

The Causes of Refugee Militarization

A thesis presented by

Justin Schon

To

The Department of Political Science

In partial fulfillment of the requirements

To graduate with honors

Of Bachelor of Arts

The University of Michigan

March 2011

Table of Contents

Abstract	4
Preface and Acknowledgments	5
I. Introduction	6
II. Literature Review	11
III. Methodology	20
IV. Analysis	22
A. Which refugee populations militarized?	22
B. Type of refugee population	37
C. Level of support from receiving state	50
D. Pre-existing conflicts within the receiving state	71
E. Level of foreign support and intervention for refugees	88
F. State Strength	100
V. Implications	110
VI. Conclusion	115
VII. Bibliography	118

Abbreviations

AFDL	Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FAR	Rwandan Armed Forces
FRONASA	Front for National Salvation
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MRND	Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (National Revolutionary Movement for Development)
MSF	Médécins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders)
NRA	National Resistance Army
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PSR	Parti Socialiste Rwandais (Socialist Party of Rwanda)
RPA	Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
SPLM	Sudanese People's Liberation Movement
UNAMIR	United Nations Armed Mission in Rwanda
UNAR	Union Nationale Rwandaise (Rwandan National Union)
UNBRO	United Nations Border Relief Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
USAID	United States Agency of International Development
WFP	World Food Program

Abstract

Since the end of World War II, the international aid regime's ability to support large refugee populations has inadvertently contributed to a new phenomenon among refugee populations: refugee militarization. Refugee populations have militarized in countries such as Zaire, Uganda, and Pakistan with the aim of forcefully returning to their country of origin. Their activities have contributed to the diffusion and escalation of many conflicts.

To prevent, or at least more effectively handle, the harm that this additional conflict creates, policymakers must be able to identify the causes of refugee militarization. I address this question by analyzing three cases of significant refugee movements, and a few historical examples, to test the importance of specific factors on whether refugee populations will militarize. I utilize a combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques for this analysis.

I find that the receiving state must decide that refugee militarization is in its interests and substantial humanitarian aid must be provided for refugee militarization to occur. These interests include characteristics such as ethnic ties, strategic interests, and legitimacy concerns of elites. The presence of humanitarian aid is a necessary, not sufficient, condition for refugee militarization. Characteristics of the refugee population can increase the likelihood of militarization, but they are not as important as dynamics within the receiving state.

Because humanitarian aid must be provided for refugee militarization to occur, aid organizations must recognize the reality that humanitarian assistance can contribute to additional conflict. This means there is a possibility of humanitarian assistance doing more harm than good. That reality mandates that aid organizations consider withdrawing or withholding humanitarian assistance as a viable policy option in certain situations to do the best work possible for refugees.

Preface and Acknowledgments

I first became interested in refugee militarization during a class on world conflict that I took while studying abroad at the University of Cape Town. That class remains as one of my favorite classes. Of the many fascinating lectures, I especially enjoyed the lecture Professor Annette Seegers gave on the Rwandan genocide. During that lecture, she made a comment in passing that there has been a lack of scholarly work on refugee militarization. After she showed us how large of a role it played in the Rwandan genocide, I was stunned that there would be a lack of scholarship on the topic. A year later, as I was contemplating the subject of this thesis, I recalled this sentiment. With my interest in refugee militarization, I continued to refine my research question. This ultimately led me to my current research question, which asks about the causes of refugee militarization.

I would like to thank a few people for helping me pursue and complete this project. First, I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Allan Stam. Second, I would like to thank Professor Andrei Markovits. Professor Markovits' willingness to answer my questions, discuss ideas and difficulties, and read drafts was incredibly valuable. Third, I wish to thank my friend Tom Pavone for reading drafts of my thesis. His comments were very insightful, befitting a colleague that I expect to do great things. I also found great motivation from the long days and nights that I spent working alongside Tamara Andrade and Hannah Jun at the campus libraries on our respective theses. When I lacked motivation to work, their drive inspired me to keep going. Last but not least, I am extremely grateful to my community of family and friends for providing the love and support to pursue my passions. Over the years, their encouragement to seize every possible opportunity has been crucial in what I have accomplished.

I. Introduction

Refugee populations have gained increasing prominence in discussions about conflict in recent times. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has had a budget of over \$1 billion in almost every year since 1993.¹ In 2009, UNHCR had a budget of almost \$2.3 billion.² Organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) are also paying much more attention to refugee populations.

To be clear on the definition of a refugee, I will use the definition from the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. It states that a refugee is a person who:

“owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”³

This definition has been complemented by including people fleeing politically-motivated harm, which does indeed make the definition more complete.⁴

One of the most worrying problems that can arise from refugee populations is refugee militarization. Muggah and Mogire list four characteristics of refugee militarization. The first involves militarized activity in and outside the refugee camps. The second is political activism and violence. The

¹ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR at a glance,” *Refugees Magazine*, February 18, 1998, 30-31.

² United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Global Report 2009,” June 2010, 65.

³ United Nations High Commission for Refugees, *Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*, September 1, 2007, <http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b66c2aa10.pdf> (accessed March 21, 2010).

⁴ Aristide Zolberg and Astri Suhrke and Sergio Aguayo, *Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

third is military training and recruitment. Fourth is popular support for armed resistance among the refugees. This is an effective definition because it is clear and easy to understand.

I further specify that I am interested in militarization with the aim of attacking the state of origin, rather than militarization that engages the refugee population in a new conflict. This is because of the difference in dynamics between cases where the refugee population participates in the conflict of its receiving state and when the refugee population strikes back at the state from where it came. Refugee involvement in the conflict of the receiving state typically comes about due to how easy it is for armed groups within the receiving state to recruit the refugees. The case of Rwandan refugees in Uganda illustrates this difference quite well. The incorporation of Rwandan refugees into Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA) took place under very different circumstances than the militarization of Rwandan refugees that occurred with the formation of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1987. Hostilities from local Ugandans convinced the refugees of the necessity to organize and assert themselves. The refugees hoped that participating in armed resistance against the government would allow them a chance to secure a place for themselves in Ugandan society. Their militarization with the RPF occurred with the understanding that their place was in Rwanda, and that they should be in power there.⁵ Because these two situations had different dynamics, I have chosen to focus on one of them to maximize the precision of my analysis.

Muggah and Mogire draw a distinction between refugee militarization and 'refugee camp militarization.' According to them, refugee militarization is a broader concept than refugee camp militarization because it includes military-oriented activities outside the refugee camps.⁶ Hence, when refugee militarization occurs, refugees are actively participating in conflict. For years, refugees were

⁵ Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001, 159-184.

⁶ Muggah and Mogire, "Arms Availability and Refugee Militarization in Africa- conceptualizing the issues." In *No Refuge: The Crisis of Refugee Militarization in Africa*, by Robert Muggah, 1-50. New York: Zed Books, 2006, 8.

assumed to be victims of conflict, not participators in it.⁷ The idea that they can actually participate in conflict, and sometimes even escalate or diffuse it, is extremely troubling. It has required policymakers and everyone involved to rethink how the international community responds to refugee populations.

Some people may contend that refugee militarization is an “African phenomenon.” Western media has a well-documented tendency to portray the African continent as being filled with violence and conflict, and refugee militarization fits nicely with this narrative. However, this narrative is inaccurate. During the 1980s, the two largest refugee populations were the Afghan and Palestinian refugees. The proportion of the world’s refugees originating from African countries increased from 47% in 1987 to as high as 70% during the 1990s, and is still quite high.⁸ However, the current trend of more and more refugees coming from African countries does not necessarily mean that they are more likely to produce refugees. During the Iraq invasion for example, thousands of Iraqis fled the country and became refugees. The current war in Afghanistan has also created a substantial refugee population, even if Pakistan and Iran have been more resistant to receiving refugees than during the 1980s.⁹

Another misperception is that the end of the Cold War brought about an upsurge of refugee militarization. In fact, the opposite happened. In 1987, almost 8 million refugees were affected by political violence. By 1998, that number had fallen to 4.3 million. It had fallen as low as 1.7 million in 1997. Political violence is Sarah Lischer’s proxy for refugee militarization. Because she includes cases where refugees were attacked as cases of refugee-related political violence, she includes some countries and refugee groups in her list of those involved in political violence that I do not count as having

⁷ Gil Loescher, *The UNHCR and World Politics*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

⁸ Sarah Lischer, Working Paper: “Refugee involvement in political violence: Quantitative evidence from 1987-1998.” Cambridge: UNHCR, 2000, 1-25.

⁹ Human Rights Watch, “Closed Door Policy: Afghan Refugees in Pakistan and Iran,” *Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan*, Human Rights Watch report, February 2002.

undergone refugee militarization. Regardless, her data does present an overall picture of fewer, rather than more, refugee populations militarizing.¹⁰

Lischer's data beg the question of how important refugee militarization currently is. If refugee militarization is on the decline, then perhaps there is no need for a sense of urgency. However, present dynamics of many current conflicts indicate that the problem of refugee militarization could get worse in the coming years. A recent article in the French newspaper *Le Monde* pointed out that there were fewer repatriations in 2009 than in any year in the past 20 years.¹¹ This observation indicates that refugees are taking longer to return home, and that the conflicts they are fleeing are not providing much assurance that they will end any time soon. The severity of the conflicts and the extended periods of exile for refugees increase the likelihood of frustrations building to the point where, as Myron Weiner would say, "refugee warriors" emerge.¹² In other words, there is increased risk that refugees will arm themselves and participate in the conflict that they originally fled. Hence, the observed decline in refugee militarization during Lischer's timeline of 1987-1998 could soon be revealed as a temporary phenomenon.

While the risk of refugee militarization appears to be increasing, it is important to remember that the majority of refugees, even when militarization begins to occur, are innocent and are in dire need of humanitarian assistance. Organizations like UNHCR, the ICRC, and MSF have been working diligently to try and provide that assistance. However, they have faced a common problem of humanitarian aid: lack of funding. In particular, UNHCR has a history of being chronically underfunded

¹⁰ Sarah Lischer, *Refugee involvement in political violence: quantitative evidence from 1987-1998*, 2.

¹¹ To be clear, repatriation is the term used for when a refugee returns to his or her country of origin. The article cited can be found here: Benoit Schaeffer, "Le monde compte de plus en plus de réfugiés 'quasi permanents,'" *Le Monde*, October 4, 2010, http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2010/10/04/le-monde-compte-de-plus-en-plus-de-refugies-quasi-permanents_1420242_3210.html (accessed October 25, 2010).

¹² Myron Weiner, "The Clash of Norms: Dilemmas in Refugee Policies," *Journal of Refugee Studies*, December 1998: 10-17.

for the projects that have been deemed necessary to conduct.¹³ The problem is made even worse by the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the resources that they do have. This criticism is common throughout the literature on development and has been extended to the literature on refugee assistance.¹⁴

However, the worst case scenario occurs when humanitarian aid actually makes a refugee crisis worse. A growing number of scholars have begun to comment on this. The most compelling explanation of how humanitarian aid can make a refugee crisis worse is through refugee militarization. Fiona Terry, Sarah Lischer, Myron Weiner, and Zolberg et al. are just a few of the scholars that have studied this dynamic. They have all observed that humanitarian aid has the ability to sustain refugee populations, grant legitimacy to strongmen within the refugee population, and become a revenue source for armed groups to finance their operations. In fact, large humanitarian assistance operations have existed in just about every documented case of refugee militarization. This means that where refugee militarization has occurred, humanitarian aid has worsened situations that it was intended to improve. Refugee militarization often does not occur when humanitarian assistance is being provided though, so it is a necessary condition for refugee militarization, rather than a sufficient condition.

Therefore, it is crucial to determine when providing humanitarian aid to a refugee population will contribute to refugee militarization. That determination must be made by first identifying the causes of refugee militarization. I will address this question and attempt to identify the causes of refugee militarization. Once those causes are identified, organizations and countries looking to provide humanitarian aid can avoid the situations where they are present. The conclusions of this thesis should

¹³ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "UNHCR at a glance," *Refugees Magazine*, February 18, 1998, 30-31.

¹⁴ This literature is extremely vast. For a couple of examples, see William Easterly's *The White Man's Burden* and Robert Calderisi's *The Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aid Isn't Working*. Extensions to refugee assistance can be found in Alexander Cooley and James Ron's article "The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action" and the Goyens et al. article "Humanitarian aid and health services in Eastern Kivu, Zaire: Collaboration or competition?"

provide improved insight for policymakers about how best to assist refugees without contributing to their militarization.

II. Literature Review

Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo provide a history of refugee movements dating as far back as the origin of the word refugee in France in 1573 “in the context of granting asylum and assistance to foreigners escaping persecution.”¹⁵ In their history, they identify the Palestinian refugee population as the first refugee population to have undergone refugee militarization. In their terms, “refugee-warrior communities” have become an increasingly serious problem in the global refugee situation. Refugee-warrior communities have formed because many refugee groups that have formed in recent decades have not been passive victims. Instead, they have developed organized political leadership and military structures. Their militarization has been a severe challenge for UNHCR because its already existing shortage of funds prevents the organization from confronting important ethical and policy dilemmas.

International law does acknowledge this challenge. Political activists are a common form of refugee, yet their political activities must be limited once in exile. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) refugee convention prohibits “subversive activities” by verbal means or arms in Article III. Furthermore, its preface includes a statement from African states that they are “anxious” to distinguish between refugees seeking a peaceful and normal life and those—non-refugees by implication—who flee “for the sole purpose of fomenting subversion outside.” Similar principles have also been articulated by the Council of Europe, several UN General Assembly resolutions, and in the 1967 Declaration on Territorial Asylum.¹⁶

The authors argue that a friendly base and relief assistance for the refugees are the two factors that allow refugee-warrior communities to develop. The friendly base has to be provided by the

¹⁵ Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo, *Escape from Violence*, 5.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, 276.

receiving state of the refugees.¹⁷ Then, because refugees often lack the resources for subsistence production, they are often dependent upon aid to survive. That aid can then be easily diverted by the political and military leadership of the refugees. For example, the United Nations Border Relief Organization (UNBRO) was set up to supply the Khmer on the Thai-Kampuchean border, and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) was established in December 1949 for the Palestinian refugees. These organizations have devoted significant amounts of resources to refugees. The resources have sustained large refugee populations, thereby providing an implicit legitimacy to the militant groups tied to those refugees. Groups like the Khmer Rouge can then point to that legitimacy to justify their continued existence and activity, even as they divert some of the money and other resources from humanitarian assistance to pursue their own goals.¹⁸

Potential Causes of Refugee Militarization

In the past couple of decades, scholars have attempted to determine the causes of refugee militarization. Zolberg et al. make one of the earliest attempts. Their book highlights the receptiveness of the receiving state to militarization and support of the international aid regime as the two most important factors allowing refugee militarization to occur. Their discussion of the international aid regime gets broadened to the international community as well. They include the diaspora of the refugees' ethnic group and foreign states in their list of actors who can support militarization.¹⁹

Later work develops their ideas remarkably well. Sarah Lischer's discussion of refugee militarization points to the type of refugee population and the response of the receiving state as the most important causal factors for refugee militarization. Her contribution of recognizing different types

¹⁷ I am only looking at receiving states that are contiguous with the sending state. To my knowledge, there have not been any cases of refugee militarization among refugee populations that have settled in non-contiguous states.

¹⁸ Ibid, 276-277.

¹⁹ Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo, *Escape from Violence*, 275-278.

of refugee populations showcases which ones are the most likely to militarize and which are the most likely to divert humanitarian assistance to support that militarization. Unsurprisingly, these characteristics match. The refugee populations that are the most likely to militarize are also the most likely to divert humanitarian assistance.²⁰

Lischer's classifications of refugee populations include situational, persecuted, and state-in-exile refugees. Situational refugees have little political cohesion and therefore little motivation to divert refugee relief to support militarization. They have generally been driven from their homes due to war, natural disasters, or some other form of chaos. Once that chaos subsides, situational refugees are generally willing to return home. They often do not take sides, instead just wanting peace. Persecuted refugees are fleeing targeted persecution or oppression. This may include genocide, ethnic cleansing, or other violent measures. Humanitarian assistance to persecuted refugees is more likely to exacerbate conflict than when it is given to situational refugees. Finally, state-in-exile refugees combine a highly organized political and military leadership with the refugee population. The leadership often intends that the refugee crisis will draw international sympathy and support their war aims. They hope to return to the state they came from and retake power. Having a high level of political organization, state-in-exile groups are very good at diverting large amounts of humanitarian assistance to advance the conflict. An easy way to think about this hypothesis is that if the refugees want to militarize and they have the capability, then they will.²¹ Categorizing refugee populations in this manner is therefore a way to classify the type of refugee population as a causal factor in refugee militarization.

Beth Whitaker adds discussions about characteristics of the receiving state and the importance of those characteristics on whether refugees will militarize. Her analysis highlights the importance of the political legitimacy of the receiving state, level of politicization of ethnic identities, and the leadership's

²⁰ Sarah Lischer, *Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005.

²¹ Sarah Lischer, "Collateral Damage: Humanitarian Assistance as a Cause of Conflict," *International Security*, 2003: 79-109.

political calculus of maintaining power. Political legitimacy in this context is referring to whether the receiving state is recognized by its citizens as having the authority to govern. Present-day Somalia is one example of a state that does not have political legitimacy, due to the fact that many of its citizens do not recognize the state's authority to govern. Politicization of ethnic identities refers to the level of division within the state's politics along ethnic lines. For instance, during apartheid South Africa had explicit political divisions between white, black, and colored people. Moreover, she looks at pre-existing tensions within the receiving state. Pre-existing tensions could include actual fighting within the receiving state, power struggles within the receiving state, or some other turmoil. Refugees may get caught up in those conflicts and militarize as a result of those. Whitaker uses these factors to compare Zaire and Tanzania in their reception of Rwandan refugees in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide. She finds that they are the keys to understanding why refugee militarization occurred in Zaire and not Tanzania. In short, Zaire had more serious pre-existing tensions and politicization of ethnic identities, a leader in Mobutu Sese Seko who found it much more in his interest to allow the refugees to militarize, and less political legitimacy as a state than Tanzania did.²²

Two additional factors that UNHCR has suggested as causes of refugee militarization are the size of refugee camps and the distance between refugee camps and the border with the sending state. However, Sarah Lischer provides convincing rebuttals to both of these causes. In her discussion of the hypothesis about distance between refugee camps and the border, she shows that while Tanzania and Zaire both had refugee camps close to the border with Rwanda, it was only the refugees in Zaire who militarized. Additionally, a group of about 25,000 refugees, led by the businessman Fikret Abdic, fled the town of Velika Kladusa in Bosnia twice during the Bosnian War. In both flights, refugee camps were

²² Beth Elise Whitaker, "Refugees and the Spread of Conflict: Contrasting Cases in Central Africa," *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 2003: 211-231.

located close to the border. However, refugee militarization only occurred in the first flight.²³ More importantly, it is just not feasible to move refugee camps very far from the border. Especially with some of the mass influxes that have occurred, such as in Thailand with Cambodian refugees and Zaire and Tanzania with Rwandan refugees, there are often too many refugees to realistically consider the movement of refugee camps a realistic policy option. With regard to camp size, Lischer uses the case of refugee camps in Zaire to discredit the theory. In the five large refugee camps around Goma, over 700,000 refugees were housed. Bukavu, on the other hand, had 23 camps in its surrounding area housing almost 400,000 refugees. Yet, refugees in Bukavu's smaller refugee camps fell under much tighter control by the militants.²⁴ MSF was one of the few NGOs to make this observation:

“While some believed that in smaller camps the leaders would have less power over the refugee population, this proved to be a mistake. The leaders, some of whom have been identified by other refugees as well-known Interahamwe, wielded considerably more power over the small camp population of 15,000 than their counterparts in the larger camps.”²⁵

The case of Bosnian refugees from Velika Kladusa supports this refutation as well. With Abdic's refugees split between two camps, the camps both had refugee populations below 20,000. UNHCR recommends that camps be limited to 20,000-30,000 refugees, so the camps were relatively small. UNHCR argues that limiting refugee camps to 20,000-30,000 refugees makes the camps more manageable and leads to fewer social problems. The militarization of Abdic's refugee camps, despite their relatively small size, contradicts this conception.²⁶

The combination of this work provides arguments for the importance of the type of refugee population, response of the receiving state of the refugees, tensions within the receiving state, and level of foreign support as causes of refugee militarization. Each of these hypotheses should be more

²³ Lischer, *Dangerous Sanctuaries*, 118-140.

²⁴ *Ibid*, 93-94.

²⁵ Medecins Sans Frontieres, *Deadlock in the Rwandan Refugee Crisis: Repatriation Virtually at a Standstill*, July 20, 1995, <http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/article.cfm?id=1467> (accessed February 14, 2010).

²⁶ Lischer, *Dangerous Sanctuaries*, 137.

rigorously examined to determine their ability to cause refugee militarization. This thesis will begin that examination. I will also add a discussion of state strength. This is important because intuitively, strong states should be able to prevent refugee militarization within their borders. Weak states may not be able to prevent refugee militarization even if they oppose it.

Explaining how refugee militarization influences conflict

When refugee militarization occurs, there are two main mechanisms through which it influences conflict. These mechanisms are conflict diffusion and escalation. Conflict diffusion occurs when conflict spreads from one country to another. Escalation occurs when additional actors get involved in a given conflict. These mechanisms are explored by several scholars.

Lake and Rothchild, in their study on ethnic conflict, argue there are four ways for diffusion to occur. First, events abroad can change the ethnic balance of power domestically. This can lead to violence by disrupting the existing ethnic contract within a country. In Zaire, the influx of Hutu refugees immediately following the Rwandan Genocide was an important reason for why Tutsi-related insurgents rose up against Mobutu Sese Seko's government. In Pakistan, large influxes of Afghan refugees have dramatically affected the political and social climate. Rwandan refugees in Uganda were key players in Uganda's rebellion under Yoweri Museveni's command. After Museveni gained power, local jealousies of perceived favoritism towards the Rwandan refugees boiled over into more violence. It is easy to observe tensions sparked by Palestinian refugees, Somali refugees in Kenya, and many other situations. Second, ethnic conflict in one country can prompt groups in another to make more extreme demands or update their beliefs about the likely demands of other groups.²⁷ Burundi and Rwanda have illustrated this mechanism extremely well. The 1972 genocide of Hutus in Burundi by the Tutsi army sparked pre-

²⁷ David Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Spreading Fear: The Genesis of Transnational Ethnic Conflict," In *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict*, by David Lake and Donald Rothchild, 3-32, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998: 25-26.

existing tensions between the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda. Many Hutus in Rwanda saw this as a signal that they would have to solve the “Tutsi question” before they suffered the same fate. Juvenal Habyarimana was able to calm tensions when he took power in 1973, but suspicions remained. With the genocide in Burundi, many Rwandans lost hope for peaceful coexistence between Hutus and Tutsis. Hutu Power leaders frequently referred to those events in the lead-up to Rwanda’s genocide in 1994 as evidence of what would happen to Hutus if they did not kill the Tutsis first.²⁸ Third, ethnic conflict in one country can cause groups in other countries to lose confidence in their existing ethnic contracts. For instance, if events abroad suggest that wealthy minority groups may not be able to use their economic leverage as well as previously believed, then the poorer majority may become emboldened and the minority threatened. This tension can easily lead to conflict, such as when Serbia’s suppression of Kosovo’s aspirations to become a republic in 1981 provided a signal to other groups in Yugoslavia of the inefficacy of existing federal safeguards.²⁹ Hardin argues this was the beginning of the unraveling of Yugoslavia.³⁰ Finally, ethnic conflict abroad may lead groups to update their beliefs about the costs of protest or violence and their likelihood of success. For example, Slovenia’s relatively easy break from Yugoslavia, which merely precipitated a ten day war and fewer than 70 casualties, gave the impression that the dissolution of a country was relatively easy.³¹

Refugee flows present a negative externality from civil war, as they can facilitate the transnational spread of arms, combatants, and ideologies conducive to conflict.³² Arms proliferation has been shown to be extremely harmful to refugees, often leading to refugee militarization. Refugee camps in Guinea for example are popularly condemned for harboring large caches of Sierra Leonean, Liberian,

²⁸ Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001, 215-216.

²⁹ Lake and Rothchild, “Spreading Fear,” 26.

³⁰ Russell Hardin, *One for all: The logic of group conflict*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982: 157.

³¹ Lake and Rothchild, “Spreading Fear,” 26-27.

³² Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Refugees and the Spread of Civil War,” *International Organization*, 2006: 335-366.

or locally sourced weaponry.³³ Many refugees have no wish to get involved in further conflict, but there can be enough refugees that do wish to continue fighting to help conflict spread.³⁴

Refugees can also serve as a source of escalation. The willingness of a state to receive refugees in and of itself can be regarded as a hostile act by the sending state. Sudan's hosting of Eritrean refugees has at times been viewed as a hostile act by Ethiopia, generating some tension between the two countries.³⁵ Rebels have sometimes mixed with refugees and used the receiving state as a staging area for attacks against the state they had fled. This is not always with the receiving state's consent. As the sending state responds to the attacks of those rebels, their "hot pursuit" cross-border attacks may spiral out of control into a wider war. This happened in late 1996 when Rwanda invaded Zaire to address its threat from ex-FAR militants in the refugee camps. Additionally, if the refugees spark any irredentist sentiment, conflict can escalate quickly. This has been the case in Pakistan and India's conflicts over Kashmir for example. Another mechanism conflict escalation can work through is the initiation of "diversionary wars" by leaders seeking to maintain support. Serbian President Milosevic's actions during the collapse of Yugoslavia were strongly motivated by his desire to avoid dealing with the opposition's demands for substantial economic reforms. Part of his aggressive behavior during this period involved supporting the militarization of Bosnian refugees during the Bosnian War.³⁶

The refugees' situation is made even more difficult by the observation that refugee flows increase the likelihood of conflict initiation by both sending and receiving countries. Receiving countries may launch military action to seal their borders, threaten sending states, or even invade sending states to prevent refugees from entering. Sending states may pursue refugees across the border or punish

³³ Robert Muggah and Edward Mogire, "Arms Availability and Refugee Militarization in Africa- conceptualizing the issues," In *No Refuge: The Crisis of Refugee Militarization in Africa*, by Robert Muggah, 1-50, New York: Zed Books, 2006: 4.

³⁴ Salehyan and Gleditsch, "Refugees and the Spread of Civil War."

³⁵ Ragnhild Ek and Ahmed Karadawi, "Implications of Refugee Flows on Political Stability in the Sudan," *Ambio*, 1991: 196-203.

³⁶ Lake and Rothchild, "Spreading Fear," 30-31.

receiving states for harboring them.³⁷ From either angle, refugees cannot be assured that they will be safe from state aggression. Their difficult position makes them more ready to prepare for conflict.

Conclusion

The literature has suggested several causes of refugee militarization. The best arguments so far have been in support of identifying the type of refugee population, level of support from the receiving state, pre-existing tensions within the receiving state, and level of foreign support as causes of refugee militarization. I also add state strength as an important factor to consider in whether a refugee population will militarize. Thus, my hypotheses are the following:

- H1: State-in-exile refugee populations are the most likely groups of refugees to undergo refugee militarization
- H2: Receiving states that support the militarization of the refugees they are hosting will host refugee militarization
- H3: Receiving states with pre-existing tensions are more likely to host refugee militarization
- H4: Foreign support for refugee militarization causes it to occur
- H5: As state strength decreases, the likelihood of refugee militarization increases

However, there has been a lack of comparison between these factors to examine each one's explanatory capability. It is not clear if any of these factors merely explain how refugee militarization has occurred in certain cases, rather than serve as causes of refugee militarization. Many questions need to be answered about these factors. In cases where a state-in-exile refugee population exists, have they ever not militarized? What prevented them from doing so? Foreign support can easily be demonstrated

³⁷ Idean Salehyan, "The Externalities of Civil Strife: Refugees as a Source of International Conflict," *American Journal of Political Science*, 2008: 787-801.

to have helped refugees militarize, but would refugees in these cases have been able to militarize anyway? Can refugees militarize in a state that does not want them to militarize? These questions and more will be answered in this thesis.

III. Methodology

Very few scholars have thus far addressed the topic of what causes refugee militarization, so there remains a lot of data to be collected and data sets to be produced. So, I will limit my analysis to the cases of Rwandan refugees from the social revolution and related chaos from 1959-1964, Rwandan refugees from the 1994 genocide, and Afghan refugees from the Soviet invasion from 1979 until its final withdrawal in 1989. Some historical examples will also be used to refine and explain my main themes, but they will not be the focus of my analysis.

These cases are not a representative sample of refugee flows. That is intentional. I chose these cases because at least one of the countries where refugees fled in each situation hosted refugees that militarized at least partially. My contention is that if my analysis does not indicate that certain hypotheses hold in these cases, then those hypotheses are even less likely to hold in a broader large N sample.

At the same time, there are several factors that I choose to vary in order to strengthen my conclusions. Namely, my cases include variation in time period, region, and ethnicity. The earliest case involves the Rwandan refugee flows from 1959-1964. Then the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan lasted from 1979-1989. The Rwandan genocide then took place in 1994. Regionally, I am looking at Rwanda and its neighbors and Afghanistan and its neighbors. As for ethnicity, the two regions I am looking at include very different ethnic groups. Additionally, it is important to note that there are substantial differences between cross-border ethnic ties in these two regions. The border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is incredibly porous. It is largely populated by Pashtuns on both sides of the

border. The tie between the Pashtun people is so strong that there remains a claim to “Pashtunistan,” which would include as much as the majority of Afghanistan and a large chunk of Pakistan.³⁸ The border between Rwanda and Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo or DRC) used to be extremely porous. In fact, Rwanda’s borders were still being discussed into the 1920s.³⁹ However, by the time Rwanda’s social revolution broke out in 1959, there was not a significant level of debate about the borders between Rwanda and the DRC. The rest of Rwanda’s neighbors, as well as the rest of Afghanistan’s neighbors, do not have significant border disputes with those countries. Burundi has similar proportions of Hutus and Tutsis as Rwanda, but there is still no sense of irredentism between Burundi and Rwanda. By including variance in all of these factors, I am strengthening my ability to generalize my conclusions.

To address my hypotheses, I use a combination of academic literature, newspaper articles, and statements from various NGOs and relevant figures. Enough secondary sources exist to allow me to not have to rely upon primary sources for a substantial part of the analysis. I will include primary sources, but I do not need to rely exclusively upon them.

It is important to note that my hypotheses are not independent of each other. For instance, if the receiving state is a weak state, then it may be more likely to have serious pre-existing tensions that an influx of refugees could aggravate. I will address these kinds of interactions further in my analysis. After I identify which hypotheses possess the most explanatory power, I will be able to focus on the interactions that are most likely at play.

³⁸ Robert Wirsing, *Pakistan's Security under Zia, 1977-1988*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991: 29.

³⁹ David Newbury, "Returning Refugees: Four Historical Patterns of "Coming Home" to Rwanda," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 2005: 252-285, 256.

IV. Analysis

A. Which refugee populations militarized?

The first aspect of this analysis involves the identification of which refugee populations are militarized. This determination will be based on the definition of refugee militarization provided by Muggah and Mogire outlined earlier. Making these determinations clear now will provide context for why I am focusing on specific receiving states and it will provide a useful baseline for the rest of the analysis.

Rwandan refugee population 1959-1964

Thousands of refugees resulted from the Rwandan revolution from 1959-1962 and the violent reactions in 1963 and 1964 to armed Tutsi attempts to regain power. There was a lull in the refugee flows in 1962, when Rwanda officially gained its independence, but essentially the period 1959-1964 involved one connected flow of refugees from Rwanda.⁴⁰ Official UNHCR numbers indicate that by late 1964 200,000 refugees had gone to Burundi, 78,000 had fled to Uganda, 36,000 had left for Tanzania, and 22,000 had gone to Zaire. Refugees would argue that this is a low estimate because it does not take into account self-settled refugees who lived outside the refugee camps. They estimate that the total refugee population was about 500,000. Gerard Prunier disagrees with that estimate though because it includes people in Zaire or Uganda who were previous migrants and not refugees. He does not fully disagree with the refugees' claims. Instead, Prunier allows for the possibility that there were around

⁴⁰ Some of the most prominent works on this are Mamdani's *When Victims Become Killers*, Prunier's *The Rwanda Crisis*, and Lemarchand's *Rwanda and Burundi*.

400,000 refugees.⁴¹ Either way, the important point to take away is that there were hundreds of thousands of Rwandan refugees.

Of these four countries, my analysis will focus on the Rwandan refugees who fled into Burundi and Uganda. Tanzania and Zaire received relatively low amounts of refugees, and the potential causes of refugee militarization that the literature has suggested were the least prevalent in those countries. Some Rwandan refugees did not integrate very well into Zaire, so there were some Tutsi refugees from this group who chose to join the RPF later on when it invaded Rwanda.⁴² However, that number is quite small, and is not important for the purposes of this thesis.

Rwandan refugees from the 1994 Genocide


The Rwandan genocide is argued to have created over two million refugees. According to UNHCR numbers, Burundi's refugee population increased by just below 30,000 from 1993 to 1994. Uganda's refugee population remained the same between 1993 and 1994. Tanzania's refugee population increased by over 250,000 between 1993 and 1994. Zaire's refugee population increased by approximately 1.2 million from 1993 to 1994.⁴³ The map below illustrates where the largest refugee camps were located.⁴⁴ With these numbers in mind, refugees that may have gone to Uganda or Burundi were inconsequential with regards to concerns over militarization (see map below for more information). Therefore, the analysis of refugees from this event will focus on Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo) and Tanzania.

⁴¹ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 63.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ World Bank, "The World Bank," *World Development Indicators & Global Development Finance*, September 28, 2010, <http://data.worldbank.org/country> (accessed October 24, 2010).

⁴⁴ This map was created by Fiona Terry and is on page 158 of *Condemned to Repeat?: The paradox of humanitarian action*




Map 6. Rwandan refugee camps in the Great Lakes region. Camp names included only for those with populations over 10,000. From UNHCR, as modified by author.

Soviet Union invades Afghanistan 1979-1990

The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan that began in 1979 created millions of refugees. These refugees almost exclusively went to Pakistan and Iran. Iran's refugee population steadily rose from 130,100 in 1979 to 4,174,401 in 1990. Pakistan's refugee population was 400,000 in 1979, and it rose to as high as 3,275,715 in 1989. In 1990, its refugee population fell slightly to 3,255,975. These flows are illustrated in the map below.⁴⁵ Tajikistan has been such a small player in hosting refugees that UNHCR does not even have a count of refugees in Tajikistan until 1992. UNHCR does not have a count of refugees in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan until 1993.⁴⁶ Considering how Soviet forces were coming from these countries, this movement pattern is very understandable. Since Afghan refugees generally fled to Pakistan or Iran, unless they were wealthy enough to leave the region entirely, my analysis will center on how these two countries received refugees.

⁴⁵ This map was created by the UNHCR Mapping Unit to show the main refugee flows from 1979-1990

⁴⁶ *World Development Indicators*



In which countries did militarization happen?

Using the definition of refugee militarization from Muggah and Mogire, I will now apply it to my cases. The first case is the Rwandan refugees created by Rwanda's revolution and related violence from 1959-1964. As discussed earlier, I am focusing on the Rwandan refugees hosted by Burundi and Uganda in this period. These refugees present a different situation than the other two cases. This is because there was one group, the Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR), which attempted to militarize Rwandan refugees throughout the Great Lakes region. Prospective instigators of refugee militarization in the other two cases did not have a regional focus, so the refugee population in each country in those two

cases can be analyzed separately. Here, the Rwandan refugees must be viewed, to an extent, as a regional group.

There were armed attacks conducted by Tutsi militants going into Rwanda from about 1960-1966. Those carrying out the attacks were often referred to as *inyenzi*. Rene Lemarchand defines the *inyenzi* as follows:

Meaning, literally, 'cockroaches,' the term *inyenzi* is currently used both within and outside Rwanda to refer to small-scale, Tutsi-led guerilla units trained and organized outside Rwanda and varying in size from about six to twelve men.⁴⁷

The *inyenzi* attacked primarily from Burundi and Uganda. They had aspirations to seize control of the Rwandan government and to return power to Tutsis. However, as Lemarchand describes, they displayed a combination of "political ineptitude, tactical blundering, and gratuitous cruelty" that prevented them from ever really gaining popular support or enough power to pose a significant threat to Rwanda. The Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR), the organization leading the *inyenzi*, never became a "tightly-knit, well-organized party."⁴⁸

There were disagreements over numerous policies within UNAR. These disagreements went beyond the usual conservative and progressive political divide that normally existed among Tutsis. For example, some elements in UNAR felt that a revolution should happen from within Rwanda to restore Tutsis to power, while others felt that the Hutu-led government should be forcefully overthrown from the outside. Jovite Nzamwita, one of the *inyenzi* movement's leaders, wrote to his colleague Abbe Ruterandongezi about the moderate Tutsi leader Michel Rwagasana's choice to pursue reconciliation with Hutu President Gregoire Kayibanda's government in Rwanda. Nzamwita insisted on the absolute necessity 'to stay outside Rwanda to avoid falling into the hands of the Belgian paracommandos and

⁴⁷ Rene Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi* (London: Pall Mall Press Ltd, 1970), 198.

⁴⁸ Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 199.

their Kayibanda.’ In numerous documents, it is clear that many of the Tutsi exiles felt utter disdain for Tutsis who had remained in Rwanda and had decided to work with the government. Lemarchand argues that some of the Tutsi exiles may have showed indifference for the fate of the remaining Tutsis in Rwanda. These exiles did not seem to worry about the danger that would be placed upon innocent Tutsis by their attacks.⁴⁹ Another major disagreement was over how to use party funds. In early 1963, Francois Rukeba, Minister of Defense at the time in UNAR’s “government-in-exile,” accused Michel Kayihura and Jean Bosco Kayunga, respectively Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, of squandering \$100,000. This amount equaled the amount given by the Catholic Relief Fund, the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief and various Communist and nationalist countries. This dispute came at a time when UNAR needed unity, not disunity.⁵⁰ On top of these issues was the fact that it was extremely difficult for the leadership of UNAR to communicate across countries. The lack of communication made coordinated action extremely difficult.⁵¹

There were several attacks launched by UNAR forces into Rwanda, but they were never very successful. The major attacks were conducted in March 1961, two in July 1962, two in December 1963, June-July 1964, March-April 1964, two in November 1966, and July 1966.⁵² As the map below shows, refugees in Burundi carried out the most attacks.⁵³


⁴⁹ Ibid, 201.

⁵⁰ Ibid, 206.

⁵¹ Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 199.

⁵² Ibid, 218.

⁵³ This map comes from page 218 in *Rwanda and Burundi*.



Map 2. Rwanda: Major *Inyenzi* Attacks, March 1961-November 1966

1. March 1961; July 1962
2. July 1962
3. December 1963
4. December 1963; June-July 1964; March-April 1964
5. November 1966
6. November 1966
7. July 1966

Uganda did not support the UNAR and its ambitions. In Uganda, overall administrative efficiency of the Ugandan government, the Ugandan government's attitude toward the UNAR, and the geographical remoteness of Buganda from the border areas were all important factors in allowing Uganda to strictly control the refugee leadership. Furthermore, the Banyarwanda (Rwandan) immigrants in Uganda displayed a very cautious, if not overtly hostile, attitude toward the refugees. They generally

did not support UNAR leadership, and they were not willing to sacrifice more prestigious and lucrative positions within the Ugandan government to support the UNAR's cause.⁵⁴ The Ugandan government made several statements and took action to back up these points. In early 1962, the Special Branch of the Ministry of Internal Affairs undertook an investigation that led to the expulsion of twenty-four refugees suspected of organizing *inyenzi* commandos. In May 1962, the Ministry of Internal Affairs released a statement saying:

Firm discipline is absolutely necessary if these refugees are to be made to behave in a manner which does not prejudice relations between Uganda and her neighbours. It is important that the Uganda government should begin to look outside her own boundaries and not take decisions based only on possible political repercussions within Uganda itself... and it is important for the future of this country that she should do everything possible to maintain good relations with her neighbours, even though, by so doing, the government may alienate certain sections of the community within Uganda.⁵⁵

On July 5, 1963, news broke of a raid that had been launched against Rwanda. Prime Minister Milton Obote warned against the militarization of refugees in Uganda:

"I wish to make it clear that I will not tolerate this sort of activity... We have no intention within the context of the Addis Ababa spirit and Charter of allowing Uganda to be used as a base for any attacks or subversion against any African state... If [our] hospitality is abused, and refugees use or attempt to use Uganda as a base to attack our neighbours, we shall have no alternative but to withdraw the protection we have granted to these people."⁵⁶

Burundi is a more complicated case. With frequent changes in government, the Burundian policy of hosting Rwandan refugees was frequently changing. There was also an ethnic bond between the Tutsi elites in Burundi and the Tutsi exiles from Rwanda. Furthermore, Burundi's lack of administrative efficiency and co-ordination at the local and provincial levels meant that there was a lack of control over the refugees. China's recognition of Burundi in 1963 added to the diplomatic tools at

⁵⁴ Ibid, 207.

⁵⁵ Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 208.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 208.

UNAR's disposal.⁵⁷ Until the major raid that occurred in December 1963, the refugees in Burundi did not get much of a chance to invade Rwanda. In fact, a raid involving 1500 refugees was attempted in November 1963 that the Burundi authorities prevented. By the time of the next invasion attempt though, the Burundian government's relationship with the Rwandese government was deteriorating. Negotiations in Gisenyi, Rwanda had been unsuccessful at reaching an agreement for the sharing of reserve currencies. In response, Burundi Vice-Prime Minister Dr. Pie Masumbuko commented, "Rwanda is ungrateful. Recently we have arrested people who were about to attack you and now you decide to sever economic relations with us. Therefore you do not want collaboration."⁵⁸

After the attacks, Hutus in Rwanda often responded with massacres of Tutsis. For example, after the attack from Burundi in December 1963, the Hutu response involved the killing of approximately between 10,000 and 14,000 Tutsis. These killings were brutal and terrifying. Many Tutsis, including leadership of UNAR, had enough evidence to at least understand that this was likely to happen. They knew that there was a good chance of violent reprisal against Tutsis within Rwanda. When the backlash did indeed occur, UNAR was unable to effectively protest. The United States and Europe did not learn about the massacres, and Burundi was the only country in the region to protest publicly. The raid in December 1963 had been UNAR's major push to retake power in Rwanda. With its failure, and the lack of international protest for the Hutu response, the UNAR had run out of political capital. Its leadership was too divided and ineffective, and it lacked the legitimacy to win substantial support from refugees and external parties. By the end of 1994, UNAR had whittled away to the point where it practically ceased to exist.

UNAR had been able to provide a source of political organization for Tutsi exiles, but it never produced a significant military force. This is why even the UNAR was unable to turn any of the Rwandan

⁵⁷ Ibid, 221.

⁵⁸ Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 221.

refugee populations into a state-in-exile group. UNAR also tried to win over foreign support, but at best it was only able to get some weapons shipments and training from the Chinese government.⁵⁹

Going back to the definition of refugee militarization from Muggah and Mogire, the determination can now be made of whether the refugee populations in Uganda and Burundi were militarized. For the first characteristic, militarized activity in and outside the camps, Burundi had a little bit and Uganda had almost none. Attacks were launched from both countries, but the attacks were very weak. Many of the attackers did not even have guns. The Ugandan government was also adamant about preventing militarization as much as possible. The Burundian government stopped some attacks, but later may have gone so far as to assist some attacks. The second characteristic, political activism and violence, was present with UNAR, but Ugandan refugees largely did not support UNAR and UNAR's organization was too disorganized to take advantage of a potential opportunity in Burundi. The third characteristic, military training and recruitment, was largely non-existent in Uganda. However, with China's help, some military training and recruitment was able to take place in Burundi. Again, it did not occur on a large scale, but some military training and recruitment certainly happened. The last characteristic is support for armed combatants and armed resistance among the refugees. This was certainly not present in Uganda. In Burundi, there was not an overwhelming amount of support from the refugees, but some did exist. All in all, this means that the Rwandan refugee population in Uganda did not have any characteristics of a militarized refugee population and Burundi had a little bit of each characteristic. Therefore, the refugees in Uganda were clearly not militarized. Burundi's refugees were somewhat militarized. This refugee population did not possess enough of any of the characteristics of militarized refugees to be definitively labeled as such, but it was at least partially militarized.

⁵⁹ Ibid, 227.

Looking more long term, the refugees in Uganda did not just meld into Ugandan society. They mostly remained separated from the rest of Ugandan society. Beginning in the 1970s, some members of this refugee population did become active with Ugandan militants. Fred Rwigyema, one of the founding members of the RPF along with Paul Kagame, began his involvement by fighting alongside Yoweri Museveni in the Front for National Salvation (FRONASA), which invaded Uganda from Tanzania with Tanzanian backing to remove Idi Amin from power.⁶⁰ Rwigyema and Kagame were later both involved in the first battle of the National Resistance Army (NRA). The military and leadership skills they developed, as well as the numerous other Banyarwanda refugees who became officers and obtained substantial military experience, allowed them to build the capacity for the refugees to have strong military organization. The troop strength of the RPF was only about 5,000 when it invaded Rwanda in 1990, but those troops had extensive military experience and a solid alliance with Yoweri Museveni.⁶¹ At that point, Rwandan refugees in Uganda possessed all the characteristics of refugee militarization. The invasion was militarized activity outside of the camps. The RPF was very politically active. Kagame and Rwigyema had each been in contact with foreign powers, as well as organizing their own people. Military training and recruitment had primarily occurred when RPF members were fighting with the NRA during its insurgency from 1981-1986. Lastly, events in Uganda and fears of returning to Rwanda had convinced Rwandan refugees that the only way to return to Rwanda would be by force.

The second case is the Rwandan refugees who fled in 1994 due to the genocide. As I demonstrated earlier, Tanzania and Zaire are the two countries to scrutinize for refugee militarization.

After all the genocide's atrocities, much of the political and military leadership of the Hutu *génocidaires* was able to escape Rwanda. They mixed with the refugees who mostly fled to Tanzania and Zaire. Refugee camps in Zaire held at least 850,000 people, including 30,000 to 40,000 ex-Rwandan

⁶⁰ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 68.

⁶¹ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 184.

Armed Forces (FAR) soldiers. Fiona Terry estimates that between 500,000 and 800,000 Rwandans crossed the Zairian border between July 14, 1994 and July 17, 1994.⁶² Practically all the politicians and military men went to Zaire, where President Mobutu Sese Seko's sympathy allowed them greater freedom of movement.⁶³

Scholars have developed a consensus that the Rwandan refugees in Zaire during this period were militarized. Their findings show that all of Muggah and Mogire's characteristics of refugee militarization were present in Zaire. Fiona Terry has direct knowledge from her position with MSF of militant activity within the camps, and there is extensive documentation of the militants' armed attacks into Rwanda.⁶⁴ The political activism and violence is well documented by Sarah Lischer.⁶⁵ The same authors also show that military training and recruitment was occurring, with support from thousands of people. Refugee militarization clearly took place in Zaire.

The refugees who went to Tanzania had a very different fate than those that went to Zaire. With the political and military leadership primarily in Zaire, the attempts that were made to militarize the refugees in Tanzania failed. There was also no serious political activism, which meant that nobody really tried to obtain support from the refugees for armed resistance. Furthermore, there was no military training or recruitment either. This group of refugees was definitely not militarized.

The third and final case is the Afghan refugees from the Soviet Union's invasion in 1979. These refugees went to Pakistan and Iran, so my analysis will look at these two countries.

⁶² Fiona Terry, *Condemned to Repeat?: The paradox of humanitarian action*, New York: Cornell University Press, 2002.

⁶³ Gerard Prunier, *Africa's World War: Congo, The Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

⁶⁴ See *Condemned to Repeat?*, *When Victims Become Killers*, *Africa's World War*, and Rene Lemarchand's *The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa* for more information

⁶⁵ She discusses this both in *Dangerous Sanctuaries* and "Collateral Damage: Humanitarian Assistance as a cause of conflict" in *International Security*.

The Afghan refugees in Iran did not militarize. For the most part, they were able to mix in with Iranian society, satisfying Iran's demand for cheap labor at the time. They did not engage in political activism or attempt to organize militarily. With increasing oil wealth and industrialization, Iran had plenty of demand for cheap labor. In fact, thousands of Afghans had already crossed into Iran as migrant workers before the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979.⁶⁶ With such an ability to integrate refugees into its society, Iran was able to prevent Afghan refugees from turning to militarization. As Paul Collier would argue, the opportunity costs for Afghan refugees in Iran were just too high to take up arms and participate in further conflict.⁶⁷

Pakistan was an entirely different matter. Afghan refugees in Pakistan participated in a lot of militarized activity in and outside the refugee camps. The covert war largely financed by the CIA, Saudi intelligence, and ISI included the Afghan refugees as its foot soldiers. Thousands of refugees volunteered from the camps to participate in the fighting.⁶⁸ While at first the refugees did not have effective political organization, Pakistani support and guidance led to seven parties being recognized by 1981. These parties became increasingly active as they received more funds and guidance. Moreover, Pakistan's government helped the refugees make their case for support on the international stage. The resistance movement was then able to recruit without hassle, thanks to Pakistan's accommodation in allowing it to have unrestricted access to the refugee camps for recruitment.⁶⁹ Finally, the refugees demonstrated their support for armed resistance in numerous ways. One of the most poignant examples of this was in the education system for refugees. Refugee education included chants of anti-Russian slogans and

⁶⁶ Barnett Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), 78.

⁶⁷ Paul Collier, "The Conflict Trap," In *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It*, by Paul Collier, 17-37. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

⁶⁸ Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars*, New York: The Penguin Press, 2004.

⁶⁹ Wirsing, *Pakistan's Security under Zia, 1977-1988*, 53-63.

weapons training for children as young as nine.⁷⁰ With all these factors in place, the Afghan refugee population in Pakistan was clearly militarized.

To summarize, the refugee populations in Pakistan during the Soviet Union's invasion, Zaire immediately following the Rwandan genocide, and Uganda in 1990 were all clear, unambiguous examples of refugee militarization. The refugee population in Uganda in 1990 derived from Rwanda's turmoil from 1959-1964. In the short term, Uganda's Rwandan refugee population was not militarized from 1959-1964. However, after Rwanda's revolution from 1959-1962, violent reprisals to the *inyenzi* attacks in the early to mid 1960s, Rwandan turmoil in 1973, and involvement in Uganda's power struggles, Rwandan refugees in Uganda formed the RPF in 1987 and eventually invaded Rwanda in 1990. Rwandan refugees in Burundi from 1959-1964 had a little bit of a few factors of refugee militarization, but the complete ineffectiveness of attempted armed attacks and abysmal organization show that they are better explained as not being an example of refugee militarization. The last two situations I am analyzing, Tanzania in 1994 and Iran during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, were clearly not examples of refugee militarization.

Table 1: Militarization Status

Receiving State	Militarization Status
Burundi 1959-1964	Somewhat militarized
Uganda 1959-1964	Not Militarized
Uganda 1990	Militarized
Zaire 1994	Militarized
Tanzania 1994	Not militarized
Pakistan 1980s	Militarized
Iran 1980s	Not militarized

⁷⁰ Lischer, *Dangerous Sanctuaries*, 51.

B. Type of Refugee Population

Analyzing the type of refugee population that existed in each country essentially means determining the preferences and capabilities of the refugee population. This approach is inherently at odds with the common global image of refugees through much of the 20th century. During that time, refugees were perceived as being weak and powerless. If they were participating in a conflict, then it must have been due to external influence and manipulation. More recently, the international community has come to recognize refugees as actors in conflict. These actors can and do become active participants in some conflicts.⁷¹ Therefore, analyzing the type of refugee population that exists in each situation should yield some indication of when refugee militarization will occur and the refugees will become active participants in conflict.

Uganda 1959-1964

The first step in determining the type of refugee population that Uganda was hosting from 1959-1964 involves identifying what the refugees were fleeing. In this case, the refugees were fleeing turmoil in Rwanda relating to the 1959 revolution and subsequent violence that occurred as a result of the revolution. Violence was targeted against Tutsis in Rwanda. For the revolution, violence toward Tutsis happened as a result of Hutu frustration about being excluded from power for so long and finally having Belgian support to take control of their country. Mamdani characterizes the 1959-1964 period as a time of fluctuation between the accommodationist and exclusionist tendencies of the Hutu elite (PARMEHUTU) and the Tutsi elite (UNAR). Accommodationists were those who were willing to negotiate and work with those in the other ethnic group. Exclusionists were not willing to negotiate and often favored the use of harsh measures, sometimes violence, with the other ethnic group. As Mamdani

⁷¹ Gil Loescher, *The UNHCR and World Politics*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

explains it, 1959 was an exclusionist time. Rwandans on both sides then became more accommodationist until gaining independence with the New York Accord in 1962. The New York Accord successfully convinced some members of UNAR to return to Kigali and participate in a coalition government. The accommodationist tendencies lasted until UNAR launched major armed raids in 1963. These raids culminated in the Bugesera invasion in December of 1963. Militants nearly got within 20 miles of Kigali, but were eventually put down.⁷² Hutu leaders in Rwanda quickly responded by directing the massacre of thousands of Tutsis, primarily in the prefecture of Gikongoro. In particular, the local prefect for Gikongoro, Andre Nkeramugabe, is reported to have told a meeting of burgomasters and PARMEHUTU propagandists: "We are expected to defend ourselves. The only way to go about [it] is to paralyze the Tutsi. How? They must be killed."⁷³ Estimates of the number of Tutsis killed have ranged over time and between sources from 750 to 20,000.⁷⁴ Catharine and David Newbury estimate that between 10,000 and 14,000 Tutsis were killed, and Rene Lemarchand agrees with that assessment.⁷⁵ The 1959 revolution involved the deaths of only about 200 Tutsis.⁷⁶ This dynamic provides a good explanation for why such a large proportion of the refugees who fled Rwanda between 1959 and 1964 fled Rwanda during 1963 and 1964.

Throughout the 1959-1964 period it is clear that the violence occurring in Rwanda was targeting Tutsis. There were not any serious armed Tutsi attacks until 1963. While the revolution of 1959 only involved about 200 deaths, those who left at that time were still fleeing targeted violence. There was not a full-scale civil war, so with Lischer's line of reasoning, Rwandan refugees were most likely to fit into the category of persecuted refugees.

⁷² Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 103-131.

⁷³ Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 223-224.

⁷⁴ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 130.

⁷⁵ See Newbury and Newbury. "Was the Genocide in Rwanda and Ethnic Struggle?" pp. 13. Also, see page 225 in Lemarchand's *Rwanda and Burundi*.

⁷⁶ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 130.

To test this assumption, I need to determine if the Rwandan refugees had effective political and military organization. This is a characteristic that I discussed earlier, when I was evaluating whether Rwandan refugees in Uganda were militarized. As I explained then, the UNAR attempted to provide political and military leadership for Rwandan refugees in Uganda, but it was ineffective and ultimately rejected by the refugees it sought to lead. Therefore, the Rwandan refugees in Uganda can be classified as persecuted refugees.

Even though persecuted refugees can become militarized, they usually do not. This instance illustrates an example of a persecuted refugee population that did not militarize. For the most part, these refugees lacked the capacity and the desire to invade Rwanda. The attempted political and military leadership from UNAR was unsuccessful as well.

Uganda 1990

The Rwandan refugee population in Uganda in 1990 still derived primarily from the 1959-1964 chaos. There was an additional flow of refugees to Uganda around 1973 because of the tension and eventual coup d'état that brought Juvenal Habyarimana to power in Rwanda. In 1973, refugees fled because of fears about targeted violence against them. So, the refugees in Uganda were bound to either be classified as persecuted or state-in-exile refugees.

That distinction can then be made by looking for the presence of political and military organization. For the Rwandan refugees in Uganda from 1959-1964, UNAR tried and failed to provide these things. In 1990 though, Rwandan refugees were organizing behind the RPF. The RPF had been formed in 1987, after Yoweri Museveni had come to power and realized how much of a political liability his Rwandan allies were. The RPF leadership involved Fred Rwigema and Paul Kagame at the top, and numerous others who had received military experience with the NRA during their insurgency and civil war from 1981-1986. While the troop strength of the RPF was no more than 4,000-5,000 in 1990, their

soldiers and commanders were battle-hardened and well-organized. Politically, they had the backing of the refugee population at large, and so were able to provide effective political organization. They maintained strong ties with Yoweri Museveni even as he had to publicly distance himself from them in order to maintain political support among Ugandans.⁷⁷

Part of the evidence of the effectiveness of the RPF's political and military organization was that it was able to respond to overtures being made by Rwanda about the potential for peaceful repatriation. In July 1990, some members of the Rwandan government who were aware of RPF mobilization in Uganda came to an agreement to send Rwandese government delegates to visit Uganda and select lists of candidates for a repatriation exercise due to be carried out in November. This decision threatened RPF militants who wanted to forcefully seize power in Rwanda because it threatened to lure Rwandan refugees away from the movement with the promise of a peaceful return. RPF militants also received a boost to their agenda from MRND radicals who wanted to finish off their opponents once and for all.⁷⁸ Here, there was a convergence of preferred outcomes among the radicals within MRND and the radicals within the RPF. Radicals wanted to fight, while moderates were much more likely to support peaceful solutions. Negotiating repatriation was therefore very appealing to moderates, but a great threat to radicals on both sides. Later, on September 28, 1990, three days before the RPF invasion began, Rwanda President Habyarimana addressed the UN General Assembly in New York and announced two significant concessions to refugees. First, Rwanda would grant travel documents and citizenship to anyone who did not desire naturalization in their country of asylum. Second, Rwanda would repatriate many of those who wanted to return. This announcement was surely recognition of the RPF's power and its threat to the Rwandan state.⁷⁹ However, it was too late by that point to stop a process that had been developing

⁷⁷ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 159-184.

⁷⁸ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 90-91.

⁷⁹ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 159-160.

for years. Circumstances in Uganda were pushing the refugees out, and the RPF had convinced the refugees that an armed return was the only way they could return to Rwanda.

With these qualities, the Rwandan refugees in Uganda in 1990 definitely had the makings of a state-in-exile refugee population. As would be expected from this classification of refugees, they did undergo the process of refugee militarization.

Burundi 1959-1964

The refugees in Burundi were very similar to the refugees in Uganda. They fled the same targeted violence and lacked effective political and military organization. As with the refugees in Uganda, UNAR was the party attempting to mobilize the refugees. While UNAR did have more success in Burundi than Uganda, it still did not have nearly enough success mobilizing refugees to be considered to have provided effective political and military organization. Therefore, like Uganda, Burundi's refugee population can be classified as persecuted refugees.

Tanzania 1994

Rwandan refugees who fled into Tanzania were fleeing essentially the same situation as the refugees who fled to Zaire. They were running away from RPF forces. The only difference is that the refugees fleeing to Tanzania were fleeing as the RPF was in the early stages of its advance through Rwanda. Hutu Power still had control in Kigali, so it was not yet certain which side would win control of Rwanda. The RPF surely appeared more powerful, but the real test for the RPF was set to be the battle for Kigali. The refugees fleeing to Zaire largely fled after the RPF had taken Kigali and had decided to take over the rest of the country. Their flight primarily came after the RPF defeated ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces at Gisenyi, the last stronghold for Hutu Power elements. As I have previously

established, this situation means that the refugee populations fleeing to both Zaire and Tanzania were going to be persecuted refugee populations or state-in-exile refugee populations.

Because the refugees going to Tanzania went before the outcome of the conflict in Rwanda was decided, the Hutu Power leadership and organizers of the genocide largely did not flee with them. They went to Zaire instead when they realized that they had lost. This meant that the political and military leadership of the genocidaires did not go to Tanzania. The Rwandan refugee population in Tanzania did not have an effective political and military leadership with them, so there was no serious attempt at refugee militarization. It was a persecuted refugee population.

Zaire 1994

The Rwandan Hutu refugee population in Zaire is a prime example of a state-in-exile group. Refugee camps were controlled by the ex-FAR and the *Interahamwe*.⁸⁰ This control was discussed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his report to the Security Council on January 25, 1995:

"... the refugee population in Zaire tends to include more political, military and militia elements of the former Government than the camps in the United Republic of Tanzania or Burundi and their hostility towards the Government in Kigali is reflected in actions that have led to insecure conditions in the camps.

More specifically, the refugees are intimidated from publicly expressing their desire to return to Rwanda. The lives of such people, as well as the lives of politically moderate refugees or those who may have intermarried or are suspected of being infiltrators are seriously threatened and some of them are known to have been killed. There is also a significant threat of civil disturbances in the camps. This threat is especially acute when refugees congregate together, for example, when relief supplies are distributed. In addition, as in any area containing a large number of people living in highly dense and impoverished conditions, common crime is prevalent in the camps.

Initially, the leaders in the camps were called upon to facilitate the delivery of relief assistance. Unfortunately they misused this responsibility by using the delivery of assistance to persuade

⁸⁰ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*.

refugees to behave according to their interests and by hoarding and/or selling such assistance rather than distributing it."⁸¹

Within the first few months in exile, the ex-FAR and National Gendarmerie fused under a single authority called the Rwandan Armed Forces Command. Initially, the authority was placed under the Minister of Defense, Colonel Athanase Gasake. There were originally four commissions: Social Affairs, Information and Documentation, Planning and Operations, and Capital and Finance. In September 1994 a fifth commission was created. It was for Politics and External Relations. The armed forces had two divisions. Camp documents state that the first contained 7,680 soldiers. The second contained 10,240 men. In addition, there were separate support units numbering about 4,000 soldiers, making a total of about 22,000 soldiers. Other estimates generally range between 30,000 and 50,000 ex-FAR soldiers in the refugee camps, so there is clearly a substantial margin of error in any of these numbers. Estimates of the number of militia members are even more varied, ranging from 10,000 to 50,000 militia soldiers.⁸² Camp documents limit their mention of the militia to complaints about the militia's lack of discipline. They also discuss the decision to forbid the presence of militia in the camps unless militia members had undergone proper military training.⁸³

The Rwandan Armed Forces were able to pay for all this militarization with many sources. For starters, the ex-FAR and Hutu government of Rwanda had emptied Rwanda's banks on their way out of the country. Gerard Prunier estimates that \$30-40 million of local currency and \$30-40 million dollars of foreign currency were taken into Zaire. Furthermore, hundreds of vehicles, trucks, buses, and machinery worth millions of dollars were brought into Zaire. Many of these items were sold off for individual profit, but a lot of them were used by the militants. Perhaps most importantly, the ex-FAR successfully brought

⁸¹ Iogna-Prat, *Refugee Camp Security in the Great Lakes Region*, 16-17.

⁸² These militia soldiers were Interahamwe. They were even more difficult than ex-FAR soldiers to distinguish from the refugees because they arrived in the camps dressed the same as civilian refugees and were less organized than ex-FAR soldiers.

⁸³ Terry, *Condemned to Repeat?*, 157-159.

considerable quantities of military hardware into Zaire with them.⁸⁴ Human Rights Watch Arms Project has reported that the military hardware was kept in bases near Goma that were maintained by ex-FAR soldiers.⁸⁵ Camp documents report that an inventory was conducted finding that the Zairian army possessed 6 helicopters, over 1000 artillery pieces, 35,000 light weapons, and several armed vehicles of Rwandan origin.⁸⁶ Not all of this hardware was actually useful, but further shipments of arms augmented these supplies pretty well. This leadership was very skilled at diverting humanitarian assistance. There was a lot of assistance to divert because international donors spent \$1.3 billion from 1994 to 1996 on the Rwandan Hutu refugee population.⁸⁷ The resources which the ex-FAR was able to access thanks to the refugees were its most important assets. Its well-developed propaganda system was crucial in acquiring those resources. The propaganda portrayed the Hutus as victims of the power-hungry Tutsi-led RPF. In documents seized at refugee camps in Zaire, one propaganda document declared:

All Hutu people, whether in the interior or in exile, are demonized. They are held globally responsible for the misfortune which they did not cause or provoke in the least. "The genocide" has become a commercial fund for the RPF which uses it as a pretext for refusing dialogue between Rwandans aimed at definitively resolving the ethnic conflict which has ravaged Rwanda since October 1, 1990.⁸⁸

One of the clearest demonstrations of the success of this propaganda comes when noting where the United States directed foreign assistance. The new Rwandan government, which had to scramble for financing due to the looting of the banks and removal of assets by the ex-FAR and Hutu refugees, had to struggle to receive foreign assistance. The United States stalled World Bank funds for the new RPF-led Rwandan government by insisting on the repayment of \$10 million in arrears in order to unblock the

⁸⁴ Ibid, 160.

⁸⁵ Human Rights Watch Arms Project, *Rwanda/Zaire: Rearming with Impunity*, May 1995, <http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1995/Rwanda1.htm> (accessed March 4, 2010).

⁸⁶ Terry, *Condemned to Repeat?*, 161.

⁸⁷ David Rieff, *A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002.

⁸⁸ Terry, *Condemned to Repeat?*, 167.

\$250 million allocation. When the United States chose to allocate funds of its own to Rwanda, it contributed far less to Rwanda than to the refugees. For fiscal year 1994, it allocated \$231.9 million in humanitarian assistance to the refugees and only \$73.3 million for Rwanda. In fiscal year 1995, the refugees received \$242.4 million and Rwanda received \$46.2 million. Finally, the refugees received \$177.9 million and Rwanda received \$13.2 million in fiscal year 1996.⁸⁹

Pakistan during the Soviet invasion

When Sarah Lischer classifies the Afghan refugee population, she does not classify it as a state-in-exile population when it first left Afghanistan. Instead, she argues that dynamics in Pakistan turned the Afghan refugee population there into a state-in-exile refugee population, whereas there was no such change in Iran. This is because when the Afghan refugees arrived in Pakistan, they were able to capitalize on their shared anti-communism and adherence to Islam with Pakistanis. Afghan refugees in Iran were not successful in this regard. Instead, according to Lischer, they maintained their status as a persecuted refugee group.⁹⁰

The best way to describe Afghan refugees in Pakistan is to break them down into five groups. The first group included those few who came from prominent and wealthy families who had personal and business assets outside Afghanistan. Many members of this group quickly moved on to the United States or Western Europe, far away from the region's turmoil. Then there were some refugees who arrived in Pakistan with all the assets they could bring with them. This group did relatively well in Pakistan, integrating and becoming economically active. After that were the well-educated Afghans. This group included doctors, teachers, and engineers, among others. They were a stabilizing influence in the

⁸⁹ *Chronology of US Government (USG) Humanitarian Assistance to Rwanda and Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DROC) (since April 6, 1994)*, Washington, DC: USAID/ Bureau for Humanitarian Response Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance, 1997, pp. 10, 13, and 17.

⁹⁰ Lischer, *Dangerous Sanctuaries*.

refugee camps. The fourth group included Afghans who escaped Afghanistan with household goods and livestock. Unfortunately though, they often had to rely upon the generosity of others to support themselves. Finally, the largest group, consisting of about 60% of the refugees, was ordinary Afghans who had brought nothing with them. They were largely dependent upon Pakistani and international assistance for subsistence.⁹¹

Afghan refugees in Iran were pretty similar to the refugees that went to Pakistan. Later on, under the Taliban, the biggest difference was that Hazara Shi'a Afghans mostly went to Iran instead of Pakistan. This is not to say that there was anything near a strict division of Sunni Afghans going to Pakistan and Shi'a Afghans going to Iran, but there was a higher percentage of Shi'a Afghans that went to Iran. The basic justification for this difference is that Iran is a predominantly Shia country, whereas Pakistan has more Sunnis. As Hazaras fled persecution from the Taliban, that religious bond was valuable to many people.⁹² In any of the refugee flows from Afghanistan, the most important distinction to keep in mind is that Afghans, specifically Pashtuns, going from Afghanistan to Pakistan are making a journey that has been made frequently by Pashtuns for centuries. There is still a strong irredentist claim to "Pashtunistan," which includes a large portion of Pakistan as well as Afghanistan.⁹³ This historic flow across the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan makes it easier in a sense for Afghans to adjust to going to Pakistan than Iran. Pakistan is used to seeing large population flows back and forth across its border, so it would naturally have a different response to Afghan refugees than Iran.

Iran during the Soviet invasion

⁹¹ Tom Rogers, "Two Dimensions of a National Crisis: Population Growth and Refugees in Pakistan," *Modern Asian Studies*, 1992: 735-761.

⁹² Diane Tober, "'My Body Is Broken Like My Country': Identity, Nation, and Repatriation among Afghan Refugees in Iran." *Iranian Studies*, 2007 Volume 40:2: 263-285.

⁹³ Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*.

When Sarah Lischer classifies the Afghan refugee population, she does not classify it as a state-in-exile population when it first left Afghanistan. Instead, she argues that dynamics in Pakistan turned the Afghan refugee population there into a state-in-exile refugee population, whereas there was no such change in Iran. This is because when the Afghan refugees arrived in Pakistan, they were able to capitalize on their shared anti-communism and adherence to Islam with Pakistanis. Afghan refugees in Iran were not successful in this regard. Instead, according to Lischer, they maintained their status as a persecuted refugee group.⁹⁴ However, Afghan refugees in Iran did have a better living situation than the refugees in Pakistan. This is because unlike Pakistan, Iran had job opportunities for Afghans. With increasing oil wealth and industrialization, Iran had plenty of demand for cheap labor. As the graph below shows, Iran experienced a solid trend of growth in GDP per capita from 1970-1986.⁹⁵ In fact, thousands of Afghans had already crossed into Iran as migrant workers before the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979.⁹⁶ Iran's economy did decline after 1986, coinciding with the less welcoming attitude of Iranians toward Afghan refugees in the late 1980s.⁹⁷ With such an ability to integrate refugees into its society, Iran was able to prevent Afghan refugees from turning to militarization. As Paul Collier would argue, the opportunity costs for Afghan refugees in Iran were just too high to take up arms and participate in further conflict.⁹⁸


⁹⁴ Lischer, *Dangerous Sanctuaries*.

⁹⁵ *World Development Indicators*

⁹⁶ Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*.

⁹⁷ Human Rights Watch, "Closed Door Policy: Afghan Refugees in Pakistan and Iran," *Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan*, Human Rights Watch report, February 2002.

⁹⁸ Collier, "The Conflict Trap."



Broader Analysis

These cases do provide support for the hypothesis that the type of refugee population can determine whether refugee militarization will occur. However, the cases of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran show that some refinement is needed in the theorizing on the types of refugee populations and how likely they are to militarize.

Sarah Lischer, one of the most prominent scholars exploring different types of refugee populations, argues that refugees must possess political and military organization in order for refugee militarization to occur. This argument leads her to argue that state-in-exile refugees are the most likely to militarize. Cases like Rwandan refugees in Zaire immediately following the genocide illustrate the argument quite well. The Khmer Rouge-controlled Cambodian refugee population in Thailand is a similar case to Rwandan refugees in Zaire. The Cambodian refugees were also fleeing a situation where millions of people had been killed, and the primary offenders of the killing were mixed in with the refugee

population. The Khmer Rouge, like the ex-FAR, was able to mobilize the international community to provide large amounts of humanitarian assistance. That assistance was then all too often used to contribute to refugee militarization. The comparison between the Cambodian refugees in Thailand and Rwandan refugees in Zaire was quickly made. Alain Destexhe contributed an article to the *International Herald Tribune* on August 11, 1994, called "Hurry to Prevent a Cambodian Epilogue in Rwanda" that was emblematic of the comparisons being made between Cambodia and Rwanda.⁹⁹

On the other hand, Lischer's argument does not adequately account for how persecuted refugees can militarize. Within her work, it is hard to learn how observers could distinguish which persecuted refugees are more likely to militarize. This is why I contend that a better way to conceptualize these matters is to highlight that refugee populations do need to have political and military organization to militarize. The political and military organization does not have to be present within the refugee population from the start though. A few Rwandan refugees in Uganda attempted to develop political and military organization during the 1959-1964 period, but they were unsuccessful. It took involvement in Uganda's civil war from 1981-1986 for the refugees to develop the capability to create effective political and military leadership. It was thanks to their involvement in that conflict, and Museveni's quiet support of their ambitions to return to Rwanda, that Rwandan refugees were able to develop effective enough political and military organization for refugee militarization to occur. For Afghan refugees, the groups that went to Iran and Pakistan both lacked political and military organization. Iran attempted to integrate the refugees into its society. Pakistan actively campaigned on their behalf to the international community, and was closely involved in developing military organization for the refugees. Essentially, Pakistan did political work for the Afghan refugees and was instrumental in helping to create military organizations for the refugees.

⁹⁹ Alain Destexhe, "Hurry to Prevent a Cambodian Epilogue in Rwanda," *International Herald Tribune*, August 11, 1994, 6.

With these points in mind, refugees sometimes have the assets they need to militarize and organize themselves on their own. However, there are many other times when refugees militarize only when a government chooses to provide some form of organization for them.

C. Level of Support from Receiving State

In addition to the interests and capabilities of the refugee population, it is important to investigate the effects of the level of support from the receiving state for refugee militarization. Support can come in a multitude of forms, but I will break it down into financial, military, and political support. Accurate data can be difficult to assemble on this factor because the receiving state may be secretive in its assistance to refugees. In light of this difficulty, I will provide as much information as possible and base my analysis off that information.

Uganda 1959-1964

Violence in Rwanda towards Tutsis led to significant exoduses to Uganda during 1959-1961, 1963-1964, and in 1973.¹⁰⁰ Gerard Prunier provides data estimating the number of Rwandan refugees that fled to Uganda from 1959-1964 at 78,000.¹⁰¹ However, Uganda made it quite clear that it did not support any political or military goals of the refugees that involved violence or conducting cross-border attacks against the new Hutu-led government of Rwanda. When the attempted government-in-exile for the Tutsi refugees was breaking up in 1962, Gabriel Sebyeza left his position as Minister of Information for the UNAR and formed the Parti Socialiste Rwandais (PSR) in Uganda. By 1964 though, Uganda had banned the PSR.¹⁰² This left no room for militarization to take hold among the Rwandan refugees in Uganda.

¹⁰⁰ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*.

¹⁰¹ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 63.

¹⁰² Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 204.

Uganda 1990

That refugee population developed close ties with Yoweri Museveni and the NRA during the 1970s and 1980s. Paul Kagame and Fred Rwigyema, two of the founding members and leaders of the RPF, were for awhile the Chief of Intelligence for the NRA and Uganda's Minister of Defense respectively.¹⁰³ As popular Ugandan opposition to hosting Rwandan refugees grew during the 1980s, the refugees chose to form the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1987.¹⁰⁴

By 1990, Rwandan refugees in Uganda had developed strong ties with the Ugandan government. Paul Kagame and Fred Rwigyema had obtained top positions in the NRA's military apparatus, and many other Rwandans had obtained important posts in the NRA-led Ugandan government. Publicly, Yoweri Museveni had to distance himself from the Rwandan refugees when he took power in 1986, but he was still very much indebted to the Rwandans for their contributions to the NRA and the insurgency from 1981-1986. When the Ugandan government expelled the Rwandan refugees in October 1990, it provided substantial military and logistical assistance to the RPF.

Yoweri Museveni's relationship with the RPF merits some explanation. This is because it is not immediately apparent why he would publicly distance himself from Rwandans after they had played such a crucial role in bringing him to power. The key to this puzzle lies in what Mahmood Mamdani calls "the politics of indigeneity."¹⁰⁵ Since the Rwandan refugees started flowing into Uganda from 1959-1964, successive Ugandan governments have considered the children of refugees to be refugees. This stands in stark contrast to other countries in the region. In Zaire, refugees were at times, though not always, offered citizenship. In Tanzania, refugees could receive citizenship fairly easily. The Tanzanian government even set aside a separate district for the refugees where they could have access to land for

¹⁰³ Wayne Madsen, *Genocide and Covert Operations in Africa 1993-1999*, Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1999.

¹⁰⁴ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*.

¹⁰⁵ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 159-184.

livelihood.¹⁰⁶ On top of this basic unwillingness to incorporate refugees into Ugandan society, tensions between average Ugandans and Rwandese refugees grew when the refugees overflowed camp boundaries and when Ugandans realized that the refugees were getting benefits from the UN recognition they were receiving that the Ugandans could not access. Namely, the refugees had access to significantly more aid than they did. Many Rwandan refugees took advantage of UNHCR scholarships to receive advanced education and skills. These refugees were then able to get jobs in Nairobi, Kampala, or even in the United States or Europe.¹⁰⁷ Naturally, this created a lot of jealousy. In addition, the benefits they were able to receive still did not remove the social stigma of being refugees. During the insurgency from 1981-1986, propaganda efforts from the Obote regime characterized the NRA, with some degree of accuracy, as a Banyarwanda (Rwandan) organization. This link stuck with the Ugandan populace when the NRA took power, which was a problem for an organization that knew from the start that it did not command the support of a majority of Ugandans. The NRA knew that it had to build a coalition. In order for that to happen, it quickly became clear that the NRA had to become less friendly to the refugees. This led to an extended process of removing Rwandans from leadership positions. That process reached a peak in 1988, when Fred Rwigyema, the commander-in-chief, was removed from his post. Tensions came to a head in August 1990 when a squatter uprising broke out. Political discourse in response to the uprising blamed Museveni's government for favoring non-indigenous Rwandans over indigenous Ugandans with its land policy. These events ended discussion of possible naturalization of the refugees. For both the refugees, who had been ill-received by indigenous Ugandans for years, and for Museveni's government, an armed return of the refugees to Rwanda appeared to be the most prudent option. Thus,

¹⁰⁶ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 164-165.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*, 165.

Museveni quietly supported an armed invasion of Rwanda by the refugees. This would allow him to garner support among indigenous Ugandans while remaining supportive to the refugees.¹⁰⁸

Soon before the invasion, Fred Rwigyema, who had been removed from his post as commander-in-chief of the armed forces in 1988, ordered troops to assemble near the border with Rwanda. Technically, he was no longer allowed to order troop movements after being removed from the commander-in-chief position, but Rwigyema was on such good terms with the Ugandan government that he was able to easily brush off questions by saying that he had ordered the troop movements to prepare for the military parade to celebrate the Ugandan Independence Day (October 9). Nobody even checked with State House to determine whether Rwigyema's explanation was true or not.¹⁰⁹

When the invasion began on October 1, 1990, RPF forces managed to take a lot of weapons and equipment with them from Uganda. RPF soldiers had heavy machine-guns, mortars, BM-21 multiple rocket-launchers, recoilless rifles and Russian ZUG light automatic cannons. A few of President Museveni's bodyguards had even stolen the presidential staff radio communication vehicles. They had not managed to steal any heavy artillery or armored vehicles, and they only had limited supplies of fuel and ammunition, but they were expecting a short war.¹¹⁰ In addition, RPF forces were able to use Uganda as a rear base for their military activities.¹¹¹

Uganda publicly gave the appearance that it did not provide any support to the RPF. On the day of the invasion, the Ugandan government declared that all Rwandese who had left the NRA to attack Rwanda would be considered deserters under the army's Operational Code of Conduct. Uganda's ambassador to the United States explained that "on conviction by a court martial, they [Rwandese deserters] would be punishable by death. This is no incentive for them to cross back into Uganda."

¹⁰⁸ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 182-183.

¹⁰⁹ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 91-92.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid*, 93-94.

¹¹¹ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 183.

Uganda claimed no involvement in RPF military activities, and statements like this portrayed a lack of involvement. However, President Museveni admitted otherwise to fellow heads of state at a meeting in Harare. He acknowledged that the Rwandese in the NRA had notified him in advance “of their intention to organize to regain their rights in Rwanda,” but they had launched the invasion “without prior consultation.” Museveni went on to point out the Ugandan government’s pessimism about the RPF’s chances of victory. He explained that Uganda thus decided “to help the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), materially, so that they are not defeated because that would have been detrimental to the Tutsi people of Rwanda and would not have been good for Uganda’s stability.”¹¹² This is about the closest a state would ever get to admitting something like this. Uganda clearly supported the RPF’s invasion of Rwanda, and it seems that the Ugandan government’s support under Museveni’s leadership is an important factor into why refugee militarization occurred.

Burundi 1959-1964

When the Rwandan refugees arrived in Burundi, they arrived in a country with similar proportions of Hutu and Tutsi people as Rwanda. However, unlike Rwanda, there was not a single ethnic group that solidly controlled Burundi in the early to mid 1960s. Power changed hands multiple times between Hutu and Tutsi leadership. Meanwhile, Burundi’s relationship with Rwanda was not always friendly. As I discussed earlier, Burundi’s feelings toward Rwanda soured after it failed to reach an agreement with Rwanda over the sharing of reserve currencies at a conference in Gisenyi in late 1963. This combination of rotating leadership between Hutus and Tutsis and fluctuating cordiality of relations between Rwanda and Burundi caused Burundi’s level of support for the refugees’ political and military goals to vary over time.

¹¹² As quoted in Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 183.

Between 1961 and January 1965, the post of prime minister changed hands between Hutu and Tutsi politicians four times. Until 1963, UNAR was preparing its forces in Burundi. The weakness of Burundi's local and provincial governments allowed this to happen relatively easily. Then in 1963 the UNAR decided to launch a major armed attack into Rwanda. They were hoping to seize power in Kigali. This led to them organizing 1500 refugees to march toward the border with Rwanda in November 1963. The refugees were mostly armed with spears, bows, and arrows. UNAR leader Francois Rukeba was arrested and jailed shortly before the attack. Burundi authorities found large amounts of arms and ammunition in Rukeba's house in Bujumbura. The arms and ammunition had allegedly been stolen from Congolese rebels and were meant to be sent to the attacking force of refugees. Thanks to warnings from missionaries and UN officials, the Burundi gendarmerie was able to stop the refugees. There was no battle between the Burundi forces and refugees. Instead, the Burundi forces confiscated the spears, bows and arrows, and offered free rides back to the refugees' residences.¹¹³

At that point in time, the Burundi government was on relatively good terms with the Rwandan government. This was aided by the fact that Burundi's Prime Minister was Hutu. The ethnic affinity with Rwanda's government seems to have contributed to a positive relationship between the two governments. That friendliness eroded though in early December 1963. This is because the conference held in Gisenyi at that time to discuss the terms of the dissolution of the customs and monetary union between Burundi and Rwanda failed miserably. The conference ended in total deadlock because the two countries failed to find a mutually agreeable formula for the sharing of reserve currencies. Burundi wanted a 60-40 split in its favor, while Rwanda wanted a 50-50 split. Burundi felt betrayed by Rwanda's attitude at the conference, feeling that it had done enough of a favor for Rwanda in preventing the refugees from attacking in November to merit a concession. This souring of relations, as well as

¹¹³ Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 220.

improved coordination, allowed UNAR forces to launch a full attack on December 21, 1963.¹¹⁴ The attack failed, but it still showed that Burundi was less willing to obstruct the political and military goals of the refugees at the end of December 1963 than it had been even in November 1963.

In March 1964, Mwami Mwambutsa of Burundi dismissed the Hutu Prime Minister, Pierre Ngendadumwe, replacing him with a Tutsi, Albin Nyamoya. The change was made because communications were circulated claiming that the Mwami (King) was planning to dismiss four Hutu members of Ngendadumwe's cabinet, sow discord among the Burundi, and that the Mwami was hoarding his money in Switzerland. Nobody has admitted to circulating these communications, and both Hutu elites and Tutsi elites had strategic reasons to do this, but the Mwami regardless elected to dismiss the four cabinet members in question and request that Ngendadumwe form a new cabinet. However, Ngendadumwe was unable to form a new cabinet, so the Mwami replaced him with Nyamoya as Prime Minister.¹¹⁵

Nyamoya and his supporters, in part due to their ethnic bond as Tutsis, were strong allies with the Rwandan refugees. The Nyamoya government viewed the refugees as a source of support against Hutus. Moreover, it viewed them as crucial allies in the event of a violent confrontation with local Hutu populations. The refugees were an important source of support to assist Nyamoya's Tutsi government to obtain power and maintain it, and the Nyamoya government reciprocated by allowing arms and ammunition to flow through Burundi. Much of the shipments of arms and ammunition were meant for Congolese rebels, but some shipments were sent to the Tutsi refugees as well. These shipments were kept quiet until mid-December 1964, when a convoy of fourteen trucks was intercepted by elements of the Burundi army under Belgian command. The trucks were transporting 80 tons of weapons and ammunitions of Chinese and Russian origin. Included in the shipment were 500 Kalashnikov rifles, 30

¹¹⁴ Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 222.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid*, 400.

Simonov rifles, nine 75 MM cannons, nine 82 MM mortars, and an undetermined number of anti-aircraft guns. The Mwami quickly withdrew his support for Nyamoya and replaced him with Ngendadumwe.¹¹⁶

The change of leadership did not remain in effect for long. On January 15, 1965, a Tutsi refugee assassinated Ngendadumwe.¹¹⁷ This act illustrated the close alliance that had developed between Burundi's Tutsi elite and the Tutsi refugees. It also showed just how ethnically polarized the country had become. The two factions competing for power were divided largely along Hutu-Tutsi lines, and Ngendadumwe's assassination proved just how far the competition could go.

As for determining Burundi's level of support for the Rwandan refugees, it should be clear that this factor changed over time. Its support increased when relations with Rwanda worsened and when Tutsis acquired power. When Hutus were in power and relations with Rwanda were strong, Burundi was not supportive of the refugees. The political and military mobilization that did occur was able to happen because of Burundi's weak local and provincial governments. Therefore, when looking for causal explanations of the limited militarization that did take place in Burundi, it appears that Burundi did not do a lot to directly support militarization. Instead, it provided a permissive environment for refugee militarization to take place. For the most part, UNAR and the Tutsi refugees were unable to capitalize.

Tanzania 1994

Tanzania has developed a reputation on the African continent as one of the most generous refugee-receiving states. In 1983, Tanzania's president, Julius Nyerere, received UNHCR's Nansen Medal for Tanzania's exemplary record of hosting refugees. At the ceremony, Nyerere offered Tanzanian citizenship and grants of land to all refugees facing permanent exile, which thousands of people accepted. Some of the refugees, such as those from Burundi and Rwanda, were accepted solely on

¹¹⁶ *Ibid*, 383-401.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid*, 390.

humanitarian grounds. Others, such as those from the liberation struggles in Southern Africa, were accepted as an act of political solidarity with the oppressed.¹¹⁸

None of the refugee populations Tanzania had hosted in the 20th century was as large, or came as rapidly, as the Rwandan refugee population. In one 24-hour period in late April 1994, approximately 170,000 Rwandans crossed the border to enter Tanzania. Thousands more came in the following months. The influx overwhelmed Tanzania because even though it had grown accustomed to hosting refugees, it had never seen such a large and rapid refugee influx. In total, over half a million Rwandan refugees fled to Tanzania. The near half million Burundian and Zairian refugees who eventually joined them only made matters worse.¹¹⁹ Such a large refugee population would have been a major challenge for any country to handle.

Tension quickly built in Tanzania about how to respond to the waves of displaced people seeking refugee status. That tension though, grew in prominence for several reasons. For starters, previous refugee populations from Southern Africa's liberation wars and Mozambique's civil conflict repatriated to their home countries. Rwandans and Burundians appeared to be fleeing unending crises, thereby presenting a long-term burden to Tanzania.¹²⁰ In addition, Tanzania changed from a policy of Ujamaa (community living) and Self Reliance to a multi-party political system, market economy, and a more open press in the 1990s. This change decreased emphasis on the community, increased the ability of Tanzanians to vocally oppose Tanzania's generous refugee policy, and turned land into a highly sought-

¹¹⁸ Augustine Mahiga, "A Change of Direction For Tanzania," *Refugees Magazine*, Winter 1997: 14-15.

¹¹⁹ Beth Whitaker, "Changing Priorities in Refugee Protection: The Rwandan Repatriation from Tanzania," In *Problems of Protection: The UNHCR, Refugees, and Human Rights*, by Niklaus Steiner ed., Mark Gibney ed. and Gil Loescher ed., 141-154, New York: Routledge, 2003.

¹²⁰ Mahiga, "A Change of Direction For Tanzania," 14-15.

after commodity that Tanzanians were not willing to give away to refugees.¹²¹ Finally, the most obvious reason for tension was the large number of refugees. Tanzania's deputy Home Affairs Minister E. Mwambulukutu summed up the concerns well in a speech he gave in 1996:

“Hosting refugees has become a heavier and more painful burden than ever before to countries of asylum like Tanzania. Protecting and assisting refugees has brought new risks to national security, exacerbated tensions between states and caused extensive damage to the environment...”¹²²

Professor Beth Elise Whitaker argues that the most important factors driving Tanzanian refugee policy by 1996 though were not related to any democratic pressures. Instead, she argues that regional security, Rwandan politics, and international funding levels were the three interrelated factors that drove the Tanzanian government's decision to repatriate the Rwandan refugees.¹²³ It was certainly no secret that the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) government that took power in Rwanda in July 1994 saw the massive refugee camps along its borders as a major security threat. Many of the organizers of the genocide had managed to escape to the camps, and had continued anti-Tutsi and anti-RPF activities. The regional agreements made in January 1995, February 1995, and November 1995 all stressed the importance of separating the guilty *génocidaires* from innocent refugees, but international assistance levels for this specific task were insufficient to follow through on the agreements. The lack of international action led to the decision of the RPF by 1996 to announce that it would take unilateral action to eliminate the threats at its borders if the international community proved unable to do so. In October and November 1996, it proved just how serious it was by attacking the camps in eastern Zaire. With the invasion of Zaire in mind, Tanzania took the visit from a Rwandan envoy to Dar es Salaam on November 21, 1996 very seriously. Details of the meeting have not been released, but informed people

¹²¹ Ibid, 14-15.

¹²² Ibid, 14-15.

¹²³ Beth Whitaker, "Changing Priorities in Refugee Protection: The Rwandan Repatriation from Tanzania," In *Problems of Protection: The UNHCR, Refugees, and Human Rights*, by Niklaus Steiner ed., Mark Gibney ed. and Gil Loescher ed., 141-154. New York: Routledge, 2003.

commented that the envoy expressed Rwandan willingness to receive the refugees, even without the separation of intimidators from the general refugee population, and assured the Tanzanian government that refugees would not be killed when they arrived in Rwanda. This assurance put the Tanzanian government's fears of serving the refugees up for slaughter at ease. This combined with Tanzania's desire to avoid getting entangled in the regional conflict as the deciding factors in Tanzania's decision to forcibly repatriate the Rwandan refugees.¹²⁴

On December 5, 1996, Tanzania's generosity ended toward the Rwandan refugees. On that day, the Tanzanian government and the Office of UNHCR issued a joint statement announcing that they expected all Rwandan refugees to return home by December 31, 1996. After having developed its reputation for years as a safe haven in a troubled region, Tanzanians appear to have just run out of patience.¹²⁵ The Tanzanian government tried to convey a different picture of the situation. The District Commissioner of Karagwe District said at a UNDP coordination meeting:

"I wish to call upon the support of all NGOs because this [repatriation] exercise has been put into gear. During my recent visit to the refugee camps, nearly all of the refugees showed a positive response towards going home. It is the feeling of the Tanzanian government that these people leave orderly, they leave in dignity, and that there is full coordination between the Government of Tanzania, UNHCR, and all NGOs. ... After the events which took place in Zaire, ... it's high time everybody encourages these refugees to go back home. They've been here for two and a half years now, and that's enough time. They should go home."¹²⁶

However, the refugees were unwilling to return to Rwanda until they could assess the level of success for the integration of returnees from Zaire. This created a situation where thousands of refugees tried to flee to Uganda and Kenya instead. Thousands more tried fleeing east, away from Rwanda. UNHCR did what it could to prevent these movements, hosting food distributions in the camps and sending out

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Beth Whitaker, "Changing Priorities in Refugee Protection: The Rwandan Repatriation from Tanzania," In *Problems of Protection: The UNHCR, Refugees, and Human Rights*, by Niklaus Steiner ed., Mark Gibney ed. and Gil Loescher ed., 141-154. New York: Routledge, 2003.

¹²⁶ Beth Elise Whitaker, "Disjunctured Boundaries: Refugees, Hosts, and Politics in Western Tanzania," (PhD diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1999).

trucks to round up some refugees and return them to the camps. The Tanzanian army took care of the rest by setting up roadblocks and blocking the movement of Rwandan refugees. The army then proceeded to herd the refugees toward Rwanda and close the refugee camps. Except for vulnerable groups (pregnant women, children, the elderly), most refugees travelled on foot. For a repatriation that was so clearly involuntary, it is striking that UNHCR contributed more than \$1.5 million to the operation. Water and biscuits were distributed to the departing refugees, easing some of the burden of their journey.¹²⁷ Regardless, the Rwandan refugees were placed in a difficult situation through their involuntary repatriation. Resentments and grudges from the genocide still existed, and the refugees had a lot of reason to fear how the Rwandan government would treat them.

To be clear, Tanzania's generosity had already begun to decline. In March 1995, the Tanzanian government elected to close the borders with Burundi and Rwanda when 40,000 people tried to flee into Tanzania. During a presentation to Parliament, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation said, "We are saying enough is enough. Let us tell the refugees that time has come for them to return home and no more should come."¹²⁸ There ensued a flood of criticism that Tanzania was not upholding its obligations under international conventions, but the Tanzanian government had made up its mind. Tanzania's hospitality did not end with that event, as evidenced by the decision to admit another 15000 refugees in mid-January 1996 when violence escalated in Burundi, but it did begin a trend of decreasing hospitality to refugees.¹²⁹

¹²⁷ Beth Whitaker, "Changing Priorities in Refugee Protection: The Rwandan Repatriation from Tanzania," In *Problems of Protection: The UNHCR, Refugees, and Human Rights*, by Niklaus Steiner ed., Mark Gibney ed. and Gil Loescher ed., 141-154. New York: Routledge, 2003.

¹²⁸ Whitaker, "Disjunctured Boundaries: Refugees, Hosts, and Politics in Western Tanzania," PhD diss.

¹²⁹ Whitaker, "Disjunctured Boundaries: Refugees, Hosts, and Politics in Western Tanzania," PhD diss.

For all the flaws of how refugee populations were handled by Tanzania in the mid 1990s, Tanzania was able to avoid a situation of refugee militarization like what Zaire experienced. Sarah Lischer points out many differences in how the response worked in Tanzania as opposed to how it worked in Zaire. For instance, while Zaire was unwilling to accept international assistance with securing its border and was incapable of securing the border itself, Tanzania was able to provide tight border security and maintain order in the refugee camps. The Tanzanian government also did not sympathize with the refugees' military goals, contrasting with Mobutu's open support of the refugees.¹³⁰ Lischer then contends that the reasons for Tanzania to allow the Rwandan refugees into the country and then to discourage military activity were that Tanzania had had positive past experiences with asylum seekers, Tanzania had relatively neutral relationships with Hutu and Tutsi people, and there was domestic political pressure to control the refugees' activity.¹³¹

Zaire 1994

Mobutu's administration was very friendly to the refugees. His alliance with President Habyarimana had been so strong that he sent several hundred members of the Division Spéciale Présidentielle to Rwanda in October 1990 to assist Habyarimana's government in fending off the RPF invasion from Uganda.¹³² After the refugees arrived in Zaire, the Zairian government allowed the Rwandan Armed Forces to have access to weapons and military hardware that it had brought from Rwanda. Many weapons were seized by the Zairian army as the refugees crossed the border, but they were largely kept in military camps under the supervision of ex-FAR soldiers. Therefore, it was not difficult for militants to obtain access to the weapons. Furthermore, the Zairian government ignored

¹³⁰ Lischer, *Dangerous Sanctuaries*.

¹³¹ Lischer, *Dangerous Sanctuaries*.

¹³² Terry, *Condemned to Repeat?*, 157.

calls to arrest the perpetrators of the genocide. It instead gave them freedom of movement and some active support. Some arms shipments to the Rwandan Armed Forces were directly facilitated by Zaire, while others were tacitly permitted. Even though this was difficult to prove, Human Rights Watch Arms Project was able to find evidence of two arms shipments worth about \$330,000 that had been flown in on Air Zaire aircraft.¹³³

Early in 1995, Zaire did send 1500 troops to the refugee camps to try and quell the violence in the refugee camps. Sending the troops may be argued by some as a sign that Zaire did not support refugee militarization, but a closer look reveals that its concern was really in trying to quell violence within the camps. The goals of Zairian troops when they were deployed were to “[improve] public order in the camps, [prevent] intimidation and violence aimed at deterring the voluntary return of refugees, [protect] humanitarian facilities and personnel, and [escort] refugee convoys to the Rwandan border.”¹³⁴ None of these goals mention anything about preventing refugee militarization. Zaire may have decided to oppose refugee militarization, but the change in preferences most likely occurred due to international condemnation of the refugee crisis and Zaire’s desire to avoid alienating the international community.

Pakistan during the Soviet invasion

Pakistan played a vital role in steering aid resources towards the militants and in making sure that the Afghan militant groups supported Pakistani interests. In her discussion of how the political organization of state-in-exile refugees is able to persuade foreign donors to provide humanitarian assistance to their respective refugee population, Sarah Lischer highlights the importance of their ability to formulate internationally appealing political arguments and publicity campaigns. These efforts have

¹³³ Human Rights Watch Arms Project, *Rwanda/Zaire: Rearming with Impunity*, May 1995, <http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1995/Rwanda1.htm> (accessed March 4, 2010).

¹³⁴ Terry, *Condemned to Repeat?*, 176-177.

proven quite successful for many refugee populations.¹³⁵ In the case of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, the Pakistani government enthusiastically took on this role for them.¹³⁶ Days after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, senior officials in Pakistan held a meeting to discuss their options. The officials agreed that Pakistan should publicly protest the Soviet invasion, but avoid overt military action. Pakistan's Foreign Minister at the time, Agha Shahi, explained the rationale for this option by explaining that it was:

“... the one dictated by the geopolitical circumstances of the region. Admittedly, this course was difficult to sustain, especially in the deteriorating political climate of East-West relations. The emotional urge to demonstrate Islamic solidarity in full measure had to be restrained as a military solution to the problem was out of the question. The only hope of withdrawal of the Soviet forces lay in mobilizing the force of international public opinion and concerting political and diplomatic pressure against the Soviet military intervention.”¹³⁷

At least, this is the policy that Pakistan publicly followed. It is well-documented that Pakistan covertly chose to support the Afghan refugees with arms, funding, and logistical assistance.¹³⁸ Pakistan's actions therefore allowed it to be the hub for billions of dollars in aid money and divert attention away from its nuclear program, which had motivated Jimmy Carter to impose an aid ban on Pakistan in 1978 and 1979. With its position of control over aid resources, Pakistan was able to choose which resistance groups would become prominent. Pakistan chose to recognize seven Afghan resistance groups. One group in particular, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami, received the largest share of assistance. However, the broader trend was that fundamentalist groups received more resources than moderate groups.¹³⁹

Iran during the Soviet invasion

¹³⁵ Lischer, "Collateral Damage: Humanitarian Assistance as a Cause of Conflict," 79-109.

¹³⁶ Wirsing, *Pakistan's Security under Zia, 1977-1988*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.

¹³⁷ Wirsing, *Pakistan's Security under Zia*.

¹³⁸ Coll, *Ghost Wars*.

¹³⁹ Wirsing, *Pakistan's Security under Zia*.

Iran was confident in its own ability to host refugees, and had enough suspicion of the West to want to avoid accepting assistance from it. Its goals in managing the refugee population were maintaining security and using the refugees as a source of cheap labor to contribute to industrialization.¹⁴⁰ Also, it was involved in a long war with Iraq. From September 1980 until 1988 Iran and Iraq fought one of the most brutal and massive wars of the twentieth century. Over one million people died, both sides suffered extreme financial costs, and foreign powers got involved on both sides.¹⁴¹ With this conflict occurring, Iran had absolutely no desire to deal with military activity on its opposite border.

Iran did provide limited support to Shiite Afghans against the Soviets. This assistance was limited though by its focus on the war with Iraq, which it viewed as its number one national security priority. This meant that there were few resources to support the political and military goals of the refugees. It is also doubtful for strategic reasons that Iran would have given extensive support to the refugees' political and military goals even if it had the resources to do so. This is because that likely would have meant escalating the conflict and creating more refugees. Iran was already hosting at least 2 million Afghan refugees for much of the 1980s. It had no desire to host more. Furthermore, Iran did not want to face retaliation from the Soviet Union. The costs of incurring Soviet wrath would have been tremendous. The situation would have required Iran to seek American support, as it was the only country truly powerful enough to stand up to Soviet power. That option, ideologically, was impossible.¹⁴²

Broader Analysis

¹⁴⁰ Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, 78.

¹⁴¹ G. Hossein Razi, "An Alternative Paradigm to State Rationality in Foreign Policy: The Iran-Iraq War," *The Western Political Quarterly*, 1988: 689-723.

¹⁴² Henry Precht, "Ayatollah Realpolitik," *Foreign Policy*, 1988: 109-128.

In analyzing these cases, it does seem that refugee populations are not likely to militarize if the receiving state does not want them to militarize. In Pakistan, Zaire, and Uganda, the refugee militarization that has occurred came when the receiving states were at least permissive of refugee militarization. Mobutu was not able to provide much in the way of financial or military assistance to militants among the Rwandan refugees, but he did give them freedom of movement and he refused to arrest genocide perpetrators. Plus, he campaigned to the international community on behalf of the refugees. Pakistan and Uganda have both provided financial and military support to refugees. Pakistan also provided political support for refugees on its territory, while Museveni had to publicly distance himself from the RPF. This variable does appear to be a significant factor in determining whether refugee militarization will occur.

Furthermore, the level of support from the receiving state appears more important than the type of refugee population. A supportive receiving state can help a persecuted or state-in-exile refugee population undergo refugee militarization. It can turn highly disorganized militant elements within a refugee population into a powerful fighting force (such as what happened in the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan). However, a state-in-exile refugee population cannot undergo refugee militarization if the receiving state is not supportive at some level. I display this interaction in the table below.

Table 2: Refugee Type vs. Receiving State Response

	State-in-exile refugee population	Persecuted refugee population
Receiving state supports militarization ❖ All refugee populations militarized	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Uganda in 1990 supported RPF militarization - Zaire in 1994 supported ex-FAR and Interahamwe militarization - Serbia in 1994 supported Abdic's Bosnian refugees in their militarization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Pakistan in the 1980s supported the <i>mujahideen</i>
Receiving State opposes militarization ❖ Zaire in 1995 was the only country in this row hosting refugee militarization ¹⁴³	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Croatia in 1995 opposed militarization of Abdic's refugees - Zaire in 1995 opposed ex-FAR and Interahamwe militarization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Tanzania in 1994 opposed militarization of Rwandan refugees - Iran in 1980s opposed Afghan refugee militarization

The best example of this situation comes from Fikret Abdic's Bosnian Muslim refugee population from the town of Velika Kladusa in Bihac municipality. This refugee population included about 25,000 refugees. While often overlooked in discussions about the Bosnian War and the breakup of Yugoslavia, the intra-ethnic conflict between Abdic's Muslim followers and Bosniacs who controlled the government in Sarajevo is a very useful case study to understand refugee militarization. During the 1980s, Abdic successfully transformed Bihac from one of the poorest areas in Yugoslavia into a highly profitable industrial center. His company, Agrokomerc, came to control nearly every aspect of the economy. Abdic's ability to provide quality employment and a high standard of living allowed him to cultivate a large loyal following. This support was so strong that it nearly made him Bosnia's president in 1991.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³ I am referring to the same Rwandan refugee population in Zaire in 1994 and 1995. I have listed "Zaire 1994" and "Zaire 1995" in different boxes because Mobutu's support for refugee militarization changed to opposition after he realized the extent of international opposition to it.

¹⁴⁴ Sarah Lischer, *Militarized Refugee Populations: Humanitarian Challenges in the Former Yugoslavia*, The Rosemarie Rogers Working Paper Series Working Paper #5, August 1999, 7-8.

He was also extremely skilled at forming alliances. Despite war breaking out between Serbia and Croatia in 1991, he was able to count elements on both sides as allies. Emma Daly observed:

The Abdic empire, built around Agrokomerc, depended on a dangerous and delicate web of trade links, involving Croatia (which gave Mr. Abdic a free port in Rijeka), its Serbian enemies in Knin, the Bosnian Serb army besieging fellow Muslims in the Bihac pocket, and Belgrade.¹⁴⁵

Abdic continued to prosper during the war between Croatians and Bosnian Muslims in 1993.

Croatia and the Serbs allegedly tried to use Abdic to pursue their own goals. "For the Serbs, Bihac was the missing link needed to join Serb-held land in Croatia and Bosnia to Serbia itself, which is what Croatia wanted to avoid at all costs."¹⁴⁶ Croatian tolerance for Abdic's behavior and Abdic's easy acquisition of Croatian citizenship may have occurred because Abdic provided intelligence about Serb positions to the Croatian government, though stories of that are unconfirmed.¹⁴⁷ However, when Abdic declared autonomy in September 1993, the United States and Germany pressured Croatia into siding with Bosnia.¹⁴⁸ This is why, starting with the exodus of Abdic and his 25,000 refugees in 1994, Abdic's refugees were friendly with Serbia and opposed by Croatia.

Abdic's refugee population succeeded in fighting its way back into Bihac in early 1995, but was forced back out again in August 1995. During both periods of exile, the refugees easily fit the classification of a state-in-exile refugee population. Describing the refugees in 1994, UNHCR commented:

[Abdic's supporters] sought to pressure others to leave, and are pressuring them not to return. They exercise effective control over the camps. There are those who fled fearing for their lives as the [Bosnian] army advanced, often reacting to false rumors spread by the first group, a propaganda campaign that began well before the final advance. Others, as witnessed by UNHCR,

¹⁴⁵ Emma Daly, "Is Life Really Worth Living Under King Babo?", *The Independent*, July 30, 1994.

¹⁴⁶ Allan Little and Laura Silber, *Yugoslavia, Death of a Nation*, (New York: Penguin Books, 1995). 359.

¹⁴⁷ UNHCR officials, interviews by Sarah Lischer, Geneva, July 1998.

¹⁴⁸ Lischer, *Militarized Refugee Populations: Humanitarian Challenges in the Former Yugoslavia*, 9-12.


did not want to flee but were pressured to do so. And there were those who had long intended to leave and saw this as an opportunity.¹⁴⁹

These conditions did not change when the refugees fled for a second time in 1995. This is a good comparison to use for this analysis because the two episodes are within the same conflict, with the same refugees, and therefore the same ethnicities at play. During the first refugee crisis, which began in August 1994, Abdic's refugees were split between camps in Turanj and Batnoga. Batnoga was solidly within Serb-held Krajina, and Turanj was on the border between Krajina and Croatia. Croatia did not support ambitions to militarize the refugee camp in Turanj, but it was not able to prevent armament on the other side of the border with Krajina. Serbia provided Abdic's refugees with extensive support for their militarization. In total, Abdic was able to get about 10,000 refugees to join his army. These refugees were seen as a valuable asset by the Serbians, who intended to invade Bosnia. Serbian assistance was crucial in allowing Abdic's forces to assemble the necessary resources to militarize. The map below illustrates the area in 1994. By the time of the next crisis, Croatia had defeated the Krajina Serbs and cut off Abdic's source of military support. Croatia had recently entered into an alliance with the Bosnian government, so it was not willing to allow the refugees to militarize. Abdic still had extensive political control over the camps in the second refugee crisis, but without Serb support he was not able to get the refugees to militarize again.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁹ UNHCR Office of the Special Envoy for Former Yugoslavia—External Relations Unit, *Information Notes on Former Yugoslavia*, September 1994- June/July 1996.

¹⁵⁰ Lischer, *Dangerous Sanctuaries*, 118-140.

Velika Kladusa and surrounding towns, (Serb-held areas shaded)



Source: *Information Notes on Former Yugoslavia*, UNHCR Office of the Special Envoy for Former Yugoslavia—External Relations Unit, November 1994 (update).

D. Pre-existing conflicts within the receiving state

My discussion of pre-existing conflicts within the receiving state will focus on the political legitimacy of the receiving state, level of politicization of ethnic identities, and the leadership's political calculus of maintaining power. The situation in each receiving country for refugees is different, making it necessary to analyze each specific country individually to learn about their own specific situations.

Uganda 1959-1964

As Rwandan refugees were flowing into Uganda during this time period, the dynamics within Uganda were conducive to preventing refugee militarization. The government had legitimacy among the people, and its hold on power relied on appealing to the "politics of indigeneity." In other words, the Ugandan government knew that it had to promote the interests of indigenous Ugandans first. Indigenous Ugandans did not want to get involved in Rwanda's troubles, so the government avoided them. This means that there was some politicization of ethnic identities, but in this case the politicization worked as a means to help prevent refugee militarization. The leadership calculus of Uganda's leader was also best served by preventing refugee militarization, and the potential blowback that could cause.

Uganda 1990

Yoweri Museveni's government in Uganda did have some trouble establishing its political legitimacy. When it came to power in 1986, it knew that it did not have the backing of a majority of Ugandans. Moreover, an important source of support for the NRA was the Banyarwandan refugee population. Indigenous Ugandans were uneasy with that, and Museveni knew that he had to appease indigenous Ugandans in order to consolidate power over the country. Here, Museveni knew that to stay in power and maintain the government's legitimacy, his most attractive option was to support the return of Banyarwandan refugees to Rwanda. Since the refugee leadership was not willing to return to

Rwanda peacefully, Museveni had to give them enough support to allow them to forcefully enter Rwanda.

Burundi 1959-1964

The political legitimacy of the Burundi state was relatively strong. The Mwami was the most powerful figure in government, but most of the government's work was handled by the prime minister and his cabinet. The prime minister position changed hands numerous times from 1959-1964, and for years afterward. Through all of those changes though, the Mwami maintained final say over policy. When the Mwami decided that he was not happy with the prime minister at that particular time, he had no problem just dismissing that particular politician and putting a new prime minister in place. Furthermore, the Mwami was able to use his power to expel Chinese diplomats from Burundi in January 1965 after learning of Ngendadumwe's assassination.¹⁵¹ As discussed earlier, the Burundi state was not especially strong, but the Mwami did not have to worry about his grip on power.

While the climate in Burundi was relatively stable, certain elements of the Burundi state made it easier for militants to arm themselves. Burundi had similar proportions of Hutu and Tutsi as Rwanda. Plus, as in Rwanda, Tutsis filled a disproportionate amount of the elite positions in Burundi society. Before Rwanda's revolution in 1959, there were some differences between Tutsis and Hutus in Burundi, but those differences became highly politicized and led to substantial ethnic polarization when Rwandan refugees entered the country. Rwandan refugees affected the internal dynamics of Burundi in dramatic ways, and they forged alliances that contributed to their attempts at militarization.

Competition for power was occurring at the level of the prime minister and his cabinet. By 1963, power was split primarily along the lines of Hutus supporting Ngendadumwe and Tutsis supporting Nyamoya. Because of their ethnic solidarity as Tutsis and common experiences of being minorities in a

¹⁵¹ Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 395.

country in which they have a disproportionate share of the power and wealth, the Tutsis behind Nyamoya and the Tutsi Rwandan refugees quickly became close allies. The polarization reached its peak with the assassination of Ngendadumwe on January 12, 1965. Nyamoya's government also knew that it needed the support of the Tutsi refugees to stay in power, so it worked to cultivate close relations with the Tutsi refugees. Meanwhile, Ngendadumwe's government knew that it was most likely to obtain and keep power by keeping the refugees at bay. The only caveat to this dichotomy is that the armed forces, Hutu and Tutsi alike, felt somewhat threatened by the presence and potential militarization of the refugees. Military officers feared that the refugees would be able to usurp their role if they became too powerful.¹⁵²

Tanzania 1994

Tanzania, unlike Zaire, was undergoing a period of sincere political liberalization during the 1990s. It had spent nearly 30 years under a regime of one-party state socialism, but started moving towards capitalism and a multi-party system in 1985. That was when Julius Nyerere stepped down from the presidency and allowed Ali Hassan Mwinyi to become president. Mwinyi put Tanzania on the path to becoming a capitalist multi-party democracy. Pressure had started building for change when the economy underwent a serious crisis. Its economic crisis had been brought on by the oil shocks of the 1970s, a drop in world coffee prices, and inefficient state-centered economic policies. In response to these factors, donors and technocrats within the Tanzanian government pressured Nyerere to allow the Tanzanian government to change.

The first few years of Mwinyi's presidency were focused on economic reforms. These reforms were made as part of an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Even as Tanzania's economic liberalization policies started profoundly affecting people, they did not generate widespread

¹⁵² Ibid, 389.

opposition among the social groups they affected most. Price incentives were shifting in favor of agriculture and rural production, per capita GDP was rising, and optimism was growing about the economy. Growth was not evenly distributed among everyone, the government was investing less in social services, and Tanzania's dependence on foreign donors was growing, but Tanzanians were still supporting economic liberalization.¹⁵³

With these economic reforms, the idea of a one-party state weakened as Tanzania moved away from socialism. This led to President Mwinyi legalizing opposition parties in 1992. Multi-party national elections were held in 1995.¹⁵⁴ These reforms were making the Tanzanian government more accountable to the people. The government had legitimacy in the eyes of Tanzanians, unlike in Zaire where the little bit of legitimacy the government possessed derived from external sources and support.

Tanzania also did not experience any notable politicization of ethnicity during the 1990s. Nyerere had successfully fostered a broad Tanzanian national identity that went above any so-called tribal competition and prevented politics from being conducted along ethnic lines. The adoption of Swahili as the national language, for example, was important in fostering the national identity. Whitaker even notes that Tanzanians in interviews actively sought to distinguish themselves from the Banyarwanda, Barundi, and Zairois when discussing politics in the region.¹⁵⁵ Her finding is confirmed by Landou, who observed that Tanzanians in refugee-hosting areas articulated stronger nationalist sentiments than elsewhere. Their use of Swahili functioned as a sort of "restrictive code" that distinguished them from the refugees.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵³ Beth Elise Whitaker, "Refugees and the Spread of Conflict: Contrasting Cases in Central Africa," *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 2003: 211-231. 220.

¹⁵⁴ Whitaker, "Refugees and the Spread of Conflict," 220.

¹⁵⁵ Whitaker, "Refugees and the Spread of Conflict," 222.

¹⁵⁶ Loren B Landou, "Beyond the Losers: Transforming Governmental Practice in Refugee-Affected Tanzania," *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 2003: 19-43.

The political leadership of Tanzania also knew that its ability to maintain control of the government depended on its ability to provide peace and security. Whitaker notes how a poll conducted in 1995 found that, when asked to provide the single most important role of government, Tanzanians most commonly answered that peace and security were the most important things for the government to provide. Education, health care, and economic planning were all far behind in the polling results. This meant that Tanzania's president at the time, Benjamin Mkapa, had to prove his party's credentials at providing peace and security in the lead-up to Tanzania's elections. Opposition parties had been legalized in 1992, so the ruling party found that it actually had to work at making its case to the public about why it should remain in power.¹⁵⁷

All of this meant that when Rwandan refugees arrived, the number one concern of the Tanzanian government was in preventing the spread of conflict to western Tanzania. The government removed weapons from the refugee camps and increased security forces in surrounding areas. Later, when the refugees were becoming increasing threats to Tanzanian security, the Tanzanian government conducted a forced repatriation of the Rwandan refugees back to Rwanda. Even though this repatriation was in cooperation with UNHCR, it was in violation of international norms regarding the hosting of refugees. Many human rights groups criticized the Tanzanian government for its behavior, but it had already decided that it was more important to satisfy its own population's demand for peace and security. This was how the regime was able to maintain power.

Zaire 1994

Mahmood Mamdani comments on the frequency of refugees going to Zaire by writing, "Conventional wisdom in Goma and Bukavu has it that Kivu Province in eastern Congo is where losers

¹⁵⁷ Whitaker, "Refugees and the Spread of Conflict," 223.

traditionally end up, and it is from Kivu that they prepare to return to power in Rwanda.”¹⁵⁸ René Lemarchand extensively discusses Burundi’s history, showing that its conflicts are closely related with Rwanda and Congo. In fact, thousands of Burundian refugees had recently arrived in Zaire when Rwandan refugees fled from Rwanda.¹⁵⁹ They aggravated tensions that already existed in Zaire.

Mobutu’s government had very little, if any, political legitimacy. It provided no state services, and produced an army that was a larger source of insecurity than security. An editorial in the Kenyan newspaper *The Nation* observed that: “By banning bribe-taking and intimidation and insisting on disciplined behavior by its own soldiers, the AFDL is bringing more order to daily life than many Zairians have seen in decades.”¹⁶⁰ When the Cold War ended, Mobutu started receiving substantial criticism for human rights violations and corruption from all corners of the international community. In an attempt to calm domestic and international criticism, Mobutu made a show of allowing some political liberalization in 1991. He declared an end to the one-party state and finally convened a National Conference in August 1991. Both reforms were really just public relations gambits meant to quiet Mobutu’s critics though.¹⁶¹ Throughout this period, Mobutu maintained his hold on power.

Mobutu had a range of forces allied against him. Congolese nationalists had been waging a campaign against him since 1965.¹⁶² Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and later Angola all backed the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) in order to protect regional security. These countries all viewed Zaire as a major source of insecurity for their respective societies.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁸ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 234.

¹⁵⁹ Lemarchand, Rene. *The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009.

¹⁶⁰ As quoted in McNulty, “The Collapse of Zaire,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 61.

¹⁶¹ Whitaker, “Refugees and the Spread of Conflict,” 219.

¹⁶² McNulty, “The Collapse of Zaire,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 1999: 55.

¹⁶³ *Ibid*, 56.

Mobutu knew that he would not be able to rely upon the government's armed forces to hold onto power. The Zairian army had a history of extortion and looting of the population, which was generally the only contact with the state for the civilian population. It was completely ineffective, appearing to serve solely for the benefit of the rich elites who could grab access to it.¹⁶⁴ He was dependent upon other sources to maintain his grip on power. Rwandan refugees were crucial in acquiring the support he needed. At first, Mobutu planned to use the refugees as leverage with which to blackmail the international community to reintegrate his regime. This worked fairly well until international sentiment turned decidedly against the Hutu refugees in late 1994.

The only political legitimacy Mobutu had was with his foreign patrons and loyal elites. From the beginning of his military career, Mobutu had been receiving financial support from the Belgian government. At the beginning of the 1960s, the Congo suffered extensive in-fighting and violence. The Cold War was moving to Africa as well, and the United States was very conscious of the threat of Communist influence taking hold. This led the CIA to turn to Mobutu as the man it felt had the best chance of holding off the nationalist and communist elements within the country and of stabilizing the country in general.¹⁶⁵ Mobutu claimed that the best way to achieve these goals was through centralizing power in a unified state.¹⁶⁶ He clearly meant to utilize strong-man tactics to achieve order. He had little reason to believe, until December 1996, that his Western allies would not rally to his support.¹⁶⁷ As for the elites, McNulty argues that Mobutu was able to maintain power by controlling money and controlling force. Mobutu stole almost a quarter of the Zairian government's budget throughout the

¹⁶⁴ Ibid, 55.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid, 57-58.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid, 59.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid, 62.

1970s, creating a large source of patronage. His personal fortune also created a group of loyal elites who helped Mobutu maintain power.¹⁶⁸

The United States had been the primary supporter of the Mobutu regime until 1975. It was then that French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing negotiated a number of cooperation agreements with Mobutu, including military cooperation. With this event, France became the primary supporter of Mobutu's regime. Zaire had become part of France's sphere of influence, changing hands in the continuing competition for control of Africa. Mobutu's longevity in power can confidently be attributed to these agreements.¹⁶⁹

When a rebellion began in late 1996 in Kivu Province, Mobutu was unable to secure French assistance in putting it down. France had been discredited as a peacekeeping force by its involvement in the region through Operation Turquoise.¹⁷⁰ Mobutu was also unable to count on the assistance of the United States. By that time, the United States was allied with the RPF government in Rwanda. It viewed the refugees as a threat to regional stability, and Mobutu's alliance with the *génocidaires* as contributing to regional insecurity. Mobutu's regime was seen as a source of great danger for Zaire and for Central Africa.¹⁷¹ The United States did not get very involved with the Rwandan invasion or the rebellion against Mobutu, but it did make a conscious decision not to intervene on Mobutu's behalf. With the United States fully in opposition to Mobutu and France politically unable to help, Mobutu had no choice but to turn to mercenaries and the refugees for help to stay in power.

Mobutu also turned ethnic diversity within Zaire into a political issue. From 1990-1993 and in 1996, Mobutu actively incited unrest in Kivu and Shaba to demonstrate the precariousness of the

¹⁶⁸ Ibid, 60.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid, 60.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid, 71.

¹⁷¹ Ibid, 72.

country he was in charge of, and the necessity of keeping him in charge of it.¹⁷² He did this by starting to enforce the citizenship law that was passed in 1981. The law stipulated that people had to prove that their ancestors had been on Congolese soil since the 1885 colonial division of Africa. The law was so impractical that it was not enforced until Mobutu started using it as a political weapon in the early 1990s. His enforcement of the law successfully stirred up enough tensions between indigenous Congolese and Banyarwandans to spark periodic fighting in early 1993 in North Kivu. As the Rwandan civil war continued, divisions emerged between Hutu and Tutsi in the Congo. The influx of predominantly Hutu refugees made tensions even worse, as refugees joined the struggle against local Tutsi. The conflict was pretty successfully contained within North Kivu, but tensions were running extremely high.¹⁷³ By 1996, the victimized people of eastern Zaire, namely the Banyamulenge, fought back. They were armed by Rwanda and Uganda primarily. Overthrowing Mobutu was the only course of action they believed could bring them a measure of stability and security.¹⁷⁴ Mobutu had over-reached by calling for the expulsion of all Banyamulenge in September 1996.¹⁷⁵ Mobutu had been a close ally of President Habyarimana, and so allowing the Hutu refugees to militarize and have freedom of movement was also a way to indirectly strike at the RPF government in Rwanda.¹⁷⁶

Pakistan during the Soviet invasion

The survival of Pakistan's government was in serious doubt when General Zia ul-Haq came to power in 1977. By that point, Pakistan had a record of constitutional failure, institutional weakness, interethnic violence, and military rule since acquiring independence from Great Britain. Four constitutions had been implemented, martial law had been imposed twice, and there had been two

¹⁷² Ibid, 68.

¹⁷³ Whitaker, "Refugees and the Spread of Conflict," 221.

¹⁷⁴ McNulty, "The Collapse of Zaire," 75.

¹⁷⁵ Whitaker, "Refugees and the Spread of Conflict," 222.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, 223.

popular uprisings. In 1982 regional expert Professor Stephen Cohen voiced a common sentiment that “many Pakistanis and foreigners do not believe that Pakistan will survive in its present form beyond this decade.”¹⁷⁷ Several other articles were also published with similar messages, such as “Pakistan: Living on the Edge,” “Dateline Pakistan: A Passage to Anarchy?,” “Pakistan: Chaos and Carnage,” “The Approach of Anarchy,” and “Pakistan: Bloodbath in the Streets.”¹⁷⁸

Perhaps even more threatening to the Pakistani government’s legitimacy were rising irredentist claims to “Pashtunistan” from the influx of Afghan refugees from the Soviet invasion. The border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, also known as the Durand Line, was arbitrarily set with a treaty in 1893. Afghanistan has never recognized it, and has supported irredentist claims to “Pashtunistan,” which would include much of Afghanistan and a substantial portion of Pakistan. If Pashtunistan were successfully created, Pakistan could expect to lose large amounts of land, people, and resources. Those losses would weaken its position in its conflict with India over Kashmir, a conflict Pakistan considers to hold the utmost importance.

India is already substantially more powerful in its own right than Pakistan. Both countries may have nuclear weapons, but in the mid 1980s India accounted for 77 percent of the population of South Asia, 72 percent of its land area, 81 percent of its gross national product, 66 percent of its military manpower, and 77 percent of its military expenditures.¹⁷⁹ It was far ahead in scientific and technological feats as well. India orbited an earth satellite in 1980, making it the sixth country to successfully accomplish that feat. It also was far ahead of Pakistan in its development of nuclear technology, long range missiles and rockets, and it had the fourth largest armed force in the world. Pakistan’s military

¹⁷⁷ Stephen Cohen, "Pakistan," In *Security Policies of Developing Countries*, by Edward A Kolodziej and Robert E Harkavy (eds.), Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1982, 111.

¹⁷⁸ Wirsing, *Pakistan's Security under Zia, 1977-1988*, 11.

¹⁷⁹ Here, South Asia is referring to the group of countries including India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Maldives, Bangladesh, and Bhutan.

was nothing to mock, having the ninth largest armed force in the world, but the difference was still noticeable. This is especially true in light of the fact that Pakistan did not win any of its three wars with India. In 1971, it suffered its worst defeat and was forced to watch its territory get partitioned and its population cut in half.¹⁸⁰ These defeats and marked deficits in power have forced Pakistan to seek foreign alliances whenever possible to compete with India.

The relevance of Pakistan's conflict with India to Afghan refugees is that Pakistan feared the possibility of India using the refugees as a weapon against Pakistan. The nightmare scenario was that India would provide military assistance to allow the Afghan refugees to forcibly pursue their ambition of creating Pashtunistan. Therefore, Pakistan's government felt it was crucial to beat India to the punch and provide assistance to the refugees first. That would prevent the refugees from posing a dire threat to Pakistan's security and the legitimacy of its government.¹⁸¹

Pakistan's government did not pit different ethnic groups against each other. That would have been far too destabilizing of a policy choice to have ever been justified by its potential benefits. Instead, it sought to unify its citizens across ethnic groups by emphasizing Islam and encouraging citizens to actively practice the religion. In fact, Zia relied on Islamist elements such as the Jama'at-i-Islami party for political support during his first few years in power.¹⁸² This policy was extended to Afghan refugees, where the Pakistani government gave more assistance to political parties and militant groups that were outspokenly Muslim. Some secular groups did receive recognition and support from the Pakistani government, but not as much as the overtly Muslim groups.

¹⁸⁰ Wirsing, *Pakistan's Security under Zia, 1977-1988*, 3-4.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid*

¹⁸² *Ibid*

Lastly, the political calculus of General Zia to remain in power and to maintain the government's authority over the Pakistani people revolved around protecting the security of Pakistan, preventing a rise of calls for "Pashtunistan," and pursuing the conflict with India over Kashmir. General Zia knew that he could not allow Afghan refugees to get involved in or stir up any tensions within Pakistan. Supporting their militarization against the Soviet Union was one way to focus the refugees' attention away from Pakistan. Additionally, preventing any popular movements for Pashtunistan would protect Pakistan from threats of losing territory, people, and resources. Perhaps most importantly, General Zia knew that the refugees could be utilized in Kashmir. This knowledge helped lead to the Pakistani government's policy of contributing to refugee militarization, as well as involving Afghan refugees in the fighting for Kashmir.¹⁸³ By pursuing these objectives, General Zia was able to maintain power in Pakistan. His own political calculus made it attractive for him to promote the militarization of Afghan refugees.

Iran during the Soviet invasion

Because Iran underwent a revolution in 1979, the government had to assertively defend its legitimacy when Afghan refugees were arriving. The revolution had left Iran weaker than it had been for many years by the time it was complete. In fact, its power had diminished so much that many analysts felt Iraq had finally surpassed Iran in power. This perceived change in relative power was an important factor leading to Iraq launching its invasion of Iran in 1980.¹⁸⁴ In retrospect, Iran actually still had a more powerful military. Its power though had declined dramatically at a time when Iraq's power was growing, narrowing the gap in power to a smaller margin than had existed for years.¹⁸⁵ Iraq's invasion came at a

¹⁸³ Coll, *Ghost Wars*.

¹⁸⁴ Efraim Kersh, "Military Power and Foreign Policy Goals: The Iran-Iraq War Revisited," *International Affairs*, 1987-1988: 83-95.

¹⁸⁵ Andrew Parasiliti, "The Causes and Timing of Iraq's Wars: A Power Cycle Assessment," *International Political Science Review*, 2003: 151-165.

time when Ayatollah Khomeini's government was still trying to consolidate power, so his government was seriously threatened.

Iran's position was further imperiled by its lack of friends in the international community. Both the United States and the Soviet Union provided more support to Iraq than Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. Henry Precht, director of Iranian affairs at the United States State Department from 1978-1980, points out that the Soviet Union resumed direct military aid to Iraq in 1982 after Iran had pushed Iraqi forces off its territory and that the United States had in general held a pro-Iraq, anti-Iran position during the war.¹⁸⁶ Also, Ayatollah Khomeini did not approve diplomatic relations broadly with the international community until late 1984. At that point, Iran finally established diplomatic relations with all countries except the United States, Israel, and South Africa.¹⁸⁷ The only close friends Ayatollah Khomeini's regime had on the international stage were Libya, Algeria, Syria, and a few liberation movements.¹⁸⁸

In spite of such serious threats, the Iranian government was able to maintain legitimacy. It had come to power through a popular revolution, and its calls for wide adherence to Islam were widely supported. Plus, contrary to American perceptions throughout the 1980s, Ayatollah Khomeini's regime took a very pragmatic course of action when it came to power. While it took power amidst calls for exporting the Islamic revolution and may have actively sought to export revolution at first, its focus quickly turned inward. It adopted a largely pragmatic approach to accomplishing its objectives of establishing its independence, pursuing its war with Iraq, and opposing the United States. This included actions such as eliminating its foreign debt, seeking economic self-sufficiency, and being flexible enough in its foreign policy to work with countries it strongly disagreed with, including the Soviet Union. I have already observed that Iran did provide some assistance to Afghans in opposition the Soviet Union's

¹⁸⁶ Henry Precht, "Ayatollah Realpolitik," *Foreign Policy*, 1988: 109-128, pp. 118 and 123.

¹⁸⁷ Precht, "Ayatollah Realpolitik," 112.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid*, 120.

invasion, but that assistance was kept at low levels. For the most part, Iran maintained a tense, but functioning, relationship with the Soviet Union. This was not the kind of policy that the American perception of an irrational, purely ideological Iranian regime would have predicted.¹⁸⁹

Like Pakistan, Iran also did not have a politicization of ethnic identities. Under Ayatollah Khomeini's government, Shia Islam was promoted as the unifying force of Iranians. Islam was extremely important politically, but it is important to recognize as a unifying force within Iran rather than a dividing one. Ayatollah Khomeini came to power thanks to a mass movement in support of returning Iran to solid Islamic values. It was a revolutionary government that talked extensively when it first came to power about exporting its revolution to other countries. Professor of Middle Eastern history Juan Cole has commented, "Khomeini did not envisage himself as making a revolution in one country... His ideology of clerical rule, rejection of the Western colonial heritage, he felt was a universal message."¹⁹⁰

The political calculus of its leadership brought it to the conclusion that refugee militarization was not a desired outcome. It had a war against Iraq to deal with, and the new regime was busy consolidating its power in the country. While the regime ideologically opposed the Soviet Union's treatment of Muslims in Afghanistan and sympathized with their cause, Iran's internal priorities and war with Iraq were more important to Ayatollah Khomeini's regime.

Broader Analysis

In all of the situations analyzed here, refugee militarization does appear to occur with some combination of a lack of legitimacy of the receiving state, politicization of ethnic identities, and a

¹⁸⁹ Ibid

¹⁹⁰ As quoted in M. Shuster, (2007, February 14), *Export of Iran's Revolution Sparks Violence*, Retrieved April 22, 2009, from National Public Radio: <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=7392405>

political calculus of the leadership that finds refugee militarization to be a favorable outcome. In a quick glance at some other refugee populations, these factors appear to remain crucial.

Southern Africa supports this story very well. Despite civil wars in neighboring countries, Zambia and Malawi have remained relatively stable over time. Zambia has hosted thousands of Angolan refugees for decades, including more than 50,000 refugees from the Congo in recent years. The Zambian government has not always been popular, especially during the country's economic crisis in the 1980s, yet its legitimacy and capacity to control the state have never been threatened. Ethnic identities have been a factor at times, but they have never been politicized to a great extent. The only exploitation that the Zambian government has attempted of the refugees has been in order to ask for increased international assistance. For Malawi, it started hosting significant numbers of refugees in the 1980s. Refugees were coming from Mozambique, and numbered more than one million by 1992. President Hastings Banda of Malawi continued his standard practice of enforcing tight control over the country as refugees arrived. This included controlling the distribution and management of aid. Banda was under pressure in the early 1990s to democratize, so the refugee influx was a welcome diversion and source of leverage for increased international assistance.¹⁹¹

These additional cases illustrate another point as well. The receiving state does not have to be a democracy to peacefully host refugees and prevent refugee militarization. It is possible that there are more cases of refugee militarization in autocracies than in democracies, but the correlation that may appear between democratization and refugee militarization should not be considered to indicate causality. As this section shows, both democracies and autocracies have prevented refugee militarization on numerous occasions. President Hastings Banda of Malawi and the Ayatollah Khomeini's regime in Iran are just a couple examples of autocratic governments preventing refugee militarization.

¹⁹¹ Whitaker, "Refugees and the Spread of Conflict," 224.

This finding indicates that the presence or absence of democracy is most likely not related to refugee militarization.

The Horn of Africa region has been less successful in hosting refugees than Southern Africa, but it still has had some degree of success. Kenya has hosted large numbers of refugees from throughout the region, particularly from Somalia and Sudan. The Somali influx came during the administration of President Daniel Arap Moi. Moi's government faced staunch criticism for its resistance to democratic reforms, but that resistance was made peacefully through official and government channels. Even though many people disagreed with government policy, the government still had enough legitimacy to have the opposition participate in it. Kenya has also seen some polarization along ethnic lines, such as in violence during the 1992, 1997, and 2007 elections, but those events were unrelated to the refugees.¹⁹² Now that Kenya has passed a new constitution, with a marked absence of violence during the referendum, the government appears to have more political legitimacy now than ever before.

In West Africa and Uganda, refugee militarization has been a serious issue for years. When viewed through the context of the factors of political legitimacy, politicization of ethnicity, and the political calculus of each country's leadership though, this can be pretty easily explained. For Uganda, Yoweri Museveni's government does not have complete control over the northern part of the country. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) is the first rebel group to come to mind in that area, but there are others as well. Sudanese refugees have become ensnared in the conflict and contributed to instability in the area. It is also an area through which Uganda is able to support the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). Sudan, on the other hand, has been documented at providing support to the LRA. Formal diplomatic agreements have been made between the two countries to stop funding militant

¹⁹² Whitaker, "Refugees and the Spread of Conflict," 225.

groups in each other's countries, but violence has continued on each side of the border.¹⁹³ In order for the conflict to get resolved, a lasting solution will likely need to be found to the refugee situation. For West Africa, conflict seems to have spread from Liberia's civil war in the early 1990s to Sierra Leone, and later Guinea. In Sierra Leone, Major General Joseph Momoh was overseeing a transition to a multi-party system when Liberian refugees arrived. A military coup occurred when people got frustrated with Momoh's response to the refugees. With the coup, the government's legitimacy and control over the country declined rapidly. Violence broke out and spread to the point where Sierra Leone was engulfed in civil war. Guinea then began hosting a combination of refugees from Sierra Leone and from Liberia. Guinea was able to remain peaceful for several years, but violence finally broke out in late 2000. President Lansana Conte provided support for Liberian refugees to organize and recruit to fight against Charles Taylor's forces. This was based on Conte's personal view of regional security because he blamed Taylor for a series of incursions from Sierra Leone and Liberia. At the same time, Guinean rebels chose to challenge Conte's government, whose legitimacy had been declining. Finally, Côte d'Ivoire has a long history of hosting refugees. However, it was very peaceful until September 2002, when rebels in the northern part of the country demanded President Laurent Gbagbo's resignation and new elections. The factors that have changed in Côte d'Ivoire have been related to domestic politics. Beginning in the mid-1990s, politicians started emphasizing the concept of Ivoirité. This development led to a politicization of ethnic identities in a country with a large number of immigrants. Alassane Ouattara, who was the country's major opposition figure, was repeatedly ruled ineligible to run in elections. The government's justification was the claim that Ouattara was from Burkina Faso. By the time he was barred from running for office in 2000, people came to doubt the government's legitimacy. Refugees were thus used as pawns in the country's own internal struggles.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹³ Ibid, 225.

¹⁹⁴ Whitaker, "Refugees and the Spread of Conflict," 225-226.

E. Level of foreign support and intervention for refugees

Uganda 1959-1964

The UNAR had enough diplomatic skill in the UN to make PARMEHUTU nervous in Rwanda, and some support from the Belgian government. Led by Michel Kayihura, the UNAR had several skilled petitioners making their voices heard at the UN. The UNAR also benefitted from the sympathies of Belgian Minister of African Affairs Auguste de Schrijver. Auguste de Schrijver had a strong admiration for Tutsi culture, and he expressed strong regret at seeing the Tutsis removed from power in Rwanda.¹⁹⁵ However, UNAR was not able to derive many benefits out of its diplomatic skills and connections beyond delaying the full transfer of power in Rwanda to PARMEHUTU.

Uganda 1990

The RPF did not have many sources of foreign support. It did, however, receive assistance from the United States. Some observers of the situation would argue that the Americans trained the RPF and turned it into a successful fighting force.¹⁹⁶ Gerard Prunier de-emphasizes the importance of American support though, pointing out that Paul Kagame and nine or ten other Banyarwanda NRA officers went to the United States at some point, as well as a larger number of officers from various Ugandan tribal origins, within the framework of a US military training program. However, Kagame and the other Banyarwandan officers were already experienced soldiers, so the training was not essential in terms of building military skills. As a sign of the low level of interest the United States actually had in the conflicts within Uganda and Rwanda, the CIA and State Department actually did not realize that one of the RPF

¹⁹⁵ Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 189-190.

¹⁹⁶ Madsen, *Genocide and Covert Operations in Africa 1993-1999*, Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1999.

leaders was on US territory until several days after the RPF invasion of Rwanda had begun. They had to call Fort Leavenworth to request Kagame's file.¹⁹⁷

On the other hand, the RPF's Hutu opponents in Rwanda had the staunch support of France, Belgium, and Zaire. These countries all assisted Habyarimana's government when the invasion began. Their assistance was crucial in giving the Rwandan armed forces the necessary firepower to effectively repulse the invasion and force the RPF to retreat. The RPF did recover and become more successful after regrouping under Kagame's leadership, but the support of France, Belgium, and Zaire for Habyarimana's government certainly made it more difficult for the RPF to achieve its goals.¹⁹⁸

The RPF was not formed through the will of any foreign powers. It received limited assistance from the United States, but it was primarily a movement that grew and organized within Uganda and with Ugandan, namely NRA, support. More foreign support could have made it easier for the RPF to achieve its political and military goals, but the decision of Banyarwandan refugees to militarize was made without the manipulation or intervention of any foreign powers. In this case, foreign support did not have much, if any, influence on refugee militarization.

Burundi 1959-1964

Burundi was a stage for competition between the East and West in the Cold War. Specifically, China competed for influence in Burundi with countries like the United States and Belgium. China began to gain influence in 1963, when it received recognition from the Burundi government. The recognition came in response to a diplomatic trip between December 1963 and February 1964 that sought to establish relations between China and as many African states as possible.¹⁹⁹ Furthermore, reports

¹⁹⁷ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 92.

¹⁹⁸ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 186.

¹⁹⁹ Mohamed El-Khawas, "China's Changing Policies in Africa," *Issue: A Journal of Opinion*, 1973: 24-28.

circulated about Burundi officials dining with Chinese officials. China did have a large diplomatic mission in Burundi, with 24 officials in the Chinese embassy by November 1964.²⁰⁰

China also got extensively involved in providing military training, arms, and ammunition to Rwandan refugee leaders. China offered substantial technical and financial assistance to Burundi in October 1963. At least three groups of ten Tutsi refugee leaders went to China and underwent a short guerilla training course.²⁰¹ Large quantities of arms and ammunitions were sent from China and other Communist countries to the Rwandan refugees. China sent thousands of dollars to the refugee leadership. Arms and ammunition were mostly unloaded through Dar es Salaam, Mombasa, and Zanzibar.²⁰²

Western countries competed with vigor. Belgium provided direct bilateral aid to Burundi of \$7.5 million in 1960, \$6.7 million in 1961, \$8.55 million in 1962, \$5.13 million in 1963, and \$5.66 million in 1964. The European Commission became the other significant donor during this period. It provided \$10,000 in 1960, \$470,000 in 1961, \$750,000 in 1962, \$250,000 in 1963, and \$1.36 million in 1964.²⁰³ However, China was also providing substantial aid, and its contributions had fewer conditions than Western aid.²⁰⁴

The West allied itself with the Hutus in Ngendadumwe's group, whereas China allied itself with Nyamoya's Tutsi group and the refugees. This East-West competition contributed to the politicization of ethnic identities that I detailed earlier. Western diplomats began attempting to counteract Chinese manoeuvres in the region in early 1964. They did not want Communism spreading to the region. China

²⁰⁰ Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 391.

²⁰¹ *Ibid*, 205.

²⁰² *Ibid*, 227.

²⁰³ *World Development Indicators*

²⁰⁴ Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 396.

was using Burundi to transport arms and ammunition to militant groups with Communist leanings in the Congo. A Chinese diplomat who defected to the West named Tung Chi-Ping commented:

‘Because it is the gateway to the Congo, this small, under-developed, over-populated nation is important in Mao’s long-range plans to dominate as much of Africa as he can. Before I was sent to Burundi, I had been thoroughly briefed on the progress being made there and the plans for the future. Again and again my superiors repeated Mao Tse-Tung’s statement: “When we capture the Congo, we can proceed to capture the whole of Africa. Burundi is the stepping stone for reaching the Congo.”²⁰⁵

At the same time, Western embassies were more numerous than Chinese embassies and the West had an extensive network of friendly organizations at its disposal. Western technical assistance missions, UN relief agencies, and the Catholic Church all have been involved at some point in shaping Western policies in Burundi. Fears of losing Belgian aid made the Burundi court reluctant to recognize China. Speculation also abounds about whether threats of economic sanctions from Belgium and other Western governments caused Burundi to sever diplomatic ties with China in January 1965. It is clear though that the West placed substantial direct pressure on the court to adopt pro-Western policies and supported local Hutu politicians to place pressure on the crown from within.²⁰⁶

Tanzania 1994

The refugees in Tanzania did not receive foreign support to militarize or organize politically. Foreign involvement was instead limited to providing humanitarian aid. Beyond that UNHCR did work with Tanzania to repatriate the refugees in December 1996. Based on Rwanda’s threats to deal with the refugee population and eliminate its potential threat to Rwanda, this involvement of UNHCR, while contravening usual norms on refugee assistance and protection, may have helped prevent a Rwandan invasion of Tanzania. The repatriation also ensured that there would not be any refugee militarization in Tanzania.

²⁰⁵ Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 390-391.

²⁰⁶ Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 396-397.

Zaire 1994

Since Zaire gained independence in 1960, it has also been a very unstable state. The American-backed overthrow of Patrice Lumumba, and the international community's support of, or at least indifference to, Mobutu Sese Seko have made it extremely difficult for the state to make any significant progress.²⁰⁷ With such instability, Zaire was not in the position to help the refugees. Humanitarian organizations would be completely responsible for the refugees.

For many years, Gerard Prunier's narrative of France's intervention in Rwanda, code-named Operation Turquoise, was the leading narrative on French involvement in the Rwandan genocide and its immediate aftermath. Prunier argued that France deserves a lot of the blame for allowing the perpetrators of the genocide to escape Rwanda. In June 1994, France launched Operation Turquoise, sending 2500 men to create a safe zone in Rwanda and stop the fighting. These men were heavily armed. French troops brought over 100 armored vehicles, a battery of 120 mm. Marine mortars, two light Gazelle and eight heavy Super Puma helicopters and air cover provided by four Jaguar fighter-bombers, four Mirage F1CT ground-attack planes, and four Mirage F1CRs for reconnaissance. The armada was deployed by chartering one Airbus, one Boeing 747, and two Antonov An-124s to supplement a squadron of six French Air Force Lockheed C-130s and nine Transalls.²⁰⁸ France also sent many highly skilled soldiers. Almost 300 Special Forces men participated in Operation Turquoise, more than had been deployed in any previous French operation.²⁰⁹ Prunier contends that all this firepower provided effective cover for Hutu politicians and military men to flee to Gisenyi and then on to Zaire. In Gisenyi, they received additional help, as 200 elite French troops entered Gisenyi from Goma and

²⁰⁷ Howard French, *A Continent for the Taking*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004.

²⁰⁸ Gerard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.

²⁰⁹ Alison Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999.

prepared themselves to protect the town from RPF advances.²¹⁰ The ex-FAR, *Interahamwe*, and Hutu politicians were thus able to stay organized and use Zairian refugee camps to regroup and prepare to retake power in Rwanda.²¹¹ Allan Stam and Christian Davenport have recently compiled evidence that Operation Turquoise was not a very important factor in allowing the Hutu *génocidaires* to escape Rwanda. Their data show that Hutu leaders fled Rwanda where and when they did more because of RPF troop movements than because of Operation Turquoise. The real impact of the French intervention was to convince RPF forces to advance from the positions they had been holding to finish off their conquest of Rwanda.²¹²

The French government also consciously chose not to arrest genocide perpetrators during Operation Turquoise. France knew of several leaders within the safe zone it created, including interim president Théodore Sindikubwabo and three of his ministers. The French Foreign Ministry justified this policy by claiming that it was not within its mandate to arrest genocide perpetrators. "Our mandate does not authorize us to arrest them on our own authority. Such a task could undermine our neutrality, the best guarantee of our effectiveness," it stated on July 16, 1994.²¹³

During the refugee crisis that followed the Rwandan genocide, the NGO community and the United States government spoke very loudly about the problems Hutu *génocidaires* were causing. Fiona Terry, director of the France division of MSF at the time, writes extensively about abuse, misuse, and outright theft of aid that was meant for refugees.²¹⁴ In December 1996, Assistant Secretary of State with

²¹⁰ Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*.

²¹¹ Madsen, *Genocide and Covert Operations in Africa 1993-1999*.

²¹² Allan Stam and Christian Davenport, "What Really Happened in Rwanda?", *Miller-McCune*, October 6, 2009, <http://www.miller-mccune.com/politics/what-really-happened-in-rwanda-3432/> (accessed November 30, 2010).

²¹³ Assemblée Nationale, Mission d'information commune, *Enquête sur la tragédie rwandaise (1990-1994)*, vol. I, Rapport, p. 325 as cited in *Leave None To Tell the Story*, p. 686.

²¹⁴ Terry, *Condemned to Repeat?*.

the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration Phyllis Oakley gave testimony supporting this narrative:

“[Many] of the Rwandan refugees were able to break free of the former Rwandan government, former Rwandan army forces that had been intimidating them into remaining as refugees in Zaire. To date, some 600,000 have returned to Rwanda, most in massive movements between November 15 and 20. Almost all of these have now returned to their home areas or communes where they are being registered and receiving a settling-in package of assistance that includes two months worth of food. Remarkably, given the still very fresh pains of genocide, human rights monitors have seen almost no cases of retribution.”²¹⁵

The United Nations attempted to limit the amount of foreign support to militants. Its most basic action towards this end was its refusal to meet with the government-in-exile in order to prevent according legitimacy to it as a negotiating partner with the UN. Some contact with the government-in-exile was unavoidable, as it was sometimes necessary in order to distribute aid or conduct certain activities within the camps.²¹⁶ Moreover, on May 17, 1994, an arms embargo was imposed to try and cut off resources that were being used for violence. Unfortunately, the embargo was not unanimously obeyed. Invoices and air waybills document the arrival of weapons in Goma. A lot of the weapons shipments arrived before the embargo was imposed but after the genocide had begun. However, at least two weapons shipments arrived after the embargo was imposed. The British firm Mil-Tec Corporation was the source of the majority of the invoices. One statement of invoices shows eight flights between April 18, 1994 and July 18, 1994 worth \$6,515,313. Payments only totaled \$4,807,000. This left a balance of \$1,708,313. Mil-Tec sent a letter on December 7, 1994, requesting payment of the balance, highlighting that the last payment had been seized in Cairo by the US government “due to the situation in Rwanda at the time.” An example of one shipment, on May 18, included 2500 AK-47 rifles, 10,000 30-round magazines, 2,500 vests with magazine and grenade pouches, 2,000 60mm mortars,

²¹⁵ Madsen, *Genocide and Covert Operations in Africa 1993-1999*.

²¹⁶ Terry, *Condemned to Repeat?*, 179.

255,360 rounds of 7.62 x 39 ammunition, 6 155mm mortars, and 102 RPG7 rockets. Officials from South Africa, Israel, Albania, France, and China have also been accused of being involved in arms deliveries to Goma.²¹⁷

When Rwanda finally had had enough and invaded Zaire in 1996, it intentionally targeted and destroyed the refugee camps. The RPF-led government faced a harsh international outcry for destroying the refugee camps. Paul Kagame was unapologetic though. He stated:

“I think we should start accusing these people who actually supported these camps—spent one million dollars per day in these camps, gave support to these groups to rebuild themselves into a force, militarized refugees, and when, in the end, they are caught up in the fighting and they die I think it has more to do with these people than Rwanda, than Congo, than the Alliance. Why shouldn’t we accuse them?”²¹⁸

Some Westerners had a more sympathetic view to the RPF. Those who had been involved in the efforts at humanitarian assistance were usually aware that the assistance all too often had contributed to refugee militarization. They knew that the situation was highly problematic, leading some public figures to express deep regret. One of these figures was Richard McCall, chief of staff of USAID, who ended his speech at the 1996 donor meeting with the following:

I am still haunted by the role that humanitarian assistance and humanitarian sanctuary in Thailand played in guaranteeing the survival of the Khmer Rouge. We all tried to do the right thing, but we accomplished the wrong result. Nearly twenty years later, the people of Cambodia are still paying the price. The situation in the refugee camps, particularly in Zaire, is not unlike the choices we faced 20 years ago on Cambodia. And I very much hope that we do not repeat the same errors.²¹⁹

Pakistan during the Soviet invasion

Afghanistan began to acquire some significance in the Cold War in 1973. That was when a coup ousted King Zahir Shah, the long-time ruler of Afghanistan. Muhammad Daoud replaced him, bringing

²¹⁷ Terry, *Condemned to Repeat?*, 163.

²¹⁸ As cited in Philip Gourevitch, “Continental Shift,” *New Yorker*, 4 August 1997, 42-55 at p. 55.

²¹⁹ US statement delivered by Richard McCall to the Rwandan Roundtable Conference, Geneva, 20-21 June 1996, p. 6.

with him a secular nationalist ideology. The coup brought about instability which pitted communist, nationalist, and Islamist forces against each other. This is when Islamist groups began establishing themselves in Peshawar, Pakistan. Afghan communists had brought Daoud to power, but his most important ally was the USSR. While ruling though, Daoud steadily pulled away from the USSR. This dynamic convinced the Afghan communist factions that they had an opportunity to seize power. In April 1978, they staged a coup that brought Nur Muhammad Taraki to power. Taraki's government then attempted to implement a series of reforms that was poorly received by the Afghan people. Because of this, he was ousted from power in late 1979. The precarious position of his replacement, Hafizullah Amin, convinced the Soviet Union to invade in December 1979 and install Babrak Karmal into power.²²⁰

In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. That invasion displaced millions of Afghans. Around three million of those Afghans fled to Pakistan, and around two million fled to Iran. The refugees fled to very different situations, and had wildly different outcomes. The refugees in Pakistan became a crucial part of the Afghan resistance to the Soviets, using assistance primarily from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States to undergo training and acquire weapons for that resistance.²²¹ On the other hand, refugees in Iran lacked the capability to mobilize, and they were absorbed into Iranian society.²²²

Pakistan welcomed and actively courted international assistance to ease the burden of hosting refugees. More accurately, it expected substantial international assistance. This meant that when President Jimmy Carter's administration offered \$400 million in aid in early 1980, Pakistan rejected the offer. Instead, it waited until 1981 to sign a deal with President Ronald Reagan. The deal included the sale of the General Dynamics F-16A fighter-bomber to Pakistan, which was the United States' most

²²⁰ Lischer, *Dangerous Sanctuaries*.

²²¹ Coll, *Ghost Wars*.

²²² Lischer, *Dangerous Sanctuaries*.

advanced combat aircraft. By selling this aircraft to Pakistan, the United States alienated India a little bit, signaling an alliance with Pakistan that Pakistan found very important for its strategic and security interests.²²³ Furthermore, Pakistan estimated that the cost of maintaining the refugee camps was about \$1 million per day. The government claimed it was covering about half of that cost, yet in reality the great bulk of relief came from UNHCR and World Food Programme (WFP) programs. Pakistan's share of the assistance never came close to fifty percent.²²⁴

The United States began supporting Afghan rebels in July 1979 when President Carter authorized the CIA to spend just over \$500,000 on propaganda and psychological operations.²²⁵ From there, American involvement only grew. It quickly got to the point where Howard Hart, the CIA station chief in Pakistan beginning in May 1981, understood the CIA leadership's message to him as "You're a young man; here's your bag of money, go raise hell... Don't fuck it up, just go out there and kill Soviets, and take care of the Pakistanis and make them do whatever you need to make them do."²²⁶ Over the course of the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan, the United States spent billions of dollars in support of the Afghan *mujahideen* and provided enormous amounts of weaponry.

Saudi Arabia was also very active in supporting the *mujahideen*. Thanks to its massive oil revenues, Saudi intelligence had vast sums of money at its disposal, and it used a large portion of that money to support the *mujahideen*. Saudi intelligence officers were not necessarily renowned for covert operations like Mossad or the CIA, but its money made it an important player. Intelligence director Prince Turki al-Faisal once commented to a CIA colleague that "We don't do operations... We don't know

²²³ Wirsing, *Pakistan's Security under Zia, 1977-1988*, 38.

²²⁴ Wirsing, *Pakistan's Security under Zia, 1977-1988*, 43.

²²⁵ Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 46.

²²⁶ As quoted by Steve Coll in *Ghost Wars* (p. 55) from personal interviews held between Hart and Coll on November 12, 26, and 27, 2001.

how. All we know how to do is write checks.”²²⁷ Saudi Arabia and Pakistan had a history of a clandestine and military alliance. Pakistani troops had been hired by Saudi Arabia for security deployments, and Saudi Arabia had provided air cover over Karachi during Pakistan’s 1971 war with India over Kashmir. Both countries were insecure and saw Islam as central to their identity. In July 1980, Prince Turki came to a formal agreement with the CIA to match congressional funding for the Afghan rebels.²²⁸ From that point, it is clear that both the United States and Saudi Arabia were taking an active role to arm the mujahideen. Aid was distributed through the refugee camps. The militants organized themselves there, and then they went back into Afghanistan.

Finally, private financiers played a substantial role in financing and supporting refugee militarization as well. The most well-known of these financiers is Osama bin Laden. These financiers pursued their own agendas and in some cases made quite a name for themselves.

It is important to note that there was not one uniform agenda among the financiers of the *mujahideen* and their support of refugee militarization. Collectively, they purchased and shipped tens of thousands of tons of weapons and ammunition to the *mujahideen* and turned them into large well-armed fighting forces. However, they also spied on each other and pursued their own independent agendas. Some financiers were interested in promoting fundamentalist Islam to the refugees through the madrassas. The United States was fighting the spread of communism. Saudi Arabia had a mix of influences from people showing solidarity with their fellow Muslims who were suffering under the Soviet occupation to people hoping to spread fundamentalist Islam.²²⁹ In the end though, the cumulative

²²⁷ This quote comes on page 73 of *Ghost Wars*. It is from an interview by Steve Coll of Nat Kern on January 23, 2002 in Washington DC. Kern attributes this quote to retired clandestine officer Frank Anderson.

²²⁸ Coll, *Ghost Wars*, pp. 73 and 81-82.

²²⁹ Ibid

amount of money, weapons, and support provided to the *mujahideen* was extremely important in allowing the Afghan refugees to militarize to the extent that they did.

Iran during the Soviet invasion

Iran refused international assistance for the refugees, placing it in stark contrast with Pakistan.²³⁰ As I discussed earlier, Iran did not want to rely upon the United States or any other foreign powers. It wanted to act independently and avoid becoming indebted to any other countries. Granted, it did a fairly good job of hosting the refugees. For instance, Iran actually had job opportunities for Afghan refugees that gave them a chance to integrate into Iranian society. This meant that foreign governments did not get very involved with the Afghan refugees in Iran.

Broader Analysis

There is a common element between all of the cases of refugee militarization. Large amounts of humanitarian aid were provided to the refugees. In Uganda, Pakistan, and Zaire, UNHCR had large operations set up to assist the refugees. In other cases, UNBRO provided large amounts of assistance to the Khmer Rouge-led Cambodian refugees and UNRWA has run humanitarian assistance for Palestinian refugees since its creation in 1948. On the other hand, Iran is the only receiving state in my case studies that actually refused international assistance for hosting refugees. This means that the provision of humanitarian assistance has not necessarily caused refugee militarization. Since it does always appear to be present when refugee militarization occurs and is sometimes present when refugee militarization

²³⁰ Wirsing, *Pakistan's Security under Zia, 1977-1988*.

does not occur, there does appear to be evidence for humanitarian assistance being a necessary condition for refugee militarization.²³¹

There are some cases, such as in Pakistan with Afghan refugees, where foreign powers directly provided resources for refugee militarization. However, there is not yet any convincing evidence that direct foreign support for refugee militarization actually caused refugee militarization to occur when it otherwise would not have occurred. It is also neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for refugee militarization because there are several cases of refugee militarization, like with Rwandan refugees in Zaire, where there was no direct foreign support for refugee militarization. Therefore, foreign support for refugee militarization should not be considered causes of refugee militarization until more evidence is found and better arguments are made. If there is a stronger connection to be made than what I have found, then the new evidence will have to support it.

F. State Strength

It should be clear by now that it is important to consider whether the receiving state or the refugee population is the most salient perspective from which to approach refugee militarization. Fikret Abdic's Bosnian refugees present a case study that would indicate that the response of the receiving state is the most important to consider. The receiving state has the ability to prevent militarization of a refugee population that would otherwise militarize. However, a refugee population cannot militarize if the receiving state does not provide a conducive environment to do so. It remains unclear though whether the receiving state has to actively prevent refugee militarization or merely be unable or unwilling to prevent it.

²³¹ A necessary condition for refugee militarization is being defined as a condition that must be present for refugee militarization to occur. This is in contrast to a sufficient condition, meaning that if it is true, then refugee militarization will occur.

Earlier sections have dealt with the preferences of the receiving states and the tensions within receiving states that may produce a supportive environment for refugee militarization. These sections have shown that receiving states tend to have some reason for wanting refugee militarization to occur when it happens. Yet, the case of Zaire also shows that a weak state may not be able to prevent refugee militarization even if it wants to. One very plausible argument would be that instead of there having to be some active cause for refugee militarization to occur, it could be that the receiving states must be able to actively prevent it from occurring. If the receiving state's response is too weak to prevent it, then refugee militarization could occur.

Tanzania, despite its lack of wealth, was able to prevent refugee militarization by Rwandans fleeing the genocide in 1994. Shortly after the arrival of the refugees and their installation in the camps, the authorities brought in a police force to ensure respect for the law and maintenance of public order. This force was very small in relation to the number of refugees, yet its activities helped to minimize the number of incidents, for it arrested, detained and prosecuted trouble-makers. This was made easier by the fact that the refugee population in the Tanzanian camps was less politicized than in Zaire, where most of the leaders of the former regime had taken refuge.

While it is difficult to find cases in history where the receiving state tried and failed to prevent refugee militarization, the Zaire case from 1994-1996 conveniently provides exactly that. It has been well-documented that Zaire's state was extremely weak during the 1990s.²³² Mel McNulty describes the Zairian state under Mobutu as non-functioning, except as "a milchcow for its rulers."²³³ Zaire was extremely poor and was unable to provide basic services for its own people. Health centers in Kivu province, for example, had to be run locally without government support because of the state's lack of

²³² Zaire (now the DRC) was a weak state for much of Mobutu Sese Seko's rule, and has remained weak ever since.

²³³ McNulty, "The Collapse of Zaire: Implosion, Revolution or External Sabotage?", 54.

resources.²³⁴ This system was completely unprepared to host an influx of hundreds of thousands of Rwandan refugees. Within a matter of months, 50,000 people died from an epidemic of cholera and dysentery in the refugee camps.²³⁵

Zaire did attempt to stabilize the refugee camps, but its efforts were largely unsuccessful, possibly even counterproductive. Beginning in early 1995, two contingents of soldiers were sent to the refugee camps. The first contingent had some success in improving conditions in the refugee camps. The second contingent was extremely destabilizing. It engaged in activities such as extorting money by levying taxes on refugees illegally conducting economic actions and taking advantage of refugees for sex or prostitution.²³⁶ It did not help that many policemen and soldiers had not been paid for several months. They were disorganized and were primarily concerned with their own survival.²³⁷

There have been other cases where refugees arrived in countries that could not effectively control them. During the early 1960s, Burundi had very poor administrative systems in its government. It was not run effectively enough to reliably monitor and control the activities of the Rwandan refugees. Pakistan presents a slightly different situation because it effectively controls part of its territory, but Afghan refugees often settled in areas that the state did not effectively control. By the early 1990s, Afghan refugees had largely become concentrated in two parts of Pakistan. Approximately 75% of the refugees were in North-West Frontier Province, and about 20% were in Baluchistan. Almost all the other refugees congregated in the city of Peshawar.²³⁸ Coincidentally, the North-West Frontier Province is the

²³⁴ Goyens et al., "Humanitarian Aid and Health Services in Eastern Kivu, Zaire: Collaboration or Competition?", *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 1996: 268-280.

²³⁵ Terry, *Condemned to Repeat?*, 171.

²³⁶ *Ibid*, 177.

²³⁷ Iogna-Prat, *Refugee Camp Security in the Great Lakes Region*, UNHCR Inspection and Evaluation Service: April 1997, 18.

²³⁸ Tom Rogers, "Two Dimensions of a National Crisis: Population Growth and Refugees in Pakistan," *Modern Asian Studies*, 1992: 735-761.

most weakly controlled part of Pakistan. This would have made it extremely difficult for Pakistan to prevent refugee militarization even if it had wanted to do so.

To test the relationship between state strength of the receiving state and refugee militarization, I will use selected variables from the World Bank's *World Development Indicators* data set that can proxy state strength.²³⁹ These variables include the percentage of the labor force made up by armed forces personnel, the total number of armed forces personnel, GDP per capita, GDP per capita growth, military expenditure as a percentage of central government expenditure, population density, percentage of roads that are paved, and the number of telephone lines per 100 people. Together, these variables create a picture of the receiving state's level of infrastructure, ability to acquire resources, manage its territory and resources, and provide security.

Each of these variables has been deliberately chosen. The two variables relating to armed forces personnel are meant to show the size of each country's armed forces and their relative participation rates in their respective armed forces. The military expenditure variable demonstrates the central government's level of commitment to having a strong military. As the percentage of the central government's expenditure involving the military increases, one would expect that the government's level of commitment to national security is increasing. This relationship should be taken loosely though because governments can also be expected to spend more of their money on the military if they are at war, their neighbors are at war, or there are any other significant threats to security. Therefore, the best way to conceptualize this variable is that the expected relationship of commitment to national security and percentage of government expenditure on the military increasing together holds when the security outlook is held constant. The relevance to this paper's analysis of state strength is that countries with

²³⁹ World Bank, "The World Bank," *World Development Indicators & Global Development Finance*, September 28, 2010, <http://data.worldbank.org/country> (accessed October 24, 2010).

higher amounts of their budgets spent on the armed forces should be more capable of providing security, holding all other factors constant. Population density indicates how much difficulty the government has in controlling its population. Low population density indicates that a country has a rural population. It can also indicate that there is rough terrain forcing people to spread out. These characteristics can make it more difficult for the government to provide security for its population. A country with low population density may also have a harder time preventing refugee militarization. The roads paved and telephone lines variables are both indicators of the level of infrastructure. The telephone lines variable is somewhat problematic because many countries, particularly African countries, often skipped installing telephone lines and went straight to cell phones. Cell phones started taking hold in Africa in the mid to late 1990s, so this observation is not relevant for many of the data values in my data set.²⁴⁰

The GDP per capita measure serves as a measure of the state's ability to acquire resources to perform functions like raising an army, develop an effective police force, and develop an effective bureaucracy. The amount of growth from year to year in GDP per capita shows the direction in which the economy is moving. Solid growth in GDP per capita generally shows that the economy is doing well, people are making more money, and the government's leadership is managing the economy well.²⁴¹ Effective government leadership can increase its legitimacy, thereby increasing its ability to govern. Fearon and Laitin use per capita GDP as a proxy for state strength in their discussion of civil wars and insurgencies, and their analysis remains applicable for refugees. They write:

Most important for the prospects of a nascent insurgency, however, are the government's police and military capabilities and the reach of government institutions into rural areas. Insurgents are better able to survive and prosper if the government and military they oppose

²⁴⁰ William Jack and Tavneet Suri, "The Economics of M-PESA," MIT Sloan, August 2010, 4.

²⁴¹ Of course, these are generalizations. Situations could plausibly arise where, for example, an economy is experiencing high levels of growth without the benefit of sound government policies. However, these generalizations are usually true when a country is experiencing high levels of growth.

are rather weak—badly financed, organizationally inept, corrupt, politically divided, and poorly informed about goings-on at the local level.²⁴²

Their analysis is applicable to refugees as well. To demilitarize refugees and prevent them from militarizing, the receiving state must have sufficient police and military capabilities and effective institutions. A low per capita GDP means that the government is not likely to have substantial access to tax revenue. Also, the institutions of countries with low per capita GDPs tend to be ineffective or poorly developed.²⁴³ With poor institutions and a lack of resources, states with low per capita GDPs seem likely to be the hosts of the refugees who choose to militarize.

The data I am using go from 1987-1998. This time span was chosen because it corresponds with research that documents specific cases of refugee militarization. Sarah Lischer pieced several sources together to document cases of refugee involvement in political violence from 1987-1998. Not everything included under her definition of political violence constitutes refugee militarization, but it is easy to sort out which of her cases of political violence do constitute refugee militarization.²⁴⁴

The main countries identified by Lischer as hosting refugee militarization include the West Bank and Gaza (Technically, this is not a recognized state by the UN, but the entity remains important to specify for this study.), Pakistan, Uganda (both Rwandan and Sudanese refugees militarized), Ethiopia, Zaire, Lebanon, Guinea, and Ivory Coast. There are a few other cases of refugee militarization, such as Fikret Abdic's Bosnian refugees, but these are the longest running cases during the 1987-1998 time period. This characteristic allows me to take advantage of as much data as possible in my data set. This is an important concern because the maximum amount of country years that I could have data values

²⁴² James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review*, 2003: 75-90. p. 77.

²⁴³ Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, "Understanding Prosperity and Poverty: Geography, Institutions, and the Reversal of Fortune," In *Understanding Poverty*, by Abhijit Vinayak Banerjee, Roland Benabou and Dilip Mookherjee (editors), 19-36. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc, 2006.

²⁴⁴ Sarah Lischer, Working Paper: "Refugee involvement in political violence: Quantitative evidence from 1987-1998." Cambridge: UNHCR, 2000, 1-25.

for each variable is 96. There are not data values for every year in every country, so it is useful to have this long term perspective.

For comparison between the selected countries that hosted refugee militarization and the rest of the world's countries, I run t-tests for each variable. Statistical analysis is challenged by the dramatic difference in country years between the hosts of refugee militarization and other countries, but I contend that the t-tests still yield useful results. These results are listed in Table 1 below.

Table 3: State Strength

	All			Militarization			No Militarization			Diff	SE
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N		
Armed forces personnel (% of total labor force)	1.9476	2.405	1550	0.8218	0.6201	50	1.9851	2.4333	1500	1.1633***	0.3446
Armed forces personnel (Total)	164606	394710.3	1571	189688	256231.5	50	163781.5	398746.1	1520	-25906.3	56744.85
GDP per capita (Constant 2000 US \$)	6501.609	10522.6	2152	340.7306	307.5818	65	6693.49	10627.88	2087	6352.76***	1318.54
GDP per capita growth (% annual)	1.1914	7.1358	2149	-0.0231	5.5273	64	1.2287	7.1772	2085	1.2517	0.9054
Military spending (% of central government spending)	13.536	16.7524	440	28.4785	10.015	12	13.117	16.718	428	-15.3615***	4.8537
Population Density (people per square km)	341.9	1569.1	2285	91.4966	98.9002	57	348.306	1588.458	2228	256.8095	210.4516
Paved Roads (% of total roads)	48.4919	33.0312	1322	27.1407	16.995	27	48.937	33.1408	1295	21.7963***	6.3972
Telephone lines (per 100 people)	15.0983	18.0425	2310	0.8942	1.2696	55	15.4448	18.1217	2255	14.5505***	2.4442

Note: Significance can be found by observing that *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. The Diff column is taking the difference between values of countries that are not included in my group of 7 countries that hosted refugee militarization (No Militarization column) and the values of the 7 countries that I do use as hosts of refugee militarization (Militarization column). The N columns are counting country years.

Table 3 provides evidence that measures of state strength can be useful indicators of whether a country will be a host country for refugee militarization. The variables for armed forces personnel as a percentage of the total labor force, GDP per capita, military spending as a proportion of central government spending, paved roads as a percentage of total roads, and telephone lines all show statistically significant differences. The variables growth in GDP per capita and population density do not show statistical significance, but with P-values of 17% and 22% respectively they should not be ignored. With more and better data, these have a reasonable chance of becoming significant. The logic for why these variables should be statistically significant is compelling, so it is very plausible that future statistical analysis could produce significant results. It is reasonable that the total number of armed forces personnel would not be significant, so that result is understandable.

The difference in armed forces personnel as a percentage of the total labor force of 1.1633 means that the countries in the “No Militarization” category had a proportion of people in the armed forces 1.1633 percentage points higher than people in the receiving states on average. With more people in their armed forces, the “No Militarization” countries would have had a larger share of their populations ready to demilitarize refugee groups. The result for total armed forces personnel is most likely insignificant because it depends more on the size of the country and whether it is in a state of war or peace. These factors are not necessarily linked to refugee militarization.

The results for GDP per capita and GDP per capita growth indicate that the “No Militarization” countries have stronger economies and better manage those economies. They have a GDP per capita that is \$6352.76 higher than “Militarization” countries on average. They also have growth in GDP per capita that is 1.2517 percentage points higher on average.

The percentage of central government expenditure devoted to the military indicates that non-hosts are much less concerned about their security than hosts. The “No Militarization” countries devote

15.3615 percentage points less to their militaries on average. As I discussed earlier, this result is as expected because countries neighboring a country at war can be expected to devote more resources to their militaries. Moreover, the “Militarization” countries all had internal concerns of their own, so they likely would be devoting more resources to their militaries with or without refugees.

The difference in population density indicates that “No Militarization” countries are more heavily populated. They had a population density that was about 257 people per square kilometer higher than “Militarization” countries on average. As explained before, higher population densities make it easier for countries to manage their respective populations.

The paved roads and telephone lines results both indicate that “No Militarization” countries have substantially more developed infrastructures than “Militarization” countries. The “No Militarization” countries had about 22 percentage points more of their roads paved and about 15 more telephone lines per 100 people on average. These are dramatic differences that speak to the extreme difference in infrastructure levels between the “Militarization” and “No Militarization” countries.

All this goes to show that “No Militarization” countries had better infrastructure, more resources, better leadership, and more participation in their armed forces than “Militarization” countries. These aspects cumulatively form a comprehensive picture of state strength. With such large differences along these variables, it seems that state strength of the receiving state is an indicator of whether a refugee population will militarize. Earlier sections have demonstrated the importance of preferences and tensions within the receiving state, but this section has demonstrated that state strength of the receiving state is a reliable indicator of whether a refugee population will militarize. There is surely a relationship between state strength, tensions within the receiving state, and the preferences of the receiving state. The following table illustrates this.

Table 4: State Strength vs. State Interests

	Want to prevent militarization	Do not want to prevent militarization
Can prevent militarization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Tanzania in 1994 wanted to prevent militarization and, with international aid, had the capability to do so. - Iran in the 1980s wanted to and was able to prevent refugee militarization. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Pakistan in the 1980s might have been able to prevent refugee militarization. With the refugees largely going to the poorly-controlled North West Frontier Province, it would have been difficult for Pakistan to prevent refugee militarization even if it had wanted to prevent it. - Uganda in 1990 wanted to get the RPF out of Uganda, so it chose to support RPF-led militarization.
Can't prevent militarization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Zaire in 1995 unsuccessfully tried to stop refugee militarization. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Zaire in 1994 did not try to stop refugee militarization. Mobutu even supported it.

Parsing out how that relationship works should be an objective of future research. For now, that relationship is unclear. What is clear is that characteristics of the receiving state, more than characteristics of the refugee population, are crucial to study in order to understand the causes of refugee militarization.

V. Implications

In light of these findings, countries and aid organizations should focus on the dynamics within the receiving state to decide how much their contributions will accomplish. The response of the receiving state and the manner in which it receives aid are key aspects of whether the aid will benefit the refugees, or whether it may actually harm the refugees. This is because the receiving state defines

how refugees settle (camps, integration into society, etc.) and how humanitarian assistance is provided to refugees. There is a lot of responsibility that receiving states are required to shoulder. With that responsibility, receiving states also have the authority to use a refugee crisis to its advantage if it so desires.

Of the many tasks that UNHCR recommends be carried out is screening of the refugees. This is meant to determine if they should actually qualify for refugee status and the protection that comes with that status or if they are combatants. If they are combatants, then receiving states are tasked with separating them from the refugees. This is a huge burden to delegate to receiving states, especially when taking into account that the majority of the world's refugees are hosted by developing countries. For example, in 2001 developing countries hosted 14 out of the world's 15 million refugees.²⁴⁵ To address this concern, and to try and improve responses to refugee movements, a policy of burden-sharing has been promoted within the UN and UNHCR. Burden-sharing dates back to the Preamble of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. The Convention states that "the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and... a satisfactory solution... cannot therefore be achieved without international cooperation."²⁴⁶ However, this policy has been extremely difficult to effectively implement.

On a broad level, burden sharing is primarily hampered by every state's desire to minimize its share of the burden of hosting refugees. Hosting refugees is very expensive. International sources are often willing to contribute to humanitarian activities like providing medical and food aid, but they often overlook the security aspects of hosting refugees. Moreover, many humanitarian aid workers resist working alongside security personnel because they fear losing trust from the refugees if they are

²⁴⁵ Eiko Thielemann, "Burden-Sharing: The International Politics of Refugee Protection," Paper prepared for the conference 'Immigration policy after 9-11: US and European Perspectives,' University of Texas, Austin, March 2-3, 2006.

²⁴⁶ As quoted in James Milner, "Sharing the Security Burden: Towards the Convergence of Refugee Protection and State Security," Refugee Studies Center Working Paper #4, May 2000: University of Oxford, 6.

associated with soldiers.²⁴⁷ Some have argued that hosting refugees can be a public good globally, but this is a difficult case to make. Instead, states will often seek to avoid contributing to the assistance effort for a refugee population.²⁴⁸

To those who argue that refugee militarization would occur less often if the international community did a better job of burden sharing, Zaire presents a striking example of how difficult that suggestion actually is. Of course, this is much easier said than done. Instead of listing all the challenges involved with getting the international community to collectively take responsibility for the security of refugees, the attempt to muster a peacekeeping force in late 1994 for the refugee camps in Zaire can provide an effective illustration. By October 1994, the international community knew that it had to consider options for intervention in Zaire's refugee camps. The joint UNAMIR/ UNHCR mission in September-October 1994 failed to effectively identify the problems and potential solutions. Then, on November 30, 1994, at the request of the Security Council the Secretary-General of the United Nations consulted with states that would have the capability to contribute to a peacekeeping force of 5,000 men. The force would aim to protect the storage and distribution of humanitarian aid, guarantee the safety of the personnel of international humanitarian organizations, and to enable refugees who wanted to return home to cross the border into Rwanda in safety. Sadly, out of 60 states consulted, only one state indicated a willingness to contribute to the force. This caused the operation to be abandoned. Another possibility was for the international community to train and supervise Zairian troops. Zaire offered 1500-2000 troops for this plan, but once again the option was not chosen due to the lack of international support. A third option included hiring a private company specializing in security matters to train and supervise Zairian troops. However, the final cost of this option would have been about \$60 million per year. Finally, with no other option, the Security Council supported Zaire's offer to deploy its

²⁴⁷ Fiona Terry, *Condemned to Repeat?*

²⁴⁸ Thielemann, "Burden-Sharing."

troops to the refugee camps.²⁴⁹ As I have already shown, this deployment turned out to be unsuccessful at fully stabilizing the refugee camps. When a second contingent of Zairian troops was deployed, they arguably left the refugees worse off than they found them. However, due to the lack of international willingness to intervene, deploying Zairian troops was the only available option. This is not unique. It is exceedingly easy to find situations where the international community was unwilling to act collectively.

Hence, the current setup, relying upon the receiving state to protect and demilitarize refugees, does not work. The international community, loosely organized into the United Nations, has also proven itself to be unreliable at best in responding to refugee crises. So, what is the best way to prevent refugee militarization? That answer is not clear, but it is clear that the current system does not work.

With the realization that the current system does not work, this thesis echoes a common argument across much of the literature on foreign aid. Development economist William Easterly asks why, if providing enough aid is what it will take to end world poverty, the international community has not seen more results from the \$2.3 trillion that has been spent on foreign aid over the past five decades. Easterly argues that as long as the West continues imposing its own development ideas upon others instead of letting countries develop in their own ways, aid will continue to yield disappointing results.²⁵⁰ Robert Calderisi, in his look at Africa specifically, argues that African countries need to address their home-grown dictatorships, corruption, and lack of open political systems and free press.²⁵¹ Calderisi and Easterly are in line with the general consensus on aid that it must be appropriate for the people it is intended to help. Too often though, foreign aid is grossly inappropriate. Still, there is no claim that foreign aid should end. Instead, aid must be improved and given in smarter ways.

²⁴⁹ Iogna-Prat, *Refugee Camp Security in the Great Lakes Region*, UNHCR Inspection and Evaluation Service: April 1997, 11-12.

²⁵⁰ Easterly, William. *The White Man's Burden*. New York: The Penguin Press, 2006.

²⁵¹ Calderisi, Robert. *The Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aid Isn't Working*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

Stronger arguments to limit aid are made when it becomes linked to violence. The violence component, unlike in development efforts in peaceful countries, makes it possible for humanitarian assistance to do more harm than good. Peter Uvin discusses the link between aid and violence at great length in relation to Rwanda. He argues that “the process of development and the institutional aid given to promote it interacted with the forces of exclusion, inequality, pauperization, racism, and oppression that laid the groundwork for the 1994 genocide.”²⁵² His argument becomes quite powerful when we recall that Rwanda began a civil war in 1990 that only officially ended with the Arusha Accord in 1993. During that time, aid was increased even though several prominent reports of human rights violations emerged from Rwanda. Furthermore, increasing amounts of that aid were put into state hands. This provided support for the Hutu-controlled government to maintain and increase its power. It was able to continue operating in a culture of impunity as aid organizations neglected to speak out against the problems in Rwanda. However, even Uvin admits that there is no reliable way to tell whether or not more serious consideration of the option to withdraw aid would have improved the situation, or at least made genocide less likely. Perhaps most importantly, humanitarian organizations did succeed in getting change when they publicly fought for it on a couple of occasions.²⁵³

The situation where the strongest case can be made to withdraw aid is when aid is being given specifically to refugees. Having been forced to leave their homes, refugees have also had to leave their home country, often putting them in a very dire position. As my analysis demonstrated, some refugee populations have well-organized political and military organizations that are adept at using this to their advantage. Cambodian, Rwandan, Palestinian, and Afghan militants are just a few of the groups who have successfully used international humanitarian assistance meant for refugees as substantial shares of their budgets. For example, ex-FAR militants were able to divert a large proportion of the estimated \$1.3

²⁵² Uvin, Peter. *Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda*. West Hartford: Kumarian Press, Inc, 1998.

²⁵³ Ibid.

billion that was meant for Rwandan refugees during the 1994-1996 period to support their military goals.²⁵⁴ With so many resources being used to prolong, intensify, or expand conflict rather than for their intended goal of alleviating suffering from conflict, the argument to withdraw or withhold aid from refugee populations gains credibility. Those familiar with the horrors that refugees often endure may consider arguments to withdraw or withhold aid from them cruel and immoral, but if the receiving state cannot produce an environment that at least discourages militarization, then withholding or withdrawing aid from refugee populations hosted by that receiving state may just be the option that does the most good.

VI. Conclusion

The results from the analysis and review of various bodies of literature in this thesis have challenged many assumptions about refugees and suggested some new ways to think about refugee militarization. I argue, in a slight modification of Sarah Lischer's framework, that dynamics within the receiving state are the most important factors in determining whether a refugee population will militarize. The type of refugee population can make militarization more likely, but it has a smaller role than the receiving state. The capability of the receiving state to prevent refugee militarization is important, but the interests of the receiving state are just as important, if not more so. Additionally, there is a necessary condition for refugee militarization that the refugees must be receiving international humanitarian assistance. With the rise of organizations such as UNHCR, UNRWA, UNBRO, MSF, and the ICRC, refugee populations can generally expect to receive international humanitarian assistance unless the receiving state actively refuses it.

I have explored the causes of a horrible phenomenon, and observed that the international community does not adequately understand how to prevent it. Misguided ideas have been circulated as

²⁵⁴ Rieff, David. *A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002.

solutions for years. For example, the UNHCR recommendation to limit camp size to 20,000-30,000 people was unsuccessful in preventing the militarization of Abdic's Bosnian refugees and Rwandan refugees in Zaire. In fact, militants in Zaire were actually able to exert greater control over the smaller camps.

What has emerged is that receiving states can cooperate with the international community to prevent refugee militarization. Tanzania was able to prevent the militarization of Rwandan refugees despite the country's poverty. It was able to do this because its leaders actively sought to prevent refugee militarization and it was willing to work with the international community to provide security for the refugees. In cases where the receiving state cannot or does not want to prevent refugee militarization and it is not willing to seek international assistance to do so, humanitarian assistance all too often ends up in the possession of militants. These are the cases where the best solution can be to withdraw or withhold humanitarian assistance. Otherwise, there is a dangerous risk of aggravating conflict.

Of course, pursuing this policy suggestion would force the international community to endure horror stories of what has happened to refugees, and the condemnation that would inevitably result from not doing everything possible to help in the short term. This condemnation would be filled with the stories of refugees who have lived through terrible events, including people like Marie Umutesi, a Rwandan Hutu refugee who tells the story of running from ex-FAR soldiers:

When people began to run in all directions, sweeping before them everyone who was in their path, I tried to keep my balance and held tight to Zuzu's hand, which was covered with scabies. She in turn tugged at my hand saying, "Auntie, let's run fast. If we don't, they will kill us." We ran on, pushed from behind by those who followed, and hid in the closet huts, but there was so much shooting that these were not safe either. We entered the forest by the first path we found. After running for about a kilometer, those in front stopped abruptly, as if there were something that had frightened them, and suddenly turned on their heels. We abandoned the path and entered the depths of the forest. The branches struck our heads, and thorns and brambles scratched our arms and faces. Happily, the other girls had followed me on this mad dash. Under the dense cover of the forest we stopped to figure out what to do. We couldn't stay

hidden for too long, since we needed to eat and drink. Furthermore, the place where we were wasn't far from the road, and the rebels would find us during the first clean-up operation. Nor was it a good idea to continue deeper into the forest, since we were unfamiliar with the area. I decided to retrace our steps and try to find a shallow spot along the river where we could wade across. The water came up to my chest. I feel dizzy when I walk in water, and Marcelline held my hand so that I would not fall and drown. A man who was with us offered to carry Zuzu to the other side, since she was in danger of being swept away by the current, which was quite strong there.

When we finally reached Lubutu, we realized that two children were missing, a boy who left Tingi-Tingi with us and a four-year-old girl I had picked up the night before who had been separated from her mother in the confusion. I had entrusted her to Virginie. When we were running through the forest she let go of Virginie's hand and was lost in the crowd. As for the boy, Assumpta was the person responsible for him. She had succeeded in keeping him with her since Tingi-Tingi, in spite of the commotion. However, when the shooting broke out, Assumpta and the boy both fell, knocked down and trampled by the fleeing mass of people. When Assumpta finally was able to get up, she tried to find the boy, but in vain. Later we continued, unsuccessfully, to search for these two children. In light of the vast numbers of people who perished at Lubutu Bridge, I don't have much hope that they survived. During the shooting we also abandoned a large part of what we had carried from Tingi-Tingi so that we could run faster. We weren't the only ones who had to abandon part of our provisions. Mountains of peas, corn, flour, buckets, and blankets carpeted the road.²⁵⁵

Umutesi's story and the thousands of others like it have been extremely effective at convincing people to open their check books and donate or convincing governments to provide humanitarian assistance. In the face of such hardship, human morality inspires people to want to act and provide humanitarian assistance. It is then easy to portray the decision to withhold or withdraw humanitarian assistance as being immoral. However, with the evidence of this thesis indicating that humanitarian aid has contributed to refugee militarization and made some refugee crises worse, withholding or withdrawing aid could actually be the most moral option in certain circumstances. As unconscionable as that sounds, it may just be the option that conscience demands.

²⁵⁵ Marie Umutesi, *Surviving the Slaughter: The Ordeal of a Rwandan Refugee in Zaire*, Translated by Julia Emerson, Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2000, 3-4.

Bibliography

- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. "Understanding Prosperity and Poverty: Geography, Institutions, and the Reversal of Fortune." In *Understanding Poverty*, by Abhijit Vinayak Banerjee, Roland Benabou and Dilip Mookherjee (editors), 19-36. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc, 2006.
- Borton, John. "The State of the International Humanitarian System." *Overseas Development Institute*, 1998.
- Calderisi, Robert. *The Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aid Isn't Working*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
- Cohen, Stephen. "Pakistan." In *Security Policies of Developing Countries*, by Edward A Kolodziej and Robert E Harkavy (eds.), 111. Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1982.
- Coll, Steve. *Ghost Wars*. New York: The Penguin Press, 2004.
- "The Conflict Trap." In *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It*, by Paul Collier, 17-37. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Cooley, Alexander, and James Ron. "The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action." *International Security*, 2002: 5-39.
- Daly, Emma. "Is Life Really Worth Living Under King Babo?" *The Independent*, 1994.
- Des Forges, Alison. *Leave None to Tell the Story*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999.
- Destexhe, Alain. "Hurry to Prevent a Cambodian Epilogue in Rwanda." *International Herald Tribune*. August 11, 1994.
- Easterly, William. *The White Man's Burden*. New York: The Penguin Press, 2006.
- Ek, Ragnhild, and Ahmed Karadawi. "Implications of Refugee Flows on Political Stability in the Sudan." *Ambio*, 1991: 196-203.
- El-Khawas, Mohamed. "China's Changing Policies in Africa." *Issue: A Journal of Opinion*, 1973: 24-28.
- Fearon, James, and David Laitin. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *American Political Science Review*, 2003: 75-90.
- French, Howard. *A Continent for the Taking*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004.
- Goyens, P, D Porignon, E.M. Soron'Gane, R Tonglet, P Hennart, and H.L. Vis. "Humanitarian Aid and Health Services in Eastern Kivu, Zaire: Collaboration or Competition?" *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 1996: 268-280.

- Grare, Frederic. "The Geopolitics of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan." In *Refugee Manipulation: War, Politics, and the Abuse of Human Suffering*, by Stephen Stedman ed. and Fred Tanner ed., 57-94. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003.
- Hardin, Russell. *One for all: The logic of group conflict*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982.
- Hochschild, Adam. *King Leopold's Ghost*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998.
- Human Rights Watch Arms Project. *Rwanda/Zaire: Rearming with Impunity*. May 1995. <http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1995/Rwanda1.htm> (accessed March 4, 2010).
- Human Rights Watch. "Closed Door Policy: Afghan Refugees in Pakistan and Iran." Human Rights Watch report, New York, 2002.
- Iogna-Prat. *Refugee Camp Security in the Great Lakes Region*. UNHCR Inspection and Evaluation Service, 1997.
- Jacobsen, Karen. "Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to Mass Refugee Influxes." *International Migration Review*, 1996: 655-678.
- Kersh, Efraim. "Military Power and Foreign Policy Goals: The Iran-Iraq War Revisited." *International Affairs*, 1987-1988: 83-95.
- Kuperman, Alan. *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2001.
- Lake, David, and Donald Rothchild. "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict." *International Security*, 1996: 41-75.
- Lake, David, and Donald Rothchild. "Spreading Fear: The Genesis of Transnational Ethnic Conflict." In *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict*, by David Lake and Donald Rothchild, 3-32. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.
- Landou, Loren B. "Beyond the Losers: Transforming Governmental Practice in Refugee-Affected Tanzania." *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 2003: 19-43.
- Langenkamp, Daniel. "The Victory of Expediency: Afghan refugees and Pakistan in the 1990s." *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, 2003: 229-254.
- Lemarchand, Rene. *Rwanda and Burundi*. London: Pall Mall Press Ltd, 1970.
- . *The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009.
- Lischer, Sarah. *Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005.

- Lischer, Sarah Kenyon. "Collateral Damage: Humanitarian Assistance as a Cause of Conflict." *International Security*, 2003: 79-109.
- Lischer, Sarah. "Militarized Refugee Populations: Humanitarian Challenges in the Former Yugoslavia." The Rosemarie Rogers Working Paper Series Working Paper #5, 1999.
- Lischer, Sarah. *Refugee involvement in political violence: Quantitative evidence from 1987-1998*. Working Paper, UNHCR, 2000.
- Little, Allan, and Laura Silber. *Yugoslavia, Death of a Nation*. New York: Penguin Books, 1995.
- Loescher, Gil. *The UNHCR and World Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Loescher, Gil. "UNHCR at Fifty." In *Problems of Protection: The UNHCR, Refugees, and Human Rights*, by Niklaus Steiner ed., Mark Gibney ed. and Gil Loescher ed., 3-18. New York: Routledge, 2003.
- Madsen, Wayne. *Genocide and Covert Operations in Africa 1993-1999*. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1999.
- Mahiga, Augustine. "A Change of Direction For Tanzania." *Refugees Magazine*, Winter 1997: 14-15.
- Mamdani, Mahmood. *When Victims Become Killers*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.
- McNulty, Mel. "The Collapse of Zaire: Implosion, Revolution or External Sabotage?" *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 1999: 53-82.
- Medecins Sans Frontieres. *Deadlock in the Rwandan Refugee Crisis: Repatriation Virtually at a Standstill*. July 20, 1995. <http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/article.cfm?id=1467> (accessed February 14, 2010).
- Mogire, Edward. "Preventing or Abetting: Refugee militarization in Tanzania." In *No Refuge: The Crisis of Refugee Militarization in Africa*, by Robert Muggah ed., 137-180. New York: Zed Books, 2006.
- Mthembu-Salter, Gregory. "The wheel turns again: militarization and Rwanda's Congolese refugees ." In *No Refuge: The Crisis of Refugee Militarization in Africa*, by Robert Muggah, 181-216. New York: Zed Books, 2006.
- Muggah, Robert, and Edward Mogire. "Arms Availability and Refugee Militarization in Africa- conceptualizing the issues." In *No Refuge: The Crisis of Refugee Militarization in Africa*, by Robert Muggah, 1-50. New York: Zed Books, 2006.
- Nahm, Sue J. "From bad to better: reflections on refugee and IDP militarization in Africa." In *No Refuge: The Crisis of Refugee Militarization in Africa*, by Robert Muggah, 217-250. New York: Zed Books, 2006.
- Newbury, David. "Returning Refugees: Four Historical Patterns of "Coming Home" to Rwanda." *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 2005: 252-285.

- Parasiliti, Andrew T. "The Causes and Timing of Iraq's Wars: A Power Cycle Assessment." *International Political Science Review*, 2003: 151-165.
- Parker, Alison. *Closed Door Policy: Afghan Refugees in Pakistan and Iran*. Report, New York: Human Rights Watch, 2002.
- Pottier, J. "Relief and Repatriation: Views by Rwandan Refugees; Lessons for humanitarian aid workers." *African Affairs*, 1996: 403-429.
- Pottier, J. "Why aid agencies need better understanding of the communities they assist: The experience of food aid in Rwandan refugee camps." *Disasters*, 1996: 324-337.
- Precht, Henry. "Ayatollah Realpolitik." *Foreign Policy*, 1988: 109-128.
- Prunier, Gerard. *Africa's World War: Congo, The Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- . *The Rwanda Crisis*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.
- Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. "What makes Democracies Endure?" In *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives*, by L. Diamond et al (eds.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997.
- Razi, G. Hossein. "An Alternative Paradigm to State Rationality in Foreign Policy: The Iran-Iraq War." *The Western Political Quarterly*, 1988: 689-723.
- Rieff, David. *A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002.
- Rogers, Tom. "Two Dimensions of a National Crisis: Population Growth and Refugees in Pakistan." *Modern Asian Studies*, 1992: 735-761.
- Rubin, Barnett. *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002.
- Sachs, Jeffrey. *The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for our time*. New York: Penguin, 2005.
- Salehyan, Idean. "The Externalities of Civil Strife: Refugees as a Source of International Conflict." *American Journal of Political Science*, 2008: 787-801.
- Salehyan, Idean, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. "Refugees and the Spread of Civil War." *International Organization*, 2006: 335-366.
- Sambanis, Nicholas. "Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars have the same causes?" *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2001: 259-282.

- Schaeffer, Benoit. "Le Monde." *Le monde compte de plus en plus de réfugiés "quasi permanents"*. October 4, 2010. http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2010/10/04/le-monde-compte-de-plus-en-plus-de-refugies-quasi-permanents_1420242_3210.html (accessed October 25, 2010).
- Schmeidl, Susanne. "(Human) Security Dilemmas: Long-Term Implications of the Afghan Refugee Crisis." *Third World Quarterly*, 2002: 7-29.
- Stam, Allan C, and Christian Davenport. "What Really Happened in Rwanda?" *Miller-McCune*. October 6, 2009. <http://www.miller-mccune.com/politics/what-really-happened-in-rwanda-3432/> (accessed November 30, 2010).
- Stedman, Stephen, and Fred Tanner. "Refugees as Resources in War." In *Refugee Manipulation: War, Politics, and the Abuse of Human Suffering*, by Stephen Stedman ed. and Fred Tanner ed., 1-16. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003.
- Swearingen, Will D. "Geopolitical Origins of the Iran-Iraq War." *Geographical Review*, 1988: 405-416.
- Terry, Fiona. *Condemned to Repeat?: The paradox of humanitarian action*. New York: Cornell University Press, 2002.
- Tober, Diane. "'My Body Is Broken Like My Country': Identity, Nation, and Repatriation among Afghan Refugees in Iran." *Iranian Studies*, 2007 Volume 40:2: 263-285.
- Umutesi, Marie. *Surviving the Slaughter: The Ordeal of a Rwandan Refugee in Zaire*. Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2000.
- United Nations High Commission for Refugees. *Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*. September 1, 2007. <http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b66c2aa10.pdf> (accessed March 21, 2010).
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. "Contributions to UNHCR for Budget Year 2010." *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees*. September 7, 2010. <http://www.unhcr.org/4c0e031b9.pdf> (accessed September 21, 2010).
- . "UNHCR at a Glance." *Refugees Magazine*, February 18, 1998: 30-31.
- Uvin, Peter. *Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda*. West Hartford: Kumarian Press, Inc, 1998.
- Uvin, Peter. "Reading the Rwandan Genocide." *International Studies Review*, 2001: 75-99.
- Weiner, Myron. "Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the causes of refugee flows." *International Security*, 1996: 5-42.
- Weiner, Myron. "The Clash of Norms: Dilemmas in Refugee Policies." *Journal of Refugee Studies*, December 1998: 10-17.

Whitaker, Beth. "Changing Priorities in Refugee Protection: The Rwandan Repatriation from Tanzania." In *Problems of Protection: The UNHCR, Refugees, and Human Rights*, by Niklaus Steiner ed., Mark Gibney ed. and Gil Loescher ed., 141-154. New York: Routledge, 2003.

Whitaker, Beth Elise. "Disjunctured Boundaries: Refugees, Hosts, and Politics in Western Tanzania." Dissertation, Chapel Hill, 1999.

Whitaker, Beth Elise. "Refugees and the Spread of Conflict: Contrasting Cases in Central Africa." *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 2003: 211-231.

Wirsing, Robert. *Pakistan's Security under Zia, 1977-1988*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.

World Bank. "The World Bank." *World Development Indicators & Global Development Finance*. September 28, 2010. <http://data.worldbank.org/country> (accessed October 24, 2010).

Zolberg, Aristide, Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo. *Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.