of constituent service, but also highlight the different function of violent retaliation after civilian and military deaths. For instance, IDF commanders describe violent retaliation after military deaths as a reaction to implied tactical weakness and evidence that the IDF “has the will to fight and can rely on the IDF. We will stand fast in this mission as long as is necessary” (Mofaz 2004). In an interview justifying ODS, an operation launched following a string of attacks on civilians, Sharon argues that the operation and its severity reflect public demands made in the aftermath of severe attacks on Israeli civilians and refuses to withdraw until the mission is complete asserting “ ‘I don't think the public opinion here will accept it. Do not accept it’ ” (Sharon, interview with Wolf Blitzer, *CNN* 2002). The lack of response after 2002, and Sharon’s increasing political pragmatism, also directly matches constituent demands. As one political analyst notes in 2003, Sharon “senses the popular mood and seeks to ensure Likud’s future predominance as the centrist party that made the decisive moves toward a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” (Bailey, *International Herald Tribune* 2003).

Figure 4.5
Counterterror Response to Israeli Fatalities



*Each specification includes 2 lags.

CT Response to 5 Israeli Civilian Deaths					CT Response to 3 IDF Deaths (1SD)								
Targeted Killing Response Month	Pre-ODS			Post-ODS			Targeted Killing Response Week	Pre-ODS			Post-ODS		
	Response	95% CI		Response	95% CI			Response	95% CI		Response	95% CI	
0	0.05	-0.03	0.13	0.08	-0.02	0.17	0	0.03	-0.02	0.08	0.01	-0.04	0.07
1	0.19	0.11	0.27	0.20	0.11	0.29	1	-0.04	-0.08	0.01	-0.05	-0.10	0.01
2	0.07	-0.01	0.16	0.04	-0.05	0.13	2	0.02	-0.03	0.06	0.03	-0.03	0.09
3	0.00	-0.05	0.05	-0.02	-0.07	0.04	3	0.02	0.00	0.04	0.03	0.00	0.06
4	0.03	-0.01	0.06	0.01	-0.02	0.04	4	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.00	-0.02	0.02
Home Demolition					Home Demolition								
Response Month	Pre-ODS			Post-ODS			Response Week	Pre-ODS			Post-ODS		
	Response	95% CI		Response	95% CI			Response	95% CI		Response	95% CI	
0	0.23	-0.32	0.78	0.66	-0.15	1.46	0	0.13	-0.21	0.46	0.45	-0.02	0.93
1	1.05	0.46	1.63	1.62	0.78	2.45	1	0.13	-0.20	0.47	0.22	-0.28	0.72
2	-0.10	-0.71	0.50	-0.07	-0.93	0.78	2	0.03	-0.32	0.38	0.14	-0.39	0.68
3	0.19	-0.24	0.63	0.30	-0.24	0.84	3	0.05	-0.17	0.26	0.16	-0.12	0.44
4	0.09	-0.24	0.41	0.26	-0.05	0.57	4	-0.02	-0.17	0.13	-0.05	-0.20	0.11
Military Ops					Military Ops								
Response Month	Pre-ODS			Post-ODS			Response Week	Pre-ODS			Post-ODS		
	Response	95% CI		Response	95% CI			Response	95% CI		Response	95% CI	
0	0.16	-0.20	0.52	-0.23	-0.61	0.16	0	0.74	0.54	0.95	0.27	0.04	0.50
1	0.93	0.54	1.32	0.23	-0.17	0.63	1	0.36	0.14	0.58	0.08	-0.16	0.33
2	0.53	0.13	0.93	-0.09	-0.50	0.31	2	0.10	-0.13	0.33	0.10	-0.15	0.35
3	0.34	0.06	0.63	0.22	-0.02	0.46	3	0.16	0.02	0.30	0.07	-0.06	0.20
4	0.13	-0.07	0.32	0.14	-0.01	0.29	4	0.08	0.00	0.17	-0.01	-0.09	0.08
Palestinians Killed					Palestinians Killed								
Response Month	Pre-ODS			Post-ODS			Response Week	Pre-ODS			Post-ODS		
	Response	95% CI		Response	95% CI			Response	95% CI		Response	95% CI	
0	2.56	0.81	4.30	-0.40	-1.93	1.12	0	1.93	0.91	2.95	0.88	-0.03	1.79
1	6.08	4.21	7.95	1.14	-0.43	2.70	1	1.03	-0.04	2.11	0.87	-0.08	1.82
2	1.44	-0.52	3.41	-0.33	-1.91	1.24	2	1.33	0.21	2.44	0.28	-0.69	1.25
3	0.82	-0.48	2.12	-0.05	-0.56	0.45	3	0.90	0.22	1.58	0.14	-0.31	0.59
4	1.00	0.13	1.87	-0.01	-0.18	0.15	4	0.32	-0.07	0.71	-0.04	-0.27	0.19

Not only the size, but also the form of armed counterterrorism appears to follow constituent demands and preferences. Highly popular and exceptional counterterror tactics, including targeted killings and home demolitions, are more likely when demands for violence are large and occur exclusively after attacks on civilians. These exceptional,

observable counterterror responses are effective political tools that are able to address the more significant political response to civilian fatalities because they reveal an observable political commitment to security provision and because they are highly popular among diverse segments of the Israeli electorate (David 2002). Figure 4.5 shows that targeted killing responses immediately follow high fatality civilian attacks throughout the conflict but are not used after military deaths. A shock of about 25 additional Israeli civilian deaths in any week results in a targeted killing within the next two weeks. Home demolitions are also likely after attacks on civilians, but not military personnel. After ODS, the period during which demolitions are used most consistently, an increase of five civilian deaths in any week is associated with approximately two additional demolitions.

Signaling arguments do offer some insight into the different types of counterterror responses used after civilian and military deaths. Specifically, signaling arguments suggest that the more significant response to attacks on civilians communicate to Palestinian terrorists the illegitimacy of attacks on noncombatants and reveal the state's resolve to the domestic audience. However, justifications given for these operations by Israeli political and military leaders refer to their domestic popularity, echoing the logic of constituent service. One analyst explains the use of targeted killings noting that "democracies follow public opinion and targeted killing is a policy that has never lost favor with the Israeli electorate" (David 2002, 8). Home demolitions also match constituent demands. One report released before the 2003 election notes that reacting to constituent demands, Sharon has shifted his counterterror strategy "from sweeping and hard-hitting operations to long-term less spectacular deployments, with daily pinpoint arrest campaigns and home demolitions" (Shattner, Agence France Presse 2002).

The distinct counterterror responses employed following civilian and military deaths and the evolution of these responses over the course of the conflict suggest clear attention by Israel's political and military leadership to constituent preferences and their use of counterterror responses to serve constituent interests. Military-based counterterror responses occur when Israeli constituents demand violence (when expected military efficacy exceeds political optimism), but restraint is more likely when Israeli voters grow tired of violence. Highly popular responses like targeted killings and home demolitions, only follow civilian deaths, where they address more significant demands for violence among Israeli voters. Military responses after IDF fatalities are larger prior to ODS than after, and serve a primarily tactical purpose when they occur. Tit-for-tat and signaling arguments that are traditionally used to describe the timing and form of violence explain the pre-ODS response, but offer less insight into the apparent decline in violent responsiveness in the post-ODS period than do explanations focused on local political dynamics and constituent demands. Under Constituent Service interpretations, constituent expectations and demands are primary determinants of both the use of violence and the decision to employ restraint, able to trigger rapid escalation or place bounds on violent counterterrorism that encourages de-escalation.

What Are the Political Implications of Responsive Counterterrorism?

Although there is some evidence that popular counterterror policies used according to constituent demands do have positive political implications for the Likud party's relative support, the political gains that result from the use of military counterterrorism are small and temporary. As expected by Retrospective Projection and

Constituent Service, only highly popular targeted killings are associated with a notable increase in support for the Likud party. Political responses to other forms of counterterrorism are more limited or negative. Figure 4.6 shows that both before and after ODS, each additional targeted killing is associated with a temporary increase of one percentage point in relative support for Likud that falls slightly short of statistical significance.³⁸ One commentator describes the power of targeted killings as political tools by noting their ability to “[weaken] the effectiveness of terrorist organizations, [deter] terrorist operations,” and “[gain] the support of the overwhelming percentage of the Israeli population” (David 2002, 8).

In contrast, the change in Likud support following an increase in home demolitions appears statistically significant and negative, despite the anecdotal popularity of such responses. After ODS, the period in which these operations are used most extensively, a standard deviation shock of 14 home demolitions in any month contributes to a temporary decline in Likud-lead of two percentage points within the first post-shock month. This response suggests either that Israeli voters are more comfortable with home demolitions in theory than in practice or that the popularity of the tactic is concentrated in specific constituent segments. The negative political implications of these operations may explain their cessation in 2005.

The political implications of military operations vary, as expected, based on constituent demands and attitudes. Additional military operations are weakly associated with rising support for the Likud party in the pre-ODS period, when support for military counterterrorism is relatively higher based on its expected efficacy, but have no real

³⁸ Low statistical significance in this case appears to be due to the limited number of targeted killings.

effect on Israeli political attitudes after ODS, when support for military counterterrorism is low. Prior to ODS, a one standard deviation increase in military operations is associated with a delayed increase in Likud-lead that begins in the second post shock month, but because this gain merely offsets a more immediate decline in support for Likud, the net effect is close to zero. After ODS, there is little political reaction to counterterror operations, due to widespread conflict fatigue and low confidence in the efficacy of violent counterterror strategies.


The empirical results suggest that constituent expectations and preferences shape the political benefits of counterterror violence and that popular counterterror policies can be used as political tools. However, the political implications of counterterror activities are more uncertain than comparable political responses to terrorist violence and than the responses expected by existing literature and conventional wisdom. The results are consistent with Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service. Because voters elect political leaders based on expected policy responses, the use of these responses is already incorporated into voter attitudes and has only small additional effects. At the same time, the inability of Israeli military-based counterterrorism to definitively stop Palestinian violence weakens political rewards for its use.³⁹

The limited and ambiguous political implications of responsive counterterror violence diverge from the expectations of conventional rally, repression-radicalization, and signaling arguments. Both rally and repression-radicalization arguments expect that military counterterrorism will consistently increase support for the perpetrating actors,

³⁹ Although the operational impact of targeted killings is contested, most Israelis believe that targeted assassinations do improve national security (Brym and Araj 2005; Hafez 2006; Frisch 2006; David 2002). This perception contributes to positive retrospective evaluations of incumbent performance and positive political implications.

especially when the military activity responds to an external threat. Signaling arguments similarly predict positive political responses to military counterterrorism as voters react politically to the revelation of commitment and resolve by their leader. The empirical results, however, imply a much more dynamic and nuanced response to counterterrorism that incorporates assessments of military efficacy, political opportunity, and the severity of the threat. This is an important result because it suggests that even the use of highly popular counterterror strikes that match constituent demands have few lasting political implications and warns against the manipulation of counterterrorism for political gain.

Figure 4.6
Change in Likud-lead following Counterterror Operations



Change in Likud-lead (following 1 SD shock)						
Response Month	Targeted Killing (1 Assassination)			Home Demolitions (14 Demolitions)		
	Response	95% CI		Response	95% CI	
0	0.46	-0.26	1.18	-1.02	-1.69	-0.36
1	0.79	-0.34	1.93	-1.81	-2.82	-0.79
2	1.10	-0.22	2.42	-0.29	-1.35	0.76
3	0.49	-0.66	1.64	-0.08	-1.08	0.91
Response Month	Military Ops Pre-ODS (10 Operations)			Post-ODS (7 Operations)		
	Response	95% CI		Response	95% CI	
0	-1.43	-2.44	-0.42	-0.01	-0.72	0.70
1	-1.90	-3.82	0.01	-0.71	-1.80	0.38
2	1.12	-1.59	3.83	0.31	-0.94	1.55
3	2.06	-0.74	4.86	0.29	-1.03	1.60

*Each specification includes 2 lags

Discussion

The qualitative and quantitative results from the Israeli example offer support for Retrospective Projection and the Constituent Service. Constituent demands for violence that increase support for the Likud party occur only following civilian deaths prior to ODS, when Israelis expect aggressive counterterrorism to better advance their political and security goals than alternative approaches that rely more heavily on political accommodation. Israeli counterterrorism closely follows constituent demands in form and timing. Violent responses are largest and most likely to include targeted killings and home demolitions in the pre-ODS period and after civilian fatalities. Only targeted killings, as the most popular form of Israeli counterterrorism, have positive implications for the perpetrating Likud party. These results and their general support for the initial hypotheses are summarized in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3
Were the Hypotheses Supported?: *Israel*

Hypothesis	Result
H1. Political responses and demands for violent retaliation are more likely after civilian fatalities than IDF deaths.	Supported. Political response to civilian deaths is larger than that to IDF fatalities.
H2. Demands for violence that increase support for Likud are more likely prior to ODS (high military efficacy).	Supported. Demands for violence are less likely after ODS.
H3. Disaffection and fragmentation are most likely after civilian deaths.	Supported.
H4a. Demands for violence that increase support for Likud are encouraged by the conflict's intractability.	Supported. Comparison with British example.
H4b. Demands for violence that increase support for Likud are encouraged by political competition.	Supported. Comparison with bipartisanship in Britain.
H5. Armed responses are most likely where there are demands for violence—prior to 2002 and after civilian deaths.	Supported. Violent response to prior to 2002 and after civilian deaths consistently larger.
H6. Counterterror responses to civilian deaths include exceptional operations, such as home demolitions and targeted killings, that are not used after military deaths.	Supported. Targeted killings and home demolitions follow only civilian deaths.
H7. (non-state only)	NA
H8. Counterterror responses have weaker political implications than Palestinian attacks.	Supported.
H9. Only targeted killings have strong political implications for the incumbent leader.	Supported. Only targeted killings increase support for Likud party.

There is some overlap between these findings and the predictions of existing literature, particularly prior to ODS. Demands for violence that occur in the conflict's initial period increase support for Likud, a response that is generally consistent with rally and repression-radicalization arguments. Significant violence and the use of targeted

killings after civilian deaths during the same pre-ODS period matches the expectations of signaling arguments and is broadly supportive of the tit-for-tat logic. However, existing explanations of violence and demands for violence do not address lack of political or violent responses observed in the post-ODS period. Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service, however, describe dynamic associations between attitudes and violence and predicts frequent use of restraint. Demands for violence reflect constituent expectations and beliefs about political and military strategies, and violent retaliation serves not only as a deterrent or signal, but as also as political tool.

The Israeli example identifies the intensity of violence, the likelihood of a political settlement, the expected success of military violence, political competition, and conflict duration as the characteristics of the security and political context most likely to affect constituent expectations, demands, and the use of violence. In the Israeli example, the continuation of violence without progress towards a final settlement gradually erodes perceptions of military efficacy, but weak political alternatives and past political failures place strong bounds on political confidence and limit political pressure for accommodation. The Israeli example suggests, therefore, that although a reduction in expected military efficacy contributes to de-escalation by placing constraints on demands for violence, it is insufficient on its own to support a lasting, long-term cessation of hostility or the formation of a final political settlement.

A final important observation to emerge from the Israeli example is the very limited political benefit earned by Likud from its use of military counterterrorism during the Second Intifada. Despite the domestic popularity of the aggressive, hard-line counterterror approach employed throughout much of the conflict, these operations do

not unambiguously consolidate political support or prevent political costs to the incumbent from ongoing violence. As noted previously, only targeted killings appear to consistently increase support for the Likud party. This does not mean that the use of violence as a political tool is misguided. Military operations and targeted killings may have small political implications because retaliation is already incorporated into constituent expectations or because the use of these responsive operations simply sustains political support and popularity at an equilibrium level. The limited, temporary political benefits of targeted killings have direct relevance to the United States as it relies increasingly heavily on targeted drone strikes in its own counterterror campaigns. Targeted killings may be effective in weakening the military capabilities of non-state groups, but the results in this chapter show that an exclusive reliance on aggressive counterterrorism may not have the expected or desired effects on non-state violence or domestic public opinion.

Small political gains from responsive counterterrorism also warn against attempts to manipulate counterterror strategy for domestic political purposes. This is an especially important observation in the Israeli example where competition over security issues sometimes does seem to encourage the use of unnecessary violence that triggers Palestinian backlash and further complicates attempts at lasting political settlement (Russett and Barzilai 1990). Explicit attempts to depoliticize counterterrorism and pursue bipartisan policies on the state side may be important first steps towards political compromise where they limit unnecessary state violence and the political incentives that encourage demands for violence.

Chapter 5

The Efficacy and Necessity of Violence: Constraints on Palestinian Retaliation during the Second Intifada

Introduction

When the Second Intifada began in 2000, Hamas militants were proclaimed as heroes for their willingness to fight the Israeli occupier. One man noted, “ ‘I'm not religious, but if Hamas fights the occupation I have all the respect for Hamas’ ” (Hockstader, *Washington Post* 2001). By the middle of 2002, however, growing numbers of Palestinians blamed Hamas for invasive Israeli military operations and the Palestinian casualties they caused. The mother of one deceased suicide bomber angrily asserted that “ ‘those who send the kids to carry out attacks and get killed must be punished’ ” (*Xinhua* 2002). This shift in Palestinian attitudes suggests that the stereotypical tit-for-tat pattern of attack and counterattack is no more accurate a description of violence during the Second Intifada within the Palestinian Territories than on the Israeli side of the conflict.

A close reading of the case and empirical analysis of Palestinian political attitudes and violent retaliation show instead that in the Palestinian Territories, as in Israel, demands for violence occur only when local constituents believe that armed responses are likely to advance political and security objectives more effectively than non-violent alternatives, and violence closely matches constituent demands. Constituent demands for violence are most likely prior to 2002, when military efficacy is high, and after threats

that undermine political optimism, including the targeted killings of political leaders and attacks on members of Fatah, the political representative of the Palestinian people.

Palestinian violence closely follows constituent demands, occurring after most Israeli operations prior to 2002, but less frequently and only by Hamas after 2002. More limited constituent demands for violence and less frequent violent retaliation in the post-ODS period reflect weakening Palestinian confidence in armed resistance strategies. However, even more than in the Israeli case, the lack of political opportunities sustains support for violence throughout the conflict and presents an obstacle to a final political resolution.⁴⁰

This chapter applies Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service to the case of the Palestinian Territories during the Second Intifada. I use qualitative case analysis to define the characteristics of the political and security context most likely to affect the attitudes of Palestinian constituents, derive hypotheses about the timing of radicalization and violence in the Palestinian case, and empirically evaluate the hypotheses.

Conflict Background⁴¹


The preceding chapter offered a brief summary of the events that occurred in the lead up to and during the Second Intifada. A few additional details on the conflict from the Palestinian perspective facilitate an application of Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service to the non-state side of the case. When the conflict began in 2000, Fatah (supported by its military wing, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade (AMB)) and Hamas were the two strongest Palestinian groups, but multiple smaller organizations were also involved. Suicide bombs executed in major Israeli population centers were the most

⁴⁰ I refer to the perceived efficacy of militant groups and armed resistance as 'military efficacy.'

⁴¹ For a complete coverage of events during the Second Intifada see Pressman 2003; Frisch 2006; BBC, "Al-Aqsa Timeline," http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3677206.stm.

devastating Palestinian attacks, but sniper fire and armed assaults on Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) troops and Israeli settlers also caused significant damage. Palestinian violence increased over the course of 2001 and early 2002 (see Figure 5.1), contributing to major Israeli reprisals, including targeted killings and military incursions. The most significant offensive, Operation Defensive Shield (ODS), occurred in March of 2002, involved the reoccupation of West Bank cities, and marked a turning point for Palestinians because of its real effect on the capabilities of militant groups and Palestinian confidence in armed resistance. As Prime Minister in 2003, Mahmoud Abbas won acceptance by Fatah and Hamas of a temporary ceasefire, or *hudna*, and made some steps towards the resumption of negotiations with Israel. Although the ceasefire collapsed in 2003, violence never returned to its pre-2002 levels. Arafat's death in 2004 and Israel's disengagement from Gaza initiated a period of relative calm until the Gaza War in 2009.

Figure 5.1
Trends in Violence, Second Intifada



Source: ICT

Source: B'tselem

Palestinian fatalities exceed Israeli deaths. Hamas causes more Israeli fatalities than Fatah.

Operationalizing the Argument: Palestinian Territories

In this section, I use qualitative information on the Second Intifada to apply the Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service arguments to Palestinian example. The

discussion focuses on how key features of the domestic political and security context influence the attitudes and expectations of Palestinian constituents towards violence and political compromise and considers how these same determinants influence the violent responses of Fatah and Hamas. It concludes with several Palestinian-specific hypotheses.

Severity and Intractability of the Conflict

According to Retrospective Projection, the consistently high severity and intractability of the security threat in the Palestinian example encourage expectations of future violence and the belief that military-based responses are necessary, both of which support Palestinian constituent demands for violent retaliation. The seeming intractability and zero-sum nature of the issues at the center of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict make political compromise appear dangerous and unlikely, increasing support for violence and the belief that armed resistance is necessary. Public opinion polls confirm strong and consistent Palestinian support for violence based on its perceived necessity and the lack of appealing political alternatives (PCPSR Polls 2000-2004) (see Figure 5.2). Existing survey research confirms this association at the individual level. Individuals who view the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an intractable one are more likely to support violence as a legitimate, justified response (Bar-Tal 2007).

In addition to the conflict's intractability, the severity of the threat presented by Israeli counterterrorism creates expectations of future violence that increase the likelihood of political responses to Israeli counterterrorism. Figure 5.1 shows a consistently high level of violence during the Second Intifada. Violence is most intense in the Intifada's first two years, but Palestinian casualties exceed Israeli deaths throughout

the conflict. The threat presented by Israeli counterterrorism is strengthened by Israel's clear military supremacy, heavy reliance on military counterterrorism, and acceptance of collateral damage to protect Israeli security.

The perceived severity and political implications of Israeli counterterrorism vary more significantly by fatality type. As in the Israeli case, civilian fatalities present the most direct threat to Palestinian security, and the one that should have the most significant effect on Palestinian expectations, attitudes, and demands. Civilian deaths during the Second Intifada present an especially significant threat to Fatah's political legitimacy since its inability to protect civilians from Israeli violence "exposed to full view the faults of the Palestinian Authority (PA) leading the street to demand fundamental reform" (PCPSR, Poll 4 2002). Hamas is not immune to punishment for civilian deaths, especially when Palestinians blame the group's inflammatory attacks for Israeli retaliation. Under Retrospective Projection, political responses to civilian deaths should be consistently significant, but as described in more detail below, only demand violence when Palestinians are confident in the efficacy of violence as a political tool.

Targeted killings of Palestinian leaders also affect Palestinian political attitudes, but do so in two very distinct and sometimes conflicting ways. On one hand, targeted killings undermine political optimism, make compromise appear unlikely, and increase the perceived necessity of violence. For example, one Palestinian mourner at the funeral of an assassinated leader describes that as a result of the attack, " 'Israel now is involved in troubles with all the Palestinian people...Every Palestinian will seek revenge for their deaths' " (Abu Ramdan, United Press International 2003) At the same time, however, targeted killings weaken the apparent strength of the targeted militant organization and

expectations about the likely success of violence as a political tool. Palestinian analysts confirm that targeted killings affect both the real and perceived efficacy of militant groups and their violence. One investigation finds that after the assassinations of Ahmed Yassin and Abd-al-Aziz al-Rantisi “despite boosted popularity, Hamas is having a hard time raising funds, passing down orders and dispatching suicide bombers” (Schechter, *Jerusalem Post* 2004). According to Retrospective Projection, the political response to a leader assassination should be minimal in the medium-term because targeted killings simultaneously weaken confidence in armed and political strategies. Palestinians are unlikely to demand violence or political accommodation when their confidence in both tactics has been undermined and eroded.

Although in many conflicts military and militant deaths have small political implications because they are interpreted as a ‘cost of war,’ the embedded position of Palestinian militants and strong Palestinian support for violence increase the political importance of militant fatalities and the size of political responses to their deaths.⁴² After the deaths of several Hamas militants in 2001, for example, “thousands of shocked and furious Palestinians swarmed into the streets” demanding retaliation (Saada, *Agence France Presse* 2001). The deaths of Fatah militants have especially severe political implications because they challenge Fatah’s political legitimacy and weaken confidence in potential political solutions to the conflict. As one Fatah militant comments, after ODS “ ‘we all remember the words of Palestinian officials who said that if Israel ever dared to

⁴² Fair and Shapiro (2009) make a similar argument about support for militants in Pakistan. However, they do not explicitly or empirically consider how support for the political goals or violence of non-state groups affect political responses to terror and counterterror violence or how these responses constrain and motivate additional violence. The argument and empirical analysis presented in this chapter offer insight into why, how, and how much support for the political goals of militant groups affects the response dynamics of an extended terror conflict.

reenter our areas, they would teach it an unforgettable lesson... Now we know that all these threats were worth nothing' ” (Abu Toameh, *The Jerusalem Report* 2002).

Retrospective Projection predicts demands for violence after militant deaths in most political and security contexts during the Second Intifada because of the embedded position of Palestinian militant group members and expectations about the efficacy of violence that consistently exceed confidence in political alternatives. Group reputation also affects political responses to militant fatalities. Fatah militant deaths are more likely to result in demands for violence than the deaths of Hamas militants because the group's political position increases the threat such fatalities present to political approaches to the conflict. While Hamas's supporters see Hamas militant deaths as a sign of weakness, members of Fatah (and especially marginal supporters with relatively more extreme views) are most likely to see Fatah militant fatalities as evidence that political accommodation cannot protect Palestinian interests. Demands for violence after militant deaths are also encouraged by their higher clarity and tactical nature, characteristics that favor demands for violent retaliation.

Retrospective Projection anticipates that the intractability and severity of the Israeli threat encourage expectations of future violence and strong beliefs in the necessity of armed retaliation throughout the conflict. Demands for violent retaliation by Palestinian constituents are most likely when these constituents expect militant violence to be more effective in achieving political and security goals than weak political alternatives as well as when Israeli counterterrorism directly challenges the potential for a political settlement. As a result, a complete understanding of when demands for violence

occur requires a more detailed investigation of Palestinian attitudes towards military and political strategies.⁴³

Expected Military Efficacy and Political Optimism

According to Retrospective Projection, Palestinian expectations about the efficacy of armed resistance and evolving political optimism reflect Palestinian evaluations and reactions to specific changes in the political and security context. At the start of the Second Intifada, Palestinian expectations about the benefits of a militant-based strategy (expected military efficacy) exceed optimism about political accommodation, engagement, or settlement (political optimism). Low confidence in political strategies in the pre-ODS period results from the failure of political negotiations in 2000 and the collapse of the Oslo Accords. A public opinion poll taken in July 2000, for example, finds that after the collapse of Camp David, 46% of Palestinians believe there is no hope for a political settlement, compared to only 23% before the summit (JMCC, Poll 37-38 2000-2001). At the same time, evidence that armed resistance can extract concessions from Israel, including the partial Israeli withdrawal from Hebron following the 1996 ‘tunnel riots’ and Hezbollah’s success in forcing the Israeli pullout from Southern Lebanon in 1999, bolster the projected success of a violent strategy. Confidence in military efficacy and beliefs that negotiations will fail encourage demands for violent retaliation prior to ODS.


⁴³ ‘Clarity of responsibility’ refers to the ease with which voters can assign blame for specific policies or outcomes (Powell and Whitten 1993). Civilian fatalities tend to have low clarity because they are difficult to defend against and imply a systemic failure. Leader deaths also fall into this category, as a result of Israeli military supremacy. Militant deaths have higher clarity and imply a tactical threat that can be addressed by armed responses.

The balance between perceived military efficacy and political optimism in the Palestinian case appears to shift starting in 2002, as a result of the conflict's endurance, changes the political and security context caused by ODS, and changes in Palestinian political leadership. Israel's counterterror success during ODS and the IDF's reoccupation of West Bank cities undermines Palestinian confidence in armed resistance and support for violence because it reinforces Israel's military supremacy and "dash[es] the hopes of many that the Intifada would bring about a quick Palestinian independence" (PCPSR, Poll 6, 2002). The simple continuation of the conflict without political gains also erodes Palestinian confidence in armed resistance because it offers additional proof that violence cannot achieve Palestinian political goals. As one Palestinian commentator argues, "people are ready to support the Intifada as long as they believe it will help achieve their objectives," but turn against violence when its costs exceed perceived benefits (Ephron, *Boston Globe* 2004).

Finally, the appointment of Abbas as Prime Minister and his initial success in controlling violence and resuming political negotiations foster some revision in Palestinian political attitudes that further undermine support for an exclusively violent and militant-based strategy. After two summits in early June 2003 and the declaration of a unilateral ceasefire, one commentator described rising "optimism...[and] expectations that if things go according to plan, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would enter a new phase where a solution would end the conflict..." (*Amman Al-Ra'y* 2003, translated by World News Connection). Changes in the political context encourage continued Palestinian support for political approaches even after Abbas resigns in 2003.

Trends in Palestinian public opinion during the Second Intifada offer additional evidence of the shift in the balance between Palestinian support for armed resistance and interest in political alternatives in the post-ODS period. As shown in Figure 5.2, support for the continuation of the Intifada gradually declines in 2003 and 2004 from over 80% to only 63%, and direct support for the cessation of military operations rises, from a low of 52% to over 80% by 2004 (PCPSR, JMCC Polls 2000-2004). Over the same period, optimism about a political settlement rises steadily from 30% in late 2002 to 63% in 2004 (JMCC polls, 2002-2004). There is also more specific evidence that changes in support for an armed Intifada are driven by the perceived efficacy of violence. For example, falling support for suicide bombs in 2003 and 2004 (see Figure 5.3) reflects the widespread perception that “ ‘there have been suicide bombings for years...and there have been no results so far’ ” (Barr, *Christian Science Monitor* 2002), a belief that is reinforced by Israeli success in stopping would-be bombers after 2002. However, positive assessments about the efficacy of rocket attacks and violence against IDF soldiers sustain support for these other tactics throughout the conflict. Many Palestinians agree with Musheer al-Masri when he calls the Gaza withdrawal “a big achievement of the Palestinian people and the resistance, which alone has pushed the Zionist enemy to think of leaving Gaza’ ” (Erlanger and Myre, *New York Times* 2004, quoting al-Masri). Support for violence, therefore, reflects reasoned constituent assessments of the existing threat and available strategies.

Figure 5.2
Palestinian Attitudes on Peace and Violence




Source: JMCC

Source: Truman Peace Index

Support for continuation of the Intifada begins to fall in early 2003 as support for cessation of violence and optimism about peace begin to rise.

Figure 5.3
Support for Violence by Target and Tactic



Source: PCPSR poll

Source: JMCC

Although support for suicide bombs falls over the course of the conflict, support for attacks on IDF, settlers remains above 90% throughout the conflict.

Under Retrospective Projection, Palestinian expectations about the efficacy of militant violence and their optimism about political strategies adapt to changes in the Palestinian political and security context and affect the timing and intensity of constituent demands for violence. High perceived military efficacy prior to ODS increases the likelihood of demands for violence, but disillusionment with armed resistance and limited changes in political optimism that emerge over the course of the conflict constrain

support for violence after ODS. Despite a measurable change in Palestinian political attitudes after ODS, the lack of political opportunities sustains both the tolerance for and use of violence throughout the conflict.

Political Institutions and Competition

While gradual erosion in the perceived efficacy of armed resistance controls demands for violence after ODS in the Palestinian case, Palestinian political and security institutions have the opposite effect: encouraging radicalization, political disaffection, and violent retaliation by undermining confidence in political alternatives, reducing clarity of responsibility for security failures, and exacerbating competition between Fatah and Hamas. The inability of the PA to govern or provide security to Palestinians weakens Palestinian support for political alternatives, increases support for violence, and contributes to the low clarity of responsibility associated with security failures. In describing the sharp increase in Hamas's popularity in 2001 and 2002, one hard-liner notes " 'the Palestinian Authority is broken; its institutions are destroyed....How can the Palestinian Authority assure the security of the Israelis when it cannot even protect its own people?' " (Golden, *New York Times* 2002, quoting Sheik Abdallah al-Shami). The lack of political alternatives also explains the endurance of support for violence. Even when they grow tired of conflict, Palestinians lack political opportunities, creating a tolerance for violence that makes resolution difficult. A Palestinian lawmaker argues that without viable political alternatives to advance their interests, " 'the Palestinians have no option except...steadfastness ...resistance' " and violence (Abd-al-Rahman, Interview by Zaki Abu-al-Halawah, *al-Quds* 2002).

Political competition between Fatah and Hamas also plays an important role in explaining responses to and the use of violence in the Palestinian case. Although this competition is encouraged by weak institutions, it has an independent effect on Palestinian expectations. Competition between Fatah and Hamas influences the direction and increases the size of political responses to violence because constituents expect very different outcomes from the aggressive Hamas and more politically-oriented Fatah. As one analyst notes, “support for Hamas is the public response to fears and threats imposed by Israeli collective punishment measures...”, but “Abbas [and Fatah] benefit from [Palestinian conflict fatigue] because he is viewed as the candidate most likely to bring about peace and the one most able to improve economic conditions” (Shikaki, *Washington Post* 2004). In the Palestinian example, competition most often encourages demands for violence. According to one observer, “the popularity of Hamas has tracked the ebb and flow of conflict with the Israelis. It is no coincidence that its popularity has climbed during the past year as peace talks collapsed” (Bennett, *New York Times* 2001). Finally, as expected by Constituent Service, competition between Hamas and Fatah shapes trends in the use of violence. When Palestinian constituents express strong support for military operations, both Fatah and Hamas face incentives to intensify violence to attract new supporters. One analyst describes in 2001 that while Hamas escalates violence to protect military dominance and its popularity, secular factions like Fatah “try to imitate what Hamas has been saying and doing” to attract and consolidate its own political support (Hockstader, *Washington Post* 2001).

Weak Palestinian political institutions sustain constituent demands for violence throughout the conflict because Palestinians perceive of few appealing political

alternatives to armed resistance. Competition between rival Palestinian groups also affects the timing and form of violent retaliation, creating additional incentives for political responses to violence and the use of violence as a competitive political tool.

Violence as Constituent Service

A Constituent Service interpretation of Palestinian violence anticipates that, in addition to being driven by competition between Palestinian groups, the timing and form of violent responses by Fatah and Hamas directly reflect constituent demands. Violent retaliation should be most likely where Israeli counterterrorism results in Palestinian constituent demands for violence and will vary according to responding group, as each group adheres to the demands of its local supporters. Statements by Palestinian political leaders offer some initial support for this Constituent Service interpretation. Marwan al-Barghouti, a Fatah leader, suggests that violent responses “ ‘[express] the pulse, conscience and will of the Palestinian street’ ” (al-Barghouti, 2001, interview with *Al-Mustaqbal*). Similarly, a senior Hamas official, Mahmoud Zahar claims Hamas is obligated to respond to the deaths of civilians because “ ‘their families and their souls demand revenge’ ” (Zahar, Interview by Tawfiq Taha, *al-Jazeera* 2000). Another Hamas leader, al-Rantisi, justifies violent responses as the necessary response to “ ‘the bloody aggression against our people, the assassination of our people’ ” (Beeston and Tait, *The Times* 2003).

Differences in the rhetorical responses and trends in violence used by Fatah and Hamas offer further evidence for the Constituent Service argument and each group’s attention to the preferences of its core support base. As the more politically-oriented

actor, Fatah's leaders refer to violence as a legitimate political tool employed by a state-like actor in defense of its constituents. Nasser Badawi, a senior commander of Fatah's military wing, describes that " 'the armed resistance is merely a way to advance the political goals of the movement... ' " (Biederman, Inter Press 2002). Fatah also adheres to the constraints of constituent tolerance, reducing its use of violence after 2002 to match falling Palestinian support for armed resistance. Statements by Hamas's political leadership confirm constituent interests as a driver of violence, but also suggest close attention to the hardened, militant attitudes of its intended audience. As one Hamas leader describes, the group ensures continued support from hardened Palestinian constituents and prevents fragmentation by remaining " 'at the forefront of 'armed resistance' ... [with] the killing of Israeli soldiers and civilians alike ' " (Lynfield, *Christian Science Monitor* 2004). Hamas's continued use of violence after 2002 is explicitly intended to retain the support of the group's hard-line supporters, but its increasing political pragmatism after 2003 suggests simultaneous attention to mainstream preferences. An Israeli political analyst notes " 'Hamas has been very careful to read Palestinian public opinion' " in its political and military decisions (Deutsche Press Agentur June 2003, quoting Merari).

Constituent Service arguments applied to the Palestinian example predict variation in the form and timing of violence across groups and over the course of the conflict as a result of the distinct preferences of each group's key supporters. For both groups, violent responses are most likely where local Palestinians demand violence. Because of its political orientation and more moderate support base, Fatah adheres more closely to mainstream preferences and does not respond violently after ODS, when

Palestinians turn increasingly against violence. In contrast, Hamas uses violence more often and more severely throughout the conflict, matching the demands of its harder-line support base and addressing any threat to its military competence. The timing and form of violent responses expected by a Constituent Service interpretation of violence differ from the more consistent violent responsiveness across groups and over time that is predicted by tit-for-tat and signaling arguments. Instead, a Constituent Service interpretation suggests that violence is locally-driven and predicts dynamic, group-specific trends in armed attacks that match constituent preferences.

Propositions to Hypotheses

The discussion above applies Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service to the Palestinian case. It describes how Palestinian assessments of the security threat and evaluations of past conflict outcomes affect expectations of military efficacy and political optimism, and identifies the implications of these expectations for political responses to violence and the likelihood of violent retaliation by Palestinian groups. The discussion facilitates the operational translation of the theoretical propositions into hypotheses specific to the Palestinian case that can be evaluated empirically. These hypotheses, summarized below and in Table 5.1 and 5.2, present a locally-focused, constituent-driven, and dynamic interpretation of the relationship between political attitudes and violence on the Palestinian side of the Second Intifada.

When does Israeli violence beget Palestinian demands for violence?

H1a. *Political responses to civilian fatalities exceed those to militant deaths.*

H1b. *Political responses to leader deaths are small and temporary.*

H2a. *Demands for violence that increase support for Hamas are more likely before ODS (expected military efficacy high, early in the conflict).*

H2b. *Demands for violence that increase support for Hamas are more likely after Fatah leader and militant deaths than those of Hamas (more direct threat to political optimism).*

H3. *Disaffection and fragmentation are most likely after civilian deaths.*

H4a. *Demands for violence that increase support for Hamas are encouraged by perceived intractability.*

H4b. *Demands for violence that increase support for Hamas are encouraged by competition between Fatah and Hamas.*

When does Israeli counterterrorism beget Palestinian retaliation?⁴⁴

H5. *Armed responses are most likely where demands for violence occur and occur most often prior to 2002.*

H7. *Hamas is more likely to respond violently than Fatah, especially to militant deaths.*

What are the political implications of responsive Palestinian terrorism?

H8. *Palestinian terror attacks have weaker political implications than counterterror operations.*

H9. *Violent responses prior to ODS have strongest positive political implications for perpetrating groups.*

⁴⁴ There is no Palestinian analog to H6 which considers variation in the *type* of response to different security threats. Although Palestinian groups did use different types of attacks, I focus instead on fatalities-claimed by Fatah and Hamas. Once again, the test of H4 is a qualitative and comparative one. I address it in more depth later in subsequent case chapters.

Table 5.1
Demands for & the Use of Violence: What Matters? *Palest. Territories*
What encourages demands for and the use of retaliatory violence?

Determinant	Level in Palestinian Territories	Demands for and the use of violence	
Severity of Threat	High, esp. after civilian deaths and pre-ODS	↑	
Intractability	High	↑	
Expected Military Efficacy	High prior to ODS, but falls after	Pre-ODS ↑	Post-ODS ↓
Political Optimism	Consistently low (some improvement after 2003)	Pre-ODS ↑	Post-ODS ↔
Political Competition	High	↑	
Political Institutions	Weak institutions reduce clarity and make violence appear necessary.	↑ ↔	
		Weak institutions increase disaffection	
Conflict Duration	Endurance of violence erodes support for violence.	↓	

Table 5.2
Expectations of Competing Explanations: *Palest. Territories*
How do expectations of the competing interpretations differ?

Following counterterror violence	Palestinian Territories
Retrospective Projection & Constituent Service	<i>Demand for and use of violence</i> Pre-ODS Post-ODS ↑ ↓
Rally	<i>Support for incumbent</i> ↑
Repression → Radicalization	<i>Demand for and use of violence</i> ↑
Tit-for-Tat	<i>Demand for and use of violence</i> ↑
Signaling	<i>Use of violence</i> ↑

Empirical Results

This section presents the results of the vector autoregression analysis (VAR), incorporating qualitative information where appropriate. As a summary, the data combines Israeli and Palestinian fatalities by type and perpetrator taken from B'tselem and the Institute for Counterterrorism (ICT)⁴⁵ and measures of Palestinian political attitudes that combine the results of similarly worded surveys conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) and Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC).⁴⁶ I use the fatality data to operationalize violence and data on political affiliation to operationalize demands for violence. I consider Fatah-lead as a measure of relative support for Fatah and Hamas and shifts towards Hamas as a 'demand for violence.' I use absolute support for both groups to explore the effects of targeted killings and 'support for no party' as a measure of political disaffection. I use vector autoregression (VAR) to evaluate the hypotheses. The results of the VAR are interpreted as impulse-response functions (IRF) that empirically describe the dynamic associations between covariates (Freeman, Williams, Lin 1989; Stock and Watson 2001). The tests of H1-H3 and H8-H9 link violence with political attitudes using monthly data. The tests of H5-H7 use weekly data to measure terrorist responses to counterterrorism.

Identifying Structural Breaks

According to Retrospective Projection, events that alter constituent expectations about the efficacy of armed resistance, the severity of the external threat, or the

⁴⁵ Fatah-claimed fatalities and militant and leader deaths include Fatah and its armed wing, AMB.


⁴⁶ Political support data come from answers to question, "Which of the following political parties do you support?", JMCC and PCPSR surveys, July 2000-December 2004. Appendix A3 lists dates.

opportunities for political settlement lead to structural breaks in the political and violent responses to Israeli violence. The discussion above identifies two potential break points in the Palestinian example, Operation Defensive Shield and the Palestinian *hudna*, which marks the height of Abbas's political advance. Both events have implications for the perceived efficacy of military and political approaches and the nature of the Israeli threat. Israeli military supremacy and success during ODS contribute to increasing disillusionment with the efficacy of armed resistance. Similarly, political changes during 2003, including the appointment of a Palestinian Prime Minister and US pressure for a political settlement, influence Palestinian expectations about the likelihood of future violence and the potential for a political settlement in the post-hudna period.

I test these two potential break points for evidence of a structural break using a recursive forecasting strategy that corresponds to a series of Chow forecast-tests, described in a previous chapter. The results of these tests are presented as graphs of actual values, forecasted values, and confidence intervals in Figure 5.4. The forecasting line is created by specifying a VAR with the minimum number of periods needed to produce reasonable estimates, generating a forecast for the next period, and then repeating this process, adding one additional period at a time, across and beyond the break point. Evidence of a break occurs when the actual value falls outside the confidence intervals of the forecast line for several periods. A structural break may occur even if actual values eventually move back inside forecast confidence intervals.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Because the forecast process incorporates additional data at each step, the forecast line should eventually right itself and its confidence interval should again encompass the actual values.

Figure 5.4
Forecasting Structural Breaks: Palestinian Territories



***Pre/Post ODS:** The confidence intervals for the ‘Israeli killed’ and ‘Fatah-lead’ covariates do not contain the actual values in the immediate aftermath of the ODS break point and (May- July 2002). This offers evidence of a structural break.*

***Pre/Post Hudna:** The confidence intervals for the ‘Israeli killed’ and ‘Fatah-lead’ covariates contain the actual values at and after the Hudna (July/August 2003). There does not appear to be a structural break at this point.*

The results show some evidence of a structural break after ODS. At this point, actual values for ‘Fatah-lead’ and ‘Israeli-killed’ fall outside forecast confidence intervals, implying a fundamentally different relationship between political support and violence after the Israeli offensive. In contrast, actual values fall within forecast confidence intervals both before and after the *hudna*. Given these results, I specify and report separate VAR models for the pre- and post-ODS periods. In the pre-ODS specifications, I add a control for Barak’s term as prime minister in Israel. In the post-ODS specifications, I include a control for the *hudna*. I use these controls to be consistent

with previous work, but they have few ramifications for the IRF results. The lag length for each specification is identified using diagnostic tests suggested by Lütkepohl (2005).

*Overview*⁴⁸

The empirical results support Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service. Demands for violence occur when Palestinians are more confident in the efficacy of armed resistance than the benefits of a political strategy and when they perceive of few political alternatives, including following most types of Israeli counterterrorism prior to 2002. Palestinian constituents are also likely to demand violence after Israeli violence that directly undermines confidence in political accommodation, specifically targeted killings of Fatah leaders and deaths of Fatah militants. Demands for violence are more limited in the post-ODS period when expected militant efficacy is considerably lower. Palestinian violence closely matches constituent demands, occurring only when there is evidence of a demand for violence, primarily prior to 2002 and by Hamas. However, despite the congruence between responsive violence and constituent demands, violent responses by Fatah and Hamas have few additional effects on their own political support, suggesting some Palestinian uncertainty about the efficacy of violence as a political tool, but also a lack of political alternatives.

When Does Israeli Violence Beget Palestinian Demands for Violence?

As expected by Retrospective Projection, Palestinian constituent demands for violence occur primarily prior to ODS, when expectations about militant efficacy exceed

⁴⁸ In the empirical results, I do not present the coefficients from the VAR regressions. As noted previously, these coefficients are less useful as outputs metric for interpreting the VAR result than impulse-response functions. VAR coefficients are available from the author on request.

the appeal of political strategies, as well as after acts of Israeli counterterrorism that directly undermine the potential for political compromise. Demands for violence follow civilian, militant, and leader deaths prior to ODS, when expectations about the efficacy of violence are relatively high. Constituent demands for violence are less frequent in the post-ODS period and occur only following Israeli violence that directly undermines Palestinian confidence in political accommodation. For instance, because Fatah acts as the Palestinian political representative, Fatah militant deaths undermine political confidence and result in demands for retaliation more often than the deaths of Hamas militants. When demands for violence do occur, however, they are temporary, rarely lasting longer than four months, and fall short of the expectations of repression-radicalization or even rally arguments.


Political responses to civilian fatalities are larger than most responses to militant and leader fatalities before and after ODS, but result in demands for violence only in the pre-ODS period. As shown in Figure 5.5, a median shock of 30 Palestinian civilian deaths is associated with an immediate drop of 0.5 percentage points in Fatah-lead that implies a temporary hardening of Palestinian attitudes and demands for violence based on its efficacy.⁴⁹ As one UN observer notes, “ ‘You cannot expect anything but a radicalization and a feeling on the part of many that the path towards peace proved to them so far to be...a path to even greater subjugation and humiliation’ ” (Engel, *Washington Times* 2001). However, these demands for violence are temporary, offset in the third and fourth post-shock months by an increase in disaffection, over two

⁴⁹ In most cases, I use standard deviation shocks when presenting the IRF results. However, the range of Palestinian civilian fatalities is rather large, making the standard deviation shock less useful in interpreting a typical response to an attack on Palestinian civilians. In some cases, I use median shocks to provide substantively meaningful output metrics. See discussion in chapter 3 about interpreting IRFs for additional details. Appendix A12 shows the distribution of Palestinian fatalities by month.

percentage points following a median shock. Retrospective Projection anticipates this disaffection after civilian deaths and suggests that the response reflects Palestinian uncertainty about the optimal response to Israeli counterterrorism, the juxtaposition of “a willingness to aggravate the violence” with “deepening reluctance to engage in [violent tactics]” (Barr, *Christian Science Monitor* 2002).

After ODS, however, civilian deaths are associated with evidence of political moderation and an *increase* in Fatah-lead that rejects violence based on its apparent failure to achieve political goals. As shown in Figure 5.5, a median shock in Palestinian civilian deaths after ODS increases relative support for Fatah by two percentage points. Fatah-lead remains elevated through the fourth post-shock month, suggesting a more enduring response than observed in the pre-ODS period. Retrospective Projection explains this change as a reflection of weakening Palestinian confidence in armed resistance and some realignment in attitudes towards political accommodation.

Figure 5.5
Political Response to Palestinian Civilian Deaths⁵⁰
(Median Shock=30 Deaths)



⁵⁰ Disaffection measures Palestinians who report no political affiliation. In the tables, the dark gray shaded cells have statistical significance at the 95% level. The light gray shaded cells fall slightly short of, but close to, statistical significance. The outlined cells are also statistically significant at the 95% level, but in the opposite direction from the original, dark gray-shaded response. See Chapter 3 for a more complete discussion of interpreting of IRF graphs.


One Palestinian political analyst asserts in 2003 that “initial support for the Intifada [among Palestinians] has been eroded by the Israelis’ dogged... refusal to capitulate” (Barfi, *Washington Post* 2003). As Palestinians recognize that violence is unlikely to achieve political goals, they support Fatah based on the group’s political reputation.

Political responses to leader deaths are also consistent with Retrospective Projection. Because they simultaneously undermine Palestinian expectations about the efficacy of militant-based resistance and weaken Palestinian confidence that a political settlement can be achieved, political responses to targeted killings, particularly targeted killings of Hamas leaders, are fairly small and temporary. There is little indication of the severe escalation in constituent demands for violence predicted by the critics of targeted killings. Following the deaths of Hamas leaders, there is little evidence of either a strong demand for or strong rejection of violence before or after ODS. As shown in Figure 5.6, Hamas temporarily loses 0.5 percentage points of political support after targeted killings in the pre-ODS period and temporarily gains 0.4 percentage points of support following a targeted assassination post-ODS. While the post-ODS response implies some demand for additional violence, the reaction is smaller than the significant radicalization predicted by alternative arguments. Palestinian political analysts confirm that the threat targeted killings present to militant efficacy explains the muted radicalization. After al-Rantisi’s assassination, one source describes “‘panic’ and ‘serious distress’ among Hamas activists” and supporters who fear the effect of the attack on the group’s ability to execute operations (Matza, *Philadelphia Inquirer* 2004, citing *Ma’ariv* report, April 20).

Demands for armed retaliation are somewhat more likely after the targeted killings of Fatah leaders. Figure 5.6 illustrates that Fatah leader deaths are associated with

an increase in relative support for Hamas of 1.5 percentage points that lasts over the four-month response period. According to Retrospective Projection, the more significant demand for violence after Fatah leader deaths reflects the group’s more central political position. Because Fatah is the primary Palestinian political representative, attacks on its leaders present a more severe threat to the potential for a lasting political settlement and lead to more significant demands for Hamas’s more aggressive approach. Mourners at the funeral of one Fatah leader killed by a targeted strike, for instance, call the Palestinian prime minister, also a member of Fatah, “a cockroach” for the group’s inability to prevent Israeli strikes against its own leadership (Associated Press 2004). While the response to targeted killings of Fatah leaders is somewhat larger than that after Hamas leader deaths, it still falls short of the radicalization predicted by some alternative arguments.

Figure 5.6
Political Response to Palestinian Leader Deaths⁵¹



⁵¹ There are too few targeted killings of Fatah-affiliated leaders post-ODS for a test of this response.

Notably, first-hand accounts of the immediate response to targeted assassinations of political leaders report widespread radicalization and calls for military retaliation. In the wake of the assassination of Yassin, one observer reports, “a wave of revenge swept through Gaza and the West Bank. Residents near the mosque rubbed their hands in pieces of gravel mixed with Yassin's blood, a traditional sign of revenge... Hundreds of young Palestinians rushed to volunteer as suicide bombers” (Dowdney, *The Mirror* 2004). This immediate radicalization is not at odds with the more muted responses suggested by the IRFs since the reaction captured by the IRF occurs at the monthly level. However, the IRF results do suggest that the response is extremely short-lived and may exert limited pressure on the behavior of non-state groups.

Political responses to militant deaths incorporate Palestinian attitudes about the efficacy of militant violence, their confidence in political alternatives, and group reputation, and are consistent with Retrospective Projection despite some caveats. Palestinian constituents demand violence after Fatah and Hamas militant deaths in the pre-ODS period, when perceived military efficacy exceeds political optimism. As shown in Figure 5.7, demands for violence after Hamas militant deaths are most significant in the pre-ODS period, when a median shock of six Hamas militant deaths increases the group's relative support by up to two percentage points. The increase is concentrated in the first two post-shock months, but endures over the four-month response period. Hamas leader Yassin confirms the benefit that the group often derives from attacks on its militants noting that Israeli operations against Hamas militants “ ‘cannot end the resistance; on the contrary, they work towards making it more spontaneous, because the martyr has friends and students that can avenge him and continue the march’ ”

(*Palestinian Information Center* 2002, quoting al-Rantisi). After ODS, more pessimistic Palestinian expectations about the efficacy of armed resistance based on Israeli military supremacy contribute to the realization that “ ‘Israel cannot be defeated, now or at any time in the foreseeable future’ ” (Potter, *The Toronto Star* 2003). This belief constrains Palestinian constituent demands for violence after Hamas militant deaths post-ODS.


Because of Fatah’s more political orientation, Fatah militant fatalities present a greater threat to Palestinian political confidence than those of Hamas and are more likely to trigger constituent demands for violence as a result. As one analyst notes, Fatah militant fatalities exacerbate widespread dissatisfaction with the PA and contribute to the belief that the PA is “disintegrating and could collapse,” both reactions that “play into the hands of radical Islamic groups already competing with the Palestinian Authority for power” (Anderson and Moore, *Washington Post* 2004). Fatah militant deaths result in demands for violence before and after ODS, as shown in Figure 5.7, but the response is larger in the post-ODS period when evidence of the group’s political incompetence is more substantial. In the post-ODS period, a median shock of three Fatah militant fatalities is associated with a decrease in Fatah-lead of 1.3 percentage points over the first two post-shock months that demands violent responses as more effective than Fatah’s political alternative. Even as Palestinians recognize the failure of violence as a political tool, they continue to tolerate violence in many contexts because they lack appealing political alternatives.

Palestinian constituent demands for violence following Israeli counterterrorism are much less consistent or enduring than predicted by existing literature. Instead, demands for violence occur only where constituents expect a more aggressive armed

approach to advance Palestinian political goals and after threats that directly undermine confidence in political strategies. Demands for violence are most likely prior to 2002, but follow Fatah militant and Hamas leader deaths in the post-ODS period due to the negative political implications suggested by these attacks. Although observed changes in political support are small, recent political developments in the Palestinian Territories suggest that even small differences can have significant implications. A comparison of surveys of Palestinian political attitudes in 2000 with those in late 2004 shows only a small increase in support for Hamas in Gaza and for Fatah in the West Bank.⁵² However, these seemingly minor changes are sufficient to produce the very different political systems and outcomes that exist in Gaza and the West Bank today.

Figure 5.7

Political Response to Palestinian Militant Deaths



Palestinian Political Responses to Militant Deaths, Change in Fatah-lead						
Response to Fatah militant deaths (Median Shock=3 militant deaths)						
Response Month	Pre-ODS (2 lags)			Post-ODS (3 lags)		
	Response	95% CI		Response	95% CI	
0	-0.27	-0.37	-0.17	-0.17	-0.30	-0.05
1	-0.13	-0.29	0.03	-0.57	-0.83	-0.32
2	0.48	0.02	0.94	-0.54	-0.88	-0.20
3	0.58	0.05	1.11	0.11	-0.51	0.74
4	0.26	-0.21	0.74	0.38	-0.63	1.39

Response to Hamas militant deaths						
(Median Shock=6 militant deaths pre-ODS, 3 militant deaths post-ODS)						
Response Month	Pre-ODS (2 lags)			Post-ODS (3 lags)		
	Response	95% CI		Response	95% CI	
0	-0.35	-0.58	-0.12	-0.01	-0.08	0.05
1	-1.44	-1.99	-0.89	-0.11	-0.26	0.05
2	-1.23	-2.16	-0.30	-0.14	-0.33	0.04
3	-1.04	-2.12	0.04	-0.12	-0.33	0.08
4	-1.13	-2.27	0.01	-0.14	-0.41	0.13

When Does Israeli Counterterrorism Beget Palestinian Retaliation?

The timing and intensity of violent retaliation by Palestinian groups throughout the Second Intifada closely matches constituent demands.⁵³ Violent responses are more

⁵² Assessment based on JMCC, PCPSR polls.

⁵³ In conducting the VAR analyses in this section, I combine violence claimed by Fatah and AMB. Although AMB executed some attacks not condoned by Arafat and mainstream Fatah leaders, the group

likely where Palestinian constituents demand violent retaliation by increasing support for Hamas, specifically after most types of Israeli counterterrorism prior to 2002 and after counterterror attacks that directly undermine Palestinian optimism in political compromise. Violent retaliation by Hamas is also more extensive than that by Fatah, as the group responds to the demands of its harder line support base.


Both groups respond violently to civilian fatalities in the pre-ODS period, where there is a demand for violence, but neither group responds violently to civilian fatalities in the post-ODS period, where demands for violence do not occur. As shown in Figure 5.8, prior to ODS, a standard deviation increase in civilian deaths in any week (about 12 deaths) contributes to four additional Fatah-claimed fatalities through the first post-shock week and two additional Hamas-claimed deaths in the third post-shock week. There is no evidence of a violent response in the post-ODS period.

Statements by Fatah and Hamas leaders identify constituent preferences and demands as important drivers of and constraints on violence. In 2001, Fatah leader al-Barghouti describes that violence after civilian deaths “ ‘reflect[s] the Palestinian street's agitation and extreme anger at the continuing Israeli aggression’ ” (al-Barghouti, Interview with Nisrin Darwish, *Al-Mustaqbal* 2001). In 2004, Hamas leaders explain their decision to consider a more political approach by noting, “ ‘the Palestinian street is demanding that we participate in the political process’ ” and move away from a reliance on violent tactics (Ephron, *Boston Globe* 2004, quoting al-Amr). Neither signaling nor tit-for-tat arguments can explain the lack of violent responses in the post-ODS period, especially since the political objectives of Fatah and Hamas do not change significantly

derived resources and some level of immunity inside the Palestinian Territories a result of its association with Fatah. Furthermore, Palestinians tended to conflate the two when forming their political demands and expectations.

over the course of the conflict. Where they do occur, violent responses fall short of tit-for-tat and the level of aggression needed to signal a hard-line reputation. Constituent Service can explain the use of violence and restraint by Palestinian groups.

Figure 5.8
Violent Response to Palestinian Civilian Deaths⁵⁴




Violent responses to leader deaths are similarly driven by constituent demands. Although there is evidence of an immediate violent response after Fatah and Hamas leader assassinations, retaliation intended to address any short-term backlash, responses by both groups are limited in duration and smaller than expected by much conventional wisdom. Temporary, muted violent responses match the small political reactions noted previously. As shown in Figure 5.9, violent retaliation after leader deaths is larger in the pre-ODS period, when Palestinian confidence in the efficacy of armed resistance is somewhat higher. Each additional Fatah leader death contributes to an immediate increase of almost two Fatah-claimed deaths in the pre-ODS period. The same increase in Hamas leader fatalities is associated with four additional Hamas-claimed deaths in the first post-shock week prior to ODS and an immediate increase of three additional

⁵⁴ Fatah-claimed violence includes violence claimed by Fatah’s military wing, Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade.

fatalities in the post-ODS period. The use of violence after targeted killings is broadly consistent with signaling and tit-for-tat arguments, but statements by Hamas and Fatah leaders confirm the relevance of constituent demands to the decision to employ violence after targeted killings. Following the assassination of al-Rantisi in 2004, Hamas’s new political leader Mahmoud Zahar promises violent revenge to prove to Palestinians that Hamas is “ ‘committed to the policy of resistance and... cannot be swayed. Hamas cannot be defeated’ ” (Barzak, Associated Press 2004, quoting Zahar). At another point, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh similarly pledges violent revenge that would assuage the demands of Palestinians in the wake of a targeted killing, reminding them, “ ‘this blood will not be wasted...it is our fate in Hamas...to die as martyrs’ ” (Macleod, *Scotland on Sunday* 2004, quoting Haniyeh). Constituent Service may not be the only driver of violence after targeted killings, but these statements identify it as a major factor.

Figure 5.9
Violent Response to Palestinian Leader Deaths⁵⁵



Violent Responses (Claimed Fatalities) to 1 Leader Death						
Pre-ODS (1 death)						
Hamas to Hamas (4 lags)			Post-ODS (1 death) (2 lags)			
Response Week	Response	95% CI	Response	95% CI	Response	95% CI
0	-1.79	-4.06 0.48	2.95	1.10 4.80		
1	3.45	1.13 5.77	-0.36	-2.29 1.57		
2	1.35	-1.09 3.78	1.72	-0.21 3.65		
3	-3.92	-6.36 -1.48	0.20	-0.58 0.98		
4	-4.14	-7.22 -1.05	-0.34	-1.10 0.41		
Pre-ODS (1 death)						
Fatah to Fatah (4 lags)			Post-ODS (1 death) (2 lags)			
Response Week	Response	95% CI	Response	95% CI	Response	95% CI
0	1.28	0.15 2.41				
1	0.31	-1.75 2.37				
2	0.42	-1.95 2.79				
3	-0.89	-3.31 1.52				
4	-0.52	-2.89 1.85				


⁵⁵ There are too few Fatah leader deaths in the post-ODS period to calculate an IRF.

While the uses of violence after civilian and leader deaths are similar across groups, Hamas's violent responses to militant fatalities exceed those of Fatah, especially in the post-ODS period. This accords closely with the different political responses to each group's militant fatalities, described above, and with the different reputations and constituencies of the two groups. As shown in Figure 5.10, Hamas responds violently to the deaths of its militant members before and after ODS, addressing the demands of its harder-line constituents in each case. In both periods, Hamas responds to a standard deviation shock of five additional militant deaths with a one-time increase of one additional claimed fatality in the first post shock month. The pre-ODS response closely matches Palestinian demands, but the use of violence after Hamas militant deaths in the post-ODS period is more surprising, given the lack of radicalization reported by the VAR results. However, first-hand accounts of the response to militant fatalities suggest the continued existence of strong demands for violence among hard-liners after ODS that explain the group's violent responses in this period. Statements by the group's leaders confirm attention to the demands of its more extreme supporters after militant deaths. At one point Hamas leader Haniyeh promises " ' Hamas is loyal to the blood of its martyrs and will continue on the path of...resistance...' " (Barzak, Associated Press 2004). At another, al-Rantisi asserts that the group would " ' avenge the killing of its people' " with more violence (Beeston and Tait, *The Times* 2003).

In contrast, Fatah does not respond in any significant way to militant deaths in either period. Figure 5.10 shows a small, limited response in the pre-ODS period that amounts to less than one additional Fatah-claimed fatality following a standard deviation shock of two Fatah militant deaths. After ODS, there is no evidence of a violent response

by Fatah to militant fatalities. The lack of retaliation by Fatah for militant fatalities in the post-ODS period is consistent with Constituent Service and qualitative evidence of falling support for militant violence among Palestinian constituents generally and Fatah’s supporters in particular. Statements by Fatah’s political leaders confirm close attention to constituent demands in the decision to use restraint rather than violent retaliation after ODS. In 2004, Arafat advocates restraint that matches these preferences, “calling on Palestinians to refrain from violence” and promoting “ ‘a peaceful, wise large-scale uprising’ ” (McGreal, *The Guardian* 2004).

Figure 5.10
Violent Response to Palestinian Militant Deaths



Responses (claimed fatalities) to Militant Deaths						
		Pre-ODS (1 SD=4 deaths)			Post-ODS (1 SD = 4.8 deaths)	
Hamas to Hamas		(4 lags)			(2 lags)	
Response Week	Response	95% CI		Response	95% CI	
0	0.19	-0.58	0.95	0.87	0.26	1.49
1	0.68	-0.10	1.46	-0.08	-0.68	0.53
2	-0.08	-0.90	0.73	-0.14	-0.76	0.47
3	1.00	0.12	1.89	-0.18	-0.78	0.43
4	-0.87	-1.94	0.19	0.02	-0.26	0.30

		Pre-ODS (1 SD=2 deaths)			Post-ODS (1 SD = 2.3 deaths)	
Fatah to Fatah		(4 lags)			(2 lags)	
Response Week	Response	95% CI		Response	95% CI	
0	0.57	0.17	0.98	0.20	-0.21	0.61
1	0.29	-0.35	0.93	0.13	-0.27	0.53
2	-0.11	-0.82	0.61	-0.04	-0.44	0.36
3	-0.43	-1.13	0.28	-0.30	-0.71	0.10
4	-0.08	-0.75	0.58	-0.12	-0.32	0.09

Both qualitative evidence and the empirical results of the VAR analysis suggest significant support for the Constituent Service interpretation of Palestinian violence. The

use of violence closely follows constituent demands for violence, occurring prior to ODS when expected military efficacy is high and after attacks on Fatah militants and leaders that directly undermine political optimism. Violent responses by Hamas are more likely and larger than those employed by Fatah and appeal more directly to the group's hard-line constituents. Violent responses are unlikely when there is no evidence of demands for violence and once Palestinian constituents have begun to turn against violence. The lack of violent responses in the post-ODS period challenges tit-for-tat and signaling arguments, but is consistent with a Constituent Service interpretation and its focus on the constraints created by constituent demands. An alternative argument proposes that the decline in responsive violence after ODS reflects operational weakness (Frisch 2006). However, although both groups experience operational set-backs during ODS, the statements of Fatah and Hamas political leaders point directly to constituent demands as the motivation for their decision to limit violence. Furthermore, Palestinian groups continue to use violence after ODS, suggesting at least some continued operational strength. What changes most starkly after ODS is not the Palestinian *use* of violence, but the *use of systematic responsive retaliation* after Israeli counterterrorism. The results suggest that Israeli counterterrorism does not trigger an escalating cycle of violence, but it also does not finally deter armed attacks by Palestinians. Instead, the effect of Israeli counterterrorism depends on Palestinian attitudes.

What are the Political Implications of Responsive Palestinian Terrorism?

The final set of results offers insight into the actual political utility of violence over the course of the conflict by considering the effect of each group's use of violence

on its own support. Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service predict that the political responses to retaliatory Palestinian attacks are positive only when they match constituent demands and produce observable and desirable results. Political reactions to responsive violence should also be smaller than the political implications of precipitating Israeli counterterrorism, since Palestinian political attitudes already incorporate prospective expectations regarding each group's use of armed operations. The results confirm this prediction. In fact, the most notable result to emerge from the analysis of Palestinian political responses to Palestinian violence is the almost complete lack of a measurable response from Palestinian voters. Although there is some evidence that violence employed prior to ODS consolidates support for the perpetrator, political responses to Palestinian violence after ODS are small and insignificant.

Fatah receives a small boost in political support following its use of responsive violence in the pre-ODS period, but none after ODS when Palestinians turn more finally against the use of violence. Prior to ODS, Figure 5.11 shows some positive association between Fatah-claimed violence and political support for the group. Although the increase is temporary and falls short of statistical significance, a standard deviation shock in Fatah-claimed deaths is associated with an 0.8 percentage point increase in support for Fatah over the first two post-shock months, evidence that the group benefits from its use of violence in the conflict's initial period. There is no evidence of such a response to Fatah-claimed violence in the post-ODS period, once conflict fatigue becomes widespread and support for violence limited. Fatah's leaders recognize the increasingly negative implications of military operations on the group's political support and respond by reducing their direct use of violent responses. According to several of Abbas's


advisers, “the great mistake made then by Yasir Arafat, the Palestinian leader, was to try to out-Hamas Hamas. That was an impossible proposition for Fatah, given its official acceptance of a two-state solution with Israel” (Bennet, *New York Times* 2003).

Political responses to Hamas-claimed fatalities are more ambiguous and suggest limited evidence of a payoff to Hamas following its use of violence against Israeli targets. Prior to ODS, a standard deviation increase in Hamas-claimed deaths is associated with a lagged increase (following an initial decline) in support for the group of about 0.5 percentage points in the third and fourth post-shock months. This response is consistent with the assessment of observers, like the one who argues, “ ‘ Hamas members . . . are admired for standing up to Israeli soldiers’ ” in their defense of Palestinian constituents (Nessman, Associated Press 2003). However, the observed political gain is also much smaller than implied by outbidding arguments that credit violence for Hamas’s rapid rise in 2000 and 2001. Finally, consistent with the theoretical argument, post-ODS responses to Hamas-claimed fatalities are minimal. This lack of response is consistent with the conflict fatigue that characterizes political attitudes in the post-ODS period.

The results show that violence used by Fatah or Hamas rarely provides a significant political advantage for the perpetrating group. The similarity in political benefit achieved by Hamas and Fatah following the use of violence is surprising based on Hamas’s harder-line constituency, but confirms the prospective nature of Palestinian expectations and generally uncertain attitudes towards violence. Because each group’s use of violence is expected and because Palestinians often question the efficacy of violence as a political tool, violence has few political effects for either group. While there is little quantitative evidence that violence earns either group new supporters, qualitative

evidence suggests that violence does serve a competitive function that helps each group *maintain* its existing support base. The lack of strong political responses to violence claimed by Fatah and Hamas calls into question the value of violence as a recruiting tool and has hopeful implications for states facing a violent non-state threat. The results suggest that even when non-state groups perpetrate successful violent attacks, this does not lead automatically to a surge in support for the group or ensure the group's ultimate success.

Figure 5.11
Political Response to Palestinian-claimed Fatalities



Political Responses to Palestinian Violence						
Fatah-claimed, Fatah Support	Pre-ODS (2 lags)			Post-ODS (1 lag)		
	Response	95% CI		Response	95% CI	
Response Month						
0	0.14	-0.15	0.42	0.04	-0.46	0.54
1	0.37	-0.08	0.82	-0.04	-0.78	0.70
2	0.41	-0.10	0.92	0.10	-0.68	0.89
3	0.15	-0.30	0.59	0.07	-0.84	0.98
4	-0.05	-0.45	0.35	0.09	-0.96	1.14

Hamas-claimed, Hamas Support	Pre-ODS (2 lags)			Post-ODS (1 lag)		
	Response	95% CI		Response	95% CI	
Response Month						
0	-0.33	-0.48	-0.18	0.00	-0.34	0.33
1	-0.38	-0.59	-0.16	0.07	-0.33	0.48
2	-0.07	-0.29	0.16	0.04	-0.30	0.38
3	0.17	-0.03	0.36	0.04	-0.22	0.29
4	0.36	0.09	0.64	0.02	-0.16	0.21

Discussion

The results from the Palestinian case offer support for Retrospective Projection and the Constituent Service interpretation of violence. Palestinian constituents demand violence only when they expect armed resistance to achieve political goals and when Israeli violence undermines political optimism. Demands for violent retaliation increase support for Hamas following most Israeli violence in the pre-ODS period and after leader and Fatah militant deaths after ODS, due to their more significant political implications. Fatah and Hamas use violent attacks according to constituent demands because they are accountable to local supporters. Violent retaliation is more likely prior to ODS and is used more consistently by Hamas. Fatah and Hamas respond violently to civilian deaths before ODS, but neither reacts violently in the post-ODS period when Palestinians become increasingly disillusioned with a reliance on armed retaliation. Hamas's violent responses to militant and leader deaths are more frequent and larger than those of Fatah, as a result of its harder line constituency. However, although violence does appear to match demands, neither Fatah nor Hamas gains a significant amount of additional political support following acts of retaliatory violence. These results and their consistent support for the initial hypotheses are summarized in Table 5.3.

Table 5.3
Were the Hypotheses Supported?: *Palest. Territories*

Hypothesis	Result
H1a. Political responses to civilian deaths exceed those to militant fatalities.	Supported (with caveats). Political response to civilian deaths larger than response to militant deaths, but demand for violence more likely after militant deaths in many contexts.
H1b. Political responses to leader deaths are small and temporary.	Supported. Limited political responses to leader deaths, especially Hamas leaders.
H2a. Demands for violence that increase support for Hamas are more likely before ODS (expected military efficacy high, early in the conflict).	Supported (with caveats). Demand for violence is less likely after civilian deaths in post-ODS period, but follows militant deaths pre- and post-ODS. Limited response to Targeted Killings.
H2b. Demands for violence that increase support for Hamas are more likely after Fatah leader and militant deaths than those of Hamas.	Supported.
H3. Disaffection and fragmentation are most likely after civilian deaths.	Supported. Especially prior to ODS
H4a. Demands for violence that increase support for Hamas are encouraged by perceived intractability.	Supported. Comparison with less intractable Northern Ireland case.
H4b. Demands for violence that increase support for Hamas are encouraged by competition between Fatah and Hamas.	Supported. Comparison with more limited inter-group competition in Northern Ireland.
H5. Armed responses are most likely where there are demands for violence—prior to 2002 and after civilian deaths.	Supported (with caveats). Violent response to civilian deaths is larger than militants in pre-ODS period only. Demands for violence match use of violence.
H6. (states only)	NA
H7. Hamas is more likely to respond violently than Fatah, especially to militant deaths.	Supported. Hamas is more likely to respond violently and its responses tend to be larger, esp. after militant deaths.
H8. Palestinian terror attacks have weaker political implications than counterterror operations.	Supported.
H9. Violent responses prior to ODS have strongest positive political implications for perpetrating groups.	Supported (with caveats). Violent responses have positive political implications only prior to ODS.

A synthesis of the results from the Palestinian case and the Israeli example described in the preceding chapter identifies constituent expectations and demands as a primary mechanism of conflict escalation and de-escalation. On both the Israeli and Palestinian sides of the conflict, armed retaliation is encouraged by constituent demands for violence, but is limited and controlled when local publics turn against violence or demand political solutions. Demands for violence are based on constituent expectations about the relative benefits of a political or armed approach to the conflict. When Israelis or Palestinians expect military or militant violence to better advance their political goals, they demand violence, often causing conflict escalation. When they lose confidence in violence or prefer a more political approach, weaker demands for violent retaliation constrain the use of violence and encourage de-escalation. In this interpretation, counterterror policies that are able to shift the balance between perceived military efficacy and confidence in political alternatives can control violence and encourage political settlement by eliminating constituent demands for violence. In the Second

Intifada, successful Israeli counterterrorism reduces Palestinian confidence in the efficacy of armed resistance, erodes support for militant groups, and constrains violent retaliation by Fatah and Hamas. A similar set of reactions occurs on the Israeli side, where continued Palestinian terrorism reduces support for military counterterrorism among Israelis and places bounds on the use of force by Israeli political and military leaders. Simultaneous and parallel changes in Palestinian and Israeli constituent expectations and demands facilitate some de-escalation between 2003 and 2004.

However, even as Palestinians and Israelis lose confidence in the efficacy of violence as a political tool, the lack of robust political opportunities and past political failures prevent the strong constituent demands for political settlement necessary for a lasting or permanent de-escalation. This is especially true on the Palestinian side, where political alternatives are non-existent or unappealing. The political and violent reactions to targeted killings is a clear case where declining confidence in the efficacy of violence prevents new demands for militant retaliation, but the lack of real political opportunities precludes any real movement towards a final political resolution. Targeted killings and counterterror operations aimed at destroying non-state military capabilities are often effective in controlling Palestinian violence and reducing demands for retaliation, but these approaches do not appear to produce the lasting de-escalation or cessation of violence needed for a permanent settlement.

A more permanent de-escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, therefore, may require direct attention to local political dynamics and the creation of new political opportunities that build Palestinian confidence in political alternatives. For example, reform of the PA that is able to reduce corruption, improve internal security, and provide

governance and social services could support final de-escalation by addressing some of the grievances that drive Palestinian support for violence while also building confidence in the efficacy of political approaches. The resumption of direct negotiations contributes more directly to confidence in political alternatives by creating direct political engagement that raises optimism about the potential for a political compromise. Because political issues are so charged in the Israeli-Palestinian context, successful negotiations will require reframing and may be most effective if they begin with easy to solve issues where overlap in Israeli and Palestinian interests is more extensive. Direct negotiations that do not quickly produce some kind of progress may have the opposite effect, however, undermining political optimism in a more permanent way.

In addition, to placing constraints on the use of violence, the Israeli and Palestinian cases highlight two other important functions played by constituent expectations. First, the expectations and attitudes of Palestinian constituents affect the outcomes of Israeli counterterror policies. Israeli operations that occur before and after ODS have very different effects on demands for and the use of violence, depending on prevailing constituent expectations. Constituent attitudes and local political dynamics not only affect the types of violence that occur, but also the types of counterterror policy that are most effective. States facing non-state threats, therefore, must attend carefully to the expectations and demands of non-state supporters and choose counterterror policies that are tailored to the prevailing political and security context. Second, although a lasting de-escalation is never achieved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the convergence of Israeli and Palestinian expectations about the benefits of violence and the necessity of some political accommodation supports a temporary cessation of violence in 2004 and 2005.

Expectation convergence occurs because Palestinians and Israelis respond to similar changes in the political and security context and appears to be essential to achieving any sort of de-escalation in protracted conflict violence. Despite a clear decline in conflict violence after 2002, de-escalation is only temporary at the end of the Second Intifada due to the consistent failure of Israeli and Palestinian political leaders to institutionalize political engagement or employ political reforms that ensure continued confidence in political alternatives. The lack of robust political alternatives to violence, the inability of the PA to provide governance, and the continued exclusion of Hamas and other hard-liners from political processes remain significant obstacles to a final political resolution.

Chapter 6

Legislating Counterterrorism: The British Response to Northern Ireland's 'Troubles'

Introduction

Despite periodic attacks by the IRA on the British mainland, violence in Britain during Northern Ireland's 'Troubles' never approached the intensity of that experienced by Israelis during the Second Intifada. In fact, in most years, less than 10% of voters reported the Northern Ireland conflict as an important national challenge.⁵⁶ One historian describes, "these polls reflect the political reality of an offshore region, geographically and constitutionally set apart from the core nation since its inception..." (McSweeney 1996, 172). As a result of the conflict's very limited political importance, British voters are much less likely to demand violent retaliation after IRA attacks than are Israeli voters after Palestinian terrorism. The tractability of the conflict in Northern Ireland from the British perspective, the peripheral nature of its violence, and the bipartisan approach to the conflict taken by Labour and Conservative Party leaders further constrain both political responses to IRA violence and the use of violent retaliation by the British government.

Despite the lower likelihood of demands for violence by British voters after IRA attacks than observed in previous examples, when British constituents do respond to IRA terrorism, their responses are driven by the same considerations identified as decisive

⁵⁶ From Ipsos-MORI polls 1974-1998 asking British voters to identify the most significant national challenges.

during the Second Intifada: constituent expectations about military efficacy and confidence in political alternatives. Constituent demands for aggressive counterterrorism occur only when British voters expect this approach to more effectively advance security goals than political or policy-based counterterrorism. For example, IRA violence benefits the Conservative Party under Thatcher, when her more aggressive strategy appears to control the conflict in Northern Ireland, and under the Labour administrations in the 1970s, when violent attacks directly undermine British confidence in a more politically-oriented approach. As in the Israeli case, however, counterterror responses closely match constituent demands. Military-based counterterrorism is infrequent and rarely follows civilian fatalities. Instead, more popular policy-based counterterrorism that relies on legal reform, law enforcement, or legislation to prevent terrorism is more common, especially after civilian deaths and IRA attacks that directly undermine political confidence.⁵⁷ Only this more popular policy-based counterterrorism increases support for the ruling party.

The very limited size of political responses to IRA violence and the infrequent use of military-based counterterrorism is unexpected by tit-for-tat and signaling arguments that predict more frequent use of violence by British leaders to signal their unwillingness to compromise. However, the observed trends are aligned with Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service. Demands for aggressive counterterrorism occur where British voters expect armed responses to effectively advance their security interests, and the use of violence closely matches demands. This chapter applies Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service to the case of Britain during Northern Ireland's 'Troubles.' I use

⁵⁷ Policy-based counterterrorism includes legislation like the Prevention of Terrorism Act, revision in the approach towards Northern Ireland such as direct rule or police primacy, and the use of legal or law enforcement measures to control terrorism and prevent conflict escalation. I code these using chronologies of the conflict and include only events that fundamentally alter British counterterror strategy. A list of policy changes is included as Table 3.8.

qualitative case analysis to define the characteristics of the political and security context most likely to affect the attitudes of British voters, and empirically evaluate case-specific hypotheses.

Conflict Background

The conflict between the British, Northern Ireland's Catholic minority, and the region's Protestant majority extends back hundreds of years. While Catholic nationalists want to reunite the region with the Republic of Ireland, Protestants want continued ties to Great Britain and fear discrimination in a Catholic dominated Irish Republic. At the start of the 'Troubles,' in 1969, the Catholic population of Northern Ireland lived primarily in poor ghettos and faced both high unemployment and discrimination. The 'Troubles' began when Catholic civil rights marches in 1969 descended into sectarian riots that required the deployment of British troops to restore order. Although the 1969 deployment of British troops was initially intended to be temporary, the surge in violence forced a long-term commitment of British troops. The conflict involved three strands of violence: a constitutional conflict between British troops and Irish Republicans led by the IRA; a sectarian clash between Protestant Loyalists and Catholic Republicans; and vigilante violence within each sectarian community. Although the British involvement in the conflict was most extensive in the conflict's first months, sectarian violence and IRA attacks on British targets endured with varying intensity until the mid-1990s. The Good Friday Accords (GFA), signed in 1998 after an extended period of negotiations, created political and security institutions that supported the cessation of violence, disarmament, and some progress towards lasting political stability.

Although the British strategy evolved substantially over the course of the conflict, the bipartisan approach adopted by Labour and Conservative leaders limited the politicization of violence and ensured some policy continuity. The initial British strategy relied on counterinsurgency tactics that caused radicalization among Irish Catholics who “turned to the IRA as their protectors” (Kelly, Interview, *PBS Frontline* 1998). The backlash caused by the Bloody Sunday incident in 1972, in which British soldiers killed thirteen unarmed civilian protestors, underscored the dangers of a military-based counterterror strategy and encouraged a revision in British counterterror strategy. Starting with the imposition of direct rule in 1972, the short-lived Sunningdale Agreement in 1973, and the shift to Police Primacy in 1976, British counterterror strategy in Northern Ireland relied most heavily on political and law enforcement-based activities to control violence. Police Primacy, for example, shifted primary responsibility for counterterrorism to Northern Ireland’s indigenous police force and used advanced intelligence and special courts to infiltrate terrorist groups and eliminate their leaders, rather than relying on military operations.

The political and legislative aspects of the conflict became increasingly important in the 1980s and 1990s. Thatcher’s refusal to give concessions to hunger strikers in the early 1980s, the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985, and the media ban on Sinn Fein had significant ramifications for trends in violence and political attitudes in Northern Ireland.⁵⁸ For example, the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) in 1985, another attempt to create a political framework that would support a final settlement, strengthened the role

⁵⁸ The Hunger Strikes in 1980 and 1981 were the response of IRA to the loss of their ‘political prisoner’ status. The Hunger Strikes and the British response to them were well-publicized and controversial. Thatcher’s refusal to give into the protests was popular among British voters. The incident won the IRA and Sinn Fein new support from Catholics in Northern Ireland. See Bew and Gillesepie 1993.

of the Irish Republic in Northern Ireland's Affairs, but sparked a resurgence in Loyalist violence in the early 1990s. By the mid-1990s, however, the growing recognition by Catholics and Protestants that violence was unlikely to achieve political goals created the political opening needed to support a more sustained set of political negotiations, successful IRA and Loyalist ceasefires, and the Good Friday Accords in 1998.⁵⁹

Operationalizing the Argument: Britain

I use qualitative information on the 'Troubles' to apply Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service to the British example. The discussion in this section focuses on how key features of the domestic political and security context influence the attitudes and expectations of British constituents towards violence and political compromise and considers how these determinants influence the British counterterror strategy. The section concludes with several Britain-specific hypotheses.


Severity and Intractability of the Conflict

According to Retrospective Projection, the limited, peripheral, and tractable nature of the security threat presented by IRA terrorism to British voters limits the effect of IRA attacks on British political attitudes towards and demands for violence. Although many British voters recognize the sectarian issues at the core of the 'Troubles,' the conflict has low political importance on the British mainland. As noted above, in most years less than 10% of British voters report the Northern Ireland conflict as an important national challenge (Figure 6.1), and the Northern Ireland issue rarely factors into pre-

⁵⁹ For more complete history of the 'Troubles' see Adams 2003; Farren and Mulvihill 2000; Faye, Morrissey, and Smyth 1999; Bew and Gillesepie 1993.

election debates or vote decisions. The conflict is a tractable one from the British perspective because a majority of British voters perceive of a simple and appealing political solution: allowing Northern Ireland to determine its own fate. As shown in Figure 6.2, almost from the conflict's beginning, at least 50% of British voters prefer a withdrawal of British troops from Northern Ireland to continued deployment (Hayes and McAllister 1996; British National Election Studies 1969-1979; British Social Attitudes Studies 1983-1998). Because, in this context, violent responses appear unnecessary and political solutions more appealing, constituent demands for military counterterrorism after IRA attacks are unlikely. A MORI poll from 1984 confirms this relationship, showing that a plurality of respondents are less willing to keep troops deployed in Northern Ireland following IRA attacks on British targets, both in Britain (37%) and in Northern Ireland (42%) (*The Economist* 1984).


Figure 6.1
Is Northern Ireland an Important Political Issue in Britain?



Source: Ipsos-MORI

Percent British voters reporting Northern Ireland as a national concern is significantly smaller than percent reporting unemployment and inflation (typically two of the top concerns) in most years.


Figure 6.2
Support for Withdrawal from Northern Ireland



Source: British Election Study, British Social Attitudes Surveys
Well over 50% of British voters prefer withdrawal to continued deployment in Northern Ireland

The limited intensity and largely peripheral nature of the violent threat presented by the conflict in Northern Ireland to most British voters further limits its effect on constituent expectations and political responses to violence. Figure 6.3 confirms that British civilian fatalities and military deaths are minimal compared to civilian casualties in Northern Ireland and fall far short of Israeli military and civilian deaths during the Second Intifada. According to Retrospective Projection, small and peripheral threats are unlikely to trigger significant changes in political attitudes.


Figure 6.3
Fatalities by Type: Civilian and Military Deaths during the ‘Troubles’



Source: Ipsos-MORI
British civilian fatalities are far lower than military deaths, fatalities inside Northern Ireland.

Despite the generally small size of political responses by British voters after IRA violence, qualitative case information reveals significant variation in political implications according to fatality type. Successful IRA operations on the British mainland present the most direct and severe threat to British security and so have the most significant political implications. As one political analyst notes “it could be argued that the bombers’ campaign [in Britain] over the years has forced Ulster into the minds of those on the mainland” (Brown, *Guardian* 1984). Figure 6.4 offers additional support for the relative political significance of IRA attacks on the mainland. Each spike in the percentage of British voters reporting Northern Ireland as a significant political concern corresponds to a conflict-related event that challenges the security of British voters. The direct threat implied by IRA attacks on the mainland increases the likelihood of political responses by British voters, but does not guarantee demands for violent retaliation. Instead, qualitative information suggests that British voters demand aggressive counterterrorism infrequently and only when they expect military-based responses to achieve political and security goals. Political responses to British civilian deaths are most likely to express uncertainty about the appropriate response. As one British MP argues during a 1974 debate “we all recognise that there is no foolproof and certain way of preventing these maniacal killings which have taken place” (Howell, HC Debate, November 8, 1974, vol. 881, cc1393-8). According to Retrospective Projection, this type of uncertainty increases the potential for disaffection and preferences for withdrawal following British civilian deaths.

Figure 6.4
When is Northern Ireland a Significant Political Issue?



Source: Ipsos-MORI

Attention to NI conflict rises at when conflict 'spills' onto the mainland.

Examples of Correspondence

- October 1974:** Guilford bombs in Surrey England kill 5.
- April 1979:** Airey Neave assassinated March 31, 1979.
- April 1980:** End to Special Category Prisoner status announced March 1980.
- September 1983:** IRA prisoners escape from Maze prison.
- January 1984-April 1984:** Harrods' bombing in London, December 17, 1983.
- October 1984-November 1984:** Attack on Conservative Party Convention in Brighton Oct. 12, 1984.
- March 1988:** SAS assassination of 3 IRA militants in Gibraltar Spain, March 8, 1988.
- August-September:** Ballygawley bombing kills 8 British soldiers.
- September 1989:** Deal bombing kills 10 members of Royal Marines Band.

Fatalities among British military personnel in Northern Ireland have more limited political implications because they present a peripheral threat and even an expected cost of the deployment itself. In fact, even IRA commanders recognize that “ ‘Top of any agenda was how to keep the bombing away from England. A long long way after that came the lives of British soldiers...’ ” (Holland, *Observer* 1977). British military fatalities retain political relevance where they affect constituent expectations about military efficacy, but imply a more narrow, tactical threat than that posed by civilian deaths. Debates in the House of Commons after military deaths make this distinction clear, directly blaming military leaders and focusing on tactical changes that would improve the

operational security of British forces (HC Debate, “Northern Ireland,” December 18, 1973, vol. 866, cc1124-8). However, the political response to military deaths is still driven by constituent beliefs about the benefits of a military-based or political approach to the Northern Ireland conflict. According to Retrospective Projection, responses to military fatalities are most likely under Labour governments. Military deaths undermine confidence in Labour’s more accommodating approach and incentivize some demand for a more aggressive military response. Military deaths have smaller effects on support for the Conservative party due to the party’s more aggressive counterterror reputation.

Deaths of Northern Ireland civilians have almost no effect on British expectations. IRA commanders and British political elites recognize that even “... the deaths of British soldiers have a much greater impact on British public, and hence political, opinion than the killing of....” civilians and local security personnel in Northern Ireland (McKittrick, *Independent* 1989). Political and counterterror responses to civilian deaths in Northern Ireland should be minimal.

Applied to the British case, Retrospective Projection suggests that the limited severity of the security threat and the low political importance of the conflict itself reduce the effect of conflict violence on British expectations and limit the likelihood and size of political responses following IRA violence. Different types of IRA attacks have distinct effects on constituent expectations and, according to Retrospective Projection, also result in very different political responses to violence. Attacks on British civilians present the most immediate and severe challenge to British security and result in the largest political response by the British electorate, but trigger constituent demands for military-based counterterrorism only when British voters expect aggressive (and sometimes military-

based tactics) to more effectively advance security and political interests than political or policy-based alternatives.⁶⁰ Because qualitative case information suggests that British voters rarely consider violence the more effective policy approach, demands for violence should be limited and infrequent in the British case. Political responses to military deaths are smaller and should result in constituent demands for additional military counterterrorism only under governments with weak security reputations. The political response to Northern Ireland fatalities should be small and insignificant. Fatality type determines the size of political responses to violence and shapes the direction of these responses, but perceived military efficacy and political optimism play an even more decisive role in when demands for military counterterrorism are most likely.

Expected Military Efficacy and Political Optimism

British constituent beliefs about the efficacy of political and military approaches to the conflict in Northern Ireland are based on past outcomes of violent and policy-based counterterrorism that inform expectations about the future. In general, British voters expect military responses to successfully resolve the conflict in Northern Ireland and prefer political approaches as both more effective and less costly. As a result, they rarely demand aggressive military-based counterterrorism. British voters expect military responses to be unsuccessful in solving the conflict in Northern Ireland based on experiences during the first years of the ‘Troubles.’ Events such as the Falls Church raid in 1970, Bloody Sunday in 1972, and the poor implementation of internment drive home to British voters that a military-based strategy is unlikely to bring a solution. As one

⁶⁰ Policy-based counterterrorism refers to legislative, legal, and law enforcement activities used to control terrorist violence. See chapter 3 for more details.

British voter argues “there must be a political solution...the more Catholics killed by the security forces, the more determined they are to get the British out” (*Guardian* 1972a). Military-based tactics prove equally unsuccessful in stopping violence during the 1980s and even the deployment of additional troops in the 1990s fail to stem the Loyalist-driven escalation.

In contrast, the apparent success of legislative reforms, law enforcement tactics, and the use of detentions, arrests, and prosecutions in reducing IRA terrorism encourages confidence among British voters in the efficacy of policy-based counterterrorism. The Prevention of Terrorism Act (1974), for instance, successfully and publicly prevents IRA attacks inside Britain and consolidates British support for legislative responses to IRA violence. Similarly, a reformed legal process that facilitates the detention and conviction of suspected IRA members advances confidence in political, law enforcement approaches to counterterrorism by showing that authorities are “in control” of the security situation, able to track down terrorists and prevent future attacks (Lutz et al. 2002, 236).⁶¹ One study of British attitudes during the 1970s notes, “public opinion is...supportive of the convictions and the all out effort of the authorities to charge and convict the bombers at all costs (or at least to convict someone)” because convictions offer observable proof that legal approaches to counterterrorism do protect constituent security (Lutz et al. 2002, 236). Strong confidence in the ability of policy-based approaches to provide security and prevent terrorism creates pressure by British constituents for a political resolution that constrains constituent demands for military counterterrorism.

⁶¹ The Guildford Four, Birmingham Six, and Macguire Seven were groups of men wrongfully convicted of IRA attacks in the 1970s. See Lutz et al. (2002) for more details.

Although the relative efficacy of political strategies constrain support for armed retaliation throughout the ‘Troubles,’ expectations about the efficacy of military-based counterterrorism as a political tool still vary over the course of the conflict with the distinct reputations held by each British administration and changes in the political and security context. Expectations regarding military efficacy are especially low in the early 1970s, when incidents like Bloody Sunday and the Falls Church Raid show that despite its greater strength the British military is unprepared to deal with Northern Ireland’s unconventional threat. The first IRA attacks in Britain during the early 1970s only reaffirm to British voters the failure of an aggressive military approach and increase constituent demands for a British withdrawal.

Continued IRA violence under the Labour administrations of Wilson and Callaghan in the later 1970s triggers some reversal in British attitudes and disillusionment with what appears to be a too accommodating approach. As one observer explains in the first eight months of Wilson’s 1974 administration, “more than a hundred lives have been lost. A Northern Ireland Government has been brought down by strikes...and the political future of the province has never been more clouded by hatred...” (Brown, *Guardian* 1974). The continued ability of the IRA to perpetrate violent attacks under the Labour administrations does not eliminate British preferences for a non-violent approach to counterterrorism, but does encourages some British voters to call for a more assertive response. The election of Thatcher, known as the ‘iron lady,’ in 1979 is not solely a response to the enduring conflict in Northern Ireland, but the uncertain security situation may have played some role in the Thatcher’s appeal (Cunningham 1991).

British expectations for military efficacy are somewhat higher under Thatcher because her more aggressive stance on Northern Ireland and more liberal use of military force is more successful in controlling and reducing conflict violence than the tactics employed by her predecessors. For example, commentators describe Thatcher's willingness "to pack the province with troops and hold it down by brute force" when necessary, an assessment that refers most appropriately to the uncompromising character of Thatcher's counterterror strategy (Deming et al., *Newsweek* 1979). Even policy-based responses adopted during the Thatcher administration take a more aggressive and offensive orientation towards the conflict. The collapse of the 1981 Hunger Strikes is also deemed a "major victory over terrorism" that is credited to Thatcher's resolve and "courage" in the face of the IRA challenge (Macleod, *Christian Science Monitor* 1980). Despite generally low British tolerance for the use of force in Northern Ireland, Thatcher's hard-line strategy is popular because it produces results, confirming the importance of efficacy in shaping constituent attitudes towards the use of violence. According to Retrospective Projection, the apparent efficacy of Thatcher's hard-line approach increases the likelihood of political reactions to IRA violence during this period that directly benefit the Conservative Party.

Qualitative case information suggests that British political attitudes towards violent and policy-based counterterrorism shift once again under Major. However, even in the conflict's final decade, political responses to IRA terrorism are based on expectations about military efficacy and political alternatives. The reaction of British voters to IRA terrorism in the 1990s reflects disillusionment with military- and policy-based counterterrorism, following decades of continuing violence. According to one

political analyst, by the 1990s “the Conservatives and Labour are under heavy pressure to switch from what many British politicians (and...a majority of British voters) have come to regard as the dead-end policy of trying to cope with Northern Ireland violence by using police and military containment” (MacLeod, *Christian Science Monitor* 1992). The lack of a clear Northern Ireland policy during Major’s administration increases uncertainty and the potential for political fragmentation following IRA violence in this period.

According to Retrospective Projection, low expectations about the efficacy of military-based counterterrorism and greater confidence in political solutions limits constituent demands for armed retaliation after IRA attacks, while increasing support for policy-based responses. Variation in the expected efficacy of military and political strategies over the course of conflict reflects the evolution of constituent expectations following changes in the external security and political context. Violence leads to some limited support for aggressive counterterrorism when armed approaches appear more effective, under Thatcher for example, or when political alternatives have clearly failed, as under the Labour administrations. However, for a majority of the conflict, British constituents respond to IRA attacks with demands for policy-based counterterrorism. In the 1990s, conflict fatigue and Major’s own ambiguous stance leads to uncertain political responses and fragmentation. The dynamic nature of perceived military efficacy and political optimism in Britain implies that the reputations, competition, and strategic position of leading parties also affect the attitudes and expectations of British voters and, as a result, influence the timing and form of political responses to violence.

Political Institutions and Competition


British political institutions and competition between the leading Conservative and Labour Parties limit both political responses to violence and the demands for aggressive counterterrorism during the ‘Troubles.’ Most importantly, the intentional bipartisan approach to the Northern Ireland conflict prevents the politicization of counterterror policy and spreads accountability for security policy failures across both parties. One political commentator notes “the politicians have....clung to a bipartisanship which has helped to defuse the Irish issue in British politics” (Jenkins, *The Guardian* 1975). Because they expect similar counterterror strategies from Labour and Conservative Party leaders, British voters have limited incentive to respond politically to IRA terrorism. Bipartisan consensus also reduces clarity of responsibility for security failures, increasing the likelihood of disaffection following new violence.⁶²

However, despite the limiting effect of the bipartisan consensus on political responses, small inter-party differences in security reputation do affect British constituent expectations and their political attitudes towards violence. Cross-party similarities “[do] not mean that party perceptions are identical or that the degree of opposition support is constant...” or that “differences do not exist between the parties concerning both the use of emergency legislation and ad hoc security measures” (Cunningham 1991, 247). Of the two parties, the Conservative Party takes a consistently harder-line on Northern Ireland that includes a willingness to employ violent counterterrorism and sympathy towards Ulster’s unionist population. The Labour party, in contrast, takes a more sympathetic position towards Irish nationalists and earns a reputation for being “soft and flabby on

⁶² As noted previously, ‘clarity of responsibility’ refers to the ease with which constituents can allocate responsibility for policy successes and failures. Bipartisanship reduces clarity of responsibility by diffusing accountability across both major parties.

terrorism” (Deans and Rose, *Daily Mail* 1992). Figure 6.5 shows that British voters understand and incorporate inter-party differences in their political attitudes, consistently identifying the Conservative Party as the ‘best party’ to handle terrorism in Northern Ireland. Constituent expectations about security policy outcomes are also associated with political affiliation. In 1983, 56% of Conservative Party supporters feel that British troops should remain deployed in Northern Ireland, while only 32% of Labour supporters agree. Even small differences in reputation, therefore, can affect the types of constituents a given party attracts, the pressures it faces to respond violently or to employ restraint, and the size and direction of political responses to violence. In the British case, the Conservative Party seems primed to capitalize on any increase in British support for aggressive counterterrorism in Northern Ireland. As noted above, however, not only party reputation, but also the Prime Minister’s reputation may influence political responses to violence through its effect on the expected benefits of a military strategy.

Figure 6.5
Best Party to Handle Northern Ireland



Source: Ipsos-MORI

Conservative party is considered ‘best’ on Northern Ireland.

The intentionally bipartisan approach to the Northern Ireland conflict limits political responses to violence in the British example through its effect on constituent

expectations, but also increases the potential for political fragmentation by reducing clarity of responsibility. Small differences in party reputation incentivize only small political responses following IRA terrorism. Retrospective Projection predicts smaller British responses to violence than anticipated by much existing literature because these alternatives do not fully consider the dampening effect of bipartisanship.

Counterterrorism as Constituent Service

Constituent Service interpretations of violent retaliation predict that the form and timing of counterterror responses consistently match constituent demands and preferences. Applied to the British example, Constituent Service expects limited use of military-based counterterrorism and a heavier reliance on policy-based responses, including legislative changes and law enforcement and legal tactics. Qualitative evidence supports the popularity of policy-based responses and the relevance of the Constituent Service rationale in explaining trends in British counterterrorism. For example, public opinion data from the 1970s shows that “public opinion [is] supportive of the passage of the Prevention of Terrorism Act in the emergency session of the House of Commons” and approves of the use of extraordinary legal procedures to try and convict suspected IRA terrorists (Lutz et al. 2002, 236). Similarly, a 1981 survey finds that almost 90% of British voters support Thatcher’s refusal to make concessions to the Hunger Strikers, and in the 1990s more than 50% support Major’s decision to include Sinn Fein in political negotiations (ICM Survey by *Guardian* 1993; MORI Survey sponsored by *New Society* 1981). Military-based counterterrorism is less popular among British voters who have little confidence in military efficacy. In debates, British members of Parliament

consistently express “concern over the effects on British public opinion of the sight of young soldiers...being transported home in coffins... [and] concern over the image presented of heavily armed British troops patrolling the streets” (O’Malley 1997, 104). The transition to police primacy in 1976 reacts to these preferences, transferring counterterror responsibility to Northern Ireland’s police and reducing British military involvement.

Applied to the British example, Constituent Service arguments predict small counterterror reactions that rarely include military operations. Policy-based responses, because of their popularity, are more likely than military activities following IRA violence, particularly after British civilian fatalities, and are the only type of counterterror response able to consolidate support for the implementing government. Military responses are most likely when British constituents express some demand or tolerance for an aggressive strategy, although tactical necessity may also drive armed retaliation. The limited size of responses to violence deviates from the predictions of tit-for-tat and signaling arguments, but reflect the political dynamics in Britain during the ‘Troubles.’

*Propositions to Hypotheses*⁶³

The discussion above applies Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service to the British case. It describes how British beliefs about the nature of the security threat and expectations for political and military solutions affect political responses to violence and the likelihood of military-based and political counterterrorism. The discussion facilitates the operational translation of the theoretical propositions into hypotheses specific to the Israeli case that can be evaluated empirically. These hypotheses, summarized below and

⁶³ As in previous cases, the hypotheses are tailored explicitly to the British example.

in Table 6.1 and 6.2, suggest that constituent demands for violence emerge from the local political and security context and the use of violence is constituent-driven and dynamic.

When does IRA violence beget demands for an aggressive response?

H1. Political responses to violence are more likely after British civilian fatalities than military deaths (and responses to NI civilians are smallest/least likely).

H2. Demands for aggressive counterterrorism that benefit the Conservative Party are most likely under Thatcher (higher military efficacy) and under Labour governments (violence threatens political optimism).

H3. Disaffection and political alienation are most likely after civilian deaths.

H4a. Conflict tractability (from British perspective) limits political responses to violence.

H4b. Bipartisan consensus limits political responses to violence.⁶⁴

When does IRA violence beget a British counterterror response?⁶⁵

H5. Counterterror responses are more likely after civilian than military deaths.

H6. Policy-based counterterror responses are more likely than military-based responses, especially after civilian deaths.

What are the political implications of responsive counterterrorism?

H8. Counterterror responses have weaker political implications than IRA terrorism.

H9. Policy-based counterterror responses may increase support for the perpetrator, but military-based responses have the opposite effect.

⁶⁴ H4a and H4b most effectively evaluated with cross-case comparisons.

⁶⁵ There is no British analog to H7, which applies only to non-state actors.

Table 6.1
Demands for & the Use of Violence: What Matters? Britain
What encourages demands for and the use of retaliatory violence?

Determinant	Level in Britain	Demands for and the use of violence
Severity of Threat	Low. British civilian fatalities present most direct threat.	↓
Intractability	Low. British voters are willing to accept Northern Ireland's independence.	↓
Expected Military Efficacy	Low. Rarely achieves political goals, low confidence in their efficacy based on initial results. Highest under Thatcher.	↓
Political Optimism	Moderate. British voters prefer and support political settlement, but recognize challenges inherent in political compromise.	↑
Political Competition	Low. Labour and Conservative party pursue intentionally bipartisan approach that limits politicization of violence.	↓
Political Institutions	Prime Minister reputation plays a larger role than party in British attitudes towards violence.	↔
Duration	Support for all involvement falls, over time, conflict fatigue reduces all political responses to violence.	↓

Table 6.2
Expectations of Competing Explanations: Britain
How do expectations of competing interpretations differ?

Following terrorist attack	Britain
Retrospective Projection & Constituent Service	<i>Demands for and use of aggressive CT</i> 1970-1974 (Heath): ↓ 1974-1979 (Labour): ↓ <i>Violence implies failed political approach</i> 1980s(Thatcher): ↑ <i>Higher military efficacy</i> 1990s (Major): ↓
Rally	<i>Support for incumbent</i> ↑
Repression → Radicalization	<i>Demands for violence and use of violence</i> ↑
Tit-for-Tat	<i>Demands for violence and use of violence</i> ↑
Signaling	<i>Use of violence</i> ↑

Empirical Results

This section presents the results of the VAR analysis, incorporating qualitative information where appropriate. A detailed description of the data and the method were included in a previous chapter (chapter three). To summarize, the data combines conflict-related fatalities in Britain and Northern Ireland from 1969-1998, military counterterror responses by the British government (fatalities claimed), policy-based counterterror responses coded using conflict chronologies, and British vote intention, including relative support for the Conservative Party (Conservative-lead). I also use a measure of political fragmentation that includes unaffiliated voters and those supporting parties other than Conservative and Labour.⁶⁶ I interpret any increase in Conservative-lead that follows IRA terrorism as a demand for the Conservative Party's more aggressive approach to the Northern Ireland conflict. However, increasing support for the Conservative Party does not suggest the same sort of demand for violence that is implied by an increase in Likud-lead in the Israeli example. Instead, an increase in Conservative-lead reveals a hardening of British attitudes, an acceptance of British involvement in Northern Ireland, and a preference for a more aggressive approach.

Identifying Structural Breaks

According to the theoretical argument, events that alter constituent expectations about the efficacy of armed resistance, the severity of the external threat, or the opportunities for political settlement may lead to structural breaks in the political and counterterror responses to terrorist violence. The discussion above identifies several


⁶⁶ Although this designation aggregates several different types of voters, it captures the generalized political alienation and rejection of the status quo suggested by the preceding discussion.


potential structural breaks in the Northern Ireland example, including administration changes (Heath to Wilson, February 1974; Wilson to Callaghan, April 1976; Callaghan to Thatcher, May 1979; and Thatcher to Major, November 1990) and key policy revisions (direct rule, March 1972; police primacy, March 1976; the Anglo-Irish agreement, 1985). Retrospective Projection recommends both sets of points as potential structural breaks because of their direct effect on constituent expectations. Administration changes affect constituent expectations about the efficacy of military-based and political approaches to the conflict because each British leader has a very different security reputation. Thatcher's more effective use of military counterterrorism increases British tolerance for armed operations, but the failure of the Labour party's more accommodating approach reduces political optimism in the late 1970s. Policy changes also have the potential to alter constituent expectations about the benefits of violence and the potential for peace. Police primacy, for instance, may increase optimism about a political solution, because it replaces British military involvement with a local, police-based approach to security.

As in previous cases, I test these points for empirical evidence of a structural break using a recursive forecasting strategy that corresponds to a series of Chow forecast-tests. The results of these tests are presented as graphs of actual values, forecasted values, and confidence intervals in Figure 6.6. The forecasting line is created by specifying a VAR with the minimum number of periods needed to produce reasonable estimates, generating a forecast for the next period, and then repeating this process, adding one additional period at a time, across and beyond the break point. Evidence of a break occurs when the actual value falls outside the confidence intervals of the forecast line for

Figure 6.6
Forecasting Structural Breaks: Britain

Clearest evidence of structural breaks occurs at Heath/Wilson, Callaghan/Thatcher, Thatcher/Major breaks (shaded in light gray).





several periods.⁶⁷ At the Heath/Wilson, Callaghan/Thatcher, and Thatcher/Major administration, there is evidence of a structural break. The values for Conservative-lead appear to fall outside or along the boundary of the confidence intervals for the VAR forecasts at and around these election points, though evidence of the structural break is often weak when trends in violence are considered. At the policy revisions and the Wilson/Callaghan break, there is little evidence of a structural break, since values for Conservative-lead and British fatalities fall within forecast confidence intervals. Based on

⁶⁷ Importantly, a structural break may occur even if actual values move back inside forecast confidence intervals after some number of additional periods. Because the forecast process incorporates additional data at each step, the forecast line should right itself, even after a break, and its confidence interval will encompass the actual values.

these results, I specify and report four VAR models, Heath (1970-February 1974), Wilson/Callaghan (March 1974-April 1979), Thatcher (May 1979-November 1990), and Major (November 1990-August 1994 (IRA start of IRA ceasefire)). I include controls for the pre-direct rule period, policy primacy, the Anglo-Irish agreement, and the Falkland's War. I use these controls to be consistent with previous work, but they have few ramifications on the IRF results.

*Overview*⁶⁸

The empirical results are consistent with Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service. Because of the limited severity and low political importance of the threat presented by IRA terrorism, political responses to all forms of IRA terrorism are small. Demands for military-based counterterrorism are also unlikely because British voters do not expect aggressive strategies to better protect their security and political interests. Political responses to civilian deaths are slightly more likely than those following military deaths because they present a more direct and immediate threat to the security of British voters. British voters demand the Conservative Party's more aggressive approach after civilian deaths under Thatcher, when a hard-line approach appears temporarily more effective at controlling violence, and during the Labour administrations in the 1970s, when IRA violence reveals the clear failure of an accommodating approach and makes a harder-line approach to counterterrorism appear more necessary. British counterterrorism

⁶⁸ I do not present traditional tables of coefficients, standard errors, or p-values in the discussion of the empirical results in this chapter or subsequent ones. As noted previously, the coefficient estimates produced by the VAR are less meaningful as output metrics from the VAR than impulse-response functions. Furthermore, because VAR models include multiple equations and multiple lags of each covariate, tables of raw coefficient estimates would be long and difficult to interpret. Instead, I present graphs and tables of impulse-response functions to empirically evaluate the hypotheses.

follows constituent demands in timing and form. Policy-based counterterrorism is most likely where there are significant political responses to IRA violence and demands for a more aggressive approach to Northern Ireland. Policy-based activities are consistently more likely than military-based counterterrorism, particularly after civilian deaths. Military responses sometimes follow military deaths and the deaths of Northern Ireland civilians, but seem to be guided by tactical necessity in these instances. Only more popular policy-based counterterrorism consolidates political support for the perpetrating party. Neither political nor violent responses to IRA attacks, therefore, are automatic, but instead reflect careful calculations about efficacy by British voters and responsive counterterrorism by the British government.

When Does IRA Violence Beget Demands for an Aggressive Response?

As expected by Retrospective Projection, the relative tractability of the conflict, the peripheral threat, and the bipartisan consensus limit political responses to acts of IRA terrorism. More significant political responses follow British civilian than military deaths due to the greater political importance of attacks on the British mainland. Figures 6.7-6.9 show that even the small political responses observed after British civilian deaths are larger and more frequent than responses to either military or Northern Ireland civilian fatalities. Even when political responses to IRA attacks do occur, constituent demands for military-based counterterrorism are unlikely. British political responses to IRA violence only support more aggressive counterterrorism when the expected efficacy of military retaliation is relatively high or when IRA violence directly challenges confidence in political alternatives. For example, British civilian deaths are associated with a small


increase in support for the Conservative Party under Thatcher, when constituents expect military strategies to be effective based on their observable ability to contain and reduce conflict violence.⁶⁹ Figure 6.7 shows that a shock of two British civilian deaths (a median shock) is associated with an increase in Conservative-lead of 2.5 percentage points over the first two post-shock months, suggesting a strong preference for the Conservative Party's aggressive approach against the IRA at this point. Although the response falls slightly short of statistical significance, it is still a sizeable one and is supported by qualitative case information. Following the 1983 Harrods' Department store bombing, one analyst notes "a rising demand, in the wake of the outrage at Harrods, for greater social control to combat terrorism" (MacLeod, *Christian Science Monitor* 1983).

Political responses that benefit the Conservative Party and demand a more aggressive counterterror strategy are also likely after British civilian and military deaths under the Labour administrations in the 1970s. Because of Labour Party's more accommodating approach to the Northern Ireland conflict, IRA violence that occurs in this period has an especially negative effect on British political optimism and even results in a "backlash about Labour's complacency...lack of attention to Northern Ireland" (*Guardian* 1970). This response simultaneously weakens confidence in Labour's primarily political approach and increases the perceived efficacy of the Conservative Party's more aggressive reaction. During this period, a shock of two British civilian deaths is associated with a 1.5 percentage point increase in political fragmentation that suggests disillusionment with status quo responses, especially those of the incumbent Labour party. Although the response falls just short of statistical significance, this

⁶⁹ Two British civilian deaths is an appropriate and meaningful shock size. The mean value for months with British civilian deaths is 2.8, while the median is 2 civilian deaths. The distribution of British fatalities by month is illustrated in Appendix A12.

fragmentation benefits the Conservative Party indirectly by undermining confidence in more accommodating political alternatives. Fragmentation is encouraged, in this instance, by the low clarity associated with civilian deaths and British uncertainty about the optimal counterterror response. The response to two additional military deaths during this same period, a 1.4 percentage point increase in Conservative-lead in the second post shock-month, more clearly demands the Conservative Party's aggressive counterterror response.⁷⁰ As shown in Figure 6.8, Conservative-lead moves back towards, but never reaches, its equilibrium level over the four post-shock months.


Figure 6.7
Political Response to British Civilian Deaths



*Graphs include only significant responses.

⁷⁰ Once again, the choice of shock size uses the median value of 2 British Army deaths. The distribution of British fatalities by month is illustrated in Appendix A12.

Figure 6.8
Political Response to British Military Deaths




*Graphs include only significant responses.

In all other periods, political responses to British military and civilian deaths are small or highly uncertain. This is especially true under the Major government, where the IRFs are too uncertain and the confidence interval too wide to be meaningful. This uncertainty appears to result from disillusionment with all forms of counterterrorism, the low level of violence, widespread conflict fatigue, and the Major's lack of a consistent Northern Ireland policy able to guide constituent attitudes.

Political responses to Northern Ireland civilian deaths are also small and inconsistent due to the very peripheral nature of the threat such attacks pose to British constituents. The only evidence of political responses following civilian deaths that occur in Northern Ireland is concentrated in the 1970s. As shown in Figure 6.9, Northern Ireland civilian deaths lead to a small, temporary loss of support for the ruling party under Heath and Labour governments. Retrospective Projection explains this response as the British reaction to the failure of British policy to control conflict violence.

Figure 6.9
Political Response to Northern Ireland Civilian Deaths



Political Response to Northern Ireland Civilian Deaths			
Heath, 1SD= 9 Civ. Deaths			
(4 lags)		Change in Con-lead	
Response Month	Response	95% CI	
0	-0.61	-1.00	-0.22
1	0.01	-0.38	0.41
2	0.08	-0.38	0.54
3	0.17	-0.33	0.68
4	0.14	-0.45	0.73
Labour, 1 SD=7 Civ. Deaths			
(2 lags)		Change in Con-lead	
Response Month	Response	95% CI	
0	0.89	0.09	1.68
1	0.49	-0.52	1.51
2	-0.14	-1.27	0.99
3	0.13	-1.09	1.35
4	0.51	-0.65	1.66
Thatcher, 1 SD= 2 Civ. Deaths			
(1 lag)		Change in Con-lead	
Response Month	Response	95% CI	
0	0.34	-0.29	0.96
1	0.56	-0.27	1.39
2	0.40	-0.28	1.08
3	0.31	-0.24	0.85
4	0.22	-0.23	0.67
Major, 1 SD= 4 Civ. Deaths			
(1 lag)		Change in Con-lead	
Response Month	Response	95% CI	
0	0.37	-0.56	1.30
1	0.31	-0.90	1.51
2	0.25	-0.96	1.45
3	0.21	-0.87	1.28
4	0.16	-0.78	1.11

* Graphs include only significant responses

The size, direction, and timing of British political responses to IRA violence against civilians and military personnel reflect the expectations and attitudes of British voters towards policy-based and military counterterrorism. The limited severity and low political importance of IRA terrorism and the bipartisan approach adopted by British political parties limit political responses to violence, while the consistent failure of military-based counterterrorism constrains constituent demands for aggressive approaches to the conflict. Political responses that do occur reflect constituent expectations about the efficacy of violence in a limited political and security context based on the specific nature and severity of the threat, the reputation of relevant political

actors, and past military and political successes and failures. The limited political response and even more infrequent demands for violence suggested by the VAR results diverge from the more extensive political reaction to IRA terrorism expected by existing literature, but are consistent with Retrospective Projection because it explicitly incorporates the dampening effect of British expectations and attitudes towards violence.

When Does IRA Violence Beget a British Counterterror Response?

British counterterror responses closely follow constituent preferences and demands. In general, small political responses to IRA terrorism incentivize only small counterterror reactions that almost never include the use of military-based counterterrorism. The most significant counterterror responses occur after IRA attacks that provoke a political reaction among British voters, under Thatcher and the Labour administrations, and include policy-based counterterrorism, including legislative changes, law enforcement-based activities, or significant policy revisions that are popular among British voters. This heavy reliance on policy-based counterterrorism reflects close attention by British policymakers to the demands and preferences of their constituents. Where it is used, military-based counterterrorism appears driven by tactical considerations following military and Northern Ireland civilian deaths.

Policy-based responses are largest and most likely where IRA violence has strong effects on political attitudes, particularly after civilian fatalities under Thatcher and during the Labour administrations. Under Thatcher's administration, a shock of five British civilian deaths in any week (amounting to one large IRA attack) results in a policy response in the first two post-shock weeks. The broadcasting ban applied to Sinn Fein


and other parties and groups associated with violence implemented in 1988 is an example of a policy response to escalation in violence under Thatcher. As they debated the media ban on Sinn Fein, Conservative and Labour MPs reference existing political pressure from constituents to make legislative and policy changes that address the exploitation of the media by paramilitary organizations (Hattersley, HC Deb, Broadcasting and Terrorism, 19 October 1988 vol. 138 cc893-903).⁷¹

Policy responses are also likely after civilian and military deaths under the Labour administrations, another period where IRA violence takes on political importance. During this period, a policy response occurs in the first-post shock month following an increase of 10 additional British civilian deaths in any month (Figure 6.10). The first Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) in 1974 immediately follows IRA attacks on British civilians and is a good example of a policy response to civilian deaths in this period. Constituent Service is used as a rationale for policy-based counterterrorism throughout the 1970s. One MP argues “the British public will not have much confidence in or respect for a House of Commons which is not prepared to grant the authorities powers” sufficient to fight terrorism (Beith, HC Debate, Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Bill, HC Deb 28 November 1974 vol. 882 cc634-752, November 28, 1974). Policy responses are also likely after British military deaths during the Labour administrations because, as noted previously, military fatalities attract additional political attention during this period. As shown in Figure 6.11, six British military deaths are required for a policy response during the Labour administrations. The extension of the Prevention of Terrorism Act from Britain to Northern Ireland at the end of 1974 following significant IRA violence

⁷¹ Although weekly data in the British example contains many zeros and is somewhat unreliable as a result, the IRFs offer at least some evidence that policy responses follow British civilian deaths during this period.


against British soldiers is one example of a policy response taken to protect British military deployed in Northern Ireland.

Figure 6.10
Counterterror Response to British Civilian Deaths



*Graph show only significant responses.

Figure 6.11
Counterterror Response to British Military Deaths



* Graphs include only significant responses

In addition to policy- and military-based counterterrorism that responds directly to constituent demands, there is also evidence of counterterror responses that occur where the political reactions to IRA violence are generally small or insignificant.

Although these counterterrorism responses appear contrary to the Constituent Service argument, case information suggests that these responses react to the demands of specific constituent segments that retain political importance even if they do not affect electoral outcomes. For example, there is evidence that an increase of 10 British civilian deaths also triggers a policy-based response under Heath. The imposition of direct rule in 1972 is one concrete example of a policy-based response to civilian deaths in this period. There is also evidence of a policy-based response to military and civilian fatalities under Major. Because political responses to both types of fatalities under Major's administration are highly uncertain, the apparent use of policy responses in these periods may be intended to address widespread disillusionment and dissatisfaction with Major's approach to the Northern Ireland conflict.


While policy-based counterterrorism follows IRA violence that triggers a British political response, military-based counterterrorism appears to be guided by tactical and operational considerations. Military-based counterterrorism responses never follow civilian deaths, but are used after military fatalities and some attacks on Northern Ireland civilians primarily during Conservative administrations and most extensively in the 1970s. The largest response to British military deaths occurs under Heath when an increase of two British military deaths contributes to an additional British army-claimed fatality over the first three post-shock months. The response is both small and temporary, however. British army-claimed violence falls below the equilibrium in the fourth post-shock month. Figure 6.11 shows a similar military-based response following British army deaths under Thatcher, where six British army fatalities lead to one additional military-

claimed death in the contemporaneous month of the shock.⁷² Qualitative case information confirms the more frequent use of military counterterrorism in these two periods and the importance of tactical considerations in explaining British tolerance for the violence itself. For example, one observer reports that under Heath “British soldiers [are] directly threatened by disturbances in which persons [attack] them with stones, bricks, and petrol bombs....The soldiers respond to these attacks using their weapons at the next opportunity” (White and Falkenberg-White 1995, 344-345). Importantly, these military-based responses are small in size, likely due to the very limited tolerance of the British public for violence.

Military responses to Northern Ireland civilian deaths similarly occur under Heath and Thatcher, Conservative incumbents with harder-line approaches to the conflict, and are driven primarily by tactical considerations. As shown in Figure 6.12, military responses to Northern Ireland civilian deaths under Heath address observed incumbent punishment and are consistent with the military-based approach to the conflict employed during the early 1970s. A shock of nine civilian deaths result in 1.4 additional British-claimed deaths in the month of the shock. Under Thatcher, a shock of two Northern Ireland civilian deaths increases British-claimed violence by one fatality. This response is consistent with Thatcher’s hard-line approach and greater tolerance for her effective military counterterrorism.

⁷² Although this response is very small, given the limited use of lethal force by British troops in Northern Ireland after the 1970s, any increase in British violence is worth noting.

Figure 6.12
Political Response to Northern Ireland Civilian Deaths



CT Response to Northern Ireland Civilian Deaths						
Heath, 1SD= 9 Civ. Deaths						
(4 lags)		British Army Response		Policy Response		
Response Month	Response	95% CI	Response	95% CI	Response	95% CI
0	1.42	1.00	1.84	0.06	0.01	0.12
1	-0.28	-0.80	0.24	-0.01	-0.07	0.05
2	0.36	-0.31	1.02	0.01	-0.06	0.08
3	0.29	-0.43	1.01	0.01	-0.05	0.08
4	-0.11	-0.84	0.62	0.04	-0.04	0.11
Labour, 1 SD=7 Civ. Deaths						
(2 lags)		British Army Response		Policy Response		
Response Month	Response	95% CI	Response	95% CI	Response	95% CI
0	0.15	-0.09	0.39	-0.12	-0.25	0.01
1	0.04	-0.19	0.27	-0.08	-0.22	0.05
2	0.01	-0.21	0.24	0.31	0.16	0.45
3	0.06	-0.11	0.23	0.06	-0.07	0.19
4	0.03	-0.11	0.16	0.00	-0.11	0.12
Thatcher, 1 SD= 2 Civ. Deaths						
(1 lag)		British Army Response		Policy Response		
Response Month	Response	95% CI	Response	95% CI	Response	95% CI
0	0.30	0.11	0.50	0.01	-0.06	0.07
1	0.09	-0.12	0.29	0.00	-0.06	0.07
2	-0.01	-0.06	0.04	0.00	-0.02	0.01
3	0.00	-0.02	0.02	0.00	-0.01	0.00
4	0.00	-0.02	0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.00
Major, 1 SD= 4 Civ. Deaths						
(1 lag)		British Army Response		Policy Response		
Response Month	Response	95% CI	Response	95% CI	Response	95% CI
0	0.02	-0.10	0.14	0.09	-0.01	0.18
1	0.10	-0.01	0.22	-0.02	-0.12	0.08
2	-0.01	-0.06	0.04	0.00	-0.04	0.03
3	0.00	-0.02	0.02	0.00	-0.01	0.01
4	0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.00

*Graphs show only significant responses.

Counterterror responses in the British case are consistent with Constituent Service arguments. Preferred among British voters, policy-based counterterrorism is more likely than military-based responses, especially after civilian deaths and IRA violence that triggers substantial political responses. Policy-based counterterrorism follows civilian deaths under Labour and Thatcher, and military deaths under Labour and Major. Military responses are driven by tactical considerations after military and Northern Ireland civilian deaths under Heath and Thatcher. The small size and limited likelihood of violent and political responses to IRA terrorism match the small political responses reported previously, but diverge from tit-for-tat arguments and even challenge signaling interpretations that predict more consistent, aggressive responses to signal resolve and commitment. However, in the British example, policy-based counterterrorism and military and political restraint are the preferred counterterror approaches because they address constituent demands and serve an internal political function.

What are the Political Implications of Responsive Counterterrorism?

Political trends following policy- and military-based counterterror responses support Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service. More domestically popular, policy-based counterterrorism is more likely to increase relative support for the perpetrating party, especially under Heath and Thatcher, while military counterterrorism has ambiguous and even negative political implications in all administrations. As shown in Figure 6.13, the positive response to policy-based counterterrorism is most sizeable and statistically significant under Heath, where each policy response is associated with a sustained increase in Conservative-lead that is largest in the fourth post-shock month at over two percentage points. The response returns to equilibrium within eight months of the additional policy change, however. Under Thatcher, the increase in Conservative-lead is similarly large, two additional percentage points in the second post-shock month, but still temporary. Anecdotal evidence confirms the popularity of policy responses under Thatcher. As one British MP notes “there is a fairly widespread feeling in Britain that... wants action on Northern Ireland, a political solution...” (Downie, *Washington Post* 1981). Policy-based responses do not result in political gains under Labour or Major, however. Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service suggest that low political optimism and the failure of policy-based responses to control violence during these two administrations explain the lack of political response to policy-based counterterrorism. This observation underscores the importance of expectations and outcome to the political dynamics of protracted conflicts.


There is little evidence of an increase in support for the incumbent party following military responses under any administration. In fact, although most political

responses to military counterterrorism fall short of statistical significance, the IRF does move in a negative direction, suggesting a loss of support for the incumbent following military-based counterterrorism. Political punishment for the unpopular use of military-based counterterrorism is largest under Heath, where a standard deviation shock of five British-claimed deaths results in a loss of over one percentage point in support for the Conservative party over the third and fourth months. The large negative response reflects dissatisfaction with the heavily military, but unsuccessful, approach to counterterrorism in Northern Ireland during the early 1970s. Following a surge in British military activity in the province, one commentator notes “militarily this [‘get tough’] policy might be understandable following the killing of the three unarmed, off-duty sergeants in a Belfast flat. Politically, it is perilous....” (Meyers, *Observer* 1973). The political response to military counterterrorism under Thatcher also trends in the negative direction, but falls short of statistical significance. Qualitative case information confirms discomfort with Thatcher’s military approach, despite its comparative efficacy. For example, although many Britons support the assassination of several IRA militants in Gibraltar in 1988, an editorial in the *Guardian* expresses the sentiments of others by asking “How can the rule of law be squared with an Army unit (the SAS), working as an anti-terrorist force, which has been highly trained for preemptive, swift and aggressive action?” (Pallister and Norton-Taylor, *Guardian* 1988).

Political responses to counterterror activities by the British government confirm the popularity of policy-based counterterrorism, especially compared to military-based responses. British voters are not ignorant about Northern Ireland, but reward policy responses that match their demands, especially when these operations also achieve

desired outcomes. The responses are not, however, supportive of rally or signaling arguments, both of which expect policy and military counterterrorism to increase support for the incumbent leader. Retrospective Projection predicts and explains this drop in political support as a reflection of constituent preferences, expectations, and attitudes.

Figure 6.13
Political Response to Counterterror Activities



* Graph includes only significant responses

Discussion

Small political and counterterror responses to IRA terrorism observed in the British example are consistent with Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service. British voters respond infrequently to IRA violence because it presents a peripheral threat of minimal severity and are unlikely to demand aggressive counterterrorism because they are pessimistic about its efficacy as a political tool. Political responses express preferences for the aggressive counterterror strategy advocated by the Conservative Party only when they expect this approach to effectively advance their security objectives, including under Thatcher when military efficacy appears comparatively high and during the Labour administrations, when a more accommodating strategy visibly fails. Political responses in other periods are small and insignificant. Counterterror responses closely

follow constituent demands. More popular, policy-based counterterrorism is used where political responses to violence are most substantial, after civilian deaths under Thatcher and during the Labour administration, but also following civilian deaths at other points in the conflict. Military-based responses never occur after civilian deaths, but follow military fatalities and the deaths of Northern Ireland civilians according to tactical and operational concerns under Conservative administrations. Policy-based counterterrorism is the only form of counterterrorism used after civilian fatalities and the only form of counterterrorism that consolidates support for the incumbent administration. There is little overlap between these results, summarized in Table 6.3, and the expectations of existing literature. Political responses to IRA terrorism result in rallies to the incumbent only following civilian deaths under Thatcher and suggest a hardening of British attitudes only after military fatalities during the Labour administrations. The timing of neither military nor political counterterrorism follows tit-for-tat patterns, and policy-responses, not violence, serve as the most important signals of British resolve.

Table 6.3
Were the Hypotheses Supported?: *Britain*

Hypothesis	Result
H1. Political responses to violence are more likely after British civilian fatalities than military deaths (responses to NI civilians are smallest/least likely).	Supported. Political response largest after British civilian deaths.
H2. Demands for aggressive counterterrorism that benefit the Conservative Party are most likely under Thatcher (higher military efficacy) and under Labour governments (violence threatens political accommodation).	Supported. Demand for aggressive response after civilian deaths under Thatcher, military and civilian deaths under Labour.
H3. Disaffection and political alienation are most likely after civilian deaths.	Supported. Particularly under Labour administrations.
H4a. Conflict tractability (from British perspective) limits political responses to violence.	Supported. Comparison with Israeli example where intractability increases support for military CT.
H4b. Bipartisan consensus limits political responses to violence.	Supported. Comparison with more extensive political competition that drives support for violence in Israel.
H5. Counterterror responses are more likely after civilian than military deaths.	Supported (with caveats). Responses more likely after civilian deaths, but they are policy-based.
H6. Policy-based counterterror responses are more likely than military-based responses, especially after civilian deaths.	Supported. Policy responses most likely where IRA terrorism causes political response, esp. after civilian deaths.
H7. (non-state only)	NA.
H8. Counterterror responses have weaker political implications than IRA terrorism.	Supported.
H9. Policy-based counterterror responses may increase support for the perpetrator, but military-based responses have the opposite effect.	Supported. Only policy responses show any evidence of positive political implications.

The political and violent dynamics observed in the British example are also distinct from those that prevail in the Israeli case. Although demands for violence and

violent counterterrorism do not always follow Palestinian terrorism, political reactions to violence and retaliation are far more likely in Israel than in Britain, particularly prior to 2002. These differences can be explained by the distinct constituent expectations and local political dynamics that characterize each conflict. Larger political responses to violence and more frequent constituent demands for violence in the Israeli example reflect the intractability of the conflict and the more intense and existential threat presented by Palestinian terrorism to Israeli security. While intractability and severity make violence seem necessary in Israel, the peripheral, tractable nature of the threat constrains political responses in the British example. Furthermore, intense competition over the security policy between Israeli parties encourages political responses and constituent demands for violence in the Israeli case that are intentionally dampened by British bipartisanship. Finally, evidence that military-based counterterrorism does work in the Israeli case reinforces support and demands for violence, while the clear failure of military-based responses in Northern Ireland weakens support and demands for violence in Britain.

In both cases, however, constituent demands for violence, political settlement, and restraint reflect their expectations about the relative efficacy of potential approaches to the conflict, expectations that are based on past outcomes and prevailing local political dynamics. British constituents are unlikely to demand military-based responses because they rarely expect military violence in Northern Ireland to advance their security goals. As a result, expectations place a constraint on the use of violence and prevent an escalation in British military involvement in Northern Ireland. Also in both cases, constituent demands and preferences guide the form, timing, and intensity of

counterterrorism. More popular and observable responses follow more significant political demands, and restraint is most likely when constituents do not respond or react with pressure for a political settlement. In both cases, escalation and de-escalation are driven from the bottom-up as the state responds to constituent demands.

Although the political and violent dynamics of the British case differ from conflicts where the violent threat is more severe or intractable, the case still offers several insights into the types of conflict dynamics and policy approaches most likely to de-escalate violence in extended conflicts. First, the bipartisan approach to the Northern Ireland conflict adopted by the Labour and Conservative parties plays a significant role in preventing the politicization of the conflict and controlling constituent demands for and the use of more aggressive counterterror retaliation. Because British constituents expect similar policy approaches to the Northern Ireland conflict from both parties, they have little incentive to respond politically following IRA attacks, even where they express strong dissatisfaction with continued military deployment. The lack of political responses or strong constituent demands for violence prevent the manipulation of counterterror policy for political gain and control the use of military counterterrorism, facilitating the de-escalation of the conflict and British involvement over the 1980s and 1990s.

The bipartisan approach does not eliminate debate over counterterror strategy or ensure the passage of all proposed counterterror legislation. In fact, there is significant disagreement and lively debate between the British political leaders within the broad confines of the bipartisan commitment (Dixon 1995). However, bipartisanship does remove political competition as a driver of violent retaliation and conflict escalation. The ability of bipartisanship to limit the politicization of the conflict and demands for

violence in the British example serves as a recommendation to policymakers involved in similar protracted conflicts. Bipartisanship may be an effective way to limit internal pressures that can drive conflict escalation, both in terms of demands for violence and the use of violence. Informal bipartisan cooperation may be achieved through explicit commitments by party leaders to a single stance on the conflict and agreements to keep politics out of counterterror policy. Formal bipartisanship requires some institutional constraints or conventions, including the formation of cross-party policy-making committees charged with crafting and implementing counterterror policies.

The British example also suggests the power of a counterterror strategy based on legislation, law enforcement, and legal processes. Police tactics, such as house raids and checkpoints, extensive intelligence networks, legislation aimed to disrupt terrorist financing and movement, and legal processes that allow British courts to prosecute and convict suspected terrorists, successfully control IRA violence within Northern Ireland and in Britain itself. Legal and law enforcement approaches have several clear advantages. First, because it relies less heavily on military force, law enforcement-based counterterrorism causes less severe backlash than more aggressive tactics. Second, law enforcement approaches criminalize and de-sensationalize terrorism, removing some of its emotive value and often weakening beliefs among the non-state public that violence is a legitimate political tool. Finally, law enforcement approaches can simultaneously influence the confidence of non-state constituents in political alternatives and reduce the perceived efficacy of militant groups, by committing the state actor to a rule-based approach and eroding their capabilities of non-state groups. Law enforcement tactics appear to be a powerful tool available to state actors involved in protracted terror-

counterterror conflicts.

To develop and employ this type of approach, however, states must build an active, well-resourced, and well-trained police force that is able to deal with terrorist threats and a court system able to handle the unique challenges of prosecuting terrorists. The ability to arrest and quickly prosecute those involved in terror attacks may be especially important to the efficacy of a law enforcement approach that can deter future terrorist plots and convinces the non-state public of the futility of their armed resistance. Successful arrests and convictions also serve a domestic function because they prove to state constituents that a legal, law enforcement approach to counterterrorism can effectively protect constituent interests. The importance of clear, open, and fair legal processes and institutions to an effective counterterror strategy is directly relevant to the United States. Legal reforms that address the unique challenges associated with prosecuting terrorists, but eliminate the ambiguity and secrecy that bring calls of misconduct, could improve the United States' ability to respond to and deter terror attacks by external and homegrown organizations.

Although constituent demands appear to shape the British counterterror approach throughout the 'Troubles', each British administration during the 'Troubles' ignores strong British preferences for withdrawal of British troops from Northern Ireland and suffers no political punishment for this decision. This appears to suggest that the British government is neither responsive nor accountable to its local supporters, a direct violation of the Constituent Service argument. Retrospective Projection points to the conflict's peripheral violence and low political importance to British voters to explain the ability of British leaders to retain this unpopular stance without political costs, but offers less

insight into the question of why consecutive British administrations chose to remain entangled in Northern Ireland despite the extensive political risks. Existing scholarship on the Northern Ireland conflict suggests two possibilities. First, British leaders may maintain their commitment to Northern Ireland out of fear that a British pull-out will lead to a devastating civil war that will only further de-stabilize the region and potentially have negative domestic political ramifications inside of Britain. Second, British leaders may remain involved in Northern Ireland out of a sense of duty to the region's Protestant constituents (Farren and Mulvihill 2000). From this perspective, continued involvement in Northern Ireland serves as a form of Constituent Service, specifically targeted at Protestant voters in Northern Ireland and their allies in Britain. This is especially relevant to the policy decision of Conservative Party leaders whose British constituents are more supportive of the deployment than the British public as a whole.

The ability of a small, but politically important constituent segment to sway the political agenda and keep the British army involved in a conflict that acts as a deadweight on resources is significant because it suggests the power of hard-liners. Hard-line and recalcitrant constituents can prevent conflict de-escalation, making successful settlement contingent on hard-liner buy-in. The failure to win buy-in from hard-line Palestinian and Israeli groups undermines attempts to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and is a major obstacle to a final political settlement in Northern Ireland until the Good Friday Accords. In fact, the Good Friday Agreement appears to endure because it does win the support of relevant constituencies, including key stakeholders in each sectarian community.

Chapter 7

Violence as Politics: Political Competition and Sectarian Violence during the ‘Troubles’

Introduction

“The high death rate [in Northern Ireland during the ‘Troubles’] was an expression of political instability,” one historian describes. “The IRA killed because it saw a real chance of destroying the Stormont state; the Protestants killed because they saw a real threat of a united Ireland” (Bruce 1992b, 79). However, despite its significant political importance and frequently high severity, ‘Troubles’-related violence in Northern Ireland has few observable electoral implications and only sometimes takes on the stereotypical tit-for-tat pattern often used to describe it. As in previous examples, demands for violence during the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland are most likely when constituents expect militant-based strategies to effectively advance political and security goals, and the use of violence follows constituent demands. On the Catholic side, Catholic civilian deaths provoke strong constituent demands for violent retaliation in the 1970s, but these demands become increasingly less likely over the course of the conflict, following military disappointments and the emergence of new political opportunities. Among Protestants, weak political leadership in the 1970s and 1990s drives support for militant retaliation following sectarian attacks, but the failure of these violent approaches to achieve political objectives weakens support for violence in the 1980s. Constituent demands for violence do increase support for paramilitary groups, but the most consistent

electoral response to paramilitary violence is one of disaffection or abstention. The use of violence by paramilitary groups follows constituent demands. It is most consistent and largest in periods when support for violence is high and falls as political opportunities become more robust and appealing. Limited constituent demands for and infrequent responsive paramilitary violence are aligned with the predictions of Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service, but deviate from much existing literature and conventional wisdom which expect violence to consistently benefit hard-line parties and result in violent retaliation.

This chapter applies Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service to the case of Northern Ireland during the ‘Troubles.’ I use qualitative case analysis to define the characteristics of the political and security context most likely to affect constituent attitudes and derive and evaluate hypotheses about the timing of radicalization and violence in the Northern Ireland case.

Conflict Background⁷³

The previous chapter discussed the events that led to the outbreak and endurance of the ‘Troubles’, but mentioned the sectarian conflict only peripherally. However, the sectarian conflict between Catholics who wanted a unified Ireland and Protestants who preferred integration into Britain posed a more intractable and significant threat to Northern Ireland’s constituents throughout the conflict (Faye, Morrissey, and Smyth 1999). Sectarian violence was most intense in the 1970s and 1990s (Figure 7.1). Although Loyalist and Republican groups argued that their violence was targeted at


⁷³ For a more complete history of the Troubles in Northern Ireland see Faye, Morrissey, and Smyth 1999; Cunningham 1991; Bew and Gillespie 1999.

known militant group members and was necessary to fill the gap left by weak security forces, most violence was indiscriminate. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) represented Catholic interests, and was most popular in the 1970s, when the external threat was severe and alternative political options few. The IRA lost support in the mid-1980s when its political wing, Sinn Fein began contesting elections and achieved electoral gains against the more established Social Democratic and Labour Party. Paramilitary groups on the Protestant side, the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) acted primarily to prevent changes in the political status quo, but were less organized or effective than their Republican counterparts and commanded the support of a very limited segment of the Protestant population. Inter- and intra-sectarian competition extended into the political realm. On the Catholic side, the moderate Social Democratic Liberal Party competed with the more militant Sinn Fein. Among Protestants, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) competed for primacy. The Alliance party offered a non-sectarian alternative.

As noted previously, efforts to reach a lasting political settlement occurred in each decade of the conflict, but were undermined by Loyalist hardliners and Catholic extremists. In 1973, the Sunningdale agreement attempted to establish a power-sharing executive, but collapsed under Loyalist opposition. The Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) signed in 1985 involved the Republic of Ireland in Northern Ireland's affairs and established more substantial cooperation between Britain and Ireland on security affairs. Security cooperation did contribute to more effective counterterrorism and the prevention of several IRA attacks, but the agreement did not make significant progress towards a political settlement and triggered a resurgence in Loyalist (and Republican) violence. In

the 1990s, more proactive British efforts to reach a lasting political settlement resulted in ceasefires signed in 1994, political negotiations that involved Sinn Fein and other militant-affiliated parties, and the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.

Figure 7.1
Total Fatalities in Northern Ireland’s ‘Troubles’, 1969-1998



Total fatalities are highest in the 1970s. Civilian fatalities consistently exceed fatalities of combatants, regardless of affiliation. Catholic fatalities are higher than Protestant deaths in the 1970s and 1990s, but Protestant deaths are slightly greater in the 1980s. Army deaths exceed Republican and Loyalist militants 1970-1975.

Operationalizing the Argument: Northern Ireland

In this section, I use qualitative information on the ‘Troubles’ to apply Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service to the Northern Ireland example. This discussion focuses on how key features of the domestic political and security context influence the attitudes and expectations of Protestant and Catholic constituents towards violence and political compromise and considers how these determinants influence paramilitary violence and electoral outcomes.

Severity and Intractability of the Conflict

The intensity, intractability, and indiscriminate nature of the sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland increase the likelihood of political responses to violence and the potential for constituent demands for violence because they shape expectations for future

violence and foster the belief that political strategies are unlikely to protect constituent interests. The sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland appears intractable because there are few outcomes deemed acceptable by both sectarian communities. As one source describes “the main stumbling block to a wider settlement between nationalists and unionists is at the level of constitutional principle. The British and Unionist position is that there can be no change in the constitutional position of Northern Ireland without the consent of the majority. The nationalist view is that respect must be given to the right of the Irish people to self-determination” (Kinahan and Lennon, *Irish Times* 1993). The perceived intractability of the conflict in Northern Ireland increases constituent demands for violence by making armed strategies appear necessary and justified and political compromise difficult and dangerous. Bivariate cross-tabulations from a 1978 survey show that support for paramilitary groups and their violence is slightly higher among those who perceive the conflict as intractable or who believe that a political settlement is unlikely. Furthermore, 44% of Protestants believe Loyalist violence is justified by the existing political context and 47% of Catholics agree that IRA members act as freedom fighters against British occupiers (Moxon-Browne 1980).

However, unlike the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which becomes increasingly intractable and zero-sum over time, multiple rounds of political negotiations and increasing interaction between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland encourage a softening of attitudes within both sectarian communities. Public opinion surveys conducted in the 1980s and 1990s show increasing overlap in the preferences of Catholic and Protestant voters. For example, polls conducted as early as 1978 reveal that at least one-third of Catholic voters in Northern Ireland support a continued relationship between

Northern Ireland and the UK as the best political solution to the sectarian conflict, a solution entirely aligned with Protestant preferences. At the same time, only about 50% of Catholic voters support a united Ireland, the solution feared by many Protestant voters. On the Protestant side, even in 1978, more than 50% of Protestants believe that a political settlement is possible (Moxon-Browne 1980). Even former militant group members express increasing openness to political accommodation as the conflict endures. A former IRA chief of staff notes, “ ‘as a young man in the IRA I felt there was only one way to deal with the situation and that was to blow the British army out....[Now] I believe the only way to have any kind of freedom in Ireland is when Catholics and Protestants unite for both their rights’ ” (Trevelyan and Heller, *Advertiser* 1989, quoting Cathal Goulding). When asked if deep hatred explained his willingness to kill Catholics a former Loyalist militant responds “ ‘How can I hate or dislike the Catholics?’... ‘I don't know any Catholics’... ‘I am a soldier, carrying out my duty’” (*The Economist* June 25, 1988). According to Retrospective Projection, flexibility in Catholic and Protestant attitudes weakens the conflict's seeming intractability and contributes to conflict de-escalation by reducing the perceived necessity of militant retaliation in the eyes of Catholic and Protestant voters.

In addition to its intractability, the severity of the sectarian conflict encourages political responses to violence by creating strong expectations for future violence. Sectarian violence is most intense in the 1970s and again the 1990s and results in larger political responses in these periods. Political responses to violence also vary by fatality type due to the very different political implications of civilian fatalities and deaths of militant group members. Civilian fatalities present the most immediate threat to the

personal security of Northern Ireland's voters and, as a result, have the most significant effect on their expectations, attitudes, and political responses. After one attack on Catholic civilians, a Catholic political leader notes "there is great feeling of horror and grief" that increases support for the IRA among Catholics who "look on the IRA as their only protector" (Hoggart and Brown, *Guardian* 1973). Protestant voters express similar sentiments in the aftermath of IRA attacks. As one voter notes "the UDA is probably the only body that is willing to help" and protect Protestant communities from IRA violence (Winchester, *Guardian* 1972). There is less evidence, however, that violence has strong or consistent electoral implications for legitimate political parties. In some cases, Sinn Fein benefits from its attachment to the IRA, as occurs during the hunger strikes. In others, particularly following the resurgence of violence in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Sinn Fein seems to lose political support when Catholic fatalities rise. In 1989, for instance, 20% of Sinn Fein voters reject the use of violence and 33% prefer that the party take a strictly political approach (Irvin and Moxon-Browne 1989). Protestant civilian deaths have similarly inconsistent effects on electoral outcomes. Some instances of IRA violence appear to benefit the harder-line DUP, but at many points in the conflict, even significant IRA attacks trigger minimal change in political affiliation (Irvin and Moxon-Browne 1989; Moxon-Browne 1980).

Finally, the indiscriminate nature of sectarian attacks aimed at civilians reduces clarity of responsibility, creates uncertainty about the efficacy of retaliatory violence, and makes disaffection as likely as demands for violent retaliation.⁷⁴ The success of the Alliance party in the 1970s is one example of disaffection as a response to civilian

⁷⁴ As noted previously, 'clarity of responsibility' refers to the ease with which constituents can allocate responsibility for policy successes and failures. Weak political institutions and indiscriminate sectarian violence reduce clarity of responsibility in Northern Ireland.

fatalities. Political analysts attribute the 1970s success of the Alliance party to the fact that it offers an alternative to “an increasingly polarized status quo” and “hope for a political settlement” (Downie, *Washington Post* 1979).

The threat presented by militant deaths is less immediate to Protestant and Catholic voters, but retains political relevance when it challenges constituent expectations about the efficacy of a paramilitary-based strategy. Militant deaths on the Catholic side take on additional political implications because IRA militants are more deeply embedded in local communities than their Loyalist counterparts. One political analyst notes “even though the Catholic community might wish to be free of the gunmen...it is doubtful whether many Catholic families would deny them refuge..., let alone betray them to the security forces” (Wilson and Chesshyre, *Observer* 1991). In contrast, “the majority of Protestants are not only appalled by their side’s share of the sectarian murders, they...are ashamed of the posturing of...the UDA” (*Guardian* 1972c). As a result, the political implications of militant deaths both for militant groups and political parties will be smaller than those associated with civilian deaths and smaller for Loyalists than Catholics.

According to Retrospective Projection applied to the Northern Ireland case, the intractability and severity of the security threat increases the size of political responses to violence and the likelihood of constituent demands for new violence. Constituent demands for violence are largest in the 1970s, when the threat is most intense and the conflict most intractable and after the more direct threat implied by civilian fatalities. While intractability increases the likelihood of demands for retaliation from Catholic and Protestant constituents, the indiscriminate nature of civilian deaths contributes to low

clarity of responsibility that encourages disaffection. Militant deaths, in contrast, have more limited political significance, especially among Protestant communities, where tolerance for violence is generally low (Bruce 1992b). Importantly, although militant and civilian fatalities appear to have different effects on Catholic and Protestant political attitudes, there is relatively little evidence of variation in the political implications of violence by perpetrator, a distinction most relevant on the Catholic side. Qualitative analysis and initial quantitative tests suggest that violence perpetrated by Loyalist paramilitaries and the British army has similar effects on Catholic political attitudes and demands for violent retaliation. Because Loyalist and British violence is connected in the minds of targeted Catholic constituents and IRA rhetoric and because both forms of violence have comparable security implications, Catholic voters respond in similar ways to each type of attack (Geraghty 2000).⁷⁵

Expected Military Efficacy and Political Optimism

While intractability and fatality type affect demands for violence, evolving expectations about the efficacy of militant violence and the potential for a political settlement react to military and political developments and play a decisive role in subsequent political responses to violence. In the 1970s, for example, military strategies appear more effective to Catholic and Protestant voters in achieving political goals than weak or non-existent political alternatives. On the Catholic side, the lack of political alternatives to the weak Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and early success of

⁷⁵ I validate this decision by considering political and violent responses across British and Loyalist perpetrated attacks. The distinction between militant and civilian deaths overlaps with that between sectarian and British-perpetrated attacks. Attacks by British soldiers after police primacy in 1976 killed primarily IRA militants, while sectarian violence was much more likely to take civilian lives. Qualitative information confirms the greater importance of fatality type as a driver of violent and political responses.

IRA violence in achieving political goals (specifically, the fall of the Stormont government) increase support for violence and encourage Catholic constituent demands for violence after sectarian and British attacks. As one Catholic priest argues in the early 1970s, “of course we are appalled by bloodshed, but the Provisionals are the only defense the people feel they can rely on” (Wilson and Chesshyre, *Observer* 1971). On the Protestant side, the weakness of political leaders, their acceptance of the Sunningdale Agreement in 1973, and the inability of British forces to protect Protestant security suggest the dangers of relying on political solutions and the necessity and efficacy of violence employed as a political tool. The relative efficacy of Loyalist violence against the Sunningdale Agreement and the Catholic threat reinforce Protestant support for paramilitary activities during this period.

Counterterror successes in the late 1970s and 1980s and the simple continuation of violence with no political gains reduce the perceived efficacy of paramilitary approaches to the conflict and undermine support for militant groups among Catholics and Protestants. For Catholics, confidence in the ability of a military approach to ‘drive the Brits out’ faded in the 1980s due to British counterterror successes, the effective shift to police primacy, and Thatcher’s hard line stance. Internal IRA communications and Catholic public opinion confirm that “by the early 1980s, the prospect of a quick military victory had receded,” and with it support for the IRA’s armed strategy had also weakened (McAllister 2004, 127). A similar response occurs on the Protestant side where increasingly destructive and ineffective paramilitary violence gradually erodes Protestant support for militant groups and violence as a political tool. By 1978, almost 80% of respondents agree that the British government should take a harder line against Loyalist

paramilitaries (Moxon-Browne 1980). As one activist noted “the most important message we’ve tried to convey...is: ‘We’ve had enough of the violence and enough of the paramilitaries’ ” (Heilpern, *Observer* 1977).

Attitudes towards political alternatives in the 1980s, however, are very different on Catholic and Protestant sides of the conflict, a divergence that prevents political compromise during this period. On the Catholic side, declining confidence in militant violence is replaced by growing interest in political alternatives. Sinn Fein’s entrance into the political arena and initial electoral success encourage political engagement that limits violence by creating new political opportunities and a more proactive, aggressive political alternative to the SDLP (McAllister 2004). The Anglo-Irish Agreement, while limited in its efficacy, similarly strengthens Catholic confidence in political alternatives because it suggests some movement towards an acceptable political solution that directly involves the Republic of Ireland in Northern Ireland’s affairs. On the Protestant side, however, these same changes in the political context weaken support for political approaches and, by the end of the 1980s, encourage disaffection that allows militant groups to survive and rebuild. The Anglo-Irish Agreement and the successful entrance of Sinn Fein into political competition reduce the appeal of political alternatives for Protestant voters because they suggest new vitality and involvement by Catholic voters that threaten the status quo. While for some Protestants this challenge to the status quo sparks political disaffection, for others it strengthens support for violence. Commentators in the UK linked the surge in Loyalist violence during the 1990s with “a hardening mood within the Protestant community which says ‘enough is enough’ ” (Edmunds, *The Herald*

(Glasgow) 1993). Loyalist disaffection and outright rejection of political accommodation prevents progress towards political settlement in the 1980s period.

Events in the 1990s consolidate support for political strategies among majorities within the Protestant and Catholic communities. First, the 1992 Downing Street Declaration sets out a clear, British-led framework for a political solution to the conflict that increases optimism on both sides about the true potential for a lasting agreement. Second, ceasefires by Loyalist and Republican groups in 1994 that are moderately successful consolidate support for and build confidence in political alternatives by suggesting that continued violence is not inevitable or assured. Finally, extensive political negotiations that involve hard-liners on both sides of the conflict help win buy-in from extremists who had undermined past attempts at agreement. Importantly, confidence or acceptance of political strategies in Northern Ireland does not end the political relevance of the sectarian conflict. Instead, Catholic and Protestant hardliners are more likely to demand hard-line *political* approaches when more serious negotiations increase the benefits of an aggressive political strategy.

Changes in the expected efficacy of violent and political solutions over the course of the conflict react to real changes in the political and security context and affect the timing and likelihood of constituent demands for violence. Catholics and Protestants are most likely to demand violent retaliation only when they expect it to successfully advance their political and security goals. High-perceived military efficacy and low political optimism in the 1970s increase the likelihood of demands for violence during the conflict's first decade. Declining confidence in the efficacy of militant violence and optimism about the political opportunities limits Catholic demands for violence on the

Catholic side during the 1980s and 1990s. On the Protestant side, support for violence falls with counterterror successes in the 1980s, but continued dissatisfaction with political leadership prevents constituent pressure for a lasting political solution. Converging expectations regarding the benefits of political solutions facilitate political settlement in the 1990s, but continued insecurity sustains support for hard-line political parties.

Political Institutions and Competition

For much of the ‘Troubles’, Northern Ireland’s weak political institutions and intense intra-sectarian political competition encourage political responses to sectarian attacks and often support for militant violence. However, ambiguous links between militant groups and political parties constrain the *electoral* implications of even significant sectarian attacks. The weakness of Northern Ireland’s political institutions and the lack of a strong executive encourage support for militant violence among Catholics and Protestants who feel that they have few alternatives to violence (McAllister 2004; Bew 1985). Even as they recognize the shortcomings of a reliance on paramilitary violence as political tool, Protestants and Catholics are hesitant to support political accommodation due to its overlapping lines of accountability and limited ability to provide governance or security.

Intense intra-sectarian competition between legitimate political parties over the security issue also has significant effects on political responses to violence in both sectarian communities because constituents expect different policy approaches and outcomes from rival parties. On the Catholic side, the more militant Sinn Fein competes with the moderate SDLP for support of Catholic voters, relying on its aggressive

approach and direct connection with the IRA to solidify its strategic position as the party best able to deal with the threat of sectarian and state violence. Sinn Fein “defends the right of the IRA to engage in armed struggle” “because there [is] no alternative for those who [will] not bend the knee, or turn a blind eye to oppression...” (Adams, “An Address to the IRA,” 2005). Sinn Fein’s militant approach appeals to harder line Catholics, often from lower class neighborhoods, but the SDLP retains support among many moderates who are uncomfortable with the party’s close attachment to the IRA (Hayes and McAllister 2004). However, although inter-party differences affect the types of voters each party attracts, violence by Catholic or Protestant paramilitary groups only increases support for Sinn Fein when Catholics expect additional IRA violence to serve an important political purpose. Uncertainty surrounding the link between the IRA and Sinn Fein somewhat constrains the size of observable political responses to violence.

On the Protestant side, the DUP adopts an aggressive approach that is sympathetic to militant violence, while the UUP is more open to political compromise and accommodation. At many points, the DUP gains from its hard-line position. One political analyst describes that threats to the political status quo “prompted large swathes of the middle ground, middle class unionist community to cast aside their natural distaste for intolerant and extreme positions and plump for the more fundamentalist, hard line parties, headed by the DUP” (Grogan, *Irish Times* 1996). At other points, however, electoral pacts between the two parties that limit competition contribute to Protestant disaffection. One political analyst assesses in 1987, “the ill-fated OUP/DUP pact proved to be a recipe for apathy...Some Unionists do feel that their vote no longer ‘counts’ ” (Bew 1988, 85-


86).⁷⁶ Although violence by Catholic and Protestant paramilitary groups does affect Protestant political attitudes, qualitative case information suggests that violence itself is only associated with rising support for the DUP when Protestants expect militant violence to achieve some specific political objective. Ambiguous ties between the DUP and militant groups limit electoral implications from conflict violence.

Finally, the existence and rhetoric of paramilitary groups encourage constituent demands for violence by creating an appealing alternative for those disillusioned with political failures. Paramilitary group leaders from both sectarian communities criticize political representatives for their apparent inability to protect constituent interests and propose their own use of violence as the more effective way to achieve lasting security. In the 1990s, hardliners credit IRA violence, rather than Sinn Fein's political maneuvers with advancing Catholic political interests and argue, " 'the IRA will never be beaten and they'll never hand over their weapons' " (Pogatchnik, Associated Press 1993). Protestant paramilitaries launch similar attacks on the efficacy of their political representatives (Winchester, *Guardian* 1972). High rates of abstention and disaffection during the 'Troubles' are one indication that the existence of a militant alternative does encourage demands for violence from Protestant and Catholic constituents because they reveal an increasing number of voters turning against legitimate political solutions. Both disaffection and abstention are likely when political alternatives are nonexistent or ineffective. High Catholic abstention in the 1970s reflects disillusionment with political alternatives and reveals support for the IRA's violent approach. Disaffection and falling turnout on the Protestant side, shown in Figure 7.2, reflect a political response that is encouraged by political competition, but empowers militant groups.

⁷⁶ The OUP or Official Unionist Party is another name for the Ulster Unionist party (UUP).

Political competition between Northern Ireland's political parties and militant groups encourages political responses to violence, but, according to Retrospective Projection, results in constituent demands for violence only when political alternatives appear ineffective and constituents expect paramilitary violence to more effectively advance political goals. On the Catholic side, the IRA is most likely to benefit from conflict violence when political alternatives are unappealing and limited, particularly during the 1970s. In contrast, Sinn Fein gains political support in the 1990s when voters expect the party's hard-line *political* approach to defend Catholic interests. On the Protestant side, Retrospective Projection predicts that militant groups benefit from political failures and subsequent political disaffection that encourages support for violent alternatives in the early 1970s and 1990s, while the DUP gains political support when its aggressive political approach seems most advantageous, primarily in the 1990s. However, Northern Ireland's weak political institutions and often ambiguous ties between militant groups and political parties restrict the size of political responses to violence and encourage disaffection throughout the conflict.

Figure 7.2
Relative Vote Share by Sectarian Group



Source: <http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/>

Violence as Constituent Service

Constituent Service arguments predict that retaliatory violence used by Loyalist and Republican paramilitary groups closely matches constituent demands and preferences. The statements and actions of militant group leaders confirm attention to constituent preferences and the use of violence as a political tool to meet constituent demands and interests. IRA commanders explicitly reference the value of violence as a political tool. For example, as one IRA leader argues, “ ‘Morale is the vital key to our success...’ and the key to high morale is successful operations” (Lohr, *New York Times* 1988). Describing the retaliatory calculus of the IRA, one commentator confirms the Constituent Service function of violence noting, “popular sentiment after the riot [and

associated violence against Catholic civilians] will allow PIRA to shoot some British soldiers and even some civilians” (Winchester, *Guardian* 1972). However, the preferences and demands of Catholic voters also limit and constrain the IRA’s use of violence. Recognizing that Republican voters are “reassured if there [are] clean IRA operations against British soldiers or RUC or UDR men”, but less comfortable with attacks on civilians, the IRA increasingly targets police, state, and financial targets and moves away from the unpopular use of suicide bombs almost immediately (Simpson, *Globe and Mail* 1983; Bloom and Horgan 2008).

Loyalist paramilitary leaders similarly argue that their violence is driven and constrained by constituent demands and preferences, noting, “Once [the RUC] showed they was willing to do the business on the IRA”, “there was no need for us...” (Bruce 1992b, 136). While the initial rise in violence in the 1970s is driven by low confidence in the efficacy of state security forces, the sharp drop in Protestant paramilitary violence in the late 1970s reflects growing Protestant discomfort with violence and their preferences for legitimate political solutions (Bruce 1992b). Importantly, public opinion polls show more consistent sympathy for the political goals of militant groups on the Catholic side than among Protestants (Bruce 1992b; Moxon-Browne 1980). As a result, retaliatory violence by Catholic paramilitaries should be more frequent and sizable throughout the conflict than violent retaliation by Protestant groups.

Constituent Service arguments predict variation in the intensity of violent retaliation throughout the conflict and across the sectarian divide based on constituent demands. Violent retaliation is most likely when targeted constituents demand retaliation,

prior to 1985 on the Catholic side and in the 1970s and 1990s for Loyalist groups.⁷⁷

More robust support for violence and the embedded position of the IRA in Catholic communities incentivize IRA retaliation after civilian and militant deaths, but limited tolerance for violence among Protestants constrains Loyalist violence, particularly to militant deaths.

Propositions to Hypotheses

The discussion above applies Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service to the Northern Ireland case. It describes how assessments of the security threat and evaluations of past conflict outcomes on the Catholic and Protestant sides affect expectations of military efficacy and political optimism, and identifies the implications of these expectations for political responses to violence and the likelihood of violent retaliation by paramilitary groups. The discussion facilitates the operational translation of the theoretical propositions into hypotheses specific to the Northern Ireland case that can be evaluated empirically. These hypotheses, summarized in Table 7.1 and 7.2, present a constituent-driven and dynamic interpretation of the relationship between political attitudes and violence in Northern Ireland during the ‘Troubles.’

When does state and sectarian violence beget demands for violent retaliation?

H1. Political responses to violence are more likely after civilian fatalities than militant deaths.

H2. Demands for violence after sectarian violence are most likely in the 1970s and for Protestants also in the 1990s (threat severe, military efficacy high).

H3. Disaffection is most likely after civilian deaths in the 1980s and 1990s.

⁷⁷ As described below, the data suggest a structural break only at 1985. I consider IRA responses to militant deaths in the pre-1985 period rather than 1983, the first general election contested by Sinn Fein. Changes in political confidence likely take some time to emerge.

H4a. *Demands for violence are encouraged by intractability, primarily early in the conflict.*

H4b. *Demands for violence are encouraged by political competition.*⁷⁸

When does state and sectarian violence beget paramilitary retaliation?

H5. *The size, duration, and likelihood of violent responses rises with the size of the political response, so should be largest prior after Catholic civilian and militant deaths prior to 1985 and after Protestant civilian deaths in the 1970s and 1990s.*

H7. *(non-state only) Violent responses by Catholic groups are larger than those of Loyalist groups, especially after militant deaths.*⁷⁹

What are the political implications of responsive non-state violence?

H8. *Responsive terror attacks have few political implications for legitimate parties.*

H9. *Violent responses only increase support for perpetrating groups where they match constituent preferences and appear to achieve desired outcomes (1970s for IRA, early 1970s and 1990s for Loyalists).*








⁷⁸ As explained previously, Hypotheses 4a and 4b most effectively evaluated with cross-case comparisons.

⁷⁹ There is no analog to H6 for Northern Ireland because it applies to state actors only.

Table 7.1
Demands for & the Use of Violence: What matters? Northern Ireland
What causes radicalization and violence?

Determinant	Level in Northern Ireland	Demands for and use of violence
Severity of Threat	Moderate to High. British threat largest to Catholics pre-1975, sectarian violence most intense in 1970s and 1990s.	↑
Intractability	High, but declining. Sectarian conflict appears intractable, but political flexibility emerges over time.	↑ Pre-1985, but ↔ after mid-1980s
Expected Military Efficacy	Military efficacy is high prior to 1975, but falls after 1976 and police primacy.	↑ pre-1975, but ↓ in 1980s and 1990s
Political Optimism	Confidence in political strategies rises in 1980s for Catholics after the emergence of Sinn Fein. Appeal of political settlement rises more slowly for Protestants.	↑ pre-1975, ↓ after 1985 for Catholics (after ~1994 for Protestants)
Political Competition	<i>Intra-sectarian</i> competition between political parties and between political parties and militant groups encourage political responses to violence.	↑
Political Institutions	Weak political institutions and intra-sectarian competition reduce clarity of responsibility, but encourage political competition.	↔ Increase disaffection, fragmentation
Duration	Conflict fatigue reduces the likelihood of demand for violence (except for some increase for Protestants in early 1990s).	↓

Table 7.2
Expectations of Competing Explanations: Northern Ireland
How do expectations of competing interpretations differ?

Following terrorist attack	Northern Ireland
Retrospective Projection & Constituent Service	<i>Demands for violence and use of violence</i> Pre-1975  1975-1980  <i>Military efficacy falls, but few political options</i> 1980s 1990s  <i>Rising political optimism</i>
Rally	<i>Support for incumbent</i> 
Repression → Radicalization	<i>Demands for violence and use of violence</i> 
Tit-for-Tat	<i>Demands for violence and use of violence</i> 
Signaling	<i>Use of violence</i> 

Empirical Results

This section presents the results of the VAR and graphical analysis, incorporating qualitative information where appropriate. As described previously, the data used for this case combines fatalities and relative and absolute vote share for each major party within its sectarian community in Westminster and local elections in Northern Ireland between 1970 and 1998.⁸⁰ On the Catholic side, I consider relative political support for the SDLP and Sinn Fein in percentage of the Catholic vote. A decrease in SDLP-lead is considered

⁸⁰ I exclude European Union elections because they are known to attract a distinct set of voters and often to involve a different set of issues than local and national elections that have more direct implications for constituent well-being.

a demand by Catholic voters for a more aggressive political response and at least an expression of sympathy for IRA violence. I qualitatively consider direct support for and participation in the IRA as a more explicit demand for violence that rejects political solutions. On the Protestant side, I use the relative percentage of Protestant votes earned by the DUP and the more moderate UUP to measure shifts in political attitudes. A decrease in UUP-lead signals a demand for a more aggressive political approach and some sympathy for violence. I discuss direct support for Loyalist paramilitaries as a more explicit measure of Protestant constituent demands for violence. I operationalize disaffection using support for the non-sectarian Alliance party, turnout, and abstention.

As noted in the description of the data and the methodological approach, limited data on public opinion in Northern Ireland prevents a rigorous empirical assessment of the association between violence and electoral outcomes in Northern Ireland. I rely instead on graphical analysis that maps pre-election violence onto electoral results. This graphical analysis of political responses maps fatalities in the six months prior to an election on to electoral outcomes. If violence results in demands for an aggressive political approach and armed retaliation, then high levels of pre-election violence will be followed by elections in which hard-line parties increase their relative vote share. Where trends in electoral support for hard-line parties and pre-election violence move in similar directions, this is evidence that violence is associated with electoral outcomes. Where the two trends show no congruence, there is little evidence of a relationship. I continue to use the VAR approach to consider violent responses, using monthly data and specifications that include fatalities and controls for external events and economic conditions.

Identifying Structural Breaks

As in each of the previous examples, events that alter constituent expectations about the efficacy of armed resistance, the severity of the external threat, or the opportunities for political settlement may lead to structural breaks in conflict dynamics. The discussion above identifies several potential structural breaks in the Northern Ireland example, including changes in British political leadership that affect counterterror policy (Heath to Wilson, February 1974; Wilson to Callaghan, April 1976; Callaghan to Thatcher, May 1979; and Thatcher to Major, November 1990) and policy revisions that alter the political and security context in the region (the imposition of direct rule, March 1972; police primacy March 1976; the Anglo-Irish agreement, 1985). Policy revisions play a large role within Northern Ireland because of their more direct and immediate effects on constituent attitudes and expectations. For example, the Anglo-Irish agreement undermines the confidence of Protestants in political alternatives and affects their political responses to and support for violence.

As described in a previous chapter, before conducting empirical tests of the hypotheses, I test these potential break points for evidence of a structural break using a recursive forecasting strategy that corresponds to a series of Chow forecast-tests. The results of these tests are presented as graphs of actual values, forecasted values, and confidence intervals in Figure 7.3. The forecasting line is created by specifying a VAR with the minimum number of periods needed to produce reasonable estimates, generating a forecast for the next period, and then repeating this process, adding one additional period at a time, across and beyond the break point. Evidence of a break occurs when the actual value falls outside the confidence intervals of the forecast line for several

periods.⁸¹ In the Northern Ireland example, evidence of structural breaks is more limited than in some of the previous examples, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. Where there is ambiguity about the existence of a break, I compare the IRFs generated using data from each period separately. There is relatively strong evidence of a structural break at the start of direct rule and following the October 1974 Westminster election that gives the Labour party an official majority. Surprisingly, there is no evidence of a structural break at the start of the Thatcher administration, suggesting that although Thatcher's policies towards Northern Ireland are distinct from those of Callaghan, patterns in responsive violence by the IRA and Loyalist paramilitaries do not adjust immediately. There is some weak evidence of a structural break at the Anglo-Irish agreement, especially on the Protestant side. Although evidence of a similar break on the Catholic side is limited, IRA-claimed violence does fall below the mean for several months after the implementation of the agreement. Finally, evidence for a break at the start of Major's administration is limited, but because the IRF responses on each side of this administration change do seem different, I consider the 1985-1990 and 1990-1994 periods separately.

Based on these results, I specify five VAR models: *pre-direct rule* (1970-March 1972), direct rule to the second 1974 election (henceforth *direct rule*) (1972-Oct. 1974), collapse of Sunningdale to the AIA (henceforth *pre-AIA*) (Nov. 1974 to Nov. 1985), AIA to Major (henceforth *post-AIA*) (1985-11/1990), and *Major's* administration prior to the IRA ceasefire (1990-1994). I also add controls for the Hunger strikes, the Sunningdale Agreements, and the Gibraltar assassinations. The controls are included to be consistent with previous research, but have few ramifications for the IRFs.

⁸¹ Importantly, a structural break may occur even if actual values move back inside forecast confidence intervals after some number of additional periods. Because the forecast process incorporates additional data at each step, the forecast line should eventually return to within the confidence interval.


Figure 7.3
Forecasting Structural Breaks: Northern Ireland

Based on forecasting analysis I consider the following periods: July 1969-March 1972 (Pre-Direct Rule); March 1972-October 1974 (Direct Rule); October 1974-November 1985 (Post-Direct to AIA); November 1985-November 1990 (AIA to Major); November 1990-December 1994 (Major to ceasefire).

Period	IRA-claimed violence	Loyalist-claimed violence
Pre-Direct Rule/ After Direct Rule (March 1972)	<p align="center">Evidence of break.</p>	<p align="center">Evidence of break.</p>
Heath/ Wilson (February 1974)	<p align="center">There is no evidence of a break at the February 1974 election, but there is evidence of a break in the aftermath of the October election, when the Labour party officially gained the majority position.</p>	<p align="center">There is no evidence of a break at the February 1974 election, but weak evidence of a break after the October election. Weaker than for IRA-claimed.</p>
Pre-police primacy/Post-police primacy	<p align="center">No evidence of a break.</p>	<p align="center">No evidence of a break.</p>
Callaghan/ Thatcher (May 1979)	<p align="center">No evidence of a break. August 1979 as outlier.</p>	<p align="center">No evidence of a break.</p>

*Dark gray: Clear structural break. Light gray: Some evidence of a break. White: No evidence of a break.

Figure 7.3 continued



Overview

The political and violent dynamics that characterize the Northern Ireland side of the ‘Troubles’ are consistent with the expectations of Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service. Sectarian violence triggers demands for violence among Catholic and Protestant voters that increase support for paramilitary groups when military approaches appear most effective in advancing political and security goals or when political approaches to the conflict clearly fail, and violence closely matches constituent demands. Catholic fatalities are associated with rising political support for the IRA prior to Sinn Fein’s emergence as a political party, but pre-election violence has no lasting effect on support for Sinn Fein itself. On the Protestant side, militant groups gain from

Protestant fatalities in the 1970s and 1990s, periods of political disaffection, and the DUP benefits from pre-election violence inconsistently, primarily in the early 1970s and late 1980s, when Protestants fear Catholic challenges to the status quo. Disaffection and abstention appear to be the most common responses to violence. Throughout the conflict, violence matches constituent demands. Violence by the IRA follows Catholic civilian and militant deaths before 1985, but declines in frequency and size throughout the rest of the conflict. Loyalist retaliation follows Protestant civilian deaths in the early 1970s and 1990s, when support for violence is high, but rarely occurs after militant fatalities. Violence that matches constituent demands consolidates political support for the perpetrating militant group, but even this violence has limited political implications for legitimate political parties. The qualitative and quantitative analyses presented here show a more conditional support for and use of violence than implied by existing literature.

When Does State and Sectarian Violence Beget Demands for Violent Retaliation?

Demands for retaliatory violence are most likely in Northern Ireland when targeted constituents expect military violence to better advance their political and security objectives than a reliance on existing political alternatives. However, constituent demands for violence appear to increase support for paramilitary groups with few lasting implications for Northern Ireland's legitimate political parties. Figures 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6 show electoral trends mapped against pre-election violence. The most striking observation is the lack of a consistent relationship between pre-election violence and electoral outcomes. On the Catholic side, Sinn Fein appears to benefit from additional IRA violence only prior to 1985, and even this relationship is uncertain. In the 1985-1989


period, violence is associated with falling support for Sinn Fein. After 1994, Sinn Fein gains vote share, but no pre-election violence occurs. Pre-election attacks on Catholic civilians are more consistently associated with Catholic political disaffection, manifested as rising support for the non-sectarian Alliance party in the 1970s, and high rates of abstention that reject political approaches entirely. McAllister (2004) describes that Catholics “had little incentive to vote for a Nationalist candidate since the Nationalist Party’s permanent minority status in parliament meant that they had no influence on public policy” (McAllister 2004, 132).

On the Protestant side, there is similarly limited association between violence and electoral outcomes. Figure 7.5 shows that high levels of pre-election violence are weakly associated with rising support for the hard-line DUP, in the early 1970s and late 1980s, periods characterized by strong Protestant support for the use of violence as a political tool. However, even in these periods, the association between violence and political attitudes is inconsistent and varies from election to election. According Figure 7.6, Protestant civilian deaths are more directly associated with falling voter turnout particularly, in the 1980s, a response that expresses dissatisfaction with the status quo approaches of both major political parties. One analyst describes that since “the loss of self-government and the imposition of power-sharing, Protestants have had less incentive to vote: in 1994, for example, twice as many Protestants reported abstaining compared to 1973” (McAllister 2004, 133).

The lack of observable electoral implications is somewhat surprising based on existing literature that expects violence to consistently benefit hard-line parties and the Israeli example where Palestinian violence does increase support for the harder-line

Likud party prior to 2002. However, the lack of response is consistent with constituent expectations. Hard-line parties only gain from violence when their aggressive approach is expected to achieve political objectives. Importantly, limited electoral responses to militant violence may also reflect the often ambiguous relationship between militant groups and political parties, particularly on the Protestant side of the conflict.


Figure 7.4
Electoral Implications of Catholic Fatalities



The graph is divided into three periods: 1983 to 1985 (pre-AIA), 1985 to 1989, and 1990 to the Good Friday Accords. There is some evidence that pre-election violence against Catholic civilians increases support for Sinn Fein in the period prior to 1985. However from 1985-1989, pre-election violence is associated with falling support for Sinn Fein. Sinn Fein gains support when violence falls to zero in the 1990s.

Conclusion: Sinn Fein may benefit from violence prior to 1985, but there is no evidence of this relationship in subsequent years .


Figure 7.5
Electoral Implications of Protestant Fatalities



The graph is divided into four periods: pre-direct rule, direct rule to AIA, AIA to Major, and Major to the Good Friday Accords. In no period is there significant evidence that Protestant civilian deaths increase support for the DUP. In fact, in most periods the two move in opposite directions. Only in 1975 is an increase in violence associated with an increase in support for the DUP. In the 1980s, high pre-election violence is associated with a loss in DUP vote share. Low violence against Protestants is associated with relatively greater support for the DUP. In the 1990s, the DUP gains vote share as violence falls.

Conclusion: Little evidence that DUP gains from Loyalist violence, especially after 1980.

Figure 7.6
Civilian Fatalities, Alliance Support, and Protestant Turnout



The graph is divided into four periods: direct rule, post-direct rule to AIA, AIA to 1990, Major's administration to GFA. Support for the Alliance party is highest in the 1970s, when violence is most intense. Peaks in violence are associated with falling turnout on the Protestant side (1989, 1985, 1979). Conclusion: Violence is weakly associated with disaffection.

While the electoral implications of violence are consistently weak, qualitative case information suggests that violence does affect support for and participation in the activities of Catholic and Loyalist paramilitary groups. However, this relationship exists only when violence appears to be an effective political tool. On the Catholic side, violence against Protestant civilians and Loyalist militants consolidates support for the IRA when militant violence is an appealing alternative, primarily prior to 1985, but has more negative implications for the group's popularity when political alternatives are more appealing. One analyst describes that increasing sectarian and British violence in the early 1970s causes Catholics to "[turn] to the gunmen to give them a false sense of

security and...the revenge they...crave” (Hoggart, *Guardian* 1973). Similarly, IRA commanders report that when IRA militants are killed “a lot of young people will be motivated to step into their (the dead guerrillas) shoes and take their place” (Clark, United Press International 1988). Observers report that IRA violence in the 1980s and 1990s, however, increasingly alienates Catholic voters and creates pressure for an end to political violence. However, once Catholic voters turn against violence and prefer political solutions, attacks on Catholic civilians and IRA militants further erode support for the IRA, as Catholic voters blame the group for continued violence.

On the Protestant side, constituent demands for violence that increase support for the UDA and UVF follow civilian deaths, but only during periods when Protestants expect militant violence to advance constituent interests or when they are disillusioned with existing political options. In the 1970s, weak political leadership increases the perceived efficacy and necessity of militant violence and the likelihood of Protestant constituent demands for violent retaliation after Protestant fatalities. One analyst notes in 1973, “many Loyalists, obsessed with the fear of a Westminster betrayal...seem to be abandoning formal politics in favor of the gun...” (Myers, *Observer* 1973). Protestant voters are also likely to demand violence in the late 1980s and early 1990s, after the AIA challenges the political status quo. The re-emergence of a new, stronger UDA in that second half of the 1980s and its ability to recruit new militant supporters is evidence of renewed Protestant support for militant violence and retaliation (Bruce 1992b, 286). At other points in the conflict, however, the late 1970s and the early 1980s, widespread distaste among Protestants for additional violence and strong preferences for a political settlement limit constituent demands for armed retaliation even after severe IRA attacks

and force Protestant paramilitary groups to disband. Constituent demands for violence that benefit paramilitary groups are also less likely after Loyalist militant deaths, due to their frequently strained relationship with local supporters (Bruce 1992b).

As expected by Retrospective Projection, constituent demands for violence occur only when a violence-based strategy appears more likely to achieve key objectives than political alternatives and have their strongest implications on support for militant groups rather than electoral outcomes. Among Catholics, demands for violence are concentrated in the pre-1985 period, before Sinn Fein offers a more appealing political alternative. Violence contributes to abstention in the 1970s and is associated with rising support for Sinn Fein only weakly in the early 1980s. However, pre-election violence hurts Sinn Fein's vote share in the 1980s when political alternatives appear more viable. On the Protestant side of the conflict, demands for violence occur in the early 1970s and the 1990s, driven by unpopular political outcomes. Pre-election violence weakly benefits the harder line DUP party prior to 1975 and in the late 1980s, but is more often associated with rising disaffection on the Protestant side of the conflict, particularly in the 1980s. Importantly, the most significant increase in support for Sinn Fein and the DUP occurred after 1994, despite the lack of violence. Because they expect aggressive political approaches to better protect and represent their interests in political negotiations, Catholics and Protestants increasingly shift their support towards the harder line party. In 1996, the SDLP chairman argues "the SDLP and the two governments cannot convince the IRA of the futility of going back to political isolation and an open-ended struggle that nobody can win - only Sinn Fein can" (*Belfast Telegraph* 1996). On the Unionist side rising support for the DUP in the 1990s occurs because voters " " [fear] that the union [is]

being weakened' ” and believe that the DUP is best able to protect Protestant interests (Breen, *Irish Times* 1993). Political responses to violence are not reflexive or automatic, but are based on careful strategic calculations.

*When Does State and Sectarian Violence Beget Paramilitary Retaliation?*⁸²

The violent responses of paramilitary groups on both sides of the sectarian divide closely follow constituent demands and are consistently most likely when constituents expect military violence to protect and advance security and political interests. On the Catholic side, violent responses are largest and most likely after militant and civilian deaths in the 1970s, the period when Catholic support for violence is strongest and when Catholic voters have few political alternatives to continued violence. The likelihood and intensity of retaliatory violence by the IRA falls after 1985 as Catholics turn away from violence as largely ineffective and accept the political alternative offered by Sinn Fein. For Protestants, violent reactions are far more likely after civilian than militant deaths and are largest where Protestant voters are most likely to demand violent retaliation, particularly in the early 1970s and after 1990 when political alternatives are weakest. On both sides of the conflict, retaliatory violence is unlikely where local constituents do not explicitly demand this type of response.

Retaliatory violence by the IRA closely matches constituent demands, and is largest and most likely in the period prior to 1985, when Catholics support and demand this violence as their only alternative. As shown in Figure 7.7, the IRA retaliates violently

⁸² As in previous cases, I present the empirical results as impulse response functions. The individual coefficients from the VAR estimations are less useful as metrics to assess the responsive violent relationships. However, the regression output is available on request. The distribution of civilian and militant deaths in Northern Ireland during the Troubles is shown in Appendix A12.

to civilian and militant deaths prior to 1985. In the period prior to direct rule and the direct rule period, the IRA's violent response to shocks in civilian fatalities is large and even approaches a tit-for-tat response. Prior to direct rule, a one standard deviation shock of seven additional Catholic civilian deaths is associated with a significant increase in IRA-claimed fatalities that lasts over the next three months and amounts to 3.5 additional deaths. During direct rule, a standard deviation increase of 5.5 Catholic civilian deaths in any month is associated with an immediate increase of 3.3 additional IRA-claimed deaths, with some evidence of about 2.2 additional claimed fatalities over the next two post-shock months. As one source describes, retaliatory violence by the IRA "assures its supporters at grassroots that, despite the...loyalist murders in recent years, republican paramilitaries have the situation under control" (Breen, *Irish Times* 1994). The response to militant deaths in both periods is smaller, but still relevant. The pre-direct rule response occurs with a lag, but is statistically significant. The direct rule response amounts to about one additional claimed-death per militant fatality, and falls just short of statistical significance. Violent retaliation after 1974 is considerably smaller in size and only follows civilian deaths. During this period, a one standard deviation shock in civilian deaths is associated with 1.3 additional IRA claimed deaths in the period contemporaneous with the shock, but there is no evidence of a response in subsequent months. The more limited use of violence in this period reflects eroding Catholic demands for violent retaliation, following Sinn Fein's political rise and the consistent failure of IRA violence to achieve political goals.


Continued decline in the incidence of IRA violence in the post-1985 period reflects a more permanent shift in Catholic political attitudes and a more final rejection of

violence employed as a political tool. First, the IRA does not respond to militant deaths in the post-1985 period. The group also does not react to civilian deaths in the 1985-1990 period, when backlash against IRA violence has the most negative effect on the group's support and the performance of Sinn Fein. The statements of IRA commanders confirm the decisive importance of constituent preferences in the decision not to use violence. One former IRA militant describes that because of constituent limitations, the IRA "fought with one hand tied behind its back....did not carry out the indiscriminate campaign of all out war, which it would have been capable of fighting" (Bloom and Horgan 2008, 590, quoting Collins 1997, 8). An alternative explanation for the sharp drop in IRA retaliation after 1985 credits successful counterterrorism by British and RUC forces with reducing IRA capabilities and their ability to use violent retaliation. Qualitative case information casts doubt on this explanation however. As one source notes there is "no evidence of a weakening IRA negotiating an end to violence under the duress of organizational collapse" (McSweeney 1996, 170).

In addition to responses that clearly match constituent demands, there is some unexpected evidence of a response to Catholic civilian deaths in the 1990s, about two additional claimed deaths over the first two post-shock months following a standard deviation increase of 2.4 civilian deaths. The use of violence at this point deviates from mainstream demands, but can be interpreted as a response driven by hard-liners and the rising Protestant threat. According to British security sources, IRA hard-liners "chafing at what they see as slow progress" of the more moderate, political approach employed by the group in the 1990s continue to demand and exploit every "opportunity to resume violence" (McNulty, *Advertiser* 1994). This observation is significant because it

underscores the ability of hardliners to escalate violence in protracted conflicts and implies the importance of winning their support for any final settlement.

Figure 7.7
IRA Response to Catholic Fatalities
Response to Civilian Deaths



Violent Responses, IRA-Claimed Fatalities						
Pre-Direct (7 lags)						
	+7 (1 SD) Catholic Civilian Deaths			+1 (7 SD) IRA Militant Death		
Response Month	Response	95% CI		Response	95% CI	
0	0.75	0.38	1.12	-0.17	-0.37	0.04
1	0.42	-0.01	0.85	-0.39	-0.67	-0.11
2	1.27	0.54	2.00	0.66	0.32	0.99
3	1.98	1.12	2.83	0.21	-0.31	0.73
Direct Rule- Oct. 1974						
	+5.5 (1 SD) Catholic Civilian Deaths			+1 IRA (7 SD) Militant Death		
(1 lag)	Response	95% CI		Response	95% CI	
0	3.27	1.60	4.94	0.90	-0.05	1.84
1	1.84	-0.14	3.82	-0.24	-1.43	0.94
2	1.33	-0.04	2.69	-0.12	-0.78	0.54
3	0.67	-0.44	1.78	-0.07	-0.46	0.32
Oct. 1974-Nov. 1985						
	+3.3 (1 SD) Catholic Civilian Death			+1 IRA (1.2 SD) Militant Death		
(6 lags)	Response	95% CI		Response	95% CI	
0	1.27	0.61	1.93	0.53	-0.27	1.34
1	0.32	-0.34	0.98	-0.05	-0.88	0.78
2	0.17	-0.43	0.76	0.67	-0.15	1.49
3	0.08	-0.49	0.65	0.37	-0.44	1.17
Nov. 1985-Nov. 1990						
	+1.2 (1 SD) Catholic Civilian Death			+1 IRA (8 SD) Militant Death		
(1 lag)	Response	95% CI		Response	95% CI	
0	0.72	-0.08	1.53	0.50	-0.15	1.16
1	0.36	-0.48	1.19	0.08	-0.58	0.74
2	-0.12	-0.38	0.14	0.02	-0.12	0.15
3	0.03	-0.06	0.12	0.00	-0.04	0.03
Major (3 lags)						
	+2.6 (1 SD) Catholic Civilian Deaths			+1 IRA (1.2 SD) Militant Death		
(3 lags)	Response	95% CI		Response	95% CI	
0	1.01	0.61	1.41	-0.21	-0.66	0.24
1	0.35	-0.07	0.77	-0.03	-0.54	0.49
2	0.81	0.38	1.24	0.47	-0.04	0.97
3	0.11	-0.33	0.54	0.26	-0.26	0.78

Loyalist violence similarly follows constituent demands, but is consistently more limited than that employed by the IRA because Protestant constituents are less supportive of violence than legitimate political alternatives during much of the conflict. Violent retaliation by Loyalist groups is most likely when Protestant demands for armed responses to IRA attacks are most significant, prior to 1972 and after 1990. At other points, demands for violence are infrequent and violent retaliation unlikely. Loyalist retaliation that does occur is limited in size and duration, rarely extending outside of the contemporaneous period. In the pre-direct rule period, a standard deviation increase of four civilian deaths is associated with four additional Loyalist-claimed deaths within the first post-shock month. Violent retaliation in the 1990s is also similar in size to a tit-for-tat response, but the increase in violence is one-time and temporary. In both periods, an immediate and sizeable response addresses constituent demands for militant protection in the absence of effective state security provision, while the temporary nature of the response appeases constituents with more uncertain attitudes towards violence.


In contrast, Loyalist responses in the three periods between 1972 and 1990, when Protestant support for violence as a political tool is substantially lower, are small in size and generally fall short of statistical significance. In the direct rule period, the Loyalist response to Protestant civilian deaths is initially negative, and subsequent positive responses fall short of statistical significance. In the 1974-1985 and 1985-1990 periods, a standard deviation shock in Protestant civilian deaths is associated with an increase of less than a single Loyalist-claimed fatality. The small response to civilian deaths in the post-AIA period is somewhat surprising, given some qualitative evidence of Protestant

radicalization and intensified demands for violence by Protestant constituents after the unpopular AIA. However, it is possible that it takes Protestant militant groups some time after the AIA to achieve the operational strength necessary for a consistent pattern of retaliatory violence.

As shown in Figure 7.8, Loyalist responses to militant fatalities are small and often negative, reflecting the more marginal position of Loyalist groups in Protestant society. As one woman notes “ ‘people in the Ardoyne can understand why there was an attack against the UDA. That people were killed is a tragedy but if it had been 10 UDA men then no one here would have cared’ ” (Bowcott, *Guardian* 1993). Figure 7.8 shows that during both the pre-direct rule and the direct rule periods, Loyalist violence declines following Loyalist militant deaths. In the pre-direct rule period, one additional Loyalist militant death results in an immediate decline of three Loyalist-claimed deaths. The response under direct rule implies a larger drop in Loyalist-claimed deaths of five fatalities, while that in the 1974-1985 period reflects a smaller one-death decline in Loyalist activity. Only in the post-AIA period do Loyalist groups respond violently to militant deaths. A one militant death shock during this period is associated with a contemporaneous increase in militant-claimed deaths of almost one fatality. Rising political disaffection and associated tolerance for armed resistance are two key drivers of the more significant violent response in this period. While UDA leaders prior to 1987 “kept a tight rein on the hotheads”, after 1987 “the old guard began to lose its grip” leading to an intensification of Loyalist violence (Bruce, *Guardian* 1992c) that is supported and encouraged primarily by the demands of Protestant hard-liners. As above,

therefore, conflict escalation owes much to the activity and political pressure exerted by hardliners and extremists.

Figure 7.8
Loyalist Response to Protestant Fatalities
Response to Civilian Deaths



Response to Militant Deaths

Violent Responses, Loyalist-claimed Fatalities						
Pre-Direct (5 lags)	+4 (1 SD) Prot. Civilian Deaths			+1 Loyalist (5 SD) Militant Death		
Response Month	Response	95% CI		Response	95% CI	
0	2.34	1.49	3.19	-2.97	-5.93	-0.01
1	1.58	0.46	2.70	-1.37	-5.49	2.75
2	1.06	-0.11	2.23	-2.45	-7.12	2.22
3	0.47	-0.69	1.63	-0.23	-5.05	4.59
Direct Rule- Oct. 1974 (7 lags)	+4 (1 SD) Prot. Civilian Deaths			+1 Loyalist (2 SD) Militant Death		
Response Month	Response	95% CI		Response	95% CI	
0	-0.38	-0.66	-0.11	-0.87	-1.34	-0.40
1	0.64	-0.28	1.56	-4.82	-6.20	-3.45
2	0.52	-0.39	1.42	-0.34	-2.31	1.63
3	0.69	-0.12	1.51	0.18	-1.76	2.11
Oct. 1974-Nov. 1985 (8 lags)	+2.5 (1 SD) Prot. Civilian Death			+1 Loyalist (3 SD) Militant Death		
Response Month	Response	95% CI		Response	95% CI	
0	0.57	0.36	0.78	0.05	-0.55	0.64
1	0.18	-0.04	0.41	-1.06	-1.74	-0.39
2	0.16	-0.09	0.41	0.56	-0.21	1.34
3	0.12	-0.13	0.37	0.40	-0.36	1.17
Nov. 1985-Nov. 1990 (8 lags)	+1.6 (1 SD) Prot. Civilian Death			+1 Loyalist (3 SD) Militant Death		
Response Month	Response	95% CI		Response	95% CI	
0	0.28	0.10	0.45	0.80	0.33	1.27
1	-0.20	-0.38	-0.01	0.40	-0.13	0.93
2	0.21	0.03	0.38	0.05	-0.51	0.62
3	-0.02	-0.19	0.15	-0.25	-0.83	0.33
Major (1 lag)	+1.6 (1 SD) Prot. Civilian Death			+1 Loyalist (2 SD) Militant Death		
Response Month	Response	95% CI		Response	95% CI	
0	1.66	1.15	2.18	-0.03	-0.92	0.86
1	0.54	-0.04	1.12	0.45	-0.65	1.55
2	0.15	-0.12	0.42	0.08	-0.18	0.34
3	0.05	-0.07	0.17	0.04	-0.09	0.16

Violent responses by both Protestant and Catholic groups closely follow constituent preferences and demands. Violent retaliation is most likely when Catholic and

Protestant constituents are confident in the efficacy of militant violence as a political tool or are disillusioned with political alternatives. Violent responses by both the IRA and Loyalist paramilitaries are largest prior to 1974 and after 1990, periods when high expected military efficacy and few appealing political alternatives contribute to widespread support for violence. The IRA's more consistent use of violence and responses to militant deaths reflect its more embedded position in Catholic communities and more robust support among Catholics for the group's political goals and objectives. Constituent Service arguments also explain the *lack* of violent retaliation in the 1980s as a manifestation of low perceived military efficacy, conflict fatigue, and support for political solutions. Signaling and tit-for-tat arguments, in contrast, offer less insight into periods of restraint and the small size of most responses to violence.

What are the Political Implications of Responsive Non-State Violence?


The final set of results considers the political implications of paramilitary violence for the perpetrating group and affiliated political parties. As in previous examples, responsive IRA and Loyalist violence has few observable implications for legitimate political parties, rarely benefits hard-line political actors, and attracts new supporters to perpetrating militant groups only when the response matches public demands. On the Catholic side, Figure 7.9 shows no evidence of an increase in support for Sinn Fein following pre-election IRA violence against Protestant civilians, although the two trends do move together prior to 1985. In fact, Sinn Fein's share of the Catholic vote appears to decline when pre-election violence by the IRA is high in the late 1980s, additional evidence for the general rejection of militant violence by this point in the

conflict. A Sinn Fein political representative argues that severe IRA violence is “ ‘an absolute disaster for us...politically we have not shot ourselves in the foot, we have shot ourselves in the head’ ” (Hearst and Naughtie, *Guardian* 1987). Pre-election violence directed explicitly against British Army personnel also shows little association with support for Sinn Fein, despite assertions by IRA commanders and Sinn Fein’s political leadership that Catholic voters support IRA violence against ‘legitimate’ targets.

Although the electoral implications of responsive IRA terrorism are limited, qualitative accounts suggest that violence by the IRA *does* consolidate direct support for the IRA. However, this relationship exists only when IRA violence matches constituent preferences and demands. First-hand accounts suggest that IRA violence during the 1970s, especially attacks on state targets, attracts new support and recruits. One commentator notes, “in some ghetto areas of Belfast, [the PIRA] enjoys almost total support from the ordinary people,” because the group uses violence to protect Catholic interests and Nationalist goals (Wilson and Chesshyre, *Observer* 1971). IRA violence also has some political implications at later points in the conflict, primarily among militant Catholics who support violence. Reports from Catholic areas following several successful IRA attacks predict that the attacks are likely to “revive morale among *militant* Irish nationalists after a string of setbacks in the past year” (italics added, Costello, *Courier-Mail* 1987). Violence has the opposite effect on support for the IRA in the 1980s, when Catholic voters are less supportive of militant violence. In the late 1980s one analyst notes that the IRA has “lost substantial support in the republican community” following a string of unpopular violent actions (DeYoung, *Washington Post* 1988). A

leader of Sinn Fein confirms, “ ‘the republican movement has had a very bad run’ ”
 (DeYoung, *Washington Post* 1988).

Figure 7.9
Electoral Implications of IRA Violence for Catholic Parties




The graph is divided into three periods: 1983 to 1985, 1985-1989, and 1989 to the GFA. In the 1983 to 1985 period, increasing IRA violence is associated with rising support for Sinn Fein. In the 1985 to 1989 period, IRA-claimed violence results in a loss of support for Sinn Fein. In the 1990 to 1998 period, Sinn Fein gains support as violence falls to zero.

Conclusion: Sinn Fein gains from IRA violence ONLY prior to 1985, if at all.

Pre-election violence by Loyalist groups against Catholic civilians has few political implications for either the UUP or the DUP. In fact, Figure 7.10 shows some evidence that the DUP is punished for Loyalist violence that kills Catholic civilians. The political gains accrued by Loyalist militant groups are also more limited than those earned by the IRA because of the more constrained support for violence on the Protestant side. Violence perpetrated when Protestant constituents do support violence has some positive political implications for Loyalist paramilitaries. For example, in the 1970s, violence by Loyalist militants consolidates political support among Protestants who are

“ ‘prepared to go to any lengths to prevent change [in the political status quo]’ ” and who “believe fighting the IRA is the only way” to achieve key political goals (Chesshyre, *Observer* 1972). Attacks that kill known IRA members have particularly positive implications for Loyalist groups. One Protestant notes “ ‘everybody condemns loyalist violence, then they say 'but' . . . Certainly when an obvious republican gets shot many feel, well that's one person we can happily do without’ ” (McKittrick, *Independent* 1993). However, when support for violence is low in the late 1970s and early 1980s, violence often provokes Protestant backlash that weakens support for paramilitary groups. According to a 1976 report, “a backlash by the public against the actions of the

Figure 7.10
Electoral Implications of Loyalist Violence for Protestant Parties



The graph above is divided into four periods: direct rule (1972-1974), post-direct rule through AIA (1974-1985), AIA to Major’s Administration (1985-1990), and Major’s Administration through the Good Friday Accords (1990-1998). Only in 1974 and the late 1980s is there any evidence that more significant pre-election violence against Catholic civilians killed is associated with rising support for the DUP. In other periods, DUP gains when violence decreases.

Conclusion: DUP gains from Loyalist violence ONLY in early 1970s and late 1980s if at all.

Ulster Defense Association is growing.... it [is] clear from widespread comments in Protestant areas of Belfast yesterday that the recent UDA campaign...has won the organization no friends” (Brown, *Guardian* 1976). The political benefits of violence as a tool, therefore, depend on constituent preferences.

Responsive violence by Loyalist and Republican paramilitary groups increases support for the perpetrating militant group only when this violence matches constituent demands and has few positive political implications for hard-line political parties. These limited political implications are consistent with Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service. Because the efficacy of violence as a political tool is widely uncertain and because voters incorporate expectations about violence into their initial political attitudes, hard-line parties are as likely to be punished for their association with paramilitary violence as they are to be rewarded for its use. However, when violence matches demands and achieves desired outcomes, it increases support for the perpetrators. Violence does serve as a political tool for militant groups, but its utility is based on constituent demands, rather than its success as a signal or deterrent.

Discussion

British and sectarian violence during Northern Ireland’s ‘Troubles’ only results in demands for retaliation when targeted constituents expect paramilitary violence to protect or advance their security interests more effectively than political alternatives, and both Loyalist and Republican groups use violence according to constituent demands. On the Catholic side, Catholic fatalities lead to constituent demands for retaliation only prior to 1985, when the lack of political alternatives increases support for violence. These

demands for violence increase support for the IRA, but have limited effects on electoral outcomes. Sinn Fein is most often punished for its association with violence. IRA violence closely follows constituent demands and is most likely after civilian and militant deaths in the 1970s and early 1980s. Among Protestants, demands for violence follow Protestant fatalities when political failures or escalating Catholic violence suggest the necessity of paramilitary violence. Demands for violence appear most often as increased support for paramilitary groups, although the DUP sometimes benefits from conflict escalation when support for violence is high. Loyalist violence follows constituent demands and is most likely after civilian deaths. Although Catholic and Protestant militant groups gain from their own violence when it matches constituent demands, responsive violence has little impact on electoral outcomes. These results are consistent with Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service and are summarized in Table 7.3.

Table 7.3
Were the Hypotheses Supported?: *Northern Ireland*

Hypothesis	Result
H1. Political responses to violence are more likely after civilian fatalities than militant deaths.	Supported (with caveats). Political response to civilian deaths is larger than response to militant deaths, especially true on the Protestant side of the conflict and later in the conflict.
H2. Demands for violence after sectarian violence are most likely in the 1970s and for Protestants also in the 1990s (threat severe, military efficacy high).	Supported.
H3. Disaffection is most likely after civilian deaths in the 1980s and 1990s.	Supported. Low turnout, abstention, and voting for the Alliance Party reveal disaffection after pre-election violence.
H4a. Demands for violence are encouraged by intractability early in the conflict, but flexibility emerges over time.	Supported (qualitatively). Supported with comparison to Palestinian case.
H4b. Demands for violence are encouraged by political competition.	Supported (qualitatively).
H5. The size, duration, and likelihood of violent responses rises with the size of the political response, so should be largest after Catholic civilian and militant deaths prior to 1985 and after Protestant civilian deaths in the 1970s and 1990s.	Supported. Response size, likelihood fall over time, but renewed violence in 1990s.
H6. (states only)	NA
H7. (non-state only) Violent responses by Catholic groups are larger than those of Loyalist groups, especially after militant deaths.	Supported (with caveats). Catholic violence generally larger after civilian and militant death with exception of 1990s.
H8. Responsive terror attacks have few political implications for legitimate parties.	Supported.
H9. Violent responses only increase support for perpetrating groups where they match constituent preferences and appear to achieve desired outcomes (1970s for IRA, early 1970s and 1990s for Loyalist)	Supported (qualitatively).

A synthesis of the results from the Northern Ireland and British cases and a comparison of this example to the Second Intifada offer insight into the types of conflict dynamics and counterterror strategies most likely to encourage a lasting political settlement. First, in each case, constituent expectations and local political dynamics affect

the timing and intensity of violence and serve as key mechanisms of conflict de-escalation. Protestant and Catholic voters are most likely to demand violence when the expected efficacy of violence exceeds confidence in political strategies. As a result and as in previous cases, policies that are able to shift this balance between expected military efficacy and political optimism by increasing the appeal of political opportunities and building confidence in political alternatives can encourage de-escalation by discouraging demands for violence.

Lasting de-escalation is encouraged in Northern Ireland by counterterrorism and mediation strategies that simultaneously erode the perceived efficacy of paramilitary violence, build confidence in political approaches, and address the grievances that drive support for violence. Effective use of law enforcement-based counterterrorism in Northern Ireland serves several purposes. First, it reduces the capabilities of Protestant and Catholic paramilitary groups and does so without spectacular violence likely to cause severe backlash. At the same time, law enforcement-based approaches reduce the severity of the British threat and suggest a state actor committed to the rule of law, a reputation that reduces the necessity of paramilitary violence from the Catholic perspective. Finally, counterterrorism that relies on regular law enforcement techniques equates terrorism with average criminal behavior and weakens the emotive power that is so important to terrorist recruiting and retention. The Northern Ireland example recommends the benefits of a law enforcement-based approach to counterterrorism. In the Palestinian case, however, it is unclear whether law enforcement approaches alone will be effective in controlling or reducing the more significant and emotionally charged violence. Although the Palestinian police force has shown periods of relative efficacy and moderate strength, further reform,

training, and strengthening of Palestinian police forces is needed before law enforcement counterterrorism can guide conflict de-escalation in the Palestinian case. Contributing to police reform and training may be one area where international assistance can be especially effective in promoting lasting conflict de-escalation.

De-escalation is also encouraged in Northern Ireland by real attention to the political and economic drivers of support for violence and local political dynamics, particularly among Catholics. The Anglo-Irish Agreement, Sinn Fein's participation in elections and political negotiations, economic incentives, and legal reforms that address Catholic claims of discrimination are all steps that help consolidate Catholic support for political accommodation and their gradual rejection of violence by offering observable evidence that political strategies can effectively advance security and protect constituent interests (Ellison and Smyth 2000; Honaker 2008; McAllister 2004). For the Palestinian case, the success of locally-focused political and economic tools in Northern Ireland suggest that internal political reform of the Palestinian Authority and local government bodies that reduce corruption, create more effective political opportunities, and facilitate the provision of demanded social services may support de-escalation by eliminating grievances that currently drive support for violence and reducing the relative appeal of armed resistance.

The 'Troubles' case also confirms the importance of response and intervention timing to conflict settlement and offers insight into the specific factors most essential to the conclusion of a successful, lasting political agreement. In the Palestinian example, the outcomes of military-based counterterror interventions differ over time according to constituent expectations. In the Northern Ireland case, the outcomes of attempts at

political settlement similarly vary based on constituent attitudes. In the 1970s, military efficacy exceeds political optimism among Catholics and Protestants, undermining British attempts to impose political solutions. In the 1980s, Catholic attitudes begin to shift, but hard-liners on both sides prevent movement towards a political solution. Only in the 1990s does conflict fatigue, relatively successful ceasefires by Catholic and Protestant groups, and early progress in inclusive negotiations encourage the political confidence necessary to support a lasting settlement.

The relative success of political negotiations in the 1990s compared to failed attempts in previous decades can be attributed to at least three factors: constituent expectations and preferences for political solutions; successful reframing of the conflict's core issues; and the buy-in of hard-liners on each side of the conflict. First, constituent expectations about the necessity of a political solution place pressure on political and militant group leaders on both sides of the conflict to reach an acceptable political agreement. The lack of this pressure in previous decades and even open resistance to compromise can explain the failure of previous attempts to reach a lasting political solution. Second, efforts to reframe the core motivating issues of the 'Troubles' reinforce lasting de-escalation by increasing the potential for a political settlement and the acceptability of political compromise. The structure of the negotiations used in the 1990s contributes to the reframing of the conflict in ways that support de-escalation. By dividing the negotiations into three 'strands,' each focused on a specific dimension of the conflict, negotiators are able to identify areas where overlapping Catholic and Protestant interests facilitate easy agreements as well as hard issues that are more resistant to settlement. Finally, the buy-in and support of hard-liners on each side of the conflict

contributes directly to success of negotiations in the 1990s and the endurance of the Good Friday Accords. The inclusion of hard-liners in the 1990s supports the success of political negotiations and the success of the Good Friday Accords by making political compromise robust to isolated incidents of sectarian violence.

For the Israeli-Palestinian example, these observations suggest three parallel recommendations. First, a lasting political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must emerge from the bottom-up and have widespread support from both the Israeli and Palestinian sides of the conflict. Second, although attempts to reframe the Israeli-Palestinian conflict's intractable issues will be more complicated than is true in Northern Ireland, future negotiations may be more successful if they split off easy to solve areas of mutual agreement and focus on building trust with side agreements. Finally, although directly engaging with Hamas is controversial, the Northern Ireland experience suggests that a lasting political settlement will need to find creative ways to incorporate Hamas supporters and mid-level leaders as well as other Palestinian (and Israeli) hard-liners.

Chapter 8

Extending Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service: Conflict Dynamics in Chechnya, Sri Lanka, Iraq, and Pakistan

Introduction

Constituent expectations drive demands for violence, the timing of armed retaliation, and de-escalation in the Second Intifada and Northern Ireland's 'Troubles.' In each case, qualitative and quantitative findings support Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service more directly than the predictions of conventional wisdom and much existing literature. Constituent demands for violence occur only when the expected efficacy of violence exceeds political confidence, and retaliatory violence is most likely when it is supported by constituent demands. As a result, conflict de-escalation is a bottom-up process that is driven by constituent expectations and demands. A comparison of the two extended cases identify the severity of the external threat, the tractability of the conflict, past military outcomes, existing political opportunities, and political competition as some of the determinants that shape constituent expectations and demands for violence. Demands for violence appear most likely when the external threat is severe, the core issues of the conflict intractable, political opportunities limited or unappealing, and political competition over security policy intense. The timing and form of violent retaliation closely follows constituent demands.

The qualitative and quantitative results of the extended case studies suggest further that counterterror policies able to undermine the confidence of non-state publics

in the efficacy of violence as a political tool or increase the appeal of political alternatives can encourage the de-escalation of a protracted conflict by eliminating demands for violence and placing bottom-up constraints on retaliation. This observation has potentially significant implications for the management and resolution of protracted conflicts because it identifies fairly straightforward and specific mechanisms that political and military leaders can target to reduce and control conflict violence. However, the use of only two cases raises the question of generalizability. In this chapter, I address this issue, using qualitative case studies of four additional protracted conflicts—that between Russia and Chechnya, the Sri Lankan Civil War, the Iraqi insurgency since 2003, and Pakistan’s conflict with militant groups since 2001—to evaluate the relevance of this dissertation’s theoretical argument in a wider set of contexts.

Although distinct local political contexts make the political and violent dynamics in each of these conflicts different, the mechanisms of Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service are supported in each example. In all four cases, demands for violence are shaped by constituent beliefs about military efficacy and political opportunities, and the use of violence follows constituent demands. Demands for violence are most likely when political alternatives are weak or unappealing and when military or militant-based strategies appear to advance important political goals. Violent retaliation is consistent when supported by the local population, but unlikely when local constituents turn against armed approaches as unnecessary or ineffective. De-escalation is, therefore, a bottom-up process driven by constituent expectations rather than one led by elites.

Case 1: First and Second Chechen Wars

The political and violent dynamics observed in the First and Second Chechen Wars offer significant support for Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service. On each side of the conflict, demands for violence occur only when constituents expect violence to achieve important political objectives more effectively than legitimate political alternatives, based on their evaluation of past outcomes, assessments of the current threat, and expectations about future violence. Low political interest in Chechnya and a peripheral violent threat constrain support for violence among Russian voters, while limited support for the goals of active militant groups after 1997 makes political compromise popular among Chechens. State and non-state violence adheres to constituent demands, falling in intensity with constituent support for military activities.

Although tension between Chechens and Russians extends back hundreds of years, renewed violence in the 1990s was triggered by regional instability and competing claims of sovereignty following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The First Chechen War began as a civil conflict within the Chechen Republic, following the 1993 declaration of independence by Chechen leader Dudayev. Russian forces allied with these opposition groups entered Chechnya in December 1994, hoping for a quick victory that would re-establish a new pro-Russia government in the Republic. However, Chechen fighters successfully repelled Russian advances at many points, using both traditional and guerilla tactics. Fighting culminated in the Battle of Grozny in 1995, in which Russian forces finally defeated Chechen militants and took control of the city. After Dudayev was assassinated in 1996, Yeltsin called a ceasefire that ended official Russian military operations and gave Chechnya regional autonomy. Violence continued in the region,

encouraged by an influx of foreign Islamist fighters, escalating in the late 1990s with Chechen attacks on Russian police and border troops.⁸³

The Second Chechen war began in August 1999 with the official intention of subduing rebel fighters in the Caucasus Mountains and the unofficial goal of reasserting Russian control of the region. The immediate precipitant of the attack was a series of apartment bombings in Russian cities, used by Putin to win a mandate for his military deployment.⁸⁴ The conflict terminated the defacto independence of the Republic of Ichkeria and re-established direct Russian rule over Chechnya in May 2000. Although this ended the official war, it marked only the start of an insurgency led by Chechen nationalists and Islamist foreign fighters. Militant violence in Chechnya included mass casualty attacks against Russian civilian targets, such as the Dubrovka theater siege, the Beslan attack, and several major suicide bomb attacks on Russian airliners. Russians retaliated with air strikes and ground operations on Chechen populations. The official end to counterterror operations was announced in April 2009. However, violence continued and in 2010, Chechen militants launched several major bombings in Russian cities.

Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service predict a different set of political and violent dynamics in the Chechen conflict than most existing literature. The first column of Table 8.1a and 8.1b outlines these differences.⁸⁵ On the Russian side of the conflict, repression-radicalization and rally arguments suggest that Chechen violence and especially attacks on civilians inside of Russia consistently increase support for

⁸³ Tracey German, *Russia's Chechen War* (London: Routledge, 2005).; Mark Kramer, "The perils of counterinsurgency," *International Security* 29, no. 2 (2005): 5-63.

⁸⁴ Kramer, "Perils," 2005.

⁸⁵ As defined in chapter one, 'repression-radicalization' arguments are those that predict immediate radicalization following state repression; 'rally' arguments are those that predict incumbent based rallies following violent attacks; 'tit-for-tat' arguments expect violence that occurs in eye-for-an-eye patterns of attack and counterattack; and 'signaling' arguments describe violence as a tool used to reveal type or resolve.

military counterterrorism, the deployment of Russian troops, and the Russian incumbent, Putin in the case of the Second Chechen War. Applied to Chechnya, these same arguments predict that severe Russian counterterrorism and its high collateral damage contribute to demands for violence by Chechen civilians that increase political support for Chechen groups and lead to violent backlash against Russian troops. Tit-for-tat arguments expect significant violent retaliation by both Russian and Chechen actors that immediately follows the initial, precipitating attack. Signaling approaches also expect violent responses by the state and militant groups, but interpret violent retaliation as an attempt by each actor to build a hard-line, aggressive reputation (Walter 2006).

Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service predict more infrequent demands for violence and internal constraints on the use of violent retaliation on both sides of the conflict, particularly as the Second Chechen War endures. According to Retrospective Projection, Russian and Chechen constituents radicalize and demand hard-line, military-based counterterrorism only when they expect armed responses to advance political goals or provide security more effectively than political alternatives. Because military and militant violence are consistently unable to achieve desired political goals, constituent demands for violence should be infrequent on both sides of the conflict during the Second Chechen War, occurring only in the rare periods where violence does appear effective, between 1999 and 2000 in Russia and during the First Chechen War in Chechnya. In all other periods, political responses by Russian and Chechen voters are most likely to support political compromises. Constituent Service arguments predict violence that matches constituent demands and declines over the course of the conflict.

Table 8.1a
Expectations of Competing Explanations: State Examples

Following a terror attack	Russia	Sri Lanka	Iraq	Pakistan (non-FATA)
Retrospective Projection & Constituent Service Demand for and use of violence	1999-2000 ↑ 2001-2009 ↓	1980s ↑ 1999-2000 ↑ 1990s; 2001-2005 ↓ After 2005 ↑	Shiite and Sunni: Until 2007 ↑ After 2007 ↓	Support for state and military CT: Until 2009 ↓ After 2009 ↑
Rally Support for <i>incumbent</i> (regardless of party)	↑ Putin	↑	↑	↑
Repression → Radicalization Demand for and use of violence	↑	↑	↑	↑
Tit-for-Tat Demand for and use of violence	↑	↑	↑	↑
Signaling Use of violence	↑	↑	↑	↑

Table 8.1b
Expectations of Competing Explanations: Non-State Examples

Following counterterror violence	Chechnya	Tamils	Pakistan (FATA)
Retrospective Projection & Constituent Service Demand for and use of violence	1994-1996 ↑ 1999-2009 ↓	Support for LTTE: 1980s ↑ 1990s* ↔ After 2001 ↓ *Support for LTTE falls, but lack of alternatives prevents moderation	Support for militants (Taliban/AQ): Until 2009 ↑ After 2009* ↔ *After 2009, support for militants falls, but support for military CT remains low
Rally Support for <i>targeted militants</i>	↑	↑	↑
Repression → Radicalization Demand for and use of violence	↑	↑	↑
Tit-for-Tat Demand for and use of violence	↑	↑	↑
Signaling Use of violence	↑	↑	↑

Trends in Russian political responses to Chechen violence follow the expectations of Retrospective Projection more closely than the predictions of rally or repression-radicalization arguments. Demands for violent retaliation by Russian voters in 1999 reflect the belief that the escalating threat presented by a more extreme Chechen militancy requires an aggressive military-based response. Public opinion polls confirm that Russian constituent demands for violence in 1999 are not reflexive, but instead reflect a measured political reaction that incorporates expectations about future violence, political alternatives, and leader competence. Polls taken just before the offensive show that 64% of Russians support the initial deployment of troops in 1999 as the most effective way to deal with apparently escalating Chechen terrorism.⁸⁶ Initial military successes encourage some additional support for violence and consolidate Putin's political base.

However, even significant Chechen attacks after 2002 trigger domestic pressure for a political resolution because Russian voters lose confidence in military-based strategies following significant military disappointments and continuing violence. Expected military efficacy is eroded in Russia by successful Chechen operations like the Dubrovka theater siege and the Beslan hostage crisis and the simple continuation of conflict violence. In the aftermath of the Beslan incident, in 2004, there is a clear consensus among Russian voters that “a campaign to win an overwhelming military victory in Chechnya appears remote” and that Putin's refusal to negotiate with Chechen

⁸⁶ Matthew Evangelista, *The Chechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union?* (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2002). There is much speculation about Federal Security Service (FSB) involvement in the 1999 apartment bombings in Moscow. Although never proven, some claim that Putin arranged the attacks to create a popular mandate for the deployment.

militant leaders only contributes to violent escalation.⁸⁷ After the 2002 Dubrovka theater siege, political analysts report that Putin faces strong domestic pressure to “bring the Chechen war to a rapid close, if necessary by negotiations.”⁸⁸ Demands for violence by Russian voters are also limited by the peripheral nature of the Chechen threat. Because Russians are willing to give Chechnya independence in return for stability and the economic benefits of peace, an extensive, costly military deployment does not appear necessary. One political analyst argues, “ ‘people don’t know and don’t want to know what’s happening in Chechnya.’ ”⁸⁹ Importantly, the rejection by Russian voters of military involvement in Chechnya occurs despite the centralized control of the Russian media and manipulation intended to encourage support for military-based counterterrorism. The Russian reaction to military failures, therefore, offers fairly strong support for the independence of constituent expectations and attitudes towards violence.

Trends in Russian counterterrorism closely follow constituent demands and the expectations of a Constituent Service argument. Russian counterterror strategy in Chechnya relies almost exclusively on military activities when Russian voters support the use of violence, but incorporates political elements when Russian voters grow tired of violence and demand a political solution after 2003. Constituent attitudes also shape the timing the 1999 offensive. Despite his own strong preference for the deployment of Russian troops into Chechnya, Putin waits to begin the military offensive until after the apartment bombings win him the necessary domestic support. Even if, as some critics

⁸⁷ Jim Heintz, “Putin’s Chechen policy fails to stop bloodshed, gives him little room for maneuver,” Associated Press, September 1, 2004.

⁸⁸ Bernard Besserglik, “Hostage crisis racks up pressure on Putin to end war,” Agence France Presse, October 25, 2002. His assessment is based on Russian newspaper editorials, anti-war protests, and TV broadcasts.

⁸⁹ Jim Heintz, “Terrorism won’t change a thing,” Associated Press, September 3, 2004, quoting Yuri Korgonyuk, INDEM political institute.

suggest, Putin orders the Federal Security Service (FSB) to carry out the bombings to manipulate constituent demands, the fact that he feels the need to create a violent precipitant and consolidate support prior to the deployment suggests the constraints of constituent tolerance. The more political approach Putin adopts in 2003 is similarly a response to constituent preferences and demands. Chechenization included constitutional revisions, the election of a new Chechen president, and amnesty to certain Chechen militants. Although these reforms serve a pragmatic purpose and are intended to improve Chechnya's security situation, they also address the demands of Russian voters for a reduced Russian military presence. Because they are congruent with constituent demands, political reforms consolidate Putin's political support.⁹⁰ By June 2006, 35% of Russian citizens express a belief that the situation in Chechnya is improving because of these political advances.⁹¹

The political and violent response dynamics on the Chechen side of the conflict are consistent with Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service, but depart from conventional arguments that expect state repression to immediately follow demands for additional violence. In Chechnya, constituents demand violence only during the First Chechen War when militant violence appears effective against Russian troops and support for the nationalist political goals of Chechen militant groups is high. As one reporter describes, "in the first war, Chechens fed, financed and sheltered the militants in the hope that Chechnya could win its independence."⁹²

⁹⁰ Public Opinion Foundation, "Russians optimistic about Kadyrov's possible appointment as Chechen president," March 1, 2007.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Sharon LaFraniere, "Chechens view themselves as hostages of war," Washington Foreign Press Service, November 10, 2002. Based on interviews with Chechen civilians in aftermath of Dubrovka hostage crisis.

Chechen voters do not demand violent retaliation during the Second Chechen War, however, because they view the undisciplined violence used by Islamist militants as destructive rather than as a tool that can be used to achieve political objectives. As one Chechen police official reports in 2002 “ ‘Maskhadov and Basayev have long lost touch with the people. The people are living other lives, while they are bandits.’ ”⁹³ Limited support for violence in Chechnya is confirmed empirically. A matched comparison of Chechen villages shows that militant violence is less likely to originate from villages directly affected by Russian air strikes than those that are not, suggesting that in the aftermath of these strikes, affected residents do not radicalize, but reject militant groups and their violence, by denying them shelter or other resources.⁹⁴ Surveys conducted during this same period similarly show that, despite some individual radicalization,⁹⁵ “the [Chechen] public as a whole favors peace, even at the price of national independence.”⁹⁶

By offering political alternatives (albeit weak and often corrupt ones) that advance Chechen confidence and interest in political accommodation and stability, Putin’s political reforms in 2003 further reduce Chechen support for militant violence. A poll in 2003 finds that after the introduction of political reforms and in the lead up to Chechnya’s presidential elections, a majority of Chechen respondents support continued

⁹³ Interview with Chechen Police Chief, “Basayev has no forces for large-scale acts of terrorism,” Interfax, November 24, 2002.

⁹⁴ Jason Lyall, “Does indiscriminate violence incite insurgent attacks,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53, no. 3 (2009): 331-362.

⁹⁵ The ‘Black Widows’ are a group of female suicide bombers, who are allegedly radicalized and motivated to carry out suicide attacks after the deaths of their brothers or husbands at the hands of Russian soldiers. See Simon Shuster, “ ‘Black Widows recruited for terrorism in Russia,’ ” *Time Magazine*, April 7, 2009; Anne Speckhard and Khapta Ahkmedova, “The making of a martyr: Chechen suicide terrorism,” *Journal of Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 29, no. 5 (2006): 429-492.

⁹⁶ Speckhard and Ahkmedova, “The making of a martyr,” 2006, 441. Based on extensive interviews with family and friends of Chechen suicide bombers between 2000 and 2005.

ties with Russia over separatist leaders.⁹⁷ As in previous cases, demands for violence occur only when constituents expect violence to be more effective than a political alternative or perceive of violence as the only viable option.

There is some evidence that violent retaliation by Chechen militant groups follows the demands of local Chechen constituents. Empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that militant groups, especially those with nationalist goals, do consider constituent preferences and use violence to attract political support. For example, an analysis of trends in Chechen violence in the period between 1997 and 2003 suggests close attention by Chechen groups to constituent preferences in the choice of attack targets. Chechen militant groups attack civilian targets only inside of Russia and focus on military ones inside of Chechnya in order to limit collateral damage of Chechen civilians. One analyst notes that by attending to the targeting preferences of supporters, Chechen “terrorists are able to maintain public support within Chechnya while still causing great harm to the Russian populace.”⁹⁸

Islamist militant groups in Chechnya, including those behind mass casualty attacks like that in Beslan and at the Dubrovka theater, appear more willing to deviate from the preferences of local Chechens. However, those groups that do violate the tolerance of Chechen supporters are often punished with the loss of local resources and protection. For example, although Islamist militant groups and those led by Basayev are able to operate even without local support by relying on external donors, the lack of indigenous support ultimately constrains the ability of these groups to perpetrate

⁹⁷ Vadim Rechkalov, “Chechens want a president from Moscow,” *Izvestiya*, February 19, 2003. Based on poll by Chechnya’s Press Ministry in lead up to elections.

⁹⁸ Lisa McCartan et al., “Logic of terrorist target choice: An examination of Chechen rebel bombings From 1997-2003,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 31, no. 1 (2008): 60-79.

successful attacks. One Chechen police official notes in 2002 that without local support “ ‘Basayev and his men do not have [the] potential to commit large terrorist attacks.’ ”⁹⁹ The presence of outside support weakens the association between constituent demands and violence in the Chechen example, but constituent preferences still affect the timing and form of militant violence.

As expected by Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service, on both the Chechen and the Russian side of the conflict, demands for and the use violence occur only when the relevant constituency expects this violence to achieve political goals more effectively than political alternatives. Military disappointments and new political alternatives appear to weaken support for violence, strengthen internal pressure for a political solution, and place some constraints on the use of violence by state and non-state actors. As a result, the de-escalation of the Second Chechen War is as much a bottom-up process driven by constituent expectations as it is a top-down, leader initiated one. Table 8.2 and 8.3 summarize the influence of key domestic determinants in this example.

Although this example is similar to the Second Intifada and ‘Troubles’ cases, the conflict between Russia and Chechnya is also distinct in several ways that affect the evolution of political and violent response dynamics. First, Russia’s weak democracy gives Putin more flexibility in his use of violence than either British or Israeli leaders. Even after implementing the Chechenization program and despite strong domestic objections to Russian military involvement in the region, Putin is able to continue Russian ‘mop up’ operations and exploit media coverage to limit public attention to military setbacks. Conflict dynamics on the Chechen side are distinct from previous

⁹⁹ Interview with Chechen Police Chief, “Basayev has no forces for large-scale acts of terrorism,” *Interfax*, November 24, 2002.

examples due to the marginalized position of militant groups. While the embeddedness of IRA and Palestinian militants in their local communities creates a robust support for violence, alienation between Chechens and Chechen militant groups explain the more infrequent constituent demands for violence and the more rapid onset of conflict fatigue in the Chechen example. However, neither Putin’s semi-authoritarian position nor the more independent and autonomous position of Chechen militant groups eliminates the relevance of constituent demands to conflict dynamics.

Table 8.2
Demands for & the Use of Violence: What Matters? *Russia*

Determinant	In Russia	Demands for and the use of violence
Severity of Threat	Low with some exceptions: 1999 apartment bombs, Dubrovka (2002), Beslan (2004)	↓
Intractability	Low	↓
Expected Military Efficacy	High only 1999-2000, low afterwards	↓ *Exception: encourages support for violence 1999-2000
Political Optimism	Moderate. Russians prefer political settlement to continued deployment and support Chechenization.	↓
Political Competition	True competition is limited, but Putin uses the conflict to eliminate rivals and propaganda to encourage demands for violence.	↑
Political Institutions	Putin’s consolidated control increases clarity, but reduces incentives for political responses to violence. Media control allows him to diffuse blame.	↔
Duration	Support for military counterterrorism falls after 2001 with increasing military failures.	↓

Table 8.3
Demands for & the Use of Violence: What Matters? *Chechnya*

Determinant	In Chechnya	Demands for and Use of Violence
Severity of Threat	High (indiscriminate Russian air strikes).	↑
Intractability	Low to Moderate. Nationalist demands are fungible. Most Chechens prefer stability to independence.	↓
Expected Military Efficacy	Moderate 1994-1995, low otherwise. Political solutions more appealing after 2003.	↓ *Exception: encourages demands for violence 1994-1995
Political Optimism	Initially low, but rises with Chechenization and benefits of stability.	↓
Political Competition	Competition between 'legitimate' Chechen state and militant groups has mixed effects. Competition between militant groups incentivizes violence.	↔
Political Institutions	Weak political opportunities limit chances for political engagement, but also reduce clarity of responsibility.	↑
Duration	Support for military violence is low starting in the mid-1990s and falls over time as militant violence becomes destructive.	↓

Case 2: Sri Lanka

Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service also explain the repeated, cyclical patterns in violence and political attitudes that characterize the Sri Lankan Civil War. On both the Sinhalese and Tamil sides of the conflict, constituent expectations of military efficacy and their confidence in political alternatives determine when they demand violence and when they prefer restraint. Constituent demands shape the timing and intensity of violence and drive conflict escalation and de-escalation. Early in the conflict and at certain points in the 1990s and 2000s, intense conflict violence, multiple failed attempts at political compromise, and strong ethnic nationalism encourage support for military and militant-based approaches to the conflict and incentivize significant violent retaliation by state and non-state actors. However, disappointment with the outcomes of military and militant-based strategies and changes in the political context encourage pressure for political settlement from Sinhalese and Tamil voters in the late 1990s and early 2000s that contribute directly to an extended ceasefire in 2002. Constituent expectations even explain the success of the state's 2008 offensive. The state is able to defeat the main Tamil militant group, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), in 2008 because Tamil voters tired of the LTTE's destructive violence turn to political alternatives and defect to the state, leaving the LTTE without the resources needed to continue violent resistance.

The Sri Lankan Civil War was primarily a nationalist struggle between the nation's Sinhalese majority and its Tamil minority over control of territory and the demands of some Tamils for regional autonomy. Competition between Sinhalese and Tamil voters began soon after the country's independence from British rule, when

Sinhalese political leaders used disenfranchisement of Tamils as a political tool.¹⁰⁰

Without viable political alternatives, Tamils increasingly turned to militant groups, including the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to protect and advance their interests.¹⁰¹ The LTTE became the primary representative of Tamil interests after a campaign of intense violence and suicide bombs eliminated rival organizations.¹⁰²

The First Eelam War officially began in 1983 when an LTTE attack killed 13 Sinhalese soldiers and led to widespread anti-Tamil riots that demanded state retaliation. Sinhalese political leaders eventually surrendered to these demands, using violence against Tamil communities to consolidate political support.¹⁰³ A ceasefire reached in 1987 ended the First Eelam War, but this agreement lasted only until 1990, when violations by both sides led to renewed conflict (the Second Eelam War). After another brief ceasefire in 1995, the Third Eelam War began and lasted until 2001. More serious efforts by Sinhalese leaders to reach a political settlement in the late 1990s produced a regional autonomy plan, but these efforts were temporarily derailed by an attempted assassination of Sri Lanka's president in 1999. A more substantial political agreement, reached in 2002 with the help of international mediation and widespread domestic support, ushered in an extended period of stability and negotiations aimed at producing a lasting settlement. However, LTTE violence resumed in 2004, gradually eroding support

¹⁰⁰ Donald Horowitz, "Incentives and behaviour in the ethnic politics of Sri Lanka and Malaysia," *Third World Quarterly*, 11, no. 4 (1989): 18-35.; Neil Devotta, "From ethnic outbidding to ethnic conflict: the institutional bases for Sri Lanka's separatist war," *Nations and Nationalism* 11, no. 1 (2005), 141-159.

¹⁰¹ Kristian Stokke, "Sinhalese and Tamil nationalism as post-colonial political projects from 'above', 1948-1983," *Political Geography* 17, no. 1 (1998): 83-113.

¹⁰² Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).

¹⁰³ Robert Rotberg, *Creating Peace in Sri Lanka*, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute 1999).

for peace among Sinhalese voters. Sri Lanka officially abrogated the ceasefire in 2008, leading to a military incursion that successfully defeated the weakened LTTE.¹⁰⁴

Applied to the Sri Lankan example, Retrospective Projection predicts a more dynamic and cyclical pattern of demands for violence and violent retaliation than most alternative arguments. Table 8.1 summarizes the predictions of competing explanations of violence and demands for violence on both sides of the conflict. According to repression-radicalization arguments, violence perpetrated by Tamil militants radicalizes Sinhalese voters, leading to strong demands for hard-line parties and political pressure for military-based counterterrorism. Repression-radicalization arguments anticipate a similar set of responses on the non-state side, predicting that state repression immediately encourages radicalization and strong support for the LTTE. Rally arguments predict strong political responses that consistently increase support for the incumbent, regardless of party, on the state side and the LTTE on the non-state side. Tit-for-tat and signaling arguments also have parallel expectations for state and non-state actors, predicting immediate violent responses following attacks by the adversary, to deter future violence and to signal uncompromising commitment.

In contrast, Retrospective Projection predicts demands for violence among Tamils and Sinhalese voters only when targeted constituents expect an armed strategy to achieve ethnic and nationalist goals more efficiently than political alternatives, including after the failure of political agreements and when an escalating external threat makes compromise appear unlikely. On the state side, Retrospective Projection anticipates demands for violence following the initial surge in Tamil violence in the 1980s, the attack on Sri

¹⁰⁴ Kristine Hoglund, "Violence and the peace process in Sri Lanka," *Civil Wars* 7, no. 2 (2005): 156-170.; Amita Shastri, "Sri Lanka in 2002: Turning the corner?," *Asian Survey* 43, no. 1 (2003): 215-221.

Lankan President Kumaratunga in 1999, and the violation of the 2002 ceasefire in 2005, all points where failed attempts at political settlement make violent retaliation appear as the only viable approach to counterterrorism. On the Tamil side, Tamil constituent demands for violence are most likely when political opportunities are limited and should be especially significant early in the conflict, when a stronger LTTE achieves some operational successes. Constituent Service arguments expect violence that rises in intensity when local constituents support armed strategies, but is replaced by attempts at political settlement as disillusionment with violence spreads.

On state side of the Sri Lankan Civil War, demands for violence closely follow the expectations of Retrospective Projection, but are less frequent than predicted by repression-radicalization and rally arguments. Demands for violence among Sinhalese voters are only likely when Sinhalese voters expect military approaches to better advance their political and security interests than political compromise or when Tamil violence undermines confidence in political strategies. For example, in the 1980s an escalating violent threat from an increasingly effective non-state challenger encourages the belief among Sinhalese voters that only military solutions can address the Tamil threat. One senior Sinhalese political leader remarks after a 1987 LTTE bus bomb, “ ‘The long-term situation is clear...the LTTE won’t come for talks,’ ” leaving only military options.¹⁰⁵

LTTE violence that occurs during political negotiations or that violates a ceasefire also contributes to new demands for violence because it directly undermines confidence in political strategies and creates stronger demands for military-based responses as necessary to protect and advance political and security interests. The resumption of

¹⁰⁵ Michael Hamlyn, “Tamil attacks harden attitudes: Sri Lankan despair over ethnic crisis,” *The Times* (London), April 22, 1987.; Bloom, *Dying to Kill*, 2005. Based on interviews with Tamil and Sinhalese voters and political leaders.

violence by the LTTE in 2005 sparks new demands for violence because it implies a final rejection by the group of the political process.¹⁰⁶ One Sinhalese voter expresses this belief in 2007 right before the government's final offensive “ ‘we tried peace. They didn't want peace... War is our only solution.’ ”¹⁰⁷ Sinhalese constituent demands for violence are not reflexive, but forward-looking responses based on past experiences.

When Sinhalese voters lose confidence in violence or perceive new opportunities for political engagement, they appear to turn away from violence and the candidates that promote it creating some pressure for a more political approach. Military set-backs and enduring violence with no political gain erode support for military counterterrorism in Sri Lanka just as occurs in Russia, Israel, and Northern Ireland. For example, Sinhalese voters turn against violence in the mid-1990s based on their disappointment with the failure of military-based counterterrorism to eliminate the Tamil threat and the belief that military approaches are unlikely to result in lasting peace. A 1998 poll finds that 77.4% of Sinhalese voters believe that a continued military approach will not solve the conflict with Tamil populations.¹⁰⁸ This belief creates pressure for political solutions rather than escalating violence. The political response to the 1993 assassination of President Premasada is another case where the failure of a military approach results in demands for peace. In the election immediately following the assassination, Sinhalese voters do not demand additional violence or rally to their slain leader's party, but strongly support his more dovish rival, rejecting a reliance on military counterterrorism as inefficient. Changes in the broader political context can affect constituent expectations and limit

¹⁰⁶ Center for Policy Alternatives, Peace Confidence Index March 2008 and November 2007, www.cpalanka.org.

¹⁰⁷ Matthew Rosenberg, “Sri Lanka heads into new war,” Associated Press, May 5, 2007.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

constituent demands for violence in the Sri Lankan case through their effect on constituent expectations. New political optimism that results from the emergence of more moderate Tamil political leaders in the late 1990s and early 2000s reinforces the rejection of violence and contributes to Sinhalese support for negotiations. As the Sri Lankan foreign minister notes in 2001 “ ‘the public opinion is now very much in favor of an honorable, negotiated settlement within the framework of an undivided Sri Lanka.’ ”¹⁰⁹

Sri Lankan counterterrorism closely matches constituent demands and the expectations of Constituent Service. Military counterterrorism is most severe when it matches constituent demands, but restraint is likely when Sinhalese voters turn against violence or express preferences for political alternatives. The very different military responses to the attempted assassination of Kumaratunga in 1999 and the successful assassination of Premasada in 1993 make the importance of constituent demands clear. As noted previously, Premasada’s assassination in 1993 weakens already-declining Sinhalese confidence in the efficacy of violence as a political tool and strengthens support for political compromise and accommodation. As a result, violent retaliation following Premasada’s death is minimal. In contrast, the attempt on Kumaratunga’s life in 1999, occurs in the midst of peace negotiations, undermines confidence in political strategies, and contributes to new demands for violent retaliation that incentivize state retaliation. The continued commitment of Rajapaksa to the 2002 ceasefire even after the LTTE resumes violence in 2005 also reflects close state attention to the preferences and demands of domestic voters. Although Rajapaksa gives some indication that he supports the resumption of violence well-before 2008, he waits until a majority of Sinhalese voters

¹⁰⁹ Celia Dugger, “Truce helps revive hope for peace in Sri Lanka,” *New York Times*, December 24, 2001, quoting Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Tyronne Fernando.

support a military response before launching the offensive.¹¹⁰ Accommodation is not an indication of state weakness, as suggested by some signaling arguments, but rather a reflection of the constraint created by constituent demands.

Constituent expectations about the efficacy of violence also explain the evolving political responses to violence on the Tamil side of the Sri Lankan Civil War, including both demands for violence prior to the mid-1990s and the rejection of violence after 2000. Tamil constituent demands for violence following indiscriminate state violence in the 1970s and 1980s reflect the lack of political alternatives and the relative success of LTTE violence in damaging Sri Lankan military capabilities. As one analyst describes “the rise of militant separatism to a hegemonic position within Tamil nationalist politics, was a direct outcome of...the radicalization of Tamil nationalism by the Tamil political elite and the subsequent failure of this elite to obtain sufficient concessions....”¹¹¹ The severity and indiscriminate nature of the state threat, the seeming intractability of the conflict at certain points, and strong support for the political goals of Tamil militants motivate Tamil demands for violence prior to the mid-1990s through their effect on the Tamil beliefs about the necessity of militant activity.¹¹²

However, as expected by Retrospective Projection, Tamil support for militant violence is not automatic. Disillusionment with the failure of violence to achieve real political gains, operational set-backs caused by Sinhalese counterterrorism, and increasingly destructive Tamil violence after 2002 gradually weaken Tamil demands for

¹¹⁰ Poll by TNS Lanka, conducted December 2008. Cited in Agence France Presse, “Sri Lankan govt has public backing for offensive.” December 10, 2008. According to the poll, close to 75 percent of people questioned said they are “firmly in favour of military action, viewing it as the only route to wipe out terrorism.”

¹¹¹ Stokke, “Sinhalese and Tamil nationalism,” 1998, 109.

¹¹² Stokke, “Sinhalese and Tamil nationalism,” 1998; Bloom, *Dying to Kill*, 2005.

retaliation and increase preferences for settlement and political stability.¹¹³ As one Tamil reported “we are tired of them (LTTE); they have destroyed everything we had...”¹¹⁴ Changes in the political context on the Tamil side also erode support for violence and encourage Tamil demands for a political solution to the conflict. Advances by Sinhalese political leaders that appeal directly to Tamil voters and the participation of former LTTE members in the political process increase the appeal of political alternatives and further reduce constituent demands for violence.¹¹⁵ For example, the defection of a former LTTE leader, Karuna, “shows the fighters under him that their leader could become part of the political process.”¹¹⁶ Demands for and the rejection of violence emerge from constituent expectations and local political dynamics. Importantly, repression-radicalization explanations address Tamil political attitudes towards violence prior to the mid-1990s, but do not predict the rejection of militant violence after 2000.

Although the correspondence between constituent demands and violence is weakened by the LTTE’s strong external support base, there is evidence that LTTE violence still matches constituent preferences. Tamil demands and preferences incentivize the LTTE’s widespread military offensive, but also constrain the LTTE’s target choice. Surveys of Tamil constituents and LTTE members find that “Tamil attitudes are varied and constrain what the organization can and cannot do and who they can target.”¹¹⁷ For example, recognizing widespread discomfort among Tamils with attacks on Sinhalese civilians, the LTTE uses violence primarily against military and

¹¹³ Rajat Ganguly, “Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict: At a crossroad between peace and war,” *Third World Quarterly*, 25, no. 5 (2004): 903-918.

¹¹⁴ Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence, “Vanni prison gates crumble, civilians breaking out of terror rule,” 2008.

¹¹⁵ Ganguly, “Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict,” 2004.

¹¹⁶ Emily Wax, “‘Without me they couldn’t win the War,” *Washington Post*, February 10, 2009. Based on interviews with former LTTE leader Karuna and commanders of Sinhalese Army.

¹¹⁷ Bloom, *Dying to Kill*, 66-67.

political targets.¹¹⁸ Statements of group leaders also suggest that the group's experiment with political involvement in 2002 and the willingness to enter ceasefire negotiations react directly to constituent preferences and demands.¹¹⁹ In 2003, the group's political leader, S.V. Thamilselvan states that because of the demands of supporters " 'the LTTE is highly committed to peace through a negotiated settlement' " because this is the approach preferred and demanded by the group's local supporters.¹²⁰ This represents a fairly significant shift in strategy and implies the importance of constituent attitudes and expectations.

Unlike Palestinian groups and the IRA, LTTE violence addresses not only the demands of domestic supporters, but also the demands of a large Tamil Diaspora. The support of these external constituents explains the LTTE's return to violence in 2004 and the group's willingness to violate the preferences and demands of the domestic public. Importantly, the negative implications of this violence on local support for the LTTE offer evidence that Constituent Service remains relevant even for non-state groups with extensive external support networks. Because violence deviates from mainstream preferences, it alienates former Tamil supporters and contributes directly to the group's military defeat.¹²¹ Contrary to the expectations of traditional out-bidding and signaling arguments, Tamil violence does not consistently win popular support for the group and is an effective political tool only when local constituents expect political gains.

¹¹⁸ Bloom, *Dying to Kill*, 2005.

¹¹⁹ Ganguly, "Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict," 2004.

¹²⁰ Amal Jayasinghe, "Sri Lanka Tigers slam peace talks but rule out war," Agence France Press, May 22, 2003.

¹²¹ Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe, "COIN lessons from Sri Lanka for the West," *Defense News*, May 3, 2010.

The violent and political dynamics of the Sri Lankan Civil War conform closely with the expectations of Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service across conflict iterations. Table 8.4 and 8.5 summarize the effects of key domestic determinants on demands for and the use of violence on each side of the conflict. On both sides of the conflict and as in previous examples, constituent demands for violence and violent retaliation are most likely when perceived military efficacy exceeds confidence in political alternatives, and the timing of violence follows constituent preferences.

Despite these broad similarities, however, the Sri Lankan case is distinct from previous examples in several ways that affect the conflict's political and violent response dynamics. For example, although Sri Lanka's democracy is more robust than that in Russia, it is weaker and more opaque than that in Israel or Britain. This opacity and associated media censorship allow for a level of state violence and collateral damage that exceeds that present in either extended case study. The weak democracy also limits the political alternatives available to the non-state public, constraining the appeal of political engagement and sustaining more robust support for violence. A second major difference concerns the intractability of the conflict. The issues at the core of the Sri Lankan Civil War are less intractable than those motivating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but somewhat more zero-sum and immutable than those driving violence in Northern Ireland. This distinction explains the more robust support for military and violent alternatives in this example compared to that observed in the 'Troubles' and in the Chechen War.

A final difference relates to the relationship between the LTTE and the Tamil public, a relationship that fundamentally influences the timing and intensity of violence and often determines the ultimate success of counterterror interventions. While

Palestinian and Northern Ireland militant organizations are deeply embedded in and dependent on local communities, the LTTE's weaker political objectives and close ties with external donors lessen its dependence on local Tamil support. However, the existence of a strong external support base is both a blessing and a curse for the LTTE. Its relative independence gives the LTTE more flexibility in its use of violence, but also contributes to alienation between the LTTE and Tamil constituents, especially after 2002, that isolates the LTTE from potential supporters and ultimately speeds the LTTE's demise. The Sri Lankan example is more similar in this way to the Chechen case, where divergence between militant group goals and the objectives of local populations contributes directly to alienation that limits non-state support for violence.

Retrospective Projection and the Constituent Service interpretation of violence applied to the Sri Lankan Civil War suggest that constituent expectations and demands drive the de-escalation of the Sri Lankan War in 2002, the re-escalation that occurs in 2008, and the ultimate defeat of the LTTE. For example, de-escalation achieved just prior to and immediately after the 2002 ceasefire does not last because LTTE hard-liners never buy into the political settlement and continue to demand violent retaliation. As noted following the discussion of the Northern Ireland case, ensuring the buy-in and support of hard-liners is essential to a lasting political settlement in protracted conflict contexts. Constituent expectations can also explain the success of Sri Lanka's 2008 offensive after decades of failure. Because the 2008 offensive occurs when a majority of Tamils have already turned against violence and the LTTE, this final offensive defeats the LTTE without causing renewed Tamil support for violence. The success of Sri Lanka's 2008 offensive underscores the importance of response timing. While optimally timed

offensives that capitalize on conflict fatigue or a rejection of violence by the non-state public can erode militant capabilities and reduce support for violence, interventions that occur too soon are more likely to result in backlash.

Although post-war political consolidation in Sri Lanka appears to be underway following presidential and parliamentary elections, the results of previous cases suggest that lasting political stability requires the creation of political opportunities that institutionalize Tamil political engagement and is unlikely if the Sri Lankan state continues to rely on the use of violence. However, evidence suggests that government policies since the military offensive have worked in the opposite direction, ignoring Tamil grievances and disenfranchising Tamils in recent elections. The discussion above warns that without political reforms, military offensives only temporarily reduce violence and peace in Sri Lanka may be tenuous at best.¹²²

¹²² Fisnik Abrashi and Bharatha Malawarachi, "Sri Lankan challenger rejects president's poll win," Associated Press, January 27, 2010.

Table 8.4
Demands for & the Use of Violence: What Matters? Sri Lanka

Determinant	In Sri Lanka	Demands for and Use of Violence
Severity of Threat	Moderate to High. Most attacks aimed at military and state targets, but LTTE violence is increasingly indiscriminate.	↑
Intractability	Moderate. Sinhalese nationalism is weaker than that in Israel (and is historically constructed), but strong enough to encourage violence.	↑
Expected Military Efficacy	Highest in 1980s and after 2005. Military responses appear relatively more effective following failure of attempted political settlements/negotiations/ceasefires (esp. 1999 and 2005).	Encourages demand for violence 1980s, 1999-2000, after 2005 ↑ Creates pressure for settlement 1990s, 2001-2005 ↓
Political Optimism	Highest in 2001-2004 period. Rises through 1990s, but falls 2004-2008.	Limits demand for violence mid-1990s and 2001-2004 ↓
Political Competition	High. Competition between political parties encourages ethnic outbidding by Sinhalese.	↑
Political Institutions	Opaque political institutions reduce clarity of responsibility.	↔
Duration	Failure of 2002 ceasefire and negotiations leads to renewed support for military CT to finally end LTTE threat.	↓ until 2002, but ↑ after 2005

Table 8.5
Demands for & the Use of Violence: What Matters? *Tamils*

Determinant	In Tamil population	Demands for and Use of Violence
Severity of Threat	High. Sri Lankan state uses indiscriminant violence, also violence by Sinhalese paramilitary (JVP).	↑
Intractability	Moderate. Tamil nationalism is strong, but ethnic cleavage historically constructed. Political compromise seems possible.	↑
Expected Military Efficacy	High in conflict's early years (through mid-1990s), but falls over time with failure of LTTE to achieve political gains and changing nature of LTTE violence.	↑ Through mid-1990s, ↓ Post 1995* *Esp. post-2001
Political Optimism	Low in the conflict's early years but rises in late 1990s and early 2000s. Preference for political strategies encourages defection after 2008.	↑ Through mid-1990s, ↓ Post 1995* *Esp. post-2001
Political Competition	High in early years, when LTTE faces internal rivals. Emergence of moderate Tamil politicians favors rejection of violence after 2001. Increasingly extreme LTTE marginalizes Tamil population.	↔
Political Institutions	Lack of real political opportunities encourages support for violence.	↑
Duration	Support for continued violence falls over course of the conflict.	↓

Case 3: Iraq

In Iraq, as in each previous example, demands for violence and violent retaliation occur when Iraqis expect militant violence to provide security and advance sectarian interests more effectively than legitimate political alternatives. However, support for armed attacks declines sharply as militant violence becomes increasingly destructive without producing any real political gains. As a result, demands for armed retaliation and

support for militant groups are most significant prior to 2007. Consistent with Constituent Service arguments, insurgent violence follows constituent demands and sectarian violence is similarly most intense prior to 2007. These trends adhere to the predictions of Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service, but depart from tit-for-tat, repression-radicalization, and signaling arguments, that expect reflexive or automatic responses to sectarian violence.

The Iraqi insurgency, which began soon after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, is made up of many groups with diverse political goals, including ex-Baathists, former regime members, Iraqi nationalists, Sunni nationalists and Islamists, Shiite militias, foreign fighters, and Al-Qaeda affiliated organizations.¹²³ As in the ‘Troubles’ example, it is useful to think about two strands of violence, a conflict between Iraqis and the US occupier (and its allies) and a sectarian conflict between Iraq’s Sunnis and Shiites that borders on civil war. Insurgent violence initially targeted primarily US and coalition forces, but as the insurgency evolved, attacks were also directed at new Iraqi police, Army personnel, and anyone willing to cooperate with the US occupiers.¹²⁴ The sectarian dimension of the insurgency became increasingly severe over 2004 and 2005, and concerned the division of ruling power and access to resources.¹²⁵ While Sunni groups hoped to eliminate the Shiite leadership and return Sunnis to the position of power enjoyed prior to the US invasion, Shiite militias, including the Mahdi Army led by Moqtada al-Sadr and the Badr Brigades affiliated with Supreme Council for the Islamic

¹²³ Steven Simon, “The price of the surge: How the US strategy is hastening Iraq’s demise,” *Foreign Affairs* 87 (2008): 57-76.; Anthony Cordesman, *Iraq’s Sectarian and Ethnic Violence and its Evolving Insurgency: Developments through Spring 2007* (Washington DC: CSIS, 2007).

¹²⁴ Associated Press, “Insurgent attacks against US troops decline; militants target Iraqi forces,” March 20, 2005. Also trends in violence in Iraq at icasulaties.org.

¹²⁵ Cordesman, *Iraq’s Sectarian and Ethnic Violence*, 2007.; Simon, “The price of the surge,” 2008.

Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), used violence to assert control of Shiite areas and take revenge on Sunnis for recent and historical grievances.¹²⁶ Finally, foreign Islamists, mostly Sunni and affiliated with Al-Qaeda, also contributed to insurgent violence.¹²⁷

Both Iraqi support for insurgent groups and the intensity of sectarian violence escalated sharply in 2005 and 2006. The 2006 Sunni attack on the Al-Askariya Mosque (Golden Dome or Samarra Mosque) marked a turning point in the sectarian clash and the start of more, systematic and ruthless sectarian violence that took thousands of lives, particularly in Baghdad and outlying areas.¹²⁸ However, starting in 2007, changes in the political and security context, including the cooperation of Sunni ‘Awakening Councils’ with US forces, ceasefires by Shiite militias, the US ‘surge,’ and successful US drone strikes against militant leaders, weaken support for militant groups and contribute to a reduction in sectarian violence. Although this reduction in violence allowed for some political consolidation, several rounds of national elections, and the training of Iraqi police, recent developments in Iraq, including renewed extremist violence in the lead up to the March 2010 election, political uncertainty following the election itself, and resurgence in al-Qaeda-claimed violence throughout the country threaten what progress has been made.

Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service applied to the Iraqi example predict a more dynamic pattern of political responses and violent retaliation than existing repression-radicalization, signaling, rally, and tit-for-tat approaches. The competing

¹²⁶ Cordesman, *Iraq's Sectarian and Ethnic Violence*, 2007.; Edward Wong, Abdul Razzaq al-Saiedi, and Joao Silva, “Shiite cleric wields violence and popularity to increase power in Iraq,” *New York Times*, November 27, 2005.

¹²⁷ Simon, “The price of the surge,” 2008.; Cordesman, *Iraq's Sectarian and Ethnic Violence*, 2007.

¹²⁸ Cordesman, *Iraq's Sectarian and Ethnic Violence*, 2007, 3.

expectations of existing arguments are illustrated in Table 8.1. Repression-radicalization arguments predict that both sectarian and US-perpetrated violence contribute immediately to radicalization of targeted constituents and demands for violent retaliation. Rally arguments expect a similar pattern in which sectarian violence consolidates political support for militant groups. Both tit-for-tat and signaling frameworks predict consistent retaliation, used for either deterrence or to communicate strength, resolve, and commitment. Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service, in contrast, anticipate demands for violence primarily prior to 2007 when Iraqi constituents expect violence to achieve political objectives more effectively than political alternatives and retaliatory violence that is most intense where constituent demands for violence are strongest.¹²⁹

As expected by Retrospective Projection, Iraqi beliefs about the benefits of military approaches and limited confidence in weak political alternatives drive demands for violence prior to 2007. The severity of the external threat and the lack of robust or appealing political opportunities undermine Iraqi confidence in political engagement and increase the appeal of militant groups and violence as an alternative. Public opinion surveys from 2004 confirm low political optimism as a source of relatively strong support for militant activity. In April 2004, following several months of escalating violence and instability, confidence in the Iraq Governing Council stands at 23%, while only 18% of respondents report that the local police increase their feelings of security or safety.¹³⁰

These same polls show more consistent confidence in local militias as security

¹²⁹ Poll by Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland, 2006. Cited in Barry Schweid, "Poll says majority of Iraqi's back attacks on US forces," Associated Press, September 27, 2006.

¹³⁰ Poll conducted by Coalition Provisional Authority, "Iraqi Public Opinion," May 14-23, 2004.

providers.¹³¹ Although support for violence prior to 2007 also matches the expectations of repression-radicalization arguments, the statements of individual Iraqi constituents refer explicitly to the necessity and efficacy of violence and the weakness of political alternatives as major reasons they support militant groups, offering some support for Retrospective Projection. One Shiite notes “ ‘the Mahdi Army keeps us safe here.’ ”¹³² For Sunnis, the perceived necessity of militia-based protection is reinforced by their minority position and their complete exclusion from the political process. One Sunni insurgent notes Sunnis had “ ‘no other choice but to take up our rifles and protect ourselves.’ ”¹³³

Declining support for violence after 2007 responds to a shift in the perceived benefits of both militant violence and political accommodation, but still closely mirrors constituent expectations and attitudes. Demands for violence by Iraqi Sunnis and Shiites become increasingly less likely after military disappointments that erode confidence in the benefits of a militant-based strategy and as continued violence fails to produce a political solution. Successful US counterterror operations and increasingly effective activities by Iraqi security forces undermine the perceived efficacy of militant violence, especially among Sunnis, by reducing militant group capabilities, suggesting the likely failure of militant violence as a political tool, and revealing the growing efficacy of state security provision.¹³⁴ According to public opinion polls, confidence in the Army rose from 38% in 2003 to 74% in 2009, while confidence in the police started at 44% in 2003

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Bassem Mroue, “Mahdi Army gaining followers amid talks of crackdown,” Associated Press, July 14, 2006.

¹³³ Simon, “The price of the surge,” 2008.; Stephen Biddle, “Seeing Baghdad, thinking Saigon,” *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 85, no.2 (2006): 2-14.; Ahmed Hashim, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).

¹³⁴ Cordesman, *Iraq’s Sectarian and Ethnic Violence*, 2007.; Simon, “The price of the surge,” 2008.

and rose to a similar 74% in 2009.¹³⁵ Growing confidence in the efficacy of state security provision constrains Iraqi demands for sectarian retaliation by reducing the perceived necessity of militant violence.

Militant violence also loses its appeal as a political tool when it becomes increasingly indiscriminate and destructive and as militant groups adopt extreme ideological goals that alienate former supporters.¹³⁶ One Iraqi official reports in 2008 “ ‘in terms of Iraqi public opinion, you see a message being given that the people of Iraq, whether Shia or Sunni, are tired of this violence and this criminality.’ ”¹³⁷ Alienation and the associated rejection of violence is especially important among Sunni tribal leaders who initially support militant groups as a way to advance their political interests, but turn against this violence as it directly challenges the tribal hierarchy.¹³⁸ One Sunni sheikh notes in 2007 “ ‘if it was not for the coyotes [insurgents and foreign fighters] among us, no one would have been killed, kidnapped, or bombed.’ ”¹³⁹ Similarly, according to some Shiites, “ ‘the Iraqi people are waking up from the Mahdi Army...Iraqis know now that they are criminals.’ ”¹⁴⁰ Finally, confidence in the efficacy of militant violence as a political tool is undermined by the simple endurance of the conflict and the observable fact that even sharp escalation in militant activity does not produce real political gains.

The emergence of new, stronger political opportunities at the local and national level reinforces the rejection of violence after 2007 by sparking nascent confidence in

¹³⁵ BBC, ABC, NHK, “Iraq Poll February 2009,” March 19, 2009.

¹³⁶ Simon, “The price of the surge,” 2008.

¹³⁷ Phillip Reeker, Counselor to Ambassador Ryan Crocker, quoted in Foreign Press Center Briefing, Update from US embassy in Iraq, US Fed News, April 10, 2008.

¹³⁸ Simon, “The price of the surge,” 2008.

¹³⁹ Sam Dagher, “Sunni Muslim Sheikhs join US in fighting al-Qaeda,” *Christian Science Monitor*, May 3, 2007, Quoting tribal notable Hussein Zbeir.

¹⁴⁰ Trudy Rubin, “People are defeating the militias in their neighborhoods,” Editorial, *Pittsburgh Post Gazette* (Pennsylvania), July 7, 2008.

political alternatives to violence that replaces pre-existing support for militant groups and their activities. The gradual consolidation of security and political institutions at the national and local level starting in 2007 increases political optimism by creating new political opportunities and building confidence in the ability of Iraqi police and military forces to provide constituent security. In 2009, 50% of Iraqis report that the security situation in their area is improving as a result of political consolidation at the local and national level, compared to only 24% who express this view in 2007.¹⁴¹ For Sunnis, the emergence of local political opportunities and increasing inclusion in the national political process encourages confidence in political channels as a means to advance sectarian interests. Local “Sons of Iraq” councils empower Sunni leaders at the local level, increase their stake in stability, and eliminate a key source of militant support.¹⁴² On the Shiite side, it is the quality of political opportunities offered by a more consolidated Iraqi state that make violence less and political engagement more appealing. Al-Sadr’s decision to support Iraqi elections in November 2005 reflects, at least in part, his realization that influence in a consolidated Iraqi government would more effectively advance his political goals than continued violence.¹⁴³

Finally, Retrospective Projection and constituent expectations can also explain more immediate and consistent demands for violence among Iraqi voters following US-perpetrated operations that kill Iraqi civilians throughout the conflict. A 2004 report finds that “overall: there is a correlation between Iraqis’ experiences of violence, negative

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Simon, “The price of the surge,” 2008.; Stephen Biddle, Michael O’Hanlon, and Kenneth Pollack, “How to leave a stable Iraq,” *Foreign Affairs* 87 no. 3 (2008).

¹⁴³ Steven Lee Myers, Riyadh Mohammed and Stephen Farrell, “In Iraq, militant group takes on new role: Patron of the arts,” *New York Times*, February 14, 2009.; Wong, al-Saiedi, and Silva, “Shiite cleric wields violence,” 2005.

appraisals of US troops, and support for insurgent attacks.”¹⁴⁴ This relationship remains strong throughout the conflict, as does explicit support for violent retaliation against US forces. In 2006, 88% of Sunnis and 47% of Shia support this retaliation.¹⁴⁵ In 2008, 61% of Iraqis still approve of attacks on US targets.¹⁴⁶ Demands for violence follow US perpetrated operations, according to Retrospective Projection, because Iraqis expect violence to be more effective in forcing an end to the US presence than political pressure exerted by a weak and co-opted Iraqi state.

Confidence in the efficacy of violence as a political tool against US occupiers reflects Iraqi beliefs about US casualty sensitivity based on past US behavior.¹⁴⁷ Even after 2007, when Iraqis see violence as unlikely to achieve *domestic* political goals, many continue to view armed resistance as the only effective political tool against US forces. One source notes that the Fallujah offensive against Sunni insurgents “has turned the muddled center of Iraqi public opinion...decisively against the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority and its local allies.”¹⁴⁸ Similarly, when Shiite militias and US forces clash over control of Shiite areas, Shiite militias are “seen as Shiite Robin Hoods, protecting undefended neighborhoods...and standing up to what many Shiites saw as an

¹⁴⁴ Project for Defense Alternatives report, based on series of public opinion polls conducted in Iraq, “Study: Insurgency feeding on occupation,” UPI, May 18, 2005.

¹⁴⁵ WorldPublicOpinion.org, “Poll of Iraqis: Public Wants Timetable for US Withdrawal, but Thinks US Plans Permanent Bases in Iraq,” January 2006, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jan06/Iraq_Jan06_quaire.pdf.

¹⁴⁶ Testimony by Steven Kull, Director, Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), in front of House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, July 23, 2008, citing 2008 WorldPublicOpinion.org survey.

¹⁴⁷ Mansoor Moaddel, Mark Tessler, and Ronald Inglehart, “Foreign occupation and national pride,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 7 no. 4 (2008): 677-705. Based on survey conducted in Iraq in 2004, project funded by NSF. *White House Bulletin*, “New survey: Iraqis pessimistic, cynical about invasion,” August 17, 2006.; Poll conducted May 2004 by Coalition Provisional Authority.

¹⁴⁸ Dan Murphy, “Siege of Fallujah polarizing Iraqis,” *Christian Science Monitor*, April 5, 2004.

act of American aggression.”¹⁴⁹ The very different Iraqi response to attacks by US forces and sectarian rivals is not expected by most existing arguments, but suggests the sophistication of Iraqi political responses to violence and the importance of expectations to these responses.

Insurgent violence broadly follows constituent demands and is more likely and more sizeable when support for violence is high. Although sectarian violence prior to 2007 is often described as tit-for-tat, a cycle of “attack and counterattack, with Sunni militants staging what commanders call ‘spectacular’ strikes and Shiite militias retaliating with abductions and murders of Sunnis,”¹⁵⁰ statements by insurgent leaders explicitly describe and justify violence as a reaction to constituent demands, confirming the relevance of a Constituent Service argument. For instance, in 2006, widespread Sunni demands for retaliation against Shiite militias in Baghdad prompt several Sunni groups to “[send] weapons to Baghdad and prepar[e] to dispatch their own fighters to the Iraqi capital.”¹⁵¹ Shiite violence similarly responds to the Shiite belief that “ ‘we need militias to provide protection.’ ”¹⁵²

After 2007, falling support for violence drives restraint and ultimately some political involvement by Sunni and Shiite groups after 2007. One tribal leader, a political candidate and reformed militant, describes the strategic shift noting, “ ‘we are very close

¹⁴⁹ Sabrina Tavernise and Solomon Moore, “In this Shiite battle, marked shift from the past,” *New York Times*, March 30, 2008.

¹⁵⁰ Sabrina Tavernise, Qais Mizher, and Hosham Hussien, “A fresh pattern of revenge fuels Baghdad killings,” *New York Times*, November 19, 2006, citing report by US military command in Iraq.

¹⁵¹ Cordesman, *Iraq’s Sectarian and Ethnic Violence*, 2007.; Nancy Youssef, “Sunnis say they’re mobilizing to combat Shiites, protect Mosques,” *Knight Rider Tribune*, February 27, 2006.

¹⁵² Neil Macdonald, “After Iraq attacks, calls for militias grow,” *Christian Science Monitor*, July 18, 2005, quoting Saad Jawad Kandil, member of SCIRI, quoted in speech to Iraqi Parliament

to the community... we are trying to influence people, to satisfy them.’¹⁵³ Similarly, al-Sadr’s decision to call a ceasefire in 2007 responds to growing Shiite demands for stability.¹⁵⁴ One source describes the ceasefire as “an attempt to limit violence in Iraq” based on the recognition that violence is turning popular support against him.¹⁵⁵ Restraint does not reflect weakness or revised political goals at the elite level, as suggested by many existing arguments, but instead addresses constituent demands. As a result, de-escalation in Iraq is constituent-driven.

There is evidence that even foreign fighter-dominated Islamist groups in Iraq respond to constituent demands. For example, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi moves away from some of his more unpopular violent tactics after an attack in Jordan against Sunni civilians provokes outrage among Iraqis.¹⁵⁶ In 2009, one political analyst notes that while al-Qaeda in Iraq “may still...be carrying out attacks on civilians...the group does not take credit for these attacks for fear of losing popular support.”¹⁵⁷ The willingness of transnational groups with outside resources to revise their use of violence to maintain local support suggests the power of constituent constraints and the importance of these local supporters to group survival. Even organizations with transnational presence are often accountable and responsive to some set of supporters within their host nation.

The political and violent dynamics of the Iraqi insurgency closely match the expectations of Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service. Table 8.6 summarizes

¹⁵³ Sabrina Tavernise, “A new Sunni Party raises hope of more political participation,” *New York Times*, November 7, 2005, quoting Hussein Jumaili.

¹⁵⁴ Cordesman, *Iraq’s Sectarian and Ethnic Violence*, 2007.; UPI, “Sadr orders Mahdi Army to stand down,” August 29, 2007.

¹⁵⁵ UPI, “Sadr orders Mahdi Army to stand down,” August 29, 2007.

¹⁵⁶ Amit Paley, “Shift in tactics aims to revive struggling insurgency,” *Washington Post*, February 8, 2008.

¹⁵⁷ Ernesto Londo, “Al Qaeda in Iraq is regaining strength,” *Washington Post*, November 22, 2009.

the characteristics of the political and security context with the most significant effects on demands for and the use of violence. Constituent demands for violence are most likely when expected militant efficacy is high and political optimism low, but are also encouraged by the intractability and zero-sum nature of the conflict in Iraq, political competition between rival tribes, factions, and militias, and the embedded position of many militant groups in local communities. Violent responses by Sunni and Shiite groups are most likely when supported by local demands. As in previous examples, in Iraq, de-escalation is encouraged by counterterror policies that undermine the efficacy of militant groups, enduring conflict violence that proves the likely failure of violence as a political tool, and the emergence of new political opportunities that build confidence in alternatives to violence. The Iraq example underscores the relative importance of political reforms in triggering a final rejection of violence and supporting real progress towards lasting political solutions.¹⁵⁸ The US Surge plays a role in conflict de-escalation, but its ultimate success is likely conditional on pre-existing alienation between insurgent groups and the local population, desire for political stability, and the emergence of new political opportunities and alternative.

De-escalation of violence in Iraq after 2007 shares some similarities with previous examples. As in Chechnya and Sri Lanka, alienation between militant groups and local supporters erodes demands for and the use of violence. As in the Northern Ireland example, improved use of law enforcement tactics and a more effective Iraqi police force plays an important role in conflict de-escalation after 2007, eroding the capabilities of non-state groups and encouraging confidence in political alternatives. At the same time,

¹⁵⁸ Biddle, O'Hanlon, and Pollack, "How to leave a stable Iraq," 2008; Simon, "The price of the surge," 2008.

new political opportunities further consolidate the appeal of political strategies and place additional constraints on demands and support for violence. As in the Palestinian Territories, intractable motivating issues and continued weakness of existing political opportunities ensures some continued support for violence throughout the conflict.

The Iraq case differs from the previous cases, however, as a result of the strong US presence and the weakness of the Iraqi state. Unlike previous examples where non-state actors use violence against a stronger state, the vast majority of violence in the Iraqi insurgency occurs between Sunni and Shiite militias. The lack of a strong state actor encourages demands for militant operations and armed retaliation because it increases non-state dependence on militant groups and their violence and creates a large obstacle to the development and consolidation of Iraqi confidence in political solutions. The involvement of the United States in Iraq also makes the conflict distinct from previous examples and affects the political and violent response dynamics in two ways. First, US guarantees and military activities provide a level of security and stability that facilitate the political risks necessary to advance political optimism. At the same time, US involvement fosters demands for violence by Iraqi voters that sustain militant groups and weaken the legitimacy of the Iraqi state. The presence of a foreign occupier, therefore, explains the greater tenacity of demands for violence and the continued use of violence by Iraqi militant groups.

Although violence in Iraq has de-escalated significantly from its peak in 2006, it is unclear that the conflict in Iraq has past the crucial tipping point needed for a final political settlement or complete de-escalation of violence. Although the perceived efficacy of violence has declined, political optimism remains tenuous due to the

continued weakness and instability in the political situation. As in previous examples, low military efficacy without robust political optimism is unlikely to ensure a lasting political settlement. Recent political instability in Iraq since the March 2010 election warns that renewed violence by Sunni extremists could become a lasting trend.

Table 8.6
Demands for & the Use of Violence: What Matters? *Iraq*

Determinant	In Iraq	Demands for and the Use of Violence
Severity of Threat	High. Sectarian violence is intense and indiscriminate. Threat from US violence highest prior to 2005-2006. Falls somewhat after 2007.	↑
Intractability	High. Conflict has deep ethnic, sectarian, religious roots and concerns control of territory, cultural symbols, and natural resources.	↑
Expected Military Efficacy	High initially, but falls as violence continues. For Sunnis, it becomes clear that violence won't reestablish power. Shiites realize violence may be less effective than politics in securing political gains. After 2007, political opportunities become more robust and appealing. Awakening councils for Sunnis and opportunities at center for Shiites.	Pre-2007 ↑ After 2007 ↓
Political Optimism	Rises with political consolidation and new political opportunities post-2007.	Pre-2007 ↑ After 2007 ↓
Political Competition	High, between political parties on each side of the sectarian divide and between political parties and militant groups. Encourages demands for violence by inflaming sectarian competition and security fears.	↑
Political Institutions	Weak political institutions and competition between militant groups reduces clarity, but lack of political opportunities increases support for militants.	↑ Also increases likelihood of fragmentation
Duration	Demands for and use of violence fall after 2007, but the shift seems tenuous.	↓

Case 4: Pakistan

Although the political and violent dynamics of the conflict between Pakistan and insurgent groups since 2001 are somewhat distinct from those in previous examples, constituent expectations about military efficacy and optimism about political solutions continue to explain support for violence, the timing of military offensives, and conflict escalation. Pakistanis support military-based counterterrorism only after 2009, when an increasingly severe and expanding militant threat underscores the failure of an approach that relies on political accommodation. Pashtun tribes living in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) are similarly more tolerant of military counterterrorism after 2009 as the increasingly destructive nature of militant violence erodes its efficacy as a political tool. However, support for military-based counterterrorism in the FATA is consistently more limited than that in the rest of Pakistan, due to the political alienation of Pashtun tribes, their nationalist goals, and their close ethnic affinity with many militant commanders. State counterterrorism adheres to constituent demands throughout the conflict, attending even to the preferences of Pashtun tribes in the timing and extent of its offensives. Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service offer insight into constituent demands for and the use of violence in the Pakistani example, but also explain why conflict dynamics in Pakistan differ from previous cases.

Although militant groups were active in the FATA before 2001, Pakistani military incursions into the FATA to root out al-Qaeda leaders and other terrorist cells in the wake of the 9/11 attacks started the longer campaign of more intensive violence that continues today. The violent dynamics of this conflict are complicated by the diversity of militant groups operating in Pakistan and Pakistan's relationship with active militant

organizations. Kashmiri and sectarian groups were some of the first groups in the region, but historically posed little direct threat to the Pakistani state, and even received some state assistance for their attacks on Indian and Shiite targets. The Afghan Taliban was also a Pakistani creation, formed in the 1970s to advance Pakistani interests in Afghanistan. Since 2001, however, the group's activities have destabilized the region, radicalized Pashtun tribal members interested in autonomy, and encouraged the formation of new militant groups with more extensive anti-state agendas.¹⁵⁹ For instance, the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), comprised of a loosely affiliated network of militant groups, began military operations in 2006 and has expanded these operations from the FATA to the Northwest Frontier Province, setting up shadow regimes based on Islamic law.¹⁶⁰ Finally, al-Qaeda affiliated organizations operating in the FATA use the weakly-governed region to train fighters and launch transnational attacks, while cooperating with local militant groups against Pakistan.¹⁶¹

Since the start of its more intensive campaign against militant groups operating in the FATA, the Pakistani military has achieved some successes against al-Qaeda cells operating in the region, including the arrest and capture of key leaders, but made few gains against the Afghan Taliban who fled to the FATA following the US invasion of Afghanistan. Until 2009, most Pakistani offensives ended with ceasefires and negotiated agreements that gave militant commanders considerable autonomy in return for a their commitment not to challenge state authority. These agreements were popular among

¹⁵⁹ Christine Fair and Jacob Shapiro "Understanding support for Islamist militancy in Pakistan," *International Security* 34 no. 3 (2009): 79-118.; Christine Fair, Neil Malhotra, and Jacob Shapiro, "The roots of militancy," Working Paper, December 28, 2009.; Ashley Tellis, "Pakistan's record on terrorism: conflicted goals, compromised performance," *The Washington Quarterly* 31 no. 2 (2008): 7-32.

¹⁶⁰ Fair and Shapiro, "Understanding support," 2009.; Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro, "Roots of militancy," 2009.; Tellis, "Pakistan's record on terrorism" 2008.

¹⁶¹ Fair and Shapiro, "Understanding support," 2009.; Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro, "Roots of militancy," 2009.

Pakistani voters, but had little lasting impact on violence because militant commanders consistently violated the terms of the accords.¹⁶² The limited success of Pakistan's military against militant groups reflects not only the military's operational weaknesses, but also sympathy for militant groups and their objectives within the Pakistani electorate and leadership that weakens the state's commitment to counterterrorism. However, starting in 2008 and 2009, Pakistani military and political leaders adopted a more aggressive counterterror strategy, following a sharp increase in insurgent attacks in 2007 and 2008 and the spread of this violence into major Pakistani cities. The 2008 TTP offensive into Buner was a particularly decisive turning point because it signaled the destructive nature of the insurgent threat and rejection of political compromise.¹⁶³ Importantly, the more aggressive approach to the conflict adopted at this point was driven and facilitated by the demands and preferences of Pakistani voters (outside and to some extent within the FATA) who increasingly supported military counterterrorism as necessary to eliminate an escalating terror threat.¹⁶⁴

Applied to the Pakistani case, both conventional arguments and the alternative explanation presented in this dissertation treat the expectations and demands of Pakistan's non-FATA population separately from those of Pashtun residents of the FATA. The predictions of each approach are summarized in Table 8.1. Repression-radicalization arguments expect Pakistan's non-FATA population to respond to violence

¹⁶² Fair and Shapiro, "Understanding support," 2009.; Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro, "Roots of militancy," 2009.

¹⁶³ Fair and Shapiro, "Understanding support," 2009.; Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro, "Roots of militancy," 2009. Pashtun sympathy for the Taliban has been strained by collateral damage, but it remains robust in certain areas of the FATA. Although Pashtuns do not constitute a non-state public like those in other cases, I will consider their political attitudes as distinct from the rest of the Pakistani population.

¹⁶⁴ Interview with Robert Gates, *Al-Jazeera*, September 2009, described in Agence France Presse, "Gates praises Pakistan's grip on extremists," September 8, 2009.; Agence France Presse, "Pakistan PM hails 'success' in Taliban battle," August 19, 2009.

by non-state insurgents against state targets with hardened constituent demands for military-based counterterrorism. Rally arguments predict surges in support for the incumbent after these same attacks. In contrast, applied to the Pashtun population, repression-radicalization arguments identify state violence as the primary trigger of radicalization and predict little response to insurgent violence throughout the conflict. Tit-for-tat and signaling arguments anticipate consistent violent retaliation by the state and non-state groups. Tit-for-tat approaches explain this violence as automatic, while signaling arguments describe violence as an indicator of resolve.

Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service predict a more dynamic set of political responses and retaliatory violence in the Pakistani case that evolves with constituent attitudes and expectations about the necessity of military violence. From this perspective, attacks by non-state militants on state targets only contribute to demands for state counterterrorism starting in 2009, when the Taliban's Buner offensive seriously undermines optimism about political accommodation and implies the necessity of a military-based response. Prior to this point, low confidence in state institutions, sympathy for non-state militants, and a weak perceived threat limit demands for military counterterrorism by Pakistani voters. Similarly, Retrospective Projection predicts that Pashtuns living in the FATA react against militant violence only after 2009 when it challenges their tribal hierarchies and becomes unappealing as a political tool. Constituent Service interpretations predict state violence that closely matches constituent demands and is most likely after 2009.

The political dynamics of the conflict in Pakistan closely follow the expectations of Retrospective Projection. Pakistanis support military counterterrorism only when

militant violence poses a severe threat and when they believe military offensives are both necessary and likely to be effective. Prior to 2009, demands for military counterterrorism by Pakistani voters are limited by the contained, peripheral threat presented by militant violence, strong sympathy for militant groups, and limited confidence in the efficacy of state counterterrorism. Public opinion polls show that Pakistanis living outside the FATA perceive of a very limited threat from militant violence prior to 2009 that does not warrant significant military-based retaliation. For example, in 2007 only 34% of Pakistanis view the Taliban as a significant security threat and few believe that insurgent violence targets civilians (it does).¹⁶⁵ Militant violence also does not pose a direct threat to Pashtun communities within the FATA who welcome anti-state attacks that support their political objectives. One analyst notes, “the army has been less successful in containing the... support for the Taliban in Afghanistan amongst NWFP’s population... due to their common Pashtun heritage.”¹⁶⁶

Demands for armed retaliation following militant violence are also constrained prior to 2009 by limited Pakistani confidence in the efficacy of military operations. The inability of Pakistan’s military to defeat insurgent groups in the period after 2001, evidenced by military stalemates and necessary political compromise with insurgent commanders, undermines confidence in and demands for military-based counterterrorism.¹⁶⁷ Less than 50% of Pakistani respondents support the use of military operations against these groups in 2007, largely because they do not expect military

¹⁶⁵ Christine Fair, Steven Ramsay, Clay Kull, “Pakistani public opinion on Democracy, Islamist militancy, and relations with the US,” Study by WorldPublicOpinion.org and US Institute for Peace (2007), 24.; Julian Borger, “Attacks have al-Qaeda on the run, Pakistani minister claims,” *The Guardian*, July 2, 2009.

¹⁶⁶ Ahmed Rashid, “Increasing support for Taliban from NWFP Pashtuns,” *Peshawar and Gulanai*, September 4, 2003.

¹⁶⁷ Pamela Constable, “Pakistan’s uneasy role in the War on Terror,” *Washington Post*, May 8, 2004.

offensives to achieve political goals.¹⁶⁸ In Pashtun areas, state counterterrorism is not only seen as ineffective, but as destructive and threatening to security and sovereignty. As a result, military counterterrorism in the FATA often increases Pashtun support for militant violence as a political tool used to advance their anti-state interests and objectives.¹⁶⁹ As one political analyst notes “the tribal areas... have now been radicalized as never before. The rain of armaments from US drones and Pakistani ground forces, which have caused extensive civilian casualties, daily add a steady stream of angry foot soldiers to the insurgency.”¹⁷⁰ US involvement further exacerbates pessimism about the efficacy of military approaches because it contributes to the Pakistani belief that military counterterrorism serves US political goals rather than those of Pakistan.¹⁷¹ The lack of political response to insurgent violence in the Pakistani example diverges from the expectations of rally and repression-radicalization literature, which expect strong support for violence in these contexts. The political response to militant violence of Pakistani voters is not automatic or reflexive, but reflects the expectations and assessments of Pakistani voters about the need for and likely success of military retaliation and political accommodation.

Demands, or least support, for military-based counterterrorism become more significant starting in 2009, however, following an escalating militant threat that rejects political accommodation and makes violent counterterrorism appear more necessary.

¹⁶⁸ International Republican Institute Poll, December, 2007.; WorldPublicOpinion.org poll conducted in 2007, cited in *Pajhwok Afghan News*, “In Pakistan little support for military action,” October 31, 2007.

¹⁶⁹ International Republican Institute Poll, July-August 2009.; Fair and Shapiro, “Understanding Support,” 2009.; Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro, “Roots of militancy,” 2009.; Fair, Ramasy, and Kull, “Pakistani Public Opinion,” 2008.; Alan Fram, “Pakistanis oppose US terror hunts,” Associated Press, September 12, 2007.

¹⁷⁰ William Dalrymple, “A country staring disaster in the face,” *The Guardian*, March 4, 2009.

¹⁷¹ Fair, Ramsay, and Kull, “Pakistani public opinion,” 2008.

Increasingly indiscriminate violence that spills into major Pakistani cities provokes a more significant response among Pakistanis living outside the FATA, while destructive violence that challenges tribal hierarchies alienates Pashtun tribal residents who had previously supported militant groups and their activities. As a result of this escalating and expanding threat, public opinion surveys show that by 2009, 80% of Pakistanis express the belief that the Taliban and other violent extremists present a severe threat to security, a significant increase over previous years.¹⁷² At the same time, support for the Taliban and al-Qaeda falls into the teens and single digits, suggesting a widespread rejection of violence and an associated increase in constituent tolerance for military-based counterterrorism.¹⁷³ The expansion of militant violence into Buner and the violation of ceasefires also spark demands for military counterterrorism from the Pakistani electorate because they imply the failure of political accommodation as a de-escalation strategy. Another survey reports “following the failed peace deal with militants who had seized Swat and the overreaching of the Taliban into Buner, the public turned dramatically against peace deals and increasingly supported their military’s fight against the extremists.”¹⁷⁴ Finally, polls taken in June 2009 following several moderately successful military operations show an increase in Pakistani support for military offensives based on their perceived efficacy.¹⁷⁵

Among Pashtuns, increasingly destructive militant violence that challenges tribal hierarchies undermines the political utility of violence for Pashtun tribal members and

¹⁷² Borger, “Attacks have al-Qaeda on the run,” 2009.

¹⁷³ Kenneth Ballen and Reza Aslan, “A radical turnabout in Pakistan,” *Christian Science Monitor*, February 21, 2008.

¹⁷⁴ Christine Fair, “Pakistan’s own war on terror: What the Pakistani public thinks,” *Journal of International Affairs* 63 no.1 (2009), 49.

¹⁷⁵ Fair, “Pakistan’s own war on terror,” 2009.

leads to alienation between Pashtuns and militant groups. This alienation weakens support for militant violence, but increases tolerance for military-based counterterrorism in ways that match the expectations of Retrospective Projection. Tribal leaders turn against violence when insurgent groups challenge their political authority, while increasing collateral damage alienates a broader segment of the Pashtun community. One refugee fleeing Taliban violence “welcomed the military campaign to push the insurgents out” and notes “ ‘it's the Taliban that's responsible for our misery.’ ”¹⁷⁶

Falling Pashtun support for militant violence and increasing tolerance for state counterterrorism after 2009, however, does not reflect consolidated or permanent support for state offensives. Instead, Pashtun acceptance of military counterterrorism remains tenuous at best. In 2009, 47% of residents in the FATA and NWFP report that they want neither the military nor militant extremists in their territory. Pashtuns reject US involvement more strongly. Surveys taken between 2007 and 2009 consistently show that close to 80% of Pakistanis reject US military involvement.¹⁷⁷ The decision of Pakistan’s tribal area residents to support state violence is not a reflexive one, but a careful, pragmatic decision based on expectations, local political dynamics, and security context.

The timing and intensity of military counterterrorism closely follows the demands of Pakistan’s constituents, including those living in the FATA. Restraint prior to 2008 reflects low constituent support for military counterterrorism. In 2008, over 50% of Pakistanis support ceasefires rather than military operations, creating political pressure

¹⁷⁶ Sabrina Tavernise and Irfan Ashraf, “Taliban stir rising anger of Pakistanis,” *New York Times* June 5, 2009.

¹⁷⁷ Fram, “Pakistanis oppose US terror hunts,” 2007.; WorldPublicOpinion.org, “Pakistani Public Opinion on the Swat Conflict, Afghanistan, and the US,” 2009, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jul09/WPO_Pakistan_Jul09_rpt.pdf.

that motivates and explains the decision of Pakistan's leaders to forgo the use of force.¹⁷⁸ Pakistan's leaders refer explicitly to the demands of constituents, including Pashtuns, as justification for their decision to rely on ceasefires. Pakistani Foreign Minister Qureshi notes in 2006 that "he strongly supports the truce as a way to prevent the bulk of Pashtun tribes on the border 'from going to the sides of the extremists.'"¹⁷⁹ A study of Pakistani political attitudes confirms that "public sentiment does constrain military as well as political options in Pakistan...Pakistani public attitudes are critical to Pakistan's ability and political will to stay involved in military operations against the militants."¹⁸⁰ Signaling and tit-for-tat approaches do not explain the lack of military response to insurgent violence prior to 2009.

Constituent demands are also a primary driver of the 2009 decision to increase the use of military counterterrorism. Zardari describes that " 'decisive military action has been possible largely thanks to a shift in public opinion,' " including that within the FATA, against the Taliban.¹⁸¹ Military commanders attend to constituent preferences even once the offensives begin by relying on local militias.¹⁸² The shift to a more aggressive military counterterrorism does not reflect a change in the resolve or goals of Pakistani leaders, but instead a change in the attitudes of Pakistan's constituents.

The political and violent dynamics in the Pakistani example are distinct from previous cases, but confirm many of the key mechanisms and observations of

¹⁷⁸ Fair and Shapiro, "Understanding support" 2009.; Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro, "Roots of militancy," 2009.

¹⁷⁹ Interview with Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi, Edith Lederer, "Pakistani foreign minister says truce aims to prevent support for Taliban," Associated Press, September 26, 2006.

¹⁸⁰ Fair and Shapiro, "Understanding support," 2009.; Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro, "Roots of militancy," 2009.

¹⁸¹ Zardari quoted in *Daily Times*, "Public opinion behind anti-extremism policy," June 6, 2009.

¹⁸² Karen DeYoung, "Pakistan will give arms to tribal militias," *Washington Post*, October 23, 2008.

Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service. As in each previous case, militant violence results in constituent demands for military counterterrorism only when political accommodation clearly fails and when constituents expect military offensives to achieve their political goals. Also consistent with previous examples, the severity of the external threat and failure of political accommodation encourage support for military counterterrorism, while alienation between the non-state groups and supporters increases the efficacy of counterterror offensives. State responses adhere to constituent preferences, and are most likely when local populations demand violence.

However, despite similar mechanisms, distinct local political dynamics and differences on the core domestic determinants (severity, intractability, military efficacy, political optimism, political competition) make the Pakistan example distinct from previous examples in several ways. These determinants and their effects on political and violent dynamics are summarized in Tables 8.7 and 8.8. First, unlike in previous examples where constituent demands for violence are strongest in the conflict's initial stages and weaken over time with continued violence, in the Pakistani example the low support for military counterterrorism that characterizes the conflict's initial stages gives way to more extensive demands (or tolerance) for military activities as violence escalates. Evidence that political accommodation is unlikely to successfully defeat or control militant violence plays a significant role in motivating and sustaining this shift in Pakistani attitudes. Sympathy for militant groups and low expectations about the efficacy of violence explain the very different attitudes towards violence observed in Pakistan compared to those in previous examples.

A second key difference between the Pakistani case and previous examples concerns the nature of militant groups and their relationship with the local population. Although militant groups share some ethnic connection with the local Pashtun population, they do not actively represent Pashtun interests and are not embedded in local communities to the same extent as Palestinian or Iraqi groups. This separation places boundaries on Pashtun support for militant violence, speeds the onset of conflict fatigue, and facilitates effective state counterterrorism after 2009. The separation between local supporters and non-state groups also increases the flexibility of militant violence and the ability of militant groups to use violence even once Pashtuns have turned against it. However, this flexibility and militant group independence do not make Constituent Service irrelevant in the Pakistani example. There is still qualitative evidence that both al-Qaeda and the Taliban consider the limits of local constituent tolerance on their ability to respond violently, use economic and other incentives to consolidate local support, and incorporate Pashtun cultural sensitivities into their strategies.¹⁸³ In fact, there is some evidence that militant groups in the FATA are more effective in manipulating and influencing the expectations of local constituents than the United States.¹⁸⁴ These observations are significant because they suggest that constituent demands do shape, at least to some extent, the behavior of groups with transnational goals. Furthermore, this example shows that influence operations employed by either militants or the state can affect support for violence in protracted conflicts and may serve as powerful counterterror policy tools when employed effectively.

¹⁸³ Scott Atran, "A question of honor: Why the Taliban fight and what to do about it," *Asian Journal of Social Science* 38 (2010): 343-363.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

Table 8.7
Demands for & the Use of Violence: What Matters? *Pakistan*

Determinant	Level in Pakistan (non-FATA)	Demands for and Use of Violence
Severity of Threat	Low prior to 2007 when most violence is contained in FATA. Rises after Red Mosque siege to include the use of suicide bombs and violence within major Pakistani cities.	Pre-2009 ↓ Post-2009 ↑
Intractability	Moderate	↔
Expected Military Efficacy	Low prior to mid-2009. Failure of military offensives in FATA prior to 2009 and military corruption result in low confidence in military efficacy. Reforms, some military success, and broken ceasefires increase faith in military operations in recent months.	Pre-2009 ↓ After 2009 ↔
Political Optimism	Political accommodation appears sufficient prior to 2009, but failure of political approaches is increasingly clear over the course of the conflict.	Pre-2009 ↓ After 2009 ↑
Political Competition	Low. Weak democracy reduces political competition. Political corruption weakens support for violence.	↔
Political Institutions	Ties between govt and militant groups weaken clarity of responsibility. Distrust between state and population constrains support for violence.	↔
Duration	Support for military operations appears to rise over time after failed ceasefires and with falling tolerance for militant attacks.	↑

Table 8.8
Demands for & the Use of Violence: What Matters? *Pashtuns*

Determinant	In Pakistan's FATA	Demands for and Use of MILITANT Violence
Severity of Threat	High threat from STATE violence pre 2009. MILITANT threat exceeds state threat after 2009.	Pre-2009 ↑ Post-2009 ↓
Intractability	Moderate. State activity in the FATA threatens Pashtun nationalism. However, this concern is trumped when AQ/Taliban threaten tribal hierarchy.	Pre-2009 ↑ Post-2009 ↓
Expected Military Efficacy	Higher prior to 2009 than after. Militant violence appears effective as means to achieve independence prior to 2009. After 2009, collateral damage from TTP and AQ attacks, political challenge by TTP and AQ to tribal leaders creates pressure for settlement.	Pre-2009 ↑ Post-2009 ↓
Political Optimism	Low, but rises moderately after 2009 due to threat of militant violence.	Pre-2009 ↑ Post-2009 ↔
Political Competition	Moderate. Competition between Pashtuns and the state over Pashtun autonomy encourages Pashtun support for violence.	↑
Political Institutions	Clarity low due to weak institutions, US involvement. Lack of political opportunities increases demands for violence.	↑
Duration	Support for militant violence falls, but tolerance for state counterterrorism rises somewhat.	↓

Discussion

Constituent expectations act as the primary drivers of demands for violence, armed retaliation, and de-escalation in each of the four cases considered, confirming the key propositions of Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service. In each conflict, demands for violence are based on the balance between expected military efficacy and optimism or confidence in political strategies; violence follows constituent preferences

and demands; and de-escalation occurs when new political opportunities and military failures trigger a rejection of violence or new confidence in political alternatives. The timing of constituent demands for violence, the form of retaliatory violence, and the potential for de-escalation vary across conflicts and over time as constituent expectations respond to changes in the local political and security context. The qualitative cases also extend the generalizability of Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service. Despite significant differences in the nature, causes, and efficacy of violence and the characteristics of existing political institutions and opportunities, constituent expectations and demands are primary mechanisms of conflict escalation and de-escalation in each conflict. The extension of the theoretical argument to conflicts in Iraq and Pakistan are especially important because they suggest that Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service apply with caveats to conflicts with transnational elements and non-state groups with transnational objectives. In Iraq and Pakistan, even militant groups with external support and global networks still respond to the preferences and demands of local populations, although the constraints created by constituent demands are clearly weaker in these instances.

In each of these cases, conflict de-escalation is a bottom-up process in which constituent expectations and demands for political solutions force leaders and elites to consider political alternatives that encourage accommodation. In Sri Lanka, for example, constituent pressures are largely responsible for the 2002 ceasefire agreement. In Iraq, more appealing local political opportunities reduce constituent demands for violence and the loss of local support motivates some non-state groups to willingly enter into politics. In Russia, Putin's Chechenization policy reacts, in part, to the preferences of his local

supporters. The emergence of new political opportunities and erosion in the capabilities of militant groups are both important to de-escalation because they affect constituent attitudes about the relative benefits of military and political approaches to the conflict. In Iraq, the Awakening Councils offer appealing political opportunities that reduce support for violence, while law enforcement-based counterterrorism that destroys militant capabilities further weakens demands for militant operations. In Chechnya, the opportunity for political stabilization and the clear failure of militant violence to achieve political goals contribute to the rejection of militant violence. However, while the most effective counterterror strategies include military and political components, the case studies suggest attention to political attitudes, confidence, and engagement are required for lasting political settlements. In Pakistan and the Palestinian Territories, for example, the failure to offer viable political alternatives prevents a lasting political settlement and sustains support for violence.

This qualitative exploration of Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service shows clearly that, despite similarities, the political and violent dynamics of each conflict are made distinct by the prevailing local political dynamics. In each example, local political dynamics determine when constituents demand retaliatory violence or choose political approaches and shape the level of accountability and responsiveness between the state or non-state group and its local supporters. Domestic determinants such as conflict intractability, political competition and opportunities, the severity of the violence, and the initial success of military or militant-based reactions also affect the timing and form of violence and constituent demands for violence through their effect on constituent expectations. This cross-case variation has implications for counterterror policymaking.

Specifically, in each qualitative extension, the expectations of the non-state public shape the form and timing of the optimal counterterror response and the outcome of that intervention. For example, counterterror interventions of all kinds may be less successful when applied in intractable conflicts where violence is more intense, the perceived necessity of armed resistance generally higher, political alternatives less appealing, and constituent attitudes more inflexible. Conflicts involving non-state actors with serious political goals can be controlled with strategies that build new political opportunities, but those with non-state actors who have more abstract objectives or external support are often less sensitive to political strategies. Response timing also appears to affect the outcome and success of counterterror interventions. In Iraq, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Russia, early offensives lead to backlash and conflict escalation, but offensives used at later points in the conflict, once attitudes of the non-state public have turned against violence, are often effective in reducing support for violence. Attempts at political settlement that occur too early in a conflict without the necessary local support are also likely to collapse, even if the same strategy employed at some later point would lead successfully to a political settlement. To design effective policies, political leaders must not only consider expectations of the non-state public, but also track the evolution of constituent attitudes to identify the optimal point in a conflict for specific types of counterterror activities.

Together, these observations support the propositions of Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service and suggest the importance of local political dynamics to the formation of effective counterterror policy. Local political dynamics explain when violent retaliation occurs, the form of the violence, its political implications, and the types

of counterterror operations most likely to support a lasting de-escalation. The idea that constituent demands and local political dynamics matter to the timing and form of violence and the optimal counterterror responses has direct relevance for the United States, not only in its counterterror and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also in global campaign against extremist violence and its domestic attempts to prevent homegrown terrorism.

Chapter 9

Conclusion and Policy Implications: De-escalation from the Bottom-Up

What Have We Learned?

The very different Palestinian response to Israeli targeted killings in 2002 and 2004, Israel's more extensive use of military-retaliation prior to 2002, the decision by British leaders to use restraint after most IRA attacks, and varying levels of sectarian violence in Northern Ireland and Iraq can each be explained by a similar set of mechanisms and domestic political determinants. In each example, the form, timing, and intensity of the violent response or the decision to use restraint are influenced by constituent demands and preferences. Violent retaliation occurs when local constituents support or demand its use, but restraint is more likely when domestic publics reject or turn against armed approaches because state and non-state actors are accountable to their local supporters and use violence as a tool of Constituent Service. Also in each conflict, constituent demands for violence are conditional on expectations about the relative efficacy of military and political approaches, expectations that are based on past outcomes, the severity of the threat, and existing political opportunities. Demands for violence are most frequent when voters expect violence or military force employed as a political tool to more effectively advance political objectives than political alternatives. In each example, constituent expectations act as a causal mechanism that explains the

timing and extent of conflict de-escalation. De-escalation occurs when constituent demands for political solutions place constraints on additional violence.

The qualitative and quantitative results support the main hypothesis: violence begets demands for violence and the use of retaliatory violence when expected military efficacy exceeds political optimism. In the Second Intifada example, demands for violence from Israeli voters and violent retaliation by the IDF are most likely prior to 2002 (higher military efficacy) and after civilian fatalities (the more severe threat). On the Palestinian side, demands for violence from Palestinian constituents and armed responses by Hamas and Fatah are most likely prior to 2002 and are larger when perpetrated by Hamas in the post-2002 period. In Northern Ireland, constituent support for and the use of paramilitary violence are largest early in the conflict, prior to 1980, when there is some evidence that armed strategies can achieve limited political aims. Demands for and the use of armed retaliation fall through the 1980s and 1990s with new political opportunities. In each case, the size and form of responsive terrorism or counterterrorism matches constituent demands. Larger, more significant, and more popular responses follow large political reactions and demands. The most popular and observable form of counterterror response in each case, targeted killings in Israel and legislative or policy-based responses in Britain, are most common after civilian fatalities where there is also significant evidence of a shift in political attitudes. Only those responses that are aligned with supporter preferences and have observable outcomes consolidate political support for the group.

A comparison of the Second Intifada and the 'Troubles' cases makes clear the importance of local political dynamics, the nature of the conflict and its violence, and the

expectations of local constituents in driving conflict escalation and de-escalation and suggests several policy recommendations that are explored in this chapter. Although the same basic mechanisms, Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service, underlie constituent demands for violence and the timing of retaliation in the two conflicts, the very different political and security context in each case makes support for violence more robust and de-escalation more limited in the Second Intifada example. The greater intractability of the Second Intifada, its more severe violence, and the consistent failure of past attempts at political settlement make armed resistance appear necessary and political accommodation insufficient. Even as Palestinians and Israelis become disillusioned with the efficacy of violence, they continue to tolerate armed responses due to the lack of political alternatives and fear that political approaches will undermine political and security interests. This continues to be true today. The consistent failure of attempts at direct negotiations and the weakness of the Palestinian Authority sustain support for militant violence among Palestinian constituents and for military counterterrorism among Israeli voters because they highlight the lack of political options.

In contrast, although the sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland appears intractable to certain groups and at certain points, there is more flexibility in Protestant and Catholic attitudes, especially towards the end of the conflict. This flexibility facilitates the emergence of political alternatives to violence that, combined with the consistent failure of paramilitary activities to achieve political goals, gradually erodes demands for violence by Catholic and Protestant voters and builds support for political accommodation (Trevelyan and Heller, *The Advertiser* 1989; *Economist* 1988).

The finality of the ethnic and cultural divide between Israelis and Palestinians also exceeds that observed in Northern Ireland, with additional implications for the use of violence by state and non-state actors in each conflict. Because Palestinians and Israelis have little shared heritage and no real interest in living in a unified state, it is easier for each side to use violence on the other than is true in Northern Ireland, where shared ethnic ties and past experience living as a unified and peaceful public create cultural constraints on violence (Bar-Tal 1993; Kreisberg 1993; Salomon 2004). Conflict characteristics and past outcomes influence the timing of violence and the potential for political alternatives through their effect on constituent expectations. In Northern Ireland, these dynamics push the conflict towards a settlement. In the Second Intifada, they only intensify violence.

Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service appear to generalize to a wider set of protracted conflicts, including insurgencies like in those in Iraq and Pakistan that include both regional and transnational elements. Constituent expectations about the efficacy of violence and their optimism about political strategies are also a primary determinant of the violent and political dynamics in each of the four qualitative extensions. In each case, demands for violence occur when expected military efficacy exceeds political optimism, and are encouraged by political competition over security issues, intractability, and the severity of violence. Changes in the political and security context that build political confidence or suggest the failure of violence as a political tool, however, limit demands for violence by local constituents in each conflict and, as a result, often encourage at least temporary de-escalation. For example, Iraqi Sunnis and Shiites support militant violence as an effective substitute for weak political opportunities

prior to 2007. Strong local support for violence encourages conflict escalation and sectarian violence. However, Iraqis turn against increasingly ineffective and destructive militant violence after 2007 and express growing confidence in emerging political alternatives. The loss of local support contributes directly to post-2007 de-escalation, although the severity of the threat and weak political institutions prevent a final or permanent political resolution (Cordesman 2007; Simon 2008; Hashim 2006). During the Second Chechen War, support for militant violence among Chechen constituents and tolerance for military counterterrorism by Russian voters decline after 2000 as continuing Chechen attacks suggest the likely failure of military and militant-based approaches to achieve political objectives. Unlike in Iraq, however, in the Chechen conflict, de-escalation and support for political accommodation are reinforced by the low intractability of the conflict between Chechnya and Russia and the fact that both sides accept political compromise as the cost of stability. As a result, de-escalation and political settlements are more complete in Chechnya than in Iraq by the end of 2010. Despite clear differences in the conflict dynamics and outcomes that characterize sectarian violence in Iraq and those present in the Second Chechen War, constituent expectations about military efficacy and attitudes towards political alternatives determine the timing of demands for violence and the intensity of violent retaliation in each case. A summary of the results for each case is included in Table 9.1.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁵ I include Iraqi Shiites with the ‘state’ examples and Sunnis with the non-state examples. Although the Iraqi government includes both Sunnis and Shiites, Sunnis are in the decided minority in Iraq and hold a smaller percentage of political power. As a result, their alienation from state institutions is more extensive and their support for militant violence more robust through much of the post-2003 period (Simon, 2008; Cordesman 2007).

Table 9.1a
Were the Hypotheses Supported?: State Examples

Proposition	Israel	Britain	Russia	Sri Lanka	Iraq, Shiites	Pakistan, Non-FATA
P1. Political responses are more likely after civilian than militant deaths.	Supported. Political response to civilian deaths is larger than that to IDF deaths.	Supported. Political response largest after British civilian deaths.	Supported.	Supported (with caveats).	NA. Civ/mil distinction blurred.	Supported (with caveats).
P2. Demand for violence is most likely when expected military efficacy exceeds political optimism.	Supported. Political responses fall after ODS.	Supported. Demand for aggressive response only under Thatcher.	Supported. Demands for violence fall with Russian military failures, over time.	Supported (with caveats). Demands for violence fall with military efficacy, but political failures result in renewed support for militant violence.	Supported (with caveats). Demands for violence fall with military efficacy, low political confidence maintains support for militant violence.	Supported (partially). Demands for violence rise with military efficacy and after political failures, but <i>increase</i> over time.
P3. Disaffection and political alienation are most likely after civilian deaths	Supported.	Supported. Particularly under Labour administrations.	Supported (weakly).	NA	Supported. Civilian deaths undermine confidence in state.	Supported. Violence undermines state legitimacy.
P4a. Demands for violence are more likely when the threat is intractable.	Supported. Comparison with British example where low intractability limits demand for violence.	Supported. Comparison with Israeli example where intractability increases support for military CT.	Supported. Demands for violence weakened by Russian disinterest in Chechnya.	Supported. Sinhalese nationalism drives demand for violence.	Supported. Intractability encourages support for violence.	Supported.
P4b. Demands for violence are more likely when political competition over security policy is intense.	Supported. Compared with bipartisanship in Britain that constrains violence.	Supported. Comparison with effect of competition in Israel.	Supported (weakly). Lack of competition limits political responses	Supported. Competition encourages demands for violence.	Supported. Competition encourages demands for violence.	Supported. Limited political competition constrains politicization of violence.
P5. The likelihood, size, and duration of terror responses rises with the size of the political response.	Supported. Violent response to civilian deaths consistently larger.	Supported (with caveats). Responses more likely after civilian deaths, but they are policy-based.	Supported.	Supported.	Supported.	Supported. Attacks in major Pakistani cities provoke the largest responses.
P6. (states only). 'Exceptional' and 'popular' counterterror responses are most likely after attacks that result in large political responses.	Supported. Targeted killings and home demolitions follow only civilian deaths.	Supported. Policy responses most likely after civilian deaths.	Supported. Attacks on civilians lead to more severe state violence.	Supported. Major attacks on civilians, NA leaders lead to most severe offensives.	NA	Supported (weakly). Military response occurs only once voters respond politically.
P7. (non-state only). Extreme or ideological groups are more likely to respond violently to counterterrorism than moderate groups.	NA	NA	NA	NA	Supported. Note: This applies here because while allied with the state, Shiite groups are technically non-state actors	NA
P8. Retaliatory terror and counterterror responses have weaker political implications than precipitating acts of violence.	Supported.	Supported.	Supported (weakly).	Supported (weakly).	NA	NA
P9. Violent responses only increase support for perpetrating parties or groups where they match constituent preferences and appear to have positive performance outcomes.	Supported. Only targeted killings increase support for party in power.	Supported. Only policy responses show any evidence of positive political implications.	Supported. Deployment helps Putin when military is successful.	Supported. Successful violence consolidates support.	Supported. Successful violence consolidates support for perpetrator.	Supported. Successful violence consolidates support for perpetrator.

Table 9.1b
Were the Hypotheses Supported?: Non-State Examples

Proposition	Palestinian Territories	Northern Ireland	Chechnya	Tamils	Iraq, Sunnis	Pakistan, Non-FATA
P1. Political responses are more likely after civilian than militant deaths.	Supported (with caveats). Political response to civilian deaths larger than response to militant deaths, but demand for violence more likely after militant deaths in many contexts.	Supported (with caveats). Demands for violence follows civ. and mil. deaths on Catholic side and civ. deaths on Protestant side, but political responses suggest moderation and disaffection.	Supported. Alienation between civilians and militants limits attention to militant deaths.	Supported (with caveats). Militants hailed as martyrs, but civilian deaths provoke more severe political response.	NA. Civ/mil distinction blurred.	Supported. All violence unpopular, esp. civilian deaths.
P2. Demand for violence is most likely when expected military efficacy exceeds political optimism.	Supported (with caveats). Demand for violence is less likely after civilian deaths in post-ODS period, but follows militant deaths pre- and post-ODS. Limited response to Targeted Killings.	Supported (weakly). Demands for violence decrease over the course of the conflict, but disaffection and demands for peace increase in 1980s.	Supported. Demands for retaliation after Russian violence constrained by failure of Chechen militants.	Supported. Support for violence falls with LTTE's strength.	Supported (with caveats). Demands for violence fall with efficacy of insurgent violence, but political setbacks result in renewed interest in violence.	Supported (weakly): Demands for violence decrease when violence becomes destructive.
P3. Disaffection and political alienation are most likely after civilian deaths	Supported. Especially prior to ODS.	Supported.	NA	NA	Supported. Civilian deaths alienate Sunnis from political leaders.	Supported. Civilian deaths alienate Pashtuns from political leaders.
P4a. Demands for violence are more likely when the threat is intractable.	Supported. Comparison with Northern Ireland case, Chechnya, Pakistan where militants alienate their supporters.	Supported. Comparison with Palestinian case where support for violence and intractability are consistently more robust.	Supported. Limited intractability, willingness to compromise promotes accommodation.	Supported. Moderate intractability supports demands for violence.	Supported. Radicalization and demands for violence supported by intractability.	Supported. Limited intractability allows some flexibility, but support for violence sustained by strong desire for autonomy.
P4b. Demands for violence are more likely when political competition over security policy is intense.	Supported. Comparison with more limited inter-group competition in NI, change in Sri Lanka after LTTE primacy.	Supported. Comparison with more intense competition in Palestinian Territories.	Supported (weakly). Competition between groups politicizes violence.	Supported (weakly). Competition between groups encourages radicalization until LTTE primacy.	Supported. Competition between groups encourages radicalization and demands for violence.	Supported (partially). Groups cooperate to increase efficacy and attract support.
P5. The likelihood, size, and duration of terror responses rises with the size of the political response.	Supported (with caveats). Violent response to civilian deaths is larger than militants in pre-ODS period only. Demands for violence match use of violence.	Supported (with caveats). Violent responses largest in 1970s when political responses are most significant.	NA	NA	NA	NA
P6. (states only). 'Exceptional' and 'popular' counterterror responses are most likely after attacks that result in large political responses.	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
P7. (non-state only). Extreme or ideological groups are more likely to respond violently to counterterrorism than moderate groups.	Supported. Hamas is more likely to respond violently and its responses tend to be larger, esp. after militant deaths.	Supported. Violence is most likely after civilian deaths, but only where there is support for violence.	Supported, weakly. Islamist violence more severe than that of nationalists.	Supported (weakly). Violence by LTTE exceeds that used by less extreme militants in the 1970s.	Supported. Violence by Islamist groups exceeds that of nationalists.	Supported (with caveats). Variation by group exists, but increasingly they cooperate.
P8. Retaliatory terror and counterterror responses have weaker political implications than precipitating acts of violence.	Supported.	Supported.	NA	NA	NA	NA
P9. Violent responses only increase support for perpetrating parties or groups where they match constituent preferences and appear to have positive performance outcomes.	Supported (with caveats). Violent responses have positive political implications only prior to ODS.	Supported (weakly). Violence may increase support for perpetrating group in 1970s. Few consistent implications for legitimate political parties.	Supported. Unpopular indiscriminate violence erodes support for militants.	Supported. Unpopular indiscriminate violence erodes support for the LTTE.	Supported. Unpopular indiscriminate violence erodes support for perpetrators.	Supported. Unpopular indiscriminate violence erodes support for perpetrators.

How Can Protracted Conflict Violence be Contained and Controlled?

The conflicts considered in this dissertation show that the timing and success of conflict de-escalation depends heavily on constituent expectations and attitudes about the relative benefits of military and political tactics. When constituents expect that violence employed as a political tool will be more effective than political accommodation or compromise in advancing their political objectives, they appear to demand violent retaliation. These demands contribute to conflict escalation by incentivizing responsive violence by state and non-state actors. However, when political alternatives become more appealing or violence increasingly destructive, constituents are more likely to support political engagement, placing constraints on the use of violence by state and non-state actors that encourage political settlement and de-escalation. The tractability of the conflict, the severity of the threat, political competition, and the outcomes of previous military and political approaches affect the timing and form of violent escalation and de-escalation through their influence on constituent expectations about the likely benefits of political and military strategies and subsequent demands for retaliation and restraint.

By identifying constituent expectations and demands as a primary causal factor that explains conflict de-escalation, the empirical results in this dissertation suggest a more precise answer to the questions of how and when conflicts de-escalate that addresses a remaining gap in existing literature on conflict management. As noted previously, existing literature suggests that ‘ripeness’ for settlement emerges after some period of violent conflict when a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ makes political solutions more appealing and less costly than continued violence (Zartman 2001). The notion that some initial period of violence may be necessary to build a lasting political settlement has

been confirmed in large-N research and case studies of conflicts such as those in the Balkans or West Africa in the 1990s (Luttwak 1999; Bercovitch 1986; Regan and Stam 2000). However, existing work is unable to anticipate when ripeness for settlement is most likely, how ripeness emerges to support a lasting political settlement, or why there is significant variation in the success of mediation attempts across cases and over time.

Retrospective Projection answers these remaining questions with attention to constituent expectations and local political dynamics. According to Retrospective Projection, Constituent Service, and the qualitative and quantitative results of this dissertation, de-escalation of protracted conflicts is driven by constituent demands. Conflict de-escalation and lasting political settlements are more likely when new political opportunities or evidence of military (or militant group) failure cause realignment in the expectations of relevant domestic publics, increasing their support and confidence in political alternatives and placing bottom-up constraints on the use of violence by state and non-state actors. In Northern Ireland, for example, the emergence of Sinn Fein as an appealing political alternative combined with the increasingly apparent failure of IRA violence to achieve political goals creates pressure for political settlement among Catholics that constrains violence and facilitates negotiations. Similarly, de-escalation in Iraq in 2007 follows the preferences of Iraqi voters for political alternatives based on their recognition that militant violence is both costly and ineffective. In each conflict, settlements and attempts at mediation are more successful when there is sustained confidence and interest in political alternatives on both the state and non-state sides of the conflict.¹⁸⁶ Counterterror policies that attend to the expectations and attitudes of local

¹⁸⁶ The issue of how states can identify these points is considered below in more detail.

constituents and are designed to improve expectations about political engagement are most likely to encourage lasting political settlements.

Because constituent expectations and demands are a primary determinant of conflict escalation and de-escalation, counterterror policies that are able to shift the balance between expected military efficacy and political optimism can constrain violence by reducing constituent demands for violence. There are two primary ways this can be accomplished, both evident in the cases considered in this dissertation. First, counterterror policies can reduce expected militant efficacy by destroying the capabilities of the non-state militant group to convince local supporters that violence is unlikely to be effective in achieving political goals or is simply too costly to continue indefinitely. Counterterror policies can also encourage de-escalation by building political optimism and creating new political opportunities and alternatives that shift constituent attitudes about the potential for political compromise, or at least the relative benefits of political accommodation compared to enduring violence. Although state activities that target militant group capabilities and those that focus on political attitudes can both reduce support for and the use of violence, the case studies in this dissertation suggest that the most effective counterterror strategies include political *and* military components.

Reducing Expected Militant Efficacy

Counterterror policies that focus on reducing expected militant efficacy encourage de-escalation by undermining demands for and confidence in violence as a political tool. This is accomplished by destroying the capabilities of the non-state group, weakening its ability to execute effective armed operations, and convincing non-state publics that

violence is unlikely to achieve political goals (Frisch 2005; Ganor 2005). The qualitative and quantitative analysis presented in the case studies recommend several more specific activities that can control conflict violence by undermining the expectations of non-state constituents about the efficacy of violence. These recommendations are summarized in Table 9.2.

The simplest way states can affect constituent expectations about the efficacy of violence is relying on massive military offensives that overwhelm the non-state group. This approach is used with some success by Russia, Sri Lanka, and Israel during ODS (Lyll 2009; Frisch 2005). In each case, military offensives reveal clearly to the non-state public the almost certain failure of an armed resistance strategy, undermine support for armed retaliation, and create bottom up constraints on the use of militant violence. Counterterror strategies that rely solely on repressive military force are often able to reduce non-state violence by destroying the capabilities of the non-state rival, but they may cause significant collateral damage, backlash and a temporary escalation in the near term. In some cases and at some points in the conflict, this backlash may be prohibitively high, warranting the use of alternative strategies. The cost may be an acceptable one, however, if it is offset by significant de-escalation in later months.

Targeted military counterterror operations, including targeted assassinations and limited military raids, arrests, and incursions, can also reduce expected militant efficacy by weakening the operational capabilities and undermining the reputation of militant groups, often with less backlash than more indiscriminate operations. For example, military operations that cut off internal supply lines, disrupt resource or communication networks, destroy operational assets such as safe houses and weapons' factories, or

restrict access to external resources and funding not only make it difficult for non-state groups to execute effective military operations, they also suggest a degree of incompetence by the militant group that affects the expectations and attitudes of local supporters (Frisch 2005; Ganor 2005). Targeted killings of key group leaders can have similar effects on support for and the use of violence when they undermine constituent confidence in militant group efficacy or disrupt the group's real ability to organize and execute violent attacks. Israel relies heavily on targeted military tactics during the Second Intifada, including targeted killings and containment-based counterterrorism intended to limit militant group access to weapons, funds, and other technology. Although the effectiveness of targeted killings is debated, in general, targeted assassinations and limited military strikes used increasingly after 2002 appear more successful in controlling Palestinian violence than incursions used earlier in the conflict (Catignani 2005a).

Counterterror strategies that rely on law enforcement tactics to combat terrorist violence are also generally successful in reducing expected and real military efficacy, weakening local constituent demands for violence, and contributing to conflict de-escalation. Law enforcement-based counterterrorism uses intelligence networks, police-led raids and weapons seizures, and arrests and detentions to eliminate militant group capabilities and effectively stifle their communication, movement, and operation process. Law enforcement approaches often include court processes that are able to prosecute and convict suspected terrorists. Not only do such convictions weaken the perceived competency of the non-state group, they also often remove militant commanders from their positions, further damaging the group's operational capabilities and their ability to respond violently (Lutz et al. 2002). Law enforcement activities are an especially useful

counterterror technique because they undermine real and perceived military efficacy, but use a non-violent approach with a more limited risk of backlash than large scale military offensives. In addition, by equating terrorists with common criminals, law enforcement strategies de-sensationalize terrorism and reduce the emotive drivers that encourage support for terrorist violence. The British use a law enforcement-based approach in Northern Ireland with significant success against Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries. After the 1976 shift to police primacy, extensive intelligence and legislation designed to support effective counterterrorism allow British forces and North Ireland's police to uncover and disrupt paramilitary plots, arrest group leaders and operatives, and then prosecute and imprison them (Lutz et al. 2002; Ellison and Smyth 2000). As noted previously, legislative and law enforcement counterterrorism also contributes to de-escalation in Chechnya and to some extent Iraq, where increasingly effective police activity disrupts violence by non-state actors and reduces the perceived necessity of militant retaliation in the eyes of Iraqi voters. Law enforcement approaches are even relevant in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict where preventative arrests are often more effective against violence than targeted assassinations (Kaplan et al. 2005). However, effective law enforcement-based counterterrorism may also require some prerequisite level of stability to successfully control violence.

However, while the case studies show numerous examples where counterterror strategies focused on reducing the perceived and real efficacy of violence are able to lessen and control conflict violence, there are few instances where an exclusive reliance on military-oriented counterterrorism is able to eliminate violence or permanently de-escalate the conflict.

**Table 9.2:
Controlling Conflict Violence by Reducing Expected Military Efficacy**

Approach #1 Reduce expected military efficacy	
<i>Objective: Erode confidence of non-state public in violence by eliminating militant group capabilities</i>	
Recommendation	Comments
<i>Large-scale military incursions that wipe out militant capabilities</i>	Fairly easy to plan and execute, but often causes backlash.
<i>Targeted violence that eliminates leadership, key capabilities</i>	Requires more operational skill, intelligence, but less risk of backlash.
<i>Law enforcement-based counterterrorism that uses arrests, convictions</i>	Requires some level of stability as well as effective police and court system. Provokes limited backlash and has some political benefits.

Increasing Political Optimism

Counterterror strategies that create appealing political opportunities or that improve the attitudes of non-state voters towards political alternatives to violence also support lasting de-escalation through their effect on expected military efficacy and political optimism. The Palestinian example suggests the important role played by political opportunities, engagement, and confidence in the de-escalation of protracted conflicts by default. Palestinians have little confidence in the efficacy of continued armed resistance, but they continue to support militant violence because they lack appealing political alternatives and have low confidence in the potential for successful political engagement with Israelis. This is especially true in the Gaza Strip, where political alternatives and opportunities for engagement are essentially non-existent. In other conflicts, such as Northern Ireland and even Iraq, counterterror strategies do incorporate political components and are more successful in permanently eliminating conflict violence, as a result.

The case studies included in this dissertation offer some insight into the specific types of counterterror strategies most likely to encourage significant, lasting de-escalation in protracted conflict violence. These are summarized in Table 9.3. First, qualitative and quantitative analyses recommend the creation of new political opportunities, at the central and local level, as one of the more effective ways to permanently embed confidence and support for political alternatives. Political opportunities are able to institutionalize political optimism when they directly engage non-state publics at the local level, offering them appealing and culturally relevant alternatives to violence. Rather than being based exclusively on a Western-style democracy, relevant political opportunities work through local networks and alongside existing local leaders. These locally-focused political strategies are more effective than centralized, top-down political initiatives because they address local grievances that drive support for violence and produce measurable changes in the lives of the non-state public. For example, in Northern Ireland, power-sharing arrangements, police reform, and economic incentives effectively address Catholic grievances, undermine support for the IRA, and build confidence in political compromise (McAllister 2004; Honaker 2008). In Iraq, the most effective political changes are those that work through existing tribal networks and alongside local stakeholders, rather than those that are implemented from the top down (Simon 2008).

Where state counterterrorism places more limited emphasis on local political dynamics, attempts to control or de-escalate violence are less successful. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, the failure to employ political strategies that work through existing tribal networks or engage Pashtun tribes in culturally relevant ways encourages violence and support for militant groups (Atran 2010). In both cases, attempts to superimpose a

centralized democracy only increase the value of violence as a political tool able to advance Pashtun interest in political independence. Similarly, in the Palestinian Territories, the lack of policies able to address local grievances is one remaining obstacle to a lasting political settlement.

The case studies in this dissertation offer more specific insight into the types of counterterror policies most likely to advance political confidence. Across cases, political opportunities and institutions have the strongest positive effect on political optimism when they effectively provide services and security, offering observable evidence that political strategies can advance and protect constituent interests. The Palestinian Authority technically offers Palestinians the chance for political engagement, but the PA's failure to protect Palestinian interests, limited provision of basic social services, and its own corruption prevents the emergence of any real political optimism able to support a lasting de-escalation. Similarly, support for militant groups in Iraq is encouraged and sustained by the weakness of the Iraqi central government and its inability to effectively provide services and security to the local population. After 2007, more effective service and security provision helps consolidate support for political alternatives and weakens tolerance for militant groups and their violence (Simon 2008; Biddle, O'Hanlon, and Pollack 2008; BBC, ABC, NHK, "Iraq Poll February 2009," March 16, 2009). In Northern Ireland, community-level political and economic reforms that provide economic incentives and restructure the indigenous police force are similarly essential to the ultimate achievement of a political settlement because they observably address core grievances that drive support for the IRA and prove that the political process can work (Ellison and Smyth 2000; Honaker 2008; McAllister 2004). Although simply creating

political opportunities and alternatives to violence can begin the process of de-escalation in protracted conflicts, long-term cessation of violence requires political institutions that produce observable results able to consolidate support for political engagement.

Political optimism and openness to compromise can also be encouraged by policies that reduce the severity of the external security threat and reframe the intractability of the conflict's core issues. These changes contribute to de-escalation by making political compromise appear less dangerous and more likely. Conflict reframing is difficult, but not impossible. The case studies show that tractability is not dichotomous or static, but instead continuous and mutable, able to change over the course of the conflict with changes in constituent expectations and demands. In Northern Ireland, reframing is accomplished through mediation that reveals areas of mutual interest, the creation of new political opportunities, cross-sectarian civic engagement, and economic reforms that address the primary Catholic grievances (Adams 2003; Honaker 2008). Tracked negotiations that divide complex issues into smaller, easier to resolve pieces also facilitate reframing and settlement in the Northern Ireland case (Adams 2003). Attempts to reframe conflicts with more severe intractability will be more challenging, but should focus first on peripheral, easy to address issues that can serve as a foundation for more extensive compromise at a later point. At the very least political leaders can steer away from rhetoric or policies that exacerbate the zero sum nature of the conflict.

Policies that reduce the severity of the violent threat presented by the state may also contribute to conflict de-escalation by reducing the perceived necessity of violence from the perspective of the non-state group and increasing the potential for a political settlement. Law enforcement-based counterterrorism, for example, can reduce the direct

threat implied by state counterterrorism because it implies a state actor that is committed to rule of law, marginalizes terrorists as criminals, and increases the potential for and acceptability of political compromise. For example, the British shift to police primacy in 1976 weakens the symbolic threat posed by the British presence and begins the slow processes of refiguring Catholic attitudes towards their relationship with Britain and the British government (Weitzer 1985). Law enforcement-based approaches to counterterrorism are also centrally important to de-escalation in Chechnya and Iraq because of their effect on the political attitudes of non-state constituents. In Iraq, public opinion polls show that the improved performance of Iraq's indigenous police force after 2007 directly affects Iraqi political attitudes, reducing support for continued militant violence and increasing confidence in political solutions (Simon 2008; Biddle, O'Hanlon, and Pollack 2008; BBC, ABC, NHK, "Iraq Poll February 2009," March 16, 2009). In Chechnya, Chechenization includes the creation of a stronger and better-trained local police force with additional counterterror responsibilities. The success of this police force in providing stability, through arrests of local militants and seizures of weapons caches, and the associated reduced presence of Russian soldiers in the region consolidates Chechen support for political alternatives and their rejection of violence.

The relative success and importance of politically-focused counterterror strategies is consistent with Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service and its emphasis on local political dynamics and constituent expectations as drivers of violence. However, the efficacy of politically-focused approaches does not eliminate or negate the contribution of military-based tactics, described previously, especially in conflicts characterized by rampant violence that precludes slow moving political reform.

**Table 9.3:
Controlling Conflict Violence by Increasing Political Optimism**

Approach #2 Increase political optimism	
<i>Objective: Create political alternatives that build confidence in political strategies rather than violence</i>	
Recommendation	Comments
<i>Create local political opportunities that provide governance</i>	Should work through local networks, address local grievances and cultural sensitivity. Observable outcomes are essential.
<i>Reframing conflict's central issues</i>	Phased or tracked negotiations. Address easy issues first.
<i>Reduce severity of violent threat</i>	Can be accomplished with law enforcement-based counterterrorism.

A 'Two-Tracked' Approach

In each of the conflicts considered in this dissertation, there is an important place for military-based counterterrorism, one that is focused on destroying non-state group capabilities and eliminating both their real and expected military efficacy in order to remove bottom-up demands for violence by relevant constituencies. However, on its own, a military-based counterterror strategy is unlikely to finally resolve a protracted conflict. Instead, an effective counterterror strategy must include a political component that builds confidence among non-state voters in political alternatives to violence and opportunities necessary to support lasting political optimism. The case studies underscore, therefore, the importance of developing a two-tracked counterterror strategy that incorporates political and military components. The most effective and successful counterterror strategies include military and political activities that are implemented simultaneously and work together to promote de-escalation. In Sri Lanka, for example, a military operation finally destroys the LTTE, but the experience of peace in the 2002-2004 period

and efforts by the state to separate the LTTE from local supporters create the political context in which the 2008 offensive can be effective. In Northern Ireland, law enforcement strategies weaken expected efficacy of paramilitary groups and foster conflict fatigue, but political reforms and opportunities consolidate support for political engagement and compromise. In Iraq, de-escalation follows both the realization that militant violence is only destructive and the emergence of new political opportunities, like Awakening Councils, that offer a viable and increasingly appealing alternative to violence (BBC, ABC, NHK, "Iraq Poll February 2009," March 16, 2009).

In conflicts where the political component is ignored, however, de-escalation is temporary and partial at best. During the Second Intifada, the use of military-based counterterrorism constrains the ability of militant groups to operate effectively, but the lack of political alternatives contributes directly to sustained Palestinian support for violence, the continued popularity of Palestinian militant groups, and conflict flare-ups. In Pakistan's FATA, Pashtun confidence in the efficacy of militant violence erodes as violence endures without real political gains, but the lack of political opportunities and alternatives sustain Pashtun tolerance for militant groups and their activities against the state. Counterterror strategies that rely exclusively on violence and focus primarily on militant capabilities reduce constituent demands for violence, but appear unable to build the political confidence needed for lasting de-escalation.

A two-tracked approach to counterterrorism is most effectively executed with counterterror strategies and tactics that simultaneously affect constituent attitudes towards military and political approaches to the conflict and explicitly include military and political components. Two-tracked strategies recommended by the case studies in

this dissertation are summarized in Table 9.4. Influence, information, and psychological campaigns are especially likely to be successful as part of a two-tracked counterterror strategy because they typically do include military and political components and can be designed to be locally-focused and context specific. Influence operations are defined as any state civilian or military activity intended to shape the attitudes of the non-state public towards military and political alternatives in ways that support state objectives, extending far beyond ‘propaganda’ or even diplomacy. Influence operations include tactical and operational Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) carried about by military personnel as well as strategic PSYOPS and targeted information campaigns that use radio, broadcast, or TV to affect constituent attitudes. More specific examples of influence operations include economic incentives intended remove grievances that drive support for violence; infrastructure development; information operations that use the distribution of pamphlets, radio broadcasts, and television programs to provide accurate information about the costs of militant violence and the benefits of engagement with the state; and provision of incentives linked to cessation of violence (Larson et al. 2009). In each manifestation, influence and information operations work by altering the expectations and attitudes of non-state constituents, pulling them towards greater support of the state and pushing them away from tolerance of violence. Importantly, the most successful policies are those executed by local leaders and intermediaries that work to build lasting indigenous political and security institutions.

The results presented in this dissertation suggest that the most effective influence and information operations are those that operate at the local level and through indigenous, local actors, taking into account what local constituents already believe and

providing incentives that are culturally relevant and meaningful. For example, effective provision of economic incentives and reconstruction assistance by the Sri Lankan government to local Tamil communities during the 2001-2002 period significantly erode Tamil support for violence by directly affecting their well-being and their attitude towards both political solutions and the state itself (Sriskandarajah 2003). In Chechnya, Putin enlists the support of Chechen sympathizers who take leadership positions in the new Chechen state after 2003, execute Putin's own policy preferences, and use state media and service provision to sway the attitudes of local Chechens in ways favorable to Russian objectives (German 2003; Evangelista 2002; Kramer 2005). The United States has used locally-focused influence operations extensively in Iraq. For instance, Awakening Council program uses economic and political incentives to win the cooperation of Sunni tribal leaders in the fight against insurgents and to undermine Iraqi support for militant groups. Because these benefits are conditional on their effective cooperation and because the strategy itself works through the local level, the linkage approach creates bottom up constraints on Sunni militant groups that successfully reduce violence (Simon 2008; Biddle, O'Hanlon, and Pollack 2008). Similarly, economic and political incentives that directly address the grievances of Catholics in Northern Ireland are successful in controlling conflict violence because they directly affect the attitudes of individual constituents towards violence and political accommodation at the micro-level.

Information operations are also most effective when they appeal directly to local constituents through local channels and when communicated by non-state elites because this approach maximizes the direct effect of information operations on constituent attitudes. The choice of message and medium depends very much on the local context.

As an example, the most effective information operations in Iraq use Iraqi moderates and Awakening Council leaders to communicate the destructive qualities of militant violence and the potential for political strategies. Top-down communication of similar messages is less effective in Iraq due to nation's tribal structure and sometimes limited access to television broadcasts outside of major cities (McCrary 2009). The Sri Lankan government takes a different, but also successful approach, using former militants who have defected to the state as a mouthpiece for political accommodation (Wax, *Washington Post* 2009). In Russia, a more centralized political structure and Putin's consolidated control makes manipulated media and new coverage a more effective influence tool in the example of the Second Chechen war.

In addition to influence operations, the case studies recommend law enforcement-based counterterrorism that occurs through an effective police force and court system as an often important part of a successful two-tracked counterterror strategy. Law enforcement counterterrorism, like influence operations, can simultaneously weaken the perceived efficacy of militant groups and strengthen confidence in political engagement. Police-based tactics reduce support for violence by eliminating militant group capabilities. They also de-sensationalize terrorism by criminalizing it and affect political confidence by portraying a state actor that is more directly committed rule of law. By reducing the perceived necessity and relative benefits of violence, law enforcement-based counterterrorism builds confidence in political alternatives. The best example of law enforcement-based counterterrorism occurs during the 'Troubles', but as noted previously, legal and law enforcement approaches also control violence in Chechnya and Iraq. However, law enforcement and legal procedures require some level of stability and

may not be possible when conflict violence is intense. In these cases, targeted military operations that eliminate militant group capabilities may be required before a police-based response is employed.

A final important observation is the effect of group type on the outcomes of counterterror strategies that work through constituent expectations and demands to control violence. This type of counterterror strategy is most effective when the non-state group is dependent on local supporters for resources or support and especially when the group has strong political goals or interests that increase ties of accountability. For example, as a group with strong political interests and direct dependence on local supporters, the IRA is responsive to constituent preferences and sensitive to counterterror strategies that work through constituent demands. In contrast, groups with extensive external resources and abstract political goals are less constrained by the demands of local supporters and less affected by state policies that rely on bottom-up constraints. Islamist militants in Chechnya, Iraq, and Pakistan have exploited external support to continue their use of violence despite low and falling support for these tactics among local publics. Although Retrospective Projection and Constituent Service apply less directly to groups with transnational support and resource networks, even these groups are not exempt from local political pressures and constituent constraints. Counterterror policies aimed at transnational groups can exploit even the limited accountability of these groups by identifying the specific constituent population to which the group is responsive or from which it draws supporters and designing policies that influence their expectations and attitudes. Furthermore, in both Iraq and Pakistan, even transnational groups are forced to consider the demands and preferences of local supporters. In these cases,

increasing the group’s dependence on local support may place some constraints on the use of violence.

**Table 9.4:
Controlling Conflict Violence with a Two-Track Approach**

Approach #3 Two-track Approach	
<i>Objective: Simultaneously reduce expected military efficacy and increase political optimism</i>	
Recommendation	Comments
<i>Law enforcement-based counterterrorism</i>	Uses arrests, convictions to erode expected military efficacy, but also commits to rule of law and reduces severity of external threat.
<i>Influence operations (PSYOPs and Information Operations)</i>	Includes military and political components. Targeted political and economic incentives; Social service provision; Psyops executed by military units; Information campaigns. Work by directly influencing expectations of non-state public about the benefits of military and political approaches.

When Does Intervention Work?

Local constituent expectations affect not only the type of counterterror intervention most likely to reduce and eliminate protracted conflict violence, but also the timing of this intervention. Similar interventions at different points in a conflict can have distinct implications on future violence and the attitudes of affected constituents as a result of the dynamic and evolving nature of constituent expectations and demands. For example, initial Israeli offensives before ODS contribute to Palestinian constituent demands for violence and conflict escalation. However, declining Palestinian confidence in the efficacy of armed resistance after 2002 reduces Palestinian demands for violent retaliation and increases the relative success of Israeli counterterror interventions in the post-ODS period. Similarly, Sri Lanka’s early military offensives radicalize Tamils into

supporting the LTTE, but its 2008 operation is successful because the Tamil population has lost confidence in violence as a political tool and no longer supports the LTTE's militant strategy. In Britain, political initiatives implemented during the 1970s fail because they occur before Catholics and Protestants firmly accept the necessity and benefits a political approach. Political reforms proposed in the 1990s, when support for violence is low and interest in political settlement high successfully institutionalize political optimism. The observation that the efficacy of counterterror interventions varies over time with constituent expectations suggests the importance of response timing to conflict settlement in de-escalation.

In many instances, lagged interventions that are implemented sometime after the initial outbreak of hostilities and after some period of escalation are more successful than those implemented early in a conflict because conflict endurance erodes confidence in military-based strategies and increases openness to political accommodation and compromise. These changes in constituent expectations create political and security environments in which significant counterterror interventions have a higher chance of success. The observation that the expected efficacy of violence erodes naturally over time when violence fails to produce desired outcomes is a hopeful one because it suggests that even without aggressive counterterror offensives, conflict fatigue may constrain conflict violence on its own. However, evidence that conflict endurance and failed political settlements can also increase support for violence and permanently erode political confidence is more troubling. The Pakistani and Sri Lankan examples are ones where the consistent failure of political accommodation gradually creates more robust support for military-based counterterrorism on the state side. In the Palestinian case, several failed

political agreements similarly sustain some support for violence. When political strategies are used, therefore, it is important that they immediately and observably produce a result that reinforces, rather than erodes, political optimism and confidence in political alternatives.

Constituent expectations determine the types of intervention most likely to de-escalate violence at any given point and the point in a conflict when intervention is most likely to eliminate conflict violence. Counterterror policymakers, therefore, must attend closely to the attitudes and beliefs of the non-state public to identify the optimal intervention point. In the ideal situation, states would be able to anticipate the exact moment when the balance between military efficacy and political optimism will shift definitively towards strong constituent support for political alternatives. This type of anticipation may be difficult, because constituent expectations are dynamic and because each case is distinct. However, the cases included here do identify a set of indicators and guidelines that signal or warn state actors when the attitudes of the non-state public approach this tipping point. Even when states cannot anticipate the precise moment when a conflict is primed for settlement, policymakers can anticipate the types of events and conflict dynamics most likely to immediately precede this realignment by looking at the drivers of support for violence in each case. This approach may not allow states to anticipate when in a conflict de-escalation will occur, but it does focus policymaker attention on indicators that provide early warning of a shift.

The qualitative and quantitative results suggest that the most accurate signals of an impending shift in the expectations of non-state constituents about the benefits of military and political strategies are those that imply a fundamental change in attitudes

towards political engagement or towards the non-state group and its violence. Changes in the nature of the relationship between the non-state group and local publics affect the potential for de-escalation and violence because this relationship defines the willingness of the non-state public to support and demand violence, the perceived efficacy of violence as a political tool, and the responsiveness of the non-state actor to local supporters. Collateral damage caused by the militant group to its supporting population, forced conscription, defection of former militant group supporters to the state, and even protests by the non-state public against violence are all associated with realignment of non-state attitudes towards violence and the creation of conflict dynamics that favor conflict settlement. In Iraq, defections of former Sunni insurgents, infighting among Shiite militia members, and collateral damage by both Sunni and Shiite groups within local communities are early signals of a shift in Iraqi attitudes that creates openness to political initiatives and that support the success of the surge (Simon 2008). The early formation by Pashtuns in Pakistan of independent militias to protect tribesmen against militants similarly serves as an indication of growing dissatisfaction among Pashtuns with Taliban violence and some openness to state intervention (Fair and Shapiro 2009).

Changes in political engagement or participation on the non-state side are also common precursors of de-escalation because they are often associated with new levels of political optimism and confidence. Rising political turnout, the emergence of new moderates or political parties, internal fissures within the non-state group, and an increase in local community organizations (formal or informal) all signal changes in political interest, involvement, and attitudes that create openness for new political interventions and strategies. Returning to the Iraq example, rising voter turnout in Iraqi elections in

2006, especially among Sunnis, and the participation of former militants in the election process are early evidence of rising political interest among Iraqis. More extensive political involvement by local constituents reinforces falling support for violence and contributes directly to the post-2007 de-escalation. In Northern Ireland, Sinn Fein's entrance into legitimate politics and its strong electoral performance signal a shift in Catholic attitudes towards political engagement in the 1980s that creates openness for political intervention.

However, the preceding discussion of response timing also suggests the best answer to the question "When should states employ aggressive counterterror initiatives?" is really, "It depends." To identify the optimal time for a given response, states must be able to track changes in the attitudes and demands of local constituents, diagnose and even anticipate shifts in these attitudes that are conducive to intervention, and to identify specific political and security shocks most likely to affect constituent expectations and demands.

Acquiring this type of deep cultural understanding requires sustained attention to local political dynamics, including not only the preferences and demands of non-state publics, but also their political and economic networks and their cultural and religious sensitivities and histories. Knowledge of local political dynamics can be used to identify vulnerabilities and stakeholders that can be targeted by counterterror initiatives as well as the cultural and local practices that must be considered in effective counterterror strategies. The acquisition and utilization of detailed local knowledge is not incidental, but instead requires an extensive on-the-ground state presence, including military and police forces, overt and covert operations, and where conditions permit, a broad-based

civilian network that can gather intelligence and interpret information about the political attitudes and grievances of local populations and the activities of militant groups. The development of this type of workforce will require a set of recruiting strategies and training programs that can attract and prepare civilian and military personnel with the appropriate competencies. As important, state actors facing a violent non-state threat, including not only Israel, Pakistan, and Iraq, but also the United States, must develop processes and institutions that facilitate quick response, for instance the design and implementation of effective counterterror programs that capitalize on windows of opportunity and incorporate relevant cultural knowledge.

How Do These Results Inform US Counterterror Policy?

Although the qualitative and quantitative analyses presented in this dissertation focus on violence and demands for violence in protracted terror-counterterror conflicts, one of the most important implications to emerge from the analysis—that constituent demands and local political dynamics determine the types of violence that occur and the types of counterterror responses that are best able to encourage de-escalation—is directly relevant to the United States’ counterterror strategy in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan as well as its efforts against homegrown terror cells active inside the United States. There are certainly differences between the dynamics that drive geographically-constrained and regional protracted terror-counterterror conflicts, those that explain radicalization that supports transnational violence by non-state groups, and those that motivate homegrown terror plots. However, in each instance, constituent expectations and local political

dynamics appear to affect the timing and form of violence, the potential for de-escalation, and by extension the type and timing of the optimal counterterror interventions.

A survey of militant organizations including Hezbollah, al-Qaeda linked cells in the United States and Europe, larger Islamist groups recruiting in East Africa, and Taliban-affiliated organizations in Afghanistan and Pakistan suggests that the individual decision to support violence depends less on the group's overarching ideology or political goals than on local conditions, networks, and grievances (Kfir 2008; Atran 2010; Kavanagh 2011). In Africa and Lebanon, lack of economic and educational opportunities combined with the absence of a strong state presence encourages membership in militant organizations (Kfir 2008; Kavanagh 2011). In Pakistan and Afghanistan, strong local constituent demands for autonomy and the threat presented by state attempts to impose centralized governance create political grievances that increase the appeal of militant violence, even when local Pashtuns have limited support for the political goals of local Taliban or al-Qaeda commanders (Atran 2010). Homegrown terrorist cells in the United States and Europe similarly tolerate or employ violence to address specific local conditions and discontents, including poverty or feelings of deprivation. Those responsible for bombs in London in 2005, the Madrid bombs in 2004, and radical cells in Germany and Holland turn to violence as a more effective way to address feelings of social dislocation and marginalization.

Because local grievances appear to drive support for violence in regional and transnational contexts, counterterror policies designed to anticipate, prevent, and counteract radicalization, constituent demands for violence, and the use of violence must also be locally-focused, working through local channels, networks, and leaders to

influence constituent expectations and shape constituent attitudes. American policymakers and military commanders must determine when, why, and under what conditions local populations support violence before beginning counterterror operations, either domestically or overseas, and integrate this information into counterterror policies that effectively address local grievances and incorporate local political and cultural dynamics. Where grievances are political, the creation of new local government opportunities may be most effective in limiting radicalization and constituent demands for violence, especially where these political opportunities build off of pre-existing political or cultural networks. Where grievances are economic, local economic incentives that work through local practices and traditions should be employed. When grievances are social, state provision of social services (through civilians if possible) can limit demands for violence and improve the attitudes of non-state actors towards the state, especially when these services, resources, and opportunities are offered according to local customs and traditions.

Although these counterterror policies are distinct in form and target, each controls support for and the use of violence by influencing the expectations and addressing the demands of local constituents and working through existing local stakeholders, institutions, and networks to create bottom up constraints on the use of violence. Applied to Afghanistan, this type of approach underscores the importance of tribal cultural and structure and recommends the design of political strategies that work through tribal networks, address demands for regional autonomy, and exploit the power of local tribal leaders to create bottom-up constraints on the use of violence. In Eastern Africa, where socioeconomic dislocation and state weakness encourage radicalization, a counterterror

approach that offers community and clan-based financial incentives, services, and education opportunities may effectively prevent radicalization. Inside the United States and in Europe, economic and social service programs targeted at depressed cities and neighborhoods and attempts to integrate new immigrants into mainstream communities (rather than allowing them to isolate themselves as often occurs in Europe) can address domestic grievances that motivate homegrown terror plots. As noted previously, the development of locally-focused counterterror policies requires an extensive commitment of personnel and technology resources, to gather and interpret relevant cultural information and incorporate this information into counterterror policies. The design, acquisition, and deployment of this technology and personnel with these specific skills should be a key priority for US policymakers and military planners going forward.

US counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan increasingly do attend to local political dynamics and include activities intended to increase or consolidate political optimism. For example, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) and Human Terrain Teams (HTT) are used in both conflict zones to incorporate civilian expertise and politically-focused components into counterinsurgency operations. PRTs are involved primarily in reconstruction activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. The activities of PRTs in Iraq emphasize the building of political and economic infrastructure at the provincial and national level, including training and technical assistance provided to government ministries, provincial representatives, and governors; distribution of aid for economic and infrastructure development; and strengthening the legal system (Perito 2007). In Afghanistan, PRTs have been involved in a similar set of reconstruction activities, including military patrols, school building, UN assessment, and police training, all in

support of the Afghan government (McNerney 2005-2006). HTT's also incorporate civilian and military personnel and conduct non-combat Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, but have a slightly different function. HTTs include senior officers and civilian social scientists whose goal and purpose is to ensure that military commanders have access to information about the local culture, religion, and political systems of the specific local public among whom they are operating (Kipp et al. 2006; Silinsky 2010). HTTs collect information on local customs, leaders, religion, and economic characteristics and use this information to create counterinsurgency strategies that effectively engage local populations.

In design, both HTTs and PRTs follow many of the recommendations made in this chapter. They are locally-focused, incorporate civilian expertise, identify and address local grievances, and attend closely to constituent expectations. They have achieved some successes, PRTs in improving governance, building infrastructure, and integrating civil and military activities in Iraq and Afghanistan (McNerney 2005-2006) and HTTs in designing counterinsurgency strategies that address local grievances and enlist local support. In practice, however, neither PRTs nor HTTs have been fully integrated into the counterinsurgency strategy. In some cases, their operations are hampered by lack of stability and security. In others, lack of coordination or resources limits their ability to effectively support reconstruction or apply cultural knowledge. In addition, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the progress of HTTs and PRTs has been further undermined by the strong military emphasis of US counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategy, the tendency of this strategy to push non-combat activities involving civilian personnel to the periphery, and the continued instability that limits civilian deployment and movement

(Connable 2009; Fawcett 2009; Golinghorst 2010; Schaner 2008). Although the cases in this dissertation confirm the necessity of these military campaigns as part of a counterterror strategy, they also warn that a sole focus on military-based responses is unlikely to permanently eliminate violence.

The recommendations outlined in this chapter are also similar to guidance described in recent *U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Sewall et al. 2006), but go further in their emphasis on the importance of the political component of counterterrorism, the necessity of context-specific, locally-targeted counterterror policies that address local grievances, and constituent expectations and demands as key determinants of the optimal form and timing of counterterror interventions. The empirical and qualitative results suggest that counterterror policymakers must attend as closely to the political dynamics and constituent expectations on the non-state side as they do to military and operational concerns. The activities and authority of the HTTs and PRTs need to be expanded and more centrally integrated into existing counterinsurgency strategies. In addition, counterterror and counterinsurgency plans that incorporate local political dynamics and constituent demands need to be developed *before* the United States becomes involved in new transnational or domestic operations, not afterwards, as occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan. Backlash caused by early mistakes or lack of preparation can make the counterterror challenge far more dangerous and complicated.

Going forward, attention to constituent preferences and local political dynamics should serve as a key pillar of US counterterror strategy, a dimension considered in the earliest stages of military planning. The first questions military planners and political leaders should address are those related to the expectations and demands of local

constituents and the types of engagement or opportunities most likely to influence the attitudes of local publics towards political and military approaches. The answers to these questions can lead directly to the formation of a counterterror strategy that is context-specific, precisely-tailored to fit local dynamics, timed to capitalize on shifts in local constituent demands, and flexible enough to adapt with dynamic constituent expectations.

Appendices

A1 Israeli Poll Dates (Political Support)

Monthly averages from September 2000-January 2003 from Berrebi and Klor, 2006
 Monthly average from February 2003-December 2004 collected by author

Month	Poll?	Source
Sep-00	x	Gallup
Oct-00	x	Gallup
Nov-00	x	Gallup
Dec-00	x	Gallup
Jan-01	x	Gallup
Feb-01	x	Gallup
Mar-01	x	Gallup
Apr-01	x	Gallup
May-01		
Jun-01	x	Gallup
Jul-01	x	Gallup
Aug-01		
Sep-01	x	Gallup
Oct-01		
Nov-01		
Dec-01	x	Gallup
Jan-02	x	Market Watch
Feb-02	x	Market Watch
Mar-02	x	Market Watch
Apr-02	x	Market Watch
May-02	x	Market Watch
Jun-02	x	Market Watch
Jul-02		
Aug-02	x	Market Watch
Sep-02	x	Market Watch
Oct-02	x	Market Watch
Nov-02	x	New Wave
Dec-02	x	New Wave
Jan-03	x	New Wave
Feb-03	x	New Wave/Election Outcomes
Mar-03		
Apr-03		
May-03		
Jun-03		
Jul-03	x	New Wave
Aug-03		
Sep-03		
Oct-03	x	Based on Local elections
Nov-03		
Dec-03		
Jan-04		
Feb-04		
Mar-04	x	Haaretz, as part of referendum coverage
Apr-04		
May-04		
Jun-04	x	TNS/Teleseqer
Jul-04	x	TNS/Teleseqer
Aug-04	x	TNS/Teleseqer
Sep-04	x	TNS/Teleseqer
Oct-04		
Nov-04		
Dec-04	x	TNS/Teleseqer

Note: missing months imputed

A2 Israeli Public Opinion (Supplemental polls & Survey questions)

Truman Polls

July 2000

July 2001

December 2001

November 2002

April 2003

June 2003

December 2003

March 2004

June 2004

December 2004

Key Questions

Prospects for lasting peace

Support for peace

Belief in efficacy of armed approach

Intifada a success for Israelis?

Support for negotiations

Support for targeted killings

Support for withdrawal from West Bank settlements

Support for cessation of violence

Gaza withdrawal will reduce violence?

Separation fence will decrease violence?

Israeli National Election Surveys

1999, 2001, 2003, 2006

Support for Likud/Labor

Most important challenge for the government

Party best suited to deal with terrorism, to stand firm against terrorism

Best way to prevent war? Military power or negotiations?

Influence of economy/Jerusalem/terrorism/social policies/corruption on vote choice

Acceptance of land for peace deal

Support for Palestinian state

1999

Danger of confrontation with Arabs

2001

Perceived differences among political candidates on security and defense

Reasons for peace (economic, international standing)

Fear for personal security

2003

Support for withdrawal, separation fence

Most important reason to vote for party

Identification with Likud/Labor peace and security/economic/religion and state policies

2006

Chances of war/peace in future

National security situation now/5 years ago/5 years from now

A3 Palestinian Poll Dates (Political Support)

July 27-29, 2000 (PCPSR)

December 2000 (JMCC)

April 10-12, 2001 (JMCC)

July 5-9, 2001 (PCPSR)

September 2001 (JMCC)

December 19-24, 2001 (PCPSR)

March 2002 (JMCC)

May 15-18, 2002 (PCPSR)

August 18-21, 2002 (PCPSR)
November 13-22, 2002 (PCPSR)
December 2002 (JMCC)
April 2003 (JMCC)
June 19-22, 2003 (PCPSR)
October 7-14, 2003 (PCPSR)
December 4-9, 2003 (PCPSR)
March 14-17, 2004 (PCPSR)
June 24-27, 2004 (PCPSR)
September 23-26, 2004 (PCPSR)
December 1-5, 2004 (PCPSR)

A4 Palestinian Public Opinion (Supplemental polls & Survey questions)

Truman Polls

For dates, see above

Key Questions

Prospects for lasting peace
Support for peace
Belief in efficacy of armed approach
Intifada as success for Palestinians?
Support for negotiations
Support for suicide bombs
Support for cessation of violence
Gaza withdrawal will reduce violence?
Separation fence will decrease violence?

PCPSR surveys, supplemental questions

Attacks on civilians/settlers/IDF justified
Support for suicide attacks
Efficacy of armed strategy?
Optimism about peace? Beliefs about Israeli attitudes towards peace?

Definition of Terrorism (December 2001 only)
Attitudes towards PA (November 2002 only)
Attitudes towards Hudna (June 2003)
Attitudes towards Gaza Withdrawal (March 2004 and after)

JMCC surveys, supplemental questions

Support for continued armed Intifada
Optimism about peace
Peace process dead
Support for suicide attacks
Evaluation of Palestinian authority
Effect of ODS on attitudes (May 2002 only)
Support for two state solution

A5 British Poll Dates (Political support)

Quarterly from Gallup, July 1969-August 1979
Monthly from Ipsos-MORI, August 1979-December 1998

A6 British Public Opinion (Supplemental polls & Survey questions)

British Social Attitudes Surveys (only after 1983)
Major national challenge
Best party on terrorism/national defense/economy
Approach to Northern Ireland (part of UK/independent/part of Republic of Ireland)
Death penalty for terrorism
Effect of a British withdrawal (1990)
Support for British withdrawal
Prejudice in Northern Ireland
Likelihood of united Ireland
Confidence in Northern Ireland's institutions

British Election Studies (1970, 1974, 1979, 1983, 1989, 1992)

Support for British withdrawal (1979, 1987, 1992)

Approach to Northern Ireland (part of UK/independent/part of Republic of Ireland)

Ipsos-MORI

Major national challenge

Best party on terrorism/national defense/economy

A7 Northern Ireland Election Dates

March 8, 1973 (Northern Ireland Assembly)

February 28, 1974 (Westminster)

October, 10 1974 (Westminster)

May 1, 1975 (Constitutional Convention)

May 18, 1977 (Local election)

May 3, 1979 (Westminster)

May 20, 1981 (Local election)

June 11, 1983 (Westminster)

May 15, 1985 (Local elections)

June 11, 1987 (Westminster)

May 17, 1989 (Local elections)

April 9, 1992 (Westminster)

May 19, 1993 (Local elections)

May 1, 1997 (Westminster)

June 25, 1998 (Assembly)

A8 Public Opinion in Northern Ireland (Supplemental polls & Survey questions)

Social Attitudes in Northern Ireland, 1978

Experience with violence (witnessed/been a victim of)
IRA as patriots? As murderers?
Loyalist violence justified?
British Army should take stronger stance against IRA/Loyalists?
Long-term policy on Northern Ireland?
Consequences of British withdrawal?
Likelihood of a settlement?
Causes of conflict?
Performance of RUC, Army
Perceived religious discrimination

Northern Ireland Life and Times, 1989-2004

National identity (unionist/nationalist)
RUC/Army/UDR/courts/government treat Protestants and Catholics the same?
Best long-term policy on Northern Ireland?
Support for withdrawal
Perceived religious discrimination?
Relations between Protestants and Catholics...now? in future?
Death penalty for terrorism?

Northern Ireland Election Study, 1992

Attitudes towards AIA (improved conditions in Northern Ireland?)
Attitudes towards future talks (Fresh round of talks? Should talks include SF?)
Long-term policy on Northern Ireland?
What are major concerns facing the country? Facing your family?
Attitudes towards major parties
Trust in police, UDR
Perceived religious discrimination

Northern Ireland, 1998

Support for Good Friday Accords? Did you vote for GFA?

Likelihood of unified Ireland?

Best long-term policy for Northern Ireland?

Has GFA helped Unionist/Nationalists more?

Support for RUC

Support for decommissioning

Attitudes towards major parties?

Trust in major political figures (Gerry Adams, John Hume, Ian Paisely, David Trimble)

Perceived discrimination

Experience with violence

A9 Key Search Terms

Universal

violence, political violence, outbidding, political competition, revenge, retaliation, signaling, hard-line, “support for violence”, public opinion, electoral outcomes, radicalization, “rejection of violence”, “conflict fatigue”, “constituent demands”, “constituent preferences”, cooperation, (counter)terrorism ((counter)terrorism and elections/political support/constituent preferences, etc.), disaffection , political alienation, issue ownership, retrospective, prospective, “protest vote”, “embedded violence”, “enduring conflict”, signaling, (political) rally, “targeted violence”, “indiscriminate violence”, outbidding, “constituent service”, prospective retrospective, “incumbent punishment”, reputation

Israel

Likud, suicide terrorism, ultra-nationalist, “settler bloc”, dove, hawk, Labor, right-bloc, targeted killing, home demolitions, checkpoints, curfews, border fence, containment, military autonomy, “peace dividend”

Palestine

Hamas, Fatah, revenge, suicide terrorism, recruiting, retention, Palestinian Authority, Palestinian police, targeted killing, repression,

Northern Ireland

Polarization, sectarian, police primacy, ulsterization, internment, Bloody Sunday, Gibraltar, Loyalists/Unionists (and violence/outbidding/competition/political interests), withdrawal, IRA, Republicans, Sinn Fein, SDLP, DUP, UUP, Paisley, Alliance party, abstention, house search/raid, detention, “tactical use of armed strategy”, UDA, UVF, Irish dimension, “ballot box”, feud, proscription

Britain

Bipartisanship, Conservative party, Labour party, Thatcher, Major, “soft on terrorism”, “iron lady”, withdrawal, exclusion orders, extradition, SAS, raids, house search, internment, Anglo-Irish Agreement, proscription, death penalty, media ban

A10 Variable Definitions and Sample VARs

Chapter 4: Israel

Variable Definitions

isciv: Israeli civilians killed
idf: IDF killed
pat: Palestinians killed
ta: Targeted killings
mil: Military operations
demol: Demolitions
gdp: Quarterly change in GDP
rightlead: Right-lead
right: Support for Likud
other: Votes to parties other than Labor or Likud
pre: Pre-ODS
post: Post-ODS
hudna: Months of the hudna
ODS: Months of ODS (April, May 2002)
exogenous(): Identifies controls

Sample VARs

Political support, monthly data

Figure 4.4

```
var isciv idf pat gdp rightlead if pre, lags(1/2)
var isciv idf pat gdp rightlead if post, lags(1/3) exogenous (hudna)
```

Figure 4.6

```
var isciv idf mil ta demol rightlead if pre, lags(1/2)
var isciv idf mil ta demol rightlead if post, lags(1/3) exogenous (hudna)
```

Violent responses, weekly data

Tables 4.5

```
var isciv idf pat rightlead if pre, lags(1/2)
var isciv idf mil ta demol rightlead if pre, lags(1/2)
```

Chapter 5: Palestinian Territories

Variable Definitions

pat: Total Palestinians killed
pact: Total Palestinians civilians killed
hamasm: Total Hamas militants killed
fatahm: Total Fatah militants killed
hleader: Hamas leader killed
leader: Total leaders
fleader: Fatah leader killed
hamasf: Hamas-claimed fatalities
fatahf: Fatah-claimed fatalities
israelis: Total Israelis killed
gdp: Quarterly change in GDP
hamas1: Support for Hamas
fatah1: Support for Fatah
flead: Fatah-lead
other: Support for other parties
none: Support for no party
pre: Pre-ODS
post: Post-ODS
preh: Pre-hudna
posth: Post-hudna
hudna: Months of the hudna
ODS: Months of ODS (April, May 2002)
exogenous(): Identifies controls

Sample VARs

Political support, monthly data

Figures 5.5-5.7

var pactd hamasm fatahm leader israelis gdp fatahlead if pre, lags(1/2)

var pactd hamasm fatahm hleader israelis gdp fatah1 if post, lags(1/3) exogenous (hudna)

Figure 5.11

var pat hamasf fatahf gdp fatahlead if pre, lags(1/2)

var pact hamasf fatahf gdp fatahlead if post, lags(1/2) exog (hudna)

Violent responses, weekly data

Figures 5.8-5.10

var pact hamasm fatahm hleader fleader hamasf fatahf flead if pre, lags(1/4)

var pact hamasm fatahm hleader hamasf fatahf flead if post, lags(1/2) exogenous (hudna)

Chapter 6: Britain

Variable Definitions

britishciv: British civilians killed

britarmy: British army killed

niciv: Northern Ireland civilians killed

policy: Policy response

baperp: British army-claimed deaths

deoi: Economic optimism index (seasonally-adjusted)

dunemp: Unemployment (seasonally-adjusted)

con: Conservative party support

conlead: Conservative party-lead

other: Support for “other” parties

predirect: Pre-direct rule (control)

police: Pre-police primacy (control)

heath: Heath’s regime (6/1970-2/1974)

labour: Labour administrations, Wilson/Callaghan (2/1974-5/1979)

thatcher: Thatcher’s regime (5/1979-11/1990)

major: Major’s regime to IRA ceasefire (11-1990-12/1994)

post-aia: Thatcher’s administration, after AIA 11/1985

faulkland: Faulkland war (control)

hunger: 1981 Hunger Strike

exogenous(): Identifies controls

Sample VARs

Political support and violent responses, monthly data

Figures 6.7-6.13

var britishciv britarmy niciv policy baperp dunemp drpi conlead if heath, lags(1/4)
exogenous (predirect)

var britishciv britarmy niciv policy baperp dunemp conlead if labour, lags(1/2)
exogenous (police)

var britishciv britarmy niciv policy baperp dunemp drpi conlead if thatcher, lags(1)
exogenous (faulkland hunger)

var britishciv britarmy niciv policy baperp dunemp drpi con if major, lags(1)

Chapter 7: Northern Ireland

Variable Definitions

catholicciv: Catholic civilians killed

protciv: Protestant civilians killed

ira_killed: IRA militants killed

loy_killed: Loyalist-killed

ira_violence: IRA-claimed violence

loy_violence: Loyalist-claimed violence

predirect: Pre-direct rule (7/1969-3/1972)

directrule: Direct rule (3/1972-10/1974)

police: Pre-police primacy (control)

heath: Heath's regime (6/1970-2/1974)

labour: Labour administrations, Wilson/Callaghan (2/1974-5/1979)

pre-aia: Labour through Anglo Irish Accord (10/1975-11/1985)

thatcher: Thatcher's regime (5/1979-11/1990)

major: Major's regime (11-1990-5/1997)

post-aia: Thatcher's administration, after AIA (11/1985-11/1990)

faulkland: Faulkland war (control)

hunger: 1981 Hunger Strike

exogenous(): identifies controls

Sample VARs

Violent responses, monthly data

Figures 7.7-7.8

var catholicciv ira_killed ira_violence if predirect, lags(1/7)

var protciv loy_killed loy_violence if predirect, lags(1/5)

var catholicciv ira_killed ira_violence if direct, lags(1)

var protciv loy_killed loy_violence if direct, lags(1/7)

var catholicciv ira_killed ira_violence if pre-aia, lags(1/6) exogenous (hunger faulk)

var protciv loy_killed loy_violence if pre-aia, lags(1/8) exogenous (hunger faulk)

var catholicciv ira_killed ira_violence if post-aia, lags(1)

var protciv loy_killed loy_violence if post-aia, lags(1/8)

var catholicciv ira_killed ira_violence if major, lags(3)

var protciv loy_killed loy_violence if major, lags(1)

A11a Abridged Chronology: Second Intifada

- July 11-15, 2000: Camp David Summit occurs, but achieves no agreement
- September 28, 2000: Sharon visits the Temple Mount
- September 29, 2000: Riots break out in Old City of Jerusalem
- December 9, 2000: Barak calls new elections
- January 21-27, 2001: Taba summit between Barak and Arafat
- February 6, 2001: Sharon wins PM elections
- May 7, 2001: *Santorini* captured by Israeli navy, filled with weapons bound for Palestinian Territories
- May 18, 2001: Israeli warplanes attack Palestinian Territories after Hamas suicide bomb
- June 1, 2001: Islamic Jihad Dolphinarium suicide bomb
- June 13, 2001: Tenet Plan
- August 9, 2001: Sbarro Pizzeria bomb by Islamic Jihad
- October 17, 2001: PFLP kills Israeli tourism minister Rehav'am Ze'evi
- October 17, 2001: Sharm El Sheik Conference, hosted by Egypt, Mitchell Commission
- November 11, 2001: First suicide bomb claimed by AMB
- December 1, 2001: Ben Yehuda market bomb claimed by Hamas
- January 3, 2002: IDF seizes *Karine A* carrying weapons towards Gaza
- March 27, 2002: Passover Massacre suicide bomb, Netanya
- March 28 – May 5, 2002: Operation Defensive Shield
- June 5, 2002: Meggido Suicide attack by Islamic Jihad
- June 18, 2002: Hamas suicide bomb
- June 19, 2002: AMB suicide bomb
- June 23, 2002: Israel announces construction of security fence
- June 24, 2002: Roadmap for peace plan announced by Bush
- July 22/23, 2002: Major targeted killing of Hamas leader, Saleh Shehadeh
- September 19, 2002: Hamas suicide bomb on bus in Tel Aviv
- September 20, 2002: IDF incursion in Gaza City
- December 22, 2002: IDF reoccupies Bethlehem
- January 5, 2003: AMB double suicide bomb in Tel Aviv

January 28, 2003: Israeli elections give Right-bloc parties wide margin of support
March 5, 2003: Hamas militant in Haifa perpetrates suicide bomb
April 19, 2003: Mahmoud Abbas appointed as Prime Minister
June 28–August 19, 2003: Palestinian *Hudna* (ceasefire)
September 6, 2003: Abbas resigns
September 9, 2003: Two suicide bombs inside Israel
October 4, 2003: PIJ suicide bomb in Haifa restaurant
November 24, 2003: Sharon unilateral disengagement
March 14, 2002: Ashdod bombing by AMB
March 22, 2004: Assassination of Ahmed Yassin
April 17, 2004: Assassination of Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi
August 31, 2004: Suicide bomb in Beersheba
October 24-26, 2004: Knesset approves disengagement plan
November 11, 2004: Arafat's death
January 9, 2005: Abbas elected Palestinian PM

A11b Abridged Chronology: Northern Ireland's 'Troubles'

August 12-14, 1969: Battle of Bogside

August 14, 1969: First British troops deployed

July 3, 1970: Falls Church Curfew

August 9, 1971: Start of Internment

January 30, 1972: Bloody Sunday, British soldiers kill 14 unarmed protestors

July 21, 1972: Bloody Friday, 22 bombs explode in Belfast, claimed by PIRA as retaliation for Bloody Sunday

March 30, 1972: Direct rule

December 1, 1972: Bombs explode in Dublin (Loyalist)

December 6-9, 1973: Sunningdale agreement establishes the powersharing executive

February 28, 1974: Labour Party wins UK election, Harold Wilson becomes British PM

May 14-28, 1974: First Ulster Workers' Council Strike, leads to the end of the NI executive

May 17, 1974: Loyalist bombs at Dublin and Monaghan bombs kill 33 people

December 22, 1974: IRA ceasefire

February 9, 1975- March 5, 1976: IRA Truce

January 7, 1976: First acknowledged deployment of SAS (British special forces) to Northern Ireland

December 5, 1975: End of Internment

March 1, 1976: End of Special Category Status for Prisoners

March 25, 1976: Start of police primacy/Ulsterization

March 26, 1976: PTA in Northern Ireland

April 5, 1976: Labour Party wins UK election, James Callaghan as Prime Minister

July 21, 1976: British Ambassador to NI, Christopher Ewart Biggs, killed

August 10, 1976: Peace People Established

May 3-13 1977: UUAC Strike

March 30, 1979: Airey Neave (Conservative Party Spokesperson on NI) Killed

May 3, 1979: Conservative Party wins UK election, Thatcher as Prime Minister

August 27, 1979: Warrenpoint Attack and Assassination of Lord Mountbatten (Queen's cousin)

January 7, 1980: Atkins Talks at Stormont

March 26, 1980: Announcement of end to special category status

October 27 – December 18, 1980: First hunger strike

March 1-October 3, 1981: Republican hunger strikes

July 20, 1982: Hyde Park and Regent's Park Bombs

December 6, 1982: Droppin Well Bomb by INLA kills 17

April 11, 1983: Sentences in first 'supergrass' trial

May 30, 1983: First meeting of the New Ireland Forum

December 1983: Harrod's department store bomb

March 14, 1984: Assassination attempt on Gerry Adams

October 12, 1984: Brighton bomb targets Conservative party conference and Thatcher

February 28, 1985: Attack on RUC station in Newry kills 9

November 15, 1985: Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA)

November 23, 1985: Unionist rally against AIA

December 17, 1985: Unionist MPs resign over AIA

March 2, 1986: Unionist 'Day of Action' against AIA

Spring 1986: Unionist attacks on RUC forces

July 6, 1986: Riots in Portadown, Orange order parades

November 2, 1986: Sinn Fein ends abstentionist stance

May 8, 1987: Loughgall Killings. One civilian and 8 IRA militants are killed by SAS troops while attacking an RUC station (highest loss of life by IRA in any incident)

November 8, 1987: Enniskillen Bombing (Remembrance Day bombing). Bomb by IRA exploded at War Memorial killing 11

December 22, 1987: John McMichael, then deputy leader of the Ulster Defense Association was killed by a booby-trap bomb planted by the IRA

January 11, 1988: Hume Adams Meeting

March 6, 1988: Assassination of 3 IRA militants in Gibraltar by SAS troops

June 15, 1988: Lisburn killings: IRA attack kills 6 off-duty British soldiers

August 20, 1988: Ballygawley Bombing. Eight British Army soldiers killed by IRA

October 19, 1988: Broadcasting ban on proscribed organizations

September 22, 1989: Deal Bombing: IRA kills 10 musicians from the Royal Marines

April 11, 1990: Charles Haughey, then Taoiseach (Irish Prime Minister), made the first official visit to Northern Ireland by a Taoiseach since 1965

July 20, 1990: IRA Stock Exchange bomb

July 30, 1990: Ian Gow killed

October 24, 1990: Proxy Bomb Campaign by IRA. IRA forces unwilling Protestants to carry out suicide attacks at three British checkpoints

February 7, 1991: Mortar Attack on 10 Downing St. while British cabinet is meeting

April 29, 1991: Combined Loyalist Military Command Ceasefire (ends July 4, 1991)

April 1991-November 1992: Brooke/Mayhew Talks

February 28, 1992: IRA bomb London Bridge rail station

April 10, 1992: Baltic Exchange Bomb (high monetary damage)

August 10, 1992: UDA banned

April 10, 1993: Hume meets Adams, set framework for Hume-Adams Talks

September 25, 1993: Hume-Adams Initiative released

October 23, 1993: Shankill road bombing by IRA

October 30, 1993: Greysteel attack by UFF/UDA

November 28, 1993: Secret talks between British and the IRA

December 15, 1993: Downing Street declaration

January 19, 1994: Irish Broadcast ban lifted

March 9, 11, 13, 1994: IRA mortar attacks on Heathrow

April 6-8, 1994: IRA calls ceasefire

June 14, 1994: Loughlinisland Killings by IRA

August 28, 1994: Hume-Adams joint statement

August 31, 1994: IRA ceasefire

September 16, 1994: British Broadcast ban lifted

October 13, 1994: Combined Loyalist Military Command announces ceasefire

October 24, 1994: British Army (BA) soldiers stopped patrolling in Derry

February 22, 1995: Framework Documents published, lay out the framework for a political agreement and government in Northern Ireland

March 7, 1995: 'Washington Three' conditions on terms of entry into peace talks

May 24, 1995: Mayhew meets Adams

July 9, 1995: Stand-off at Dumcree when RUC stops an Orange Order from following pre-planned route

July 15, 1995: Secret meeting between Britain and Sinn Fein

November 28, 1995: Joint communiqué by Irish and British government on "twin track" approach

January 24, 1996: Mitchell Report on Decommissioning, includes six 'Mitchell Principles'

February 9, 1996: IRA ceasefire broken with Dockland's bombing

March 4, 1996: Proximity Talks between Northern Ireland political parties at Stormont. The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) refuse to join and Sinn Fein (SF) was refused entry to the talks

May 1, 1997: Labour party comes to power, Tony Blair as PM and Mo Mowlam as the new Sec. of State for Northern Ireland

May 30, 1996: Forum election held for Northern Ireland Forum

June 10, 1996: Stormont Talks begin

June 15, 1996: Manchester Bombing by IRA

July 7, 1996: Drumcree Parade. RUC prevents a march by Portadown Orangemen from returning from Drumcree Church via the Garvaghy Road, sparks widespread protests. Protests and roadblocks spread across Northern Ireland

July 13, 1996: Continuity IRA car bomb

October 7, 1996: IRA bombs British Army Headquarters in Lisburn

July 6, 1997: Standoff at Dumcree (Dumcree III) between Orangemen and RUC on occasion of parade

July 20, 1997: IRA ceasefire reinstated

August 26, 1997: Agreement to set up International Commission on Decommissioning

August 29, 1997: Announcement that Sinn Fein can enter talks






September 9, 1997: Sinn Fein signs the Mitchell principles

September 15, 1997: Multiparty talks resume



September 16, 1997: Continuity IRA bomb at Markethill

September 24, 1997: Agreement on procedures for multiparty talks
September 30, 1997: 'Three Strand' format of negotiations accepted
October 7, 1997: Talks begin at Stormont
October 13, 1997: Blair in Northern Ireland
October 17, 1997: Parades commission announced
December 2, 1997: The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) announced that all day-time foot patrols by the British Army were to be withdrawn from all parts of Belfast.
December 11, 1997: Sinn Fein delegation at Downing Street
January 23, 1998: UFF Reinstate Ceasefire
April 10, 1998: Good Friday Accords signed
May 28, 1998: Good Friday Accords ratified



A12 Frequency Distributions, Fatalities by Month





*Shows only months with leader deaths. Leader deaths occur in 30% of months.



*Shows only months with British civilian deaths. *Only months with military deaths (42%/months).
 British civilian deaths occur in about 10% of months.



*Only months with Northern Ireland civilian deaths. *Only months with Cath. civ. deaths (60%/months)
 Includes 70% of months.



*Only months with Prot. civ. deaths (40%/months). *Only months with militant deaths (10% of months for Loyalist, 25% Republican).

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