

**SOCIAL MEDIATION AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS: THE
DISCOURSE OF MARGINALITY IN A THEATER OF WAR**

by

Silvia Nathalie Koc-Menard

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Doctoral Committee:

Professor Bruce Mannheim, Chair
Professor Fernando Coronil
Professor Thomas E. Fricke
Assistant Professor Robert S. Jansen

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Dedication

Pour Maman

Où que tu sois...

*Merci pour m'enseigner l'importance de suivre
mes rêves et mes croyances, sans importer où ils m'envoient.*

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

APRA	Popular Revolutionary American Alliance is a center-left Peruvian political party.
ARA	Ayacucho Regional Archive
BONGO	Bank Organized NGO
CEDAP	It is an ONG based on Ayacucho city, working issues related with sanitation, and refining cattle.
CNR	National Compensation Council
CMAN	High-Level Commission
COMISEDH	Human Right Commission (NGO)
DINCOTE	National Direction Against Terrorism
ELN	National Liberation Army
EU	European Union
FR	Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report
GONGO	Governmental Organized NGO
IMF	International Monetary Bank
NGO	Non-Governmental organization
MIR	Revolutionary Left Movement
MIMDES	Ministry of Women and Social Development
PROANDE	NGO working in the area of Apurimac and Ayacucho

PTRC	Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission
RUV	Unique Register of Victims
PCP-SL	Peruvian Communist Part- Shining Path
SP	Shining Path
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organization
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
IDB	International Development Bank

Chapter 1. Introduction

My research is a political and moral denunciation of the political representation that scholars-- in collusion with the state, and NGOs-- have developed for the Quechuas living in the rural Andes in Peru. This auto-reflexive critique highlights how, despite the good intentions researchers may have in emphasizing the conditions of exclusion and poverty of the rural population, they have reproduced the same hierarchies of race and power that they aimed to denounce. This is what I call ‘moral denunciation,’ a common practice developed by scholars working in postwar societies, who often forget to ground their comments and analysis in the social and political realities of the society they are analyzing.

This work is the result of an analysis and reflexive critique about my experience as a researcher in Peru. My approach emerges from within the Peruvian academia, shaped by the theoretical tools that I have developed as a doctoral student in a North American university. Analyzing the Andes and its population from beyond the local frames that Peruvian scholars often employ to explain the Andes and its inhabitants (for examples see Degregori 1990, Quijano 1980, IEP 2000), has allowed me to develop a deep analysis and has given me the necessary distance to review and criticize my work in Peru.

Focusing on Chungui, a convulsive Quechua-speaking district in the Peruvian highlands—the epicenter of several episodes of political violence across the twentieth century and continuing up to the present—I explore the discourse of ‘marginality.’ Today, Chunguinos use this narrative to avoid any mention of political beliefs or actions during two insurrectionary periods, in 1965 and during the 1980s and 1990s. This allows them to portray themselves as passive victims caught between two fires. In order to better comprehend this, it is critical to comprehend actors’ choices and analyze them in the frame of their political understandings and their historical experiences.

Today, people in the rural Peruvian Andes use the discourse of ‘marginality’ to represent themselves in face-to-face interactions with different governmental offices, NGOs and Human Rights activists. By portraying themselves as ‘marginal’ they avoid talking about political beliefs or actions during the two insurrectionary movements they lived, first during the ELN guerrilla movement in 1965, and later during the internal war provoked by the Shining Path between 1980s -2000s. As will be discussed extensively, when Chunguinos use the word ‘marginal’ they address different ideas, some of which are closely related to the way they understand and experience the state and its different programs and institutions. This research looks how Chunguinos use ‘marginality’ to identify themselves as subordinate members of the Peruvian society. Along with focusing on how people in a rural community describe themselves as ‘marginal,’ I will analyse how the social mediation performed by anthropologists, NGO workers and activists has crafted, from outside and above of the social structure, the image of a ‘marginal people’ that Chunguinos use in their interactions with the state and foreigners.

The community of Chungui, or *Oreja de Perro* as it is generally known, is located in the region of Ayacucho in the central Peruvian Andes. It is divided in two peasant communities: Chungui and Chapi, these communities have maintained a hierarchical relationship in which Chapi is seen as the backward area inhabited by ignorant and illiterate former hacienda workers. Among scholars, NGO workers and state officials in Lima and Ayacucho city, this community elicits fear and sorrow, piety and guilt, abandonment and resignation. The community of Chapi (as I prefer to call *Oreja de Perro*) is a geographically distant community situated in the central Andes of the region Ayacucho (see Figure 1), and its story of violence became public with the release of the Final Report of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (PTRC) in 2003. I was part of the group that made this story public, as I conducted the research and wrote the report about Chungui that was included in the Final Report (see *Los Casos de Chungui y Oreja de Perro* in PTRC 2003a). This experience has given me a privileged position, able to speak from inside the PTRC, as witness (of how the PTRC have developed its researches and work inside as institution) and researcher.

The report about Chungui became one of the most important representations of the internal war in the countryside because it provided detailed information about how the Shining Path (a Maoist insurgent group that declared the war on the Peruvian state in 1980) organized rural communities to escape from the national army in a strategy called *retiradas* (En. withdrawals).¹ This information, along with detailed stories of violence

¹ An extended explanation of this is in Chapter 2.

and the high number of fatalities documented in the report (?), positioned *Oreja de Perro* and Chungui as the ‘most marginal community’ affected by the internal war.

This history of violence lived by Chapi and Chungui was ‘discovered’ by the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (PTRC), and thereafter continuously exposed by Peruvian and North American scholars, NGOs and Human Rights activists. These scholars and activists have assumed the role of the ‘humanitarian witness’ (see Fassin and Rechtman 2009), who feel the moral urge to transmit people’s stories of suffering and violence in order to publicly denounce the atrocities relayed through these stories. This problematic since, in most cases, the core of their denunciation is empathy, crafting a narrative of what the group considers important and rather than the story that the primary actors want to tell. In so doing, the urge of the humanitarian spokesmen to denounce the violence and suffering caused by the Peruvian internal war denies rural Quechuas the power to speak for themselves and the possibility to be heard.² The protective role that activists and scholars have assumed thus reinforces a historical subordination of rural Quechuas. In this context, the good intentions of the intelligentsia become tools of domination.

Almost ten years have passed since the communities of Chungui and Chapi have entered into the public narratives of the internal war, becoming the ‘most marginal’ and ‘forgotten communities’ in Peru. As a result, today it is common to find that people in Chungui and Chapi use the narrative of ‘marginality’ in every public meeting to

² I do not discuss here the problems if the subaltern can or cannot speak. For an extended discussion see Spivak (1987) and Coronil (1994)

introduce themselves as a community in much need, especially before government agencies and NGOs. However, what people in Chungui and Chapi mean by ‘marginal’ and ‘forgotten’ is different than the official narrative of ‘marginality’ used by the state, activists and social scientists (for an extended discussion see Chapter 4). For them, being ‘marginal’ becomes a strategy to become visible and talk about their relationship to the central state. Although ‘marginality’ does not seem to be a part of everyday life, we should not conclude that this is only an instrumental tool to achieve visibility. In some contexts, especially when people in Chapi (other than authorities) talk about their relationship with the state, and how they experience it, it seems that people have internalized the position of a ‘marginal community.’ The multiple personal interviews and stories of families that I collected suggest that to label themselves as a ‘marginal community’ is also a way to experience being at the margins of Peruvian society.

Each time I am back in Lima and Ayacucho, I am confronted with narratives that portray Chungui and Chapi as the ‘marginal,’ ‘forgotten’ and ‘isolated’ community that lives on the frontier of the modern Peruvian state. Moreover, it is often taken for granted that these communities are only ‘war victims,’ as if there was not anything else to say about them. It is clear that all of these representations aim to produce compassion and empathy by calling for the civil society’s ‘moral obligation.’ Beyond the temporal empathy that these stories provoke, the concrete historical and socio-political problems of this community and the Peruvian state are not addressed. This, in turn, prevents a complete understanding of the problems of violence and the hierarchies upon which Peruvian society is constructed.

The humanitarian witness role, self-assumed by NGOs and scholars, produces a context in which people in Chapi and Chungui do not have the authority to act as spokespeople, despite all they have lived through. Thus victims of violence are deprived of the power to express themselves; instead, professionals step out to defend the cause and speak on their behalf, also crafting demands of compensation for them.³ The Peruvian and North American intelligentsia finds the need to protect the helpless rural Quechuas by nurturing a traditional role of domination.

This research looks at the way ‘marginality’ is used as a label and narrative by people in Chapi when they interact with the state and NGOs in the current postwar context. Originally used in the 1960s by scholars of dependency theory, and particularly explored by Perlman (1976),⁴ ‘marginality’ aimed to call attention to the economic exclusion experienced by one group of the population. However, at the same time, this label and narrative has reproduced a hierarchical and racialized discourse about rural Quechuas that reinforces the colonial domination.⁵ In this sense, a discourse that attempts to highlight the rural population’s particular conditions of economic exclusion and isolation ends up imposing a hierarchy of race and power. By using the category of ‘marginality’ and the discourses this generates, people in Chapi look to call attention to their needs, demanding the attention of the state (in the form of different agencies and social programs) that they feel are absent. Moreover, they use ‘marginality’ in particular

³ In this case, as will be discussed, the demands for compensation are established by NGOs and Human Rights groups and they state what the state should give the rural population, not what they have asked for.

⁴ For an extended analysis see Chapter 6.

⁵ I refer to colonial domination to the historical domination that Creoles have historically deployed over Andean subjects.

ways to highlight their relationship with the state and to explain the intense violence they lived during the internal war.

The challenge of describing concrete social phenomena is to do it without using the descriptive terms already in use. In this sense, my work avoids this trap by creating an analysis that avoids the flaws and failures that arise from our acceptance of constrained conventional thinking. If we choose to name what we study with the words that the people involved already use, we acquire, with those words, the attitudes and perspectives they imply (Becker 2003: 661). Therefore, in analyzing 'marginality,' I address the ideas and practices of race that are closely related to ideas of modernity and knowledge, which are at the same time deeply embedded in the way most scholars have represented rural Quechua communities (for examples of this approach see: Fuenzalida 1970; Matos Mar 1969; Quijano 1980). At the same time that 'marginality' condenses ideas of economic and political exclusion it consolidates a particular way of reproducing the rural Andes and its population. 'Marginality' reproduces dichotomies by imagining the Peruvian society as composed of two groups, one modern and progressive, and the other marginal and backwards. This division is closely related to other dichotomies used on a daily basis by Peruvians: Criollo/mestizo vs. indigenous, urban vs. rural, and educated vs. illiterate.

To understand this production process, it is important to look at how names for things reflect a relationship of power: to be 'marginal' is to be a racialized and pre-modern subject, one who antagonizes the non-racial, unmarked and modern subject living in the urban centers. Although some may find that this distinction has the danger of reproducing the racial hierarchy (between urban and rural groups, Criollo/mestizos and

Quechuas), I find it important to establish a clear distinction between the groups analyzed. Acknowledging the homogenization that these categories have produced, I nonetheless recognize the different levels and forms of ‘marginality’ that exist inside each of these groups (Chapters 2 and 3 highlight these different levels within the district of Chungui).

Criollo/mestizo is an unmarked category that is assumed to be the norm, against which those who look or behave different is compared. Therefore, in Peru *campesino* (En. peasant) and *indígena* (En. indigenous) are racialized terms that mark and tacitly address a group living in rural and poor areas, without basic services (like running water and electricity), who are illiterate and Quechua monolingual. Race discourses frame a group’s origin in natural terms, and racializing defines a polarity between the Criollo/mestizo and rural Quechua groups (cf. Urciuoli 1996: 15).

‘Marginality,’ as other categories, cannot be fully thought through (unless we are conscious that the word itself is an element of the problem (Sapir [1929]1985 162). Since words and categories are implicated in the way we conceptualize reality, it is important to acknowledge the limitations that this may bring. Chunguino often related to be ‘marginal’ with being ‘ignorant’ and ‘easily deceived.’ These categories are only used in the district of Chungui to talk about former hacienda workers and its families who live in Chapi. Moreover, these words are commonly used by people in Chapi (especially the younger generation) to explain why they lived them lived under the hacienda regime and how they were tricked by the Shining Path.

My dissertation looks at the ways anthropological discourses, in collusion with the state and NGOs have created the very social realities that they presume to study. These discourses not only have shaped people's subjectivities but also they have produced knowledge and power apparatuses. I aim to show how anthropologists play an essential role in transforming subordinates' lives, creating them as 'marginal' and contributing to their subordination (Rosaldo 1989, Trouillot 1991). I bring out anthropology's rhetorical power, focusing on its political undertones and the implications of our analysis in academic and non-academic domains alike, in this case in the daily lives of people in Chungui. My final goal is to open a discussion about the power of academic discourses ('scientific' knowledge), and especially the power of anthropological discourses to create the particular realities that it intends to study.

The following Chapters work independently, but all of them are connected through the discussion of how Criollo/mestizo urban knowledge is imposed on rural Quechua communities, producing a cultural, social and political subordination. This creates a hierarchical system in which rural Quechuas accept that to be included into the Peruvian state they need to 'de-indianize' themselves through the acquisition of Western knowledge, which implies modern rationality. The cases analysed in the following Chapters deal with the production of rural Quechuas as 'marginal' subordinate subjects often treated as infants in need of guidance by the Criollo/mestizo knowledge, in many instances led by social scientists and activists.

By engaging an integrated view of the micro and macro—the local and the global – in one analysis, my project expands the ways in which Andean society has traditionally

been understood. This approach more accurately reflects the complexity of social life in the Andes, keeping in mind that the same phenomenon is repeated at different levels by different actors. The community of Chungui constantly discriminates, producing a racial subordination against people in Chapi. By considering themselves superiors, subjects in Chapi are portrayed as backward and ignorant group that has caused much suffering by supporting the Shining Path. In the same path, people living in the city of Huamanga discriminate and subordinate those who live in the countryside, because they are seen as backward and pre-modern, in other words, they are 'Indians.' Finally, at a national level, elites in Lima consider that all the Andes (even urban areas) are the problem in Peru, because this region and its people halt the progress of 'modern' Criollo Peru by maintain traditional practises and speaking Quechua.

1. Peru: race and modernity in the post-war context

The Shining Path (Sp. *Sendero Luminoso*), a Maoist insurgent group born in the University of Huamanga in the south-central city of Ayacucho, started the internal war against the Peruvian state on May 18, 1980. This group emerged from one of the multiple factions of the Peruvian Sino-Left (for the extended history see Degregori 1990; Poole and Rénique 1992; PTRC 2003a; Stern 1998), that between 1977 and the beginning of the 1980s worked underground, gathering supporters in rural high schools and peasant communities in the central region of Ayacucho. Although Abimael Guzmán⁶ is recognized as the official leader, an important ideologue behind the Shining Path's

⁶ A. Guzman, along with other important Shining Path leaders, was captured on September 12th 2002, during the regime of President Fujimori.

project was Diaz Martinez, an agricultural engineer also working at the University of Huamanga (see Harding 1988; Hinojosa 1987). The twenty years of internal war produced 69,280 victims (among dead and disappeared citizens), of which 75% were native Quechua speakers living in rural areas (PTRC 2003a).

In 2001, at the fall of President Fujimori's regime, the transitional government of President Valentín Paniagua appointed a group of scholars and intellectuals to investigate the crimes committed by the Peruvian state and the Shining Path between 1980 and 2000. After some changes, the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (PTRC) finally began its work and submitted its Final Report in August 2003.

Although the Final Report did not consider the internal war to have been a racial conflict (PTRC 2003a), race is one of the explanatory factors of the high number of native Quechua-speaking victims.⁷ The racial ideology upon which Peruvian society has been constructed played an important role in the daily lives of civilians and security forces in identifying Shining Path suspects. During the internal war, Limeños were likely to suspect that someone with brown skin, dark hair and the particular accent that people have when Spanish is not the mother tongue, were was member of the Shining Path. Likewise, being Ayacuchano was synonym with being a terrorist, and having a rural background made people immediately suspect of Shining Path affiliation. Racial

⁷ Peruvian society, including its scholars and activists, are used to 'assuming' that everybody understands how the racial practices work in everyday life in Peru. Accordingly, the PTRC and its Final Report did not strongly assert in its first pages that the main cause of the internal war was the racial practices performed on a daily basis by the state and its institutions (such as the national army), nor the consequent muteness of civil society. Having said that, I nonetheless consider the PTRC, and the Final Report, to be one of the most important political projects ever developed in Peru.

practices did not need to be formal or explicit to influence the state's behavior (Lemon 2002) and actions.

In Peru race works through social practices that rarely use explicit racial terminology. Racial terms –such as *Indio* and *indígena*– are instead silenced and masqueraded with euphemisms like illiterate, rural, ignorant and marginal; these racial terminologies mark hierarchical differences in every sphere of social, political and cultural life. In this sense, race becomes one of the more determinant means of domination. The category of race has evolved from identifying subjects by phenotypic features (mainly skin color) to identifying subjects through other racial markers, such as economic activity (peasants vs. professionals⁸), dress, residence and level of education. For example, when subjects are identified by education level, categories like illiterate and ignorant are naturally associated with rural Quechuas by the rest of the Peruvian society. In this process of discrimination, subordination or domination, subjects living in the countryside are racialized by those living in the city, and also by some rural communities that consider themselves superior to others (like the community of Chungui⁹). Through intertwined linguistic signs, body language and the particular situation itself, subjects evade, subvert, transform or perpetuate hierarchies in face-to face interactions (Huayhua 2010: 84).

⁸ Professionals (*Sp. Profesionales*) is the label used in Peru to name people working in the city. This does not necessarily mean that they have a college degree; however, it is assumed that there was some educational training after finishing college.

⁹ See Chapter 2 for an extended explanation of the differences between Chapi and Chungui.

Rural communities are constantly racialized not only by urban institutions and subjects, but also amongst themselves. In this sense, the peasant community of Chungui, which has historically been an independent community, racialized Chapi because it was a former hacienda and its inhabitants were former hacienda workers. In this context, to be ‘marginal’ in Chapi is different from being ‘marginal’ in the community of Chungui. Within each community, therefore, there are different levels of experiencing ‘marginality,’ depending upon the characteristics of the different social and economic groups living in each community.

Although racialized practices are not new, contemporary scholars, NGOs and state officials also tend to ‘Indianize’ rural Quechuas by keeping them silent and dominated under the labels of ‘ignorant’ and ‘marginal.’¹⁰ Racialized practices are relational, processual and dynamic. People categorize others in order to assert a particular social standing or position in the socio-political structure, or to exert power in everyday life. For Peruvians living in centers of power like Lima, the rural Andes are seen as containers of backward, pre-modern, illiterate and monolingual groups that hold back the development of the Peruvian nation-state. In contrast, the coast of Peru and the urban areas of the highlands, such as Cusco and Huamanga, are inhabited by Criollo/mestizos who are seen as modern, educated, rational, Spanish-speaking groups that work toward the progress of the nation-state. Within this racial ideology, phenotypic distinctions are not as important as other racial markers. In other words, a person from a rural community may look, phenotypically, like any other urban settler; however, what classifies someone

¹⁰ This will be extensively discussed in Chapter 6.

as one or the other (as indigenous or Creole/ mestizo) is constrained by the set of racial markers displayed in their daily interactions.¹¹ These markers sometimes can be controlled and changed, and this process is seen as an important ascension in the social hierarchy. For example, regional NGO workers often have a rural background, which they feel they have surpassed (or erased) by acquiring a college degree.¹² At the same time that upward social mobility implies respect and power, it also implies leaving behind the possibility of being a proud indigenous Quechua. In Peru racial ideologies and practices position being indigenous as antagonistic to being a modern and rational subject.

For the purposes of my analysis, I use the term ‘rural Quechuas’ for individuals whose first language is Quechua, although some of them speak Spanish fluently. They live in rural communities in the Andean highlands, and their main economic activities are agriculture and raising livestock. In contrast with Ecuador and Bolivia, they do not recognize themselves as “Quechuas”; therefore, rather than use Quechua as an ethnic label I use it to refer to the language used by these communities. In addition, and more polarizing than it deserves to be, in order to simplify a complex reality I use “urban Criollo/mestizos” as only one category. This category refers to those people who speak Spanish as a first language, live in urban centers and practice economic activities not directly related to agriculture. Although Creole (*Sp. criollo*) was the term used during

¹¹ How people dress, what they speak and what they do for living are important racial markers that are generally internalized from early ages (for a complete discussion see de la Cadena 2000).

¹² See Chapter 7 for a complete analysis of this example.

colonial times to refer to Spaniards born in the Americas, since the early 20th century it has been used to refer to those who live in Lima and are seen as ‘whiter’ than the rest of the Peruvian population. “Mestizo” is the category traditionally used for the offspring of a Spaniard (‘white’) and an indigenous Quechua. During the 1920s, Cusco’s intellectuals began to use the term to refer to themselves, positioning themselves closer to Creole status and opposite to the ‘Indio’ who lived in the countryside. I use the term urban “Criollo/mestizo” precisely because of these ideas of superiority that provincial intellectuals imagine themselves to have in relation to the rural population, and the equal status they claim to have in relation to the coastal Creoles,. This is certainly a more radical and sharp distinction than what we find in the field. Indeed, “rural Quechuas” and “Criollo/mestizos” are not homogenized categories, and there are important differences in how communities within those categories understand ‘marginality.’ However, I find that that this sharp distinction is necessary—at least in a relational sense--in order to effectively explain how social relationships work.

For a long time, “modernization” served as the Peruvian state’s paradigm for development. It was assumed that in order to develop the country, the first task was to modernize the countryside and its population. Even today, Quechua-speaking communities are seen by state officials, some scholars, NGOs workers and international aid agencies as the major obstacle to achieving modernization and progress in Peru, due to the traditional practices that are considered backward (such as farming and raising livestock).. In other words, it is believed by the state that Peru does not develop because the native populations (indigenous groups in the highlands, like Aymaras, and the

Amazon) still 'live in pre-modern times' and urgently need to be modernized. The modernization project has been a major topic among scholars, NGOs and state officials who have proposed the "urgent need" to include these 'underdeveloped' indigenous communities into the modern structures of the nation-state. However, these projects have often treated rural Quechuas as minors in need of guidance and knowledge imagined to only exist in the urban coast of Peru.

The division in Peru between modern and pre-modern implies a racial classification that goes beyond physical features (as race is not only about skin color), and refers to discursive practices of racial identification that legitimize the power that urban groups exert over rural communities. Thus rural inhabitants are marked as *Indios* (En. Indian), an extremely pejorative term in Peru. As Alaina Lemon highlights, other things could signal race on their own; anything isolated as a difference can be made to signal some ostensibly essential nature connecting a particular group (2002: 58). Thus 'marginal' becomes the euphemism to refer to rural Quechuas as *Indios* without uttering these words, but embedding its same meanings. Racial logics not only live in the terms that refer to things, but in the various ways in which people use language to index relationships in specific contexts.

The rural Andean highlands are constructed as a subordinate container in which 'Indians' live. The 'Indian problem' is defined as the lack of integration of the indigenous group into the modern Creole society that emerged after at the beginning of the 20th century (as I will explain in Chapter 6). Trying to solve the 'Indian problem,' Peruvian and North American scholars have often reinforced the very subordination that they aim

to fight. The outcome has been an academic tradition that, despite possible good intentions, has only reinforced the historical domination upon which the Peruvian society has been built.

The Peruvian Andes is a geographical space as much as a discursive reality, it is a set of images upon which Peruvian society has built fantasies, fears and desires. Although there is a material reality, the difficulty is that this materiality is defined by discourses and through words (Mignolo 2007; quoted by Vich 2010: 157). Thus, 'reality' cannot be independent from language and the images that are configured as social representations, which influence the ways people interact with reality (Vich 2010). The images of the Andes dominating the Peruvian imaginary need to be rethought and desedimented, enabling us to localize the ways in which this space has been conceptualized. Although the set of images through which the Andean highlands and its inhabitants are produced have political importance, these representations exercise social and political forms of control and domination (for extended discussion see Said 1979).

The imaginaries regarding the Peruvian Andes play a central role in the analysis of the problems that the central state faces, as fantasies that hamper any relationships between the centers of power and the Andes (Vich 2010: 155). Thus, the current depiction of the Peruvian Andes as 'static,' 'barbarous,' 'violent' and 'marginal' (among others), flows among different governmental, academic and development spaces, and exemplifies the exclusion of the region from different national projects. Vich suggests that no political-economic project regarding the Peruvian Andean highlands will succeed if the dominant cultural representation does not change.

Since colonial times, the Peruvian Andes have been the source of several imaginaries that circulate within different political and academic domains. Some of the images produced by dominant groups are still present and shape the way coastal elites interact with the Andean highlands. According to Victor Vich, these images are:

A) The Andes is perceived to be a degraded and abject reality, a space understood as barbaric and in need of education –in a guardianship way– and to be excluded from all political participation (Vich 2010: 159). In this context education demands to ‘de-indianize,’ which stresses the need to leave behind all forms of (the considered inferior and pre-modern) Andean cultural heritages.

B) The *sierra* (the Peruvian geographical region surrounding by the Andean highlands that goes from 8,000 to 14,000 feet above the sea level) is imagined to be an empty reality where there is no important knowledge, which contrasts with the developed coast as the space that has ‘everything’ (Vich 2010: 160). Andean provincial cities are still imagined by coastal elites as backward and static in which development cannot be achieved. In contrast, coastal cities are seen as centers in which knowledge is available to all (coastal elites, mestizos and rural Quechuas). The coast has been constituted as the place of civilization and the market (Vich 2010: 160), and in this discussion the opposition between urban and rural is critical.

C) The *sierra* is an extended, unknown and difficult territory to control, a ‘savage’ space impossible to govern. Yet at the same time, it is a natural, virgin, romantic, and bucolic scenario (Vich 2010: 161) that is the subject of national pride. This is a space in which capitalism and modernity need to enter so it can be developed like the ‘modern and

productive' coast. In this sense, projects promoted by the Peruvian government, like *sierra exportadora* (En. Sierra Export),¹³ suggest that the Andean region is an available and vast space that can satisfy the demands of the global market. However, within this image Andean communities living in this space do not matter, and are systematically transformed, erased and silenced (Vich 2010: 164). Consequently, the *sierra* is portrayed by the state as a space without proper actors, one that needs to be conquered by the modern state.

These perceptions/ideas of the Peruvian Andes form the backbone of the national imaginary, which functions as the means of domination and justification for the hierarchy between Creole-mestizo/Quechua, urban/rural and coast/Andes. To change this, the Andean region needs to be reinvented as a space of possibility; rather than an obstacle, it needs to be conceived in a dialogical process with its native population, which needs to be considered equally intelligent and capable.

2. From Said's *Orientalism* to the 'marginal' Andes

Ruling and dominant elites, including scholars, have often pictured the Andean Indigenous population in landscapes associated with isolation and barriers to development (Orlove 1993, Radcliffe 1996, Weismantel 2001), ignoring the close articulation between indigenous labor and regional political economies (Andolina, et al. 2009: 57). This dominant image problematically creates a reality that is imagined to be isolated and backward.

¹³ See <http://www.sierraexportadora.gob.pe/>

The social and political representations that will be discussed in the following chapters will be better understood if they are analysed in light of Edward Said's work. Said's discussion of Orientalism is helpful for understanding how the Andes, like Asia and other non-European societies, have been produced as exotic spaces inhabited by backward and pre-modern subjects. Said defines Orientalism as the body of knowledge produced by the West about the Orient. As a representation, Orientalism entails particular interests, claims, projects, ambitions and rhetoric. Therefore, the challenge to overcome Orientalism and the colonial era is to surpass the muteness imposed upon the Orient as an object (Said 1985: 93). In the same line of argument, my research challenges the imagined passivity and silence historically imposed upon rural Quechua subjects, who have their own way to interpret and explain social life.

The development of Orientalism has depended on four elements: expansion, historical confrontation, sympathy and classification; without these, Orientalism could not have occurred (1979: 120). Expansion refers to the European interest in expanding their knowledge about the Orient beyond Islamic lands, promoting European exploration in the rest of the region. Said argues that the expansion of Europe fortified its sense of being the cultural strength of the world. Therefore, Europe established itself as the privileged centre that is also the privileged observer. The expansion of the Orient lands dissolved and reshaped the world map, incorporating areas like India, China and Japan as references on the map (Said 1979: 120).

By "historical confrontation," Said refers to a knowledgeable attitude toward the alien and the exotic (the Orient) historically held by travellers, but also by historians who

found it profitable to compare the European experience with the older civilizations that they were ‘discovering’ (Cf. Said 1979: 117). The possibility of dealing historically with non-European and non-Judeo Christian cultures strengthened History as a discipline. Consequently, a proper understanding of Europe meant comprehending the relations between Europe and its reachable cultural frontiers (Said 1979: 120).

Said used “sympathetic identification” to explain how, before the eighteenth century, all cultures were believed by Europe to be organically and internally coherent, bound together by a spirit or national idea which an outsider could penetrate only by an act of historical sympathy. Thereby imbued with this populist and pluralist sense of history, the eighteenth-century mind (like Herder and others) could breach the doctrinal walls erected between the West and Islam, and see hidden elements of kinship between himself and the Orient. Napoleon and Mozart are famous examples of this identification via sympathy (Said 1979: 118).

For Said, the fourth element of Orientalism was the need to classify nature and man into types, creating networked systems of related generalizations. The idea was to reduce vast numbers of objects into a smaller number of objects and describable types. A type has a particular characteristic that provided the observer with a designation and a ‘controlled derivation.’ These types of characters belong to a system, a network of related generalizations (Said 1979: 119). Therefore, classifications of mankind were systematically multiplied, as the possibilities of designation and derivation were refined beyond categories (Said 1979: 120). In short, for Said the modern Orientalist theory and praxis (from which present-day Orientalism derives) can be understood not as a sudden

influx of objective knowledge about the Orient, but as a set of structures inherited from the past, secularized, redisposed, and re-shaped by such disciplines as philology, which in turn were naturalized, modernized, and laicized substitutes for Christian supernaturalism (Said 1979: 122).

In 'Orientalism Reconsidered' (1985), Said calls for the inclusion of Orientalists as part of the study of Orientalism because

the social world includes the person or subject doing the studying as well as the object or realm being studied, it is imperative to include them both in any consideration of Orientalism, for, obviously enough, there could be not Orientalism without, on one hand, the Orientalists, and on the other, the Orientals (Said 1985: 90)

Similarly, my research considers the need to include the different groups that have produced the 'rural Quechuas' and their space as 'marginal.' My work aims to highlight the importance of relating the observed to the observers, and knowledge to the site of the information, which may result in a better strategy to understand the historical production of the Other (Coronil 1995).

In the 1990s Orin Starn, using Said's Orientalism as a model, wrote a provocative article that triggered an important discussion among North American scholars working in the Andes (for a complete analysis see Starn, et al. 1994). Starn argued that social scientists did not foresee the emergence of the Shining Path in the Andes because they were not attuned to the conditions that made the rise of this group possible: by ignoring the inter-linkage of Peru's rural and urban; scholars overlooked the climate of unrest in the countryside. To understand this practice, Starn coined the phrase *Andeanism* (andinismo) to refer to 'the representation that portrays contemporary highland peasants as outside the flow of modern history' (Starn 1991: 64). Rather than repeat the debate that

this piece provoked I explain the limits of the concept of *Andeanism*, and discuss some of the problems embedded in the call by Starn (although he is not the only one practicing this) to develop an anthropology of (moral) denunciation. Starn argues that studies in the Andes have overemphasized the continuity and otherness of Quechuas, and thus, like Orientalism, “Andeanism” dichotomizes the Occidental, coastal, urban, with the non-Western, highland, rural, indigenous, and essentializes the Andean population. Comparing the work of Billie-Jean Isbell and Antonio Diaz Martinez, Starn develops his argument for what the role of anthropology should be in places like Peru. According to Starn, Isbell’s work *To defend ourselves* (1977) represents *Andeanism*, while Diaz Martinez’s work *Ayacucho: Hambre y Esperanza* (1969) considers important changes that *Andeanism* did not. These are different works with different agenda that aimed to be read by different groups. While the work of Isbell is an anthropological analysis performed by a North American scholar and framed in the anthropological tradition of the 1960s, the work of Diaz Martinez is a moral-political denunciation realized by a Peruvian agricultural engineer who aimed to justify the Shining Path’s ideology of violence. Even though these are completely different works with different goals and methodologies (for instance, Isbell did first-hand ethnographic while Diaz Martinez did not), Starn chose them to highlight how “Andeanist” anthropology has done little to include the discontent of peasants and their actions in their work. Starn celebrates the political denunciation in the work of Diaz Martinez, and condemns the ‘celebration’¹⁴ of

¹⁴ Rather than ‘celebration,’ the work of Isbell is framed in a political context where the Andes and ‘lo andino’ was seen as the obstacle to becoming a modern (developed) nation-state.

Andean culture that he considers Isbell was doing. He argues that Andeanist anthropology did not recognize the explosive pain and discontent in the highlands (Starn 1991: 69); consequently, he argues for the need to dismantle the binary logic of Andeanism: Andean/European, indigenous/western, traditional/modern. Rather than presume the separateness of the Andean and the West, he calls for an approach that considers plural identities as particular ways of living (Starn 1991: 85). However, his analysis is trapped in a moral denunciation by refusing to engage in an historical analysis of the sort Said called for in his analysis of Orientalism.

Among all the critiques that the idea of Andeanism and Starn's positions provoked, the most relevant problem is the one generated by his characterization of Andeanist anthropology. This homogenizes earlier works from the 1960s as static and primitivizing, assuming that they have negative political impact. Through a random selection of works and quotes, Starn actually excludes from his discussion and analysis the indigenous resistances and postcolonial practices considered in other academic works. In other words, he barely includes a political history of Andean anthropology, which results in an extremely selective set of works that removes from the analytical scope many important contributions that fought the representations of the Andean subject as timeless and isolated. In addition, his claim that anthropology focused on peasants because of its obsession with 'primitive otherness' is untrue. In the 1950's the work of E. Wolf and S. Mintz pioneered the study of peasants explicitly located within the context of modern complex societies and global forces, outside the bounds of the primitive world. Their generation in turn inspired subsequent anthropologists, whom Starn accuses of

being trapped in the primitivizing assumptions of Andeanism (Comment by David Nugent, in Starn, et al. 1994: 28).

Starn also fails at reproducing the historical and literary analysis developed by Said on Orientalism. While Said offers a critique of the intellectual European-Westernized production and representation of the Orient, Starn limits the idea of Andeanism to an idealized discourse about the socio-historical reality in the Andes. Said stresses that Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction between the West and Orient (the rest) (Poole and Renique 1994: 81). Moreover, an important part of Said's contribution is the form through which the textual and discursive constructions of the racial and cultural differences become the political and institutional foundations of the imperialist power:

Orientalism is more valuable as a sign of European-Atlantic power over the East than as a truthful discourse about the Orient (which is what, in its academic or scholarly form, it is meant to be). However, we must respect and try to understand the coherent and persuasive power of Orientalist discourse¹⁵ (Poole and Renique 1994: 81-2)

The difficulty with Starn's piece is that he does not develop, beyond the obvious, an analysis of the similarities between Andeanism and Orientalism. In fact, as Poole and Renique emphasize, Starn's model is different from the one followed by Said. First, Starn rejects Said's methods of careful readings, such as his Foucauldian definition of Orientalism concerning a wide multidisciplinary spectrum. Rather, Starn develops an essentialist operation, and seems to be arguing that a close reading becomes too

¹⁵ El Orientalismo es particularmente más valioso como un signo de poder Europeo-Atlántico sobre el Oriente, que como discurso veraz sobre el Oriente (que es lo que, en su forma académica o erudita, pretende ser). Sin embargo, lo que debemos respetar y tratar de comprender es la coherente y persuasiva fuerza del discurso orientalista.

meticulous a polemic. Instead, Starn chose a simple sampling of texts and authors, restricting his discussion to a reduced sample of North-American and Peruvian anthropologists. In addition, entire books and research are reduced to phrases and quotes pulled out of context that seem to be crafted to achieve his purpose (Cf. Poole and Renique 1994: 81-3).

A final relevant difficulty with Starn's piece is the selection of Diaz Martinez's work as the example of moral denunciation that Andean anthropology should make. The result of his argument is an abstract and general claim for a change in scholarly approach in which it is irrelevant whether it is formulated in Ann Arbor in the 1990s or Lima in 2011. In other words, there is not any temporal or historical context to ground his argument that may explain the particularities of analysing the Andes. The danger of this sort of denunciation is that it talks about the past without considering the politics of the present. In Starn's piece, the morality of the past is not grounded and does not have a political perspective of any concrete response. The culpabilities of the past provoke the 'need' to perform a moral denunciation for not having seen what was in front of them at that particular moment. In other words, Starn started his argument by accusing scholars working on the Andes of not recognizing the emergence of the Shining Path; however, his argument does not include the important mobilization (and the consequent research) developed in the 1960s and 1970s during the land struggle for the land.

Moral denunciation is a general practice by some scholars (such as Diaz Martinez and Starn) who either look to justify violence or denounce the violence suffered by communities. Writing from Ayacucho, Lima, Washington or Ann Arbor, moral

denunciations intend to provoke empathy and sorrow for a particular cause, and can be performed by insurgent leaders or Human Rights activists. However, the outcome of these pledges (like the pledges of Diaz Martinez and Starn) is shallow, in the sense that they do not address the concrete historical conditions that made these situations of violence and suffering possible.

Therefore, I find that Starn's critique of Andeanism and Shining Path's ideology are closely related in the way they ground their arguments. Shining Path neatly divided the world into absolute good or absolute evil, providing simple answers to the complex problems of Peru and its youth. Shining Path saw the armed struggle as an Olympian battle between good and evil fought at all levels of existence, from the individual soul to the universe (Poole and Rénique 1992: 48). This black-and-white vision of political struggle derives from Guzman's idiosyncratic (Kant-influenced) understanding of the Maoist and Marxist concepts of contradiction. Guzman departed from the Marxist-Leninist tradition, assuming that all contradiction is antagonistic. Rejecting with this the basic Marxist principle of unity of opposites, Guzman constructed his theory of contradiction on Kant's concept of real or exclusive oppositions, which are only resolvable through the intervention of a supra-human agency (the divine). Guzman concludes that the solution to this antagonism is irreconcilable, and must be through the eradication of one of the poles (Poole and Rénique 1992: 50-1). Building on Kant's theory of causal necessity, Guzman sees the party and its armed struggle as the necessary consequence of all past events leading up to that moment. For Guzman, as for Kant, there is no need to look back into history and question why, or what if: 'the done is done, it

cannot be reopened.’ Through Guzman’s writing and speeches, history is presented as an inexorable material force lacking human agency (Poole and Rénique 1992: 50-1).

3. Geopolitics of Knowledge

Peruvian and North American scholars (some exceptions are Allen 1988; de la Cadena 2000; Poole 1994b; Quijano and Ennis 2000; Seligmann 1989) have historically understood the rural Andes and its population through representations that produce the image of separate units, when in reality they are bounded together. These representations disaggregate relational histories and transform difference into hierarchy, naturalizing these representations and intervening in the reproduction of the existing power relationships that justify the domination of urban Criollo/mestizos over rural Quechuas (Cf. Coronil 1995: 57). Thus, what should be understood as one historical phenomenon, that gives origin to Peruvian society, is understood as two different social groups placed against each other as antagonists. In other words, rather than seeing the Sierra as a production of the dominant relations between urban and rural, it is understood as two, sometimes even unrelated, distinct groups. Understanding the Sierra as an independent unit not related with the history of the coastal region (mainly Lima) does not allow us to uncover the hidden relational nature of the representation of social groups, bringing out the origin of asymmetrical power relations, which often tend to represent the historical outcomes of connected peoples as internal and separate attributes of bounded entities (Coronil 1995: 56). In this sense, my work exposes the rhetoric through which the Andes

and its communities have been produced and reproduced as independent realities that are labelled as 'marginal,' emphasizing the racial practices used in this process.

The asymmetrical way in which rural Quechua communities are understood and incorporated into the Peruvian imaginary cannot be separated from the Western hegemony embodied by the Criollo/mestizo Peruvian coast. At the same time, these are neither homogenous groups. Since colonial times, the Peruvian coast has been considered the centre of Hispanic power. That Lima was one of the most important cities in the Spanish colonies influenced the production of an identity different from the Andes. Lima and the coast were considered the dominant form of knowledge, expressing Western power and domination, establishing a specific bond between power in the West and superior knowledge (Said 1979).

Thus our task should be to recognize the implications of the representation and images we produce as scholars, their dominant effects and the historical consequences they have. This type of analysis will lead us to be accountable for our statements and analysis, in terms of politics and in relationship to the politics of epistemology and the epistemology of politics (Cf. Coronil 1995: 73). Challenging the domination performed by Criollo/mestizos upon the rural Quechua implies overturning the polarity between the Andes and the rest of Criollo/mestizo society in Peru, which involves understanding cultures in relation to each other and constituting each other, rather than comprehending them as autonomous entities. Moreover, differences need to be historicized rather than essentialized, and boundaries and groups understood as historically determined within relationships of domination. The Peruvian Andes is represented and converted into a

tangible reality by urban Creoles/mestizos; therefore the connection between knowledge and power becomes important to analyse since it directly influences how we understand rural Quechuas (Coronil 1995: 73-5).

Knowledge is constituted by the ways in which people categorize, code, process and assign meaning to their experiences. This is true of academic ('scientific') and non-academic knowledge. In this sense, knowledge should not be equated exclusively with a professional set of ideas. Rather, knowledge is something that everybody possesses, although the beliefs and procedures for its validation may vary from group to group. Western societies are built upon the dominant ideology that holds that academic knowledge is superior because it is objective and provides literal accounts of what the world is like.

To understand how Western knowledge has been established as the dominant paradigm for understanding and explaining the world and its differences, it is important to go back to the colonization of the New World, which sheds light on the origins of how boundaries between Western Europe and the rest of the world have been drawn. Within these boundaries, "cannibals" and "savages" were located in a space that began to be conceived as the New World at the end of the 15th century (Mignolo 2000: 283). At the end of the 19th century, the "cannibals" and "savages" were converted into primitive and exotic Orientals. The question was not about the human conditions of these groups, but rather how far removed these primitives were from the present and civilized stage of humanity. The 'denial of coevalness' (see Fabian 1983) was the final result of relocating

people into a chronological hierarchy rather than a geographical place (Mignolo 2000: 283).

After WWII, the civilizing mission was reconverted under the leadership of the U.S., producing new encompassing ideals of Western civilization. The first change was to establish Human Rights as a new international standard, and the United Nations as a transnational organization dedicated to avoiding international discrimination and abuses (Mignolo 2000: 296). However, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was pronounced by protagonists of a European-North American history that projects a particular global design of how subjects should behave. The Christian and civilizing tradition of the West produced the standards for the 'Declaration of Human Rights' with universal values based on a local history that is presented as universal. Although the Human Rights declaration may be seen as 'necessary' to rule basic aspects of humanity (like behaviour during war and conflict), it is also true that old Western standards of civilization have survived and continue to oppress through this universal declaration (Mignolo 2000: 298-7). The practice of imposing ideas like the Human Rights Declaration as a universal truth led to the idea of superior, rational and scientific knowledge that is decontaminated of magical and 'irrational' believes.

The second change in the ideals of Western civilization was the establishment of the 'standard of modernity,' which manifests itself through different masks such as education level and place of residence (this will be largely discussed in Chapter 4). As a consequence, the vindication of the universalism of science was a successful imaginary

construction that sought to claim that science was not bound by cosmology (Mignolo 2000: 297).

Following these changes, the configuration of transnational economic alliances in the 1970s, and the erosion of national power states, provoked the strengthening of repressed communities. In Latin America, there was a revival of indigenous movements for their rights, especially language, land, and control of natural resources. These new social actors contested the idea that global designs can only emerge from one particular local history. However, the inequality of power is still evident in these groups (Mignolo 2000: 296-300). Although there have been some improvements regarding indigenous groups in the Americas over the last three decades, the production of knowledge is still organized by norms that remain within the parameters of the West (Mignolo 2000: 300).

Assumptions guiding local and international aid agencies have been recast, allowing indigenous groups to renegotiate their relationship to development, as subjects who may contribute and participate. Nonetheless, this does not challenge the fact that indigenous people and their cultures have become objects of intervention, and this development model has often remained silent on key concerns such as racism, national inequalities, and international dependencies (Andolina, et al. 2009: 11). Some projects in the world of development and international aid have represented indigenous groups as inherently different from the rest of the national populations. Based on rigid notions of culture and space, indigenous groups are portrayed as homogenous, poor, spatially circumscribed, vulnerable communities. These representations mark indigenous communities as racially distinct and materially poor, but also tend to portray them as rich

in social capital, possessing an endogenous form of development (Andolina, et al. 2009: 58). The International Development Bank states, for instance, that ‘indigenous culture becomes an asset, rather than an impediment’ to progress and development (Deruyttere 197:9: quoted by Andolina, et al. 2009: 58-9). In addition to the problematic idea of a poor and vulnerable indigenous group that lives in isolation in remote locations (like the rural Andes), the re-marking of “culture” as a form of social capital capable of providing the indigenous with a route to development is equally troubling.

It is rarely stated by development practitioners that indigenous communities are equal and valuable subjects, and often within the discourses of NGOs and aid agencies, indigenous knowledge is only recognized as positive if it fits in their (linear) interpretation of modernity, and when it is not related to anti-Western or anti-capitalist assumptions. This type of ethno-development produces an indigenous subject that serves certain neoliberal precepts. Thus these neoliberal forms of development constitute a racial project, capitalizing upon the image of a polarized economy, society and geography in which the indigenous can take a modern role, albeit premised on their vulnerability and poverty (Andolina, et al. 2009: 60).

The difficulty with these models is that Western and indigenous knowledges are imagined as opposing forms, differentiated by the use of technology. The opposition is set up in and by the epistemological descriptions of what technology does to improve (increase) production (Cf. Mignolo 2000: 301), like the Peru-Cornell project did in the

1950s.¹⁶ Some authors, like Andolina (2009), believe that there have been important advances in some ethno-development tendencies, by presenting more flexible notions of culture and spatiality that downplay the concept of social capital as a guiding principle. This flexible model bring together the efforts of the state, NGOs and social movements, and is believed to articulate concerns regarding indigenous rights, structural constraints and the fight against racism. This model is considered some indigenous organization (in Ecuador and Bolivia) and development practitioners to be more in tune with activists in indigenous organizations because it offers a better explanation for indigenous problems and views them as embedded within a wider network.

Even though there are different interpretations about indigenous knowledge (IK) in the world of development, there is confusion over what is understood as knowledge. The existing literature about Indigenous Knowledge discusses how it has been incorporated into development projects, and how beneficiaries become active participants by contributing to changes in their life conditions. In this line of thought, NGOs and aid agencies finance traditional forms of technology to improve and increase agricultural productivity. These agencies are promoting, under the label “knowledge,” the use of the local *savoir* to improve people’s condition in order to increase their economic production and insert them into the market. In this sense, they are dealing with different forms of indigenous technologies, organization, practices, etc.

By constraining the definition of knowledge to technologies and techniques, the concept of Indigenous Knowledge does not consider the particular forms through which

¹⁶ This will be extended discussed in Chapter 5.

people interpret, understand and imagine their experiences. The different ways to experience, to conceive and to understand the world are still placed as subordinated to those of the West. Western knowledge, especially in the form of the scientific and Human Rights paradigms, continues to set the parameters through which the world is measured and understood (Mignolo 2000). In this frame of analysis, the belief in animate nature could be understood as a pre-modern belief still practiced by rural Quechuas in the remote Andes (see Chapter 7 for an extended discussion). The colonial power structure communicates particular cultural and socio-political presuppositions that elevate Western knowledge as ‘real knowledge,’ while ignoring other knowledge— except to validate their own master narrative (Doxtater 2004: 619).

During my fieldwork in Peru (and in contrast to cases in Ecuador and Bolivia), the superiority of mainstream Criollo/mestizo knowledge about the internal war and Human Rights discourse (especially about issues like the validity of the findings of the Final Report of the Truth Commission, the need for monetary compensation and the call to developed sites of memory), were rarely challenged. In addition, metanarratives such as the need to “improve oneself” (*Sp. superarse*) through achieving formal education (*Sp. ser alguien en la vida*) are generally embraced without question, even if it implies ‘de-indianizing.’

I use Raymond Williams’ concept of ‘structures of feelings,’ to understand the narrative of marginality. This is a more accurate means for describing a process that combines thoughts and feelings shaped in an on-going social process. Williams argues that to understand culture one first must understand hegemony, which he defines as ‘in

the strongest sense a ‘culture,’ but a culture which has also to be seen as the lived dominance and subordination of particular classes’ (Williams 1977: 110). In this sense, hegemony is always a dominant, but never complete or inclusive, phenomenon. It is not a one-way phenomenon, but rather a dialogical production through the social and linguistic interactions of individuals (Mannheim and Tedlock 1995: 9). Like the analysis of domination, it is not just the act of domination that should be examined, but rather a process of domination depends upon accepting and resisting.

The idea of *structures of feelings* provides researchers with a way to talk about the inchoate, often unconscious stirrings that signal potential changes in the status quo. Because culture and society should be understood in the process of formation, social forms are actively lived by individuals and tensions arise when the received interpretations of social forms clash with the individual’s personal experiences, ideas or feelings. This tension cannot yet (if ever) be termed resistance or social transformation; rather it is an embryonic phase, a social and material kind of thinking and feeling that is not (yet) fully articulated or explicit (Ahearn 2001: 52).

William’s concept of *structures of feelings* effectively describes the attitudes and experiences surrounding the practice of ‘marginality’ in Chapi because it attends to qualitative changes in the way people experience and interpret events and relationships. These changes are subtle yet strong enough to exert pressure and set effective limits on experience and action (Williams 1977: 132). Therefore, ‘marginality’ is as much a strategy to become visible in order to be attended to by the state as it is a way to experience domination (the state’s domination). Even though people do not explicitly say

that the state or the urban Criollo/mestizo exert domination over them, when people say that their communities are placed in the corners and forgotten, it is a way to express that they are dominated. By using *structures of feelings*, our attention is directed to how changes occur in ‘meanings and values as they are actively lived and felt’ by individuals (Williams 1977: 132). In this sense, ‘feeling’ does not merely refer to emotions but rather encompasses changes in thoughts and feelings, as well as the grey area between the two. It is this dimension that better represents the complexity of being ‘marginal’ from Chapi’s point of view. My project seeks to understand how thoughts are felt, and feelings are thought. Therefore, by introducing themselves as a ‘marginal community,’ people in Chapi feel as if they are outside the structure of the state. They experience the state as a careless and distant institution (sometimes described as a person in the form of particular state officials) that hides and deceives them, and exerts power in the form of military violence or complete indifference toward their demands. At the same time, people in Chapi do not talk directly about domination,¹⁷ which could also be interpreted as being in a formative phase. Therefore, my dissertation is not only considering a hegemonic domination performed by urban groups, but rather an on-going process fully articulated with domination and its acceptance.

The methodological consequence of understanding ‘marginality’ in the frame of structures of feeling is that specific qualitative changes are not assumed to be epiphenomena of changed institutions, formations and beliefs. Likewise, they are, from

¹⁷ See Chapter 3 and 4 for a complete analysis of other labels that may express domination.

the beginning, taken as ‘social experiences,’ rather than personal experiences. They are social because they are changes in the present, and because they are emergent or pre-emergent, which means that they do not have to await definition, classification or rationalization before they exert palpable pressure and set effective limits on experience and action (Williams 1977: 131-2). These changes, Williams argues, can be defined as changes in structures of feelings, feelings chosen to emphasize a distinction between more formal views like ideology and worldview. The stress / emphasis is placed upon meanings and values as they are actively lived and felt, and the relationship between these and the formal or systematic beliefs vary in practice. At the same time, Williams is defining a social experience that is still in process, and not always recognized as social but taken to be by scholars as private, idiosyncratic and even isolating (Williams 1977: 132).

4. Fieldwork and Methodology

My first fieldwork in Chungui and Chapi took place between October and November 2002. The data were gathered collectively with Edilberto Jiménez and Nory Córdor, who were members of my team in the Ayacucho region. We stayed one week in the community of Chungui, and one week in Oronqoy. Interviews were conducted in Spanish and Quechua. I personally conducted the interviews in Spanish, since I did not know Quechua at that time. In Oronqoy we interviewed mainly Quechua speaking informants that Jimenez interviewed, because they have met him before as an NGO worker. The analysis of the Quechua and Spanish interviews I developed while doing the

analysis for this dissertation, revealed that many of these were guided and words were suggested to the interviewee. In addition, I noticed that the translations of these interviews were not carefully done, and they were translated with Spanish expressions commonly used by NGO workers.¹⁸ These translations were the main source of the report I wrote in 2002. The general practice in Ayacucho was to translate every testimony and interview from Quechua to Spanish. These were never transcribed in Quechua, only in Spanish, and became the main source for the PTRC's Final Report.

My second fieldwork, as a doctoral student, was completed over a period of 24 months, combining three months between 2005-2006, with the main fieldwork developed between November 2007 and October 2009, and was concentrated in the Ayacucho region located in the central area of the Peruvian highlands (see Figure 1). The first part of my work was developed in Ayacucho, and combines data from the regional archive with life stories, interviews and participant observation in the villages of Chupón and Oronccooy in the community of Chapi, in the district of Chungui (Figure 2). I spent 9 months in these villages trying to build close relationships with the population, who were extremely skeptical about the real purpose of my research. Some families did not believe that I was doing research about the community, because they did not find any importance in such a project, and they argued that this was a cover for a bigger project that aimed to take their land and give it back to Chapi's former hacienda family (the Carrillo family). The fact that I was an outsider, although I had all the credentials from the authorities of

¹⁸ Many of the people who worked translating the Quechua interviews were sporadically working with local NGOs in the city of Ayacucho. NGOs are the main source of jobs for anthropologists and social workers in this city.

Chapi, only nurtured the image of a *gringa* who claimed to be an anthropologist, but in reality was there working on behalf of the former hacendado families. It took me several visits to convince them that I did not have any connection with the former hacendados, as well as signing a written commitment of no harm to the community. Even after my active participation in meetings and festivities, and the relationships of *compadrazgo*¹⁹ that I established in both villages, not everybody agreed to talk to me, and some people considered me a threat. As my relationships started to consolidate, people opened up and told me stories about politics during the times of the hacienda.

Most of my interviews were gathered in Spanish and Quechua, and I take full responsibility for the quotes translated from Spanish to English, and the final translations of the Quechua quotes. For security reasons, the names of community members of Chapi and Chungui remained pseudonyms. However, local authorities like the Mayor of Chungui, NGOs workers and officials from the state are presented with their real names and the state institutions they represent.

In my last visit to Oroncco in August 2008, rumors circulated about a group that was visiting villages in Chapi, forcing people to gather in meetings where they were asked about problems in their communities. At the time, the information was mixed and confusing, with stories alleging the presence of the Colombian FARC or the Bolivian

¹⁹ Rooted in the pre-colonial and Catholic morality, *compadrazgo* is a fictive relationship established between two families. It is fictive in the sense that is not a real kin, but is understood as highly significant and a way to fortify one's kindred (see Leinaweaver 2008 for a complete explanation of ritual kinship). For example, I became the godmother of a child in a ritual called *cortapelo* (En. hair cutting) in Oroncco; and in Chupón I became the godmother of a couple who married in a civil ceremony. Both families made important connections every time I arrived to their villages, and our kin relationship established certain behaviour. For instance they offered me lodging, food and extended conversation hours, while I offered some economic help, food and lodging when they were in the city.

army of Evo Morales. When I returned to the region's capital, Huamanga (also known as the city of Ayacucho), I received the warning from people in Chapi and Chungui to avoid returning to Chungui and Chapi; because I was a *gringa* they warned that my safety could be in danger, and explained that I could be kidnapped.

During those weeks, the Peruvian army was carrying out an operation in Vizcatán in the northern part of the VRAE (see Figure 3), bombing remaining groups of Shining Path members and civilians in the Amazon jungle. This attack seemed to provoke the temporary abandonment of the area and the displacement of Shining Path camps toward Chungui, Chapi and La Convención in the neighbouring region of Cusco. During this displacement, Chunguinos claimed that they received visits from different Shining Path members looking to apologize for their cause, which frightened the local population (see figure 4).

After consulting with Dr. Bruce Mannheim and local specialists in Lima about this military project and the on-going political situation, the advice was clear I needed to stop my work in the district and to reframe my original research. These changes made me rethink the region, and I contacted two NGOs working on the topic of reparations for the 1980s war victims. I joined them in different activities and workshops, in which they allowed me to observe and record the interactions between beneficiaries and NGO workers. In addition, I conducted interviews with their field personnel and the directors in the main offices. The opportunity to observe the dynamics of NGO workers and their beneficiaries illuminated the racial practices happening in the countryside, as well as the hierarchies between those who are 'marginal' and those who are not.

During my fieldwork I found that different forms of knowledge meet and sometimes clash when the state and NGOs interact with rural Quechuas. Knowledge emerges out of a complex process that involves social, situational, cultural and institutional factors, and takes place on the basis of an existing conceptual framework and set of procedures that are affected by skills, orientations, experiences, interests, resources and patterns of social interaction characteristic to that group. However, at the same time that knowledge by itself is an open possibility, it also has the power to destroy other possible frames of conceptualization and understandings that are delegitimized because they are seen as inferior (usually called magical, irrational, Andean beliefs, or by other euphemisms).

To better understand the production, reproduction and transformation of knowledges and how they are hierarchized, we must analyse face-to-face interactions. Every actor carries with him/her a particular knowledge that is deployed in each encounter, establishing a unique relationship with other actors. In this sense, when Chapi's population is on one side, with governmental officials, NGOs, insurgent groups (like the ELN– National Liberation Army– a Cuban oriented guerrilla movement from the 60s, and the Shining Path) and Peruvian intellectuals on the other side, a situation is produced in which each side brings their knowledge to the interaction. The process of adapting to everyday life is continuously changing and accommodating itself to new phenomena and variant situations (Arce and Long 1992: 212). When individuals process information, they produce cognitive maps that categorize and classify experiences into classes of phenomena.

When face-to-face interactions are ethnographically described, it is important to explore the cognitive world of the groups concerned (Arce and Long 1992: 212-3). ‘Marginality’ contains a certain meaning for rural Quechuas, since it is used exclusively in Spanish (there is no Quechua word for marginality) and only within the context of interactions with external actors. As such, “marginality” can be understood as a category that addresses their knowledge as the way they experience the state in the post-war context. Contrasting this, governmental officials and NGO workers define rural communities as ‘marginal’ to emphasize the economic and social exclusion that these communities experience in relation to the central state, which has permanently ‘forgotten’ and ‘deceived’ them.

At issue is not only the different ways that each group understands ‘marginality’; rather, the tension develops as these different groups interact, and when rural Quechuas decide to define themselves as ‘marginal’ after they have interacted and negotiated with Criollo/mestizo knowledge. These interactions lead to the transformation and reinforcement of particular types of knowledge, and this process is shaped by the power, authority and legitimation available to the different actors involved (Arce and Long 1992: 214).

A face-to-face encounter occurs between individuals with different interests, resources and power (Arce and Long 1992: 214). Therefore, the analysis should not be restricted to observing what goes on during face-to-face encounters, but rather to also look beyond and to incorporate influential actors and resources that may not actually be physically present. Although my methodology focuses on specific social interactional

processes, the analysis should be situated within broader institutional and power fields (Arce and Long 1992: 214).

The analysed face-to-face interactions entail an acute awareness of the ways in which different, possibly conflicting, forms of knowledge intersect and interact. In contrast to more conventional works, my dissertation takes an actor-oriented vision and focuses upon the interplay of different social constructions of ‘reality’ developed by the various parties of the interaction (peasants, governmental officials, farmers, etc.), tracing out the social and political effects of using the category of ‘marginality.’ Nevertheless, I do not make any ontological distinction between what is seen as academic knowledge and everyday knowledge, between western Criollo knowledge and rural Quechua knowledge (Arce and Long 1992: 214). Within these encounters, actors may believe in the superiority or inferiority of their knowledge but, when analysed, the different sets of knowledge brought to the interaction should be seen within the same horizontal framework.

The discussion about the state and NGOs discussed in Chapter 6 share a common view of development and social change as naturally emanating from centers of power. These take the form of interventions led by state or international agencies, which follow a determined developmental path (Cf. Long and Long 1992: 19). In contemporary academic literature, indigenous knowledge is linked to natural resource management, attributed to a specific territory or information held by a particular group that is assumed to live in bounded geographical spaces (Andolina, et al. 2009: 177). Within the literature

on Human Rights, indigenous knowledge and experiences with it are subordinated and erased in order to impose the assumed superiority of urban and modern knowledge.

Knowledge processes are embedded in social processes that imply aspects of power, authority and legitimation, and they are just as likely to reflect and contribute to conflict between social groups as they are to lead to the establishment of common perceptions and interests (Long and Long 1992: 27). It is in this way that Human Rights activists and NGOs deploy their power and domination upon rural communities, shaping people's narratives and demands for compensation to the state. The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission's recommendations were developed as a body of 'specialist' knowledge that an elite group from the Peruvian urban society presented to the rural victims of the 1980s violence. Although this was an important political project for the Peru, it cannot be said that it was the work of the civil society; rather, the project must be understood as the demands that one (especially influential) group considered important and beneficial for the nation to grant.

Knowledge encounters involve a struggle between actors who aim to enroll others in their projects/agendas and convincing them to accept particular frames of meaning. These struggles focus around the 'fixing' of key points that have a controlling influence over the exchanges and attributions of meaning, including the acceptance and reification of positions related to 'authority' (Long and Long 1992: 27).

This dissertation is organized in two parts. The first focuses on the community of Chapi, and includes Chapter 2 through Chapter 5. Chapter 2 presents how the community of Chapi has been constructed through different myths and stories that highlight its

backwardness, isolation and ‘marginality.’ Chapter 3 discusses the political history of the region, looking at the ways historical events unfolded to create a particular interpretation of the area and its population. Chapter 4 uncovers how, in the aftermath of the internal war, people in Chapi used the label of ‘marginal’ to describe themselves in relation to the Peruvian state. Chapter 5 then analyses two interactions between Chapi and the state, looking at the particular ways ‘marginality’ is reinforced by state officials. I conclude this section by arguing that being ‘marginal’ is a strategy used by Chungui’s authorities, and supported by the younger generation, to become visible to the state.

The second part of the dissertation looks at scholars, NGOs and the state as composing one social actor. Chapter 6 presents a brief analysis of how the social sciences developed in Peru and focused particular attention on solving the ‘Indian problem.’ I argue that since the 1920s, social scientists in Peru and North America have contributed to reinforcing the domination and exclusion of indigenous communities. In Chapter 7, I argue that NGOs act as *statelike* institutions and proxies of the state, reproducing the state’s domination and subordination in the rural Andes. By analyzing how two NGOs act as *statelike* institutions on the ground, I argue that the social mediation these institutions perform reinforces the historical subordination of Quechua communities.


Figure 1-1
Region of Ayacucho



Figure 1-2
The district of Chungui



Figure 1-3
Valley of Apurimac and Ene Rivers-VRAE



Chapter 2

Representations of the Oreja de Perro

Chungui is a district located in the Northeast of the Ayacucho region, between the limits of Cusco and Apurímac regions (see Figures 1.1 and 1.2) in the area known as the Valley of Apurímac and Ene River (VRAE). This district, specifically the southern part of it, is usually called *Oreja de Perro* (En. Dog's ear); label coined by the national army during the internal war, use to recognize the region in the regional map. The name corresponds to the shape of the Ayacucho map which has the shape of a dog; its eastern part, where Chungui is located, would correspond to the dog's ear.

I first heard about a place called *Oreja de Perro* when I was working as researcher at the PTRC in 2002. This occurred during a meeting in our office in the city Ayacucho where one of the teams gathering testimonies²⁰ was narrating amazing stories about an isolated community near the border with Cusco. I was told that during the internal war there was a 'slave market' in which women and children were sold as commodities to local families. This type of story was combined with others that talked about the

²⁰ The PTRC had two different groups working in the Ayacucho office. One group was in charge of collecting people's voluntary testimonies in their communities. The other group, in which I was working, was focused on develop researches (ethnographies) about the particularities of the political context in which the Shining Path and the national army acted.

complete disappearance of villages and the existence of thousands of mass graves unknown to the rest of the Peruvian society. For some people in Ayacucho, these stories were not surprising, because many of them had previously heard incredible and fantastic stories about the hacienda of Chapi, and the cruelty its owners practiced against the workers. One of the PTRC directors remembers,

They [people in Ayacucho city] had a fabled view of this hacienda (Chapi) they talked us about the jungle, the mountain, gigantic turtles, and when they were seat in a rock, it moved! At the end they were not seating in a rock, it was the turtle and it was moving! (Coronel, Ayacucho 2008)²¹

The stories heard in the meeting²² with my PTRC colleagues produced and nurtured earlier images of a forgotten community in which the worst of the war was allowed to occur. There were only two NGOs (CEDAP and Proande²³) who were sporadically working in the district, and first knew about this region when they organized the return of a displaced group living in the city of Andahuaylas. These stories surprised the directors and researchers from Ayacucho' and Lima's offices at the PTRC. The political and personal guilt, as well as their ignorance about these stories made them feel compelled to publicize this story and transform it in to a public narrative. For my colleagues in Lima, who assumed that they knew everything about the significant crimes that occurred during the internal war, the story of *Oreja de Perro* was an important milestone that deeply

²¹ “*tenían una visión fabulada de su ex hacienda. ¿No? Nos hablaban de selva, de monte, de tortugas gigantes y cuando se sentaban en una piedra y total se estaba moviendo y total era la tortuga, ¿No?*”

²² Instead of stating that the team narrating these stories were the ones responsible of crafting these representations, I consider that was a collective process, of the attendants to this meeting, producing this image of an exotic and unknown community.

²³ CEDAP work agricultural and health topics in the community of Chungui. Proande works from Andahuaylas similar topics, but its work focuses on Chapi. At the moment of my fieldwork, both NGOs were halting their work in the area due to lack of resources.

questioned their real knowledge and comprehension about the internal conflict.

For me this was the start of many years of research in Chungui, and especially in *Oreja de Perro*. In 2002, I led the team that was sent to the region to investigate the characteristics of internal war, along with E. Jiménez and N. Condor, both Anthropologists from Ayacucho. Our report²⁴ challenged the myths about ‘slave markets’ and explained that there was a long tradition of states and rebellions in the district.²⁵ The report also added important insights about the camps or *retiradas* (En. withdrawals) that the Shining Path developed in the upper Amazon area to protect the population from the national army (this will be explained later). Rather than preventing the emergence of exotic images, *Oreja de Perro* --as produced by the PTRC and its heirs--became the ‘most marginal community’ in the Peruvian Andes. The Final Report affirmed that between 1983 and 1994 the internal war claimed 1384 victims (between deaths and disappeared), which means the disappearance of 17% of the district’s total population in 1981 (Degregori 2009: 20). After the release of the Final Report, *Oreja de Perro*, especially because of its previously unknown story, became fodder for news articles, documentaries and fiction novels that have nurtured the image of the region as ‘the most marginal and forgotten community’ in Peru.

Although outsiders use *Oreja de Perro* to refer to the whole district, Chunguinos

²⁴ See <http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20V/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20violencia%20%28continuacion%29/2.%20HISTORIAS%20REPRESENTATIVAS%20DE%20LA%20VIOLENCIA/2.3%20CHUNGUIT%20Y%20LA%20OREJA%20DE%20PERRO.pdf>

²⁵ I need to recognize that I wrote the report that was later completed and edited by several persons. However, the core of the report is the original that I submitted in January 2002. After nine years, I recognize some of the problems of the report, like interpreting people’s narratives in a transparent way.

themselves barely use this label and prefer to use 'hacienda area' when they refer to Chapi, highlighting the difference between the independent community of Chungui and the former hacienda of Chapi. Nevertheless, in the last 5 years local authorities (who are originally from the community of Chungui) frequently use *Oreja de Perro* when they interact with political officials and governmental agencies expecting to get more attention. To avoid confusion, I use "Chungui" when I refer to the whole district, "the community of Chungui" when I refer to the independent community, and "Chapi" to refer to the former hacienda area.

This chapter will place *Oreja de Perro*, and particularly the community of Chapi, in the geopolitical and social context of Peruvian society. The first section presents Chungui and Chapi, emphasizing their respective relationships and characteristics. The second part starts by describing some of the narratives about the internal war presented in the Final Report, and continues by discussing how the region has been portrayed through different means, building an image of a community whose existence seems to be restricted to the extreme violence it suffered. We need to acknowledge, as Fassin and Rechtman (2009) suggest, that in most contexts, the only possibility that these voices will be heard is by highlighting the trauma and misery they have lived. However, this does not mean that Chunguinos only see themselves as victims of the internal war.

1. Oreja de Perro and Chapi

Chungui is a district located in the south central part of the Andean highland of Peru in the region of Ayacucho, in the northeastern province of La Mar. This district is

also part of the region called Valleys of the Apurímac and Ene Rivers (VRAE), known for the illicit production of coca and cocaine paste (see Figure 1.3). The district is bordered on the east by the Pampas River and the Apurímac region and on the west by the Apurímac Rivers and the region of Cusco. This is an area difficult to access, with a harsh geography that shares three ecological niches: valley (6561 feet over the sea level), *puna* (over 13000 feet) and the upper Amazon jungle (6000 feet over the sea level).

The district of Chungui has been historically divided in two regions. One is the community of Chungui, which has been an independent peasant community since the 1920s; and the other is the community of Chapi, which until the 1974 was the hacienda of Chapi²⁶ (see Figure 1.2, previous chapter). This latter region, with more than 30,000 ha, includes the villages of Chupón and Oroncco, where I focused my fieldwork during 2008.

The relationship between Chungui and Chapi has been historically hierarchical and full of conflicts. The community of Chungui has been an independent peasant community for a long time (late 19th century) which has nurtured a self-assumed image of superiority as ‘free’ subjects. This contrasts with the image they have of Chapi’s inhabitants as monolingual Quechua and illiterate ex-hacienda workers. People in Chungui explain that the ignorance (lack of formal education) of Chapi’s people has allowed them to be exploited and deceived, first by the hacendado, and later by the Shining Path. This imaginary dominates the population in the community of Chungui,

²⁶In the Oreja de Perro area there were also small haciendas, however their economic and political importance is reduced if compared with the one Chapi had.

who have established a hierarchical relationship tinted by exclusion and domination with people in Chapi that is still at play. The community of Chungui has produced its own identity by placing themselves as the antagonist to Chapi, shaping an image of progressive and modern farmers (they do not call themselves peasants but *agricultores* – En. farmers – as a marker of distinctiveness), intelligent and educated. It is important to notice, that in a micro level there is a reproduction of the strongly socio-cultural differences that work between rural and urban, sierra and coast, between the ignorant Quechua and the modern Criollo/mestizos (which will be extensively discussed in the next chapters).

The 2007 National Census showed that the district of Chungui has a total population of 6311,²⁷ most of which work on agriculture and live in the rural areas of the district (INEI 2007). The sierra part of the district produces potatoes, the low valley produces peaches and corn, and the jungle produces coca, coffee, cocoa beans and peanuts. During my fieldwork, the rapid rise in the coca price made it the most rentable product in the district (24.2 pounds of coca are sold at US\$30). The local production of coca is usually purchased in advance by local groups dedicated to make cocaine paste (Sp. *Pasta Básica de Cocaina or PBC*). In the last five years, a fungus attacking the coca plants has spread in the region,²⁸ which has influenced a change toward the production of peanuts and coffee; however, the labor demanded in the latter is much more intensive

²⁷ Jimenez's work (2009), as well as the local authorities in Chungui, considers that the district of Chungui has over 8,000 persons. However, I will use the official numbers provided by the Peruvian Institute of Statistics and Information (INEI) which is in charge of processing this information. See: www.inei.gob.pe
²⁸ People usually explain that the Plan Colombia in this neighboring region is attacking the plants in Peru.

than in the cultivation of coca.²⁹ Nevertheless, neither the fungus nor the intensive police control in the neighboring districts over illicit coca production have provoked a significant reduction in the annual volume of coca leaves harvested. This is supported by the official numbers that show an increase from 11,475 has dedicated to coca production in 2007, to 17, 486 has in 2009³⁰ (OPD and Devida 2010). In addition, there has been an increase in the number of *pozas de maceración* (En. coca maceration pits), which has become a profitable business in some villages in the community of Chungui, especially in the Amazon jungle.

The fact that there is no direct police control in the district (because of the lack of roads) makes this a ‘protected’ area suitable for drug production. For the transportation of the coca paste the neighboring cities of Andahuaylas and Cusco, groups of young men are hired as *mules* to carry up to 5kg (11 pounds) of coca paste, receiving in exchange around US\$200 for 3 days of travel. In some occasions, these *mules* are caught by the police near the Pampas River on the Apurímac side, and the police patrols confiscate the drugs. However, the police only report a fraction of what is caught, selling the rest to other cartels and firms in the region (personal communication with a mule’s family). The implication of the local police complicates the drug problem in the region, and has been used to build the image of *Oreja de Perro* as ‘no man’s land.’³¹ When I was doing some archival research in the Superior Court in Huamanga, judges and lawyers considered the

²⁹ In average, people affirm that the production of coca does not need special care because it ‘grows by itself.’ In contrast, the production of coffee demands a selection of beans and a drying process, which means high intensive labor.

³⁰ For exact numbers see Annex 2-1

³¹ In the last five years there have been mysterious murders in the region, which the Major and other authorities attributed to drug cartels reckoning among them.

district of Chungui as a ‘liberated zone’ for drugs in which groups of *mules* walked around the capital of the district armed and talking openly about their *business*. In fact this is the image that state officials in Ayacucho have themselves crafted about the area, representing Chungui as a district in which the rule of law does not exist.

Oronccoy is the getaway from Chapi to the city of Andahuaylas, which is known as a money laundering city.³² It is common to find groups of *mules* passing toward Andahuaylas, but mainly at night trying to avoid be seen by the community. The scenario is much more discreet and secret than the image Ayacucho’s state officials have spread. The local population knows them and their business; however nobody talks openly about this with strangers. During the summer months (January to March) high school students from the district and neighboring areas are recruited to transport drugs. In Chupón, the community also knows who is involved with the drug business, as some mothers told me that people in Huaccana—where their children go to high school—were contacting students from *Oreja de Perro* to transport drugs. The impact of drug money is neither visible in Chupón nor Oronccoy, however, I was told that this is only visible and an openly discussed topic in the forest around the community of Chungui.³³

The district has only one road leading to Chungui (the capital of the district) which was constructed in 1999. Since 2005, there have been small projects to extend the road connecting the capital with its surrounding villages and with the Apurímac region,

³² See interview with Jaime Antezana, a Peruvian specialist about drug trafficking <http://www.larepublica.pe/node/20764>

³³ Due to security issues, I did not visit myself the forest villages located in the community of Chungui. However, people say that families in this area are wealthy and have all the commodities that people have in the city (cable TV, electricity provided by solar panels, modern appliances like flat screen TVs).

but this is restricted to the community of Chungui (no more than 20 km). During my fieldwork, the road only led to Sonccopa (located in the border between the community of Chungui and Chapi), from where it was required to walk around 6 hours in order to arrive to the village of Chupón. To arrive to Oroncco, people usually walked around two days through the district from Chungui. Nevertheless, people from southern villages of Chapi used to walk to Oroncco, where they descend twelve hours from a path that ends into the Pampas River. Here there is a bridge called *Kutinachaka* (En. returning bridge), from which there is a road to Huaccana, the neighboring town in the Apurímac region. Every month, regional traders from the Apurímac region gather on the riverside of the Pampas River, at the end of the Kutinachaka Bridge, to hold a market. People from all communities in Chapi descend to buy oil, candles, soap and other products, and they often sell handmade blankets, agricultural products and cattle. From Huaccana there is public transportation to the city of Andahuaylas (capital of the region), from where it is possible to take a bus to Ayacucho (12 hours on an unpaved road). Since the hacienda time, Chapi has been conflated with the Apurímac region, because of the proximity; and although these villages depend politically upon Chungui, services like education and health are supervised by offices in Apurímac.

Since May 2008, Chapi and Chungui have had several visits from a group that claims to be the Shining Path. This group approached people from Chupón and Oroncco (as well as people from Chungui and other villages), asking questions about the political situation in the district and the major problems the population is facing. The group affirms that they are different from the Shining Path from the 1980s, arguing that they

have learnt their lesson from the internal war. They state that Guzman's politics (the official leader of the Shining Path) were wrong because they included the physical assault on the local population. Although the group seems to be in an early phase, they are looking for supporters, offering US\$400 if people join the group). In addition, witnesses state that this group has new weapons (AKMs and war weapons), although they have not been seen using them. Some of my informants argue that this is a new Shining Path that recognizes the errors from the past, and now look to fight for people's well-being. Others, such as the elderly, are traumatized and want to leave the community as soon as they can. The local authorities (mainly the Major and his workers) argue that in contrast with the 1980s, now they know about politics and Human Rights, and they strongly affirm that they will stay defending the community and all the progress they have achieved during the last decade. These incursions also have provoked an official request, with a detailed map of the days and villages visited by the insurgents (see Appendix 2-2), to the authorities in Lima to open a military base. However, the memories regarding the internal war are still present and most people do not want the army nearby.

It is a fact that Chungui is a district located in a geographically isolated area, and that it has problems with violence and drugs; however, portraying this as a 'no man's land' where there is not any state presence is inaccurate. Images of Chungui as an extremely dangerous place have been present in the national imaginary for a decade, and this has been provoked by the multiple representations that emerged after the release of the PTRC Final Report. Therefore, a major challenge for researchers, is to dismantle these images and understand the ideology behind these representations that believe

violence is only possible in the uncivilized (=Andean) parts of the Peruvian territory.

2. Understanding the internal war in Chungui

On May 18th, in 1980, Peruvians returned to the polls after eleven years of dictatorship to elect a democratic government. That same day, the Peruvian Communist Party-Sendero Luminoso (PCP-SL) declared war against the Peruvian state. Led by Abimael Guzman (*alias President Gonzalo*), a professor at the University of Huamanga, the Shining Path recruited schoolteachers and provincial intellectuals trained at the university to be sent to work in rural areas. Throughout the rural school system, the Shining Path indoctrinated hundreds of young students who were eager to change their lives of poverty and exclusion. The hierarchical education system, in which the teacher was seen as the bearer of truth, did not allow students to question or criticize the Shining Path's discourses (for a complete discussion see Degregori 1989).

When the Shining Path entered Chungui, it exacerbated the community's internal conflicts and differences (see Chapter 3 for a detailed historical account). Several works have analyzed in detail the Peruvian internal conflict of the 1980s (see Degregori 1985; Degregori 1990; Stern 1998), including the Final Report of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (PTRC 2003a). Rather than repeating what others have said, I will focus on the 'retiradas,' which were one of the reasons why Chapi and Chungui became important to the PTRC Final Report.

In the beginning, the Shining Path was developing an underground indoctrination that soon became visible to local authorities, which were forced to quit their positions

under threats to their lives. Students' parents had different reactions to the Shining Path project; some found that at the beginning (1980–1982), this group looked for justice by promising an egalitarian society that the Agrarian Reform had not achieved. Others were skeptical about this project that was giving local power to young students and allowing them to question the traditional system of authority and respect in Andean villages.

During the war years, people often changed sides, specifically after the police or army came to town asking for the names of Shining Path members. Eventual treason from one side or the other was the main reason for the first executions on either side. In Oronccoy, Emeterio Huamán, who was a well-known political leader from the 1960s and the Agrarian Reform, was against the PCP-SL and he was soon identified as a threat to this project. His nephew accused him of robbery and abusive behavior, which ended in a 'popular trial' (Sp. *juicio popular*) after which Emeterio was executed.

In 1982, the Shining Path burned all the machinery used to produce sugar cane brandy in Chapi. Afterward, the PCP-SL organized the *comuneros* to follow the armed struggle. Days later the police arrived in Chapi, and by threatening to kill a man held on gun, they got the names of those Shining Path members who had burned the machines. Later the police arrived with the accused, and after they were identified by the community as Shining Path members, the police killed them. In response to this event, the Shining Path arrived in Chapi to punish the traitors (Qu. *Yanauma*, En. black head) and avenge the killing. One person accused three people as traitors, and the Shining Path members executed them (PTRC 2003c: 94).

This perverse game partially ended once Chapi inhabitants were instructed by the

PCP-SL to organize themselves in *retiradas* (En. *withdrawal*). The *retirada* was the Shining Path strategy deployed in Chapi and Chungui to displace the local population in to the jungle where they were organized, directly controlled by the Shining Path, avoiding any possible escape or contact with the national army.

Between 1982 and 1987, hundreds of Chapi's families lived in the *retiradas* in the upper Amazon jungle of the district. Within the Shining Path's structure, those recruited (willingly or coerced) were organized into supporting groups that represented the Shining Path's government in the region. For the Shining Path, the people organized in *retiradas* became the mass that was the base of the new government. These families provided militants to the Local Force, which acted locally as middle-level leaders from the region, and who supervised the mass (PTRC 2003c: 101).

The people who had followed the Shining Path were treated equally, namely the women responsible for taking care of orphan children who were still too young to be a part of the local force. At the beginning, life within the *retiradas* was seen as a form of ideal community in which there were no differences at all. Everybody had to work for the benefit of the group and there was no individualism. The socioeconomic differences were the source of several internal conflicts within the community after the Agrarian Reform, and the Shining Path was able to erase them. Some people did not participate in this project by coercion, and actually shared in the ideal community that the *retiradas* provided, that no other project (like the Agrarian Reform) would offer.

While the communication system was deteriorating among the Shining Path's forces, violence was escalating, especially between the Main and Local forces. The

control visits became more and more sporadic, giving more autonomy and power to the Local Force and the mass. People stated in 2002 that most of the abuses were coming from the Local Force, who attacked their village neighbors, punishing and executing them. Moreover, personal and familiar conflicts were used as reasons to execute people in the name of the PCP-SL. The Shining Path had a rigid structure that did not allow treason or even the suspicion of treason, and any questioning or contradiction was repressed with physical punishments or death (PTRC 2003c: 103).

I was concerned because that fellow called for a meeting and those who did not attend die. Because I was very afraid I went to the assembly. My husband and my dad, because they did not go they were lashed until they got sick. Then we cooked together because when they found us cooking individually, they punished us. (PTRC.BDI-I-P608. interviews, Huallhua (Anco). Female, 35 years)³⁴

Life was becoming more violent and dangerous. The ideal of community life was not only being threatened by the continuous national army patrols in the area, but also by a lack of food, and the consequent malnutrition. Camps were constantly moved from one place to another as they were threatened by the army's presence, which was also supported by civilian patrols. These patrols chased and killed anyone found in the jungle. Until 1987, people strongly believed that any attempt to escape from the camp and approach the army would lead to death.

Between 1987 and 1989 the Peruvian army acknowledged that in order to win the war, they needed the trust of the civilian population. To gain people's confidence, they

³⁴ Yo estaba preocupada porque los compañeros llamaban a asamblea y los que no asistían iban a morir. De mucho miedo fui a la asamblea. A mi esposo y a mi papá, como no fueron les dieron mil látigos hasta que se enfermen. Luego cocinábamos juntos porque cuando nos encontraban cocinando individualmente se molestaban y nos castigaban. (CVR.BDI-I-P608. Entrevista en profundidad, Huallhua (Anco). Mujer de 35 años)

compelled the commandos and the civilian army to rescue those living in Shining Path's camps. This was one of the most important elements that allowed the Peruvian state to win the war. Things started to change slowly in Chapi and Chungui, and by 1989 the army had achieved complete control of the area. A military base remained in the district until the 1990s.

The *retiradas* put into practice the ideal community: communal life that included the equal sharing of food and goods. This offered a project where internal differences were theoretically erased, and that a significant number of people were willing to support. However, the ideal community started to fail when food was not available (for a detailed account of the *retiradas* see PTRC 2003c). Sharing a raw piece of maize, running away without shoes, malnutrition, violence, and death were powerful conditions that helped to destroy that 'dreamed community.'

3. Representations of Peru's most 'marginal community'

After the release of the PTRC's Final Report in August 2002, Chungui entered into the public discourse as the most marginal and forgotten community in the country. It was often presented as the community that suffered the most during the internal war, all happening without the knowledge of the rest of the Peruvians. The emerging representations of *Oreja de Perro* have only further nurtured existing image of an isolated community where the worst violence can occur without any public outcry. The representations that have circulated produce this community exclusively as a war scenario and have only highlighted people's suffering. They leave out alternative ways of

understanding this community, arising from people's initial commitment to Shining Path or from the earlier struggles to dissolve the hacienda system. I do not intend to accuse or to judge people's involvement in insurgency projects—rather I strongly believe in the importance of understanding people's own ideas and beliefs about the urge to change sociopolitical and economic structures through insurgency and violent projects. In the following sections, I analyze a journal article, news article, graphic book and a documentary, to show how the representation of Chungui is strictly focused on a community that has suffered the worst of the internal war.

3.1 In Journal article

Oreja de Perro has not provoked research interest among Peruvian social scientists since its history became public, probably because its security problems.³⁵ However, in 1970 Diaz Martínez, an agricultural engineer (usually considered to be the Shining Path's ideologue and number 2), wrote a provocative article about the life conditions of the La Mar region in Ayacucho. Diaz Martínez describes the different districts that surround Chungui, highlighting that 98% of the population was dedicated to agriculture and that they had extremely low life expectancies, low literacy rates and a high infant mortality rate. The piece also describes this as a region in which communities and haciendas lived together in a highly productive land and argues that like many other Andean communities that are far from commercial centers, their participation on the

³⁵ During my all my years of fieldwork in Chungui, I only met two people working about Chungui. The first one was a photographer who made an exposition in Lima. The second is E. Jimenez, who will be analyzed in the next section.

monetary economy was scarce, accusing the mestizo society of an unbalanced commercial exchange (Diaz Martínez 1970: 310).

Through this work, Diaz Martínez also looks to emphasize that the local peasantry lacks economic resources, since they scarcely consume kerosene, sugar and salt. In contrast, local teachers in these communities buy cooking oil, canned goods, soap, sodas, coca and sugar cane brandy (1970: 311). In addition, the author believes the community is weary (*Sp. fatigada*) and that they know that with such few services they cannot survive, because their main issue is the land problem (1970: 311). What is quite interesting is that Diaz Martínez does not care to provide evidence about what he has interpreted as people's demands, and does not mention the ongoing land reform that was being executed in Ayacucho in those years.

He continues the piece by describing the important haciendas of the valley region of La Mar, which were the property of local families that have traditionally governed the region as Majors and congressmen. Although these are extended haciendas, they have not been modernized and still used traditional forms of production, which is focused on oranges and sugar cane brandy; they also own numerous cattle for which they produce grass. Overall, the final production in these states was not as productive as it could be, since the technical work performed in the haciendas has several faults.³⁶ Diaz Martinez believes that even if they have the best technical work available in the region, the haciendas' production would be still deficient. He finds the hacienda's fields are poorly

³⁶ Being an agricultural engineer, Diaz Martinez has the ability to see the technical deficiencies of the haciendas he is visiting.

preserved and the cattle has not improved (Diaz Martínez 1970: 314). He accuses the hacienda owners of not being interested in productivity; instead, he argues, hacendados are focused on hobbies such as raising horses, which can be practiced because of the free land and the cheap and abundant labor force they have. Rather than invest on increasing their productivity, haciendas are seen as symbols of political power and social status. What Diaz Martínez does not explain is that during the 1970s, the haciendas' owners were living in urban centers, and haciendas were frequently seen as country houses. The haciendas that Diaz is analyzing are not contextualized within the political and historical moment, and he does not include the dwindling number of haciendas in the Ayacucho region since the early 1920s. The hacienda system was decaying in the Ayacucho region, and more than a means of production, it was a status symbol (for a discussion see Urrutia, et al. 1988).

Diaz Martínez also visited the house of hacienda worker, and he describes

We visit the colono³⁷'s house. He is working, but the wife kindly receives us. Three barefoot children showing a bared belly, with a shirt and panties destroyed, played on the ground [...] in one corner of the small patio there are three pigs and five hens. The owner also tells us that they have five goats, one 'chusca³⁸' cow and an a donkey (My translation 1970: 314).

The author continues describing the hacienda workers, by stating that they are monolingual Quechuas and they have never gone to school. This is an arguable point in the 1970s. My archival research shows that people in the community of Chungui had at least two years of elementary schools since the late 1960s, and that the first school in

³⁷ Colonos is the Spanish word for hacienda workers.

³⁸ This is the label used in Spanish for an animal that is the result of mixed races, which does not have any genetic amelioration.

Chapi was established after 1966. Education since the 1960s was seen as a means of social ascension. In addition, the image of a monolingual community also needs to be questioned, since many families living in the district of Chungui have been bilingual and have strong ties with the city. Like representations of war and suffering, Diaz Martínez expects to provoke compassionate sentiments that would be able to erase distances and differences.

Later in the article he describes how a community, seeing the problems they were having, decided to organize with neighbouring communities to develop projects, like a road that would connect their communities to the regional road. Diaz Martínez emphasizes how people in villages organized themselves communally to develop infrastructural projects in benefit of their communities.

Overall, Diaz Martínez's work is remarkable. On one hand, he describes La Mar communities' situation with a careful selection of words, as poor and economically excluded communities that lack the technological means to increase their agricultural and cattle production. On the other hand, he also describes the potential that other communities have developed with the resources they have at hand. Therefore, by organizing themselves with neighboring villages, they achieve some important changes. However, the population in the countryside faces other problems that depend on national laws, like the land problem.

Lastly, it is worth mentioning that this article was written after the Agrarian Reform was proclaimed in 1969, which is a milestone event that affirmed the end of the hacienda regime and the distribution of these lands to its workers. This process nurtured

the emergence of peasant unions that acquired regional power and political representation. However, all of this is absent from Diaz Martínez's account.

In contrast with other articles on the hacienda regime, this piece has a political agenda to 'convince' the reader that the Agrarian Reform has not or would not have worked and that people's conditions have not changed at all. This is a particular interpretation to justify the needs of the rural community and the importance of the Shining Path work in this area. Diaz Martínez pleads to establish empathy between the reader and the 'poor' peasants he describes.

3.2 In the news

In 2003 when the Final Report was submitted, it influenced the emergence and spread of news articles about those communities where massacres took place. Chungui was one of these 'unknown' communities whose history was publicized to let Peruvian society know the magnitude of the events during internal war. In this context, Chungui received ephemeral attention and publicity as one of the emblematic stories of the internal war:

In fact [about Chungui being an emblematic story], there the concentration of deaths was enormous, especially between 1983 and 1985. Chungui's communities were virtually vaporized by the Shining Path's insurgency and later by the counter-insurgency deployed by the state. If some place in the country was between two fires, it was Chungui. This is an entire community that needs to be repaired, and to which a new dignity, a new sense of life needs to be given³⁹ (Hidalgo Vega 2005a)

³⁹ "En efecto allí la concentración de muertes fue inmensa, especialmente entre los años 83 y 85. Las comunidades de Chungui fueron virtualmente vaporizadas por una estrategia de insurgencia de Sendero Luminoso y luego contra insurgente por parte del estado. Si en algún lugar del país estuvo frente a dos fuegos, fue en Chungui. Es una comunidad entera que requiere ser reparada, y a la que debe dársele una nueva dignidad, un nuevo sentido de vida"

Two years after the submission of the final report, Chungui was in the public discourse as the most affected community during the 1980s. This quote belongs to an interview in which Javier Ciurlizza (PTRC former Executive Director) places the community at the crossfire, granting them full status as ‘war victims,’ an identity that does not allow them (the victims) to deploy agency or any political involvement in the 1980s war.

The unknown violence, and guilt, that leftist progressive and academic groups of Peruvians felt were expressed in the media. As Fassin and Retcher (2009) suggest, the media and Human Right Activists became the humanitarian witnesses and the spokesmen for the ‘war victim.’ For instance, in an article which appeared in the most important Peruvian newspaper in 2005 (see Appendix 2-3), describes Chungui as a town that lived a *holocaust*, with 17% of its population dead and disappeared. Describing the violence, the article reveals that the atrocities committed by ‘the Shining Path surpassed the humanly possible.’ It constructs a surreal image when the article states:

A testimony says that one day an army patrol ended playing soccer with the head of a peasant that they just murdered. There were men burned alive, decapitated women, entire human groups throw to abysses. There were people forced to eat their own body parts and soldiers that presented themselves with mutilated hands as symbols of their accomplished mission. It is not only the number of deaths. In this place prevailed the most obscene cruelty⁴⁰ (Hidalgo Vega 2005).

This article talks about how people suffered, and looking to be more graphic, it expresses how people were burnt alive; their hands were mutilated as proof of accomplished

⁴⁰ “Un testimonio decía que un día una patrulla terminó jugando fútbol con la cabeza de un campesino que recién habían ejecutado. Muchos hombres fueron quemados vivos, se decapitaron mujeres, y grupos personas fueron arrojados por los abismos. Hubo gente forzada a comer partes de su cuerpo y los soldados presentaban manos mutiladas como prueba de haber completado su misión. No es solo un problema de número de muertos. En este lugar prevaleció la más obscena de las crueldades ”

missions. Thus, in the way the article is presented, Chungui becomes important only because of the violence it experienced, the bloodiness of the war they survived, and their condition as ‘war victims.’ This sort of representation only reiterates the morbid and pornographic part of the violence (Daniel 1996), as if there were not any other stories to tell. Issues like peoples’ strength to continue their lives after terrible violence are not worth mentioning. Thus, discourses circulate beyond groups, becoming elements the elements that nurture the national news that in turn becomes the national narrative, and shape images that circulate through different domains (Cf. Fassin and Rechtman 2009).

3.3 A graphic work: suffering images

Edilberto Jiménez is an anthropologist from Ayacucho who has worked in different regional aid agencies. He is the son of a renowned local artisan from the Ayacucho region, where in his youth he learned the art of crafting *retablos*,⁴¹ and today he is considered the best young artist who makes them. In 1996 when he was working at CEDAP, an NGO in Ayacucho, he arrived to Chungui for the first time to work on communication projects and cultural promotion. Here he met the local population, who recounted to him their experiences during the internal war. Jiménez, who lived through the internal war in the city of Ayacucho, listened to peoples’ stories; encouraged by his insightful approach and his commitment with the defence of Human Rights, these narratives were later transformed in to drawings of peoples’ testimonies.

⁴¹ Retablos are rectangular boxes built from cedar. The classic retablo is around 32 cm high and 26 cm wide. At the back figures of about 6cm are placed, the back part is a slim wood and the doors are united to the box with leather strips. This is on the classic artisan works from the Ayacucho region.

I met Jiménez when I was working with the PTRC, and he became part of my research team in Chungui. He knew the region, as well as important informants that contributed to our understanding of the district. His ability to transform peoples' horrific stories into drawings allowed him to establish closer relationships with the local population, which I believed helped him to approach the intimate narratives of suffering and violence. Jiménez explains his own work

Every drawing has a story. [In his final form] some were done in Chungui, others in Ayacucho, Lima, and the last ones in Tokyo. But my notes were done next to the people and they were indicating how the events happened, and I was making notes, therefore I often did not use the tape recording (Degregori 2009: 22)

Degregori believes that the earlier informants were transformed into the co-authors of their drawings, illustrating and expressing the content of their testimonies, intensifying and expanding upon the potential of the narrative from unexplored 'spaces of vision' (Degregori 2009: 22). The author continues by stating that Jiménez's work proposes a different way to know and 'feel' what happened in Chungui and rural Peru during the internal war. For him, Chungui lived a dehumanization process (in the literal phrase) in which the barriers that divided culture from nature, civilization from barbarism were cracked (Degregori 2009: 22). Although collectively people in Chungui participated in the drawings, at the end this was only recognized and treated as Jiménez's work. Just as when we do ethnographies, our data comes from peoples' willingness to share their stories, but at the end we shape a work that is recognized as the ethnographer's.

Moreover, Degregori continues by arguing

The communities were disarticulated, their authorities not recognized and murdered. The families were systematically destroyed, dividing parents from children, imposing new names to villages and people. Individuals were subjected to control their more intimate

feelings. In the delirium, it was forbidden to be sad even in the middle of the worst disgraceful events, prohibited to cry, even in the moment that someone witnessed the murder of a family members, neighbours or friends (Degregori 2009: 22).

Degregori considers the violence between 1984 and 1987 to be similar to a human life *potlatch*. He adds that the peasantry organized itself into aggressive civil patrols, but the propulsion of the violence was the fragmentation of rural society, specifically of these communities; as much as this pragmatism had an impact, in this limited situation it served as a strategy for survival and depredation (Degregori 2009: 24).

In contrast to what Degregori and others stated in this work, Chungui is only one more narrative of the war that was made available by the PTRC. The violence may seem particularly cruel and irrational here because of the *retiradas*. Thus, most of Jiménez's texts and drawings represent life during the *retiradas*. Degregori considers:

The retiradas were hell, not only for the mass forced to live or to die there, in many cases as a concentration camp, but also for Shining Path's authorities. This is because the Shining Path started with a group of erroneous ideas. The first is that the longer the armed conflict, time will be in their favor. Inspired by Mao's strategy of a 'prolonged popular war' they supported the slow deterioration of the 'ancient state.' [...] the base of their premises was to consider the peasantry, specially the poor peasant, and the natural Shining Path's ally. Therefore, they will remain loyal to the Party throughout the long and bloody process (Degregori 2009: 25-6).

Degregori repeats what the Final Report has already argued six years before: that the Shining Path did not consider the heterogeneous nature of Chungui's population, and the importance of the local culture not only in the form of thoughts but also social and political organization. However, Degregori adds that the Shining Path did not recognize that people in Chungui had their own interests and ability to act (agency). Rather than expanding on this, the authors decide to just mention that this agency made some Chunguinos accept the Shining Path's ideology, as well as join different forms of


resistance (Degregori 2009: 26-7).

The following essays of the book are descriptions of Chungui and *Oreja de Perro*, and they particularly focus on life during the *retiradas* and the violence deployed by the national army. Although the original narratives were all in Quechua, the author has translated them into Spanish without identifying those who are from the community of Chungui and those who are from Chapi. This is a problem because for historical reasons, it is important to know the political difference between the two communities in Chungui in order to identify the particular features of the war and the degrees of violence. The war, just as the population, cannot be taken as a homogenous phenomenon that attacked everybody in the same way. The wealthy families of Chungui had the opportunity to leave the district, while many young students were convinced to participate in the Shining Path project. People were forced to live in the *retiradas*, but there was also a significant group that joined this Party because they believed in its ideas, many of them teenagers, and also adults. While this does not deny the fact that suffering and death was a daily issue, taking people's testimonies as transparent facts is a common practice in the Peruvian academia that limits a full comprehension of the phenomenon. Rather than support a particular argument, the quotes within Jiménez's essays constitute the only argument per se. When Degregori argues that the Shining Path did not recognize people's agency, it is important to question if, as scholars, using these techniques does not also make us complicit in denying people's agency. I understand that this book is a compelling plea, but just as with all narratives, we should not take them as transparent; they are framed through a language that calls to be heard, and because of that, issues like

personal beliefs and involvement are erased from the account.

In the next part of the book Jiménez presents his drawings, along with excerpts of the testimonies that inspired them. These are some examples,

Figure 2-1
And they have to be quiet
[Sp. *Y tuvieron que permanecer calladas*]



Source: Jiménez 2009

One morning when I was looking for small branches, a Shining Path member reached me in the path, and threatened to kill me. Showing me his gun, he raped me. I could warn my husband. After that the military arrived, they were abusive, and they took women to the military base, but the worst was done with the women of those who supposedly were Shining Path members. They raped them saying to them 'terrucas'⁴², (En. terrorists). One day, a lieutenant came to my house and he came on, closed the door, took me by force and raped me. (My translation Jiménez 2009: 170)

Figure 2-2
Shining Path Members reaped in Yerbabuena
[Sp. *Los senderistas segaron Yerbabuena*]

⁴² This is the word by the military to insult any female terrorist.



Source: Jiménez 2009

Members of the army organized the villagers into a civil defence committee, to confront Shining Path members. In May 1983, one hundred terrorists entered Yerbabuena, when the villagers were sleeping together in the local school. The shining Path members took them prisoners, tying their hands, women and children too. The Shining Path accused them of forming a civil defence committee, then, taking them out, the people were delivered to a senderista group that was waiting outside the school. The group was hit and attacked with knives. A lot of fathers and mothers died alongside their children. The killing was more than four hours, and then in the early morning, the Shining Path members went house by house looting them. After that, they left the village imposing and naming a villager as the Shining Path responsible (Jiménez 2009: 197)

Figure 2-3

All was suffering for those who did not have parents
[Sp. *Todo era un sufrimiento para los que no tenían padre ni madre*]



Source: Jiménez 2009

Members of the civil defence killed my mother in Mollebamba ... I was only six and my sister seven. We were orphans; we were near my uncles in the local mounts (camps). We suffered everything, nobody protected us, our fate was to follow our elders everywhere, and they gave us food. [...] the work for orphans, to go to the chakras to cultivate maize, potatoes and other product, watch the paths. If one was a little older he/she was incorporated into groups that had to perform dangerous missions like being in the local force, the main force. There were a lot of dead bodies in the path and a lot of disappeared. [...] Everything was suffering for those who did not have a father or mother, they were put at the end of everything, and food was the end, all of us we slept on the side. We had filthy clothes full of lice (Jiménez 2009: 192)

Although Jiménez's book is framed by Degregori's essays (and other collaborators⁴³), which intends to be an academic approach to the region, this is a graphic book and not an

⁴³ The book includes a short essay about Chungui's features written by Abilio Vergara (see Jimenez 2009)

analytical work. The district is well-described, as well as the life during the years of the internal conflict; however, this is not a different story from what was presented by PTRC Final Report in 2001. It is more complete in the sense that it includes examples of the local folklore, and includes a list of historical events. Nevertheless, the book focuses on Jiménez's drawings and the suffering they narrate as a plea for compassion, which is how the authorities in the district are using the book for. The idea among Chungui's authorities is that any type of work—even this dissertation—will stimulate interest in the region, and may possibly lead to the financing of infrastructure projects or allocations of foreign aid. Overall, Chunguinos seem to have learnt that the more suffering they show increases possibilities of monetary donations to the district. Since the PTRC, Degregori and other scholars have believed that showing peoples' suffering is a political act that allows Peruvian society to know what happened during the war years. In this sense, Degregori argues at the end of his piece,

Peru and Peruvians have an outstanding debt with Chungui. This book is a way to redeem through ethnography and art [...] In these pages it is demonstrated that the submission of the PTRC Final Report was only the beginning of a long and arduous task that needs to be continued and ameliorated in the look for a perfectible and purified truth that opens our doors to justice, compensation and reconciliation of the country (Degregori 2009: 35)

The debt the Peruvian society has with Chungui is the same it has with the hundreds of Andean communities and thousands of people that suffered the internal war between 1980 and 2000. Although some things have improved in the district of Chungui since the submission of the Final Report, this population have not received the governmental and investment attention that other communities have received. This is partly because of all the drug and violence problems that the district still faces, which wards off governmental

and NGO personnel from working long term in the region. However, while it is a worthy recognition of their suffering, I do not find that this book is a way to redeem the debt the Peruvian society has with Chungui. The book pleads to compensate them; but it is worth asking if Chunguinos and people in Chapi consider this project a compensation.

Moreover, I wonder how much of this book is about an intelligentsia's moral redemption that masks itself by stating that it is benefiting the people in Chungui. It is like the PTRC's task, in that it was needed but it was not necessarily to benefit rural Quechuas. In the same line, this book does not necessarily benefit Chunguinos, and especially not people in Chapi. Our moral redemption as scholars does not mean a significant improvement on Chunguinos' lives. As it will be later discussed in Chapter 6, 'war victims' question how their suffering has become a source of great income for artists, anthropologists and film producers, all who seem to forget them like the state does. In my interviews, I often found that people feel that they have been used and deceived (as always). This time, in contrast to previous experiences, scholars and NGOs do seem to have an important role in this.

3.4 A Documentary: suffering without tears?

Between 2008 and 2009, a Peruvian film director produced a documentary about Chungui, inspired by Jiménez's graphic work. As earlier works about this community, the documentary represents the district of Chungui only as a 1980s war scenario,

The horror of Chungui in the years of conflict beat the worst of hell imagined by Guamán Poma [...] violence spread unevenly, throughout the national territory, reaching their highest shares in two scenarios away from the main urban and commercial centres. Asháninkas in the Amazon, and ... especially Chungui district, located on the eastern slopes of the Andes ... That it was in Chungui [...] where Shining Path [...] entered in a

*land without landlords, without state and without alternative political projects*⁴⁴.
(Degregori 2010)

The film represents the community as a frontier space, isolated from urban centers and commercial circuits. This is the image of the most remote community that ever existed, with a historically absent state. To claim that the state was not present at all is a general misconception that contradicts historical evidence. In fact, the Shining Path entered into these communities because the state was present; though perhaps in precarious forms, it was there through the education system and political authorities. In addition, Chungui was certainly not the only community without alternative political projects in the countryside.

The documentary continues by affirming,

*Thus, the retiradas built a reality, a fold from culture toward nature [...] Then, reduced to the condition of food gatherers, the return to previous times, to the civilization of fire, the rupture of differences between the raw and the cooked, between the dirt and hygiene, with omnipresent lice as a painful mark of their new status. And at the end of the road hunger, disease, and death.*⁴⁵ (Degregori 2010)

The retiradas are one of the main reasons why Chungui was included in the Final Report of the PTRC. However, the documentary does not mention that many people participated in the Shining Path because they saw this project as the promise of the egalitarian

⁴⁴ “El horror de Chungui en los años del conflicto, superó el peor de los infiernos imaginados por Guamán Poma [...] la violencia se expandió de manera desigual, por todo el territorio nacional, alcanzando sus cuotas más altas en dos escenarios alejados de los principales centros urbanos y circuitos comerciales. El territorio del pueblo Asháninka en la Amazonía, y... especialmente el distrito de Chungui, ubicado en la vertiente oriental de los Andes... Así fue en Chungui [...] donde Sendero Luminoso [...] avanzó en una tierra sin terratenientes, sin Estado y sin proyectos políticos alternativos.” (Degregori 2010)

⁴⁵ “[...] Así, las retiradas constituyeron en realidad, un repliegue desde la cultura, hacia la naturaleza [...] Luego, ya reducidos a la condición de silenciosos recolectores, el regreso a las épocas previas, a la civilización del fuego, la ruptura de las distinciones entre lo crudo y lo cocido, entre la suciedad y la higiene, con los piojos omnipresentes como marca dolorosa de su nueva condición. Y, al final del camino, el hambre, la enfermedad y la muerte.” (Degregori 2010)

community that the Agrarian Reform could not offer them. Although this film does not intend to do an analysis of Chungui's war years, it is important to highlight that Chunguinos are portrayed as the most victimized 'victims of the war.' The piece stresses how Chunguinos were reduced to 'savages,' emphasizing that their lives in the jungle 'erased' their culture. It presupposes that culture is only the material artifacts that people use during their daily lives, forgetting that ideas are also cultural and do not disappear by living in harsh conditions. The extreme violence lived during the war years was the result of culture, a culture of violence, rather than a lack of it.

There are many ways to tell a story, but there should be ways to do it responsibly without doing a 'pornography of violence' (Daniel 1996). The question is how to comprehend violent acts, for the readers and ourselves, without compromising its sheer excess but also without falling into the morbidity of the images it produces. It is true that scholars and the civil society may choose to only observe when violence and terror destroy peoples' lives in their own countries. However, some have chosen to question and denounce these actions, such as Daniel's exploration of life and death in contemporary Sri Lanka (1996). Overall in Peru, after the release of the Final Report, there is barely discussion about the internal war, and what we see is a pre-ordered rhetoric that speaks about faceless victims and perpetrators. The discursive field is occupied by a morality that only erases the cause and consequences of the internal war (see Interview to Rocio Silva Santiesteban, Saravia and Wiese 2011).

If we choose to speak out, it is important to acknowledge the power of the intelligentsia's discourses as well as that of the media, and their influence in people's

ideas and behavior. These images and selection of words intend to produce surprise and sadness, emphasizing the cruelty of the war. However, at the same time, they tell us a story of human suffering loaded with death and violence; this is also a story (like any other community's) of people joining an insurrection to change the social and political structure that they find unjust. This part of the story is erased from people's narratives, because it is thought it will diminish attention to the actual suffering. This is problematic, because war and violence cannot be denounced without addressing the concrete politics that were enacted behind it, and without offering a (concrete) political alternative. We cannot talk about violence and 'war victims' in abstract, approaching these phenomena from outside the political context that originally provoked the violence gives us false ideas of what is really happening.

4. The challenges of 'representing war victims'

Some scholars (e.g. Mehl 1996) have stated that the media has forged a strong relationship with their audience around suffering and misfortune, in which a 'protocol of compassion' interacts with a surge of compassion. The intimate is opened to the public view and can be extrapolated by humanitarian action and its work of bearing witness, where the use of the media means simplifying causes and above all, giving them emotional color. In several cases (like the Biafran crisis) the television acted as intermediary, showing starving children and presenters pleading for aid. In this context, the faraway 'victims' came close to hand, reducing the complex political reality to an emotional plea. This seems to be the price that 'war victims' must pay in order to

galvanize public opinion (Fassin and Rechtman 2009: 194).

In order to be socially effective, the work of translating violence and oppression into suffering must begin by disseminating information. It is often the case that when war testimonies are mixed with professional data, the effects of war narrative lose potency. Within these narratives, emotions are prioritized over precision, the power of demonstration over showing and professional diagnostics (Fassin and Rechtman 2009: 202). By asking war survivors to talk about their suffering multiple times, professionals force them to recite their troubles yet again; they also attempt to make them believe that this is the only, or at least the most, effective way to make their story heard in the national and international arena. The humanitarian movement tends to channel the different forms of experience that are possible into a singular voice that delivers a unified message, which reduces a cause to simple and accepted expressions. The problem is that this leaves out important issues also essential in order to understand the problems of insurgency and violence. In order to be heard, they have to highlight those aspects that evoke compassion and bring facts to regarding what are considered legitimated concerns. War survivors are compelled to show a suffering body and a suffering soul (Fassin and Rechtman 2009: 211-2) in their most naked state.

In the case of Chungui, and especially Chapi, subjects have spoken about their suffering and have exposed their misery publicly multiple times. Yet in fact no one knows how this presentation of oneself and one's misfortunes modifies psychic and social subjectivity. However, it is clear that it affects people as political subjects. The image a people creates of themselves and of the way others view them, as well as the

translation of this reality into political terms, are affected by the fact that they realize they are seen purely as victims, and that often their identity is reduced to this aspect (Cf.Fassin and Rechtman 2009: 212). The problem is that what we have seen through these representations is what circumscribes Chunguinos' identity as victims, which leaves outside of the public domain other identities that they have.

It is important to consider that in post-war contexts, like the one seen in Chungui, the truth of the trauma lies as much in people's experiences as in the moral economy of contemporary Western society (Cf.Fassin and Rechtman 2009: 276). The politics of reparation, testimony and proof demonstrate practical ways in which trauma is applied in the field of action. However, in each case the focus is empathy as well as on claiming one's rights. At the same time 'war victims' emerge in the context of an ethos of compassion, they are also a tool used to demand justice. Fassin and Rechtman suggest that

We know nothing or almost nothing of their subjectivity as victims. Survivors of disasters, oppression, and persecution adopt the only persona that allows them to be heard- that of victim. In doing so, they tell us less of what they are than of the moral economies of our era in which they find place [...] (2009: 279)

It is easy take 'war victims' for granted and see them as what they profess to be. The core of the analysis should not be about questioning people's claim to be recognized as 'victims.' Instead, we need to be aware that the language used in these narratives is neither neutral nor universal, and it certainly fails to shed light on certain signifiers and agents (Fassin and Rechtman 2009: 280-1). Although 'war victims' look to erase it, people always have some degree of agency; 'war victims' have to learn to deal with the system and transform themselves into visible subjects, and the only way to claim their

rights, is to show us their suffering and misery. An example of these strategies is deployed in the Chapters 4 and 5.

Conclusion

The journal article, news article, graphic book, and documentary analyzed in this chapter have ‘good intentions’ as they look to raise awareness about the suffering lived during the internal war. However, as they look to denounce the violence and pain that happened in Chungui, they reproduce racialized representations of the population. Rural Quechuas in Chapi are portrayed as ‘war victims,’ savages, ignorant, pre-modern, violent and voiceless. They are not political subjects but victims of the violence; they are only recipients of all the actions coming from the Shining Path and the state.

These representations, rather than being the accounts of the victims themselves, are the narrative voice of self-appointed spokesmen. In this context, the humanitarian witness⁴⁶ (Jiménez, Degregori, Ciurlizza, etc.) replaces the first-hand witness, editing—consciously or not—the testimony reported (Cf. Fassin and Rechtman 2009: 193). These surrogate witnesses only make public the parts that they think make sense, which is complicated in this case by conditions of emergency and danger, and by the moral stance that is characteristic of humanitarian intervention in war zones (Fassin and Rechtman 2009: 194).

Having survived the Peruvian internal war, or any other trauma, does not imply that one’s experience is circumscribed by this event, or even that one desires that it be reduced to

⁴⁶ For an extended discussion about humanitarian witness as compared to survivor witness see Fassin 2008.

this event. Indeed, this is what victims (defined as such by others) often say as they adjust as best they can to this obligatory label, which will afford them the status of recognized victims. We should not assume the fact that though they must pass through this process of recognition in order to win financial compensation and public awareness of their plight, this does not imply that they agree with this image (Fassin and Rechtman 2009: 281).

Statements like at the ‘margins of the state,’ and a ‘marginal community,’ are rarely questioned yet extensively used as if they were unquestionable truths to portray rural Quechuas. Nothing concerning them in the public discourse is an active verb; everything refers to them in a passive voice; they are only ‘war victims’ with no agency during the war years. This is precisely the difficulty: they are seen as ‘victims’ because they have been conjointly produced by the state, NGOs and scholars, among others, only as ‘war victims’ whose suffering is abstractly denounced, without any concrete political stance.

Chapter 3

Chapi: A History of rebellions

This chapter explores the central political events that Chapi inhabitants have faced in the last 50 years. This time period covers some of the political struggles that occurred in the hacienda of Chapi, passes through a Cuban-oriented guerrilla struggle in 1965, and ends in the 1980s internal war between the Peruvian state and the Shining Path (a Maoist insurgent group). Through a brief analysis and description of these events, I will argue that these experiences have shaped subordinate groups' understanding of the Peruvian state, acknowledging their position within the social and political structure. These events share in common the violence executed by the Peruvian army, and through these experiences Andean subjects have learned to diminish and silence their political agency and beliefs in order to protect themselves. Even today, talking about a direct participation in any of these struggles is a dangerous subject that may be interpreted as supporting insurgent movements.

My search to understand the complexity of the local history of this period took me to investigate the regional archive in Ayacucho. With the information I gathered in the archive, I was able to conduct more precise interviews and to trigger subjects' memories about political events and local leaders. This chapter is not an account informed only by

archival research or by people's narratives; rather it is a combination of both sources.

1. The Hacienda of Chapi

The Andean hacienda system has its origins in the colonial time, when Spaniards received portions of land as payments for new territory conquered. These lands were produced by indigenous labor, and were administered by Spaniards and later by Creoles⁴⁷. The arrival of Peruvian independence in 1821 did not improve the quality of life in indigenous communities. Rather, it took away the protection indigenous peoples had during the colonial era, which had prevented estates from expanding their territories over indigenous land. New rules were established with the beginning of the Republic, allowing the elite (mainly composed of Creoles) to enlarge their properties, and consolidating the formation of extensive estates in Peru; these estates were called *haciendas*.

In 1863 the hacienda of Chapi, a former property of the Catholic Church, was bought by Jose Manuel Carrillo de Osorio y Altamirano, and his family became the landlords of this property until 1974⁴⁸. After several divisions within the first decades of the 20th century, the land was finally reunified under one administration, performed by the Carrillo Rocha family who were the grandsons of the first owner. Since then this state has been known in the Ayacucho region as the hacienda of Chapi. As did many other landlords, the Carrillo family lived permanently in the hacienda, going occasionally to

⁴⁷ Creole is the original name given to Spaniards born in the Americas, and this group led the Independence struggle.

⁴⁸ Carola Samanez, personal communication in Andahuaylas, August 2008.

Huamanga city. However, around 1940 the next Carrillo generation changed this pattern, living permanently in Huamanga, which offered a ‘modern’ life,⁴⁹ while the hacienda became the occasionally visited country house.

At the death of Benjamín Carrillo Figueredo, in the early 1920s, Chapi’s main administration passed to his sons, until one of his grandsons was appointed manager in the 1950s. In contrast with other Andean estates that have a person from outside the family appointed as steward (Sp. *mayordomo*), Chapi was always directly administered by one of the Carrillo family members. This manager traveled occasionally to Huamanga city to sell the cattle and the sugar brandy produced in Chapi.

At the death of Benjamín Carrillo Rocha in the 1950s, none of the Carrillo brothers wanted to take direct control of the *hacienda* since it implied living there. As a consequence, the mother, Cristina Rocha, appointed Miguel Carrillo, her eldest grandson, as Chapi’s manager. Miguel was the offspring of Benjamin Carrillo and the family maid, Eusebia Cazorla. His dark skin became a sign of his illegitimate origin that contrasted with his brother’s fair skin and blue eyes, which gave Arturo the important features to be recognized as a legitimate Carrillo. The family, and especially the grandmother, raised Miguel’s brother as part of the family, giving him an education. In contrast, Miguel was sent to Chapi without going to school like his brother; this distance kept him far from the family, and from the benefits of urban life.

⁴⁹ Before the re-opening of the University, Huamanga was a traditional provincial city inhabited by the local elite. There were only a few families living in the city, and they gathered in the afternoons to discuss books (reading circles) and to listen to music (some people used to play piano as the main source of entertainment).

I met Olga Carrillo in Lima in 2008. She was with her husband Leoncio, who was Chapi's last manager, and who knew all the main events and names I found in the archive. Olga is one of the granddaughters of the Carrillo family (she is Miguel's cousin), and she is the only remaining living member of the family who had lived in Chapi during the 1950s and 1970s. When we started the interview she told me that like any other family, hers had many dark stories and resentments, and one of them was Miguel's behavior in Chapi. She confessed to me that he grew up with the stigma of being rejected by his family in Huamanga, who always reminded him that he was the illegitimate son of the maid. Later, her daughter explained to me

Cristina raised Arturo. She educated him because he has a fairer skin than his brother. Miguel was dark skinned, and he was left in the hacienda... the same occurred the next generation ... (Carola Samanez Carrillo 2)⁵⁰

The family rejection was not the only one that Miguel had to face during his life; he also had to deal with the comments made by Chapi workers, who considered that although he tried to behave like previous landlords, he was not a 'real' Carrillo. The family hid Miguel in the aggressive geography and remoteness of Chapi, while his brother and family enjoyed a 'good life' in the city under the family's protection. In what seems an attempt to excuse and understand his violent behavior, Olga and her family argue that he had a rejection trauma. She clarifies that Miguel was a lovely person outside the hacienda, but that something happened to him when he was in Chapi, transforming him into an aggressive and violent person with the hacienda's workers. Using this

⁵⁰ "Cristina crió a Arturo y lo educó porque era el más blanco de los hermanos, mientras al negro, que era Miguel lo dejó en la hacienda... igual pasó la siguiente generación..." (Carola Samanez Carrillo 2)

narrative, the family essentializes Miguel's behavior in the hacienda with the hard geography in which he was living, associating with this geography a 'natural' component of violence as if this behavior was a natural outcome of living in this environment.

Poole (1994a) suggests that in the "Provincias Altas" of Cuzco, a regional identity was shaped over the ideas of braveness, unruliness, and masculinity. Taking this idea further, I argue that Chungui, and especially Chapi, are the equivalent of Poole's *tierras bravas*, which fulfill a double role as a dangerous fringe that defies the urban civilized center, being at the same time a romantic uncontaminated space. Thus, people living in Chapi are essentialized as violent and aggressive, like the nature that surrounds them.

Chapi had 35,000 ha (86486.52 acres) organized into seven sections (*Sp. pagos*), each of which had a *mayordomo* (en. steward) who was responsible for informing the landlord about all internal conflicts and about the peons' activities, including people leaving the hacienda. The hacienda's extension and variety of ecologic niches (between 6000 and 14700 feet over the sea level) allowed the production of a range of products (sugar cane to potatoes) and the raising of livestock. Although the land was the family's property, only the plots suitable for intensive agriculture were worked for the hacienda's profit. The rest of the land was divided between pastures for the hacienda's livestock, and *pagos* where the local families were settled. In each *pago*, families produced a small plot for their personal consumption. In exchange for using Chapi's lands, each household's head had to work during one month for the *hacienda*. The work was varied, and included the production of sugar brandy, the harvest of sugar cane, and shepherding livestock in

the highlands. In addition, each household had to pay the landlord one animal each year for the individual plot his or her family was working.

Chapi's most important income was sugar cane brandy, which was distilled in the hacienda house, and was sold locally or transported to Huamanga. Families in the community of Chungui⁵¹ were traders and they used to have a good relationship with Miguel Carrillo. In addition, as many other landlords in Peru, the Carrillo family had excellent relations with the local and regional authorities. Even though Chapi politically depended on the administration in Chungui, the Carrillo family effectively made decisions on all matters concerning Chapi.⁵² For a worker, daily life in the hacienda depended on the quality of the worker's relationship with the hacendado.

As in many other haciendas in Peru, education was forbidden in Chapi. The general belief was that an educated peon was the threat to the system, and the landlords thought that the educated subject would provoke and organize rebellions against the landlord, which could mean the end of the hacienda system. Landlords and the ruling class believed that education would overturn peons' docility (and the natural submissiveness associated with them), and would provoke them to halt the hacienda's profit by demanding pay and improvement in working conditions. Despite all of this, two families considered education as the way to overcome their peon condition, and challenged the landlord's orders by sending their children to study in the neighboring

⁵¹ The district of Chungui is divided into two areas. In the northern part contains the community of Chungui, which is composed of independent agricultural workers. In the south is located the community of Chapi.

⁵² This includes denunciations of robbery and death.

city. Although there was an important control over the hacienda territory, it was almost impossible to control all the lands, and the hacienda's work depended on the local workers. The landlord's trustworthy people received several favors and special considerations, such as allowing educated people to return to the hacienda (see the case of Emeterio Huamán in section 1.2).

Relationships in the hacienda: race, legitimacy and violence

The relationship between the *gamonal*⁵³ and his workers was hierarchical and violent, but at the same time it was one of paternalism and respect. Today people call the Chapi landlord *gamonal* and *hacendado*; however, still there are some elder workers who refer to him as 'papa Miguel' as an expression of respect and hierarchy. This relationship of fear and respect was one that legitimated the dominance of the landlord family over the people in Chapi, and over the land.

[Hacienda workers] believed that he was God and worshiped their master ... they were very good and submissive people. There were not people like them. They were gentlemen, very good people, although the hacendado mistreated his workers (Leoncio Samanez)⁵⁴

Leoncio, in the conversation that I had with his wife Olga, was interested in highlighting that people loved the landlord, and it seemed as if Leoncio was trying to reinforce that they adored him because the indigenous were good people. Like many traditional landlords, the Carrillos thought that people were happy and enjoyed living in the hacienda, and that their workers were "good people" because that was their nature.

⁵³ Also called 'strong man.' For further discussion about *gamonales*, see Poole 1994.

⁵⁴ "[la gente] cree que era dios y adoraban a su patrón ... eran gente sumisa gente muy buena era gente como esa no había. eran unos caballeros gente muy buena, a pesar del maltrato que el hacendado daba a algunas personas" (Leoncio Samanez)

Even if the data contradicts it, Samanez imagines that workers considered the landlord to be like their “God,” even if he mistreated them. The essentialization of hacienda workers is common in urban areas, especially in people who had administered or grew up in a hacienda. They consider hacienda workers to be submissive by nature (further discussion of racial essentialization in chapters III and IV).

In addition, people from Chungui considered that

workers lived, had their small cattle, things, [...] and they were used to live like that years after year, generation by generation, under such abuses, murders, and that was normal to them. I guess that was normal (Homero Juárez)⁵⁵

Hacendados and people in urban areas thought that hacienda workers were submissive by nature, which becomes their way of explaining that the submissive attitude is natural to Quechua inhabitants (further discussion of this essentialization practise in chapters 3 and 4). Mestizos and *notables* (en. notable) in Chungui state thought that hacienda peons allowed the physical punishments that the *gamonal* inflicted on them because they were ‘ignorant.’ The relationship between landowners and workers is more complicated than just stating that people did not know any other way to live and did not want to change a life conditions that they saw some times as abusive and unjust. There were conditions accepted in this relationship, but there were also issues that were challenged by hacienda workers. The landlords and their managers controlled daily life, but transgressions in this relationship were punished on both sides (for further discussion on this subject, see Lyons 2005).

⁵⁵ “gente vivía, tenía sus ganaditos, cosas, [...] ya estaban acostumbrados a vivir así tras años, por generación por generación, a ese tipo de vejaciones, de asesinatos, ya era normal, a ellos supongo que era normal” (Homero Juárez)

In the Ayacucho region Chapi was known as one of the biggest and most violent haciendas, with a traditional servitude system that was seen as cruel by other landlord families.

[Chapi] was the only hacienda in the area, it was very important, it has sugar cane (...) That region barely had state presence, the hacendado was the lord of the gallows and the knife. (Pepe Coronel)⁵⁶

Violence was practiced by all Carrillo managers and took the form of physical punishment, sexual abuses, and in some cases, the death of the worker. In addition, if one of the *hacienda*'s animals died, was hurt, or was lost, Miguel considered this to be the shepherd's responsibility. Thus, he used to take the peon's best animal to replace the one he had lost. In other cases, any non-hacienda animal that was found on Chapi's pasture was appropriated or killed by the landlord without further explanation.

Although violence had been practiced by previous managers at Chapi, the local memory recalls Miguel as the most violent and aggressive. This is probably also because while previous managers were seen as legitimate landlords, Miguel was not. People used to call him *alqa ñawi* (En. spotted eyes), in direct allusion to his dark eyes, which contrasted with the blue ones that characterized most Carrillo family members. Moreover, he was the steward who had served the longest in the hacienda in recent times and the one who was killed by the guerrillas in 1965.

I met Benjamín when I as first arrived in Chapi in 2006. Although he was the eldest in the community, he had an impressive memory that confirmed several historical

⁵⁶ “[Chapi] era la única hacienda de la zona, muy importante, cañavera (...) Eran zonas de escasisima presencia estatal, donde el hacendado era un señor de horca y cuchillo.” (Pepe Coronel)

details I had gathered in the regional archive. He is the only person who remembers abuses by other *gamonales* prior to Miguel. Part of this hierarchical relationship between landlords and workers was the respect that was shown each time the landlord gave an order. Questioning the order was not allowed, and following it immediately was part of the relationship of respect that workers needed to show.

As Lyons (2005) suggests, the hacienda was a social order in which coercion came wrapped in an ideological argument which took varied forms with deep cultural roots. Locally organizing the *pagos* and its workers, Chapi's stewards reproduced the role of the landowner at a micro-level. These local managers were often Carrillo's trustworthy persons, and assumed a role of moral regulation that constructed and reproduced relationships of gender, age, and class, infused by a moral language of respect (Cf. Lyons 2005).

Hacienda landlords and stewards, as well as indigenous authorities, administered discipline in ways that went beyond simply enforcing an oppressive labor regime, and discipline was complexly articulated with internal community politics and with workers' notions of morality and respect (Lyons 2005: 103-4). Between 2008–2009, Chapi elders said that the hacienda-era disciplinary practices allowed their own elders to demand respect with more persuasive force than they are able to demand today, and complained that today's generation is lazy and disrespectful to the elders. However, at the same time, they contradict these narratives when they emphasize narratives about the *gamonal's* cruelty and sexual perversity. Although the hacienda era was a time of respect, it was also a period of arbitrary violence and sexual abuse, in which there was no respect at all (Cf.

Lyons 2005).

The relationship between hacienda workers and the *gamonal* implied a set of understandings about what the former could “rightly” expect in return for their labor that was sustained through cultural practises as labor exchange on usufruct plots (Lyons 2005: 115). In this sense, rather than understanding the hacienda system as a coercion system, we need to understand it as an asymmetrical relationship, based on exchange in which the higher position needs to provide more than the lower one, becoming this basis of the relationship. As I will later discuss (see Chapter 5), the same structure is still used to understand the role of the state in the Peruvian post-war context.

The hacienda regime allowed landowners and stewards to employ violence and to give instructions in ways that legitimated their authority. Discipline was associated with the domain of symbolic representation, in which respect is the central category. This was as much a part of the hacienda power as a part of the culture and the social relations of the indigenous peons (see Poole 1994a). The hacienda system is more complex than just assuming there was a clear line between oppressors and oppressed. Workers played either role, depending on their relationship with the *gamonal*. Thus, forms of discipline blending persuasion and coercion could contribute to patterns of loyalty and disunity, thereby complicating the lines between oppressor and oppressed and constraining or undermining resistance (Lyons 2005: 120-1).

1. Regional politics in 1960s: rebelling against murder

The rebellious actions that took place in Chapi during the 1960s need to be

understood in the frame of the regional struggles in La Convención-Cusco (see Appendix 3-1) that produced the end to the *hacienda* regime. The work and relationships that Emeterio Huamán established with union leaders in the Amazon jungle of Cusco were an important trigger of the events that occurred in Chapi during this time. The impact of the political struggle in La Convención in the 1960s needs to be understood as an important influence in the small scale rebellions that occurred in several *haciendas* in the neighboring areas, such as Chapi. Only through understanding these relationships do the workers' political struggles have a regional and national significance.

2.1 La Convención

In the late 1950s the emergence of a peasant movement expressed major social contradictions within the Peruvian society. One of the most important events occurred in La Convención and Lares, in the Cusco region between 1958 and 1964. During this time peasant unions, looking for better labor conditions, started to struggle against landlords, and in the end achieved important changes in the Peruvian agrarian structure (Fioravanti 1974).

La Convención's unions were made up of local peasant groups, with important support from the Regional Workers' Federation and lawyers in Cusco, who although they were *gamonales* themselves, sided with the workers against the oligarchs of the jungle. The *haciendas* in this region were located in the Amazon upper land, and the main production was coffee, a profitable crop originally introduced by Andean migrants. By the time *hacendados* were converting to the production of coffee, this was already the central product of the workers' economy, which provoked several problems. *Hacendados*

tried to expand their crops over the workers' land on slopes, which was a more suitable area to produce coffee and, since the coffee ripens all at once, the time of greatest need for labor in the *hacienda* clashed with the same time the workers needed to work their own land (Whyte 1969). This exacerbated the conflict between workers and landowners.

To protect themselves against the landowners' abuses, and to support their demands to limit their labor obligations, La Convención's workers started to organize unions. During the 1950s the union work mainly took place in the Ministry of Labor, and focused on the workers defending themselves against landlords' incursion over their lands. The government was not particularly sympathetic to the workers' claims, and it held back from answering the union's demands. This situation only fostered the sense of exploitation and injustice that would manifest in radical and violent actions during the next few years. *Hacendados* in the La Convención area were repressing their workers through threats and evictions performed by the police. In addition, the landlords denounced union leaders, who were arrested by the police and sent to prison in Cusco for agitating the *hacienda* workers. In response to these actions, workers blocked bridges, took control of *hacienda* lands, and confronted the police when they were entering the *hacienda*.

The peasant movement and these struggles caught the attention of the Left. However, only Hugo Blanco was accepted by the workers' organizations. Blanco was a Trotskyist Quechua-speaking Cusqueño who had completed a university education in Argentina. He was familiar with the local situation, and in 1958 settled in Chaupimayo, one of the *haciendas* of La Convención. He was a charismatic leader, and represented his

hacienda union in the peasant federation (Brown and Fernández 1991). In one of the union's meetings Blanco proposed modifying the union's strategy; rather than continuing with a passive struggle, he called for a radical change to confront the *hacendados'* growing repression. He suggested the development of an armed struggle to show the state, and the landlords, how serious their organization and their claims were. Although not everybody in the major union supported Blanco's proposal, a group decided to follow him. Elder leaders were looking for land rights, not a revolution (Gustavo, personal communication, Quillabamba, July 2009). As a result, the union movement in the region was divided into two groups.

In November 1962, Blanco led a group of union followers to a police post in Pucyura (La Convención) to capture the policemen's weapons. However events grew out of control when a policeman resisted and was killed in the struggle. Hugo Blanco was charged with murder, and this led to the escalation of violence in the valley when Blanco fled from the murder scene, which provoked a police intervention. Confrontation between the police and workers culminated in massacres, like the one that occurred in Chaullay where thirty peasants were killed on December 25, 1962. During the next months the tensions in La Convención grew until its union leaders agreed to stop the violence if the government would enact the Agrarian Reform law. Blanco was finally captured in May 1963. Today former workers believe that the violence the armed struggle provoked outweighed its benefits to the cause:

a policeman was killed, and a chase came to us saying that unions have killed the guards, the Armed Force. The government was armed and it started chasing us everywhere. Then they said that there was a guerrilla band led by Hugo Blanco, and news here and there,

*and in that way Mr. Hugo Blanco has troubled us. (Gustavo, Quillabamba)*⁵⁷

Gustavo is one of the historical leaders of the union faction that did not support Blanco's armed struggle. For him, as for many others, the original struggle was transformed into a political persecution that resulted in the deaths of many workers.

In 1963 the union mobilization, after suffering the brutality of the state's political repression, achieved the enactment of the first agrarian reform. Although this reform was only applied in the La Convención area, it had an important impact on the politics of the region. For Chapi's workers these struggles highlighted the possibility of change, and inspired alternatives to traditional problems they had with the *hacendado*. This struggle also showed that it was possible to take actions into their own hands in order to call attention to a state that was only ruling for the benefit of the land oligarchy.

2.2 La Convención's impact in Chapi

The respect (Sp. *respeto*) that people have toward the *hacendado* did not keep them from resenting his arbitrary and excessive use of violence, and his inflexible labor demands. This respect set the terms of contention between workers and bosses, in which over violence and obedience were important. It also constructed workers' acts of resistance as wild, which limited the external view of resistance. Thus rather than being considered as a rebellious act, resistance was seen as an spontaneous response to

⁵⁷ *“murió un policía y de allí ya vino una persecución para nosotros, diciendo que los sindicatos han matado a la fuerza armada a los guardias. El gobierno se armó y nos empezó a perseguir por todo lado. Después llegaron a saber que dice que hay una guerrilla encabezado por Hugo Blanco, y pucha noticias por acá y por allá, y de esa manera nos ha entorpecido el señor Hugo Blanco.”* (Gustavo, Quillabamba)

particular conditions (Cf. Lyons 2005: 118-9).

During the 1960s, Emeterio Huamán was the most important political leader in Chapi, not only because he was committed to political changes, but also because he was both fluent in Spanish and educated. I suggest that these qualities were be the most important features that allowed him to become the main figure in the legal files that recorded the workers' struggles against the Carrillo family.

Emeterio was the son of a worker family living in Oronccoy. His father was one of the people most trusted by the landlord, and he managed to send his son to primary school in Ocobamba. In order to be allowed to return, Emeterio's father gave the *hacienda* a newborn calf for each year his son was away. Once Emeterio finished third grade, he returned to Chapi, and through his family's good connections with Miguel, became the landlord's trusted employee.

In 1960 a formal complaint against Miguel Carrillo was filled in the provincial court. The complaint was made by the father of Julian Huamán (a cousin of Emeterio's family), who accused the *hacendado* of murdering his son (ARA 1960)⁵⁸. This accusation came about because there was money missing from the sale of sugar cane, for which Julian was responsible. He was called by Miguel to Chapi, where he was tortured. Finally, it is said by witnesses and documents in the regional archive that Miguel killed Julian by cutting his throat.⁵⁹ Although the judicial file states that the origin of the conflict was the missing money, witnesses in Chapi argue that the real reason was that

⁵⁸This file had not been classified nor codified by the Regional Archive when I collected this information in November 2007–March 2008.

⁵⁹ Olga Carrillo, personal communication, Lima, February 2008

Julián Huamán was having a love affair with Miguel's mistress.

In the early 1960 politics were changing in the region, influenced by the political struggles going on in La Convención-Cusco, which provoked the workers to file complaints in the justice courts against Miguel Carrillo's abuses. Therefore, as discussed in the next section, people's formal complaints and rebellions were not triggered by a particular event; rather, it was the combination of what they saw was happening in La Convención, and the constant abuses they had suffered over the years that started a new period in Chapi.

When Julian Huamán was killed by Miguel Carrillo, the relationship between the workers and the *hacendado* was significantly affected. Probably under other political circumstances this would not have had any further repercussion; however, under the impact of the struggles in the Cusco area, this event catalyzed a search for changes in and to the *hacienda* regime. About this time Emeterio's daughter remembers:

... my dad, when the hacendado cut his throat like an animal [Julian], my dad was angry, "this cannot stay like this. I'm going to find a solution for this hacienda ... so people could be respected. How is that to his will, to the people, poor people was suffering, we are suffering?" (Ana 1)⁶⁰

In a way, the traditional patron-worker relationship allowed animal expropriation and physical punishments; however, this relationship did not allow the murder of those who were found at fault, at least not at this moment. Carrillo, in performing the role of father, was entitled to punish his workers to correct their behavior and lack of respect, but

⁶⁰ “...mi papá cuando le habían cortado el cuello como carnero [a Julián], mi papá se amargó: «esto no va a quedar así, yo voy a buscar solución como sea a esta hacienda,... o sea, para que a la gente sea respetada. ¿Cómo pues él va a hacer así a su gusto, a la gente, pobre gente que estamos padeciendo, que estamos sufriendo?» (Ana 1)

the system did not allow killing.

As a *mayordomo*, Emeterio had a position of power as Miguel Carrillo's trusted employee, and Carrillo often demonstrated this trust by sending him as a messenger to other *haciendas*, and to sell sugar brandy and cattle. In the Andahuaylas region (see Appendix 3-1) workers had news about the political struggle in La Convención through their relatives who were working in that region (Gustavo, personal communication, Quillabamba, July 2009). This news drew the attention of Chapi workers and particularly of Emeterio, who was interested in the unions' organization and its demands. Emeterio 'secretly' travelled to meet the union leaders in the valley.

Emeterio travelled to La Convención several times between 1961 and 1962, often going with other Chapi workers to meet and engage in the union struggles. This allowed him to know the problems other *hacienda* workers were confronting, and exposed him to a highly politicized environment,

About three years ago, Emeterio Huamán invited me to go to a place called Challhuay, in La Convención region, to attend a meeting of peasants that expected to form a union. In that place I met Gerardo Mormontoy, Huamán informed me that he was the leader. I did not hear the details because I was working in a coffee plantation at the suggestion of Mormontoy. (Archive of the Peruvian Army-Manifestation Eduardo Mendoza, October 8, 1965 at the hacienda Chapi)⁶¹

In the hacienda of Pomabamba, around December 1963 (1962?) I met with Eduardo Mendoza, Porfirio Casa, Ceferino Orihuela and Daniel Vargas from Huallhua; Sebastian Quispe, Julian Orihuela; Justiniano Rivas and Lorenzo Castro from Oroncco, with the goal to attend the workers meeting from Pomabamba, and learn the way they spoke and then test it on this estate, but it was never possible. (Archive of the Peruvian

⁶¹ "Hace aproximadamente tres años, Emeterio Huamán me invito a ir a la Convención al lugar denominado Challhuay, para participar en una reunión de campesinos con el fin de formar el sindicato, en este lugar conocí a Gerardo Mormontoy, de quien Huamán me informa que era el dirigente, no habiéndome enterado de los pormenores por encontrarme trabajando en un cafetal por indicación de Mormontoy." (Archivo del Ejército Peruano- Manifestación Eduardo, 8 octubre 1965 en la hacienda Chapi)

*Army-Manifestation Raúl, October 5, 1965)*⁶²

These quotations are from the national army's archive and, along with some of the interviews I conducted, are the only available testimonies that confirm the Chapi workers' interest in learning about the progress of the struggle in La Convención. The fact that these conversations were collected by the army during the 1965 guerrilla movement, and that these testimonies accuse Emeterio as the main contact with the region's political forces, does not deny their importance. These testimonies were probably gathered under threatening and violent circumstances; however, they also confirm what other interviews suggest about the close relationship between Emeterio and La Convención's leaders. Overall, it can be said that Chapi's workers were looking to replicate the union organization in Chapi, expecting that this would help to stop the abuses committed by Miguel Carrillo.

2.3 The 1963 Rebellion

On one of his return trips from La Convención in 1963, Emeterio Huamán found that a group in Oroncco had taken Miguel Carrillo prisoner. Although there are many stories about what provoked this event, the fact is that a group of women from Oroncco, apparently led by Ignacia (Emeterio's wife) and Catalina Orihuela, took action against Carrillo's abuses. With a story about the appropriation of cattle by neighbors, Catalina

⁶² “*En la hacienda Pomabamba, aproximadamente en el mes de diciembre de 1963 (1962?), nos reunimos con Eduardo, Porfirio Casa, Ceferino Orihuela y Daniel Vargas por Huallhua; Sebastián Quispe, Julián Orihuela y yo por Panto; así como Justiniano Rivas y Lorenzo Castro por Oroncco, con el fin de asistir a la asamblea de colonos de Pomabamba, y aprender la forma como hablaban y luego ponerlo a prueba en esta hacienda; pero nunca fue posible esto.*” (Archivo del Ejército Peruano- Manifestación Raúl, 5 octubre 1965)

stopped Miguel Carrillo in his way out the *hacienda* nearby Oroncco, and with the help of other women, took away the *gamonal's* gun and tied him up. People in Oroncco came out to help the women, and called for a meeting. When they were discussing what to do with the *gamonal*, a group called for his execution, without witnesses. However, Emeterio changed the course of events.

Once in Oroncco, Emeterio approached the meeting, and after a long talk he convinced the group to denounce the *hacendado* in San Miguel. The news of Miguel's capture spread quickly through Chapi, and provoked the general support of Chapi workers who reached the group near Chupón. A group gathered in order to take the prisoner to the regional authorities; they took his horse, his shoes, and his gun, and they tied his hands but left his feet free in order to walk him to San Miguel.

The commission's first stop was Chungui, where they tried to get the local authorities' support for their demands, without success. After a rally in the plaza in which Emeterio Huamán and others denounced Miguel Carrillo's abuses, the group continued their journey to San Miguel. After two days of travel, they arrived (Figure 3-1).

Figure 3-1

Chapi workers denouncing Miguel Carrillo in San Miguel, January 1963



Source: ARA, La Mar Superior Court, criminal causes, leg. 1889 first file 1963

In San Miguel, the group approached the civil governor's office in order to denounce Miguel Carrillo for the abuses he had committed over the previous years. Each of the sixty-three workers filed complaints that accused Carrillo of crimes from expropriation of animals to murder and rape. However, the government officials were not cooperative with the workers, and Carrillo was treated as a victim by the regional authorities. He filed a formal complaint against his workers for robbery and physical abuses.

The excellent relationship between the Carrillo family and the regional authorities, most of whom were also landlords in the region, allowed Miguel to be seen as a victim rather than a victimizer. Miguel was aware of the struggles occurring in Cusco,

and he directly blamed this, as well as Emeterio's leadership, for inciting the workers to rebel against him.

The judiciary process

The first information I collected about the 1963 rebellion led by Chapi workers was in Ayacucho's regional archive (ARA), and like any other historical record, I looked to understand it in the historical context in which it was produced. There are two elements to be aware of: the monolingual Quechua and the illiteracy of the Chapi workers, and the structure of the Peruvian judiciary system. With the exception of Emeterio, the rest of the workers were monolingual and illiterate. Although most of them were asked to testify, these testimonies were transcribed in Spanish by an official. The archive does not keep records of any Quechua declaration because Spanish is the only formal language of the state. Thus, we should see this material as an interpretation made by state officials about monolingual subjects, in a historical period in which the regional oligarchy was feeling threatened by the agrarian reform enacted in La Convención.

On January 18th 1963 Emeterio Huamán, his brother Saturnino Huamán Aspuri, and Espirita Huamán Ccorahua were sent to jail and accused of leading the rebellion. Carrillo explained that they were directly influenced by La Convención's political leaders, with whom they had been in contact. Although the plaintiffs included Carrillo's most trusted men, these men excused themselves in front of Carrillo by arguing that they had been forced to go to San Miguel. These men played an essential role in punishing the group leaders by accusing Emeterio of being in contact with political leaders in Cusco.

Emeterio Huamán ordered Nicanor Ccorahua to capture Carrillo, because Huamán was in Quillabamba with the Communists, who had established an important contact with

*Eduardo Mendoza to receive communications with the Communist Party's chief, for which had sent money to the society that is in Quillabamba, collecting 10 soles per Oronccoy, Chillihua, and Panto resident. (ARA legajo 1885, nro 143, Corte Superior de Justicia de La Mar)*⁶³

While Emeterio was in jail, his wife and youngest daughter stayed near him. They managed to live in San Miguel, collecting some money from selling the family's cattle. In addition, Emeterio received help from twenty Chapi workers, who stayed two months in San Miguel doing occasional jobs in order to pay for the lawyer they had hired (Archive EP, Manifestation Roman Guevara, October 1965). Even if the argument against Huamán and the others was not solid enough, Carrillo's direct influences in the regional justice system succeeded in keeping Emeterio incarcerated for several years.

During the years Emeterio was in jail, he was denied any political contact with people in La Convención, although he was allowed to go to the region to work temporarily in one of the *haciendas*. His defense was focused on denouncing the mistreatments and abuses against Chapi's workers that Carrillo had often practiced. In addition, he highlighted that, having had the chance to kill Carrillo in Oronccoy, he and his fellow workers had instead brought him to the authorities to denounce him because they had believed that the Peruvian state would give justice to 'humble peasants.' In his statement Emeterio affirmed that

The theft of animals by the landowner had not been reported before any authority for fear of being expelled from the hacienda. Facing the current situation [haciendas and peasants] is that he requests the authorities to divide the estate into individual plots.

⁶³ "Emeterio Huamán Aspú dio orden a Nicanor Ccorahua [para capturar a Carrillo], pues Huamán Aspú se encontraba en Quillabamba en contacto con los comunistas, quienes habían conformado un despacho con Eduardo para pertenecer o recibir comunicaciones con los jefe del partido comunista, para lo cual se había mandado dinero a esa sociedad que se halla en Quillabamba, recogiendo 10 soles por cabeza de los residentes de Oronccoy, Chillihua y Panto."

Because the goal of the yanacunas is the division of the hacienda property to alleviate their terrible situation. (ARA Superior Court of Justice La Mar, 1963, file 1885Nr. 143, letter to the judge from Emeterio)⁶⁴

Here Emeterio is asking for an agrarian reform as a way to stop the gamonal's abuses, and he is also calling attention to the fear people have of denouncing the gamonal because of the power the patron has over workers' lives. One year later in 1964, seeing that he was not being sentenced, Emeterio wrote another letter where he declares

In November 1960 Miguel Carrillo accused Julian Huamán of theft, and then Carrillo found this worker with a cut on his neck. In his agony Huamán accused Carrillo of murder. This crime has not had any legal significance, because the death of a humble worker has no importance in our society [...] the amount of what the hacendado accused of us stealing does not compare with the hundreds of thousands he is robbing to his workers, and the crimes based on hunger and the need of his desperate workers. They link us with Chaupimayo leaders, in front of which we are absolutely innocent. With hunger and abuses, we did not have time to know politics for being asleep. (ARA Superior Court of Justice La Mar, 1885 file no. 143)⁶⁵

Emeterio's political discourse allowed him to call attention to his cause in the local media. The words he used to make his argument may have been influenced by political groups interested in his cause. However, it is not clear if Emeterio was being directly advised by any political party or group. His language is extremely political, but no different than that of other leftist discourses for agrarian reform in the 1960s. His

⁶⁴“los robos de sus animales por el hacendado no han sido denunciados antes a ninguna autoridad por temor a ser extrañado en su residencia. Frente a la situación actual [haciendas y peones] es que solicito a las autoridades la parcelación de la hacienda. Pues el fin de la persecución de los yanacunas es la parcelación de la hacienda para aliviar la agobiante situación en la cual se encuentran.” (ARA Corte Superior de Justicia La Mar, 1963, legajo 1885 nro. 143, carta de Emeterio al juez)

⁶⁵“En noviembre de 1960 Miguel Carrillo acusó a Julián Huamán de robo y luego se encontró a este yanacuna con un corte en el cuello, y en su agonía acusó a Carrillo de asesinato. Este crimen no ha tenido ninguna trascendencia jurídica, porque la muerte de un humilde chacarero, no tiene importancia en nuestra sociedad [...] la cantidad de lo que se nos inculpa no convalidan los cientos de miles que le está robando al pueblo y sus crímenes a base del hambre y la necesidad de sus desesperados pobladores. Nos vinculan con los dirigentes de Chaupimayo, frente a lo cual, nosotros somos absolutamente inocentes. Con el hambre y los desgarramientos, no hemos tenido tiempo de conocer la política por estar adormecidos”. (ARA Corte Superior de Justicia La Mar, legajo 1885 nro. 143).

contacts with La Convención seem to have influenced his discourse, which contrasts with common workers' discourse that stresses ignorance rather than innocence.

During these years calm did not return to Chapi, and the continued imprisonment of workers only nurtured the struggle for changes among local workers, especially in Oronccoy. While Emeterio was in jail, he kept in contact with his fellow workers in Oronccoy through letters he sent from jail via ELN guerrilla members (see guerrilla section for details).

In 1965, Gonzalo Carrillo presented a formal complaint against Marcelino Sánchez, Ismael Huamán, Ignacia Orihuela, and Catalina Orihuela⁶⁶accusing them of political agitation. Carrillo accused his workers of trying to kill the *hacendados*, and of provoking a climate of tension and danger in the *hacienda*. In order to refute this claim, Ignacia Orihuela, Emeterio's wife, declared that all of Carrillo's denunciations were false, and that she did not know what the guerrillas or communism were. She stated that this was a false accusation that was intended to complicate her and her husband's situation. In September 1965 the *gamonales* of the *hacienda* of Chapi were killed by the ELN guerrillas, resulting in the closure and dismissal of this and other denunciations.

3. Guerrillas: the liberators

*"We were the liberators"- H. Béjar
[Nosotros éramos los libertadores]*

The success of the Cuban revolution in 1959 and the social movement in La Convención, encouraged two Peruvian leftists groups to go to La Havana, with the goal

⁶⁶ They also participated in the 1963 rebellion.

of changing the Peruvian agrarian structure after their return. This experience produced two guerrilla movements, the MIR and the ELN, with different political projects that were simultaneously applied in 1965. This insurrection did not last long, and was rapidly crushed by the national army. However, historians consider that this was an important moment that put the need for a social and political change on the agenda in Peru (Matos Mar and Mejía 1980).

The guerrillas used the ‘focalized’ strategy that Che Guevara described as an ideal way of jumpstarting the revolution,

A small revolutionary vanguard trained in Marxist ideology and guerrilla tactics. By establishing themselves in isolated parts of the countryside, the revolutionaries enjoy some protection from the police while they educate the rural masses in the reality of their situation (Brown and Fernández 1991)

This strategy, as will be later discussed, assumed that the rural masses did not know the reality of their dominated condition, thus the guerrillas needed to educate them.

3.1 The Cuban experience: two irreconcilable projects

In 1962, two Peruvian groups of different political affiliations arrived in La Havana, Cuba. The MIR (Revolutionary Leftist Movement) led by Luis de la Puente Uceda, and the ELN (National Liberation Army) led by Hector Béjar. A third group, composed of eighty college students, also arrived on scholarships provided by the Cuban government. A three-week tour around the Sierra Maestra was provided to help the latter group “choose” between professional careers or joining the revolution. After this decision, they were introduced to de la Puente’s and Béjar’s groups. These men composed the core of the 1965 Peruvian guerrillas.

The MIR and ELN were looking to learn from the Cuban experience so they could reproduce it in the Andes. However, both groups had different views of the role of the political party. The MIR saw itself as part of a major project that originated in the APRA and that worked with its regional leaders over a long political trajectory, bonded by the persecution, jail, and exile experiences (Renique 2004). In contrast, the group led by Béjar was against the party system and wanted to go directly into action. Rather than building a political party, they wanted to be a free revolutionary association, a disciplined military group that acted as the center of the People's Revolutionary Army. For them, this was the only way to go deep into the problem, by shortening the distances between guerrilleros and workers. They considered that only inside the masses could the party emerge—where revolutionary and exploited people were together as one body (Renique 2004).

The MIR members planned to return to Peru individually, and to introduce themselves into the guerrilla areas through a slow process that would establish the best places for military actions. This project was impossible to reconcile with Béjar's model of armed action. The ELN wanted to enter the Bolivian frontier as an armed group in green uniforms with a pre-established organization (Renique 2004).

The lack of capacity to bring together these two closely related projects was clearly exposed in La Havana. It was not only different political stances that prevented these groups from working together, it was also their leaders' ambitions for power that constrained the success of these guerrillas (Former trainee in Cuban guerrillas, personal communication, Lima, August 2006).

3.2 ELN and Chungui

Horacio Juárez La Rosa was the son of a wealthy family from the community of Chungui. He was sent to Huamanga and Lima to study, and while at the University he received a scholarship to go to La Havana. Once in there, and after a tour around Sierra Maestra, Horacio decided to join the guerrillas' school. Horacio met Béjar, and this seemed to be the connection that would decide the ELN's actions in Chapi.

Among many people who entered the Cuban schools was Horacio Juarez, and then we became friends and came to Chungui. Chungui at that time, you can imagine what Chungui was[...] it was a very important community. Chunguinos were very organized, led by strong families and one of these families were the Juárez, and the older brother was Horacio who was with us [the guerrillas]. (Hector Béjar 1)⁶⁷

Before starting the armed struggle, ELN members visited Ayacucho City looking to develop a network that would help to start their project in Chapi. ELN members⁶⁸ visited Emeterio Huamán in Ayacucho's jail. Although the real contents of this conversation are unknown, Emeterio's daughter remembers that after the visit her father affirmed that he would be freed soon.

So we were supported by the Huamán's network. The Huamán were prisoners and they communicated by letters to the community ... The Huamán were in contact with the national peasant movement and we managed to contact them. (Béjar 1)⁶⁹

Emeterio and his network were the central element of the ELN guerrilla project

⁶⁷ “Entre mucha gente que entro a las escuelas cubanas, estaba Horacio Juárez, y entonces nos hicimos muy amigos y nos vinimos a Chungui. En aquella época Chungui, te imaginarás lo que era Chungui [...] era una comunidad muy importante. Los Chunguinos eran gente muy organizada, liderada por las familias fuertes Chunguinos y una de estas familias eran los Juárez, y el hermano mayor era Horacio que estaba con nosotros [en la guerrilla].” (Hector Béjar 1)

⁶⁸ Béjar says that he does not remember the names of those who contacted Emeterio.

⁶⁹ “Entonces, nosotros fuimos muy avivados por la Red de los Huamán. Los Huamán estaban presos y se comunicaban por cartas con la comunidad... Los Huamán estaban en contacto con el movimiento campesino nacional y nosotros logramos contacto con ellos.” (Béjar 1)

because they became the connection with the rest of Chapi's workers. This relationship was crafted by the ELN members who acted as messengers between Emeterio and his fellows in Oronccooy. Through his letters Emeterio encouraged the community to continue their struggle against the *hacienda* system by supporting the ELN project (Béjar 2, personal communication, October 2009)

In March 1965, the ELN guerrilla force, composed of twenty men and led by Hector Béjar, entered the district of Chungui. Around ten people from the community of Chungui joined the cause as direct participants. This became an important element for the ELN's cause, first because these members were fluent in Quechua, and second because through their family relationships the ELN also found support for its project in the forms of money, food, and guidance.

The guerrillas attracted the participation of young Chunguinos studying in the city of Ayacucho, and of former local authorities who had suffered incarceration. The main group of locals who were aiding the guerrillas were from the town of Chungui. During previous months, this group had confronted Salvador Arce (a provincial lawyer, Sp. *tinterillo*) who was appropriating the most productive land in the jungle area, Rosaspampa. This confrontation, led by Edwin García Miranda (a local authority and the son of a landowner), ended in the incarceration of the local leaders for several months. As a literate and bilingual group, this group felt that the Peruvian state had betrayed them; they saw their land allowed to be appropriated by an abusive lawyer who was deceiving illiterate agrarian workers. They felt close to the Chapi workers' plight of injustice and exploitation, and they joined the cause of the ELN to free the indigenous population and

themselves⁷⁰ from the oligarchy's abuses and appropriations. Béjar remembers

we were dedicated to make contacts with local workers at the same time we were doing propaganda for our cause, without incorporating in the group any worker who agreed with the ideas of the guerrilla movement. But we had supporters, we reached their homes in order to stock up on food and to know the terrain that was quite large, that the reason why we settle there (EP archive, statement Béjar 1966, pp.3)⁷¹

This was an alien project for Chapi's workers. The ELN looked for the support of local peasants and *hacienda* workers, but they did not want to include locals as direct participants in their actions. Although this quotation is an extract from Béjar's declaration to the national army, he asserted in both of the interviews I conducted, and in the books he wrote after his years in jail (see Béjar 1969), that he knew that in case of repression, peasants and workers would not be safe if they were participating in the guerrilla actions. The ELN's project was not joint work between the guerrillas and workers; rather, the workers' support was mainly oriented around food supplies, lodging, and guidance in the area.

People in Chupón and Oronccoy do not talk about the 1965 guerrilla movement, even though many of them supported and witnessed it. In Chupón, people have relatives who were executed by the national army, and what they remember is the months during which the army settled in the area to find all guerrilla collaborators. In Oronccoy most of those who had helped the ELN were killed during the 1980s. In contrast, in Chungui

⁷⁰ They did not consider themselves as indigenous.

⁷¹ *“nos dedicamos a efectuar contactos con los campesinos del lugar a la vez que hacíamos propaganda a favor de nuestra causa, sin llegar a incorporar al grupo a ningún campesino que esté de acuerdo con las ideas del grupo guerrillero, pero sí teníamos simpatizantes, que llegábamos a sus casas con la finalidad de aprovisionarnos de víveres y conocer el terreno que es bastante amplio, motivo por el cual optamos por instalarnos en este lugar”* (EP archive, Béjar declaración 1966, pp.3)

there is a memory of the ELN, because many people here believed that the guerrilla movement helped to transform the Peruvian countryside. The ELN tried to avoid any direct attacks on landlords because they knew that this would lead to an immediate incursion of the national army. Today they recognize that their major fear was that the army would execute the local population as a way of combating the insurgency. Although the ELN argues that they were aware of the threat represented by the army, Béjar believes that events got out of control, which provoked a massacre. It is not clear that all workers of them were aware of the consequences of supporting the guerrillas. However, there was a group in Oronccooy and Chupón that was convinced that the only way to continue the movement was to end the *hacienda* regime.

The ELN, says Béjar, could not trust everybody, especially because Carrillo still had an important group informing him about its movements and supporters. Moreover, Béjar believes that people were confused because agrarian reform was being applied in La Convención. Thus, Béjar believes that some people in Chapi confused the ELN with a governmental agency that was trying to apply agrarian reform in the area.

The local imagery was very difficult, because they also did not have all the information. First, they thought we were a large army, a huge army, because they did not see us, and they found footprints on the trails. Then, for many this great army was the army of Belaúnde. Others thought that it was the army of the brothers because it was not said comrades, brothers, and the brothers had come to liberate them. (Béjar 1)⁷²

There were several events happening at the time in the region: the enactment of

⁷² “El imaginario de la población era muy complicado, porque además ellos no tenían toda la información, primero ellos pensaban que nosotros éramos un gran ejército, inmenso ejército, como no nos veían, encontraban huellas en los caminos, en los senderos. Entonces, ese gran ejército era el ejército de Belaúnde, para muchos, no para todos. Otros si pensaban que era el ejército de los hermanos, porque no se decía compañeros, los hermanos, y los hermanos eran gente que había venido a liberarlos.” (Béjar 1)

the Agrarian Reform in La Convención, the MIR and ELN guerrilla actions, and the national army's actions, and it was difficult to clearly understand who was doing what in the area. In addition, since the relationships between the ELN and the workers were secret, people had different ideas about what was happening. However what is important to highlight from this quotation is the last idea about the “army of brothers” that was coming to liberate the workers. Béjar still believes that his project was liberating workers from the oppression in which they lived. The need to emphasize this is interesting, because it shows the leftist political imagination of the period that Béjar represents: he believes that the *hacienda* workers were not able to overthrow the system by themselves. They needed to be liberated by the army of brothers, who he assumes had a clear understanding of the problem.

In addition, Béjar does not question whether this liberation was what the Chapi workers were looking for. His statement here highlights that the guerrillas were freeing people but ignores the workers' previous local actions to defend their rights and halt abuses by the *hacienda* regime. Although Béjar recognized the previous actions led by Chapi workers that ended in the imprisonment of its leaders, he minimizes these in favor of the ELN project.

In September 1965, after nine months of political work among Chapi's workers and peasants in Chungui, Miguel and Gonzalo Carrillo were killed by the ELN in a confrontation. The national army summarized these events, with statements from local witnesses,

On September 25th at 5.00 am, the workers of the hacienda heard successive detonations and firearms. They were communicated that strange men had arrived at the estate armed.

They heard two bells (...) so they went into the courtyard of the hacienda house and found several gunmen, only one of those who spoke Quechua. He ordered to stay in the yard, to let them know that they had killed the Carrillo and since that moment Chapi's land would be theirs, as well as all the products. They also said that they could have the cattle and every good the hacienda had (...) It was also communicated that by error they had killed 'a brother' (EP file, party of the second sector and Andahuaylas police investigations, accounting for attack by extremists finances Chapi)⁷³

During the assault in Chapi, the guerrilla members killed a young man by accident. They paid his mother for their 'error,' returned the child's body to her so he could be properly buried, and gave her an economic compensation *hacienda*. A witness from Oronccoy told me,

I was there when they killed the gamonal, some [workers] were several days without food, worried, sad and said 'now what will happen to us?' people said. When the gamonales were killed, then with black paint the guerrilla painted on the hacienda's wall 'we are the army of the peasants.' They took things out from the store and they give them to the people. Then the guerrilla cooked in large pots and they ate alone. In addition, they took the money but we (workers) do not know what they did with the money (Manuel, Oronccoy)⁷⁴

When witnesses in Chapi were questioned by the army about the relationships local workers had with the guerrillas, some identified Pablo Guevara from Chupón as the ELN central informant; they asserted that he had helped the guerrillas enter the *hacienda*

⁷³ “El día 25 de setiembre a las 5.00 am, los colonos de la hacienda escucharon detonaciones de disparos sucesivos con armas de fuego, comunicándoles que habían llegado hombres extraños y armados a la hacienda. Escuchando dos toques de campana (...) por lo que se dirigieron al patio de la casa, encontrando varios hombres armados, siendo uno de estos que hablaba quechua, or denándolos formar en el patio, para hacerles conocer que habían matado a los Carrillo y que desde ese momento las tierras de Chapi serían de ellos, que todos los productos les pertenecían, que podían disponer del ganado y todo cuanto hubiera en la hacienda (...) Así mismo les hicieron conocer que en forma equivocada habían dado muerte a ‘un hermano’”

⁷⁴ “Yo estaba cuando mataron al gamonal, algunos [peones] varios días sin comer, preocupados, tristes y decían ‘¿y ahora qué nos pasará?’ decía la gente. Cuando a los gamonales mataron, entonces con pintura negra en la casa-hacienda pintaron ‘somos el ejército del campesino.’ Sacaron las cosas de la tienda las tiraron y ahí la gente cogió las ropas. Luego en pailas grandes cocinaron conservas y ellos solos comieron. Además se llevaron el dinero pero nosotros (los campesinos) no sabemos qué hicieron con el dinero”

property. However, people in Chupón did not want to talk about their direct experience with the guerrilla action and its consequences, nor about their expectations of the guerrilla movement. This silence should be seen as the result of all the years of army repression, concentrated from 1966 through 1980s and 1990s. Although people confirm that the ELN was in the region, they carefully state that they did not have anything to do with the killing of the Carrillos. Rather than a project that looked to free them, they seem only to remember that because of the guerrilla movement they suffered a brutal repression in 1966 that caused the execution of some of their neighbors.

The police and the national army arrived in Chapi on October 7, 1965, with two Carrillo family members, to bury the bodies of the former *gamonales*. The Peruvian army formally occupied the region in October 1965, after the death of de la Puente Uceda, the MIR leader, in Mesa Pelada-Cusco. Their orders were to eradicate all insurgents, avoiding prisoners (kill everyone). Everything was carefully planned: prisoners were interrogated, tortured, and finally executed. Béjar remembers:

.. [the guerrilla members] were captured during a mission, the fact is that they was captured, and the army did not let them go [...] Many died during the interrogation. They were shot (Béjar 2⁷⁵)

The army's strategy was to confuse Chapi's workers by acting as if they were guerrilla members in order to get information about the locations of the leaders. About this strategy Béjar argues,

Sometimes we arrived at night to the house of our comrades, and there was a peasant that was ours (...) and we said "brother, little brother, how are you?" and he said "the comrades have passed through here"

⁷⁵ "... lo capturan en una misión de la guerrilla, el hecho es que le echaron guante inmediatamente, ya no lo soltaron [...] Muchos murieron capturados, después del interrogatorio. Fueron fusilados" (Béjar 2)

- "yes?" we asked.

"Yes, but they are very tough these comrades, because they have forced me to look for their mules"

He was not able to distinguish between the treatment of a friend and an enemy. (Béjar 1)⁷⁶

The ELN guerrilla plan was secret, and the guerillas acted in the region as an invisible army, in people's eyes. Affirming that the people were not able to distinguish between friends and enemies is to essentialize Andean subjects, as if by nature they were not able to distinguish an enemy from a friend. Béjar does not recognize that the problem was not about distinguishing friends from enemies, but rather that these people (for whom he was fighting) were not central actors in the guerrilla strategy. Consequently, they did not know who the ELN members were. It cannot be assumed that the local population would be aware of the army's plan to capture the guerrillas. The guerrilla movement was a top-down foreign project for workers that did not include people's views or demands, and their participation was only supportive. By essentializing the workers, and by stating that bad treatment may come either from friends or enemies, Béjar represents the workers as easily deceived subjects, naïve, and so dominated by the *gamonal* that they could not think for themselves, which was a common leftist belief during those years.

During the months the army was settled in Chungui, several extrajudicial

⁷⁶ "A veces nosotros llegábamos de noche a la casa de los compañeros y había un campesino que era nuestro, (...) ya llegamos hermano, hermanito que tal, y nos decía «han pasado por aquí los compañeros -¿sí?, les preguntábamos.

-Si, pero son bien recios esos compañeros porque me han llevado a patadas a cada cumbre para que les busque unas mulas. Él no era capaz de distinguir el tratamiento entre una persona amiga y una persona enemiga." (Béjar 1)

executions were performed. Some of the executed were original members of the guerrilla groups; others were accused by their neighbors of supporting the project by giving food and lodging to guerrilla members. The army, using the excuse of sending suspects to Cusco by helicopter, took suspects from their villages, executed them in lonely areas, and discarded the bodies. Although there were confrontations between members of the ELN and the army, not all the guerrilla members were killed in combat. Although many of them were reported as “dead in conflict”, the archive shows statements of death for some people dated months later. For example, Edwin Garcia Miranda (one of the ELN members) appears as “dead in combat” in December 1965, but he signed a statement in November 1965 when he was supposedly detained in Cusco (Appendix 3-3). Homero Juárez confirms that he witnessed Garcia Miranda’s imprisonment and execution in Soccos. In other words, the army archives show contradictory evidence that seems to be protecting their members from being accountable for these executions.

In its final report, the national army concluded on February 26, 1966 that

The peasants of the Haciendas Chapi, Soccos, Chupón and others, have been forced to collaborate in different activities (providing accommodation or serving as guides) sometimes under threat of death, and other times by promises of free land distribution. In addition the followers of the detachment 'Javier Heraud' were those who participated in the murder of the brothers Carrillo from the hacienda of Chapi, and committed to this group is Jose Homero Juárez La Rosa (EP archive, Declaration no. 2000 CRM, 1965 guerrilla)⁷⁷

The army states that *hacienda* workers only supported the ELN because they were

⁷⁷ “se desprende que los campesinos de las Haciendas Chapi, Soccos, Chupón y otras, han sido obligados a colaborar en diferentes actividades (dando alojamiento o sirviendo de guías) bajo amenaza de muerte unas veces i otras por las promesas de repartición de tierras en forma gratuita.- Que los seguidores del destacamento 'Javier Heraud' han sido los que han participado en el asesinato de los hermanos Carrillo de la hacienda Chapi, encontrándose comprometidos con estos elementos Jose Homero Juárez La Rosa”

coerced, and because they were persuaded by the reward of free land. Further, it reflects that the state did not believe that workers could have been ideologically convinced to support the guerrillas, or that they could have had political consciousness about their condition. This reflects the political imagination about the land problem in the 1960s: politicians and intellectuals did not consider *hacienda* workers as people capable of changing their life conditions and as people who needed to be rescued and liberated by the educated Left.⁷⁸ In addition, although in this discourse workers were not held accountable for the events that occurred in Chapi, they were executed for their support of the guerillas.

The violent repression of the state not only killed the ELN guerrilla members, but also those who supported them in several ways, from which there is no record of the executions. The extrajudicial executions are barely remembered and those who have a memory of this period justified the army's actions, arguing that supporters of the guerrilla were responsible for the murder of the landowners and that they needed to be punished.

Beyond the fear of the communist project that characterized some Latin American states during the 1960s, there are two other important issues to highlight. First, both the state and the ELN did not considered the *hacienda* workers as subjects capable of participating in the end of the *hacienda* system. Béjar contradicts himself by arguing that he wanted to protect peasants and accusing them of being serfs. In this sense, while Béjar believes that *hacienda* workers were not capable of distinguishing enemies from friends, the state believed that people only supported the ELN through coercion. Both share the

⁷⁸ This will be discussed in Chapter 6.

same imagined view of rural subjects, as a group easily deceived and manipulated, who do not have any political consciousness of their oppressed condition. The low status of *hacienda* workers implies an assumption that they lacked knowledge about politics and could not be interested in changing the domination structure, because, as a rigid Marxist would state, political consciousness cannot be developed under the structure of domination.

When I asked a Marxist professor from the University in Ayacucho about people rebelling against the *hacienda* system, he explained,

I think it's difficult... difficult for the same situation. If I do not have to buy books or to educate my kids, who will give me the ideological preparation. The landowner is the one who exploit them. He has them in subhuman conditions, and how they would educate their children on the countryside? The average education is practically illiterate, ... Here in Peru it is basically the influence of political parties, Cuba played an important role, APRA and PPC are the ones you near to the peasants bringing them a set of new ideas. (Prof. Pinto)⁷⁹

This statement summarizes the ideology that dominated the Peruvian left's understanding of the political struggles *hacienda* workers underwent in the late 1950s and early 1960s. For these intellectuals and scholars the only way to change *hacienda* workers' life conditions was through the superior knowledge given by political parties. Workers and peasants could not have developed an ideological education if they were kept under the *hacendado*'s exploitation (Cf. Brass 1991). They cannot open their eyes if

⁷⁹ “yo creo que es difícil... difícil por la misma situación. Si no tengo para comprar libros, ni educar a mis hijos quien me va a dar esa preparación ideológica. El hacendado es quien los explota. El los va a tener en condiciones inhumanas, y como educarían a sus hijos en el campo? el promedio de educación, es prácticamente analfabeto, ... Aquí en el Perú básicamente la influencia de los partidos políticos, Cuba tuvo un papel importante, el APRA y el PPC son los que van allegar a los campesinos trayéndoles pues un conjunto de ideas.” (Prof. Pinto)

they are not taught about the conditions of their exploitation. This type of statement became the foundation of the Peruvian social sciences in the 1960. Indigenous literate leaders, like Emeterio Huamán, were escalated in the social hierarchy because the education they received de-indianized them. The idea of the indigenous culture as pre-modern and irrational became a burden that only formal western education could combat. Thus, becoming a Peruvian citizen implied getting rid of the Quechua culture. This process was called *cholificación* by Peruvian intellectuals (for an extended discussion see Chapter 6).

4. Changes: Samanez and the Agrarian Reform

Between 1966 and 1972 the *hacienda* system continued to rule the daily life of Chapi's workers. After the deaths of Miguel and Gonzalo Carrillo, Samanez (Olga Carrillo's husband) was appointed as the new *hacienda* manager. He knew the *hacienda*, since he had worked there for several months during the late 1950s and he had a good relationship with the workers.

The change in Chapi's administration improved the relationships between the landowner and the workers. One of the first changes, demanded by the local families, was to establish an elementary school in the area. Samanez ordered the school built in Vacawasi near the house *hacienda*, and hired a teacher from Cusco. In addition, families in Oronccooy organized another school in their area, at which they managed to pay a teacher for almost two years. Part of Samanez's improvements also included monthly wages, and the ban of any physical punishments and sexual abuse. Although these

changes represented progress, for many young workers Samanez was still a *gamonal*,

Samanez arrived to Chapi, bought animals, and we worked two weeks and then we returned to our plot. He began to open the jungle Torre [exploit the forest]. Samanez paid us wages, he was not like Carrillo... but that house in Andahuaylas [Samanez's house in the city] of 20 rooms, 'we' with our work, we have built it, but it has been only for Samanez (Manuel, Oronccoy)⁸⁰

Most of the former workers with whom I spoke expressed that Samanez was different from Carrillo. However, as in the previous quotation, they still highlight that their work was used to benefit Samanez. Specifically, the house Manuel says he helped to build in the city was not a paid job, and Samanez kept it to live in with his family. Although work conditions changed, the relationship between workers and *hacendado* was still framed into the traditional *hacienda* system in which the *gamonal* had free labor at his disposal.

4.1 The Agrarian Reform: “the land is for those who worked it”

In 1968 General Juan Velasco overthrew President Belaúnde in a coup organized by an elite group of the national army. The Armed Forces' Revolutionary government (Sp. *Gobierno Revolucionario de las FFAA*), as the new military government was called, took power with the intent to change the traditional structures of power that had ruled the country, which former civilian governments had not been able to change. Among these changes, the government proclaimed the Agrarian Reform in 1969 that stated that “the land from now on would be for those who work it” (Sp. *la tierra es para quien la*

⁸⁰ “*Samanez llegó a Chapi, compró animales, y así trabajábamos dos semanas y luego regresábamos a nuestra chacra. Se empezó a abrir la selva de Torre [explotar el monte]. Samanez nos pagaba jornal, ya no era como Carrillo... pero esa casa en Andahuaylas [La casa de Samanez en la ciudad] de 20 cuartos, 'nosotros' con nuestro trabajo hemos construido, pero Samanez se la ha quedado*” (Manuel, Oronccoy)

trabaja).

Before Chapi was affected by the Agrarian Reform law, Samanez was accused by his workers of exploitation. This argument ended in Samanez's expulsion from the *hacienda*. When Samanez narrated these events in 2008, he was still convinced that this incident could not have been the workers' idea, because they wanted him to stay. Rather, he was assured that their ideas had been 'poisoned' by local teachers in the school who imported communist ideas to end the *hacienda*. After this event Samanez acknowledged that without his workers' support he would not have had enough labor to carry on the work of the *hacienda*. Therefore, he decided to leave.

In the time of the Land Reform all went to Chapi, there was a teacher who encouraged them ... all of them went like flies to honey ... one day my dad was coming back and he saw the people gathered with the Vacahuasi's teacher in Chapi, the teacher put ideas on their heads about the Agrarian Reform ... My dad left because they stopped working. (Carola Samanez 2)⁸¹

In Samanez's views the Agrarian Reform and the end of the *hacienda* regime could not be an idea that originated with Chapi workers; rather, it needed to be foreigners and communists who had placed these ideas on their heads. When I asked him to specify this, he stated, "they were such good people, they loved my family. They did not know anything about politics, they were good and innocent. However, the teachers poisoned their minds" (Leoncio Samanez)⁸².

From the data I gathered during my fieldwork, I found that young people wanted

⁸¹ *En la Reforma Agraria todos fueron a Chapi, había un profesor que los alentaba... toditos fueron como moscas a la miel... un día mi papá estaba regresando y vio a la gente reunida con el profesor de Vacawasi en Chapi, el profesor les metería ideas en la cabeza sobre la Reforma Agraria... Mi papá se fue porque dejaron de trabajar (Carola Samanez 2).*

⁸² "Ellos eran buenas personas, adoraban a mi familia. Que van a saber ellos de política, eran bueno, inocentes personas. Pero los profesores, esos son los que envenenaron sus cabezas"

the end of the *hacienda* regime in order to become owners of the land they worked. In contrast to what Samanez suggests, I did not find that the workers were manipulated by school teachers. Instead, the younger generation was more influenced by the political events that had previously occurred in the region, and they were willing to work to change land ownership. As did many other workers in different parts of the countryside, they saw their political struggles and demands as part of the national movement that resulted in the end of the *hacienda* system, and this was explained and contextualized by the school teachers in the region. The Agrarian Reform law was far from perfect, but it profoundly changed the social structure of the countryside, and showed how a social demand could become a national policy.

Like many other gamonales, Samanez knew that the Agrarian Reform would eventually be implemented in Chapi. Thus, before this happened, he sold all the *hacienda*'s cattle so the government would not distribute them to Chapi's workers. The only thing that was left in the *hacienda*, besides the land, was the machinery to distill brandy. Finally, the Agrarian Reform affected Chapi in 1974, after Emeterio Huamán announced to the Home Secretary in 1972 that the delay of the agrarian law was causing Chapi's land to be invaded by its neighbors. Chapi was formally affected by the Agrarian Reform on June 2, 1975.

The end of the *hacienda* system did not mean egalitarian economic conditions for the workers, and indeed it increased the economic and social inequality among local families in Chapi. Although there were visible inequalities (often expressed through the number of animals each household had) during the *hacienda* time, the *gamonal* was the

legitimate head of the system that prevented these inequalities from becoming a source of struggle. However, once the *hacienda* and the *hacendado* disappeared, the struggle for power and resources emerged.

Table 3-1
Number of animals per worker in 1975

Name	Number of Animals
Emeterio Huamán	311
Ramon Cusi Pacheco	383
Basilio Casafranca Inderica	39
Fausto Cusi Pacheco	49
Alejandro Guevara Sedano	336
Nicanor Ramirez	51
Pablo Orihuela	123
Teofilo Guzman	131
Lorenza Casa	74

Source: ARA. Agrarian Section 1962-1977, Chapi's expropriation file, nr. 25, year 1977.

At first, the nature of the struggle among former Chapi workers was around the land each *hacienda* section was assigned in the Chapi area. Later, this escalated as conflicts among families: some families had less cattle and found themselves obligated to work for their neighbors. During this time, Emeterio Huamán was appointed as legal representative of the community of Chapi for Agrarian Reform purposes. One of his duties was to fill the required paperwork so Chapi could be officially recognized as a peasant community. Some people in Chapi believe that Emeterio was using his powerful

position to get profits for his family and for Oronccoy. Emeterio's powerful position and his literacy, as well as the large number of cattle his family owned, may have provoked mistrust among Chapi's inhabitants, many of whom did not believe that he was working for the benefit of the whole community.

It is common to find that those who had more resources, because of education or better relationships with the Carrillo family, were later accused of behaving like *gamonales*. Differences in cattle herd size were not only seen as the result of good luck with animals, but also as the result of powerful families exploiting the poor in the community. The period between 1975 and 1980 was burdened with local confrontations and group fractures. The breach between those who had formal education and those who did not was also the source of internal conflicts, full of envy and mistrust, which continued to characterize local relationships.

Conclusions

This chapter has covered fifty years of Chapi's history. Rather than to write an extensive account of historical details, my intent in this summary is to look at the ways people's agency has been manifested. And although I believe that Chunguinos have clearly expressed their political opinions by confronting the *hacendado*, supporting the ELN, and participating in the *retiradas*, they deny their political roles in these accounts. The extreme violence and abuses that they have suffered at the hands of insurgent groups and the Peruvian state have a central role in explaining this phenomenon. Even today, it is not safe for people to talk openly about what they really believe, since the state's repression is still a possibility. These fifty years have taught them how to survive, and if

for this they need to be seen as only war victims or passive actors, then they will represent themselves as such.

Nevertheless, this strategy does not imply that as scholars we have to deny people's political beliefs and actions. Nor does it justify the position of both the ELN and the state that agricultural workers are easily deceived and manipulated, unable to act according to their own convictions, as has been traditionally believed by the Peruvian intelligentsia and the state. But this idea of Andean subjects as always being manipulated goes beyond the ELN. As I will discuss later, the Peruvian intelligentsia, especially Marxist-oriented social scientists, has believed that subordinate subjects in the Andes were not 'ready' to achieve political change, and thus it was the Left's responsibility to teach them about the conditions of exploitation in which they lived. Part of this belief comes from by a rigid Marxist approach that does not recognize that subjects may have political consciousness under conditions of exploitation. However, this is not only about the ideological frame through which social reality has been understood in Peru. This is also about the intelligentsia's superior attitude that does not allow it to understand difference in a horizontal way. Rather, difference is transformed into hierarchy and into justified forms of domination, in this case through western knowledge.

Chapter 4

“We are a Marginal Community”

The previous chapter outlined Chapi’s last 50 years of history, and highlighted how its history has been written by insurrectionary (ELN and the Shining Path) and political (PTRC and Human Rights activists) groups. As each contextualized its project, be it scholarship, human rights, or insurrection, these groups have produced narratives of violence and suffering embedded in the specificities of the region. By taking the role of humanitarian witnesses, the group of politicians, scholars, and activists on one side and rebel and insurrectionary groups on the other side, have silenced Chapinos’ original voices. In Peru, subordinate subjects are rarely recognized and respected as actors of their own stories, and they often represented only as victims of a story that somebody else is entitled to craft and voice.

Peruvian social scientists have often affirmed that people in the rural Andes are ‘marginal’(for examples see Matos Mar, et al. 1971[1975]; Quijano 1977), a label imagining that rural communities live outside the border of a national culture and polity. The Peruvian elite (also including scholars) envisions a national space that has a tangible border marking zones of inclusion and exclusion. Within this image of Peru, the Criollo/mestizos inhabiting the urban settings are portrayed as living inside a closed reality located on the coast and in important urban centers like Cusco and Lima. This

space is imagined to be separate from (and sometimes unrelated to) the Andean highlands, usually represented as an ‘isolated and remote’ space, whose inhabitants, considered as pre-modern, practice subsistence agriculture and animal husbandry. This narrative denies the historical, economic, political and socio-cultural connections that have shaped the multiple groups composing Peruvian society. In this context, the rural population is identified by urban elites as ‘marginal,’ pre-modern, and needing to be rescued by the modern Criollo/mestizo subject.

During my fieldwork, engaging people to talk about ‘marginality’ and exploring the meanings they imparted was not always easy. In many cases people used ‘marginality’ constantly, but did not always want to explain what they meant by it. However, I found that those who had migrated to the city had more to say about the multiple uses they gave to ‘marginal.’ Although I call this group rural Quechuas, I acknowledge that this group is also composed by families who have migrated to coastal cities and jungle areas during the internal war. It is precisely the experience of migration what reinforces their idea of Chapi as a ‘marginal community.’ By comparing their community to the places in which they have lived, people in Chapi find that their community is ‘marginal’ in relationship with more prosperous regions in Peru. This reinforces the idea that ‘marginality’ is about a subject position that needs to be experienced and understood outside the community borders, in relationship with an Other that in most accounts is embodied by the state.

This chapter is organized in four sections. The first summarizes how race and modernity are used in the Peruvian context by analyzing the governmental sterilization

program developed under the Fujimori regime in the 1990s. The second part looks at how ‘marginality’ works in the daily life of Chapi inhabitants. By focusing on these stories, this part aims to understand what people mean when they use ‘marginal community’ and ‘marginal,’ going beyond what is uttered in order to find connections with other major themes.

1. Race, modernity and marginality

‘Marginality’ was first explained by Perlman in 1976 in her analysis of the *favelas* in Brazil. She argued that ‘marginality’ is an ideology that shapes the self-image of the poor who were absorbing and internalizing the social features associated with this label (Perlman 1976). Her approach was built on urban settings, focusing on how rural groups migrated to the city and established themselves in *favelas* (shantytowns). In the context of urban migration, *favelas* and their population were perceived as a social problem, as containers of criminals, the marginal, and the poor. Worried about the rapid growing of *favelas*, the city of Rio decided to eradicate the problem by removing *favelas* from the city, which meant burning and bulldozing houses, forcing residents to move outside the city area (Perlman 2005: 2-3).

Taking Perlman’s approach further, I look at ‘marginality’ beyond the urban setting, to understand how rural Quechuas have been produced and reproduced as ‘marginal.’ Furthermore, ‘marginality’ also needs to be recognized as a narrative rarely challenged by both people in Chapi and social scientists working in the Andes. This is not only a scholarly label, but also a discourse through which Andean subjects have learned to define themselves and negotiate their subject position within the Peruvian society.

In Peru, 'marginality' has been extensively used to talk about rural Quechuas and their problems of integration into the Peruvian Criollo society (See Chapter 6 for an extended discussion about 'The Indian Problem'). 'Marginality' is used as a euphemism of 'Indio' that addresses economic, social, political and cultural discrimination. I expect to explain how this category and the narrative it produces works from Chapi inhabitants' perspective, by deconstructing the social metaphysics that work within 'marginality.'⁸³ As other racial categories (like illiterate and ignorant), 'marginality' belongs to a classificatory system that is based on a racial ideology that influences people's daily interactions. Mannheim (2010) identifies this as a polythetic system, that is, a classificatory system based on multiple, overlapping criteria that are assumed to align with each other, but really don't. In using a polythetic classification system, people select the criteria that fit the circumstances that they are talking about (say, "agriculturalist" and assume that all the other categories (for example "Quechua speaker," "illiterate", poor) come along with it, even if they don't empirically.

In addition, people in Chapi select categories that others (like government agencies, officials of social programs), commonly used to define them but they (people in Chapi) use these categories to define themselves in public interactions with state agencies. The acceptance of a lower rank position appears to be only economic: *somos pobres, necesitamos ayuda del estado* (En. we are poor we need the state' support). However, it is also a process in which they accept the lower socio-political status in the Peruvian (racialized) hierarchy. Moreover, there are distinctions among how this category

⁸³ This will be developed in the next section.

is used by local authorities, the elderly and the younger generation.

Identifying rural Quechuas as ‘marginal’ is a racialized practice which produces hierarchical relationships between this group and the Criollo/mestizos. This praxis has become a naturalized statement in Peru. By labeling rural Quechuas as ‘marginal,’ it becomes accepted that the ‘normal,’ ideal form is to be a Criollo/mestizo living in a modern city. The anomaly is to be a rural Quechua, who are identified through features opposite to urban (see Table 4-1) to urban Criollo/mestizos.

Table 4-1
Polythetic system

Quechua	Spanish
Sierra	Coast
Indigenous	Creole
Past	Present
Tradition	Modernity
<i>Marginality</i>	

Source: Mannheim 2010

The interchangeable use of these categories addresses the same racial ideology that conceptualizes people in Chapi, and rural Quechua in general, as pre-modern, illiterate and ignorant subjects caught in past traditions. This system works as an assemblage in daily racial practices, essentializing and reinforcing the Peruvian social structure. In addition, these categories are associated with the narrative of *modernity*.

While rural Quechuas are perceived as savage, barbarous, pre-modern and living on the margins of civilization, urban Creole/ mestizo groups are assumed to be the paradigm of modernity and the path toward which the Peruvian state should develop. This classificatory system entails different forms of mutuality, which reflect the hegemony of Western knowledge and the close bond between this knowledge and western power (Said 1979).

The different interactions are ideologically mediated by its participants and its observers (Irvine and Gal 2000:76). In other words, the polythetic system in Table 4-1 is a historical production that justifies the colonial ideology that legitimizes the inferior status of the rural Quechua population. Indeed, this racial ideology still pervades the way the Peruvian state (with the support of NGOs, scholars and politicians⁸⁴) comprehends and rules the population in the Andes.

1.1 Governmental discourses: ‘they are not identified by race, but because they are marginal’

Since the early years of the Republic, the military has assumed the role of controlling the state, through *coup d’état*, every time the ruling class does not respond to national problems. In this current of thought, in 1968 President Fernando Belaúnde⁸⁵ (a Christian Democratic Politician elected in 1964) was overthrown by the national army, led by the General Juan Velasco. This *coup d’état* was justified (by the army) because of the inability (and unwillingness) of the Belaúnde government to answer to the land struggles

⁸⁴ This is extensively discussed in Chapter 7

⁸⁵ Fernando Belaúnde was re-elected as President in 1980, the day the Shining Path declared the war against the Peruvian state.

proliferating the southern Andes. The army considered an agrarian reform an imperative change that Belaúnde and the land class did not want to apply. Although the government of Velasco was a dictatorship, it distributed the land of the haciendas to its workers, and nationalized enterprises in charge of the extraction of minerals and oil. Velasco, as other progressive elite military personnel, was trained in CAEM,⁸⁶ a military school focused on the critical problems of the state that felt compelled to assume the role of the Peruvian ruling class, whom (the military considered) did not answer to the national interests.

Following this tradition, in the late 1980s an elite military group prepared a secret analysis of the Peruvian society, called *Cuaderno Verde* (En. the green notebook). This analysis set the politics that the next elected government (in 1990) needed to urgently address in order to defeat the Shining Path, and to rescue the national economy from the deep crisis provoked by President Alan Garcia's first term (1985-1990).⁸⁷

The *Cuaderno Verde* was filtered into the national press in 1993, after some of its controversial policies were applied by President Fujimori.⁸⁸ One of this was the massive sterilization program, originally designed by the national army and presented to the Peruvian population as a Family Planning program, oriented to the rural population. This program was intended to reduce the national birth rate, without considering that the choice of how many children a couple wants should not be the government's decision.

⁸⁶ In 1948, the Peruvian government created the School of High Military Studies (CAEM). The school's purpose is to train an elite group of analysts for the study and creation of laws, and policies oriented to the integral formation of the Peruvian armed forces (see <http://www.caen.edu.pe/historia.php>).

⁸⁷ Garcia governed between 1985 and 1990, and part of his economic policies implied halting all external debt payments, which submit the national economy into deep crisis. He was re-elected in 2006 for a second term.

⁸⁸ Alberto Fujimori was considered an outsider in the Peruvian politics. However, he won the second round against the now Nobel Prize Mario Vargas Llosa, who represented the extreme right.

Instead of a sexual education program, the Family Planning program became the forced sterilization of Quechua women living in rural communities in the Andean highlands (for a detailed description see Huayhua 2006).

This ‘ethnic cleansing’ was justified because a controlled birth rate would mean the better distribution of national resources and the consequent reduction of the national poverty rate. However, the targeted population was living in the rural Andes and it was seen as savage, and lacking the ability to decide the matter by themselves. The Peruvian state (through civilians, health personnel, bureaucrats, politicians and the elite military group) assumed the imperative of controlling the bodies of the ‘marginal’ (=‘Indians’) because they were seen as the source of poverty and subversive groups like the Shining Path. Seen as the national problem, like the *favelas* in Brazil, the poor and marginal needed to be eradicated, by eliminating their reproductive rights. The reduction of the rural Quechuas was considered to have a positive impact on the economic growth and progress of the nation state. The *Cuaderno Verde* argued

In the short-term, problems are economic disarticulation, the excessive and distorting state intervention in the economic and social life of the country ... but the important thing is that the demographic trends have reached epidemic proportions ... The subversion will not be defeated if there continues to be an increase by 500 thousand people per year in demand for food, education, housing, services, jobs, water, energy ... The need has been demonstrated to stop this growth as soon as possible, and it urges a treatment for existing surplus: widespread use of sterilization in groups culturally backward and economically impoverished ... compulsive methods should be only on an experimental basis, tubal ligation should be standard in all health centers... We need to discriminate the excess populations and harmful segments of the population.⁸⁹ (Oiga

⁸⁹ “Los problemas de corto plazo, son la desarticulación económica, la excesiva y distorsionante intervención del estado en la vida económica y social del país... pero lo importante reside en que las tendencias demográficas han alcanzado proporciones de epidemia... De nada serviría derrotar a la subversión si seguimos incrementando en 500 mil personas anuales la demanda de alimentos, educación, vivienda, servicios, empleos, vivienda, agua, energía ... Ha quedado demostrado la necesidad de frenar lo más pronto posible el crecimiento demográfico y urge, adicionalmente un

1993)

Rural Quechuas were labeled as ‘culturally backward and economically impoverished,’ and although the word “indigenous” is not stated explicitly, from the polythetic system (Table 4-1) the culturally backward are the rural Quechuas. During the 1990s, the Health Ministry, the elite personnel of the national army, and the state offices urged to control the rural female body. The family planning program, in response to NGOs’ accusation of forced massive sterilization practices in the rural Andes, stated that the tubal ligation of rural Quechua women was not genocide because these women were identified not on the basis of race but because they were ‘marginal’ and poor.

But within the Peruvian imaginary, the ‘marginal’ (often used as a label that express social, economic, political and cultural discrimination) population is composed of ‘the pre-modern poor’ who inhabit the Andean highlands (the extreme examples are the illiterate Quechua women), a hostile and isolated space located at the margins of the nation-state. However, ‘marginal’ is also grounded in a larger discourse that considers this group as (naturally) poor, pre-modern, illiterate Indians whose bodies and actions need to be controlled because they are irrational and harm the progress of the country. Through its governmental agencies, the Fujimori government, like the Health Ministry, tried to use ‘marginal’ as a transparent, non-racialized category; however, this concept is so embedded in an ideological discourse that it can never be a non-racialized category.

tratamiento para los excedentes existentes: utilización generalizada de esterilización en los grupos culturalmente atrasados y económicamente pauperizados... los métodos compulsivos deben tener solo carácter experimental, pero deben ser norma en todos los centros de salud la ligadura de trompas... Hay que discriminar el excedente poblaciones y a los sectores de la población nocivos. Consideramos a los subversivos y a sus familiar directos, a los agitadores profesionales, a los elementos delincuenciales, a los traficantes de PBC como excedente poblacional nocivo... para estos sectores solo queda su exterminio total”(Oiga 1993)

‘Marginality’ as a category has entered into the state and NGO discourses in order to explain problems of the Andean population such as ‘isolation,’ associated with the lack of progress, and backwardness. Its use presents several problems. First, it assumes a social world composed of two groups: one that is ‘marginal,’ rural, indigenous, irrational, and traditional, and another that is urban Criollo/mestizo, rational, and modern. Second, it assumes that those who are ‘marginal’ are part of a homogenous body, which does not allow us to see differences inside the group. Third, ‘marginal’ is a category that does not account for people’s actions, but rather accounts for actions performed toward them. And fourth, it is a discourse that places subjects as ‘passive,’ nurturing the traditional Criollo/mestizo prejudices about rural Quechuas as passive subjects.

In summary, ‘marginality’ is a racial category and narrative extensively used by different actors, who acknowledging or not, reinforce the historical domination of the rural Quechuas. However, racialized practices other than marginality are also used by the rural Quechua. The next section analyzes how people understand and use ‘marginal’ as a category and narrative to explain their problems and the internal war.

2. ‘Marginality’ in Chapi

In Chapi and Chungui, people often articulate that they are a ‘marginal community’ as an explanation of the internal war and the high degree of violence they had to endure during the 1980s and 1990s. In most of my interviews, informants explained that the extreme violence they suffered was possible because they are a ‘marginal community.’ This discourse cannot be approached only as an imposition from above; it is also a means through which the people in Chapi participate in social and

cultural constructions that contribute to their continuing subordination (Glick Schiller 1992; Williams 1977). In other words, people have internalized the idea of a 'marginal' position in relationship with the state as a way to understand and experience domination and subordination. Therefore it should not be interpreted only as an instrumental mean to become visible to the state and the Peruvian society.

Chungui consists of two communities: Chungui, a historical independent community; and Chapi, a community that until 1974 was a hacienda. Although both communities get along fairly well, the people in the community of Chungui considered themselves superior to Chapinos because they did not serve on the hacienda and because they consider themselves to be educated. By placing themselves as educated and intelligent, Chunguinos reproduce the image of Chapi's inhabitants as ignorant and illiterate, people easily deceived by hacendados and the Shining Path. Local authorities and young families frequently use the terms 'marginality' and 'marginal community,' accompanied by 'forgotten,' 'ignorant' and 'deceived' (*Sp. engañado*). Although people in Chungui label Chapinos as 'marginal,' some groups inside Chapi also used this category to explain their experiences with the state and the internal war.

Today, expressions like 'marginal' and 'marginal community' are commonly found in Andean rural communities; former hacienda workers' narratives in Chapi are indeed not unique. In those narratives these concepts are commonly used to explain their everyday life in the aftermath of war. Nevertheless, the particular context in which these expressions are produced is framed by the explanations of their lives during and after the internal war. Indeed, it may seem peculiar that there is no Quechua expression among

elderly Quechua monolingual speakers that refers to ‘marginal.’ When I asked Chungui’s authorities to help me with a proper translation, they used ‘poor and suffering,’ (*Que. Sufriqkuna* also based on a loanword from Spanish), emphasizing it within the context of the internal war. The use of ‘marginal’ works as a bridge to communicate with the national society: the state, NGOs, activists, etc.; for this purpose, a Spanish word is necessary. The lack of a specific reference in Quechua is not a problem, because it is a category to communicate with the state and its different agencies (that by definition is Spanish speaking). Understanding ‘marginality’ in this way allow us to better understand why there is not a word in Quechua for it, and why some of the elderly in Chapi deny that they are ‘marginal.’

The discourse of marginality was not originally coined by the PTRC, but the way this organization and its heirs have shaped and used the term has produced the actual ‘marginal communities’ as war victims. As I explained earlier (see Chapter 1) the production of ‘victims’ without political agency is an outcome of the PTRC and its heirs, so in this context when agency is erased, people in rural communities –like Chapi–have appropriated this discourse and re-shaped it with their own experiences, imaginaries and goals. Chunguinos highlight that they are ‘marginal,’ but in a different way than the PTRC has framed it, or than Human Rights NGOs and activists have interpreted it. As Strathern suggested, it is not surprising to encounter these appropriations in many different contexts, although it would be quite naïve to imagine that along with the borrowing of these expressions goes the borrowing of their original meanings (Strathern and Association of Social Anthropologists of the Commonwealth. Conference 1995).

2.1 *Marginality as a forgotten place*

When I first arrive to Chupón, most of the people in the community were outside the village, living in the jungle area because it was the rainy season. However, I managed to get a meeting and introduce myself to those who were present. Since some people knew me, and I was presented by the Mayor of Chungui, I naively assumed that this was enough to at least stay in the village and begin my work.⁹⁰ This turned out to be extremely difficult, because people did not trust that I was doing a historical work for the University (although I presented several letters from a Peruvian University with which I was affiliated), and they were sure that my presence aimed to harm the community. Some of the arguments alleged that I was a mining engineer working undercover to steal minerals from the local mountains. Others argued that since I was *gringa* I was the granddaughter of the Carrillo family, and my goal was to recover the land that the family lost in the Agrarian Reform. In other words, all the stories that arose from my presence invoked ideas of taking something that belonged to them, of harming the community. After some days wandering around, signing agreements to do no harm, and a lot of talking, I was allowed to do my fieldwork. However, this did not mean that everybody in the community was willing to talk to me, or to answer questions about the time of the hacienda and the 1965 guerrilla movement. However, other topics, like how much they suffered during the internal war and how traumatized they are, arose in conversations for no apparent reason.

During my second visit in April 2008, I met Teresa, a wife and mother of five

⁹⁰ During my undergrad years in Peru, I did several fieldworks in different amazon and Andean communities, and I never faced encounter problems to develop ethnography.

who was born in Chupón, a context in which the community (again) was discussing not allowing me to continue my research. Teresa stood up in the meeting and defended my work, arguing that it was important that people in Lima and other places know about Chapi, how they live and all the needs they have. After the meeting Teresa invited me to her house to explain to me why people mistrust my work. She is 45 years old, and as other women in the community do, she takes care of the cattle, her children and the field when it is sowing and harvesting time. She has an excellent command of Spanish that shows her years living in the coastal region. When I visited her, we were chatting about the community when she confessed that she did not like people in Chupón. She explained that her neighbors mistrust everybody outside the community; even her husband, who is from Cusco and has lived in the community for the last 8 years, is mistrusted. When I asked her why she finds herself different from the rest of the community, she explains that it is because she left Chapi when she was a teenager (mid 1970s), when her family was trying to marry her to an older man. Fearing a life she did not want, she escaped with a girlfriend, first to Huamanga and then to Moquegua. In both places she worked as a maid because, she says, she did not finish elementary school and that was the only job she could get. She met her first husband, a military man from Moquegua, when she was still a teenager, and then had two children. However, things did not work out with her husband in the city, and she returned to Chapi with her two children in 1995 after the military left Chungui.

Hoping to better understand what Chapi's people express when they assert that they are a 'marginal community,' I showed Teresa some old pictures (Appendix 4-1) of

people who were not from the community. This provoked her to talk about the hacienda time, marginality and the state. Teresa explains that the people in picture 4 (Figure 1) are *hacienda runa* (En. *People from the hacienda*),

Teresa: I think that they are from here, the countryside [people are], you see ... during the hacienda time ... these fabrics I believe were brought by the landowners. For example, they were given these 'rebosas' [traditional skirt worn by women in Ayacucho]. The fabric was brought to them and then the people sewed their clothes [...] Oh this makes me feel so sad!

Q: Why are you sad?

Teresa: Because during that time we did not know shoes [meaning we did not have shoes] ... we were so far from the city, these children [referring to those in the picture] did not have the right to be educated, and they [the people] were under the command of the landowner.⁹¹ (Teresa I, Chupón 2008)

During this conversation, Teresa described growing up during the hacienda regime.

When she analyzed picture 4 (Fig. 1), she remembered growing up without shoes and the excruciating pain she suffered every time she was sent to gather the cattle. She expressed sadness when she looked at the photograph, and explained that this was because of the hard conditions in which they lived, including not having the right to be educated and the domination of that the hacendado exerted in people's lives. Not only for Teresa, but for her generation of former hacienda workers' children, to be educated and to see the end of domination by the hacendado were the two most precious achievements of the Agrarian Reform.

⁹¹ "Teresa: me parece que de acá del campo [son], ves... en tiempo de hacienda... estas telas creo que los hacendados traían. Por ejemplo, le regalaba pe estas rebosas. Tela no más traía y se cosían pe [...] ¡Ay qué pena me da esto!

P: ¿por qué te da pena?

Teresa: Porque anteriormente no conocíamos ni zapato... sería tan lejos pues, sería la ciudad estos niños no tenían derecho a la educación, eran mandados por el hacendado"

Figure 4-1
Family Workers from a hacienda in Ayacucho
Source: Baldomero Alejos Photographic Archive



After showing her all the pictures, I placed them on the ground so she could see them together, and I asked Teresa to look at them, inquiring which of the pictures she considered to represent the ‘marginal,’ and she answered Fig.1. Trying to dig into her answer, I asked her to clarify what it means when people assert that ‘Chungui is a marginalized town’ (SP. *Chungui es un pueblo marginado*), and she stated,

Marginalized, marginalized is that they [the state, the society] do not even remember. Or putting them in the corner, right? Neither governments nor anybody else remembers them, right? [They are] marginalized and they turn away from them... like despising them... they are not remembered. In fact the people from here in town, they do not even know about the national government. Now in some degree some aid arrives here to the countryside. However, in previous years no, they [the state] never remembered us... we

*were forgotten here....*⁹² (Teresa 1, Chupón 2008)

In this quote, Teresa explains that a ‘marginal community’ is about ‘being placed in a corner,’ a hidden place that nobody remembers. The action of forgetting (Sp. *olvidar*) refers to an action performed by someone else, who places the community in a corner, where the actor can forget about them. Then, talking about governments, she argues that the problem is not just one government but rather all of them that have forgotten about those who are ‘marginal.’ In the way this quote is phrased, the state does not remember the community, it ignores it. As she claims for a state that would ‘acordarse’ (En. remember) them, her statement directs us to her understanding of the state as an institution that does not keep rural communities present, that does not act as a guardian to look out for the wellbeing of its citizens. Important here too, is the Quechua word for “recordar”, *yuyay*, which carries the moral weight of recognition. In a certain way, it is related to the relationship between the landowner and his workers, because the former ‘cared for’ his workers (see Chapter 3).

To despise someone (Sp. *despreciar*) is a particularly strong word in Spanish, as it expresses a close relationship and extremely negative feelings from one party to another. Thus, by placing the community in a corner Teresa understands that her community is being despised. This is possible because Teresa and her neighbors consider that the community is not important to the government and the state. She emphasizes the

⁹² “*Marginado, marginado es que ni se acuerdan. O ponerle a un rincón ¿no? No acordarse de ellos. Ni los gobiernos, nadie se acuerda de ellos, ¿no?, marginados y se apartan de ellos pues, ¿no? ...como un desprecio pues... no se acuerdan nada, ¿no? en realidad de acá del pueblo ni siquiera sabe pe el gobierno nacional. Ahora más o menos llega ¿no? las ayudas, algunas cositas acá al campo pero ah años anteriores pe, nunca se acordaban de acá... olvidado pe.*”

hierarchical relationship that the state establishes with the community, in which the state despises the indigenous population. At the end of the quote, Teresa compares how before there was not any ‘help’ (Sp. *ayuda*) arriving to the community; however, today, ‘some things’ arrive. She is referring to the visibility that Chungui as a district has acquired after the submission of the PTRC’s Final Report. For Teresa, today aid is arriving in the form of infrastructure and assistance projects.

Teresa only uses ‘marginalized’ (Sp. *marginado*) and ‘people’ (Sp. *pueblo*) to address those who are in a marginal position in relationship with the rest of the Peruvian society. This is important to highlight because she directly addresses a racial category when she uses despised. In the Peruvian racial ideology ‘despised’ is a strong word that is commonly used within racial practices.⁹³ The combination of ‘despised’ and ‘people’ infers that the indigenous community is despised by the state because they are rural Quechuas, who are poor and illiterate. For Teresa, Chapi is marginalized because they are rural Quechuas, backward ‘Indians’ (Sp. *Indios*) that do not live the modern urban life. By doing this she is placing herself into the national discourse that racializes rural Quechuas and places them far from modernity.

Desprecio is particularly used when racial categories are at play, especially when Creoles talk about indigenous communities. Racial practices in Peru need to be approached through interactions, especially when a particular group talks about the other (for example, Criollo/mestizos talking about rural Quechuas). Racial practices are more

⁹³ To explain how racial ideologies works is not an easy task. Therefore, it is important to look at the racial practices that racialized particular groups. Even though I am trying to explain how these practices work, the categories displayed through my analysis are not necessarily evident for some readers to be race proxies.

clearly expressed when urban Creoles/mestizos imagine that there are not any rural Quechuas around; the same occurs when rural Quechuas talk about Creoles/mestizos. During my years of fieldwork, questioning the Peruvian intelligentsia about indigenous Quechuas was not a problem. It was generally assumed that I shared their view, and I was seen and treated as an insider sharing the same racial ideas and practices tacitly assumed (a position that I do not, however, necessarily share). In contrast, while establishing relationships in Chapi, especially with elderly people, I was called a *gringa* all the time, especially when the conversation was only in Quechua, which assumed that because I was a *gringa* I did not understand their language. Building on this experience and upon other analyses (see Huayhua 2010), because race as an ideology is not openly discussed, we need to focus on racial practices performed daily not only in rural communities like Chapi, but also in urban centers, NGOs and academic spaces (like colleges and universities, training social scientists).

Teresa's husband, Miguel, is a Cusqueño miner who arrived to Chapi from Maldonado, a city in the Amazon jungle, during the 1990s. In every conversation we had, he compared Chapi to Santa Teresa (the district in La Convención-Cusco where he grew up), highlighting the progress that Cusco's communities are achieving in contrast to the permanent 'backwardness' that he considers Chapi to be mired in. When I asked him to explain if he thinks Chapi is a 'marginal community', he explained:

Totally! We're talking about a marginalized area, forgotten ... we are 40 years behind [any other community] Here there is not any sort of help, what help do we have? The road that is coming, that is not help... sure, it is some help, but you should realize that

*since the day I came [1994] I have not seen any progress.*⁹⁴ (Miguel 3, Chupón 2008)

For him, Chapi is a ‘marginal community’ because there is no progress; it is like being 40 years in the past in contrast with the communities he is familiar with in Cusco. Going beyond Teresa’s words, Miguel associates ‘marginality’ with aid that is not being provided. Although he does not single out the state as the source of help, he argues that the municipality (Sp. *municipalidad*) has the power to make important changes:

*The difference is the mayor. He has all the authority and when will this community progress? If the district has a secretary for agriculture he must work on agriculture, if a secretary enters to make infrastructure projects, he must do that. He (Mayor) shall have the power to put this in place. Here is the difference with Santa Teresa (a community in Cusco), because in Santa Teresa people have a modern life.*⁹⁵ (Miguel 3, Chupón 2008)

For Miguel, Santa Teresa has achieved progress (modernity) because of the municipality’s work, and its commitment to developing the community. He is referring to developing projects, such as roads and technical assistance, but to develop these municipalities must budget properly. Miguel does not acknowledge that the budgets of Cusco region receive an important percentage of their imposed taxes from the production of natural gas (Sp. *canon minero*). This generates a larger budget that does not compare to the limited assets that Chungui and the region of Ayacucho receive annually. Rather than looking at the economic differences between Cusco and Ayacucho, Miguel

⁹⁴ “¡Total! Estamos hablando de una zona marginada, olvidada... estaríamos hablando de 40 años atrasados estamos hablando ninguna clase ayuda acá hay, que ayuda hay, la carretera que está viniendo eso no es ayuda... claro es una ayuda pero imagínese desde el día en que he venido [1994] yo, no veo progreso.”

⁹⁵ “la diferencia es el mismo alcalde. Toda la potestad todo el poder tiene y cuando va progresar así pe, si el distrito tuviera un regidor entra para hacer agricultura debe ser agricultura, si un regidor ha entrado de obras debe ser de obras. El (alcalde) debe tener esa esa potestad esa fuerza por decirte que cosas debes hacer. Acá la diferencia es Santa Teresa (Cusco), porque Santa Teresa viven moderno.”

considers that the problem in Chungui is concentrated in the authorities who do not work toward the development of the region. For him, it is not the central government that is accountable for these projects; rather it is the *municipalidad*, because they have a direct relationship with the government and should ask for more help.

Trying to understand what Miguel meant when he asserted that ‘people lived modern’ in Santa Teresa, I asked him to explain what he considers a modern life. Rather than answering with a direct explanation, he narrated his travels to Cusco with his 8 year old son for a family visit to *Santa Teresa*. Returning to Chapi, the son told his mother (Teresa): *Here we live like primitives, we do not have a TV, we eat sitting on the floor. We do not eat sitting at a table like people*⁹⁶ (Miguel, *Fieldnotes*, Chupón 2008). Miguel frames the story as reported speech, trying to reduce his responsibility in shaping this quote (see Hill and Irvine 1993); however, it is clear that it is he who believes that rural life is ‘primitive.’ Because he is talking with an urban Limeña anthropologist (*gringa*), he may have felt it was proper to tell the story through his son’s voice. In Peru, the narrative of *modernity* is associated with urban settings, where basic services like running water and electricity can be found. Being a ‘modern’ subject does not go along with rural life,⁹⁷ which is seen as backward and primitive. People aspire to move upward in the social structure, and to achieve this, they consider essential to leave the countryside. This is one of the most important markers of social success and social mobility for rural inhabitants. The idea of living in a rural area as ‘primitive’ is grounded in people’s experiences

⁹⁶ *Acá vivimos como primitivos, no tenemos TV, ni comemos sentados en la mesa como la gente.*

⁹⁷ During the hacienda time, the estate Chapi generated its own electricity; however, the enormous distance from the city of Huamanga make this country house for the Carrillo family, especially at the second half of the 1920s. A success person would not permanently live in the hacienda; the place to live was the city.

through direct discrimination and marginalization. State offices, health care workers, teachers, NGO officers and others, impose the idea that those in the rural Andes *lack modernity* because they possess a different life style and living conditions from those viewed as the ‘norm.’ A different way to be ‘modern’ does not exist; it is forced along the life pattern that is intrinsic to the urban life style. For example, the social programs *Juntos* (En. Together) demand beneficiaries to organize their kitchens as a space free of animals (like guinea pigs), to build cabinets in order to protect utensils from getting dirty, and to build a ‘cocina mejorada’ (En. improved stove), which is supposed to reduce the amount of smoke entering into the house.⁹⁸ The problem is that it is so cold during the rainy season that the stove has a double purpose: both a stove and a fire to warm the house and family members. In addition, guinea pigs need to live in a warm close space or they die, and finally, it is not so easy to build cabinets when you are more focused on making money to survive. Social programs sponsored by the central state and NGOs rarely consider important to understand why people keep particular practices. Rather than exploring these practices and understanding them in terms of local knowledge, foreigners assume that these practices are pre-modern. Finally, this only produces a process of Othering and subordination.

Carlos is a young leader from one of Chapi’s villages. I met him in Oroncco, while we were waiting to make a radio call, which is the only means of communication among the villages in the district.⁹⁹ We talked about problems with the radio and communications in general, and when I asked him if he considers *Oreja de Perro* to be a

⁹⁸ People in Chapi cook with wood placing this in a corner, with some small rocks that would hold the pans.

⁹⁹ Chungui capital has one public telephone, and a satellite telephone that rarely works.

‘marginal community,’ he said that it might not be marginalized, but that it is definitely forgotten;

...marginalized, when people say that they are marginalized they refer to racial reasons, there is a marginalization from people of the city. In this case, for example, I hear some comments about how people living in other places marginalize us, because we are hacienda people... in that way there is marginalization. Marginalization is like discrimination, it can be also in the Sierra... like people from here migrated to the coast and they are always treated like a Serrano, but if it's bad. I think that it is marginalization or discrimination. There is always the same (marginalization) from foreign countries toward Peru.¹⁰⁰ (Carlos, Oronqoy 2008)

For Carlos ‘marginality’ is being excluded or discriminated against because of race and place of origin. Having been born and living in a rural community is by itself a strong racial marker in Peru. Discrimination is particularly strong when people from Chapi interact with the community of Chungui. On one level, the village of Chungui discriminates against people in Chapi, because they used to be hacienda workers, which Chunguinos see as the lowest occupation. To highlight this Chunguinos still address Chapi as ‘hacienda property’ (Qu. *hacienda quru*), even after 40 years of the end of the hacienda regime in Ayacucho. The marginalization that occurs at a micro level is reproduced at all levels, between Ayacucho city and the Chungui district, and between the Coast and Sierra. As in the case of Teresa, ‘marginalization’ becomes a racialized term to stress hierarchical differences, even though people do not say it clearly because they themselves are indigenous and are being discriminated against. Here it is important

¹⁰⁰ “o sea, marginados, cuando se dice marginados quiere decir hay razones de raza, hay una marginación con la gente de la ciudad. En este caso por ejemplo yo escucho comentarios de que hay gente que vive en otro sitios nos marginan de que nosotros somos gente del hacendado en esa forma podría haber una marginación... La marginación es como discriminación, también puede ser la sierra...hay con la gente de la costa de acá de la sierra migran y la gente costeña siempre te tratan como serranos, así pero en si es malo. Yo pienso eso es marginación o discriminación siempre hay de igual también del Perú con países extranjeros”

to clarify that people in the Peruvian Andes do not define themselves through racial categories. They use the word “*Runa*” (En. people) and “peasants” to identify themselves, although even these terms are open to racialization. It is important to note that—much as Huayhua (2010) found in rural Cusco, they do not seek to be identified ethnically.. This is an important phenomena that might enlighten our comprehension of how racial ideologies work in the Peruvian countryside.

Calling themselves a ‘marginal community’ implies recognizing and accepting the state’s position of power within the national hierarchy, one that allows the state to hide rural communities in a corner, and to forget them as unimportant. Accepting that they are a ‘marginal community’ recognizes a subordinate place within the national structure and justifies it through racial ideologies; it is a hegemonic process in which domination is accepted through the practices of everyday life.

The quotes from Teresa and Miguel explain how Chapi is a ‘marginal community.’ This category connotes a lack of progress associated with a lack of modernity that places the community as ‘primitive,’ but that is also significantly related to rural spaces. The state (and the civil society) imaginary has placed the community in a hidden corner because it despises it, which also allows it to forget them (Sp. *olvido*). Placing rural communities in (an imaginary) hidden place prevents them from being seen. The contrary becomes to be attended by the state through development projects and social programs. In short, it is the state aid that the people of Chapi consider would change the ‘marginal’ condition of the community. To be ‘marginal’ and to live in a ‘marginal community’ is interpreted by Chapinos as a condition that they themselves

cannot change. Rather it is a condition that depends on the central state's attention and care, on the state's volition.

'Marginality' is both a relationship and a place. It becomes the construction of a place that embodies traits such as weakness, pre-modern, ignorance, easily deceived, being despised, forgotten, and lacking the state's interest and support. This produces the community within a space that is seen as distant and isolated, where it is easy to be hidden and forgotten. When people talk about being marginal, they refer to both a geographical and socio-political distance. These elements (to be despised, hidden, and forgotten) produce this community as distant from the state, in the same way that other rural Andean communities are distant. This is not a feature specific to Chungui; rather, I would suggest that this becomes a particular way that people experience and understand the state in the rural Andes especially in the postwar context.

2.2 'Marginality' as cause and consequence of the internal war

The experience of been forgotten and excluded is not new, and people explain that this is one of the reasons for the emergence of insurrectionary groups like the Shining Path.

[...] Long ago this area was completely left [abandoned,] the government did not remember anything. Thus, the Shining Path came to Chapi; they were looking to change this situation [of injustice and exploitation], that is why they caused so much harm during that time. Of course, at the beginning they talked nice, they did not do anything [in the sense of, did they kill people], but when the others came [the national army,] the others [the Shining Path] also came and attacked. That is when the problem started: one comes and kills, and later, the other comes and kills too.¹⁰¹ (Esteban 2, Oronqoy 2008)

¹⁰¹ “[...] anteriormente esta zona estaba totalmente dejado [abandonado] esto el gobierno, no se recordaba de nada. Entonces seguramente así sendero venia, ellos buscarian esa situación [que cambie] para que vengan por eso ha hecho tanto daño aquí ese tiempo. Claro, al inicio hablaban

Esteban was a child (7) when he was captured by insurgents after his parents were killed by the army. He joined the armed struggle (*Sp. lucha armada*), and was a Shining Path military commander until he was caught by the national army at the end of 1990. After being sentenced by an anonymous tribunal during the Fujimori's regime (*Sp. Tribunales sin Rostro*), his trial was declared invalid in 2002 (on recommendation of the PTRC). A new trial took place, following the agreements before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and Esteban was found not responsible for his actions because he was abducted by the Shining Path as a minor. He was released after being in jail for 10 years, and returned to his village in Chapi, where he has since behaved as a model citizen. I met Esteban in Oronqoy while we were waiting for a meeting sponsored by the state. He arrived from a neighboring village in the community of Chapi extremely concerned because a national newspaper published his picture on the cover page, accusing him of being the main leader of the Shining Path in the *Oreja de Perro*. He denied all the accusations, and told me that he does not understand where this information was coming from. To support him, the local authorities signed a letter defending him against these accusations. However, Esteban was too frightened to leave the community and he preferred to stay in Chapi and keep a low profile.¹⁰²

In our conversation Esteban explained that the violence started because the state

bonito, no han hecho nada, pero ya cuando el otro viene [el Ejercito], el otro [Sendero] también viene y ataca. Es en ahí lo que empezaron el problema: el otro viene y mata, el otro viene y mata también.” (Esteban 2, Oronqoy 2008)

¹⁰² I later confirmed that the information came from the National Direction against Terrorism (DINCOTE), and a political decision (by the APRA, the government party) to open all the cases in which accused of terrorism were absolved of charges. This was a direct political reaction to the possibility that the bomb that exploited in Ocobamba in November 2007 was a Shining Path attack (see Annex 4-2).

had historically abandoned regions like Chungui. For him, the Shining Path was an opportunity to change the injustices and the situation of abandonment in which they lived. This is particularly important because the conditions of abandonment and being forgotten caused by the state (that my informants declared), existed before the internal war. Following this thought, Chapi and Chungui consider the state doubly indebted to them because not only did it not defend them properly during wartime, but it also provoked this very violence by its attitude toward the Andean communities:

This community is totally secluded. Governments nor any of its authorities have ever been here. It is a community abandoned, and just when those problems (Shining Path) started, military bases came. Before that who remembered this community? Nobody. It was completely abandoned and because of that the problem (internal war) started. Therefore I think that now the government needs to take care of us, the government has the obligation to pay more attention to this region¹⁰³ (Esteban 2, Oronqoy 2008)

Esteban is highlighting how forgotten and isolated this community has been: they became visible only when the military opened bases in the area. But his quote refers to the need for an important outbreak of violence in order to receive the state's attention. Esteban considers the state as having the duty to compensate all the affected communities because it has forgotten them, and for this is what caused the war. The best way to compensate people is through jobs and giving them money so they can recover the cattle and things they lost during the internal war.

During all my fieldwork years (before and after this project), I gathered opinions

¹⁰³ “Esta comunidad está totalmente apartada. Nunca desde gobierno, ni sus autoridades no llegan aquí pues. Es una comunidad dejada, abandonada, ya cuando han entrado esos problemas (PCP-SL), recién las bases también vienen, los militares viene. Antes de eso ¿quién recordaba este sitio? Nadie estaba abandonado por ahí mismo ha suscitado este problema. Entonces pienso que ahora debe preocuparse pienso que el gobierno tiene obligación de prestar más atención a toda esta zona” (Esteban 2, Oronqoy 2008)

that mainly agreed with accusing the national army of being the main perpetrator during the war; however, the Final Report considers the main perpetrator to be the Shining Path (for details see PTRC 2003a). Within Esteban's narrative, the presence of military bases in the district implied that the state remembered this community. The community is only visible because of the violence experienced. For Esteban, and many others, the internal war made them visible to the state and government. As I argued in previous chapters, for outsiders, the district of Chapi started to exist with the Final Report and because of the abuses and extreme violence committed in this region.

2.3 Marginal people as 'ignorant and deceived'

Two other words emerge when Chapi's inhabitants assert they are marginal: ignorant (Sp. *ignorante*) and deceived (Sp. *engañado*). *Engañado* is constantly uttered within the narrative of the 1980s internal war. Through it, Chunguinos explain to outsiders how their neighbors committed (Sp. *comprometerse*) to the Shining Path's project. At the same time, those who were *ignorantes* are easily fooled by others, by the state and the Shining Path.

In every narrative I gathered, stories about the 1980s violence arose 'naturally' as if my presence silently demanded this. On one hand, I see this as springing from a necessity to talk about what has shaped people's daily lives and experiences in the last 30 years. On the other hand, this narrative is the means through which they interact with the world outside the community. It has become a narrative for outsiders. The close racialized relationship between ignorant and easily fooled becomes even more pronounced for the people of Chapi, more so than the people in the community of

Chungui, who are at least perceived as educated. However, this is more complex because education was available in Chapi since 1966, and the Shining Path entered these communities through the education system, and it was because they had some education (they used to go to school) they joined the Shining Path. In this context socio-cultural essentialism is intrinsic to the social discourse about Chapi; historical facts are erased (for a detailed account see Chapter 3), with only the racial ideology of inferiority remaining.

I noticed that what I gathered during this research were ‘processed’ internal war narratives, which contrasted with the ones I gathered during my first research in Chungui (when I was a researcher for the PTRC in October and November 2001). During this first work in Chungui, for the first time people talked to foreigners about the internal war; they were less careful about what they said and the accountability of their stories. For example, they affirm that they were convinced by the project of an ‘egalitarian community’ that the Shining Path proposed to establish,

In my base, the organization of the masses (in Shining Path’s retiradas) was: women cooked and –adults worked on the chakra (En. plot), women brought them food. Adults and the youth participated in the Main Force and were farmers at the same time. All the people worked for the benefit of everyone else. There was no individualism. Older children helped in what they could, and the Shining Path leader SF taught us to read, to write, and he made us sing and play. I was seven during those years. What hurts me is to remember how the masses died because they could not escape from the military’s attacks¹⁰⁴ (Testimonio202014, quoted on the Report on the Oreja de Perro, vol. V. CVR 2003)

¹⁰⁴ “... La organización de las masas (SL) en mi base era: las señoras se ocupaban en cocinar y – si los adultos trabajaban en la chacra, llevar la comida, los adultos y jóvenes participaban en la fuerza principal y a la vez eran agricultores. Todos trabajaban para todos. No había individualismo. Los niños mayorcitos ayudaban en lo que podían y a los más pequeños, el senderista SF nos enseñaban a leer, escribir, nos habían cantar y jugar. Yo tenía siete años en ese entonces. Lo que me duele recordar es cómo las masas morían porque no podían escapar de los ataques que hacían los militares.”

This quote is the type of narrative that I gathered during my first work in Oreja de Perro (2001). Five years later (when I started this research), the narratives were different. On one hand the methodology was different, as I did not need to translate the interviews I did in Quechua. On the other hand, I find that there is a critical influence of the PTRC's Final Report within the current stories. Chunguinos today try to explain to me –or maybe convince me–how they were coerced to support the Shining Path, explaining that their lack of education and political experience made them believe in the Shining Path, because they were ignorant.

What will we, the farmers, know, about politics; in the countryside we do not know about that! This movement (the Shining Path) started with students from San Cristobal [the University in Huamanga], they arrived as teachers and then got involved... and because people in the countryside are ignorant, they believed in this project.¹⁰⁵ (Roberto, Fieldnotes, Chupón2008)

Roberto is the local Evangelical Pastor, a fluent Spanish speaker who lives with his family in Chupón. In the quote above, he states that peasants, as he identifies himself and his neighbors, did not know about politics and that this is what allowed the Shining Path to easily fool them. Showing me that 'he knows' the origins of Shining Path, he carefully explains that this group started in the University of Ayacucho, among its students and faculty members. It is this group that came to the countryside with the Shining Path's politics, and that involved (Sp. *comprometido*) the villagers in its projects. The quote is framed in a way that intends to erase any reason why people in villages may have supported the insurgent group. Rather, he chooses to point out that people outside the

¹⁰⁵ *¡Qué vamos a saber los campesinos de esa política, acaso en el campo sabemos de eso! Ese movimiento (SL) ha empezado de los estudiantes de San Cristóbal, ellos han venido con profesores y han comprometido... y como son ignorantes acá en el campo han creído.* (Roberto, Fieldnotes, Chupón 2008)

community are responsible for the internal war. Roberto aligns himself with the official story that explains that the Shining Path expanded through the rural education system, which protects villagers from being liable for the internal war. Then, he explains that people in the village had believed these students and teachers because they were ignorant and did not know politics.

What Roberto narrates is the official story promoted by the PTRC Final Report, and constantly repeated by the Peruvian intelligentsia; which today everybody uses to explain how the violence started in the Andean highlands. This official narrative has carefully erased the complexities of the war, as well as the problems of race deeply embedded in the war. Moreover, it does not recognize people's participation as political subjects, stating that they do not get involved in politics, which forgets that people in Chapi participated in land struggles during the 1960s and 1970s. Even if Chapinos do not recognize it, they are conscious political subjects. Being labeled by themselves and others as *ignorante* and *engañado* aligns the community with the official academic and NGO discourse, in which the 1980s war victims are caught between a 'rock and a hard place.' This type of assertion simplifies the complexity of the Peruvian internal war, and diminishes the role of race within this conflict.

I met Nelly during my second visit to Chupón, and she invited me several times to spend the night in the field where they were harvesting potatoes. She is a middle-aged woman who lives in Chapi with her family. During the war years she migrated with her family to the central jungle (Junín), where they settled as seasonal workers. During the second half of the 1990s, her family returned to Chapi, expecting to save money to be

able to send her children to the high school and college in Andahuaylas. When I asked her about the people from Chapi who joined the Shining Path, her first reaction was to deny it, stating that nobody in the community supported it. However, when I included the name of a person in question, she admitted

*Certainly they have been deceived ... because they are ignorant people from the countryside, they have been fooled. They (people from the countryside) have thought, they have believed, I do not know. But people in Chapi did not believe. That girl Diaz, she was young, and because she was young she believed, right... There have been people like her who were deceived, right?*¹⁰⁶ (Nelly I, Chupón 2008)

By acknowledging that I knew the name of a girl from Chupón who was a Shining Path member, Nelly accepts that some of her neighbors participated in this insurgent project. However, she carefully crafts her answer explaining –justifying– that they were *engañados* because people in the countryside are ignorant. She uses ‘they’ to stress the distance between herself and those who were ‘deceived,’ indirectly stating that she was not deceived by the group. Although she asserts that Chapi’s people did not believe in the Shining Path, she finds that being young (Sp. *chica*) may be one of the reasons that explain how a young girl from the community participated in the insurgency. When she frames this, she is borrowing from the explanation given by the PTRC that argued most of the Shining Path’s members were young students. However, she carefully highlights that all in the community are *ignorant* –an assertion that does not have ground, since school have been present in the community since the second half of the 1960s– but the girl was deceived, which is imagined to place the community in a position where

¹⁰⁶ “*seguramente los han engañado ... como somos así ignorante de campo se habrán engañado pe, ellos habrán pensao, habrán creído, no sé. Pero la gente de Chapi no creía, esa chica Díaz bueno chica, pero ella chica pe, chica pe habrá creyó pe ¿no? ... habrán habido pe así engañados*”

members are not responsible for their actions.

This quote also connects *ignorantes* and rural people, emphasizing the relationship between them, as if ignorance was a natural characteristic of the countryside population, an essential component of being Quechua. Nelly continues explaining how people got involved with the Shining Path's project:

Nelly: Because they were opas, because they were ignorant they got involved [with the Shining Path]

Q: If people had gone to school, they had studied more... Would they have been involved with the Shining Path?

Nelly: I do not know, how it would have been. Some of them, because of their studies they wanted to become the boss, they could also have been fooled, because of that they would have wanted to be leader.¹⁰⁷ (Nelly I, Chupón 2008)

Nelly qualifies those who were committed to the Shining Path, first as *opas*, a Quechua word meaning ignorant, and here referring to someone lacking formal education. Then, she explains that young students wanted to have power and control, and because some of them had education they could have been group leaders. Students' desire for power is one of the main seductive tools that attracted the youth to the Shining Path. The traditional power structure in the Andes was controlled by the adults, and this system was challenged by the Shining Path's members which the elderly and authorities controlled (like Emeterio Huamán).

Most of the time people use 'ignorant' in two ways. One refers to a lack of formal education, and the second to a lack of knowledge about Criollo Peru. For Teresa, her lack of formal education was remedied by her migrant experience ... *I did not finish school, but*

¹⁰⁷ *"Nelly: por opas, por ignorantes por eso se habrán comprometido pe, se han comprometido Q: si la gente hubiese ido a la escuela, hubiese tenido más estudio ¿se habrían metido con 'esa política'?"*

Nelly: no sé pe, cómo habrán sido pe. Algunos por su estudio entrando algo jefe también puede ser engañado... profesores, ah por eso pe, ellos habrán querido estar jefe"

me getting out of the community [migration] has allowed me to get out of ignorance¹⁰⁸ (Teresa, Fieldnotes, Chupón 2008). The community becomes the place of ignorance, and migration to the city a process of acquiring knowledge that may partially replace the one offered by formal education.

Like Teresa, Nelly asserts that today her neighbors in Chapi are no longer *opas* (*En. ignorant*) because they left their village, like she did: *Opas, I do not believe anymore, because everybody got out of there [the community] ... like myself, they had to get out. Therefore, they are not opas anymore.*¹⁰⁹ (Nelly I, Chupón 2008). Leaving the community and travelling through different towns and cities (Sp. *andando*) is seen as a method of acquiring knowledge of the Creole world. Therefore, today, they are no longer *opas*. Nelly finds that leaving the village and going to other towns have allowed her to stop being an ignorant.

Combining the quotes from Teresa and Nelly, it is possible to explain what it means to be *engañado* and *ignorante*. There is a causal relationship between them: being deceived can be caused by being ignorant. But, as Nelly highlights, students can also be *engañado* by schoolteachers and their desires for power and control; and because the students are young –which connotes a lack of knowledge equivalent to ignorance – they joined the Shining Path. At the same time, one of the ways to overcome ignorance, besides formal education, is urban migration. Leaving the community immerses people in a new environment where they need to learn how to live. The migration experience is a

¹⁰⁸ *yo no terminé el colegio, pero más bien salir [migrar] me ha hecho salir de la ignorancia.*

¹⁰⁹ *'opas ya no creo Ahora porque todos hemos salido de aca... como yo también, así habrán andado. Ya no son opas.'*

process through which a person acquires the knowledge that is equated in Chunguinos' imaginary with the education received in school.

Carlos explains his ideas about migration and progress in life:

Q: But to stay in the community, is that not also a way to succeed? Or is it only if one migrates to the city, success becomes possible? What do you think?
Carlos: Staying [in the countryside and community] there is no possibility to overcome a relationship with formal education. I do not think [that in staying] one can achieve success with education. We cannot easily overcome, but if people stay in the community, they certainly do not progress.¹¹⁰ (Carlos, Oronqoy 2008)

In this quote Carlos addresses two important things. First, progressing in life (Sp. *superarse*) is related to achieving formal education, and 'good' education is not available in villages like Oronqoy. Although there is an elementary school, and some secondary grades, people consider its quality to be very low. Teachers in rural areas have no incentive to work in these communities, and most of them feel that a job in Oronqoy, or Chupón, is seen as punishment. Some teachers arrive for the first time to one of Chapi's villages, and prefer to quit their posts rather than stay in a distant village (at least 10 hours walking distance to the closest road), without electricity or running water. And second, progress cannot be achieved if people stay in the community. Chapi and Oronqoy are seen as communities that do not allow people to progress; and staying is seen as not aspiring to a better life.¹¹¹ The idea of progress is attached to modernity, and as Miguel mentioned earlier, rural life is equated to a backward life that lacks any possibility of progress and success.

¹¹⁰ *Q: pero quedarse, ¿no es acaso también una forma de superarse? O ¿solamente logras superarte si vas a la ciudad? ¿Qué piensas?*

C: Quedándose no creo que se pueda superar en el aspecto de educación. No creo en lo que es educación. No se puede superarse fácilmente, pero si se quedan están casi en ahí, no progresan."

¹¹¹ I have also seen these ideas in Huancavelica-Peru in 2000, when I was doing my first independent fieldwork as an undergraduate student in Anthropology

One night, I stayed with Nelly's family in the 'tent' where they were sleeping during the harvesting season. During that evening, while we were sharing some sugar cane liquor (Sp. *cañazo*) and coca leaves, I asked who was ignorant in Chapi, and Nelly stated: *Mr. Teófilo, Mr. German, Mr. Alejandro. They have not gone to school... they are ignorant because they do not think. But today, there are fewer ignorant people [in the community]*¹¹² (Nelly-Oscar 2, Chupón 2008). Oscar and Nelly identify the oldest members of the community as ignorant; however, they do not mention that their lack of formal education is due to it being forbidden during the hacienda time. Trying to explain herself better, Nelly argues that they are ignorant because 'they do not think' (Sp. *no piensan*), framing *to think* in an urban way that refers to the western knowledge and thought. Throughout formal education people acquire knowledge that is validated by the center of power (Lima, Cusco, Ayacucho) this is the only knowledge that has value. In other words, it is the knowledge provided by the Western world (the urban Criollo/mestizo) which is considered as superior to the self-knowledge that people may acquire during their lives. This contrasts to regions like Ecuador and Bolivia, where local knowledge is valued as part of the indigenous identity (see Colloredo-Mansfeld 2009; Huarcaya 2010).

Along with the overstated Criollo/mestizo knowledge, the close relationship between ignorant (Sp. *ignorante*) and not thinking (Sp. *no pensar*) gives us important information about the value of education for Andean families. Those who did not go to school are considered to be people who do not think, an equation which places education as the only device that gives a person the capacity for sound thought. Teresa explains:

¹¹² *'el señor Teófilo, el señor Germán, el señor Alejandro. Ellos no han ido a la escuela...son ignorantes porque no piensan pues. Pero ya hay poco ignorante.'*

*Here there are ignorant people, that is why they were not the hacienda owners*¹¹³ (Teresa, Chapi, fieldnotes). She considers that ignorance is what prevented hacienda workers from owning the plantation, and because they did not know their civil rights, they allowed the hacendado to be abusive.

The same explanation could be extrapolated onto the internal war years, claiming that a lack of formal education prevented Chunguinos from knowing their civil rights and defending themselves against the abuses committed by both the Shining Path and the army. For Teresa, and many of Chapi's inhabitants, former hacienda workers are ignorant for accepting the life conditions under the hacienda regime, and the internal war. Both parts of the local history are considered to be caused by people's ignorance; a rarely questioned essentialized feature associated with the rural population. However, the part of the history in which people struggle to get rid of the hacienda regime, some people even spending years in jail, is completely erased from local history. This narrative of ignorance is the same that people in Chungui's capital use to explain why *Oreja de Perro*'s population supported the Shining Path.

Formal education is generally considered to be the instrument that allows people to think in the same way that the ruling group does. While talking about the local authorities, Nelly's husband was telling me that they lacked the capacity (Sp. *capacidad*), which I interpret as a lack of knowledge, while Nelly also states that today's authorities do not think:

Nelly: Thoughts are missing, but I just went until third grade more or less, and I think, right?

¹¹³ *Acá hay gente ignorante, por eso no eran dueños de la hacienda*

Oscar: Sometimes when one walks about, talks to people from other places, you grasp experience; you grasp small things, knowledge and experience.
Nelly: Although I did not go to the school.¹¹⁴ (Nelly- Oscar 2, Chupón 2008)

Although she only completed three years of primary school, Nelly considers herself able to think. Her husband completes her statement by highlighting that *andando* (En. walking, migrating) throughout different places, and meeting different people, have allowed them to gain experience and knowledge. Both lacking formal education, they have achieved Criollo/mestizo knowledge through migration.

The experience of leaving the community and of talking with people from different regions is what is thought of as acquiring knowledge. This idea is in part caused by the way people imagine Chungui as a container that prevents them from getting the knowledge that they value. Both Nelly and Teresa migrated to non-Quechua-speaking regions, places where they were forced to learn Spanish and confront a society that they did not know. An important part of what they learned were their civil rights, like the right to be educated and to denounce the abuses of the army.

Education and knowledge acquired through urban migration prevents people from being *engañados*, as they were during the hacienda time. *‘En cambio, si en este tiempo volvería esa hacienda, la gente se rebelaría en una [...] claro porque en esos tiempo no había pe el estudio, no tanto...’* (Nelly-Oscar 2, Chupón 2008). Nelly recognizes that during the hacienda time, education was forbidden, and the hacienda workers’ ignorance

¹¹⁴ “*Pensamientos faltan imaynaya pero ñuqa riki kani tercero grado pero más o menos pienso no? Oscar: No pues a veces cuando uno camina, conversas con otros vas a otros sitios ahí recoges experiencia cualquier cosita recoges, los conocimientos, y agarras experiencias.*
Nelly: Pero aunque no he ido al estudio.”

kept them dominated. She sees education as a means of liberation, and she believes that the hacienda regime would not return now because they are educated. Nelly considers things to be improving, and by considering the number of educated people in the community, she affirms that current knowledge about the law, their civil rights and Spanish, would be enough elements to rebel if the hacendado tried to come back.

Formal education has been traditionally important as a provider of valuable tools: reading, writing and a command of Spanish, all of which are seen as means that would free people from ignorance. Although the knowledge that Nelly and Teresa acquired through migration helps them to avoid the *engaño*, this knowledge is not comparable to one offered by school. The former is inferior to that which can be acquired through the school system.

The word *engañado* is not only used to talk about people's relationships to the Shining Path, or the state. It has been noted by researchers who worked with indigenous people during the Agrarian Reform (Montoya 1989). Anthropologists like Degregori (1989) have explained that *hacendados* represent a group that has traditionally deceived the indigenous population; a traditional ruling class that for centuries have dominated them, a domination that partly rests on possessing the 'knowledge' to manipulate them. Therefore, reading, writing and the use of Spanish have been the traditional ruling class's instruments of domination. The education boom in the early 1960s allowed the indigenous population to overcome local domination and was the beginning of the struggle for the land, and better work conditions. The traditional power that dominated Peruvian politics in the 19th and 20th centuries has been seen as a manipulated knowledge

that was not accessible to the indigenous group. In that context, formal education becomes the way to overcome the *engaño* and be freed from domination. But this emphasis on formal education has dismissed the value of local knowledge; rather than producing an integrated body that combines the Andes and the urban Creole knowledge, only the latter is recognized as being able to give power.

Formal education (which is also the acquisition of knowledge) is seen as acquiring power, a process in which the person ‘opens their eyes,’ like waking up from a lethargic state, which corresponds to the image that the urban Criollo/mestizo group have of the Andean population:

During the Land Reform... teachers told us that this was the time where you needed to wake up [...] peasant's children were studying, and there they [teachers] used to say ‘it is the time to wake up, the President [Velasco] is giving you land.’ Other teachers told us ‘without knowing how to read or write you were given land [its property] and your father would probably waste it. They told us that. Other teachers in that time called us to reclaim ourselves, ‘to open our eyes’ because you are the hope, they used to say.’¹¹⁵ (Miguel IV)

Miguel’s quote about his school experience during the agrarian reform summarizes how teachers considered, and still conceive, indigenous people. In 1969 students were called to *open their eyes*; if they did not, teachers asserted that they would waste the land the government had given them. School teachers, usually coming from the city, consider that illiteracy could make people lose their land, implying that they could be *engañados* by others ‘who know.’ Therefore, students are called ‘to wake up,’ indicating that they have

¹¹⁵ “durante la reforma [agraria]... los profesores nos decían que es ahora es el tiempo donde ustedes deben despertar[...] hijos de campesinos mayor parte todos estudiábamos, y ahí nos decían pe, pa’ ustedes es el tiempo que despierten a ustedes el [Velasco] ha dado tierra habían otros profesores nos decían a ustedes sin saber leer y escribir les ha dado a vuestro padre tierra y ahorita le desperdician nos ha dicho así y habían otros profesores ese tiempo momento que ustedes deben recuperarse deben abrir los ojos porque en ustedes la esperanza decían”

traditionally lived in a lethargic state that is a threat to themselves and their property. Although this quote refers to 1969, it does not differ from what teachers today tell their rural students; this is a hegemonic process barely questioned within daily interaction between schoolteachers and the community.

When people claim that education overcomes the *engañado* status, they also refer to the importance of learning Spanish, which is one of the main reasons for families to send their children to school. Nelly complains that each time she goes to the city representing her community to do paperwork or workshops, everything is in Spanish. She is aware that in rural areas Quechua is their language, but she finds it difficult to speak Spanish in the city. For her, education should be only in Spanish, because that is what will allow a child to understand or better grasp (Sp. *agarrar bien*) what is being said. Children learn Quechua as a first language, only becoming exposed to Spanish during the first year of school when they are around 6 years old. It is because primary education is mainly in Spanish that Nelly finds that they cannot learn well, and consequently, they do not ‘think.’ This is an important disadvantage that complicates the process of learning Spanish correctly, and overall, how Quechua becomes an obstacle in the city:

*Elsewhere, like in Ayacucho city, San Miguel ... they do not speak to you in Quechua. Everything is in Spanish, thus if you do not know Spanish, if you do not understand, you do not understand, right? And in order to bring reports to your village, how can you bring all these difficulties?*¹¹⁶ (Nelly-Oscar 2, Chupón 2008)

Nelly claims that although in some communities people talk in Quechua, in most urban centers people do not. She finds that in order to understand what people are telling her,

¹¹⁶ “*En otros sitios Ayacucho, San Miguel ¡ay! ya no te hablan de Quechua. Puro castellano, entonces si no sabes hablar castellano, si no entiendes, no entiendes, ¿no? Y para qué traes informe para tu pueblo, cómo puedes traer toda esa dificultad.*”

she needs to learn Spanish. Being a monolingual Quechua in Peru is a limitation; it becomes a handicap when trying to grasp appropriately the knowledge offered. For her, speaking Quechua in an urban context is to *bring all these difficulties (Sp. traer toda esa dificultad)*, because it limits her access to the knowledge produced there. However, her claim is not meant to promote the use and recognition of Quechua as an official language within bureaucratic urban spaces. Rather, she considers that a good command of Spanish is an instrument of power, a tool that allows one to be visible and that can contest the exclusion and marginality that monolingual Quechuas experience.

For Nelly and Teresa, Quechua is the language of family, of their personal and intimate relations, and their everyday life in Chapi. Therefore, when Nelly asserts that being a Quechua monolingual is a limitation, she is also talking about the world she cannot grasp when someone speaks Spanish: education, and knowledge, which can be seen as the public domain. Spanish is seen as an instrument that is not meant to replace the use of Quechua in intimate spaces, as she explains that her grandchildren will always understand Quechua, because it is their mother tongue.

Quechua is Nelly's language, and she does not intend to stop using it. She only speaks Spanish with me, showing me how she controls this source of power. Moreover, using Spanish as our language of communication is also the symbol of the relationship that she wants to establish with me.

Being a rural monolingual Quechua also exposes people to discrimination. In an racist society, as the Peruvian one, being from the rural Andes (*serranos*) is highly stigmatized, as people from the urban sierra highlight:

*Sure, when you go to the city, we only speak Quechua. Thus, those who pass by us in the streets, those who sit in the Plaza, right? They will say 'these are serranas right? They will laugh at us right? They will laugh [...] because we speak Quechua, yeah, because we are from the sierra.'*¹¹⁷ (Nelly- Oscar 2, Chupón 2008)

As the quote states Nelly thinks she is stigmatized when she uses Quechua in the city, and although someone from Huamanga city is also a *serrano* (somebody from the sierra), speaking Quechua in an urban context is a marker of race in Huamanga. In the way Nelly frames it, she becomes more *serrana*, more 'Indian' if she uses Quechua in the city. In Huamanga, people barely speak Quechua in public spaces.¹¹⁸ The only space where I found people using Quechua was in the city market among the women selling coca leaves which is a practice that only rural Quechuas do. In other contexts, a state officer might use Quechua with a person from the rural Andes, especially if he/she finds the client struggling with Spanish. There is a resistance to be monolingual Spanish, and although some people aim to 'protect' their children from speaking Quechua, this is an alive language that Quechuas use in the intimate domains of the family.

Conclusion: marginality as a racialized practice accepted?

'Marginality' is a multivocal category used in many narratives whose meaning shifts according to who speaks to whom, and in what context. As it is used by Chapi's inhabitants, it expresses ideas about the relationship they have with the Peruvian state and how they consider themselves as not attended by it. In addition, 'marginality' also

¹¹⁷ "si claro cuando vas a la ciudad, entonces puro Quechua no más nosotros hablamos. Y lo que pasan por nuestros costados en las calles, lo que sienta, ¿no? nos van decir oye esas son serranas ¿no? Nos van reír ¿sí o no?, nos ríe [...] porque hablamos de Quechua, si pe, porque somos de sierra, pe."

¹¹⁸ This contrast with other Andean cities like Cusco, where people speak Quechua in different urban spaces.

becomes a way to talk about how they consider themselves in relationship to the rest of Peruvian society, addressing many of their problems from the ignorance that allows them to be easily fooled by the hacendado, the guerrilla, the Shining Path, and the Peruvian state.

When people in Chapi use ‘marginality’ they accept and highlight the subordinate position that they have in Peruvian society. However, Chapinos also challenge this category by searching in the state, the attention and care that can change their condition of being ‘marginal.’ Using ‘marginality’ in Chapi has two consequences. First, by accepting this subordinate and racialized position, they use the language of the state to get its attention and care, especially in the aftermath of the internal war (this strategy will be discussed in the next chapter). Second, by using ‘marginality,’ people in Chapi accept and share (probably without acknowledging) the racial ideology and practices that consider rural Quechuas as inferior. In other words, by using marginality, ignorance, and the other words associated with these, they participate in the very racial ideology that considers rural Quechuas to be primitive, illiterate and pre-modern. Although the need to get the state’s attention and aid is very important for Chapi and Chungui, they also recognize the racial discrimination against them as rural Quechuas.

In some contexts, ‘marginality’ refers to a geographical space that is isolated and forgotten by the state. In this narrative, Chapi has been placed in a corner where it is easily forgotten, because it is important neither for the state nor for Peruvian society. Behind it rests the state’s idea that the rural Quechua are disposable, and this is supported by the 69,000 dead during the 20 years of internal war and the forced sterilization of rural

Quechua women.

Race ideology works silently by shaping practices and behaviors without mentioning racial physical features, but stressing racial markers such as education and ignorance (de la Cadena 2000). ‘Marginality’ is a racial category and discourse, commonly used without proper acknowledgement of the racial ideology it refers to. Chapi’s families are discriminated against at different levels, inside the district and in major urban centers. Race works through social practices that rarely use race as word, but have proxy words like pre-modern, irrational and ignorant. Physical markers of race like fair skin color are an important feature for people in Chapi who tend get proud of offspring with fair skin, and who like to call foreigner’s attention to this detail.¹¹⁹ Although the word race is disguised and constituted by other categories like knowledge and education, racial practices pervade every sphere of social and political life, and it is one of the more determinant and powerful tools of domination in rural areas. Rural communities are heavily racialized not only from the perspective of the urban domain, but also within the rural setting. There is a tendency to ‘indianize’ (Sp. *indianizar*) rural areas, a process which keeps them silent and excluded from participating in national politics, like the hierarchical discrimination that the town of Chungui exerts over those who are from Chapi. Teresa talks about the state that places her community in the corner and forgets about them, because they are ‘Indians’ and the state despises them. However, she expresses this racial discrimination through proxies like ‘marginality,’ and

¹¹⁹ This is not an exclusive practice from the Andean region. It is common to find that the lower the economic status, the more importance it is given to fair skin color, especially in children. It is imagined that the light color may be a possibility of social ascension.

‘forgotten,’ as if the community needed to remind the state of its existence and that they have also the right to be recognized as citizens. These also allow the perpetuation of the racial ideology and its practices without noticing it.

Throughout the use of the categories ‘marginal,’ ‘forgotten,’ and ‘ignorant’ Chapi inhabitants position themselves in the lowest sphere of the social hierarchy, sharing the teleological idea (with the rest of the Peruvian society) that in order to progress and succeed, they need to be assimilated into the Criollo/mestizo group, which will lead them to be modern, which as long as Quechuas cannot achieve.¹²⁰ Along with this, by avoiding the use of explicit racial categories (like *Indios*), the Peruvian intelligentsia and the state imagines that differences between rural Quechuas and urban Criollo/mestizo can be erased.

Although the state has always been present in Chapi, people think of it as absent because it is not helping the community in the form they expect: infrastructure projects, expansion of health clinics, and roads¹²¹. When they claim that before the 1980s they did not receive any aid from the state, they highlight that the war has turned them into a visible community. Now some aid arrives, and this is because they lived through an internal war. The war has transformed them into visible subjects by entering them into the national discourse as the most marginal community affected by the internal war.

¹²⁰ Seligmann(1989) explains that within contemporary Peruvian society, great ideological emphasis is placed upon the social category of *Indian*. This in turn provokes an awareness of the so-called Indians of the kinds of services and goods to which they could have access if they were not labeled as *Indians* (Seligmann 1989: 707)

¹²¹ What people in Chapi constantly demand is the construction of a road and infrastructure projects. The road is imagined to be the mean through which the state will arrive and take care of them. The chapter section will extensively discuss this.

‘Marginality’ also refers to a backward space, in which progress and development is not seen as possible for Chapi’s population. The community is seen as ‘backward,’ as a place where education is poor and ‘success’ is not possible. Therefore, the goal is to achieve modernity, but the one established by the (Western) Criollo/mestizo ideology, which is not considered possible in rural areas. Therefore modernity is only achieved migrating to urban centers, where education (Spanish) and goods are found. To be modern is to migrate to the city, thus becoming less indigenous and acquiring an urban lifestyle that represents success and social mobility.

In addition, people explain that because Chapi is ‘marginal,’ the internal war emerged in a violent way. Placed in the corner, despised and forgotten by the state, the Shining Path found supporters and militants. People do not feel safe admitting that they may have believed in the insurgent project; it is probably too soon for that. However, they recognize that some of their neighbors joined this group, but they carefully explain that it is because they did not know anything about politics and they were ignorant. Through this explanation, they mean to avoid accountability for the atrocities committed during the war, which is also a strategy performed by the Peruvian intelligentsia, who only discusses superficial issues about the internal war (see Chapter 1, Saravia and Wiese 2011). The war was also caused by the state’s active forgetting; therefore, the state has the responsibility to compensate the affected communities. And it is only when the violence started that they became a visible community for the state.

As subordinate groups, people in Chapi accept, challenge and resist their subordinate position. Their acceptance that formal education is one way to get out of

ignorance through *andando*, migration, and their experience in urban settings shows us the power of racial ideology, since through these practices Chapinos become less 'marginal,' or less rural, Quechuas moving upward in the Peruvian hierarchy. This challenges part of the racial ideology, because they have introduced migration as a resource through which Criollo/mestizo knowledge is achieved. Therefore, they can get rid of the status of ignorance, although they continue to be rural Quechuas.

'Marginality' is not only about domination and subordination, it is a complex hegemonic process that is better understood through William's idea of *structures of feelings* (1977). The advantages of this approach is that it allows one to understand 'marginality' in the way it is lived by the people in Chapi, being aware of the tensions that may appear when other interpretations of marginality (for example. when it is used by the state in its family program) clash with individual's experiences, ideas and feelings. When such tensions occur they cannot yet be called resistance or social transformations. They are still in early phase, it is a social and material kind of thinking and feeling not yet explicit or fully articulated (Williams 1977: 130-1). Consequently, while 'marginality' is a relationship of domination through the racial ideology, for people in Chapi it is also a demand to be included and attended to by the state. It can be interpreted as an incipient claim by citizens to be integrated, even if for that to happen they need they must play in to the racialized practices of the Peruvian society.

The narrative of marginality is not part of everyday life; rather this is a discourse that aims to explain to foreign visitors (like anthropologists) how the Shining Path got support in *Oreja de Perro*, and how local residents experience the state. In addition, it is

used to place themselves in relationship with the rest of the groups composing the Peruvian society (Limeño elites, provincial elites, mestizos, etc.). This embeds them in a hierarchy that is not explicitly identified as racial, but in which racial referents are embedded, in a latent form. It is a discourse that avoids any accountability for the war years; one that aims to frame the state as the main party responsible for the violence, and that also demands compensation for their losses. At the same time this is a narrative that talks about relationships with the state, how they are viewed and what they expect from it. Moreover, it is important to emphasize that ‘marginality’ has also become a strategy that has made them visible subjects for the state. This subject will be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 5

'Marginal' as a strategy to become visible

The previous chapter analysed how people in Chapi use 'marginality,' and look at the different categories that emerged with it, which help us to better understand that 'marginality' is a category that talks about the relationship between this community, with other actors like insurgent groups and the governmental agencies. Chapter 4 suggested that at the same time people in Chapi seem to accept, and adapt themselves to the racial domination imposed by the Criollo/mestizo group. In some occasion Chapinos challenge the label of 'marginal,' claiming to be treated and respected as Peruvians citizens. By constantly presenting themselves as a 'marginal community,' people in Chapi deploy a strategy that aims to transform them into visible subjects for the state and the national society, especially in the aftermath of the war. However, 'marginality' is used in a more complex form than just reducing it as an instrument and strategy to become visible.

The PTRC final report was submitted in 2003, and since then, has influenced many studies about violence and Human Rights that have produced a particular understanding the indigenous population. However, the representation of rural Quechuas as *despised* (*Sp. despreciados*), dispossessed and excluded has not been challenged or questioned, and it is constantly repeated in different academic and governmental

domains. The language and representations used in academic writings have been *taken-for-granted* by scholars and the national intelligentsia, and have been constantly reproduced in the national media. ‘Marginality’ is a euphemism behind which the state hides a racial ideology that the rural Quechuas are pre-modern subjects, irrational, ignorant and that need to be ‘de-indianized’ in order to become like urban Criollo/mestizos. An example is how the state uses this label to identify those women that, according to the *Cuaderno Verde*, by having children reproduce poverty and backwardness. In doing so, the state articulates in a particular form, race as discursive practise and ideology as action (Lemon 2002: 55). The absence of an explicit racial ideology within Peruvian political discourses, policies, and texts, does not tell us whether or not policy makers have ‘no concept’ of race. In general people infers that internal, biological, and inherited essences from external ‘signs,’ which produces racialized terms inside and outside official discourses and within state institutions. In this sense racial categories are extremely complex to understand. For example, I am from Lima, but during my fieldwork I was commonly called *gringa*, which does not necessarily refers to someone that is from North America; but rather someone who has fair skin. Indeed, any children with fair skin in the community are called *gringo(a)*. From this example, it can be said that the meaning of *gringo(o)* has changed and is also applied to children that were born in the community.¹²² Therefore, racial logic not only lives in the terms that refers to things, but in the various ways people use language to signify relations in specific contexts (Lemon 2002: 57).

¹²² Originally the term *gringo* was used to call people from North America that traveled to Latin America.

As much as human bodies can be represented as raced, racialized connections among them are not always clearly seen. However they can be mapped and pointed out. Policy makers and state officers, as well as NGOs and Human Rights activists, do not live apart from other arenas of discursive production and circulation. Thus we cannot assume that discursive practises flow only in one direction (Lemon 2002: 58-60). In other words, racialized practises are also used by people in Chapi, when they talk about groups that they consider inferiors, backward and pre-modern like the Asháninka (an Amazonian indigenous group) that used to live in the Amazonian part of the district. The Asháninka are imagined to be nomads and naked all the time, and they are commonly called ‘campitas.’ People in Chapi feel strongly superior to the indigenous groups in the Amazon,

The Aguarunas [an indigenous group from the Amazon jungle], they live like wild animals, in the big jungle, without clothes. The Campas [Asháninka is the proper name] are the indigenous living in the Amazon part of Chungui; these people work as slaves for Virges [a strong man who has an extended property on the side of Cusco] He is controls the river as if it was his property, and kills anyone who crosses toward his property. (Cesar, Fieldnotes 2008)

My intention here is not to include another component to my analysis (like the indigenous people from the Amazon area), but to show how racial practices and its ideology are complex, and not fixed. Chapi defined themselves as a ‘marginal community’ but, in hierarchy they are better off than what they imagine indigenous life to be like in the Amazon jungle.

In post-war Peru, ‘marginality’ is also an important strategy used by rural communities to become *visible* subjects to the state. This *visibility* achieved to using the state’s discourse (about the internal war), as well as deployment of suffering imagines,

are extremely important, because it seems to be the only way to attract the state's attention over its responsibilities.

This chapter analyses 'marginality' as a discursive relationship between Chungui and the state, that is not only promoted by the community and its authorities, but also by state officers who repeat insistently that the state's duty is to attend to *forgotten* communities. In this context, it is not surprising to find that Chungui's Mayor –aware of the *visibility* Chungui has achieved with the release of the PTRC Final Report– invests his efforts to consolidate the district as the '1980s most affected community.' Through this label, the rhetoric and relationships developed around it, local authorities expect to become noticeable in the Peruvian society.

As much as a strategy to become *visible*, the rhetoric of 'marginality' is also deployed by the state and the aid sector. The imaginary bonding that the state and the community are establishing throughout this discourse reinforces the subordinate subject positions as 'war victims'—racially marking the rural Quechua as opposed to an unmarked Criollo/mestizo community (discussed in Chapter 4). Rather than challenging a dominated subject position, this rhetoric produces, and reproduces the traditional hierarchical system where rural Quechuas are at the bottom of the society, embodying the *backwardness, isolation* and *ignorance* that halts the modernization process in Peru.

This chapter explores this discourse of marginality in two sections. The first discusses how the state, in the form of the PTRC, has consolidated a language of 'marginal community.' This section illustrates the importance of the political context in which it appears, and explains how it is a language that exists outside Chungui, one that

also circulates through governmental institutions and the civil society. The second section shows how this language is used by state officers to interact with rural populations. Through the analysis of two state-community interactions, I look at the different ways the state agencies reinforce the label of ‘marginal community.’ I consider this to be the language of contact and interaction between the state and subordinate groups. Through these, state officers relate to and negotiate with the rural population, adapting to each other’s knowledge, experiences and demands.

My discussion in this chapter builds upon Urban’s work (1996) about replication and power, and Lemon’s (2002) discussion of race and racialized relationships. The ascription of ‘marginal community’ is a discursive strategy that does not index people’s actions; rather, it refers to the set of actions that they receive. Therefore, for methodological purposes I consider that the PTRC arise a discourse about the rural Quechuas and the internal war, that it will be called *original*. When people in Chapi and Chungui reproduces this discourse, highlighting that they are a ‘marginal community,’ they relocate the *original* discourse into a new context also produces the addition and erasure of other ideas. This process is called *replication*, and implies original and copied discourses, that at the same time addresses the social relationship between the *originator* and *copier* (see Table 5-1, Urban 1996). Considering the problem of *replication*, and how the copy and the original are related, it is important to inquire how that relationship is encoded in the circulating meta-discourse. The meta-discourse provides a crucial link between discourse and the social relations that are characterizable independently of discursive interactions.

Table 5-1
Original and Replicas

<i>Originator</i> PTRC and its heirs	<i>Original A</i>	Discourse provoked by the PTRC and the FR about the internal war.
<i>Copier</i> Chungui and Chapi authorities	<i>Replica A</i>	Discourse based on the discourse developed by the PTRC, but that some ideas are added and other erased.

Source: cf. Urban 1996

1. Consolidating a national discourse: ‘marginal communities’

1.1 Originating the discourse of ‘marginality’

For the purposes of my analysis, I consider that long before Chunguinos started to define themselves as ‘the most marginal community,’ the PTRC and other agents –such as scholars, NGOs and the media– employ this rhetoric to talk about rural Quechuas and the internal conflict. Thus, considering the PTRC to be that originator of the discourse about ‘marginal communities,’ I analyze in the following paragraphs PTRC’s *original* discourse based on its President’s, Salomon Lerner¹²³, speech at during the submission of the Final Report.

In 2002, I conducted ethnographic research in Chungui and *Oreja de Perro*, which became part of one of the representative stories that were included in the PTRC’s final report. When I presented a preliminary report in Lima, this caught people’s attention because ‘they’ (the national intelligentsia composing the PTRC) did not know the

¹²³ Salomon Lerner is a Peruvian professor specialized in Philosophy, who was the President of the Universidad Católica del Peru (in Lima) before being appointed as the PTRC President.

magnitude of the violence deployed in *Oreja de Perro*. The surprised audience even questioned the reality of Chunguinos' stories. For many of these scholars, these testimonies could not be *truth* because 'they' (the scholars) did not know anything about the violence during the war years. After long discussion, it was agreed that the research I conducted should be part of the Final Report, immediately becoming one of its emblematic stories.

To understand how the PTRC has nurtured the idea of Chungui as 'the most marginal community,' it is important to see first how the rural Quechuas were represented within its discourses. The PTRC was mainly composed by an urban coastal elite group whose task was to understand the violence of the 1980s in Peru. Among all its Commissioner members, only one was not originally from Lima and spoke Quechua, and even so, he was criticized for coming from an Ayacucho's elite family. Overall this was an urban Criollo/mestizo elite group, and these features are very important to highlight as these have directly influenced the how the rural population have been viewed, related with, and represented. The best examples of this representation are found in public discourses. Thus, I analyse some extracts of the Final Report submission's discourse pronounced by its President the day of the submission.

Salomón Lerner submitted the Final Report to the state in an official ceremony in the *Casa de Gobierno* in August 2003. Throughout his speech, he characterized the historical period analyzed (1980-2000) as a time marked with shame and dishonor: ... *the two final decades of the 20th century –it is difficult to say– are a mark of horror and dishonor for*

*the state and the Peruvian society.*¹²⁴ It is interesting to observe how innumerable times throughout his speech (written by Peruvian sociologists and anthropologists also working at the PTRC), he associated the Quechuas with a condition of exclusion and with being *despised*,

... We live, yet, in a country in which the exclusion is so absolute that tens of thousands of people can disappear without anyone in the integrated society, in the society of the non-excluded, take realize it.

*[...] It is, as we Peruvians know, a sector of the population historically ignored by the state and the urban society, one that does enjoy the benefits of our political community. These two decades of destruction and death would not have been possible without the profound disdain for the most deprived population of the country [...] that contempt is woven into every moment of the daily life of Peruvians.*¹²⁵ (PTRC 2003b)

Lerner's speech addresses the existence of two different groups within the Peruvian society. The first one composed by the historically *excluded who lived the worst of the internal war* (rural Quechuas), and the other group which is composed by the urban society (Criollo/mestizo). Those who have directly lived the consequences of this conflict are indigenous, whose suffering has been historically ignored by the state and the urban society. Moreover, he asserts that the terrible consequences of the war were possible because indigenous Quechuas, the most *dispossessed* and *despised* population, are deeply discriminated in their everyday life.

By characterizing the Peruvian society divided in two groups, Lerner's discourse

¹²⁴ "Las dos décadas finales del siglo XX son –es forzoso decirlo sin rodeos– una marca de horror y de deshonra para el Estado y la sociedad peruanos."

¹²⁵ "...vivimos, todavía, en un país en el que la exclusión es tan absoluta que resulta posible que desaparezcan decenas de miles de ciudadanos sin que nadie en la sociedad integrada, en la sociedad de los no excluidos, tome nota de ello. [...] Se trata, como sabemos los peruanos, de un sector de la población históricamente ignorado por el Estado y por la sociedad urbana, aquella que sí disfruta de los beneficios de nuestra comunidad política. Estas dos décadas de destrucción y muerte no habrían sido posibles sin el profundo desprecio a la población más desposeída del país [...] ese desprecio que se encuentra entretelado en cada momento de la vida cotidiana de los peruanos."

reproduces and reinforces this division. First, his speech is not addressed to the ‘integrated’ group of the Peruvian society, because he is excluding the indigenous population by portraying them as ‘despised, excluded, and dispossessed.’ Although, he intends to not be included in any of the groups mentioned, it becomes impossible to detach him from the urban elite he represents. As the president of the PTRC, Lerner is part of the very group he is addressing— a powerful political class that excludes, ignores, and dominates those who are different.

The last part of the speech asserts,

*The voices of Peruvians anonymous, ignored, despised, which are collected in these thousand pages, should be higher and cleaner than all those voices from the comfort of power and privilege, who have rush to rise in the last weeks to deny in advance, as so often has happened in our country, the whole credibility of their testimonies and to shut off all forms of solidarity with the poor.*¹²⁶ (PTRC 2003b)

This quote is disturbing, because it is founded on the idea that the ‘poor’ are purer because they do not have power or any privileges. The problem with this ideology is that it essentializes rural Quechua speakers as *bon savages*, insinuating that by nature indigenous groups are good, that it is in their essence to be *good*, imagining them as a group removed from ‘modernity.’ The moral judgement behind this quote does not differ from the idea expressed by ‘progressive’ scholars who argued that in Uchuraccay a community in the Northern part of the Ayacucho region, in 1983, the murder of 8 journalists could not be done by the local population, because it was impossible that they

¹²⁶ “*Las voces de peruanos anónimos, ignorados, despreciados, que se encuentran recogidas en estos miles de páginas, deben ser -son - más altas y más limpias que todas aquellas voces que, desde la comodidad del poder y del privilegio, se han apresurado a levantarse en las últimas semanas para negar de antemano, como tantas veces ha ocurrido en nuestro país, toda credibilidad a sus testimonios y para cerrar el paso a toda corriente de solidaridad con los humildes.*”

could kill people. The commission that was called to investigate this event, led by current Nobel Prize Vargas Llosa, argued that the population in Uchuraccay was accountable for the murders. However, they were not totally responsible for it, because—in the words of the Uchuraccay Commission—they were so primitive and outside of the law, that they *did not know that in Peru it is illegal to kill* (Franco 2006: 173). In this case, racialization is as much of a discursive practice, as it is a relationship that Criollo/mestizos establish with the rural Quechua; which indeed, permeates scholars' and the intelligentsia's academic and political works (for some examples see Fuenzalida 1970; Quijano 1980).

We found in our studies that those who greatly suffered violence, and those who suffered the greatest cruelty, were the in-significant, in other words, those thousands of Peruvians who then and now have no meaning and significance for the state and for big part of the Peruvian society. They are the poor, excluded, the forgotten forever, who have no other desire like the one expressed by a brave man who gave his testimony here in Ayacucho: hopefully some day we may be Peruvians.¹²⁷ (PTRC 2003b)

The last quote of Lerner's discourse highlights that the Quechuas were the group that most suffered during the war years. However, it is surprising the use of the word insignificant (*Sp. insignificantes*) to name the indigenous population, as if this was the only way subordinate groups may be called to highlight their lower social, economic, and political position. Although the speech is addressed to the urban elite highlighting and repeating again and again that the Quechua population is *forgotten, insignificant, excluded, despised*, only essentialized them, reinforcing a racial hierarchy and

¹²⁷ “*hemos constatado en nuestros estudios que en gran medida los que sufrieron la violencia, y los que la padecieron con la mayor crueldad, fueron los in-significantes, es decir, aquellos miles de peruanos que antes y ahora carecen de sentido y de significado para el Estado y para buena parte de la sociedad. Son los pobres, los excluidos, los olvidados de siempre, quienes no tienen otra aspiración que ésta que expresó por un hombre valiente que dio su testimonio aquí, en Ayacucho: ojalá que algún día también nosotros seamos peruanos*”

domination.

The discourse ends by arguing,

*...within in its pages it is also included the testimony of numerous acts of courage, acts of selflessness, signs of intact dignity that show us that human beings are essentially decent and magnanimous. There are those who did not renounce the authority and responsibility entrusted to them by their neighbors, there are those who defied the abandonment to defend their families transforming into tools their work instruments, there are those who put their fate next to those who suffered unjust imprisonment, there are those who took their duty to defend the country without betraying the law, there are those who fought to defend the uprooting of life. They are in the core and heart of our memories.*¹²⁸ (PTRC 2003b)

After extensively talking about the *poor* and *forgotten*, indexing the Quechuas with this, Lerner tries to place them –at the end of his speech– as subjects with agency, decision, and voice. Once reinforcing and reproducing a fragmented and racist society, he tries to bring back into the speech the indigenous population by erasing the division that he strongly emphasized. The two groups that composed the Peruvian society, and over which the discourse is constructed, seem to converge in the last paragraph; erasing a division that was very important highlight earlier. For my analysis, this is the *original* discourse that extensively use racialized terms shaping in this way, the relationships that the urban Criollo/mestizo group (that Lerner represents) establishes with the rural Quechuas.

¹²⁸ “...en sus páginas se recoge también el testimonio de numerosos actos de coraje, gestos de desprendimiento, signos de dignidad intacta que nos demuestran que el ser humano es esencialmente digno y magnánimo. Ahí se encuentran quienes no renunciaron a la autoridad y la responsabilidad que sus vecinos les confiaron; ahí se encuentran quienes desafiaron el abandono para defender a sus familias convirtiendo en arma sus herramientas de trabajo; ahí se encuentran quienes pusieron su suerte al lado de los que sufrían prisión injusta; ahí se encuentran los que asumieron su deber de defender al país sin traicionar la ley; ahí se encuentran quienes enfrentaron el desarraigo para defender la vida. Ahí se encuentran: en el centro de nuestro recuerdo

These discourses are the *original*¹²⁹ discourse (Urban 1996), which included the PTRC as the *originator*, but also the media and the national intelligentsia that have developed along with the Final Report the idea that Chungui is the ‘most marginal and forgotten community.’ Although ‘marginality’ has its roots in the Dependence Theory, the way it is grounded and related to the internal war and its ‘war victims,’ lead us to think that this is a different discourse, a remodeled one that emerged after the release of the PTRC final report. Considering this as the *original* discourse, will allow us to look at the ways Chunguinos have replicated this through face-to-face interactions with the state.

1.2 The legacy: National program of compensations

In 2007 the National Compensation Plan (Sp. Plan Nacional de Reparaciones-PNR) was inaugurated in Ayacucho, and launched the National Program of Collective compensations, which expected to develop projects in 440 villages affected by the 1980s political violence.¹³⁰ Build on the idea that the state was partly responsible for war’s outcome –that caused thousands of deaths–this policy was the social and political achievement of NGOs, Human Right activists and a group of the civil society concerned with the PTRC’s recommendations. In the way this has been framed, the law will compensate collectively, affected communities, and individually, only those that the state declares as ‘victims.’

Although through this program it is expected that the state will assume its

¹²⁹ It can be said that the original is the PTRC’s speech, and the media’s may be replicas. However, my argument intends to show how this original, that can be combinations of discourses, sets stage for replicas that will be generated by state officers, NGOs and Chunguinos.

¹³⁰ See: <http://www.planintegraldereparaciones.gob.pe/cman-presentacion.php>

responsibility during the internal war, it has not been acknowledge the problem that involves the state's definition as war 'victim.' In general, the state (and the civil society behind this program) has not considered the impact that the label of 'victims' would have on rural communities, as a reproducer of people's subordinate position. Most of these communities barely receive state's attention, and these groups are also those who lived the worst of the internal war. The state requires the affected population to be recognized officially as a 'war victims,' compelling them to be register in the Victims Registry (*Sp. Registro Único de Víctimas-RUV*). Once the registration is finished, the 'victim' or relative attaches all the documentation available to prove the existence of a missing, tortured, or murdered family member. The files are sent to Lima, where a group of urban lawyers analyze them, and establish, according to the law, if the person legally qualifies as a 'victim.' If this is accepted, the registered 'victim' receives accreditation which will give him/her access to some benefits. The *RUV* was not known in all communities¹³¹ when I started my fieldwork in 2008. Part of problem, people involved on this program argue, is the lack of serious governmental support and the restrictive budget. The state accepted the law because of pressure from the international community and NGOs. However, it is not a political priority—this is a populist policy designed to appease critics.

In its collective form, the compensation program in Chungui has been developing infrastructural projects (the construction of the secondary school and the health clinic) since 2007. However, the state is using the compensation money to carry out projects that

¹³¹ It first arrived to Chungui in 2009.

state should do in a regular basis.¹³² Neither the scholarly community nor the Peruvian intelligentsia is questioning this state policy. In general, the compensation program has not arrived at the most affected communities, like Chapi. This is mainly because the ‘help’ is focused on areas that are better connected to the metropole, where the road arrives.¹³³ In October 2009, the first 80 ‘war victims’ were officially recognized by the state; an important milestone for Chungui’s inhabitants who have enormous expectations from individual compensations. For the first time in their lives, Chunguinos have the right to access free health care.

For communities like Chungui, the process of being recognized by the state as official ‘war victims’ has been possible because of the Final Report, and public discourses that have placed it in the national scenario as ‘the most marginal and forgotten community’ affected during the war time. This label has placed this community as a focus of attention during a short period that faded because of the drug traffic in the region, its long distance from Ayacucho city, and lately the presence of Shining Path members.

2. Encountering the state: the path to visibility

I have discussed how elite public discourses, scholarly as well as popular, have produced the image of Chungui’s inhabitants as a ‘marginal community’. Although the core of the originator discourse is the PTRC, it has received the collaboration of scholars,

¹³² I consider that the state’s duty should attend the basic needs like education and health. What it is doing in Chungui and Chapi under the name of collective compensation, is its duty rather than compensations for the war crimes.

¹³³ Which is less than 10% of the district.

urban elites and the media. Following the Urban's suggestion that the relationship between original and replica discourses is entangled in the power relationship established between the originator and the copier, I explore the *replica(s)* discourse used by the people in Chapi and Chungui, and the governmental agencies that arrived to Chungui (Urban 1996).

The *originator* produces and reinforces Chungui as a 'marginal community,' and state officers replicate this, through the interactions they have with rural communities in workshops and meetings. In this sense, a particular cultural citizenship¹³⁴ is constructed, re-enforced and imposed through everyday practices even as it runs contrary to official citizenship which holds all citizens as equal (cf.Ong 1999).

In this section, I argue that 'marginality' is as double discourse, used by different groups with different purposes. On one side it is part of the language of the state, a code through which it communicates with and subordinates the rural Quechuas, producing it as racialized (inferior) subjects. On the other side it is part of the language used by the rural Quechua to become *visible* in a society where they are invisible, non-important, and disposable¹³⁵. The rhetoric used by the community becomes a strategy to be heard by the state and to be considered for his help. Through labels like 'marginal' and 'marginalized,' Chunguinos expect to get the state's attention and access developmental projects that they believe will drive them to progress.

For analytical purposes, I have divided this discussion on how 'marginality'

¹³⁴ I use definition of cultural citizenship that considers it as ways to belong according to the dominant cultural criteria (Ong 1999: 106)

¹³⁵ An example of the disposable character of the rural Quechuas is the forced sterilization practiced during the Fujimori regime, only to rural Quechua women (see Chapter 4)

works as discursive practise in two levels. The first one looks at the municipality (*Sp. Municipalidad*), and how local authorities use the language as a strategy to place themselves in the national political platform. The second level explores how the state, through state officers, interacts with the local population in, what I argue is, a racialized relationship.

2.1 The Municipality of Chungui: looking to be visible

Daniel Huamán is the current Mayor of Chungui, but he has also been a friend, guide and collaborator since the first day I met him in 2002. At the time, he was a popular young grassroots local leader. He was born in Chungui, and grew up in one of the most important and well-off families there. Her mother was the only woman who attended school among her peers, and because of this, she worked as civil registrar for many years. Although Daniel's family stayed in Chungui during the internal war, his sisters were sent to the city of Ayacucho where they finished high school and went to college. Daniel was the youngest son, and stayed with his parents in Chungui. He finished secondary school, which allowed him to become a local leader, for both Chungui and Chapi.

Daniel entered into the political arena in 2007. His life changed drastically when he was elected as Mayor; he moved to the city of Ayacucho arguing that there it is easier to access different institutions, and resources. His duties have distanced him from Chungui, especially from the Chapi's population to whom he used to be very close. During my last fieldwork (2008-2009) he was accused of corruption, and becoming 'rich' helping foreigners (like me) to do research in the region. People do not trust him

anymore, and Daniel is fully aware of this.¹³⁶

During his years in the Municipality, Daniel has learned to deal with the state and aid agencies. He considers that the focus of his work is to direct the state's attention toward Chungui, which he confessed has been difficult because of the district's harsh geography and the state's neoliberal policy that does not promote public investment. Daniel considers that the state is responsible for making Chungui a 'marginal community,' and it does not help the community to overcome this. Like the narratives analysed in the previous chapter, Daniel understands 'marginality' as an act performed by the state toward rural communities becoming thus, and as the undertone of the state's relationship with Chungui. In other words, authorities find that because the state marginalizes the community, its responsibility is for doing something (like projects) to change the condition of 'marginality.'

The Mayor and his team are seen as mediators between the community and the state. People attend the Municipality office in Ayacucho on daily basis, looking for forms of support that go from financial aid to part-time jobs. In the context of extreme necessity, the municipality of Chungui fills its population needs: *...they come to the Municipality, and we are paying health issues like operations, travels, etc.* (Daniel Huamán). As the quote suggest, the Municipality's role is not only about paying bills but about keeping elementary schools functioning. Therefore, the municipality pays teachers'

¹³⁶ When I present my credentials signed by the Mayor, people in Chupón and Oronqoy did not respect them, and they accused him of receiving money to allow this projects.

salaries in order to keep pre-schools and schools running in the district.¹³⁷ The municipality is the first level of the state, the one that they can approach when they need help and support.

Authorities in this office are constantly looking for financial support to develop different infrastructure projects, and they continuously travel to Lima, aiming to establish relationships with different governmental agencies, international aid agencies and NGOs. In Ayacucho and Lima, where most of the municipality's business is done, Chungui's Mayor becomes the political and social mediator between the community and the central state. In every meeting, local authorities start by stating that Chungui is 'the most marginal and forgotten community,' an expression that is extensively used by the state every time it talks about *Oreja de Perro* y Chungui.

During my last conversation with Daniel, in October 2009, he told me that he was working with state officials in Lima to name Chungui as the emblematic district in which the Compensation program will first start working,¹³⁸

*[...] we are just proposing to MIMDES, to Ministries Council, in which way, apart from special treatment that the VRAE has; the poorest area, the region most affected by the violence and how we make this an especial treatment area? Like a landmark district.*¹³⁹
(Daniel Huamán)

In order to get the state's attention and interest, Daniel reinforces the image of Chungui

¹³⁷ There are not enough people concentrated in villages in the district, and people live in a dispersed pattern that halts the state to invest in education and health services. In order to avoid this reductions and closures, the Mayor has included in his budget the salary of these teachers. Therefore health and education, which should be the central state's responsibilities, are now the Mayor's ones.

¹³⁸ Although it was not clear in what way the Compensation Program, beyond giving people credentials was going to be apply.

¹³⁹ “[...] justamente estamos proponiendo a MINDES, a la presidencia del Consejo de Ministros: de qué manera, aparte del tratamiento especial del VRAE, la zona más pobre, la zona más afectada de la violencia y ¿cómo hacemos un tratamiento especial a la zona? Como distrito emblemático.”

as the most poor, and affected community. For him, this is the way to get the state's attention, which will be transformed into projects that will benefit and 'modernize' the community. It is probably true that Chungui and *Oreja de Perro* have more reasons to be known than just the violence they experienced during the internal war. But it is also true that the current political condition – the drug problem and the re-emergence of the Shining Path—and the distance from the regional capital does not help. Chungui does not hold oil, mines, or natural gas reserves; instead, it has a history of violence and death that may indeed make it the most affected region by the political violence. This history is transforming it into a *visible* community, and the authorities are aware of this. Daniel explains what means to be a 'marginal community,'

*Chungui is marginal [...] at the state level there exists such marginalization. There are preferences... there is a marginalization... several interests are playing. There is a strong marginalization. They say we are the most affected district and do not invest.*¹⁴⁰ (Daniel Huamán)

Daniel highlights the double discourse of the state. On one hand, the state constantly remembers, discursively, that they are a 'marginal community;' but on the other hand, they do not do anything to change this situation. Although Daniel does not state it, he remarks the state's lack of commitment to change Chungui's marginal condition, arguing that this cannot be done if the state does not help them economically.

Daniel explains the discourse of 'marginal and forgotten community' as if this were a concrete reality rather than one created throughout discourse. In this case, he

¹⁴⁰ "Chungui es marginal [...] eso es que, a nivel de estado hay tipo una marginación. Preferencias hay... Tipo una marginación... hay intereses que juegan mucho. Una marginación fuerte. Dicen que somos el distrito más afectado y no invierten."

reproduces the PTRC discourse, decontextualizing it and setting a new ground, in which the relationship with the state becomes the origin of the ‘marginal’ condition they suffer. To understand the relationship between *original A* and *replica A* discourses (see Table 5-1) we need to look at how that relationship is encoded in the circulating meta-discourse (Urban 1996: 23).

In the discourse presented by Lerner the emphasis of the causes of the internal war are found in the society and in the state, as Mayor of Chungui’s explanation highlights. While the *original A* extensively talks about the *despised, ignored* and *insignificant* Quechuas that suffered the consequences of the violence; Daniel’s *replica A* does not address this or any other racial category, but rather emphasizes the state’s responsibility in producing the ‘marginality’ in which Chungui lives. While the original discourse talks about multiple agents that may be held responsible for the high number of victims and the 1980s violence, Daniel’s discourse reduces the responsibility to the state. The rest of the society, including the army, is not present in the *replica A*, it has been erased in order to reinforce the state’s-- the central government’s—responsibility.

2.2 Becoming visible to the state

During my two years of fieldwork in Ayacucho, the central state personnel was only twice in the district of Chungui. Both meetings were related to the National Program of Compensations that grants ‘war victims’ some benefits from the state. Both meetings were important not only because these were unique interactions between the state and the community, but also because they demonstrated how state officials deployed racialized practices through their relationships with the community. The agents of the state use a

particular language that people are required to use if they expect to be heard. The government personnel use this *replica (replica B)*, becoming the *copier* of the original discourse about ‘marginal and forgotten communities.’

2.2.1 MIMDES in Oronqoy

While I was visiting Oronqoy for the first time in May 2008, people were expecting an important meeting. Later I learned that the *Director of the Agency of Displaced Population and Peace Culture* in the Women’s and Human Development’s Ministry,¹⁴¹ Dr. Varillas was arriving to Oronqoy for the first time. This visit was the highest official state representative to ever be in Oronqoy, and it was important because it was an extremely exigent travel for an official from Lima.¹⁴² This action was interpreted by people in Oronqoy as Varillas’s commitment toward Chungui’s development. This official was also the first state official traveling through the district of Chungui.

Although some of the most important local authorities were expected to be in Oronqoy for the meeting, there were not as many participants as local authorities were expecting. The meeting included a few people from neighboring villages and some locals who answered the call of their authorities.

In his opening statement Varillas introduced himself claiming that

The big problem in the country is that the state has not had eyes to see, it had not had ears to hear, nor had a heart to feel. La Oreja de Perro is the micro region most affected in the country ... there are more dead, more missing here... And the problem is that the state had the obligation to defend and respect your civil rights, they had to defend your

¹⁴¹ Dirección General de desplazados y cultura de Paz del Ministerio de la Mujer y Desarrollo Humano.

¹⁴² It takes about three days to walk from Chungui to Oronqoy, and includes long walks hiking mountains that go beyond 11,000 feet over the sea level.

*lives and it did not. There is a responsibility from the state and we hope that this state now assume that responsibility.*¹⁴³ (Varillas, meeting in Oronqoy)

Although Varillas is officially representing the state in this meeting he does not align himself with it, which avoids for being accountable for the state past actions. He talks about the state as if it was a person, with eyes, ears and heart, as if it was somebody who could listen to those who lived the war. And he highlights that *Oreja de Perro* is the most affected region in the country, with the highest toll of dead and disappeared people.

Using a *replica* from the PTRC's discourse, this opening statement places Chapi as the most affected community, allowing us to presuppose that they are thousands of victims.

Then, he continues

*I do not have the certainty that [the state] will meet its duty, but much depends on the force of words, much depends on the ability of your organization and to the extent that you organize yourself and your voice is not from only one person ... that should be the voice of all the Oreja de Perro that is the most affected area of the country by the internal war. Then the country will know and meet the most affected area by the internal war but also the also the most forgotten region by the state.*¹⁴⁴ (Varillas, meeting in Oronqoy)

In the interaction between state officers and rural subjects, I have often found that while officials affirm that the state's duty is to compensate victims, they exhort people to pressure the state if they aim to achieve benefits. Varillas not only openly doubt that the state would perform its compensations duties; but also highlights (again) that *Oreja de*

¹⁴³ “El gran problema del país es que el estado no ha tenido ojos para ver, no ha tenido oídos para escuchar, ni ha tenido corazón para sentir. La Oreja de Perro es la micro región más afectada del país...aquí hay más muertos, más desaparecido... Y el problema es que el estado tenía la obligación de defender y hacer respetar sus derechos, de defender la vida de ustedes y no lo hizo. Hay una gran responsabilidad del estado y esperemos que ese estado de ahora asuma esa responsabilidad.”

¹⁴⁴ “yo no tengo la certeza de que lo cumpla [su deber] pero depende mucho de la fuerza de la palabra, depende mucho de la capacidad de la organización de ustedes y en la medida de que se organicen y su voz no sea de una persona, ... que sea la voz de todos de la Oreja de Perro que es la zona más afectada del país, entonces el país conocerá y sabrá lo que es la Oreja de perro: la zona más golpeada por la violencia pero también la zona más olvidada por el estado.”

Perro is the most affected by the violence in Peru, and ‘the most forgotten community by the state.’ At the same time he produces people in Chapi as ‘marginal,’ he calls the community to take action to claim justice. Varillas talks about how much of the state’s answer depends on how people make their voices heard. It is the situation that the *squeaky wheel gets the oil*, in which if people do not claim for justice, this probably would never arrive. As many people have told me during my fieldwork, justice is not a civil right—it is something that we need to fight for. Justice is only for those who have money.

Varillas continues talking about the state and compensations,

[...] that state that once failed to recognize its duty, to protect victims. And now that state has to recognize who are the victims and therefore this state has the obligation to compensate them ... because the law says that if the state recognize the war victims, then the state must compensated them, and if it does compensate it is breaking the law. And there, the most important thing is that you organize your community and demand the enforced of the law¹⁴⁵. (Varillas, meeting en Orongoy)

In talking about the compensation program to the ‘war victims,’ Varillas distances himself again from the state he represents and highlights the state’s legal duty to compensate them. He crafts a discourse in which he positions himself in opposition to the state, aligning with his audience that he considers as ‘victims.’

Varillas carefully molds Chapi and *Oreja de Perro* as the most affected area by the internal war. He repeats it so many times as if he needed to convince the audience about the atrocities they suffered during the period of violence. Such tone and language

¹⁴⁵ “[...] ese estado que en su momento no supo reconocer, su tarea de proteger a las víctimas. Y ahora ese estado tiene que reconocer quienes son las víctimas y por tanto ese estado tiene la obligación de repararlos... porque las leyes dicen que si el estado reconoce a las víctimas entonces el estado debe reparar, y si no lo repara está infringiendo la ley. Y ahí lo más importante es que ustedes se organicen y exijan que se cumpla la ley.”

have important consequences, especially in the way the audience talks to the state in this meeting. Although Varillas' meeting goal is to listen what people have to say, framing his speech in this particular way, repeating so many times that this is a 'very affected community and forgotten by the state,' pre-defines the path through which the meeting will develop. He probably looks to be empathic with the audience, and wants to be seen closer to them. Whatever Varillas good intentions were, it cannot be denied that his words are not as transparent as he wanted us to think, and he is constructing a clearly difference between "you" and "we."

Like Lerner, Varillas speaks of the state's responsibility for not protecting its population. However, as Daniel's *replica A*, Varillas' *replica B* does not talk about specific agents of the state, the Shining Path or the army. Rather *replica B* only talks about the role of the state, reducing the Peruvian society role to the lack of knowledge about what happened in the Andean highlands. Varillas uses his *replica B*, that adds the need to be organized and to force the state to be liable for the lack of protection during the wartime (Cf. Urban 1996). In this, the idea of justice is completely absent.

The meeting continued, and a first local speaker intervenes,

We would ask for collective and individual compensation, so we could be able to achieve a worthy future and our children. Our children who come back, they need to be well educated, with good health, to have their mean of land communication. In any form this is the target of the human development, otherwise we will always like this. Because the people of Oreja de Perro has been forgotten until these decades ... the road, the viability to the area of Oreja de Perro to contact too, to make it easy the arrival of governmental institutions or NGOs, or the, health professional, teachers and all.¹⁴⁶ (Juan, meeting in

¹⁴⁶ "nosotros pediríamos reparación colectivo e individual para que seamos dignos de alcanzar nuestras futuras y nuestros niños, nuestros hijos que vienen atrás para que sean también bueno educados, buenos de su salud, para que tenga su vía de comunicación terrestre de alguna forma sea objetivo para el desarrollo humano, caso contrario nosotros siempre cuando estaremos así. Porque el pueblo de Oreja de Perro ha sido bien olvidado hasta estas décadas... la carreta, la viabilidad hacia la zona de Oreja de Perro para contactarnos también para

Oronqoy)

In the first intervention, Juan talks about being able to have a better life for his children, achieving education and health. For him, the goal is to achieve development—presupposing and accepting the backwardness condition in which he lives— and not achieving this would mean that the community would still be forgotten, as it currently is. Juan makes an special emphasis on the road, that he imagines will keep them communicated with the state. He argues the importance of the road because it will take them out of this *olvidado* [En. forgotten] corner, and ‘help’ from governmental institutions and NGOs would use this road to bring their help. Health and Education personnel will be brought with this road, as well as other professionals who will keep them in contact (*Sp. contacto*, but meaning that they will take care of them) with other institutions. In this context, keep contact refers to establishing a permanente relationship with the state.

The road is imagined as the pathway to *modernity* and progress. The community is in a corner where it is easily *forgotten*, and the road offers the possibility to establish a permanent contact with the state, and receive the aid that this relationship may bring. Building on the original discourse and on Varillas’ *replica*, this local *replica C* repeats how the community has been ‘marginalized.’ Through reframing the *original* discourse (the PTRC’s), this *replica* adds the road as the mean to get out of this *olvidado* condition and transforming Chungui into a *visible* community to the state. On one hand, the lack of roads and the difficulties to travel from one community to others in *Oreja de Perro* are

que fácilmente llegue las instituciones gubernamentales u ONGS o los profesionales o de salud, educando y de todo”

the most common excuses that state officials and NGOs make to avoid visiting Chapi. On the other hand, when Juan talks he is imagining that the *forgotten corner*¹⁴⁷ in which he lives, is only a geographical isolation, rather than an ideology, that only the road would not change.

Juan continues,

*We also need in our Oreja de Perro, exhumation of mass graves ... we need that approval to exhume these graves and bring these bodies to their areas, at least to light a candle and maybe families also urgently need to know a bone of his/her relative. That may be given the approval or immediately to cure our wounded in the chest that hurts all the time and hurts us.*¹⁴⁸ (John, meeting in Orongoy)

Often I find that each time people speak face-to-face with state officials, their interventions are reduced –at least is what state officials think–to a list of things that they need. In a way is as if they were tell the state all they need, because the state is present there to listen to them. That is probably why the list of needs goes from the recognition of their civil rights to the exhumation of clandestine burials. In general, this demand has become the common demand in many communities. However, people do not talk about the importance of exhumations outside encounters with state agents.¹⁴⁹ I usually have people telling me how much they have suffered, how traumatized their children are and any help arrives. The pain and bad memories are present and they will not go away for a long time, and people in Chapi and Chungui should have the right to bury their relatives

¹⁴⁷ In Spanish Peruvians say: *donde el diablo perdió el poncho* [En. where the devil lost his poncho] or clear to hell and gone]

¹⁴⁸ “*También necesitamos en nuestro Oreja de Perro, exhumación de fosas comunes ... necesitamos esa autorización fiscal para exhumar esas fosas comunes y traer a esos cadáveres a sus zonas siquiera para prender una vela y quizás familias también requiere urgentemente conocer un hueso de sus familiares. Que puede haber la autorización o el apoyo inmediato para poder alcanzar también el saneamiento esa herida en el pecho que toda la vida nos tiene y que nos duele*”

¹⁴⁹ This will also be discussed in Chapter 7.

who were extrajudicially executed by the army and the Shining Path. However, today Chungui and Chapi use a pre-ordered rhetoric, that concentrates in what the state needs to hear, not what they really want to say (this will be explain in Chapter 7). In many occasions, people do not consider exhumations as a priority of their demands, they look for economic support and roads to consolidate their fragil economy. Meeting the state, especially in the postwar context and post PTRC, for many communities has meant to tell what they are supposed to say as ‘war victims.’ They have learnt what they need to say and what not, and their extensive suffering and their performance of pain and misery, is something that always the local authrotiries highlight when they have state personel visiting.¹⁵⁰ Juan continues talking about what he expects of the state

So far, we lack of the state. Any Minister, any person, they do not arrive to the end to the road to check what people need, what needs have Oreja de Perro. Therefore doctor [Varillas] please be kind and send our message to the appropriate institutions that would compensate the victims...¹⁵¹ (Juan, meeting in Oronqoy)

This quote expresses what Juan and the community expect from the state. For him, the state has a face; it is embodied in the officials and bureaucrats whose responsibility is to take care of the people, forgotten like *Oreja de Perro*. And Juan claims that neither the state nor its officials –like Secretaries (*Sp. Ministros*)– arrive to the end of the road to verify what people’s needs are and solve them. People in Chapi consider that the state does not care about them, because the state is not properly informed about the needs of the community. That is why Juan asks Varillas to inform the state what they need,

¹⁵⁰ I develop this idea in Chapter 7

¹⁵¹ “Hasta el momento se carece...del estado. Algún Ministro, cualquier persona, no llega a punta carretera [a] verificar qué necesidad tiene la población, qué necesidad tiene la Oreja de Perro. Entonces doctor tenga la amabilidad de hacernos llegar este mensaje a las instituciones que corresponde a reparar...”

especially to those institutions that deal with compensations.

The meeting continues, and now a commoner from Belen Chapi speaks,

*Because they [the state] abuse us, because are ignorant, that sir, it is important that the state compensate us. It is important to let us know if it [the state] really wants to repair, thank you very much.*¹⁵² (Manuel, meeting in Orongoy)

People's interventions address that the state has killed people, highlighting the state's political responsibility on this period, which may be seen as the *replica* of the PTRC's *original A* discourse. Nevertheless, this *replica C*¹⁵³ adds that because rural Quechuas are ignorant they are abused by the state. Lerner's discourse uses ignored and excluded people, but it does not affirm that the indigenous population is *ignorant*, and because of it, they are abused. Rather this is the people's interpretation of national history, a relationship of domination that goes beyond the war years. The condition of *exclusion* that Lerner addresses throughout his discourse is re-shaped in a causal relationship by the meeting participants, in a *replica C*. Within it the state is represented as an institution that does not care for those who are *ignorant*.

¹⁵² “*porque ellos [el estado] nos abusan porque somos ignorantes, eso señor, que nos repare, que nos haga saber si realmente él quiere reparar eso tienes que hacer señor, muchas gracias.*”

¹⁵³ *Replica B* is the one used by state officers, so *replica C* is the one used by the meeting participants.

Table 5-2
Original and Replicas

<i>Originator</i> PTRC and its heirs	<i>Original A</i>	Discourse provoked by the PTRC and the FR about the internal war.
<i>Chungui's authorities</i>	<i>Replica A</i>	Discourse based on the discourse developed by the PTRC, but that some ideas are added and other erased.
<i>Dr. Varillas</i>	<i>Replica B</i>	
<i>People from Chapi who attended the meeting</i>	<i>Replica C</i>	

Source: Based on Urban 1996

In general, people constantly repeat the need for compensation because the war left them without anything. In this context, state's compensation is seen as the help they need to recompose their lives. In a way, the idea of compensation is interpreted by 'war victims' as the way the state may atone for failing to protect them during the war. At the same time, this compensation is seen by Human Right activists and Leftist scholars as a form to deliver justice. The state has abused people because they are *ignorant*, and the verb use is in present, which means that the state has not stopped abusing them.

The government can hear us, because although we are really forgotten community by the state, a remote village in the wake of that violence, possibly that time of violence those things happened because the town was abandoned [by the state].¹⁵⁴ (Esteban, Meeting in Oronqoy)

Addressing, again, the abuse the state has committed on them, Esteban talks about the

¹⁵⁴ “nos puede escuchar el gobierno porque si bien es cierto aquí verdaderamente somos un pueblo olvidado por el estado, un pueblo apartado a raíz de eso posiblemente ese tiempo de violencia esas cosas ha pasado por que está abandonado el pueblo.”

possibility that the violence occurred because the community has been abandoned by the state. Referring to his experience as a Shining Path member, he blames the state for forgetting his community. In a way Esteban blames this as the cause of the 1980s violence.

The country does not know that this area of Oreja de Perro is the most affected, then the state's resources and the resources of the different cooperation sources in the world would not be interested if they do not know ... if the state is sensitive then it will to guide and prioritize its resources to attend Oreja de Perro... but it will be the responsibility of the state, the responsibility of the rulers of the time to meet or not, because they will know, Oreja de Perro is the most affected region in the country and for that, we are just together now. Thank you.¹⁵⁵ (Varillas, meeting Oronqoy)

One more time Varillas emphasizes that the *Oreja de Perro* is the most affected area of the country by the 1980s political violence. This quote is important because of the two ideas he is introducing. First he repeats that the country, the national and international community, does not know that *Oreja de Perro* is the most affected area; repeating in a way what Lerner stated in his speech, and adding the international community. Going further than the PTRC (but still directly related), he argues that if all the violence and suffering that has affected the community remains unknown, there would not be money for the region. And second, Varillas state that if the state would be sensitive with the region it would assign economic resources to it. However, he clarifies that this is the leaders' responsibility and those who arrive to power. Taking the *original* discourse further, Varillas shapes his *replica B* by telling the audience that *Oreja de Perro* suffering

¹⁵⁵ “El país no conoce de que esta zona la Oreja de Perro es la más afectada, entonces los recursos del estado y también los recursos de los diferentes fuentes cooperantes del mundo no se van a interesar si no saben... si el estado es sensible entonces tendrá que orientar y priorizar sus recursos para atender a la Oreja de Perro... pero será la responsabilidad del estado, será responsabilidad de los gobernantes de ese momento que cumplan o no, porque ya conocerán, ya sabrá de que la Oreja de Perro es la zona más afectada del país y para esa labor justamente estamos acá, gracias.”

needs to be known if they want to be compensated. And for this, he suggests to ‘exploit’ its conditions of ‘the most marginal and forgotten community’ affected by the 1980s internal war, to receive help. In other words, he suggests that Chungui will be transformed into a *visible* community for the rest of the Peruvian society (urban elites in centers of power) only if their war experience and suffering is known. There does not seem to be a choice to be ‘marginal’ or not, *Oreja de Perro* ‘needs’ to be the most marginal, poor and affected community by the violence, if its goal is to receive an answer and attention from the state.

*The law states that you are victims and the law says you must be compensated, therefore there we have a common task between you and us, you who are victims that somehow we have been alien to this tragedy ... I appreciate that side and acknowledge your critical sense, because it must be so, what happened in the country that you have lived has not been insignificant, the state owes much to you.*¹⁵⁶ (Varillas, meeting in Orongoy)

Varillas’ statement highlights to his audience that they are *victims*, and therefore they need to be compensated. He blames the state, this time including himself through ‘us,’ of being indifferent to the tragic violence like Lerner’s *original discourse*. But now, Varillas considers that the state and the people can join forces to compensate them for all the suffering they have experienced. Throughout this statement, Varillas identifies two different groups, the ‘war victims’ that need to be compensated (the rural Quechuas) and those who were unaware of the war in the countryside (the urban Criollo/mestizo group). He aligns himself with the group that did not answer to people’ suffering, he is a Creole.

¹⁵⁶ “La ley dice que ustedes son víctimas y la ley dicen que ustedes deben ser reparados, entonces ahí tenemos una tarea común entre ustedes y nosotros, ustedes que son víctimas nosotros que de alguna manera hemos sido ajenos de esa tragedia... por ese lado yo valoro y reconozco ese sentido crítico que tienen ustedes, porque tiene que ser así, lo que acontecido en el país lo que ustedes que han vivido no ha sido cualquier cosa, el estado les debe mucho a ustedes.”

Making this distinction, Varillas places the rural Quechuas as ‘war victims’ in the Andes, and Criollo/mestizos in urban centers; which clearly divides the population in suffering ‘Indians’ and insensitive Criollo/mestizos. Finally, what Varillas crafts is a racialized discourse, in which rural Quechuas are racially marked and identified as ‘war victims,’ while the urban Criollo/mestizo remains unmarked but only responsible for not being aware of the violence occurring in the Andes.¹⁵⁷

At the end of the meeting, Varillas concludes by exhorting his audience to adopt a critical attitude, claiming that they [Chapi] will remain a slave community unless they actively criticize their contemporary reality and its politics. He talks specifically about how people in rural communities believe on nice speeches that are not always true; in other words, Varillas is calling Chapinos ignorant for believing on nice speeches. To avoid being fooled, he continues, they people in Chapi need see facts and acts rather than get trapped by the nice discourses given by politicians.

Finally, he explains that he can use his power, to demand on people’s behalf in Lima, but at the end, the important thing is that Chapi as community needs to organize itself to claim justice and to demand the civil rights that the state have taken from them. Because of the racialized feature that composed the Peruvian society, rural Quechuas do not have inherently civil rights. However, rather than be an issue that the state grants to all its citizens, Varillas asks people in Chapi to claim them to the state.

Varillas does not speak Quechua, thus, he had the help of Julián, an anthropologist from Ayacucho who is fluent in Quechua. Although he grew up in the

¹⁵⁷ There is a discussion about race in the Introduction.

city, Julián has its background in the rural area of Ayacucho. He finished anthropology in the University of Ayacucho, and as student he used to work for local NGOs. I first met him in 2002 when I was working for the PTRC. Since then, we have occasionally met in NGOs meetings and at events in Ayacucho and Lima. Julián accompanied Varillas to Oronqoy and acted as translator in the meeting. Although he did an accurate translation during the meeting, I was surprised that the last part of Varillas' speech was translated differently.

While Varillas talks about the importance to have a critical consciousness, Julián talks about people's role in the war, and how they acted as *ronderos* (En. civil patrols) which he equates with heroes,

“Paykunallam pacificacionta tarirura nispa y chaypi doctor niwarqanchi rikuchkaptinchi y ronderukunaqa maypitaq karanchi manachu militar puntaykachispa qepanta qamuq, yuyachkankichikimi, chaynamiki kara. entonces cada de estas trece comunidades de la oreja hay héroes, héroes vivientes.

[We were told by the lawyer that only they (the ronderos by themselves, alone) have worked toward the pacification process. The lawyer said that you have seen with your eyes, you witnessed, and the ronderos too. Where the ronderos were? Where they have we been? They were at the front, guiding the militaries, you remember, right? It was like that. Therefore, in each of these 13 communities there are heroes, they are living heroes]

Mana pipas riqsinchu, ni enterun paispas yachanchu, cada comunidadmanta kachkanmi héroes, heroínas también hay, tanto que ya no están con nosotros pero también otros vivos.

[Nobody knows this, even in the whole country they don't know, from each community there are... men and women heroes, there are some heroes that they are not more with us., but also they are some who are alive]

Si no también hay historias acá, por ejemplo doctor citara a Marco Williams que es uno de los personajes que les ayuda bastante.

[There are also stories here, for example, the one about Marco Williams, who is one of the persons who have helped tremendously the community.]

Y cada llaqtapi riqsaykumanmi nin gracias a el, por ejemplo es un héroe de la

pacificación y además de cada uno de ustedes como dirigentes como ronderos como mamás en las casas, las señoras viudas que quedaron con 7, 4 hijos.

[And in each village thanks to him, for example he is a hero of the peace process and each of you as local leader, as ronderos, as mothers in the house, the widows who were left with 7 or 4 children.]

Imaynatataq manteniraku, manchu chayta Peru, mundo chayta yachanamán, chayta ñuqa nikichiman,

[How the ronderos, the mothers, the people managed to survive. It needs to be known in Peru, in the world how you people lived during this time...]

chayman qina ñuqanchik avansasunchik, masta riqsichikusunchik, ama upallalla kasunchichu, rimarisunchik fuerteman, organizakuspoa y tanto kay historiantapas,

[Then we will advance, we will be known by others. We cannot be silent, we will talk, speak out organizing ourselves and also for through your stories.] (Julián, meeting in Oronqoy)

Julián's words are a different closing statement from what originally Varillas stated. The idea of the need to be critical to what is being offered is not present in Julián's last statement. Rather, he chooses to erase this, and to align with the audience. Within his statement Julián considers that much of the victory of the war is not only the work of the army, but also the work of *ronderos* and widows who fight to achieve peace. Julián asserts that Mark Williams, a Belgian who used to run the NGO PROANDE, has helped families to return to *Oreja de Perro*, is a hero because he contributed to the return to the community. Julián equates Williams as a hero, as if he had fought as *rondero* (*civil defence soldiers*) leaders who directly confronted the Shining Path. In contrast, those who confronted the Shining Path as local authorities did, are not individually recognized as heroes. Although Julián calls all of them heroes, his speech implies a hierarchy; at the top of which is Williams, recognized by his proper name, and at the bottom is the rest, who are rural Quechuas and not a Belgian director of an NGO.

Julián employs Quechua with the audience to say what he thinks, beyond what

Varillas has said. What Julián chooses to say is very important, because he wants to align himself with the community. However by doing this, Julián ends placing the community at the bottom of the hierarchy by affirming that Williams is an individual hero, which reveals his real values and ideas. By stating that a foreigner like Mark Williams is a hero, the local heroes that Julián mentioned become diminished, a mass whose names are not worth to learn or mention.

Julián's role as translator and social mediator is important in this encounter not only because he speaks Quechua, but also because this allows him to align himself closer to the community than Varillas. However, his last words rather than bring him closer to the audience, highlights the distance between Julián—an urban educated anthropologist—and this group of Oronqoy. Like Varillas' last statement, Julián ends up framing a personal discourse that racializes the audience, as inferior and backward people that need to act and claim if they want to be attended by the state.

2.2.2 The Governmental High-Level Commission (CMAN) in Chungui

During 2009, the Compensation plan started to be known in the Ayacucho area. NGOs, like Comisedh, acted as a *statelike* institution to communicate and explain through workshops the characteristics and features of the program. However, these did not took place in Chungui under NGOs' and governmental agencies' argument that this was an isolated and dangerous area.

When my original fieldwork had to change for security reasons, I was constantly visiting Chungui's Municipality office in Ayacucho where I gathered news about meetings and other issues happening in the district. At the beginning of October 2009

Daniel Human agreed to be interviewed and he invited me to observe the important meeting with the *CMAN*. This commission is responsible to declare who are ‘war victims.’ Chungui’s Mayor expected this meeting to be an important opportunity to claim more attention and help from the state. He assumed, and expressed the importance of this event when we were preparing the meeting; that this official visit from the state would draw a stronger commitment from the state’s officials. In the preparation meeting he explained to his team:

[...] what are the results that we will have on Chungui from the Lima authorities’ visit? One gentlemen would be extension ...for the attention of collective compensations, the higher number...Two would be that ... mmm...what we have done the work, we are almost at number one on the top list of the National Registry of Victims (RUV) in the district. In other places, others they say that they have only hired and never, until now there have not submitted the forms to the RUV. Therefore, in that sense we want how we will surprise authorities from Lima, so Chungui could be implemented as pilot district for individual compensations ... Therefore these two critical issues will depend on how we organize, how we receive the commission, how we do banners...¹⁵⁸ (Daniel Huamán, Organizational meeting in Ayacucho)

Daniel’s words aim to make an impression, as if he needed to ‘sell the suffering and the marginality of his community.’ First, when he mentions the *RUV* and how they may be the district with the highest number of ‘victims,’ his tone is like he is in a contest to win the state’s attention and budget. Second, he is not concerned with the content of the meeting. Rather he is focused on how his team will organize and receive the governmental visitors. The last phrase points to the importance of getting the attention of

¹⁵⁸ “*qué resultados vamos a tener sobre la visita en Chungui de las autoridades de Lima. Uno, sería, señores, la ampliación...para la atención de reparaciones colectivas, la mayor cantidad de números...; dos sería de que...cómo se llama...lo que...como hemos hecho el trabajo, estamos, casi, en el número uno del nivel de Registro Único de Víctimas distritales; los demás, dice, sólo han contratado y nunca más, hasta ahora no hay cuando entregar a nivel del Consejo de Reparaciones. Entonces, en ese sentido queremos ver... de qué manera sorprendemos a las autoridades de Lima para implementación como distrito piloto, para reparaciones individuales.... Entonces, eso es los dos temas más cruciales de nosotros porque dependerá cómo nos organizamos, cómo recepcionamos, cómo hacemos los cartelones...*”

the visitors to the hand-drawn posters and people's demands.

The day of the meeting, since the early morning, Chunguinos and some authorities from Chapi were gathering in the town plaza waiting for the meeting to start. This was an official state visit that was also organised to give the formal accreditation for the first 1980s war victims in the district (only 80 persons were accredited). The accreditation gives the 'war victim' access for life to free health care, and (if they are implemented) individual economic compensation. There were persons from the nearest communities to Chungui's capital; although in most of the cases it was just one authority per each village and community from Chapi.

When the CMAN committee and other authorities¹⁵⁹ arrived to the Chungui's plaza, they were received by a clapping crowd, with flowers and hand-drawn posters. These posters were drawn by women and children, through which they expressed their suffering during the 1980s. During the meeting, there were no interventions from Chapi's authorities; they were silenced by Chungui's authorities who speak Spanish. However, authorities and some families from Chapi were present and were holding posters claiming justice. Without doubt this was a performance to get the state's attention, in which only certain persons had the power to talk publicly using a pre-defined speech that highlighted the horrors of the violence.

¹⁵⁹ The province Major, the regional President and the other state program officers were also invited.

Figure 5-1

“My house was burnt; my husband and my son were killed. I am alone with my small children. I want justice for my disappeared relatives”
Chungui plaza, October 2009



Source: Nathalie Koc-Menard, October 2009

Daniel opened the meeting declaring: *The district of Chungui is considered as the poorest district in the country, the district most affected by the political violence*¹⁶⁰ (Daniel Huamán, *CMAN meeting in Chungui*). Like Varillas introductory speech, Daniel finds the need to

¹⁶⁰ “el distrito de Chungui está considerado [como] el distrito más pobre del país, el distrito más afectado por la violencia política”

remember the state officials that Chungui is ‘the poorest and most affected district by the 1980s violence.’ Although he is not directly demanding attention or directly claiming for economic compensation; by using this phrase he is addressing the consequences of the internal war, from which it may be inferred that the state’s duty is to take care of this situation. Since the beginning of the event, the mayor on purpose places his community in a subordinate status and in extreme need.

When I arrived to Chungui the meeting day, I was surprised to see the town’s plaza full of governmental posters (Figure 5-2) which were deploying hundreds of projects; many of which did not yet exist. I carefully took at these posters and spend long time chatting with people from Chapi about how these projects were working. They told me that many of them did not exist, and authorities were saying that there will be executed ‘soon.’ However, most of the assistants from Chapi clarified that these posters were only state propaganda and they depicted projects that did not really exist, and they were sure that they would never exist. Nobody questioned this publicly, although among Chunguinos there were comments about the behaviour of the government. I realized that those who were in the meeting were not there to believe the state’s discourses about how much it has done for the community. Rather, their presence was about performing a role of audience, as ‘war victims’ that have the chance to be face-to-face with the state and claim for help and attention.

Figure 5-2
Collective Compensation Program, Justice for the heroic town!



Chungui Plaza, October 2009
Source: Nathalie Koc-Menard

This meeting had different meanings for different groups of attendees. For the state, it was the means through publicized what it claims it accomplished with the collective compensation program, trying to silence those who claim for attention to rural communities. In short, a populist move from the Garcia's government to halt the arising

accusations for the crimes against humanity occurred during his first term (1985).¹⁶¹ For Chungui's Mayor this meeting was the mean to reinforce his work as mediator between the state, and the local population. As for the population, it was the mean through which they pressure the state to develop the collective compensation program project.

After Daniel's opening statement, a state official from the *CMAN*, Jesús Aliaga declared

*Today is a very important and symbolic day, because we are face to face, in another context, the community, victims and the state —embodied in the Regional President, local authorities and us, as government officials of the President Garcia government. And I am very pleased to see this forest of banners about the projects that are being developed; this is concrete evidence that the state is arriving and it is coming back and asserting his presence, by all means to the district worst hit by the twenty years of violence that we have passed.*¹⁶² (Jesús Aliaga, *CMAN*)

Aliaga starts his speech setting the stage to identify two groups, the state and the 'war victims,' as if they were two tangible realities existing independently from each other. This generates the illusion of a *real* encounter with the state, insinuating that a dialogue between these groups will happen. It also provides the state with a face embodying this group. Aliaga used the governmental posters, indexing and presupposing; that this is the way to demonstrate the state's interests in Chungui. He continues talking about this as if this was the form through which the state deploys his caring for the affected communities.

¹⁶¹ During Garcia's first term, between 1985-1990, it was proved that he gave the order to kill the inmates who were rebelling in a jail in Lima.

¹⁶² "Hoy es un día sumamente importante, simbólico; porque estamos frente a frente, en otro contexto, la comunidad, las víctimas y el Estado -que lo encarna el presidente regional, las autoridades locales y nosotros, como funcionarios del gobierno del presidente García. Y me complace mucho el poder ver este bosque de carteles de obra, que significan, ya, la evidencia concreta de que el Estado está llegando, que está regresando y haciendo presencia, con toda seguridad, el distrito más castigado por la violencia durante los veinte años que hemos pasado "

The scenario, the speeches, the audience and the ‘special’ guests, were part of a performance in which misery and suffering have a central role. The ‘poor and excluded’ people received the help provided by the caring state, while state officials looked for the fruits of their work as mediators. People’s experiences, and the multiple times that each official asserted and repeated that Chungui is ‘the most marginal and poor community’ was only able to produce the place as a ‘suffering theme park.’

Another element that transformed the place into an unreal space was that, in contrast with Oronqoy’s meeting, this one did not require the community’s voices. In a way, the state officials were not there to listen to the ‘war victims.’ Rather, they were there to affirm and show how much the central government cares for this population, and how it is working to compensate them for all the years of violence and suffering.

Aliaga continues embodying his role as the state’s representative emphasizing people’s civil rights to get compensations (*Sp. Reparaciones*). He recognizes that the state did not protect its citizens (this is the *replica D*), and the compensation program expects to compensate for the errors the state had during the internal war. He continues to underline the state’s efforts to help the Chunguinos,

*We are making progress, however, as government, we perfectly know that the progress in the collective needs to be strengthened. Starting by responding individually to the victims [...] However, there are basic issues that must be implemented as individual compensations that have to deal specially with health and education.*¹⁶³ (Jesus Aliaga, CMAN)

¹⁶³ “De manera que estamos avanzando, sin embargo, como gobierno, sabemos perfectamente que ese avance en lo colectivo, tiene que consolidarse, comenzando a atender también individualmente a las víctimas [...] Sin embargo, hay cuestiones básicas que tienen que empezar a implementarse como reparación individual, que tienen que ver fundamentalmente con la salud y con la educación.”

Aliaga is an optimist. He thinks that ‘we are moving forward’ (*Sp. Estamos avanzado*¹⁶⁴) and he states that the next step will be the individual compensations that will take the form of healthcare and education. President Garcia’s political apparatus is using state resources to promote the coverage of basic services like healthcare and education as individual compensations. The state and its bureaucracy is ‘confusing’ basic rights with individual compensations. In doing so, the State is using the idea of compensations to provide the basic services that have thus far been denied to the rural Quechua all over the country.

On July 28th, 2010, in his annual address to the country, President Garcia declared that the individual compensation program will start in 2011. However, rather than a real commitment to deal with the aftermath of the war—a process that would involve an input of significant monetary investment—this is a populist propaganda to silence the opposition and the NGOs that are accusing the government of not taking care of the ‘war victims.’ Neither the state nor Peruvian scholars (there are exceptions like Silva Santiesteban) treat the problem of the internal war beyond the compensations program and the faceless victims. Talking about the internal war in Peru has become an abstract phenomenon, whose causes and consequences are not analysed in a grounded way.

At the time of my fieldwork (2008-2009), the Individual Compensation Program was a project that posed different possibilities for the local audience. For some, it was about a significant amount of money that the state would provide to each person who was defined as ‘victim.’ For others, it was about the educational opportunities in Colleges and Universities. There is no unanimous view of its meaning. Aliaga continues his talk about

¹⁶⁴ This is the Garcia government’s slogan.

the state,

It's a great sign because the state, they are 3 levels of government, and we are working steadily and articulately, and I am sure that from next year, as these massive banners, we will also have a large amount of state investment. From the three levels of government to better attend you all not only in the collective, but also in private.¹⁶⁵ (Jesus Aliaga, CMAN)

The program continued and included the words of one of the Municipality deputies (the only person from the community, besides the Mayor, who spoke),

“ñuqa mañakuni a nombre de todo el pueblo de Chungui ñuqaykun kaniko señor Jesús Aliaga mas afectasqa kanmi wawakuna wawa karqaniku, chay violencia fecha qinaptin chaypi kaqkuna traumadukuna, mana makiyuqkuna, invalidukuna entonces chaytaya ñuqaykupas mañakuniku reparación individualtawan” (Emma, Municipality of Chungui)

[I request on the name of the town of Chungui ... We are mister Jesus Aliaga, the most deeply affected, there are children, we were children during the the time of violence. Thus those who lived it, they have trauma, childhood traumas. There are those who lost their hands, they are handicapped people. Because of these things, we appeal for compensations on individual basis for each person.]

Emma is one of the two women elected as deputy for the Municipality in 2007. She feels that she represents the community and starts her statement with a *replica E* emphasizing how much this violence has affected children and how this has traumatized the population. Because of this, they are disabled and many of them cannot work properly in the field. For her, individual monetary compensations could mean overcoming physical injuries and traumas. There is a high percentage of Chungui's current population that lived through all the war years of military abuse, rapes, murders of the Shining Path, etc.

¹⁶⁵ “Es una gran señal porque el Estado son los 3 niveles de gobierno, y estamos trabajando sostenida y articuladamente, y estoy seguro que, a partir del próximo año, como este poste de carteles de obra, tendremos también una gran cantidad de inversión del Estado, desde los tres niveles de gobierno, para poder atenderlos, no solamente en lo colectivo, sino también en lo privado.”

In most of the cases, people's experiences of violence have become different types of physical and psychological problems. Some people use these traumas to explain why they did not continue attending school classes. And in people's rationale, if you are not educated there is no possibility of progress in life.

One of the last statements came from an official program that was giving 'Peru little bag' (*Sp. bolsita peru*) with grains, cereals, and milk. This official brought 50 bags for an audience of around 150 people. She states

*...So that our President is also present in these communities that need so much. [...] Soon will be here all the institutions that work closely with the Presidency of the Republic, for what? To bring development, to bring progress, work to this community that so urgently needs it.*¹⁶⁶ (Rosa Pérez, CMAN)

This official crafts a discourse in which the Peruvian President is present through the social programs organized by his government. The most interesting part of her speech is the last phrase where she says 'the state brings progress, work and development to this community that so bad need it,' emphasizing with this a hierarchical and racialized relationship in which this community is 'backward and lazy'.

She is framing, like many other people do, progress and development as an issue that needs to be brought from the outside, voiding the possibility of finding 'progress and development' from inside the community. In the way it is framed, progress and development is embodied by the urban Criollo/mestizo who works toward progress and success. For this official as well as the state in general, the human capital for progress is

¹⁶⁶ "Es así que nuestro Presidente de la República está presente también en estas comunidades que tanto lo necesitamos. [...] Pronto estarán todas las instituciones que trabajamos de la mano, con la Presidencia de la República, para qué: para llevar desarrollo, para traer desarrollo, progreso, trabajo...a esta comunidad que tanto lo necesita."

not available within the local population: the ‘good’ and ‘modern’ things and ideas necessarily come from the city.

Neither this meeting nor the one at Oronqoy had translators, and people’s opinions were not sought at both venues. On the side of the state, it is a performance that aimed to show how it is working to compensate affected communities by the internal war. On the side of Chungui’s authorities, it was a performance to show how needy they are and how much support they need to develop and overcome the aftermath of wartime violence.

It was an important meeting, not for its content but for the rare presence of the state officials in Chungui. This meeting provided face-to-face interaction that had been recurrently requested by the population. The audience did not have a clear voice, which contrasted the meeting developed in Oronqoy. It was an important meeting for the Municipality as it was able to exhibit the pain and the consequences of the war through the graphic images carried by women. These women were not voiceless, since they expressed their pain and suffering through their drawings, many of which were extremely violent. However, in the political dynamic during the meeting the rural Quechua women were formally silenced by the local authorities, and were placed in a clearly subordinate and racialized position, while the local authorities speak about their suffering during the time of war. These ‘feelings’ and experiences of suffering refer to a pre-determined discourse about the war, in which they intend to generate pity and sorrow to the foreign

audience¹⁶⁷ (for an extended discussion about this see Fassin and Rechtman 2009).

This was also an important meeting for the state and the audience because the first 80 official ‘war victims’ were granted proper governmental documentation. They are the first of a long list that expect to get something from the state; something that could help them move on with their lives.

Conclusion: the circulation of discourse

Original and replicas

Discourses that characterize subjects in a particular way, emphasizing their social and political exclusion, reinforce pre-existing assumptions about the particular group the rhetoric is addressing (Cf. Urciuoli 2009). In the case of ‘marginality,’ the PTRC’s discourse and that of the state officials, reproduce the Peruvian society as a fragmented one in which there are two groups: Creoles and the indigenous population.¹⁶⁸ Issues about race do not need to be uttered in order to exist and influence people’s behaviour. Therefore, in the case of Lerner’s discourse, for example, Quechuas are marked with respect to the urban Criollo/mestizo group, who remains unmarked. The Quechua subject is labelled as the *victim* of the internal conflict, while the rest of the Peruvian society is projected as an insensible group which is unable to respond to violence in the Andean highlands.

¹⁶⁷ People’s suffering experiences are real, and I do not intend to dismiss them. However, it is also important to recognize that as much as real; they also belong to a pre-determined discourse in which some things are allowed to be uttered, while others are silenced. I intend to stress people’s agency and consciousness of what they are presenting and what they are leaving aside.

¹⁶⁸ I will not discuss the multiple social groups that can be associated with the Creole groups, like provincial urban elites. For an extended discussion see de la Cadena (2000).

Labelling rural Quechuas as *victims*, in the context of the Peruvian internal war, reinforces their historical subordination and domination, nurturing the racialized idea of a Quechua population as backward, isolated and passive. ‘Marginal,’ ‘marginalized,’ ‘ignored,’ ‘despised,’ ‘forgotten’ are categories indexing a racialized hierarchy (euphemisms of ‘Indio’), where those who are labeled with these categories need to be protected and rescued. Therefore, a patronizing relationship emerges which is extensively used by the Peruvian intelligentsia who argue for the protection of the population in the Andes—as if they were minors in need of an adult defence.¹⁶⁹ These categories and the marginality rhetoric produce an essentialized idea of who victims are, where they live and what ‘we’ need to do about them (Cf. Urciuoli 2009).

‘Marginality’ becomes the language of the state; a language that intends to talk about social exclusion, but that creates at the same time, rural communities as outside entities, sitting at the margins of the state, unable to be reached by the forces of *modernity*. It reinforces the hierarchical relationship existing between the urban and the rural, establishing the rural space as distant, isolated and in extreme need. The margins, ideologically and rhetorically, in which these communities exist allow a circular rhetoric from which –it seems that– the only way to escape is by becoming *war victims*.

The current rhetoric of ‘marginality’ in Peru is created, and recreated, in government agencies, NGOs and official institutions within bureaucratic spaces through

¹⁶⁹ A good example of this relationship may be found in the discussion triggered by Arguedas’ novel *Todas las Sangres*. See IEP 1985.

which people are identified and classified (Cf. Urciuoli 2009: 34).¹⁷⁰ In this context, everyday life is affected by these categories, shaping how groups related with each other and affecting how they conceive themselves within the national scenario (Cf. Urciuoli 2009: 22). The imaginary of ‘marginal communities’ implies the thought that something is directly experienced, indexing a lack of power which is correlated with a no participation in the political arena. This imaginary of a non-active role in the modern life of the nation, produces and positions the state in a higher position of the hierarchy, which is at the same time, embedded into a continual expression of race and class backwardness (Urciuoli 2009: 32).

Built over the dependency theory discourse, the current discourse of marginality is embedded within a political context that calls for the inclusion of the indigenous group, but at the end happens to create more fragmentation. The marginality discourse affirmed in the PTRC’s analysis is the *original* discourse; that will be –several times- *replicated* by different agents. Paralleled to these *replications*, new ideas are introduced, and former ones may be erased, which produce particular power relationships between groups.

The discourse of ‘marginality’ analysed in this chapter is recordable, replicable, and the meta-discourse understands them to be group expressions, not intimately linked to the individual expressers (Urban 1996: 38). In this sense, it is not about the rhetoric of a person but the expression of a group in relationship to other. The PTRC and Lerner’s

¹⁷⁰ Urciuoli (2009) discusses how the multicultural discourse was created in the offices and institutions that expect to ‘created’ diversity in colleges, having the effect of racializing groups. In the same path of analysis, my argument sustains that marginality is created to call the attention about a group that is excluded, and calling for its inclusion into the national society. However, the final effect is the racialization and essentialization of the group in question.

discourse extensively highlights the relationship between Creoles/Mestizos and Quechuas and therefore, reinforcing the domination and power relationship exerted by the former on the latter. Within this rhetoric, the national society—those living in urban centres and those who have power are signalled as responsible for the high degree of violence and *victims* produced by the 1980s internal war. In addition, the *original discourse* does not address the people's direct participation in the war, assuming that they were caught between two fires. Contrasting the *original*, the *replicas* indicate and repeat the state's responsibility within the war period, and how it is accountable for forgotten the communities in which the violence happened. All the *replicas* that were expressed by the agents of the state stress the importance of a hierarchical relationship—an important division between 'you' (the victims) who suffered during the war years; and 'we' (the state) that did not care/listen for your suffering, is emphasized. This relationship is strengthened each time a state official asserts that the state did not protect their people during the war. At the same time, while criticising its attitude toward the rural Quechua, these *replicas* barely account for the army's role within the war. Officials try to explain the state's indifference by explaining its lacks of knowledge of people's suffering and the *marginal* conditions of these communities. Although these replicas explicitly refer to the state's liability during the war, they also excused the state through the rhetoric of marginality by rEduardoing from making it formally accountable for its own crimes.

My analysis places the PTRC as a discourse producer as it was in a visible position of power that enables it to create a discourse, which is backed by scholars working in this project. The PTRC political position is questioned and challenged, but its

scholarly findings are rarely questioned (O'Brien 2003). Its discourse is taken as a general truth, that later is used by all the *replicators* the ground/authority to claim for attention (Cf. Urban 1996).

Table 5-3
Original and Replicas

<i>Originator</i> PTRC and its heirs	<i>Original A</i>	Discourse originated by the PTRC with the submission of the Final Report. Talks about exclusion and racialized discriminatory practices.
<i>Chungui's authorities</i>	<i>Replica A</i>	Discourse based on Original A, and highlights that this is the most marginal community. Talks about exclusion, but not about racialized practices
<i>Varillas</i>	<i>Replica B</i>	Discourse based on Original A, introducing the category of marginality and the most suffering community affected by the internal war.
<i>People from Chapi who attended the meeting in Oronqoy</i>	<i>Replica C</i>	Discourse base on the Original A, and replica A, but adds the image of the state that needs to approach the community to see what it needs, like a guardian.
<i>Jesús Aliaga (CMAN)</i>	<i>Replica D</i>	Discourse based original A And Replica B, that is adds the populist idea that the government is changing things in the community.
<i>Emma (Municipality of Chungui)</i>	<i>Replica E</i>	Discourse based on Original A, Replica A, and Replica B, that explicitly refers to the trauma suffered and the consequently need for help.

Source: Urban 1996

Power and visibility

The state has set up a discursive floor in which its compensation program is conditioned to those who did not participated in any insurrectionary group, something that is almost impossible to strictly follow. This official policy becomes a tool through which this population looks to craft itself in a particular way so that it can respond to the state's demands and be attended, through this they become *visible*. This has generated an important shift, going from explaining their support to Shining Path project (Personal fieldnotes 2001) to erasing their agency in order to become only 'war victims.' This label only indicates the position of receiving actions, silencing any possible agency subjects may have deployed. Erasing people's active role may include covering for crimes, but also involves people's role as *ronderos*, including the organization of their community against the abuses performed by the army and the Shining Path.

The National Compensation program forces people to fit into a victim rhetoric that merges with a pre-existing 'marginal community' discourse and crafting a strategy through which Chunguinos expect to be attended by the state. For communities embedded in the 'marginality discourse,' geographically isolated and imaginarily more distant of what they really are, this seems to be their way to become *visible* for the neoliberal state, the Peruvian society and transnational NGOs.

Within this hierarchical relationship which has informed everyday practice, patronage attitude from state officials is deployed explicitly. For example, Varillas instructed his audience in the means to get the state's attention. He suggests people to organize themselves in order to get the state's attention as if all these years did not teach

people how to get the state's interest. Nobody challenges Varillas' suggestion or the hierarchy he deploys, which reinforces the structural domination of the 'white' urban official over the rural Quechua crowd.

Today, there is an institutional procedure to achieve the status of 'war victim.' Through it people define themselves formally in front of the state by using its rhetoric as 'war victims,' which produces them as tangible subjects within the state logic. In this context, what people believe about their role during the war is not important; their goal is to transform their community into a tangible reality for the state. While the community looks to become *visible*, the state expects to become visible to its rural communities throughout the National Compensation program. The government wants to silence its detractors by showing how much it is working in 'marginal communities' like Chungui.

Like people's suffering in this community, one that becomes graphic through posters and drawings, the state also needs to show how much it is doing. It needs to show off how much it cares for and protects its citizens. But although it officially protects its citizens, the cultural citizenship that is ratified in daily practises, is racialized, treating the Chunguinos as primitive and needy.

Overall, 'war victims' in the Peruvian scenario are racialized visible subjects that the state is asked to attend.¹⁷¹ Within this relationship, as showed though the quotes analysed previously, the state becomes a 'white' unmarked subject that rules over the marked subordinate Quechua community. In every speech, it seems to be necessary to 'remember' the audience that they have been 'forgotten and marginalized' by the state,

¹⁷¹ And they will only be attended if they fit into the essentialized idea.

reinforcing the idea that the state needs to compensate them for the years of violence they suffered.

Chapter 6

The Superiority of Peruvian Intellectuals: the 'Indian Problem'

The War of the Pacific (Es. *La Guerra del Pacífico*) caused by border problems among Bolivia, Peru, and Chile, started in 1879 and finished with the defeat of Peru in 1883, with Lima occupied and a substantial loss of territory. The consequences of this war, beyond the destruction of Lima, triggered important debates among intellectuals who questioned and discussed the fragmentation of Peruvian society, which was seen as one of the major causes of the defeat by Chile. Among these problems, Peruvian intellectuals argued that indigenous groups, mainly in the rural Andes, did not support the Peruvian side during this war, giving help instead to the Chileans, because they did not recognize themselves as 'Peruvians.' The founding of the Republic in 1821 had not provoked major changes in the social structure, which continued to divide the Peruvian society in two major groups: *Indios* and *Criollos*. Influenced by 19th century racist ideologies and the evolutionary theory, the Peruvian elite considered the indigenous population to be the disgrace of the nation (A. Deustua quoted by Flores Galindo 1988).

At the turn of the new century, González Prada, an important Peruvian intellectual

and writer, was one of the first to consider that one of critical problems of Peru was the indigenous population. He stated, our form of government is reduced to a big lie, because it does not deserve to be called Democratic Republic a state in which two or three millions live outside the law. The coastal area could be the copy of a republic, but, in the interior part of the country there was a sense that every right could be violated by what was effectively a feudal regime. In this last region, there were no codes, nor courts, because the hacendados and gamonales resolved every issue in advance with the judges and executioners. The political authorities, far from supporting the weak and the poor, always helped the rich and the strong. There were regions in which the justices of the peace and local governors were themselves servants of the haciendas¹⁷²(González Prada 1946).

Although González Prada and others continue to discuss publicly these problems emphasize the need to integrate and educate the indigenous population so they could become part of the modern Peruvian state. The discussions about the rural Quechuas were labeled as *el problema del Indio* (En. ‘Indian Problem’), and this has become the main topic of discussion during the 20th century. The topic has been approached from diverse angles and approaches, ranging from insurgent missions (ELN and MIR) to development projects financed by World Bank and IMF. Even though these approaches are completely

¹⁷² “Nuestra forma de gobierno se reduce a una gran mentira, porque no merece llamarse república democrática un estado en que dos o tres millones de individuos viven fuera de la ley. Si en la costa se divisa una vislumbre de garantías bajo un remedo de república, en el interior se palpa la violación de todo derecho bajo un verdadero régimen feudal. Ahí no rigen Códigos ni imperan tribunales de justicia, porque hacendados y gamonales dirimen toda cuestión arrogándose los papeles de jueces y ejecutores de las sentencias. Las autoridades políticas, lejos de apoyar a débiles y pobres, ayudan casi siempre a ricos y fuertes. Hay regiones donde jueces de paz y gobernadores pertenecen a la servidumbre de la hacienda”

different, the diagnosis of the core problem has not changed since the 1920s.

This chapter reviews the most important theoretical approaches that have set the foundation of Peruvian social sciences. Although theories change over the time, two topics have remained constant in Peruvian academia: the *Problema del Indio* or ‘the Indian Problem’ and the need to modernize indigenous communities¹⁷³ so they could be integrated into the modern state. This section explains how these two topics have been discussed over different periods, and how rather than shed light on the need of their fully participation in political spheres, these theories have served to conceal the condescension of the Peruvian intelligentsia. The final result is the production of theories that justify the domination and power exerted by Peruvian intelligentsia over Andean groups.

This chapter is divided in four sections. The first discusses *Indigenismo* and the intellectual project to revive the Andean culture as the ‘real’ Peruvian culture. The second part discusses the modernization theory as a project to incorporate the excluded ‘Indians’ into the structures of the Peruvian state, as if the problem was the backwardness and pre-modern status of the rural population. The third part discusses dependency theory as an original Latin America approach that challenged the modernization theory. And the last part focuses on the program of development and the NGOs.

1. Indigenismo in Peru

Indigenismo is originally defined in the International Encyclopedia of the Social

¹⁷³ Because the ‘Indian Problem’ is one of the central ideas in the analysis developed in this chapter, the particular boom of peasant studies after the WWII is not discussed as a separate section. Rather, through the chapter I consider how the ‘Indian Problem’ would later become the discussion at a global scales of the peasants (see section 2 and 3 in this chapter)

& Behavioral Sciences as the revalorization of Mexico's indigenous culture (Knight 2001). In the Peruvian case the revalorization of the rural Quechuas was developed by scholars without the direct participation of the indigenous group. In the 1900s, Cusco's intellectual elite understood that the 'Indian Problem' was mainly the lack of integration of the indigenous Quechuas into the modern state; therefore their efforts were oriented to assimilate this group into the mainstream of the Peruvian society.

1.1 Cusqueño intellectuals: *feeling like an Indio without being an Indio*

During the 20th century Cusco became an important intellectual center of discussion of the 'Indian Problem,' which contrasted the discussion that took place in Lima. Cusqueño *Indigenismo* emerged as a social and intellectual movement that expected to consolidate a Peruvian nation revalorizing the Pre-Hispanic tradition, which was understood to be the real core of the national culture. The major exponents of *Indigenismo* were *serranos*¹⁷⁴ intellectuals who considered that Peru needed to produce a unified and renewed culture-race, without the components of the Hispanic colonialism. Through this idea *Indigenistas* proposed a new foundation that would construct what they see was the 'real' Peruvian nation (de la Cadena 1998: 91).

At the end of the 19th and early 20th century, Cusco was being displaced as political and economic center, which provoke several discussion among the local elite. The regional control that Cusco had profited from in the past, was being giving to Lima (the central government) that expected to concentrate most of the political functions and

¹⁷⁴ People from the Sierra are called *serranos*, which is usually used as opposite category to people from the coast, which are called *costeños*. However, not all *serranos* are rural Quechuas.

economic benefits. This political change reduced the regional elite's power and subordinated the entire region to coast. In addition, the development of the railway was considered by some groups as completing control from Lima and the submission to the foreign capital (Cadena 2000: 45).

The early development of Peruvian *Indigenismo* was produced by *Generation of 1909*, whose most important representative was Luis Valcárcel. When Valcárcel joined the group he was still a young student, but years later would become the Secretary of Education and the Director of the Peruvian Indigenista institute. As college students, the *1909 generation* criticized the backwardness of Cusco region, the lack of interest of the central government and the exploitation of the indigenous population. The group's ideas and critiques were meant to eliminate the most violent aspects of the mercantile expansion, sponsoring a regional transformation. The 1909 Generation group assumed that its role was to constitute an enlightened elite that would 'wake up' the *Indios*, and this was expected to transform Peru into a nation loyal to its historical roots, that was proud not only of its Hispanic origins (Renique 1991).

In Peru, racial categories are relational and shift according the context in which they are produced. Cusqueños intellectuals approached the rural Quechuas through the traditional racial practices that considered the latter as inferior beings, ignorant and savage. The racial idea that the intellectuals had about rural Quechuas allowed the Cusco intellectual elites to define themselves as either mestizos or 'Indians', depending on the circumstances of their interactions. However, this did not deny that the dominant intellectual and political definition of *Indianess* overrode the relational component, and

‘Indians’ were understood as illiterate agriculturalists living in the highlands in traditional organizations (Cadena 2000: 87).

Indigenistas considered that the ‘Indian Problem’ was the ignorance, the poverty, and the marginality of the rural Quechua, who were an obstacle to achieve the regional progress (Cf. Renique 1991: 57). The debates developed in Cusco intellectual circles were parallel to, and influenced by the topics discussed by González Prada and the Pro-Indigenous Association¹⁷⁵ from Lima (for historical details see Kapsoli 1980). Contrasting the debates from Lima’s intellectual circles, the Cusqueño intellectuals claimed that they had the first-hand knowledge of the condition of the indigenous population. For these Cusqueño elites, the liberation of the ‘Indian’ was the means by which the region would overcome its problems (Renique 1991).

Along with internal changes occurring in Cusco, the international political context (especially that of the Mexican revolution) also nurtured discussions in the national press and intellectual circles. These organizations stimulated what already existed as a moral imperative: the intellectuals’ responsibility in the social transformation that would include the abolition of the inequalities and the improvement of the popular classes. Education became the objective, since it was considered to be the mean by which the consciousness of the masses would arise. The sierra’s intellectuals imagined themselves and assumed the role of being the guiding force, which was provided by their moral superiority and intelligence, of the indigenous mass.

During President Leguía’s government in the 1920s, a commission was appointed

¹⁷⁵ The *Asociación Pro-indígena* was founded by Dora Mayer and Pedro Zulen (two Limeño writers immersed in Indigenismo as a literature current) in Lima in 1909.

to address the indigenous problem, whose government receiving around 7,000 complaints related to land disputes in Cusco and Puno. These complaints, along with the fall of wool prices, triggered and expanded protests in the form of important mobilizations that combined peaceful demonstrations with violence. Daily resistance practices emerged gaining persistence, and were encouraged by a President that affirmed 'Indians' rights (Renique 1991: 68). The political environment seemed to have changed, and this was not dismissed by those who struggled with the landlord's class.

Some of these mobilizations ended in violent outbreaks that caused the death of some *hacendados*. There were revolts in the countryside around Cusco that caused fear and panic of the ruling class, who imagined that these were the preceding actions of a bigger and furious 'Indian' insurrection. These conflicts impacted directly the Peruvian state, which for the first time as a Republic adopted an *Indigenista* policy. In 1922 the Race Patronage was created with the participation of the Cusqueño *Indigenistas*. Its mission was to exercise 'tutoring and protection' to the 'Indian' population (Renique 1991: 72), which was closely related with the idea that ignorance and marginality laid at the root of the countryside's problems. The patronage first action was a public assembly in which the indigenous group was allowed to expose its complaints against *hacendado* and local authorities. For the first time this intellectual group filled positions as state officials, which established a fluent relationship between the academia and the state (for an extended discussion on the role of intellectuals in the state see Renique 1991).

In the *provincias altas* (En. the high provinces) of Cusco the rural conflicts become more intense. There, the *gamonales* (En. strongman) could not control the

indigenous mobilizations, who used different means to defend their claims. In Tocroyoc, from 1912 the indigenous population was claiming the recognition of a *plaza de abastos* (En. market) where they have sold their wool and buying products for 30 years. Because the indigenous group could not prove that they have the appropriate license, their market was forbidden to function. In 1920 Domingo Huarcaya, the indigenous leader from Tocroyoc, presented a legal claim in Cusco, demanding the creation of a town and market in Tocroyoc, and its recognition as district capital. This was an important achievement because this new market could concentrate wool production from the region, avoiding the middlemen, gamonales and local authorities who used to charge commissions for the transactions (Renique 1991: 73-4).

Through indigenous leaders, like Domingo Huarcaya, the indigenous group responded to the new opportunities given by Leguía's government. The Criollo/mestizo view of an isolated and backward group that lethargically accepted conditions of exploitation was questioned directly by these indigenous actors, as many of them showed their capacity to organize their communities, claim their rights, and to decide on their own about their futures. This would have meant the emergence of a group to bring the social changes that indigenous and intellectuals were looking to produce. However Cusco's intellectuality did not see these important changes, and continued to see indigenous groups and their leaders as inferior subjects in need of their guidance and protection of their educated brothers, Cusqueño intellectuals.

In general, the rebellions against *gamonales* or strong men (see chapter 3) were interpreted as '*Indians*' being influenced by external groups (Cadena 2000: 88) which

diminished the active role performed indigenous groups performed within these struggles.¹⁷⁶ These accusations provoked the incarceration of the indigenous leaders, and although in court *Indigenistas* defended them, they were considered minors. *Indigenistas* brandished an image of ‘Indians’ as ‘irrational and primitive beings’ instigated either by mestizos or manipulated by fake ‘Indians.’ *Indigenistas* intellectuals *spoke for* indigenous leaders in 1920, and in doing so they expressed their own political agenda silencing the indigenous voices and project (Cf. Cadena 2000: 125). This attitude consolidated the racial superiority, legitimating the domination of the intellectual group over the indigenous group. This academic elite’s feeling of superiority was based on the education they achieved and the rational superiority they assumed they had over the irrational indigenous groups. For most intellectuals, in this period and later, the rural Quechuas were unable to create leadership, because they were emotionally attached to the ancient order (de la Cadena 1998: 105)¹⁷⁷.

Indigenistas had a romanticized view that considered that indigenous rebellion would enlighten the (real) Andean culture around the Andes again. However, this view did not look to establish a horizontal relationship with the indigenous group. Instead, the racial ideology through which *Indigenistas* understood the native population established the need for rational and educated leaders. Cusqueño intellectuals became the ‘only possible elite’ that imagined itself aligned with the ‘Indians,’ because they not only identified with them, but had rational a ideology (Renique 1991: 90). These intellectuals

¹⁷⁶ Even today each time there is a revolt in Peru, politicians like the President affirmed that the responsibility is on the external groups that had influenced people to rebel against the government (see for instance <http://www.andina.com.pe/Espanol/Noticia.aspx?id=Jq8gmFDa090>)

¹⁷⁷ A larger discussion about this will be developed in section 3 in this chapter.

not only felt the need to speak for the indigenous group to change their life conditions, but also imposed their political agenda, claiming with it the superior status given by their formal education. They were the good *big brothers*, bearers of the knowledge that would guide the ‘primitive and irrational’ mass, because they were the educated regional elite that felt like ‘Indian.’

The Cusqueño intellectual group assumed that understanding the reality of the Andean population needed a highly emotional commitment that only they could provide, since they were closer to the group. This would allow them to debunk ideas like backwardness, pain, abandonment and melancholy, that were imagined to have a virtuous meaning that only other non-Indian *Serranos* could understand (Renique 1991). Through positioning themselves as *Indigenistas*, the intellectuals affirmed a Cusqueño identity and emphasized their Andean roots that contrasted to the Limeños’ plan to build a mestizo state that ‘improved’ the ‘Indian’ race through mixing with the ‘superior’ European blood.

Although agrarian transformation was among the group’s tasks, they favored legal reform. This was needed before the ‘Indian’ *harassed by hunger and fueled by hate, transforms himself into a bloody warrior taking the task into his own hands*¹⁷⁸ (Kosko 1924; Renique 1991). At the moment, the Cusco’s intellectuals need to include Indigenous intellectuals, but it was too late. The indigenous rebellions were over, and most of its leaders were in jail or were executed. This situation prevented alliances between intellectuals and indigenous leaders, becoming only a regional intellectual

¹⁷⁸ “*hostigado por el hambre y estimulado por el odio formara filas guerreras sangrientas que tomara la tarea en sus propias manos*”

project that challenged the centralist integration imposed by Lima. *Indigenistas*' struggle became in practice mainly a quest to be incorporated into the formal structure of the central state as regional managers (Renique 1991: 110). This was more a regional power struggle than a regional project concerned with the wellbeing of the rural Quechuas.

In 1926, the alliance between the intellectual elite and the Indigenous group was reinitiated in the *Resurgimiento* group. The group expected to morally protect the 'Indians,' who considered its younger siblings¹⁷⁹ (Renique 1991: 110-1). Although it only lived a few months, the group stayed within the national debate as the symbol of a (fictitious) encounter between intellectuals and the indigenous group.

Jose Carlos Mariátegui was an important Peruvian intellectual, founder of the Peruvian Socialist Party, and the author of the *Siete Ensayos sobre la realidad peruana* (En. Seven essays of the Peruvian reality) first published in 1928. He also founded the magazine *Amauta* which gathered an important intellectual generation, including Cusco's *Indigenistas*. Mariátegui and Luis Valcárcel had a close relationship through *Amauta*, especially because Valcárcel became the central source the indigenous knowledge that Mariátegui would receive about the indigenous situation in Cusco (Renique 1991: 111). Mariátegui took the notion of the 'New Indian' from Valcárcel's *Indigenismo*—the 'New Indian' as the carrier of a revolutionary hope--but for him the cultural domain was not as fruitful as it was for Valcárcel. For Mariátegui, the 'Indian Problem' was social and economic, and socialism had the power to transform the 'Indians' into revolutionary elements (de la Cadena 1998: 103). By 1929, Valcárcel affirmed that the 'Indian

¹⁷⁹ "*Amparar material y moralmente a los indígenas a quienes consideraban sus hermanos menores en desgracia*"

Problem' had to be solved through the elimination of the feudal system by revolutionary actions in which the 'Indians', and not their tutors, needed to take the initiative (Renique 1991: 117). Although this was an important and significant change, it was not followed by the next generation, who instead concentrated on forming a class-based party.

For Valcárcel's generation the debate about the 'Indian Problem' ended in 1922 with the acceptance of the state intervention as the new axis to tutoring the 'Indians' as minor subjects in need of guidance. Cusco's intellectuals assumed that this reform would guarantee the gradual inclusion of the indigenous population into the 'western civilization.' From there on their *Indigenismo* was not about recognizing their struggle to free the 'Indian,' rather, it was about their demands to be included within the state, and their recognition as a regional political class (Renique 1991: 117).

During the 1930s and 1940s a long period of political repression went along with the consolidation of strength within the central state. While in Lima Hispanic tendencies were being developed, in Cusco *Indigenismo* would continue to be the main view of Cusco's intellectual circles. Through magazines *Indigenismo* would achieve an ideological consensus that would be transmitted through the press, the university and scholar education, as well as the radio (Renique 1991: 130). The most important contribution of *Indigenismo* is that it put in practice various policies oriented to *regulate* Andean indigenous life in the successive years. Luis Valcárcel, and others, moved to Lima when they were appointed to important government positions (Renique 1991: 132). *Indigenismo* became the ideology of a regional intellectual elite that influenced governmental policies, but also caught the interest of a national intelligentsia that

continued to discuss the 'Indian Problem' throughout the 20th century.

1.2 The cultural construction of race

Indigenistas were the first group concerned with the conditions of the indigenous population. However, they approached it as the nation's problem rather than viewing it as the consequences of the colonial legacy that divided Peru into two separated groups: 'Indians' and Creoles. *Indigenistas* did not consider themselves as mestizos or creoles; neither did they consider themselves to be 'Indians.'

The *Indigenista* project was not an indigenous project. It was the regional intellectual elite that, from a middle-class, privileged position, considered itself sensitized by the exploitation and the injustice of the Quechuas in the rural Andes. This group established an important hierarchical distance between them and the natives. Within their project, they became the decent elder brothers, intellectually prepared to lead the indigenous group, an attitude that did not differ from the *gamonales'* paternalism that saw and treated the Quechuas as minors (see Chapter 3).

Since the 19th century, people in Lima looked to project the image of a mestizo and progressive city that implicitly considered the need to eradicate the 'Indian' race. The indigenous population was considered to be a 'pure race' group naturally located in the Andes, that has 'retrograde and pagan' features (Belaunde 1962, cited by Cadena 2000: 64). *Indigenista* intellectuals used degeneration theories that assigned races to geographical environments and held that there was a racial declination when they abandoned the proper places. Therefore, they could stress over moral condition, rather than biological features, allowed Cusco's intellectuals to place themselves above the

Lima's intellectual elite. The Cusqueño elite was different from the indigenous mass because they were *decentes* (decent people), which directly referred to 'an innate higher morality' (Cadena 2000: 47), that could also be achieved through education. Decency was a race and class discourse that stressed the higher morality of the Cusco's regional elite had over the indigenous group, whose racial impurity and degeneration was the consequence of the centuries of lack of education (Cadena 2000: 48). At the same time *Indigenistas* rejected pre-defined biological differences, accepting as a racial hierarchy the intellectual and moral differences presented among subjects (de la Cadena 1998: 90). Both, Lima's and Cusco's intellectuals considered indigenous people as inferior. On one side Limeños considered that people from the Andes were racially inferior; on the other side, Cusqueños considered this group to have inferior intellectual and moral capacity. Therefore, indigenous Quechuas were different to the Cusco's intellectuality not because of their racial phenotype, but because intellectuals were educated and therefore morally superior to them. The impact of the Cusqueño intellectuality silenced issues about racial phenotypes, and provoked a racial definition that privileged innate Western rationality (intelligence) and high morality, that were acquired through formal education. These became the two features defining race as category (Cf. de la Cadena 1998: 90).

Although race was silenced as category in the 1930s, hierarchical and exclusionary racial practices entered into social relationships and regulated interactions among people, even intellectuals on the transformation of pure racism into classism and elitism. When rhetorically 'culture' and 'class' replaced race, intellectuals also promoted the political legitimacy on social superiority based on the idea of 'correct morality,'

supported by a superior intelligence and academic education. These ideas were considered racial attributes between 1910 and 1930, and later became naturalized features of culture and class (de la Cadena 1998: 87).

Although *Indigenismo* was perceived as a decolonizing project by its promoters, Cusqueño intellectuals used it to define themselves in racial terms against the people they wanted to control, the native population. And because race highlighted intelligence as the defining feature, *Indigenismo* represented the academic doctrine that made them equal to the Limeños (de la Cadena 1998: 92). The province's intellectuals did not consider themselves as mestizos or 'Indians,' although they shared phenotype characteristics with both groups. Race was the outcome of an individual's relative social position, indicated the person occupation and income, but modeled by his or her geographical origins. 'Indians' were associated with the Andean highlands, while the mestizos were placed in the lower valleys. The greater the altitude, the less social status and the more 'Indian' a person became. However, since education was acquired, 'Indians' could change their social position by education becoming decent and therefore less 'Indians' (see de la Cadena 2000).

Both conservative and progressive groups were preoccupied with race. While the conservative group proposed that the way to include the 'Indian' was through the ideal of social *mestizaje* that would allow their education. The progressives proposed that the regeneration of the 'Indian race' required them to stay in their 'proper place' (rural Andes). In addition, the progressives considered that the 'Indian Problem' was a problem of land, and expected that indigenous people would, in the end, confront the big

hacendados. However, this analysis also contained the implicit and essentialized definition of the ‘Indios’ as an agrarian class. During this period leftist intellectuals did not openly proclaim the inferiority of the indigenous group, as through their political agendas they subordinated racial and cultural differences to the class struggle (de la Cadena 1998: 105). Nevertheless only the conservative group was recognized as racist, while the pro-Indian position that privileged culture and racial purity was not (de la Cadena 1998: 97).

The 1920s essentialist definition of ‘Indian’ has survived until the 21st century, under another essentialist notion: “peasant culture.” This concept, as the one in 1920s, is constituted by the idea that indigenous groups are only an agrarian class, removes the possibility that they could be educated, rational and political subjects. As de la Cadena extensively explains, this formulation does not treat peasants as capable of fighting abuses and exploitation through silence and withdrawal. Rather, it is about an intelligentsia that has chosen to ignore what an Indigenous Other has to say through written and spoken means (Cadena 2000: 125). Peruvian intellectuals have consistently preferred to *speak for* than to *listen and talk with* Andean subjects, and this has deeply limited the development of the Andean Anthropology in the last half century.

2. Modernization theory

The United States emerged as the global power at the end of WWII, and not only focused on the construction of an open world economy, but also spurred the growth of social sciences discourses about the Third World. In the following decades U.S. social sciences grew dramatically with the scope of the U.S. global hegemony (Berger 1995:

66).

In the scope of this influence, the Cornell-Peru project developed in Vicos-Peru (which will be discussed in the next section) has become the ‘paradigm for international development in the Third World’ since 1952 (Ross 2008: 108). The United States’ interest in non-Western economies was twofold. First, the U.S. sponsored projects around the globe that focused on peasants and ‘poor populations,’ including indigenous groups, with the aim of changing their behavior by implementing the modernization theory. Second, by introducing economic changes that economically assimilated indigenous groups into the capitalist system, the U.S. assumed that these would reduce the risk of revolts and insurrections led by indigenous communities around the globe.

Within the Cold War context, U.S. anthropology and social sciences played an important role within post-war development policy by contributing to the myth that peasants were too conservative in their cultural values to be autonomous agents of change. Guided by this, anthropologists elaborated an argument that characterized peasants as more constrained by ‘tradition’ than by agrarian structures, building the idea that indigenous peasants ‘could not improve their living conditions at their own initiative’ (Ross 2008: 109). In the following years, this statement profoundly impacted both Peruvian academia and the political arena, and established a particular way to understand the Andes and its inhabitants. The idea of a group constrained by tradition complemented intellectual project of *Indigenismo*, and gave Peruvian intellectuals an excuse to assume the role of promoters of change in the social structure. But beyond *Indigenismo*, modernization theory and the Vicos project also legitimized the intellectuals’ racial

superiority, and this has become part of the foundation of Andeanist studies.

During these years, the U.S. 'civilizing' mission employed Western history (Europe and the U.S.) to measure Latin America's history, concluding that the way to develop and to modernize the region was through the achievement of a democratic industrialism. These were carefully crafted in a discourse that combined avowed U.S. values and goals with Latin American's imagined aspirations. Inglehart succinctly defines modernization theory as economic development, cultural change, and political change that go together in coherent, and to some extent, predictable patterns toward the industrialization of the society (Inglehart 2001).

After WWII, modernization theory was the most influential trend in area studies. The classic modernization theory reached its peak in popularity in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It was widely assumed by the U.S. government and area-studies circles that poverty in under-developed nations facilitated the spread of communism. In addition, it was believed that modernization conceived and understood in Western terms would end poverty and reduce the possibility of communist outbreaks around the world. In this frame of thought, it was also assumed that the North American and Western European model of development and modernization was the ideal that Third-World countries should aspire to attain. Guidance through the modernization process was planned to be developed from economic and political knowledge from the Western countries, mainly the U.S. and Europe, using the leading work of historians, political scientists, and other policy-makers during this period (Berger 1995: 75).

Under the surface of modernization theory lays the assumption of Western

knowledge and superiority over the rest of the world. In this sense, modernization theory implicitly valued only one political and economic model:

“Although it was more systematic, modernization theory still reflected continuity with the British Empire’s ‘white man’s burden,’ the French mission civilisatrice, and the racist paternalism of the pre- 1945 U.S. imperial state in the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific” (Berger 1995: 75)

First, it was assumed to be a period of tutelage, after which the tutored nation would emerge as ‘civilized’ and independent, that would allow it to enter into the capitalist system. The proposal focused on the need for cultural transformation in order to achieve modernity, building this premise on the idea that there were more and less developed nations. Traditional and indigenous cultures were seen as the problem of these emerging nation-states (similar to the ‘Indian Problem’), thus, cultural transformation was the first priority in order to ‘be modern.’

Modernization theory saw the world divided between modern and underdeveloped states, intensifying with its oppositions like ‘urban vs. rural,’ ‘modern vs. traditional,’ and ‘West vs. East.’ It was also assumed that changes in one area of society produced consequent changes throughout the society. It emphasized that modernization was a process of diffusion that would spread throughout the society, affecting economics, styles of government, social structure, values, religion and family structure (Berger 1995: 75).

Modernization theory would dominate the way U.S. and Peruvian scholars, politicians and intellectuals understood rural Andeans. As with *Indigenismo*, the indigenous population was conceived to be the country’s problem; the only possible solution was to modernize them. The challenge was not only to change the way indigenous groups produced on the land, but also to change their values and their ideas of

progress (changing their mentality). Education would not only become the way throughout which the ‘Indian Problem’ would be imagined to be solved, but also the means by which the Quechuas would become modern subjects, leaving behind their traditional way of life and (magical) beliefs, which made them pre-modern and backward. In other words, to achieve modernity the rural Quechuas needed to become educated subjects, which implicitly involved ‘de-indianizing’ them through the acquisition of the Westernized education (for an extensive discussion see de la Cadena 2000).

2.1 The Vicos Project

The Vicos Peru-Cornell Project started in 1951 as a scholarly and governmental collaboration between Cornell University and the Peruvian Indigenous Institute. This project was part of the Cornell University Program on Culture and Applied Social Sciences implemented in four other regions around the world. The leader of the project was Allan Holmberg, who was the first chair of the department of anthropology at Cornell, and who leased the hacienda of Vicos for five years. Faculty and students remained involved in the site until 1966¹⁸⁰. The goal of the project was to bring the indigenous population of Vicos into the 20th century and integrate them into the market economy and Peruvian society (Cornell 2005-2008).

Until 1951 the hacienda of Vicos was the property of the Beneficence Society of Huaraz located in the central Andes, a traditional hacienda in which 2,500 indigenous (380 Quechua families) lived and worked on the hacienda’s land to pay for the individual

¹⁸⁰ See http://courses.cit.cornell.edu/vicosperu/vicos-site/cornellperu_page_1.htm

plots on which they produced. They used to work three days per week without payment, and workers were forced to supply domestic animals for agricultural work. Additionally, the hacienda owner compelled each family to provide free services, such as domestic service.

Holmberg believed that one of the problems of the hacienda system was that it concentrated the power and control in the hands of patrons or mestizos who did not live in the hacienda, causing the depressed socio-economic state of Vicosinos,

“These have produced in the ‘Indians’, attitudes of distrust, suspicion, fear, and even hate of the outside world. Such are in fact, the prevailing attitudes at Vicos at the time our work began” (1971a: 25)

This relationship (was assumed by Holberg) that created feelings that made ‘Indians’ mistrust modernity. The Peru-Cornell project worked under the premise of modernization theory, and its assumptions and expectations can be summarized in four points. First, it was assumed that Peru would not achieve unity and modernization unless it started to care for the ‘Indian’ population. This group constituted at the time 50% of the national population, and it was considered to be outside the national culture. Second, it was assumed that if the hacienda’s workers were offered the opportunity to broaden their relationships with the outside world, they would adjust to modern conditions and take a productive place in Peruvian national life. Third, it was expected that the ‘Indians’ themselves through a new organization (imposed by the project) would take the control of the hacienda after the end of the project (Holmberg 1971a: 22).

From the reports produced by Cornell team, the nature of the relationship between the North American team and the Vicosinos is not clear probably because the Vicosino

voices were not important elements in the research.¹⁸¹ Nevertheless, this did not prevent the U.S. team of having their own impressions and views of the studied group:

“In the context of a modern state, this peasantry plays little or no role in the decision-making process; its members enjoy little access to wealth; they live under conditions of social disrespect; a large majority of them are illiterate, unenlightened, and lacking modern skills.” (Holmberg 1971b: 33)

Cornell’s team assumed that peasants by themselves were not able to change their life conditions. Moreover, it was recognized that their lack of economic power kept them isolated from ‘modern life.’ Therefore, one of the urgent tasks of the project was to increase agricultural productivity. The project leader explained that haciendas were not productive because the owner and renter did not invest in the property, and the workers made no improvements on their lands due to the lack of tenure security in (Holmberg 1971b: 46). However, Holmberg did not explain that in the Andes people do not invest in the land also because of the uncertainty of the crop due to climate and altitude risk. Rather than investing in the land, people invested in cattle (see Mayer and de la Cadena 1989).

The project introduced new ‘modern methods’ like good seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides that promised to increase the local productivity; and the returns stayed in the community. The money was also used in order to construct health and education facilities, and to develop other skills among the workers.

Part of the program also sought to increase people’s power, gradually working with younger men who were seen ‘more committed to the goals of modernization’

¹⁸¹ It is interesting to see that in the Vicos project webpage, it has been included a video about the memories about the project. See: http://courses.cit.cornell.edu/vicosperu/vicos-site/cornellperu_page_1.htm

(Holmberg 1971b: 46-7). In addition, the project directors developed leadership qualities among the *mayordomos* encouraging their participation in meetings that concerned hacienda management. The traditional serfs, instead of receiving orders to do the work, were gathered in forums in which they received recommendation for projects and in which people were encouraged to offer their points of views.

The Peru-Cornell project was expected to have an impact on all aspects of Vicosinos' lives although none of project leaders spoke Quechua. Holmberg expected to craft Vicosinos as North-American farmers, 'forgetting' that the Andean highlands are not the Midwestern plains (for an extended discussion Stein 1986-1987; Stein 2000). About relationships of power and hierarchies, Holmberg stated

"From the very beginning, for example, an equality greeting was introduced in all dealings with the Vicosinos; they were invited to sit down at the tables with us; no segregation was allowed at public affairs."(1971b: 55)

Although there are no descriptions about the relationship between Cornell's personnel and Vicosinos in the reports, it is not difficult to imagine that a respectful relationship between the team and the workers did not erase the hierarchies of power and moral superiority that these researchers embodied. Nor are there references about how Peruvians, with their internalized racial ideology, related to the Vicosinos. A quote from a former *mayordomo* (Mr. Luna) may represent how locals saw Vicos workers,

«In fact, the project achieved many things in Vicos». Thanks to the project, people can now see that Vicosinos are capable and hardworking people [...] «Look at these Vicosinos, they dress exactly the way they did in Vicos twenty years ago s [before starting the project] ». But the 'Indians', continued Luna, are a great asset if they are properly trained. «The Indian is like a domesticated mule. You have to know how to handle it and

show him affection»...182 (Himes 1981: 92-3)

Modernization theory had an embedded racial ideology that considered central the need to teach *inferior* indigenous people about the modern life. The *mayordomo*'s quote compares people in Vicos with a mules, implying that they are animals, that if are properly trained could become a good asset (Sp. *buen elemento*). The comparison between indigenous people and animals is a very common racist practice among Spanish speaking people, who aims to express their innate racial and intellectual superiority. Although, these ideas are not often expressed directly in interactions, it is common to find these racialized practices when Criollo/mestizos discuss or complain about rural Quechua behaviour and beliefs. Following this, Huayhua (2010) suggests that state officials and teachers refer to indigenous people as if they were not people (Sp. *gente*), implying with this that they are animals who do not care if they travel 'squashed and touching each other' (Sp. *apretados y tocándose*) (for broader discussion see Huayhua 2010: 88-115). In this sense, the racial practices has been integrated and naturalized in everyday urban-rural, Spanish-Quechua relationships and legitimized in this case by the modernization theory.

When the Vicos' lease expired in 1957, the Cornell group recommended that the Peruvian government give the hacienda to the indigenous workers. The government accepted the proposal, and in 1962 the hacienda became the property of the community

¹⁸² “‘*En realidad, el Proyecto logro muchas cosas en Vicos. ' En gran medida gracias al proyecto, la gente ahora puede ver que los Vicosinos son capaces y trabajan duro [...] 'Mire a esos Vicosinos, visten exactamente como vestían en Vicos hace veinte años [antes de empezar el proyecto]. ' Pero los indios, continuo Luna, son un gran elemento si se les capacita adecuadamente. 'El indio es como una mula domesticada. Uno tiene que saber cómo manejarlo y mostrarle afecto... '”*

of Vicos. It was transformed into an agricultural cooperative, maintaining the former hacienda land as communal property.

For the Cornell group, and other scholars, the major lesson of Vicos was that

“The Sierra, containing major concentration of indigenous populations, many of whom live under a medieval type of agricultural organization such as existed at Vicos is lagging far behind. ...The major lesson[From Vicos] it is that its serfs and suppressed population once freed and given encouragement, technical assistance, become productive citizens of the nation” (Holmberg 1971b: 61)

In 1962, the Vicosinos had control of their life conditions, and were the owners of the land. During these times, they were transformed into modern and ‘productive’ citizens, and for the Peru-Cornell project they had become a successful community. In the project’s imaginary, the modern life Vicosinos had acquired allowed them to become Peruvian citizens. Through this, the Vicos project legitimized the idea of the inferior nature of the indigenous group, and legitimized the role of scholars and intellectuals in changing their traditional pre-modern forms of life. Finally, what originally was viewed as a project to ‘help’ Vicosinos, ultimately served the purposes of the non-indigenous population, especially the Cornell University and Peruvian personnel involved in the project.

2.2 Hierarchies and racial ideology in the Vicos Project

The Peru-Cornell project operated with the premise that transforming the hacienda of Vicos into a North-American Midwestern farm was the desired model that Vicosinos wanted to follow. However, the project did not have any interest in developing agro-commerce or small production, which may have given the Vicosinos extra-value to their products in the regional market. Instead, it was assumed that changes would

naturally occur by altering some aspects of Vicosinos' life, including the introduction of technical development. All these changes would be done without changing the social and regional structure in which the community was inserted (Stein 1986-1987). The project wrongly considered Vicos was isolated island.

Within their discourse, North-American and Peruvian researchers –Allan R.Holmberg and Mario Vasquez (a Peruvian student who spoke Quechua)– considered themselves “modernizers.” They were not only intervening in what they considered ‘underdeveloped’ areas, but also considered the inhabitants to be ‘underdeveloped’ or pre-modern. This reinforced the idea that the main problem in Vicos was the indigenous group and not their work conditions nor the structures of hierarchical relationships beyond the hacienda. The Cornell group expected to eradicate local poverty through applying a modernization process, transforming the local population into knowledgeable and administered objects (Stein 2000: 28). The team members were not conscious of the colonial discourse in which their plan was embedded, which led them to erase cultural and historical contexts for understanding Vicos as if this was a pre-modern space that they needed to watch and control. The Andean region was imagined as a place that urgently needed to modernize and this required the supervision and direction of the ‘superior’ scholars. In addition, Vicos was created as an isolated space outside the modern state that needed to be rescued through the assimilation into modernity. This project involved the guidance of Western knowledge, but this time embodied by North American scholars.

‘Integration’--understood as assimilation--was an important concept in the

sociology of the 1950s. The inspiration came from Chicago sociologist Robert E. Park, who was in formulating dominant theoretical and methodological assumptions about race relationships during this time. Park's cycle of race relations was a four-step process: 'contact, conflict, adaptation and assimilation.' However, these assumptions were as much ideological and political as they were theoretical (Stein 2000: 41). They ignored the institutional and ideological nature of race in the Americas, and the systematic presence of a racial dynamic in social spheres like education, art, social policy, law, religion and science. This approach emphasized racial dynamics as irrational products of individual pathologies (Omi and Winant 1994). The goal of the promoters of applied anthropology in Peru and in the U.S. was to rationalize and to depathologize those aberrations. Thus, the assimilation of Vicosinos into the Peruvian nation-state would produce citizens, who in the process needed to get rid of the 'traditional' culture that made them indigenous. In short, becoming a citizen meant suppressing the 'Indian' component that made them backward, irrational and pre-modern (for an extensive discussion about the de-indianization of indigenous people see de la Cadena 2000).

The lack of a proper understanding of the racial ideology that operated in Peru, and particularly in Vicos, encouraged the use of categories like 'Indian' and Mestizo as if they referred to natural kinds. The project did not recognize that these were foremost relational social categories. Thus, Stein (2000) explains that Vicosinos were constructed in an essentialist way that silenced the binary construction of isolation and modernity in which they were forced to fit. Rather than approaching the community to listen and to analyze their circumstances, social and material, they arrived at Vicos with a pre-

conceived idea of what needed to be done. In this sense, Vicos acted as a human laboratory through which the Cornell project implemented its ideas of modernity.

The racial terminology used by Holmberg and his team was widely accepted during the early 1950s. However, Stein argues that even then, hacienda workers preferred to define themselves as Vicosinos or *hacienda runa*. 'Indio' was the label used by the town people, a term that in Peru was and is a serious insult, and a marker of racial and social inferiority (Stein 2000: 37). The Cornell team imagined that problems of race in the U.S. in the 1950s were similar to the ones the group encountered in Peru. Consequently, the team never understood the social and political dimensions of the process of racialization, and the meaning of labelling someone as *Indio* or *mestizo*.

What seems to be clear from all the critiques to the project is that the Cornell team was a group that felt morally and intellectually superior to the indigenous workers. The group expected to rescue them from the hacienda regime, transforming them into 'productive' citizens. In order to achieve their goals, a hierarchical relationship was needed under which anthropologists were the ones who made the important decisions. Holmberg was unable to avoid some of his team members assuming the role of patron. Although Lynch (1981) argued that this was not caused by the team's interests, and was rather a Vicosino demand; I would rather be more sceptical. The patronage relationship is not only about expressing explicit domination, it is also a relationship in which the knowledge of one side becomes legitimized by the other who sees it as superior. Patronage relationships work in both directions: intellectuals and scholars consider themselves superior because of their education and knowledge; but at the same time,

indigenous people legitimize this ideology by accepting that western knowledge is superior, placing themselves at the bottom of the hierarchy. Vicosinos depended on the word of a person in Lima to act, not because they were incapable of making good decisions; rather they accepted the superiority of the knowledge this person embodied. The Cornell-Peru project was not able to recognize that they were exerting domination over the indigenous group. Domination can also be exerted through academic discourses. In this sense, like *Indigenismo*, the Vicos project was manifestly a top-down approach to development .

Vicos entered into the Cornell-Peru project as a community without a history. During the 1920s, Vicosinos participated in a local workers' protest that caused the reduction of hacienda's work requirement from four days to three per week. Moreover, during the 19th century it was also the scene of workers' protests. The project imagined an inside world, composed of Vicos hacienda, that was surrounded by an outside world, and that the history of Vicos began with the project (Stein 2000: 38) Though the Vicos project became paradigmatic to North American and global applied anthropology, it barely interested Peruvian scholars. Those who have criticized it have highlighted the assumption that it was possible to solve the agrarian problem wholly within the Agrarian sector. Rather it was necessary to do it outside it because *the fate of the farmer is decided outside the field and ... without the participation of farmers* (Figuroa 1984). The project failed because it looked Vicos as an isolated community, and not as a community inserted in a particular agrarian context in which Vicos' economic, political and cultural relationships were embedded.

Between 1952 and 1966, the time that the Vicos project operated, it became a research site for many U.S. anthropologists, professionals and students producing dissertations and reports at Cornell. The project did not train or teach Vicosinos; nor (with some notable exceptions), did it include Peruvian scholars as professional equals. Rather, the project used Peruvian students as data gatherers (Stein 2000: 49). Part of this is because Peruvian scholars were part of the underdeveloped world that the project expected to change. The relationship inside the community was fractally reproduced between scholars and regions. U.S. imperialism went beyond the economic domain, and operated on the ground, using local scholars as data gatherers rather than as colleagues who might offer an independent analytical perspective to the project. This practice has not changed, and today we can see it in the relationships NGOs establish with their fieldworkers in provinces like Ayacucho (see Chapter 7). The hierarchical relationship between North and South did not open the possibility for a dialogue, and reproduced relationships of colonization between Northern and Southern scholars (for an extensive discussion see Ribeiro and Escobar 2006). But so too, in its modern guise, the relationship between North and South is fractally reproduced in the relationship between Lima and the Provinces.

3. Dependency Theory

Dependency theory—which arose in Latin America in the 1960s—was a social science framework that similarly sought to understand underdevelopment, analyze its causes, and move toward overcoming it. It was influential in academic circles in the 1960s and 1970s and at regional organizations, spread rapidly to North America, Europe,

and Africa, and continues to be relevant to contemporary debate (Sonntag 2001).

Over the years, Latin American scholars have continued discussing variant images of modernization in light of nationalist projects, their experiences of the geopolitics of dependency, and conflicts over the control of resources among national elites and indigenous populations. Although initially anthropologists endorsed many of the assumptions proposed in the modernization approach, during the late 1950s and 1960s they challenged the notions of inevitable stages of development. This contributed to develop to a new era of research in peasant studies (Seligmann 2006: 329). Many of the topics discussed in these debates were based on field research in the region, and the questions provoked corresponded to the ones raised previously by the works of Marx, Lenin, and Chayanov among others. These approaches explained in a better way why approaches like modernization theory were not appropriate for the Latin American context (Seligmann 2006: 329-30).

It is in this context that dependency theory emerged as an alternative to the modernization theory. *Dependentistas* considered that underdevelopment in peripheral countries, particularly in Latin American, was the outcome of capitalist development in the centers, particularly in the United States and in Europe. Thus, the economy of the periphery was inextricably conditioned by its relationship to dominant economies, such as the United States (Chilcote 1974b).

Among the most influential works of this school of thought are Cardoso and Faletto (1979), who asserted that capitalist development was possible in some dependent countries; but this was restricted and limited to an upper class that was oriented to the

market. Thus, unemployment and absorption, wealth and poverty would coexist together in the same system. For them dependency was the specific relationship between classes and groups that involved a dominant situation that structurally produced relationships with the exterior (Cardoso and Faletto 1979: 29). Dependency was not just an external variable but also it was embedded in the system of relations among social classes in dependent nations (Chilcote 1974a: 9). In short, dependency was produced by the combination between internal and external conditions.

The historicity of underdevelopment required more than just pointing to the structural features of the underdeveloped economies. Cardoso and Faletto argued that it was necessary to analyze how these economies were historically linked to the international market and the way in which social groups inside the country defined their relationships with the outside. This implied the recognition that within the political and social context dependency was what was at stake, rather than underdevelopment, and that dependency historically started with the expansion of economies in the capitalist system. Their approach suggested looking at the characteristics of national societies that maintain relationships with the exterior (Cardoso and Faletto 1979: 341). Later in the 1970s Cardoso affirmed that *dependentistas* understood dependency as dialogic relationships between internal and external factors (1977b).

Although, Cardoso's and Faletto's approach did not stress revolution as the way forward, they suggested that socialism might improve this situation. In addition, their approach suggested that politics and internal forces were more decisive in determining the forms of dependency than economic and external forces (Cardoso 1977a; Chilcote

1974b). At the end for these authors the question was not about who owned international industrial firms but rather recognizing that pivotal decision-making structures were located outside dependent countries (Cardoso cited by Chilcote 1974b: 17)

Dependency theory arrived in North America by the work of André Gunder Frank, whose *Capitalism and Underdevelopment* (1967) outlined the concept of “the development of underdevelopment” and articulated a model of historical development that was directly linked with underdevelopment, and economic stagnation in the periphery, to the extraction of economic surplus by metropolitan powers (Berger 1995: 109). Franks considered that it was capitalism that generated underdevelopment, consequently, the development of underdevelopment would continue in Latin America until its people freed themselves from this structure, and the only way possible was by a violent revolution (Frank 1969: x).

Dependentistas' studies sought to use the historic-structural method in order to analyze concrete situations. Many of these were case studies that presented new information and descriptive analysis. At the same time they sought to define relevant questions of national politics and of the relations between central capitalist economies and the dependent and non-industrialized periphery.

Dependency theory was a Latin American framework specifically developed to understand the problems of the region. It claimed, among other things, an ‘intellectual commitment’ that contradicted the neutrality of social sciences. In other words, intellectuals acquired a unique knowledge of the economic and social conditions of the region, upon which they were morally compelled to act. Although this approach

considered itself as a radical rupture with the older modernization theory, the two frameworks also shared features. In particular, it defined Latin America through its shortcomings, such as underdevelopment and the lack of autonomy (Rochabrun 2009: 190).

Although *Dependentistas* were trying to get away from a Eurocentric understanding of the world, they approached the indigenous population in similar terms to modernization theory. Thus, it was assumed that the rural populations did not want to change, preferring their traditional and communal organization. The orthodox Marxism of the approach had a lot to say about social classes and its struggles, but this framework did not allow thinking about ideology and culture. Dependency theory considered a close analysis of the relationships among elites, national bourgeoisie, and the middle class; erasing subordinate groups from the account. They were seen as the victims of the system, and not possible agents of change. *Dependentistas* focused on dominant economic relationships in which indigenous groups were seen as the historical victims within the structures of the colonial relationships that the traditional bourgeoisie had perpetuated.

Dependency theory declined in the middle of the 1970s. Some critics attribute the decline to the failure of the revolutionary prophecy and the end of the American wars in Southeast Asia. Moreover the rise of new industrialized countries in the region, such as Mexico and Brazil, undermined the image of the “Third World” states as subordinate to the industrialized powers (Berger 1995: 115). Dependency theory emerged in a political moment in which a middle class intelligentsia was living a radicalization process and

declined as the political project came to an end.

3.1 Dependence and marginality

From the 1960s to the 1970s Peruvian scholars were concerned with the effects of internal and external domination produced by dependency, with Cardoso and Falleto's work occupying pride of place among the *dependentistas*. Dependence was internally replicated as the economic surplus of the countryside drained into urban areas producing the enrichment of cities, with the rural economy acquiring a dependent character under the development of the urban area.

Aníbal Quijano (1977) noticed that there was a structural contradiction between development of the urban economy and the dependency that this caused in the rural economy so that as the rural economy was being urbanized, there was also less possibility for the participation of rural communities in the structure of production and the market. This caused the exclusion of the rural population while the urban centers got richer, reproducing the inequalities of development and an internal colonialism, through which the urban areas dominated the rural ones.

The dominant interests within the dependent country corresponded with the interests of the dominant system in general, provoking an alignment with them rather than with the internal group (Quijano 1977). The focus on how classes and groups inside the dependent economy were tied with capitalists' interests abroad particularly elucidated alliances within dependent and dominant countries. In this context, it was not only an imposed structure, but it was also the internal participation that perpetuated dependency and that was being caught into the hegemonic discourse of development.

Quijano's work was aligned with Cardoso's and Faletto's approach, and categorized as 'marginal' the group that was not able to be absorbed as part of the permanent labor force in the capitalist system. Framed in a dual understanding of the society (urban/rural, modern/pre-modern), 'marginality' was a category that referred to '*one of those commonly used concepts of which one can ask, and from which one can derive, almost anything one wishes*' (Nun 1969), that was not well defined at all. Quijano and others found it important to clarify the importance of marginality,

"Marx clearly demonstrated that the movement of capital necessarily and permanently produces a tendency to exclude from the productive apparatus part of the labor force that has arisen under its domination and that this inactive labour force contracts and expands according to the phases of contraction or expansion in capital's cycles[...]" (Quijano and Westwell 1983: 77)

Thus, marginality, understood in Marx' framework, explained that the labor market was based on a surplus population that during contraction cycles was not absorbed, which in orthodox Marxist theory was known as the 'industrial reserve army.' Quijano recognized that this was used to refer to a problem "which falls within the province of scientific investigation" (1983: 77), imagining that this was just an analytical category. He explained that the capital was creating a mass of relative surplus population on a global scale, and a decreasing proportion of this population was being absorbed (or reabsorbed) into the global productive apparatus during the expansive phases. This had implied the impoverishment of the excess labor force, increasing poverty within the capitalist system, especially in areas dominated by imperialist capital. He continued explaining that the relative surplus population had become larger and continued to grow, creating the problem of marginality (Quijano and Westwell 1983: 78-9).

"capital was becoming generalized in each and every sector and branch of the economy,

the foundations for an internal circuit of accumulation are being established, and pre-capitalist production relations are crumbling [...] In these countries, the relative surplus population [the marginal that cannot be absorbed by the system] thus becomes exceptionally large, giving rise to the problem called marginality.”(Quijano and Westwell 1983: 81)

But marginality was more than a structural problem; it became an ideology, a particular way to understand the economic excluded and indigenous populations. The Marxist approach privileged economic and social processes, undermining the role of culture and ideology. Absent was the racial hierarchy on which many Latin American states are constructed, as well as the ruling class’ racial ideology, even though these are also essential elements to understanding the socio-political dynamic (Grosfoguel 2000: 339). Combining an analysis of colonialism with the racial ideology and the politics of the national state would have attuned the approach by giving it a deeper analysis.

The analysis of “marginality” developed by Quijano in Peru was challenged by Perlman’s study of a shantytown in Brazil; Perlman argued that far from being ‘marginal,’ arguing the residents of Brazilian *favelas*¹⁸³, and of similar settlements elsewhere in Latin America were strongly integrated into the system but in an asymmetrical manner (2005: 4). In Brazil, the state considered it a solution to the “marginal” favelas to remove them by burning and bulldozing houses, forcing residents to move into housing complexes in remote areas of the city (Perlman 2005: 3). To do that the state used garbage trucks, sending a clear message that they were taking care of the ‘social garbage.’ *Favelas*’ inhabitants were considered dirty discards, and disposing them outside the city was a way to ‘sanitize’ the city.

¹⁸³ Favelas are urban settlements, commonly known as shanty towns in the U.S.

When Perlman wrote *The Myth of Marginality* (1976) ‘masses’ of poor migrants were arriving from the countryside to ‘invade’ the city, which was the paradigm of modernity. Modernization theory saw these migrants as maladapted to the ‘modern’ city life, and responsible for their conditions, including their poverty and their lack of formal job. Squatter settlements were seen as spaces of crime, violence, prostitution and social decline, and marginality was a material force as well as an ideological concept and a description of the social reality (Perlman 2005: 5-6).

The power of the ideology of marginality was strong in Brazil in the 1970s, and it justified the removal/destruction of *favelas*, arguing that this was a danger to the social order. The social and cultural resources that *favelas* provided to urban migrants: housing, access to jobs and services, and tightly knit communities were erased by the idea that they were the city’s dirt and threat (Perlman 2005: 8). There was an important fusion between the marginal, and the dangerous and violent people that reinforced prejudices that all *favelas* residents were criminals.

During the 1970s other labels emerged to name the urban poor and their problems: social exclusion, inequality, injustice, etc. These categories sought to change the focus of responsibility from the subject, to the structures of the state and the society (Perlman 2005: 11). During the 1990s, marginality re-emerged in academic circles in discussions about the persistent poverty within first world cities. Thus, terms like ‘the new marginality’ began to describe the conditions of the chronic poverty in African-American ghettos in the U.S. and in the migrant slums of Europe. The idea was that advanced marginality reflected the current stage of global capitalism, implying conditions

for a truly non-integrated, irrelevant mass population relegated to the territorial spaces of self-perpetuating ghetto (Perlman 2005: 17-8).

Today marginality is a category and a narrative that describes the poor and excluded groups, explaining that the main problem is that this group has not yet been integrated the structures of the modern state. In contrast to the 1970s this narrative is used outside scholarly spheres, and has become part of the state's discourse. 'Marginality' has become an element of common parlance, that when used clouds racial ideologies. In this sense, Fujimori's regime in Peru in the 1990s explained that poor rural Quechua-speaking women were sterilized not because they were indigenous, but because they were 'marginal.' In this context, the Peruvian state masks a policy to reduce the poor indigenous population, through the label of 'marginal' clouding the racial ideology that provoked this policy.

When the label of 'marginal' is used in Peru, it automatically implies that the 'marginal' group is located in one of the poverty containers: like a rural community in the Andes, a *favela* in Rio or an urban-marginal slum settlements in Lima. And through this relationship between group and space, 'marginality' becomes a reality that occurs in relationship to an urban center. Rural Quechuas are not the new poor or the new marginal, they have always been the poor and the marginal in economic terms, but also and especially because their ethnicity and Andean origins.

3.2 Marginality and race

Peruvian scholars have not perceived that calling a group 'marginal' has become a powerful technique that refers at the same time to a geographical space with particular

features, and to a discursive and ideological position from which people learn how to speak about things like justice (Tsing 1993 quoted by Poole 2004: 38). Although it can be argued that through the category of ‘marginality’ scholars expected to emphasize the condition of economic exclusions of the ‘marginal,’ the social and political discourses imprinted in this category are not acknowledged. Within the Peruvian national imaginary the ‘marginal’ population is composed by ‘the poor’ who inhabit the margins of the state embodied by the Andean highlands. Thus the ‘marginal’ is a racialized subject and not only, as Quijano suggested, ‘the reserve army.’

The language of “marginality” is not merely abstract. It is concrete and spatial, a means by which government officials and social scientists create a geography and make tangible a reality that evokes an inside and outside to the state. The outside is imagined as barbarian, marginal, violent, and wild; while the inside is a realm of rationality and modernity. As a consequence, the ‘marginal’ become the expression of an imagined barbarism that threatens rationality and civilization that the state and ruling groups,

“in terms of spatial language for representing the nation, liberal talk about citizenship and civilization has produced an image of Peru as a nested set of dual oppositions pitting the Creole coast against the indigenous highlands, the civilizing center against the savage periphery” (Poole 2004: 41)

The imaginary of the Andean highlands as ‘marginal’ and ‘barbarian’ also pervades social scientists’ analyses. Inheriting many of the assumptions of the Vicos project, Peruvian social scientists have taken for granted the ‘underdeveloped’ and backwardness of Quechua-speaking communities, which has not changed in the *Dependentistas’* analysis.

“studies of relationships between Andean groups and national or international

institutions tended, with a few exceptions, to treat Andean tradition as a background factor rather than an active force” (Salomon 1982: 83)

During the late 1970s and early 1980s Peruvian scholars like Cotler (1978) and Quijano (1980) focused on the consolidation of national political power and its effects in ‘marginalizing’ the peasant population in the economic and political arenas (Seligmann 2006: 338) (See Matos Mar, et al. 1971[1975]; Matos Mar and Mejía 1980).

In this context Quijano (1980) asserted the existence of a ‘marginal’ group without perceiving the power and effects of the ideologies within which this notion was constructed. For him and others, the problem was the existence of two groups: indigenous and Criollo, where the former was ‘marginal’ and needed to be integrated into the latter. This approach did not recognize the participation and contribution of these ‘marginal’ populations into national society and the state, and assumed that the only possible communication among these groups was through social domination.

Quijano observed that a third group, that he called *cholo*¹⁸⁴, was emerging and would become the joint to link these two groups and the symbol of “*the emergence of an incipient mestizo culture, the embryo of the future Peruvian nation*” (Quijano 1980: 61). For him, the *cholo* was an indigenous person who migrated to the urban center and adopted an urban life style, without losing ties with his or her rural community. The *cholo* was, in Quijano’s imagination, an urbanized and ‘modern’ (probably more developed) version of the indigenous peasant. This author and his racial sentiments were

¹⁸⁴ The category of *Cholo* originated in the 16th century to classify the indigenous population under the colonial regime. This category began to be considered pejoratively within the colonial society only after the proliferation of offspring from mixed marriage (mestizo and indigenous) threatened to undermine the purity of the castes and the protection of economic and cultural privileges (Seligmann 1989:697).

modeled by the intellectuals' beliefs about the role of education in the transformation of the racial configuration in Peru. While in the 1920 Cusqueño intellectuals silenced their phenotype features through their access to education; in the 1960, intellectuals elevated literate peasant leaders redefining them as *cholos* (de la Cadena 1998: 105). By doing this, Peruvian intellectuals reinforced the inferior condition of the rural Quechuas, which eliminated the possible existence of educated and indigenous Quechuas.

In the late 1960s, an important peasant mobilization in the southern Andean region was struggling to overturn the regime of land ownership. However, Quijano argued that

“In every peasant movement that I have visited, I have found only one indigenous leader. Indigenous leadership does not exist today within the peasant movement; it appears as an exception and in isolated fashion, the Indian leader himself going through a process of cholificación. Thus I do not think that an indigenous solution to the peasant problem would be feasible” (IEP 2000 [1965]: 59-60)

The colonial discourse of indigenous groups as ‘backward,’ not ready for providing solutions to their problems expresses greatly how peasants have been seen by intellectuals and politicians. Far from being recognized as equal subjects, with their own political ideas and projects, they were and still are portrayed and treated as ‘inferior’ subjects who need ‘guidance.’ The discrimination and hierarchies may be subtle, but are present. In Quijano’s argument, only Cholos would overcome the ‘marginalization’ of the indigenous group (Quijano 1980: 64). During the 1960s and 1970s identity labels were loaded with references to cultural stages and degrees of class consciousness that corresponded to the *the older* bio-moral evolutionist categories used by the *Indigenistas*. Rational knowledge, ‘intelligence’ and formal education became at this moment the foundations of the social difference (de la Cadena 1998: 106).

Even though the indigenous population was recognized as changing (see Matos Mar, et al. 1971[1975]), the high degree of mobility and change within rural areas were not fully conveyed in scholarly writings, which continued to trade in an imagery of stagnation and immobility. Seasonal migrations and market-oriented production were not mentioned, nor the consumption of industrialized goods and urban lifestyles within rural communities. Rural families invested in their children's education, looking to send them to college whenever it was possible. All these changes, and the ways in which rural Quechuas managed to cope with the state's bureaucracy, are not mentioned as critical elements that tie them with the national society and the state. The lack of recognition of these relationships among Peruvian social scientists re-inscribed the image of rural Quechuas as completely outside the state, frozen in a pre-modern era. The category of *cholo* only reinforces the prejudice that rural Quechuas do not change by themselves. Scholars like Quijano needed to use a new label to differentiate and highlight this "new" process.

4. NGOs and development¹⁸⁵

Development is defined by the International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences as originally implied with economic development, but recently, more emphasis has been placed on equity, sustainability, the quality of life and popular participation. Development Anthropology includes active participation by anthropologists in development policies and projects. Some anthropologists are against any involvement,

¹⁸⁵ This section may seem short in relationship to previous sections. However, the next chapter (6) will extensively discuss about the role of NGOs as institutions filling the role of the state in rural areas.

claiming that development is fatally flawed. Others are wary of any ‘applied’ work.

(Brokensha 2001)

Anthropologists have recognized it is critical to analyse the role and culture of non-governmental organizations (NGO). This has gone hand in hand with the deepening and widespread impact of neoliberal policies and readjustment programs shaped by the World Bank and the IMF in the last decades (Seligmann 2006:343). This moment is different from the modernization theory in which development projects were oriented to modernize the ‘backward and isolated’ countryside. Instead, this particular moment since the 1980s was about the current intervention and substitution for the state by international NGOs in a wide range of projects. Recent studies of NGOs have addressed how these have come to substitute for government bureaucracies, nationally and internationally staffed (for extended discussion see Chapter 7). In addition, NGO workers gather data to apply a particular model of development; and although these are often seen as ‘bottom up’ they hardly provide a nuanced view of peasant and indigenous groups within the global context (Seligmann 2006:344).

During the 1980s ‘poverty oriented programs’ concerned with rural development, health, nutrition and family planning, arose and for the first time these projects received significant resources directly targeting the poor population. This changed the previous ideology and created programs ‘*concerned with the modernization and monetization of rural society, and with its transition from traditional isolation to integration with the national economy*’ (World Bank 1975, quoted by Escobar 1991: 663). This premise has

not changed, and new policies are still driven by the idea that there is a need to 'modernize' (in a capitalist way) traditional (non-European) societies. Moreover, this presupposes that there is only one path to achieve development: the one promoted by the international financial institutions.

Latin America has not been excluded from this process and it has witnessed the emergence of hundreds of NGOs, many of which are financed by USAID, UNDP, IDB, WB, and international development agencies from the European Union. These agencies have been the major employer for social scientists in Peru until the 1990s, when new events like the fall of the Berlin Wall redirected aid funds toward other geographical areas.

In Peru alone there are 1,439 NGOs working with funds from international cooperation. The Peruvian state receives \$400 million U.S. dollars from international aid agencies and NGOs \$210 million. These numbers do not include the funds coming from private agencies, such as religious institutions (Balbi 2007).

4.1 Power and knowledge in development

The key flaw is in development work the idea of development itself, which takes for granted a positive outcome that has become a certainty in the social imaginary. Recent tools of analysis, developed with the turn toward postcolonial studies, have guided scholars to question how particular representations have become dominant and have shaped the ways in which reality is imagined and acted upon (Escobar 1995: 5). These unveil the mechanism through which a certain order of discourse produces permissible modes of being and thinking while disqualifying others or making them

impossible (Escobar 1995: 5).

Thus, development is a particular production of thought and action by relating three axes: the knowledge it produces, the system of power that employs and regulates it, and the forms of subjectivity fostered by these discourse (Escobar 1995: 10). In other words, the discourse of development has produced Andean subjects as a ‘marginal and excluded’ group that recognizes its lack of power, and the need to be helped by the government: the educated ‘white men.’

4.2 The moral project

Development anthropology is a moral project based on ethical principles (Gow 2002: 300) that we may share. *Dependentistas* expected to provide a new vision of the economic dependency, but they did not include topics like culture and race which ‘did not fit’ into the Marxist approach they used. At the same time, *dependentistas* had a pre-determined political agenda, rather than being more concern with changing the hierarchical relationship in which they were embedded in the countryside.

Despite anthropologists’ rhetorical commitment to ‘indigenous knowledge,’ ‘popular participation,’ and ‘local decision making,’ development agencies have only allowed anthropologists to have a peripheral position with little influence on policy formation (Ferguson 1997: 165). At the same time, if scholars assume that they have a superior knowledge so they can decide the fate of others, the problem resides in the scholars’ assumed superiority.

As anthropologists, we often deal with and make our living from social problems (war, violence, human suffering, etc.), and for some researchers this should drive us to a

particular obligation to reflect critically on how we choose to represent the human suffering that engages us. It is not about two distinct, and exclusive, ways to engage anthropologically with the world: the spectator that is neutral and objective; and the witness that is active and morally committed (see Scheper-Hughes 1992). Both positions are related, but the danger is that advocacy actions without acknowledging the system of power in which as scholars we are embedded will almost certainly have negative results.

Taking the Other's side without a critical understanding of our own political projects and prejudices may silence natives' own views of their situation. Therefore, as highly committed witnesses, we may end-up imposing our own moral project without recognizing the existing difference between what 'we' and the Other want. We may share ideas which do not imply that we understand in the same way what needs to be done. I am sure that in many cases, our moral and political commitment may obscure our analysis and be imposed as if the Other believed it. In this context, it is important to reflect how mediation becomes an important tool in shaping the knowledge we produce.

Conclusions: good intentions not always have good result...

Intellectuals with radically opposed political projects have agreed in identifying the lack of integration and backwardness of the Quechua population as Peru's main problem. For example, Vargas Llosa (the 2010 Literature Nobel Prize winner, and 1990 presidential candidate for the right) and Diaz Martinez (Shining Path ideologue) share the an evolutionist approach that establishes the subordinate nature of the indigenous society. Both considered Western rationality as the basis of their projects, which led them to believe in the inferiority of indigenous knowledge, because it is pre-rational and

consequently subordinate to their intellectuals' social and intellectual paradigms (Cf. de la Cadena 1998: 106). Regardless of political persuasion, there is a consensus as regards the intellectual supremacy of their projects and the inferiority of indigenous people.

Unlike Ecuador and Bolivia, where indigenous intellectual class has emerged, Peru has none. By eliding race and placing themselves as morally and intellectually superior subjects, Peruvian scholars have reshaped the colonial racial hierarchy legitimizing racial/cultural discrimination with the superiority offered by formal education and intelligence.

Thus, it should not surprise us that in 1965 Peruvian intellectuals did not recognize Jose Maria Arguedas¹⁸⁶ as an anthropologist because he intended to redirect mestizaje into intercultural relationships (Cf. De la Cadena 2006: 203). Arguedas was a non-indigenous intellectual and an indigenous Quechua, whose work resisted the binary classification. In the 1960s Arguedas' life and work defied the limits of certified sociological-anthropological knowledge.

Arguedas most popular novel *Todas las Sangres* was sympathetic to the rural struggle of the 1960s, but it ran against the grain of the popular script—popular among Leftists intellectuals and politicians, that is—that indigenous people lacked political consciousness. At the time it was assumed that by teaching rural Quechuas about political activism would transform 'Indians' into peasants; enlightened by their newly found 'class consciousness' peasants would leave behind their superstition and Indianess to become *comrades*. However, Arguedas had the courage to challenge this vision by including rural

¹⁸⁶ Arguedas was an anthropologist born in the Andes, but was recognized more for his novels than for his research work as anthropologist.

Quechua political leaders in his novel. The novel effectively presented the possibility of the ‘Indianization’ of politics that included indigenous forms of knowledge, which for social scientists of his time was a historical impossibility and a moral outrage. During those years, the indigenous world and its animated landscape were not the secular arenas that modern political organization required (Cf. De la Cadena 2006: 209-10). By identifying himself ‘as a civilized man who has not stopped being at the core an indigenous Peruvian’ (Dorfman 1970:45) Arguedas was rejected by the dominant Limeño intellectuality as an anthropologist. He could not both claim indigeneity in his novels and poems, and the role of the social scientist as were viewed as mutually exclusive.

The silent racism of the Peruvian intellectuality recognizes the right of every Peruvian to be part of the nation. However, at the same time, it places people on a differentiated scale according to the subject’s intellectual capacity and his academic knowledge. This legitimization is built upon the evolutionist idea that privileges Western rational knowledge over the one considered pre-rational, like the indigenous one (de la Cadena 1998: 108). The silent racism that we have highlighted throughout the chapter presupposes that intellectuals embodied superior forms, because of the formal Western education they received, legitimating their natural political leadership. This has become a naturalized rhetoric of exclusion that has justified social hierarchies through the use of concepts like “race”, “class,” and “culture,” differences are seen as inherited, and historically inevitable (Cf. de la Cadena 1998: 108). Throughout the twentieth century into the twenty-first, every generation has faced the intellectual challenges of a divided Peru, differently, but every generation has reproduced a racialized social hierarchy and

built it into their generation's social project as natural and inevitable.

In short, what during 19th century was seen as racism based on ideas of race and phenotype features, in the 21st century has become a cultural racism. This means that exclusion and hierarchies are legitimized through conditions of intelligence and formal education. In this sense, the rural Quechua population is still widely considered to lack intelligence and education, which places them, in the Peruvian intellectual imaginary, at the bottom of the national structure.

Chapter 7

Social Mediation: others forms of racial domination

In the last chapter I discussed how Peruvian intellectuals eliminated “race” from academic discourses and imposed instead a hierarchy based on Western education. I continue this this discussion by looking at how this hierarchy is reproduced on the ground by the NGOs that act as social mediators between communities and the government. In this context, I propose to understand aid agencies as *statelike* institutions that are asked to fulfill the roles of the state in the areas where the government has not developed the apparatus for direct intervention. In short, aid agencies act as private contractors for the state.

By taking over this role, NGOs act as political and social mediators between the state and rural communities, imposing political agenda that are being crafted as if they were the voices of rural communities. Although NGOs are considered bottom-up institutions, in the examples presented in this section I will argue that NGOs often act through top-down approaches. In the field, NGO workers embody the upper status supported by Western education (and the features associated with it rationality, modernity, being urban, etc.) which gives them the power to discriminate against the Quechua population. Using this hierarchical relationship, NGOs personnel reshape

people's actual demands into what they consider to be appropriate for the group; I call this relationship "social mediation." It is through such social mediation that the hierarchy of Western knowledge and education is used to impose upon subordinate groups particular ideologies that are hegemonically accepted.

The concept of mediation emerged in Marxist literature to explain the ideological mechanisms by which the state legitimized the system (Bartra 1976: I). In this sense, Bartra considered mediation within the historical context as an ideological phenomenon, whose characteristics will depend on the particularities of the given relationships between the political leadership and political power (Bartra 1976: 43). In Bartra's neo-gramscian framework, the domination of a social class through the state apparatus was an inseparable phenomenon from the political-economic-ideological mechanisms that grounded the hegemony of a class, as much within civil society as through violence and repression (Bartra 1976). In a gramscian framework, the state is the whole complex of practical and theoretical activities through which the ruling class justifies and dominates the governed class through its consensus (Gramsci 1971).

In short, mediation is a political phenomenon structured in particular governmental apparatuses. Consequently, inside the state there is a mediation structure that creates the illusion of consensus among social classes, while in reality this is just another way to perpetuate domination (Cf. Bartra 1976). Taking Gramsci's mediation idea, I understand NGOs as members of the civil society as well as an important component of the state that from both positions exert domination over subordinate groups. The dominant condition of NGOs is performed through a hegemonic discourse

that legitimates Western formal education as the core of the Peruvian social hierarchy.

This chapter is divided in two sections. The first aims to place NGOs within the structure of governance by applying the concept of *statelike* (or proxy state) institutions. In the neoliberal economy the state has become a delegating actor that sub-contracts NGOs and international aid agencies to fill the state's role where it cannot. By using *statelike* institutions and the proxy state (Krupa 2010) I highlight how civil society is embedded in the process of governing. In the second section I look at the ways NGOs act as social mediators by analyzing two specific workshops. Within these I will analyze how these institutions' ideologies are imposed and crafted upon people's voices, and presented as if they were the subjects' original demands. These ideologies are generally accepted by rural Quechuas, re-inscribing a hegemonic discourse of the Western and urban education. In this relationship hierarchies of race and education are conjointly produced and reproduced along with discourses of democracy and equality. The problem is that this causes Quechua-speaking communities to be framed as illiterate and helpless groups that need 'big brothers' (NGOs and scholars) to defend and to guide them.

1. The state as an on-going process

In modern Western political thought, the idea of the state is often linked to the notion of impersonal and privileged constitutional order with the capability of administering and controlling a given territory (Skinner 1978, cf. Neumann 1964 cited by Held 1989: 11). There are four traditions of political analysis that have focused on the state: (1) liberalism, which is absorbed with the question of sovereignty and citizenship; (2) liberal democracy, which develops liberalism's concerns while focusing on the

problem of establishing political accountability; (3) Marxism, which rejects the terms of reference of both liberalism and liberal democracy, and concentrates upon class structure and the forces of political coercion; and (4) political sociology (from Max Weber to Anglo-American pluralism and 'geopolitical' conceptions of the state), which has elaborated concerns with the institutional mechanisms of the state and the system of nation-states more generally (for a detailed discussion see Held 1989: 12).

During the last few years, the literature about the state has also focused on how states are powerful sites of symbolic and cultural production that are culturally represented and understood in particular forms. In this sense, the state becomes an entity that needs to be analysed with particular spatial properties, which secure its legitimacy, naturalize its authority, and represent itself as superior to other institutions and centers of power (Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 981). In this line, Corrigan and Sayer (1994) consider 'the state' not as much a fixed and durable material apparatus, but as a series of discursively and processually constructed claims. Therefore, the state represents a project to give 'unity, coherence, structure and intentionality to what are in practice frequently disunited, fragmented attempts at domination (Corrigan and Sayer 1994). This allows us to see the state as an on-going project in which its institutions work to posit a more or less coherent construction of the state in a situation where coherence and intelligibility might not otherwise be at hand (Herron 2003: 1-3). In the same line of thought, Coronil (1997) proposes to consider the state to be a complex ensemble of social relations mediated by things, or thing-like objectifications of social practice; and these objectifications are the medium through which these relations are constituted (Coronil 1997: 116).

In other words, the state is an ensemble of social relations mediated through ‘things’ that are also a series of discursive and procesual claims. The state is composed of a cluster of agencies and departments, with tiers and levels, each with their own rules and resources and often with varying purposes and objectives. To understand the relations and processes of the state and their place in shaping society, it is important to grasp the way the state is embedded in particular socioeconomic systems (Held 1989: 2).

Academic discourses about the state deal with two images that come together: verticality and encompassment. On one hand, verticality refers to the central idea of the state as an institution located ‘above’ civil society, grassroots and communities. In this sense, the state becomes inherently a top-down entity that operates from ‘above,’ placing the civil society and grassroots as groups operating from ‘below.’ On the other hand, encompassment implies the idea of the state is located within an ever widening series of circles that start with family and local communities, going up until they enclose the full system of nation-states (Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 982). In this sense, the locality of the state is encompassed by the region, the nation-state and the international community. Verticality and encompassment work together producing an implicit scalar and spatial image of the idea that the state is understood as ‘above’ the localities, regions and communities that it contains.

In the Western tradition, the state has been understood as the entity embodying the power to control rationality, that stands against the ‘irrationality and the lower passions of the lower groups.’ Therefore, the state is usually placed as morally and ethically ‘higher’ than the groups it encompasses. This is what legitimates its authority, and the power that

it exerts over the population. Even though most academics would refuse today to consider the state as a higher entity, it is generally agreed however that the civil society is the mediation zone between the state and the 'grounded' community. The imagined topography of vertical levels takes for granted that political struggles are coming from 'below' and rooted within people's lives and experiences, as if there were a mediation relationship in place that may or may not filter the contents of the struggle (for an extended discussion see Brass 1991). Civil society is usually placed in the middle imagining to offer a zone of contact between an 'up there' state and 'grounded' communities (Ferguson and Gupta 2002).

The civil society includes those areas of social life organized by private and voluntary arrangements between individuals and groups outside of the direct control of the state (Held 1989: 6). Picturing the state's relation to society through the image of a middle zone of contact, vertical encompassment fuses into a single and powerful image of the state as an entity operating on a higher level—somewhere 'up there' not related to grounded communities.

The metaphors through which states are imagined and practiced in bureaucracies are important to analyse if we aim to understand how rural inhabitants are imagining and relating to the state. The state becomes a particular entity that, through social practices, is accepted as a legitimate and authoritative territorialized institution, and is also imagined to encompass the different levels of the social world. Social life is framed on the set of relationships the state establishes with its communities. Both encompassment and verticality are embedded in everyday practices via the routine operation of the state

institutions, producing spatial and scalar hierarchies (Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 984).

1.1 Transnational Governmentality

There are different forms of transnational connections that are increasingly enabling 'local' actors to challenge the state's claims of encompassment and vertical superiority. Local grassroots operators may trump the national and international appeal to 'world opinion,' also encompassing the surveillance done by transnational institutions. Under different conditions in which states do not have success in claiming the vertical heights of sovereignty, the state finds that there are a range of contemporary organizations that not only overlap with its traditional functions, but also conditions these institutions to follow particular rules.

The idea of 'transnational governmentality' was coined by Ferguson and Gupta (2002), and is pertinent now to understand the state as an entity embedded in a web of social relations that goes beyond its verticality, which allows us to include relationships with transnational institutions. Building on Foucault's notion of 'governmentality,' Ferguson and Gupta understand this as a process through which the population is governed: by institutions and agencies, including the state; by discourses, norms and identities; and by self-regulation. Thus, both the political economy and knowledge apparatuses have operated on the population to constitute governmentality as the dominant mode of power since the 1900s (Foucault 1991: 101). 'Governmentality' offers a way of approaching how rule and power is exercised in society through social relations, institutions and bodies that do not automatically seem to fit under the category of 'the state' (Gupta and Sharma 2006).

Therefore, neoliberal 'governmentality' is characterized by competitive market logic and a focus on smaller government that operates from a distance. Neoliberalism works by multiplying sites for regulation and domination through the creation of autonomous entities of government that are not part of the formal state apparatus, and are usually guided by 'business logic.' This logic involves social institutions like NGOs, schools, communities and individuals, who are made responsible for activities that were formerly carried out by the state (Gupta and Sharma 2006: 277).

Scholars have sought to refine the analysis of governmentality to deal with the shift from the Keynesian welfare state toward so-called free-market policies. Although this move has been understood by some as a 'retreat' of the state, it needs to be seen as a transfer of operations from the government to non-state entities (Barry et al 1996: 11-12; cited by Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 989). The logic of the market has been extended to the operation of state functions in which even core institutions like schools and health services, if not privatized, function according to a business model, as this is developing in Peru. In the meantime the state's social and regulatory functions become de-statized, taken over by 'quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations' (Rose 1996:56; quoted by Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 989). This is not a 'rolling back of the state' since it does not mean that there is less government; rather, it is a new form of government committed to producing mechanisms that work (independently) from the central state. The logic of the new form of governmentality is the production of states that, rather than being welfare, rather than be guardians of citizens (like people demand in Chapi) they become managers that calling for the empowerment of this bottom of the social structure.

In this sense, the state has changed its approach to the ‘poor’ by placing on them the ‘responsibility’ to change their economic conditions. This type of approach gives up the belief that the main cause of poverty was unequal sets of opportunities and resources distribution (Cf.Sharma and Gupta 2006). Already embedded in this ideology, I have found NGO workers and institutions –in the US and the UK– affirming that the rural poor have learned to receive from the state, which has created a ‘culture of welfarism’ (*Sp. Cultura asistencialista*). In this sense, rather than teaching people ways to improve their economic conditions, through welfare the state has moulded people as welfare receivers. As a consequence, rather than work, people expect the state to give them what they need. The problem exist, but it is so different to consider an American family living in the welfare system for years, than a family in Chapi that receives monetary help, that does not include housing or food.

... they showed the victim's face and all the help arrived... they learned that if they need help they extend their arms [...] Something must be done, this is a very vulnerable population ... but I still think that the best the state can do is teach people to fish and not give them the fish. (Nolberto, Paz y Esperanza)187

Ferguson and Gupta (2002) also suggest going beyond Foucault’s Eurocentric idea of the territorial nation-state as the domain of the state’s operation. Therefore, they extend the discussion of governmentality to modes of government that are being set up on a global scale. This includes strategies of discipline and regulation; rules imposed by the WTO, IMF, and the WB; transnational alliances forged by activists and grassroots

¹⁸⁷ “... ellos mostraron la cara de víctima y todo vino del cielo ... entonces, aprenden que hay que extender la mano para que los ayuden [...] Hay que hacer algo, pues es una población bastante vulnerable ... pero yo sigo pensando de que creo que la mejor apuesta del estado es enseñar a la gente a pescar y no darles el pescado.”(Nolberto, Paz y Esperanza)

organizations; and transnational NGOs. The increasing number of these agencies and their actual influences on governmental issues should question the implicit spatial and scalar frames of sovereign states.

The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (among others), are institutions of global governance placed 'above' the nation-state. In this context, some difficulties emerge around 'global agreements' proposed by the WTO or the IMF, because they are the imposition of these supra-national agents intending to act as the state (like the policies that demand the reduction of birth rates in Third World Countries). Although these entities appear to look for 'good governance,' most of the time they impose policies without mechanisms for democratic accountability. This confusion is located partly in how states are spatialized and what relationships exist between space and government. In this sense, practices of encompassment have been modified by supranational influences and controls; the new landscape needs to be proportional to the space and scale in which governmentality is executed (Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 990).

Understanding how transnational agencies work upon the spatialized state, some African countries can elucidate how states are not able to exercise the power traditionally associated with the sovereign nation-state. In general, the Africanist literature has understood that the social reality of the region cannot be framed within the traditional idea of 'nation-building.' Instead, it has been proposed to approach 'civil society' as a means that encompasses a variety of social groups and institutions that only share in common that they exist beyond or outside the territorial state (Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 991). In general, academic writings have suggested specific views on these groups and

institutions restricting its approach to grassroots and voluntary organizations. Agencies and institutions like Sudan's rebel army, the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, and Oxfam may contrast against the state as components of the civil society. However, they are not local, national or international phenomena. These groups embody a particular local dynamic that is the product and expression of national, regional and global forces (Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 991).

For the purposes of this chapter, I consider civil society as the set of social, ideological and political relationships that allow the consensus and regulation of class relations. Moreover, civil society will also be defined as the way through which dominant classes achieve hegemony and domination over the lower ones (cf. Bartra 1976: 48-50). Instead of contrasting the state to the civil society as contradictory entities, following a Marxist approach, I propose to understand civil society as composing the part of the state that enacts governmentality. Apprehending civil society in this sense allows us to better understand the state as bundles of social practices, local in their materiality and social situatedness as any other entity (Gupta 1995; cited by Ferguson and Gupta 2002). This will also let us question beyond what the traditional state/society division provokes (like how states rule), and open a view that enables a better approach to understanding transnational relationships and mediation performed by civil society's groups. NGOs are part of what is called civil society, and they exert (like the state) domination over the subordinate classes, and especially in Peru upon rural Quechuas.

Some liberal theorists of the state and society argue that the domination and control exerted by the state is rooted in the state's power. Thus, it is assumed that the

‘rolling back’ of the state in the neoliberal era would ultimately produce the ‘democratization’ of it. This argument has turned out to be fallacious, as one may observe in regions like Africa and Latin America, where domination has long been exerted by entities others than the state (Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 992). Zambia illustrates this situation. Originally colonized by the British South African Company, a private multinational company equipped with its own army, this company acted under a British ‘concession’ and conquered this territory, setting a private system of ownership and race privilege that became the Rhodesian colonial system. Today, Zambia continues to be ruled in significant part by transnational organizations that, even though are not by themselves governments, work together with First World states to effectively rule and control the country (Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 992).

1.2 Civil Society: NGOs, BONGOs, CONGOs

In its minimum the notion of civil society refers to voluntary groupings, which taken together are, ‘a part of society which has a life of its own, which is distinctly different from the state, which is largely in autonomy from it. Therefore civil society lies beyond the boundaries of the family and the clan and beyond the locality; it lies short of the state’ (Shils 2003: 292, cited by Colloredo-Mansfeld 2009: 16). In Latin America, civil society has been credited with opposing and helping to move beyond authoritarian rule, which contrasts with the arguments developed about civil society in Europe. In Latin America, civil society seems to act as a means to fill in for an absent state (Colloredo-Mansfeld 2009: 16)

In African studies, the civil society often appears as active grassroots and

democratic local organizations that intend to represent local communities' visions of the world. However, this account ignores that civil society is also composed of international organizations with a pre-defined ideology of how subordinate groups should act. The "grassroots" are budgetary expressions of USAID, EU agencies, European Churches, and Human Rights groups working in the transnational domain. Many of these transnational groups have taken over functions and powers of the state, which has transformed them into governmental organizations that act as bank-organized NGOs (Bongos), and government-organized NGOs (Gongos) (Ferguson and Gupta 2002).

NGOs becomes actors that help Western transnational development agencies to get around 'uncooperative' governments, especially those considered as 'failed', and celebrates the empowerment of the civil society by taking over the state's functions (Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 993). Covered beneath the idea of empowerment, in reality, NGOs and transnational development agencies are the ones that get empowered through this system by becoming the legitimated group that dominates subordinate groups. However, the original philosophy that we hear is that the international community, and local NGOs, counteract within 'failed' states looking to empower the civil society.

Some states have changed from being welfare providers to acting as *facilitators of development*. Although welfare projects do not stop, the neoliberal state is now able to farm out welfare tasks to empower agents and communities who are seen as able to secure their own livelihoods without 'depending' on the state. Gupta and Sharma suggest

"Implementing programs that empower marginalized populations to meet their own needs facilitate the attainment of neoliberal goals of leaner and more efficient government. Furthermore, linking these populations to the project of self-governance and self-development makes rule more decentered and diffuse..."(2006: 285)

Transnational NGOs (CARE, World Vision, etc.) play an important role in Africa, Latin America and some regions of Asia organizing local affairs, building and operating schools and clinics. They arrive to places where the state seems to have failed to be, or has decided not to arrive to reduce costs.¹⁸⁸ Although these organizations act locally as *statelike* institutions, they are not the state in the classical definition (Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 994), but act as it. These are transnational entities that are both local and global governing local populations.

NGOs political entities are better conceptualized as integral components of the transnational apparatus of governmentality that do not replace the system of nation-states, but rather overlay, and sometimes overtake, the state's responsibilities. These organizations enact the 'transnational governmentality' that, like the state, exerts domination over the Quechua population that they look to 'help.' Therefore, these NGOs need to be approached as contemporary organs of the state that may play the role of rivals, watchdogs and proxies of the state. Whatever their role is, they coexist with the state at the same level and in the same global space; sharing also the technologies of government across this space. Therefore, NGOs-BONGOs-GONGOs need to be understood and treated as non-state organizations that act as the state in different contexts. This approach is helpful, because it allows us to leave aside verticality and encompassment as only properties of the traditional territorial nation-state, framing our

¹⁸⁸ The World Bank promotes empowerment as a crucial aspect of development. And at the same time these same institutions are asking these states to reduce their interventions in the welfare. The general belief is that empowerment will allow people to improve their life conditions, as if inequality and lack of opportunities were only related with people's willingness to improve and not with economic and political conditions imposed over the bottom group.

understandings in a more broader way to grasp contemporary practices of government as ethnographic problems (Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 994).

Statelike institutions govern the conduct of the national state and economies, and manage people's welfare living in different territories around the world. This transnational governance is growing and multiplying the number of global agreements that go from regulating development and human rights, to environmental problems and the protection of endangered species (Gupta and Sharma 2006: 280).

The move toward a neoliberal system aims to shrink the state, transforming it into a mere management agent that directs the territorialized nation-state from a distance. Parallel to this, transnational agencies shape policies from above that states are compelled to follow, becoming even more *statelike* institutions. Thus, the civil society also needs to be understood as a major body composed by different groups, in which some dominate others, but that may look less connected as they actually are. In many cases, the size of grassroots is not as meaningful as seeing how these small grassroots work as the extensions of transnational agencies. Local and transnational agencies share particular ways to understand social phenomena, embodying locally transnational ideologies like the defence of Human Rights. Transnational aid agencies act in the field through these grassroots and local NGOs, calling for democracy and equality, as the basis of the relationship they establish with social actors. However, at the same time, on the ground they reproduce national hierarchies of race and class and legitimizing domination and control they have over rural communities. Several NGOs have become brokers of transnational agencies that instead of listening to rural groups; impose upon them agenda

and particular ways to understand the world because they ‘know’ what is best for them. In this sense, there is a transfer of Western models to regions like the rural Andes, without respecting cultural differences or understanding cultural practices. This transfer is facilitated by structures and interests within the so-called Third World countries which accept these forms and attempt to shape them to their own interests (this will discuss in section 2 later in this chapter). Therefore, the transition has many agents, both foreign and local, that act in complicity (Cf. Sampson 1996: 126). Local NGOs embody the hierarchy of difference that legitimates the intellectual superiority of Peruvian scholars over the Quechuas.

1.3 Proxy state: acting like the state

Krupa considers that there are ‘too many actors competing to perform the state’ that in the end, has the effect of the state. Following his analysis I will consider that NGOs are ‘proxy states’ or *statelike* institutions that act like the state, but are not officially entitled as such (Krupa 2010: 319). By performing the state’s actions, NGOs have become an important means of the facto domination and control by the state over rural communities. Given the collaborative and mimetic relationship between the state and NGOs, it is important to understand whether NGOs act independently from the state or not, and at which points these institutions identify themselves as the state or not. Studying the state ethnographically and historically involves unpacking the production of its sense of objective presence—an apparent center of governmental gravity—out of the social relations it has internalized (Krupa 2010: 324).

States’ proxies are not new in Latin America. Along the 20th century rural

populations, often considered ‘at the margins of the state’ (see Das and Poole 2004), have been controlled by proxy state forms. Landowners came to capture state practices as part of their apparatuses to control workers performing executive, fiscal, judiciary and legislative roles. In many cases (see Chapter 2) the *gamonal* acted as the state, mediating between people’s personal conflicts, ruling in favour of one party or other and punishing offenders. In addition, when schools were instated during the late 1960s, Chapi’s *gamonal* paid the school teachers. In most cases, the *hacendado* acted as the caring state that not only provided work to his workers, but also an education.

This idea goes along with Krupa’s argument about the flower business in rural Ecuador that considers itself to be offering people the opportunity for a better life (2010: 338). In this case, the flower industry imagines itself as a *statelike* institution, providing jobs and salaries, but also giving them health care in a remote area where the state does not reach.

Although the Peruvian Agrarian Reform eliminated the figure of the landowner, this did not transform the social practices through which the state and its mediators subordinate the population. Therefore, the vertical and hierarchical relationship that characterized the relationships between NGOs’ workers and the rural Quechuas in several ways mimics the hacendado-worker relationship that is now legitimized through formal education. Embedded in this relationship is paternalism, inherited from the hacienda time—becoming a clear example of the lack of change in the way different actors approached rural communities. This is a racialized relationship, that pervades almost all social relationships established between rural communities and the state (and *statelike*

institutions) (Cf. Scarrit n/y: 28). Treated as children, race is used to blame rural Quechuas for their own exploitation, their own poverty, their lack of ambitions, their laziness and their lack of education the dominant racism blames the indigenous population for its failure to compete in the mestizo culture (Scarrit n/y: 27-9). In this scenario, NGOs and the state emerge as the group that guides and educates the 'Indian' in Western knowledge. Through this, the state and its mediators reproduce the hierarchy that originally legitimized their domination and control over what they consider to be pre-modern subjects. As I've already discussed, this superiority is also practiced by the Peruvian intellectuals.

2. NGOs as social mediators: racial practices

Statelike institutions and proxy states are hired by central governments to perform their duties, which often involved reaching isolated communities. NGOs are usually seen as a step ahead of the state because through their work they have acquired knowledge about particular regions, and they are financed by the international community. These institutions are hired to act as proxies of the state in geographical remote areas, developing political roles on behalf of the state, but using their own resources.

Drawing upon some of the ideas presented by Scarrit (2005), I consider the state and its mediators as reproducers of the hierarchy of exclusion based on race. Therefore, the state and its mediators act as agents governing through the perpetuation of the caste division between Criollo/mestizos and indigenous groups. The rural/ urban division (that equates Creoles vs. Indians, modern vs. pre-modern, and educated vs. illiterate) nurtures the racial practices that the state performs. By 'Indianizing' the rural Quechua through

face-to-face interactions, the state and its *statelike* institutions governs rural communities. By exerting its power over this population the state and its mediators reinforce practices of degradation and humiliation (for concrete examples see Huayhua 2010) that nurture patronage relationship with urban Criollo/mestizos (cf. de la Cadena 2000), usually embodied by the state personnel.

The mechanisms of racial domination are also exerted by local NGO workers, who use a double discourse. On one hand, they display the discourse of empowering indigenous communities through democratic practices highlight their citizenship, engaging in relationships of respect and equality. On the other hand, in-site sets of practices in the countryside NGO personnel display the legitimated hierarchical relationship and domination as legitimate representatives of Western education exert over what they consider to be racialized Quechua communities.

The racialized practices of the state have divided the Peruvian society in two groups: Criollo/mestizos who live in the city; and indigenous groups ('Indians') living in the countryside. The term 'Indio' ('Indian') is problematic in Latin America, as I already explained in the introduction. Although I intend to avoid the use of 'Indian,' choosing 'indigenous' and Quechua groups instead, the 'Indian' is useful to illustrate how elites and NGOs personnel use it to 're-inscribe' racialized rural Quechuas.

Although race terminology is silenced and masqueraded with other categories like intelligence, formal education and morality, race is interpreted as differences in evolutionary traits that are presented in every sphere of social, political and cultural. Race is one of the more determinant and powerful domination tools in rural areas. Thus, rural

communities are heavily racialized not only from the urban domain, but also amongst themselves. This is not a new practice, and my analysis in this section intends to show how *statelike* institutions, like the Peruvian academia, have ‘indianized’ rural areas, keeping its population silent and dominated under the labels of illiteracy and ‘marginality.’

For a long time, modernization has been seen as the paradigm of the Peruvian state’s development. It was assumed that in order to achieve this, the first task was to modernize the countryside and its population.¹⁸⁹ As it has previously explained, Quechua-speaking communities are seen as the major obstacle to achieving modernization and progress in Peru, because their traditional practices (farming and livestock) are seen as backward and hampering the development of the nation-state. This has been a major topic among scholars, NGOs and state officials who constantly argued to include the pre-modern indigenous communities into the modern structures of the nation-state. Juan Ossio, a well-known Andean anthropologist¹⁹⁰ and the current Minister of Culture in Peru, explained that in 1983, eight journalists were killed by the population of Uchuraccay-Ayacucho (during the internal war) because this was a primitive group:

[Ossio’s] approach explained that peasants [in Uchuraccay] acted as they did [killing the journalists] because there were two Peru: a modern one, which belonged to the urban and Western side of the country; and another primitive, where the peasants who killed the journalist were living, because this group belonged to a past world.¹⁹¹ (Chirif2010)

¹⁸⁹ For an extended discussion of this topic, see Chapter 5 the section about modernization theory.

¹⁹⁰ Ossio is currently a professor of Anthropology at the Catholic University in Peru.

¹⁹¹ “Su enfoque, en el primer caso, fue señalar que los campesinos habían obrado como lo hicieron porque habían dos Perú: uno moderno, al cual pertenecía la parte urbana y occidentalizada del país; y el otro primitivo, donde estaban los campesinos que habían asesinado a los periodistas porque pertenecían a este mundo del pasado.”

The drastic division between a modern and primitive Peru does not take into account that the progress of the modern and Creole Peru was achieved because of the power and domination that this group has historically exerted over the indigenous one. Although this explanation was expressed almost 30 years ago, its ideology is still present among Peruvian intellectuals, scholars, NGO workers and state officials. In this sense, the position that Quechuas and the Amazon's groups have in the social hierarchy does not differ much, since both are seen as naturally illiterate and pre-modern. In a more recent interview, Ossio affirms that 'we' (intellectuals and the state) need to teach the Amazon groups the benefits of modernity,

“Journalist: Is it that [the natives in the Amazon] have a concept of development that is distinct from ours?”

Ossio: Exactly. They have distinct concepts.

J: It is an entirely different world. And there is also an aversion toward whites?

O: Yes. There is an aversion towards whites, who blame for taking what they owe—but the indigenous do not reject the state's benefits. That is, they are not against the benefits of modernity. The question is how do we find the means to grant and fulfil these needs? That is the problem.

J: What are you going to say this Monday to President Alan Garcia when you meet in the Governor's Palace?

O: I will tell him that we have to make the State reach these populations and better support them, that these populations do not understand these two legislative decrees nor the country's institutions. We must get more and better education to these populations.”¹⁹² (Zárate 2008)

¹⁹² “-Periodista: ¿Es que [los indígenas] tienen un concepto de desarrollo distinto al de nosotros?

Ossio: Exactamente. Son concepciones distintas.

P: Es una concepción totalmente distinta del mundo ¿Aunque hay también una aversión hacia los blancos? Ossio: Así es. Hay una aversión hacia los blancos, pues les echan la culpa de que se hayan llevado lo que les correspondía, pero los nativos no están rechazando esas bondades. Es decir, no están en contra de los beneficios de la modernidad. La cuestión es cómo encontrar los medios para acceder a esta. Ahí está el problema.

P: ¿Qué le va a decir este lunes al presidente Alan García cuando se reúnan en Palacio de Gobierno?*

Ossio: Le diré que tenemos que apuntalar más y hacer que el Estado llegue a esas poblaciones, que no

Ossio embodies the superior position of the state official, intellectual and scholar, and from above the social hierarchy he considers indigenous groups as living outside of modernity, with aversive feelings toward the white population. He also explains that rural groups have a distinct concept of development, as if they did not live in the same temporal space as other urban groups (for a discussion, see Fabian 1983). Through this statement, Ossio legitimizes the responsibility of the state 'to educate' (*Sp. 'hacer pedagogía'*) the indigenous pre-modern subjects about the benefits of the modern era that it is assumed they do not know. In this example, Ossio speaks as a state official but also as an intellectual authority that has given him his years as a professor of Anthropology and researcher. Therefore, the niche from where he talks is criss-crossed among the academia, NGOs and the state, producing a discourse that becomes valid within the three domains. In contrast to what may happen in the US, in Peru these three actors have developed conjoined discourses that have historically nurtured one and other's domains.

The division in Peru between modern and pre-modern implies a racial classification beyond physical features that refers to a racial ideology that legitimizes the power urban groups exert over rural communities. Thus, rural inhabitants are considered as 'Indians' through euphemisms like 'marginal,' 'ignorant,' 'pre-modern' and 'illiterate.'

2.1 Race, knowledge and education

In Latin America we often find that race is defined on cultural rather than

comprenden en qué consisten los dos decretos legislativos ni la institucionalidad del país. Debemos hacer una mayor pedagogía en esas poblaciones."

biological criteria (Wade 2003: 271). Changing the way a subordinate population is named, like shifting between 'Indian' to 'peasant' does not imply that previous meanings and hierarchical understandings of race are not acting. In this sense, de la Cadena's work about 'indigenous mestizos' (2000) is particularly useful to understand how race and racism are active and practiced without being mentioned. Through the theoretical framework of the racial formation perspective, de la Cadena emphasizes that race is a political category whose meaning is shaped through struggle. Her work looks at how 'indigenous mestizos' in Cusco share with the elite the belief that formal education legitimates discrimination, turning racism into a hegemonic and silenced practice. De la Cadena's findings address important questions about the use of categories among different groups and the new meanings they imprint on them, calling our attention to the silent racism enacted within national, political, and academic discourses (de la Cadena 2000).

In the Peruvian political context, race seems to be absent from social relationships. However, when the state and *statelike* groups organize workshops they work with the pre-conceptions that 'beneficiaries,' especially if they are monolingual Quechuas, need to be educated in the Western culture so the nation-state could successfully develop. The state, NGOs, Aid agencies and the Peruvian intelligentsia firmly believe that discrimination is legitimate if it is based on differences in formal education (cf. de la Cadena 2000), such as in their perceived role 'to teach' the

indigenous about urban practices, like hygiene¹⁹³. This approach is highly racist; as it is assumed that indigenous people should learn and adopt the urban culture in order to improve their lives, and further the progress of the nation-state. Within this discourse, formal education is seen as the tool to assimilate Andean inhabitants into society, establishing as a primordial requirement the use of Spanish as the main communication tool.

Taking de la Cadena's ideas about cultural racism further, I argue that euphemisms like 'marginal,' 'illiterate' and 'ignorant' mask ideas of race by reinforcing the urban/rural division imposed by the state and NGOs. This is important because *statelike* institutions working in the countryside call for the need to educate the rural population not for the sake of spreading schools, but rather looking to reduce differences between the Quechua monolinguals in the Criollo/mestizo society. In this context, 'Indian-ness' becomes the social condition that reflects the individual's failure to achieve educational improvement, and the consequent failure to be a modern citizen (de la Cadena 2000: 6). Therefore, 'Indians' are those who live in the countryside, and have not achieved the social mobility granted by formal education and urban settlement. 'Urban Indians' or 'indigenous mestizos' are the successful group that combined a formal education with urban settlement, which has placed them above the rural 'Indians.' The hegemonic ideology of racial hierarchy is reinforced by the practices of NGO workers

¹⁹³ Governmental social programs in Peru are oriented to 'teach' the rural populations notions of urban hygiene. In this sense, rural Quechuas are coerced to follow practices that are not always suitable to be performed in extremely cold environments without the facilities of running water system. If they do not follow them, teachers and health personnel insult them by calling them 'Indios' and animals. For a extended discussion see Huayhua 2010.

and state officials, and by the idea among rural Quechuas that formal education is the only way to stop being peasant (=‘Indian’).

The process of ‘de-Indianization’ reveals complicity between dominant and subaltern groups in associating ‘Indians’ with the rural Andean countryside, and identifying them as the most despicable members of society (de la Cadena 2000: 328). This not only allows racism to function as an ‘invisible’ mean of classifying people, but also makes cultural racism unquestionable—even for those who believe they are working for a more participatory and democratic society (2000: 329).

2.2 NGOs: working through social mediation

During the last few decades social mediation has perpetuated the urban-rural division. NGOs are usually urban institutions operating in urban and rural settings. Over the years NGOs have understood the rural Andes as particular containers of poor, illiterate and marginal groups, statements that have been historically nurtured by social scientists in Latin America (for some examples see Fuenzalida 1970; Matos Mar, et al. 1971[1975]; Theidon 2004). Dependency is one of the important theories that have deeply influenced their understanding of the subordinate group, at the same time calling for scholars to engage in practice in order to improve people’s life conditions (for an extense discussion see Rochabrun 2009). Thus, during the Marxist fashion several scholars migrated and shared the positions of the NGOs and the academia, producing a fluent collaboration between them.

The tradition of Peruvian NGOs is embedded in this frame. Thus, it is not uncommon to find that NGO directors and members are former Leftist militants, who in

the 1970s got together to affect social change through entering the world of development. The leftist militancy helped most of these NGOs to refine their ideology and principles, orienting them to understand the rural Andean space and its people in a particular way. On the path to understand rural communities, scholars and development workers have developed theories that have nurtured the hierarchy of difference, naturalizing differences and transforming them into structures of power and knowledge.

If we understand that differences have been transformed into hierarchical relationships that overvalue formal education, we can maybe better approach how 'Indian' is a category undermined and denigrated through the structure of the state with the active collaboration of *statelike* institutions and academic discourses. The state system perpetuates the urban-rural division through envisioning rural Andean communities as 'marginal communities.' In addition, the state system is structured in such a way that rural activities are seen not only as the most degraded and despised in the country, but the rural people themselves are seen as dispensable groups that do not contribute to the national economy (cf. Scarrit 2005). By staying removed from rural affairs, the state has given up its role in the 'development' of the countryside, granting NGOs and aid agencies the power to govern rural communities. The racialized system reproduced in rural areas by these agents favours the isolation of rural villages from the larger society, by imposing a Western urban knowledge and a set of urban values (like the modern lifestyle) that collaborate in the framing of rural Quechuas as among the lower ranks of racial hierarchies.

Race cannot be taken out of the analysis because it plays an important role in

constructing the Peruvian society as two unrelated bodies. The construction of hierarchies and structures of power and knowledge are better seen when they are directly at play through different groups' discourses and interactions. In the following section I look at the relationships that two NGOs established with the rural population in Ayacucho. Both institutions currently work with the 1980s war victims through meetings and workshops. These activities were done in Ayacucho between 2008 and 2009.¹⁹⁴

2.2.1 COMISEDH: acting as statelike institution

COMISEDH is a NGO that has worked in the Ayacucho region since 1979. Traditionally its line of work has been the defence of Human Rights, especially during the internal conflict of the 1980s. In 2008 COMISEDH agreed to collaborate with the state through the National Compensation Council (*Sp. Concejo Nacional de Reparaciones-CNR*), in order to speed up the information and registration processes of the 1980s victims. Although the population in rural communities expects to receive individual monetary compensations, at the time of the workshops the state was only granting them access to free healthcare.

COMISEDH's responsibility was to carry out informative workshops in the traditional areas of intervention in order to inform the population about the national compensation program. In these workshops, COMISEDH added the task of writing a letter. Therefore, each workshop ended with the collaboration of all the participants to

¹⁹⁴ Neither of these institutions worked in Chungui or Chapi because they consider that Chungui is an extremely isolated and dangerous community that has several security problems (drug mules passing through the communities). Instead both institutions worked in closer communities (maximum 4 hour drive from Huamanga city) about topics related with justice and compensations.

prepare a letter to the National Compensation Council. These letters were supposed to be the participants' ideas of how the state should compensate them, and were sent to Lima so they could be incorporated as suggestions for the compensations program (see Appendix 7-1). Through this COMISEDH expected to include the beneficiaries as active participants in the process of compensation. However, these letters were written in Spanish—although they were discussed in Quechua—by NGO workers who influenced what people stated by re-shaping people's originally proposed ideas. The process is more complex than affirming that NGO workers erase the people's voices, because hegemony forces people to accept the workers' ideas as superior to theirs because of the formal education they received.

Like many other NGOs, people working in COMISEDH can be differentiated into two groups. One is composed of professionals, lawyers and social scientists from Lima, who perform as trainers and coordinators. The other group is composed of provincial professionals, who speak Quechua fluently and have degrees from the local university. This last group works as 'staff,' as interpreters and participants in training-of-trainers courses, which means that they are not usually in a significant position of power (Cf. Sampson 1996: 123) . In the same way that rural Quechuas are seen as backward and in need of the guidance of Western knowledge, provincial NGO workers are seen as staff that are good at communicating with the target population because they speak the language, yet they are rarely asked to act as coordinator or head of an important program.

Milton is a social communicator from Huamanga who was acting as the workshop's facilitator when I first met him in Chapi on May 2008, where he was working

for MIMDES (En. Secretary of Women and Development affairs) gathering information for the IV Peace Census.¹⁹⁵ Months later, I found Milton working for COMISEDH as a workshop facilitator (Sp. *promotor*). Milton opened the workshop explaining to the audience what the compensation program for the 1980s war victims was,

“¿Imataq chay reparación?, estadupa qillqamusman qina nichkan, reparaciunkunaqa yanapakuykuna, chay sasachakuy ukupi sufriqkunapaq, chay tukuy dañukuna kawsasqaqanta reparasqa kanampaq, justamente kay reparacionkunaqa kansi 1980 watawanta 2000 watakama chay violencia sufriqkunapaq, porque, a veces, wakinkunaqa pantankun, puntataqa karqam chay guerrillakunapas chaypi sufriqmi kani, yaykunmanchu chaypi sufriqkuna ninkun, manam chaykunapi sufriqkunaqa reparasqachu kanqaku, sino mas que nada, kay sasachakuy ukupi, chay violencia ukupi sufriqkunapaq, entonces chaymi ninchik, reparación llapa victimakunapa derechunmi, sufriqkunapaq derechunmi mañakunammi chay reparacionman, entonces estadupañataq obligacionmi prácticamente” (Milton, canaria)

[What does it mean the compensation? On what the estate has written says that there will be compensations, and help for those who have lived in a difficult time, for those who have suffered. So those who suffered can receive a compensation for all the harm that happened. It is said that these compensations began in 1980 until 2000 for those who suffered the time of violence. Sometimes, some people made a mistake by saying that they have also suffered when they acted as guides for the guerrillas, and asking if they can be benefited; for those who suffered there, there is not any compensation... [these compensations] are benefiting those who were excruciated with suffering during the hard time. It is because we say compensation is the right of all victims; for those who have suffered. They have the right to request to those who manage this system. It is the state's obligation.]

Milton explained that people are entitled to receive the compensation provided by the state because they suffered during the 1980s internal conflict. However, each time he intervened he found the need to repeat that people have suffered (*Qu. sufriqmi*) during these years, as if his listeners did not know what they lived through during the 1980s.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁵ The Peace Census is the census that the MIMDES has developed to keep track of the number of internal war victims and their needs. The compensation program is supposed to be working with the data provided by these censuses.

¹⁹⁶ Milton grew up in Huamanga city, where the war was less violent than in rural areas. However, Milton finds the need to repeat and reinforce to its audience that they lived a terrible war as if he needed to convince them of this. Moreover, the fact that he did not live the war in the rural area does not constrain

His quote repeats the word ‘suffering’ in almost every line, as if he needed to frame an environment to legitimize people’s demands for compensation. However, at the same time, by repeating ‘suffering’ so many times he was seemingly implying that they are ignorant about their own experiences during the war.

Later, when I interviewed Milton, he explained to me his role within these workshops, and, in a way, his reasons to use this particular language,

Through this program, obviously using their native language, we explained what the reparations process consisted of. So many were perhaps not exactly clear on what the process was, but they did want more. People in the countryside want to be told what to do... in a manner of speaking, they just want a more straightforward explanation. They want someone to tell them “look, you know what, this is how things are done, this way.” Sometimes people in the countryside are a bit shy, or I don’t know, perhaps it is just their way, no? Within their own group...(and the leaders generally are men)... the men formulate the opinions, and the women talk amongst themselves saying, “Yes well, having said that, how will things be?”; amongst themselves the women still wonder, but no... They do not dare to ask questions. They want more personal explanations, more concrete explanations.¹⁹⁷ (Milton, Interview in Huamanga)

Milton carefully looks to distance himself from the rural population by placing himself as a non-native Quechua speaker. Although he manages Quechua very well, and this is probably the reason why he was hired as a facilitator, he does not want to be identified as rural Quechua. The hierarchy between rural and urban and the connotations each of them carry, like education, are at play; not only in Milton’s relationship with people in the

him of repeating how much people suffered during the war, because his discourse is supported on his urban and educated background that positions him above his listeners.

¹⁹⁷ “A través del programa, lógicamente nosotros utilizando su idioma natal decíamos en qué consistía este proceso de reparaciones. Entonces, muchos no lo tenían tal vez tan claro, pero querían más. La gente del campo quiere que se le explique...cómo quien dice, quiere en realidad una explicación más próxima.[Quieren]que alguien les diga “mira, sabes qué, así es, de esta manera.” A veces la gente del campo es un poco tímida, o no sé, tal vez será su forma ¿no? Cuando está en grupo se miran entre ellos... y los líderes generalmente son varones. Y los varones opinan, y las mamás entre ellas conversan “sí pues, está hablando esto, ¿cómo será?”; entre ellas siguen preguntándose, pero no...No se atreven a preguntar ¿no?. Quieren explicaciones más personales, concretas.”

field, but also in the relationship he established with me as an urban Limeña anthropologist. Moreover, in the quote Milton implied that the educational level of the audience demands a simple discourse, one capable of providing explicit examples that are relevant to them. He also addresses the idea that he is dealing with an illiterate group; when he asserts that they need simple explanations, he is implying that the group lacks the capacity to understand complex ideas. Through this argument Milton also explained the lack of questions during meetings, assuming that people do not understand the main topic of the workshop. This ideology reinforces the idea of an urban educated mind that produces complex ideas that the rural illiterate Quechua-speakers cannot grasp.

Milton places himself in a superior position granted by the level of education he achieved, and his condition as urban settler. However, his excellent command of Quechua seems to act as an important bridge between his urban status and the rural beneficiaries he works with. His parents were traders from a rural community in Huancasancos (a southern Ayacucho province), and the internal conflict forced them to migrate to Huamanga. Milton considers himself as having surpassed his rural origins through his achievements in his professional career. Thus, within his imagined identity he is above rural groups, because of the hierarchical position given to him by his formal education and college degree. The way reality and racial differences are constructed fit in to a hierarchy that places native Spanish-speakers above native Quechua-speakers, an opposition that parallels the urban/rural and educated/ignorant categories. Milton embodies this division, and the transition from 'Indian' to non-Indian; he is not a rural peasant, although phenotypically he may look like one. Due to this, I find that he is

particularly worried about distancing himself from them. Within the urban imaginary, Milton has surpassed the Quechua rural and illiterate condition, by achieving education in the city, and consequently ‘de-indianizing’ him. In this sense, race ideologies pervade the practices of everyday life, the urban/rural and Spanish/Quechua relationships becoming particularly racialized within the context of which *statelike* institutions and NGOs work. When the workshops seems to get out of control, with people (interrupting and) talking over each other, the NGO facilitators and workers look to embody the discipline and order that their Western knowledge and urban background has given them. In this context, the racialized hierarchical structure in which the workshop functions is reinforced and legitimized, but rarely challenged

This is a matter of ordering your responses-- please, in due time!! This is not a free-for-all! (Rene, Pampa Cangallo)

[“...Bien por cuestión de orden las réplicas, ¡¡por favor en su debido momento!! ¡Ésto no es un coliseo de Gallos!”]

Comments comparing beneficiaries to animals are common in the rural Andes. These have become daily practices that look to subordinate rural subjects to the lowest possible rank, through comparing them to animals (for an extense analysis see the discussion on chapter 3, Huayhua 2010). Using comparisons between rural inhabitants and animals expresses the deeply despised beliefs that the non-Indian members of Peruvian society have toward rural Quechuas. This is not only a hierarchy supported on racial ideologies comparing people’s behaviour to animal fights, but it also expresses the racialized imagery of how Quechuas are closer to animals than the non-Indian group.

COMISEDH’s specific role within these meetings is confusing for those who attend the workshop. People recognize that this is an NGO, but are confused because

COMISEDH is informing them of a state project and acting as a *statelike* institution. It is interesting to note that the NGO only recognizes that it is ‘collaborating’ with the state, without aligning itself with it or its policies. Not recognizing that in this context it is acting as a *statelike* institution produces major confusions among the beneficiaries, who demand proper attention from the state, and do not understand why an NGO is carrying out this project,

“kay registro único de víctimas ruwanampaq encargasqa kachkan exactamente kay institución kay Consejo de Reparaciones nisqan, kaytam encargamuchkan estado kay registro único de víctimas ruwarinampaq. Pero lamentablemente kay Consejo de Reparaciuniswan mana riki presupuestuta estado urqumunchu, mana qullqiyuq kachkan... imatataq ruwarinqa? [...]Qina imatan ruwarimuchkanku kay Consejo de Reparaciones? Maskachkanku hukaqkuna yanaparinanta, entonces paykunam nink ‘manam registro ruwanaykupaqa mana kanchu qullqi,’ entonces paykuna ruwasanchik huk conveniuta, Municipiokunawan, kay Derechos Humanos[COMISEDH], chay ukupi llankaq Instituciunkunawan. Chayman qinam wawqi panikuna ari kay Comisión de derechos humanos, por ejemplo ari yanapawachkanku, kay registro Único de víctimas ruwaywan.”(Milton, Canaria)

[To do the victims registry is in charge this institution, this, that is named National Council of Compensations. This was created by the state, to do the register. But this... the state does not have the budget, thus the Council does not have the money, what can do it without money? [...] so what is this Council doing? They are looking for the help of others, they said that they do not have money to make the victims registry, so they are making an agreement with the municipality, [and?] with this COMISEDH... with those who work in these institutions, according to that brothers and sisters, yes this COMISEDH is helping to make the registry.]

Although Milton explains that COMISEDH is helping (*Qu. yanapawachkanku*) the National Compensation Program, this NGO is acting as a *statelike* institution, dropping its title of ‘non-governmental.’ Milton explains that the state does not have money, so it asks for help from municipalities and organizations like COMISEDH. However, people get confused about each institution’s role and responsibilities,

Good doctor... tell me why in support of rural peoples that have suffered these social ills, only certain NGOs are assuming [the responsibility]... Why not the government? Why not the actual ones who have done these wrongdoings to the Peruvian people, yet have the

*nerve to still preside as president?*¹⁹⁸ (Male #12, Canaria)

This last quote addresses the problem of the state as an institution that does not attend to people's needs. The beneficiaries demand the state be held responsible in the post-war context. This however becomes distorted, since the NGO is indeed there acting as the state. After this confrontation in the workshop, neither Milton (the facilitator) nor the other workers of COMISEDH answered to 'defend' the state. Instead of an ally, the state is perceived as an antagonist actor. And the NGO, which in this context is acting as a *statelike* institution, does not clarify this. Looking to keep itself in its NGO role, COMISEDH does not recognize that it is embodying the state, which is problematic because it is, from its perspective, reinforcing the idea that the state does not care about those who suffered the violence during the 1980s. When NGOs perform the state's role, they do not drop their non-governmental status, transforming themselves into ambivalent agents.

According to COMISEDH, it is not only collaborating with the state within a formal agreement that transforms it in to a *statelike* institution; but it is also avoiding being recognized as performing the state's duty, stressing only its role as an 'independent' NGO,

“Entonces kunamkama manam kanchu, no hay apoyo en la salud mental por ejemplo, pero al menos por ejemplo COMISEDH, wakin llaqtakunapi chay ancha ancha sufriq llaqtakunapi, chayaykuspaku, por ejemplo yanaparirakuña en atención psicosocial

¹⁹⁸ “Bien doctora...digo por qué en apoyo a la gente campesina que ha sufrido en este problema social, solamente los ONGs particulares están asumiendo... ¿y por qué no asume el gobierno? el actual quien ha hecho estas maldades a la población peruana y tiene cara todavía para presidir como presidente del Perú todavía”

nisqampi, salud mental nisqan proyectuwán chayanku [...]Chaypi llankarimunku, chaypi puro psicólogos rínku llankariq, sufriqkunawan ari huñunakuykunku y llamkarínku nisayman qinapas chay soporte psicológico emocional nisqankunawan paykuanapa llankayninkun chaykunaqa.” (Milton, Canaria)

[...until now there is not any help, any support in mental health for example, but at least for example COMISEDH in other villages, it has brought help to villages where people have undergone a profound, really profound suffering. For example, they have helped on what is called mental health programs. They have brought a project called Mental Health. They have worked there only psychologists, they were working with those who suffered, yes, they have meetings in which they have worked. As I am telling that is called psychological emotional support.]

As many other NGOs in Peru, besides acting as a *statelike* institution, COMISEDH is developing mental health projects financed by international donors. Yet should this not be the state’s work? NGOs are local agents and have a small-scale impact when compared with the impact that the state may have. However, it needs to be acknowledged that in many cases the state does not seem interested in investing in topics like mental health programs for post-war communities, and its priorities are elsewhere. In this context, NGOs like COMISEDH develop projects in certain communities that are ‘randomly’ chosen, which nurtures the thought that since the state cannot afford projects like this in rural areas, NGOs should do it. If we only analyse the discourse used by the facilitators and COMISEDH’s workers, this is an NGO helping the state that maintains its impartiality by criticizing the state and its poor attention to the 1980s victims,

“Bueno señores justamente nirqanchik kay Plan Integral de Reparaciones ña unanchakamuchkanña, entonces ñuqanchikqa qatipananchikmi chay leyta, chay leyta qipampi mana kaspáqa imatam aypasunchik ,manachayqa qillqasqalla chiki kedanqa, ñuqanchik insistinchikpiqa siempre incomodasun estaduta, solo así podemos lograr todo lo que dice aquí en el plan integral de reparaciones” (Milton, Pampa Cangallo)

[Good , this, that is called the National Compensation Plan and it has existed for many years. Thus we have to be benefited under that law, if we do not use that law/ if we are not pushing that law what we will obtain? Otherwise that law will remain as written law. We have to request, we will make the state to notice us.]

Milton explains the position of COMISEDH before the state, arguing that they aim to and will force the state to accomplish all that has been stated in the National Compensation Program, even if this means that they ‘make the state feel uncomfortable.’ By asserting this, he claims that the state does not interact with rural inhabitants, and asserts the NGO as the legitimate mediator that will ensure the state accomplishes its program. By placing the state far from the rural population, COMISEDH nurtures people’s idea of a distant state that does not care for Andean inhabitants, situating itself as mediator necessary to supervise a fair response.

NGOs create and nurture their roles as mediator, situating themselves between the state and the population and creating the idea that rural communities need their support in order to be listened and attended. Through performing the role of mediator, COMISEDH denies rural subjects the power and the active role that they could perform, removing them from any direct interaction with the state. This produces a situation in which rather than including beneficiaries as respected actors in a conjoined task, it is a context in which the NGO acts as the ‘big brother’ that protects the community from having a direct relationship with the state. By protecting rural subjects from direct interaction with the state, NGOs become legitimized mediators that *speak for* rural communities as if they were their representatives. In creating this relationship, Quechua subjects depend on the mediation role performed by NGOs to connect to the state, which makes individuals heavily dependent on this relationship every time they look to connect with the state (Scarrit n/y). Paradoxically, along with trying to incorporate people’s voices in the National Compensation Program (through the letters they wrote), COMISEDH prevents

these groups from getting involved in a direct relationship with the state.

Bettina is a lawyer working in the headquarters of COMISEDH in Lima. She was asked to be present in every workshop, so that she could represent the people in the meetings with the National Compensation Council in Lima. It was interesting to see that nobody questioned why this Limeña lawyer was the one informing state officials about how much people had suffered during the internal conflict. Instead, her presence seemed to guarantee the influx of people's claims to Lima. Taking this further, we can see how Western knowledge achieved through formal education becomes the sole/only condition listened to by the state. Rather than challenging this, COMISEDH reproduces this hierarchy within its practices on the countryside. Therefore, Quechuas who are supposed to benefit from these workshops are excluded from the process of interacting with the state, because they 'do not know' (ignorant and illiterate) as much as the people of COMISEDH do. In this context, Bettina becomes a legitimated representative of people's demands to the state.

Bettina is placed in a pre-determined hierarchical relationship in which she is the 'doctor' (the lawyer) coming from Lima with the power to inform officials in Lima about people's claims. In the field, COMISEDH purports to listen to the people and carry out their demands through the letters sent to Lima. These letters were written in Spanish within the workshops, they were written in Spanish by Bettina following a structured and pre-defined format requiring the use of the language of the state. Through this process, when one reads these letters they do not seem to fairly represent the complexity of the discussion on demands and responsibilities in the post-war context.

Although I witnessed the process by which the letters were conjointly written, the outline of the demands was subtly coached by facilitators. The discussions were done in Quechua; but the way questions were framed and oriented to trigger ideas for discussion projected the NGO's ideology and agenda. In the first workshop, local authorities were advised to demand for the exhumation of clandestine burials. The facilitator directed the authorities toward demanding the exhumation of the victims of Umasi. Milton not only suggested that exhumation could be one of people's demands, but he also looked for Umasi's authorities to make eye contact, so they could state this demand. This is a very delicate situation because it is not so simple as stating that people are being manipulated because the demand did not originate from the participants, but it does show the significant influence of NGO facilitators. The line between what people said and what the NGO expected that would be said becomes blurred, especially because often people hegemonically accept what the NGO suggests. When I asked people why they do not question this, my informants often affirmed that 'the people from the NGO know better because they are educated;' through this assertion they justified and legitimized the lower position they have into the social hierarchy, and the 'better' ideas that NGOs' workers may have for the benefit of the community. In this context, it is assumed that NGOs have good intentions, although these may also be questioned in other contexts (see the next section).

In the actual Peruvian political context, NGOs and Human Right activists support the National Compensations Program. Within this group there are NGOs who believe that by supporting this program they are exchanging justice for money. During the workshop,

Bettina explained,

One looks justice, therefore, look for the responsible of the death, the disappearance of a person to be punished, imprisoned for example. Compensations are another matter. What we have said about economic compensation, compensation in health, collective housing, that is a different process. It is not mandatory to make a complaint or have a judicial process [open] for a missing person ... to be compensated is not mandatory. It is only point at the time of that everything happened ... then there are two different processes: one is justice and the other is compensations.¹⁹⁹ (Bettina, Pampa Cangallo)

The way that COMISEDH understands both processes is interesting. One perspective is the justice that may be achieved in the courtroom; while the other is the compensation granted by the state. However, Bettina explains them as if these were two separate things, rather than components of the same process. In general, during my fieldwork I have seen more rural communities ask for (monetary) compensations, than demand justice in the courtroom. Nevertheless, this does not mean that people do not think economic compensations are a way to achieve justice, or at least the justice that the state can give them. In chapter 5 some of the ideas that emerged when state officials and Chunguinos met were discussed; however, more research about this topic needs to be done if we intend to better understand what the meaning of compensations is for the rural population.

In COMISEDH's workshop, petitions for justice do not emerge when people talk about compensations, and this makes me question how people understand the program.

This is important because this may actually reflect COMISEDH's agenda, rather than

¹⁹⁹ “uno busca justicia, entonces se busca al responsable de la muerte, que la desaparición de una persona sea castigada, encarcelado por ejemplo. Reparaciones es otra cosa. Lo que hemos dicho reparación económica, reparación en salud, vivienda colectiva, eso es otro proceso diferente, no es obligatorio haber hecho una denuncia o tener un proceso judicial [abierto] por una persona desaparecida... para ser reparado no es obligatorio [la denuncia]. Basta señalar en el momento del registro todo lo que paso, ... entonces son dos procesos diferentes: uno es justicia y el otro el reparaciones”

people's voices. In Chapter 5, in the two meetings Chunguinos had with state officials the population did not explicitly demand for justice; however, they explained that they consider it the state's responsibility to compensate them for not protecting their community during the years of war. Milton, as do many other NGO's workers, do not consider rural Quechuas to be looking for justice,

[...] on the topic of justice there has to be a responsible. There is someone in fault, possibly is having a position. And people said «Yes, but we must leave this to the Lord, he is going to punish them. What we will do? It is over [the years of violence] but for everything he has done, he will pay [in another world] ... God will take care. Why to file a lawsuit? and... when will this arrive[Justice]! When he will be condemned? Until we are behind the trial, we will be death. It is better this way, just like that »... Who gets the justice? People with money, but we are poor, what can we do from here?»²⁰⁰ ... (Milton, Ayacucho)

According to Milton, rural Quechuas are not interested in justice, as if the compensation program were not also a mechanism to achieve this. However, through a straightforward interpretation, Milton assumes that people do not actively seek justice, which places Quechuas as passive subjects who do not fight for their rights. Rather than sharing this conclusion, I find it important to understand people's explanations in the context in which they are produced, and to avoid extrapolating these quotes as general truths. People in the countryside constantly use the judiciary system, and this is supported by a long tradition of struggles that communities have sustained against their neighbours (for an example see Poole 2004). However, people barely use this to look for justice for the internal conflict's

²⁰⁰ “[...] en cuanto al tema de justicia tiene que haber un responsable. Hay un culpable, posiblemente está ocupando cargo. Y la gente decía: « Sí, pero hay que dejarlo a Diosito, él se va a encargar de castigar. Nosotros qué vamos a hacer, ya pasó eso, pero, por todo lo que ha hecho, allá lo pagará [en otro mundo]...Dios ya se encargará. ¿Por qué iniciar juicios? y... ¡cuándo te llegará eso [la justicia]! ¡Cuándo lo condenarán! Hasta que estemos detrás del juicio, nos va a llegar la muerte. Mejor que quede así no más’ ... ¿Quién recibe la justicia? La gente de plata, pero nosotros pobladores que somos pobres, ¿qué podemos hacer de acá?»...”

crimes. During the war years, when people approached state officials (police, military, Prosecutor office, etc.) to denounce any crimes performed by the army, the state answered by defending the army's responsibility. In this sense, possibly people do not look for justice in the courtroom because prosecutors have not been helpful in the past. In fact, in many cases prosecutors were forced to drop charges because the state (as institution) does not take an interest in denouncing the army. In this sense, the problem is not that rural inhabitants do not understand the idea of justice; the problem is that the Peruvian judicial system is not independent from the central government.

The gold mine: selling human suffering

During the last few years the proximity between NGOs and the state has become more evident, through the conjoint development of state programs. Although this is not new, COMISEDH's president was surprised that people recognized this,

There is a public statement of organizations of relatives of the victims, and they say 'NGOs and the state are over there. We are over here (social organizations).' And NGOs - us, right? that is, they are also us, but I am referring to many others with good will, with effort, they have joined them. That is what they put here. And they demand of the state and NGOs effective implementation of compensations: 'Enough lies, enough using our pain ... 'As you listen. You can feel a great frustration, sadness ... in that period of transitional justice: truth, justice, compensations, reconciliation, etc. in all these cases NGOs are involved, and grassroots have finally seeing them aligned with the state.'²⁰¹ (Pablo Rojas, COMISEDH)

Pablo is one of the founding members of COMISEDH, and he has been its President

²⁰¹ "Hay un pronunciamiento público de las organizaciones de familiares y ellos dicen 'las ONGs y el Estado están por allá. Nosotros estamos por acá (organizaciones sociales).' Y las ONGs nosotros ¿no? o sea, también nosotros, pero me estoy refiriendo a muchas otras que con muy buena voluntad, con esfuerzo, que se han plegado a ellos. Eso ponen acá. Y...demandan al Estado y a las ONGs el cumplimiento efectivo de las reparaciones: 'basta de mentiras, basta de usar nuestro dolor...' Así como lo escuchas. Entonces puedes sentir una enorme frustración, una tristeza... en ese ejercicio de justicia transicional: verdad, justicia, reparaciones, reconciliación, etc. en todo eso las ONGs están metidas, y las organizaciones sociales de base finalmente han terminado viéndolas junto con el Estado."

during several periods. His close involvement with human rights organizations and with the PTRC's recommendations has been expressed through several projects oriented to improve people's lives in the aftermath of the war. However, he does not accept that COMISEDH and other NGOs are identified by the population as being on the side of the state, as *statelike* institutions. In this quote, Pablo implies that rather than be seen as the organic expressions of grassroots organizations, people consider them to be aligned with the state. This is interesting because Pablo does not acknowledge that there is a hierarchical difference between NGOs and grassroots organizations, like the Organization of the Families of the Disappeared (Sp. *Asociación de familiares de desaparecidos*). Thus, even though Peruvian intellectuals see themselves as an element of grassroots organizations, they are hierarchically above it.²⁰² In the same way Bettina is seen as a legitimate representative of people's demands in COMISEDH's workshops, Pablo sees himself as acting on behalf of a group that has placed NGOs on the side of the state, rather than alongside the grassroots.

During my fieldwork in Peru, I witnessed some groups complaining about the work of NGOs, especially in regions like Ayacucho that were heavily affected by the internal conflict. People in rural communities affirm that these institutions have 'gotten rich off people's suffering and pain.' This belief is nurtured by a prolific production of films, documentaries, novels, books, etc. in which the internal conflict has been portrayed, including people's misery during these years. The mistrust communities express towards NGOs is important because it reveals that people are not receiving

²⁰² This clearly contrasts the hierarchy that NGO workers legitimized in the countryside when comparing beneficiaries to animals.

answers to their demands. Taking this forward, I would suggest that this may be a process that also questions the relationship between NGOs and communities, and the legitimated representation the former has upon the latter. In other words, it challenges the legitimated mediation that NGOs perform while *speaking for* rural communities. Through this, the manner and effectiveness of the use of people's suffering by NGOs is questioned, and heard by the international community. Pablo continues this by arguing

[The boy] raged against TV Cultura with hate, with a contained thing no?, saying «you thrive on our pain, and since you have gathered all this ... they have been out with all of this, all those festivals ... » But the issue that you going to a festival does not mean that you are winning prizes, is not it?, but you could win «... then all these awards they are thousands of dollars that you have put in your pockets at the cost of our pain ...» Hey, before that was a boy, he was a sweet person, and so, it appears as he has completely changed, he spoke with a resentment that left his soul ... « And we are the same and worse. Instead you ... » he said. It was a tremendous intervention, which also made it absolutely baffled the people of TV Cultura, a charming people, beautiful, committed, who works with a high level of quality, etc. etc.. and who that is very sensitive, and I know her very well They were absolutely shocked with this.²⁰³ (Pablo Rojas, COMISEDH)

TV Cultura is a Peruvian organization of social communicators whose mission is to strengthen national identity through the democratization of communications and networking alternatives. They have produced documentaries and short films based on the stories recounted by the PTRC.²⁰⁴ In the last quote, Pablo attempts to explain the way in which people are loaded with resentment and believe that organizations like *TV Cultura*

²⁰³ “[El chico] despotricó contra TV Cultura con un odio, con una cosa contenida ¿no?, diciendo «ustedes se nutren de nuestro dolor, y desde que han recogido todo esto...ahí sale pues han ido a todo esto, todos esos festivales...» Y que tú vayas a un festival no significa que ganes premios ¿no?, pero podrías ganarlos «...entonces todos esos premios son miles de dólares que ustedes se han embolsicado a costa de nuestros dolor...» Oye, antes de eso era un chico, era una dulzura; y así, se aparece como un chico totalmente cambiado, que hablaba con un resentimiento que le salía del alma... «Y nosotros seguimos igual y peor. En cambio ustedes...» les dijo. Fue una intervención tremenda, que además los dejó absolutamente desconcertados a la gente de TV Cultura, que es una gente encantadora, hermosísima, comprometida; que trabaja con un altísimo nivel de calidad, etc. etc., y que es muy sensible, y que yo la conozco muy bien... Estaban absolutamente golpeados con esto.”

²⁰⁴ For more information see <http://tvcultura.net/>

are profiting from their suffering and pain. Like the previous quote, rather than trying to understand people's frustrations, Pablo expresses his surprise that people claim institutions are getting rich upon people's suffering. In contrast, I find that this is an important complaint that expresses people's feelings and mistrusts. Later in the interview, Pablo states that these demands have been provoked by the many years people have been telling their stories without receiving any concrete answer from the state. In this context, people feel frustrated because the only thing they see is the recognition that these institutions received, while they themselves are kept at the margins of a scenario where they are supposed to be the actors, but are not. By *speaking for* rural communities and mediating between them and the state, NGOs have erased and silenced the Quechua subject from the scene.

2.2.2 Paz y Esperanza: enacting as the state

Paz y Esperanza (En. Peace and Hope) is a Christian NGO that works in many communities across Peru, including Ayacucho.²⁰⁵ One of its most important projects to date was the exhumation of bodies in the community of Putis from a 1984 massacre at the hands of the Peruvian army. Along with this, they are leading a judicial process against the army members involved in this crime.²⁰⁶ Paz y Esperanza claims that justice should not be politically traded with the current Compensation Program, and it has started a national campaign to prosecute the military personnel responsible for the Putis' massacre.

²⁰⁵ For more information see <http://www.pazyesperanza.org/>

²⁰⁶ See <http://justiciaparaputis.org/>

This project is based on the original demands put forth by Putis' inhabitants to exhume the bodies of the massacre victims. Supported by the Peruvian Team of Forensic Anthropology, the project exhumed and recognized around 20 victims in 2009. This was achieved through the legal advice performed by Paz y Esperanza, and the financial support given by the international community. Although the director of Paz y Esperanza argues that the core of this campaign emerged from the Putis' Victims Association, their original claim was only the exhumation,

"... They were demanding all the time for the exhumation. They said that their relatives' remains were at ground level, that there was a risk to be lost ... and that was their pain and whenever they came they spoke about that. So for them, I suppose, it was a painful thing pass by there, feeling that their loved ones were there and are not buried. And they demanded on their side, and we also requested the prosecutor office to act, therefore each time they came we took it to the prosecutor's office. That is how we have been entering, then we have insisted that exhumations should be done."²⁰⁷ (Nolberto, Paz y Esperanza)

Nolberto interpreted people's claim to bury their relatives within what he thinks they share with him as Human Rights; which means to exhume the clandestine burial and starting a judicial process against the perpetrators of this extrajudicial execution. At the moment of the interview, I did not question the different meanings at play in this quote; but later I realize that people in Putis were not asking for either the exhumation nor consequent judiciary process that Paz was attributing to their claims. First, it is important to clarify that people used to walk through the clandestine burial in order to go to their fields, and they were able to see the bones emerging to the surface which probably scared

²⁰⁷ "...ellos pedían en todo momento la exhumación. Decían que sus restos están a flor de tierra, que había riesgo que se perdiera...y eso era el dolor de ellos y siempre que venían nos hablaban de eso. Entonces para ellos supongo que sería una cosa dolorosa pasar siempre por allí, sentir que están allí sus seres queridos y no están enterrados. Y ellos hicieron llegar por su lado y nosotros también pedíamos que la fiscalía actué, entonces cada vez que venían lo llevábamos a la fiscalía, así ya hemos estado entrando, luego nosotros hemos insistido que se hagan exhumaciones."

them. In the Andes people believe that when people die, the soul of the death (Sp. *alma*) hovers around its home for eight days, and the *alma*'s influence is felt as malevolent and dangerous. When *almas* cannot cross to the *Hanan Pacha* (En. Heaven) because they were sinful individuals during their lives, they become a *kukuchi* condemned to wander around the glaciers of *Qoyllur Rit'i* where they eat people (Allen 1988: 38-48). Taking this to other contexts, the dead need to rest peacefully, otherwise they start wondering and bothering those who are living. In other words, when people in Putis affirm that they see the bones of their relatives, they are not demanding for an exhumation, they are likely claiming for a proper burial, so the *almas* will not bother the living.

Although the original claim came from the relatives of those killed in 1983, Nolberto considers the role played by the NGO to be key in carrying out the exhumation and receiving media coverage on the process,

“ [...] We should recognize the valuable work of Paz y Esperanza. If Paz had not intervened, probably at this point they would still fight to make legal medicine to intervene. [...] Probably, now families alone could not have done much. What happens is that NGOs in particular those on Human Rights issues, we do have these experiences in having impact, raising their voices a little, and also they have well-paid lawyers who can pursue the case. But the case raised by the context, because this case was published and there is a reaction. Moreover, when the big chains of communication raise an issue, other small ones bounce [...] they replicated information from the BBC, CNN, finally this is the thing”.²⁰⁸ (Nolberto, Paz y Esperanza)

According to Nolberto, a significant part of what has been done in Putis is due to the

²⁰⁸ “[...] *hay que reconocer el r valioso trabajo de Paz y Esperanza. Si Paz no hubiese intervenido, probablemente a estas alturas seguirían peleando con medicina legal para que intervengan allí. [...] Probablemente, ahora los familiares solos no hubiesen podido hacer [gran cosa]. Lo que pasa es que las ONGs sobre todo en derechos humanos tenemos estas experiencias de hacer incidencias, de levantar un poco la voz, además tener un poco de abogados bien pagados que puedan dedicarse al caso. Pero el caso se levantó tanto por la coyuntura porque este caso se publica y hay reacción. Además cuando las grandes cadenas de comunicación levantan un tema, los otros pequeños rebotan [...] replican información de la BBC de Londres, CNN, en fin una cosa así.*”

work this NGO has done. Although NGOs have the power to be heard as urban educated intellectuals, and even though the organizations call attention to critical issues and often with the support of the international media, it is also important to acknowledge that as an institution in a higher position of power, *Paz* may have directed the community and the process toward its own agenda. At the time of my fieldwork it was impossible to distinguish between people's original demands and the ensuing process that involved the opening of a legal case against the state. However, the exhumation to be legally valid needs to be investigated in the courtroom according to the Peruvian legal system. However, it may be important to question to whom this justice project belongs: if it is a joint proposal, between a rural community and the NGO, or if this is *Paz's* project in which the local community has little or participation. This is an important question if we seek to understand how NGOs' mediation plays an important role crafting the voices they represent. From the data collected during my fieldwork, I find that *Paz y Esperanza* decided to carry out a Justice project for Putis' inhabitants. Legally, once the exhumation is done there is a judiciary process to convict those who are found responsible. However, this does not necessarily mean that people in Putis were looking for this.

I went out to Putis with *Paz* to participate in a workshop as an observer. The goal of the meeting was to organize the community for activities that would commemorate the anniversary of the massacre. Two weeks later I observed the public ceremony held in Huamanga. The workshop that *Paz y Esperanza* carried on in Putis was led by a lawyer from Huamanga who did not speak Quechua. The most interesting ideas about Putis emerged during our trip to the community

*“These are war-torn communities ... On December 13th it will be the 24th anniversary of the Putis massacre. There are coming regional and state authorities; we expect the arrival of a great number of people for all the things we will do. With this Putis enters the history of the government, because of the exhumation.”*²⁰⁹ (Fieldnotes Alex, Paz y Esperanza)

For Alex—Paz’s lawyer—the exhumation process has granted Putis the right to enter in the official history. The publicity provoked by the exhumation has granted Putis’ inhabitants the public status of ‘war victims’ and has also mobilized state agencies to channel the implementation of infrastructure projects, such as a school and a health clinic. The way this is framed implies that the recognition of the existence of the community is granted *because* there was a massacre and an exhumation; through this producing the idea that they only exist because they are ‘victims.’

During the workshop Alex declared

*“Justice is one of the rights that have been uprooted from you, and this cannot be only temporary. The state must provide you with minimum civil rights. Only 30 bodies have been identified, the identification of the other 60 has been possible yet... they have to unite, support the president of the victims association for the 13th (the anniversary day of Putis massacre) to make their demands. [...] In addition the day 13th, Marisela Quispe of the National Compensation Registry will give Putis victims the proper identification tags. The Mayor of Huanta will lay the first stone for the cemetery / monument.”*²¹⁰ (Alex, Paz y Esperanza)

The ceremony planning to commemorate 24 years since the Putis massacre was expected to be an important event, and Alex stresses this. Not only would it be the first time Putis would be recognized as an affected community by the 1980 internal conflict, but this

²⁰⁹ *“son comunidades arrasadas por la guerra... El 13 de diciembre se cumplen 24 años de la matanza de Putis. Van a venir autoridades del gobierno regional y del estado, se espera que venga una mayor cantidad de gente por todo lo que vamos a hacer. Con esto Putis entra a la historia del gobierno, por la exhumación.”*

²¹⁰ *“La justicia es uno de los derechos que se les ha arrancado, y esta no puede ser solo provisional. El estado debe les debe brindar derechos mínimos. Sólo se han podido identificar 30 cuerpos, la identificación de los otros 60 aún no ha sido posible...se tienen que unir, apoyar al presidente de la asociación de afectados para que el 13 puedan hacer sus demandas. [...] Además el 13 Marisela Quispe del CNR acreditará a las víctimas de Putis, el alcalde de Huanta pondrá la primera piedra para el cementerio/monumento”*

would also be the first and only opportunity for the state to be present to listen to people's demands. Like the CMAN's visit to Chungui, this was an important opportunity to demand the state's attention. In this sense Alex places himself above the community. Adopting an authoritarian tone he stresses that since justice has been denied to them, the state needs to provide them with basic civil rights. It is as if Alex needed to explain to the group, as if to minors in need of guidance, that they need to work together and use the opportunity to demand the state for proper attention. Alex treated his audience as infants who did not acknowledge the importance of the event they were organizing.

Although this is considered a very important event for the community, when I was in the meeting I had the impression that people were not engaged with the discussion. It brought my attention to how dispersed and distracted participants were, as some of them were chatting, and the environment was not as engaging as Alex expected. I wrote down my first impressions, asking myself if the community and the NGO facilitator were using the same language. In addition, I had the impression that this was more a *Paz y Esperanza* project than a Putis one. Now, although I am convinced that it was important for the people, the NGO and the community were not exactly sharing the same ideas. Looking to explore this, on our way back to Huamanga I asked Alex about his impressions about Putis and he said

“... while we think that everything should be in Putis, for issues of memory, they [the community] see everything as an opportunity ... [They] have decided that the cemetery is here [in Rodeo]. They see the formal recognition of the village as an opportunity.”²¹¹
(Fieldnotes Alex, Paz y Esperanza)

The area in which the human remains were buried in 1984 is called Putis, and yet it is not

²¹¹ “...mientras nosotros pensamos que todo debería ser en Putis, por el asunto de la memoria, ellos [la comunidad] lo ven todo como una oportunidad ... [Ellos] han decidido que el cementerio sea acá [en Rodeo]. Ven lo del centro poblado como una oportunidad más”

the village where the meeting was held and where the anniversary was celebrated.

Although *Paz* wanted to do a memorial in the place of the exhumation, the community considered that this needed to be done in the village they considered to be strategically located closer to the road. Alex explains that for the inhabitants of Putis, public attention is seen as an opportunity to establish closer relationships with the state, so they could have a school and a health clinic. If to achieve this they needed to move the burial, they would do it. The inhabitants of Putis, as stated by Alex earlier, see this whole process as a means of becoming visible to the state.

Here there is a clash between the NGO's moral agenda, and people's interests. It is not surprising that the constructions of national spaces to remember the internal conflict and the projects that this may generate (like a museum, etc.) are not people's priority. To remember the massacre is probably not their goal. Actually, we should question why people would even agree with what the intelligentsia considers is best for the nation-state. Should not part of recognizing our differences also imply accepting the different positions and ideas at hand, and respecting them?

The Peruvian intelligentsia (in this I include NGOs and academia) seems reluctant to accept that people have their own understandings, beliefs and priorities regarding certain events. Rather than understanding these in the context of subjects' lives, intellectuals judge them by arguing that people are only interested in money and the state's attention. Here, what is important to explore is how people believe that a close relationship with the state will 'solve' the community's problems. I have often found in my fieldwork that NGO and government workers believe that communities are only

interested in the Compensation program because of the monetary compensation. Thus, these officials accuse 'war victims' of being only interested in what the state can give them, rather than in the process of restoring people's civil rights. When scholars and officials state these ideas, they judge the rural population from a hierarchical position that considers it as an ignorant and pre-modern group interested only in their immediate needs.

A problem of mediation was presented by Maria Elena Garcia (2005), in which she found that activists try to engage parents and other community members in conversations about bilingual education and cultural identity through parents' schools and community assemblies. However, if these strategies fail to gain support, intercultural activists and *capacitadores* usually fall back on declaring that education change in highland schools is not optional, that it comes from the state and will happen with or without community support. When activists need to justify the need for intercultural education and projects, they argue that these demands come from community demands for an education that better suits their cultural and linguistic reality. The problem, Garcia argues, is not about demanding a 'better education,' but rather about how the original definition of 'better education' has been ignored and replaced by the 'expert knowledge' of linguists, education specialists and others who claim to know what is best for Andean subjects and their children (García 2005: 110-32).

Continuing the meeting, Alex strongly emphasized that Putis is important because of the exhumation, reinforcing with this that the visibility the community has achieved is due to having suffered a massacre.

“Another aspect to highlight, nobody would have remembered Putis now, it would be forgotten if it was not for the remains that have been exhumed here in Putis... December 13th is a date that marks 24 years of that massacre, and how I am saying only for the village any authority would be coming.”²¹² (Alex, Paz y Esperanza)

It should be noted that Alex uses *recordar* (En. remember) and *olvidar* (En. forget) to emphasize that this community is known because of the massacre. Yet at the same time, he stresses the fact that nobody would remember Putis if the exhumation were not done. The idea, previously discussed, of being forgotten is a common rhetorical device used to stress the position rural communities have in the national hierarchy. The fact that this expression is used by an NGO worker, suggests that the identity of ‘war victims’ is also constructed and imposed from above. In this sense, Putis’ identity cannot be other than those who suffered a massacre, and today they ‘exist’ because of this.

Alex continues explaining during the meeting,

So that day we will support with banners demanding attention and justice for Putis. Justice is not only a judicial process, justice is also the attention you deserve for all the civil rights that have been uprooted from you. [...] Your justice is that the state provides you conditions for regain a decent life with a minimally decent living conditions²¹³ (Alex, Paz y Esperanza).

Justice is not only the judicial process that has been opened, but also the restitution of people’s civil rights. The restitution of rights is also, in Alex’s discourse, the way to achieve a dignified life. While COMISEDH performs the role of a state proxy as an institution that carries out state’s projects, *Paz y Esperanza* enacts the transnational

²¹² *“Otro aspecto que hay que resaltar, nadie se hubiera recordado de Putis ahorita seguiría en el olvido Putis, si no fuera por los restos que han sido exhumados en aquí Putis... el 13 de diciembre una fecha que se cumple 24 años de esa matanza y como les digo que solamente fuera por el centro poblado no viene ninguna autoridad.”*

²¹³ *“Entonces ese día vamos a apoyar con pancartas que exigen la atención de Putis y justicia para Putis. Justicia no solamente es un proceso judicial, justicia es también la atención que ustedes se merecen todos aquellos derechos que les han sido arrancados. [...] Su justicia es que el estado les brinde condiciones para que vuelvan a tener mínimamente una vida digna con condiciones de vida digna.”*

governmentality exercised from above the territorial nation-state. In this context, the state is held as politically responsible for the Putis massacre,²¹⁴ and *Paz* stepped out as a watchdog institution supported by the international Human Rights movement. Therefore, it is not the power of this NGO that is displayed in the process, but rather the transnational apparatus that oversees the territorial state policies and legitimizes the work performed by this institution. *Paz* becomes the proxy of the Human Rights international network, and has the power to call the media's and international donors' attention to the crimes against humanity. In the classic view of civil society as the intermediate zone between the state and the population, at first glance *Paz* may be seen as a watchdog. However, if we look closely, *Paz* is not just supervising the transnational discourse about Human Rights' it is also acting as the victims' defence team in a process that seems to fit better with a transnational agenda than with Putis' demands.

In this scenario the international Human Rights community plays an important role as both observer and judge. The prosecution of those responsible is something that the international community will closely watch. Although transnational governmentality is acting here, as many of this is driven by the First World's economic interests in specific regions there are differences in the geo-political interests around the globe.

There is a campaign to prosecute the military responsible for the Putis massacre; however, this has not had the impact that NGOs expected. In this sense, any intent to find the real names of the army members deployed in the Putis' base has not been

¹³The internal conflict occurred during the rule of democratically elected governments. Thus, in contrast with Argentina's and Chile's cases the Peruvian state is seen as politically responsible for the army's actions.

demonstrated. The collusion between the state and the army protects this information, and the external pressure is not strong enough—yet. The government’s immediate interests seem to be in the Compensation Program, rather than in allowing the prosecution of the army personnel responsible for the violation of human rights. In the public anniversary held in Huamanga, Nolberto demanded the need for a political decision to prosecute the Putis massacre,

“In Peru we feel that there is not any political goodwill to contribute to the judiciary process that certainly ennoble the Peruvian state, the democratic system for all institutions involved in the issue of justice.”²¹⁵ (Nolberto, Putis Anniversary)

My work among NGO personnel, state officials, Human Right activists and indigenous communities points to serious problems and contradictions between NGOs and the communities for whom they claim to be *speaking for*. NGOs, acting as *statelike* institutions or as proxies of the international human rights movement, have their own agendas framed by a particular morality, and neither of these are necessarily shared with the rural communities affected by the 1980s internal conflict. However, rather than openly opposing what NGOs suggest, communities see these NGOs’ projects as a means to accomplish their ultimate goal of becoming visible and therefore attended to by the state. As social mediators, *statelike* institutions and proxies of transnational organizations, ‘the civilizing forces of enlightened’ urban NGOs impose the ‘ignorant, backward, pre-modern’ condition of rural communities (Cf. García 2005: 132). In other words, the superiority of the Western knowledge of urban NGOs has decided what is best

²¹⁵ “Entonces en el Perú sentimos no hay una buena voluntad política de contribuir al proceso de la judicialización que ciertamente dignifica al estado peruano al sistema democrático a todas las instituciones vinculados al tema de justicia.”

for Quechua rural communities, whose voices are included when they claim for the state's attention but excluded when they are considered to be irrational.

Conclusion: Social Mediation or domination?

During my fieldwork, it was common to find that people consider the state to be a political claim, a sort of 'answer to people's needs.' It was not always obvious that the state exists in region like Chungui as a coherent, legitimate and authoritative arbiter of society and an organizer of national life (Cf.Herron 2003: 1-2). Where the state appears to be absent, local NGOs embody the role of the state and in performing this role and they reproduce also a racialized domination.

In this chapter, I have analysed how NGOs become *statelike* institutions and proxies of the state, and how through this they reproduce racial domination over which Peruvian society functions. Therefore, the intellectual superiority granted by formal education allows NGOs to *speak for* rural communities as legitimate representatives of their claims. In general, rural Quechuas accept this because they share the hegemony of the privileges of formal education. In this process, I have described how the moral agenda of two NGOs is imposed upon people's claims to the state in the post-war context. In this sense, cultural differences become erased rather than respected by NGOs workers and facilitators, who under the label of a college degree impose their ideas that are later crafted as beneficiaries' claims. Therefore, exhumations and trials, which are a crucial part of the intelligentsia's demands for justice, are imposed as people's claims, when in reality all the people want is a proper burial so the souls will not bother those who are alive in the nearest village (for an extense analysis see Allen 1988).

Rather than openly question or challenge NGOs' moral agenda, beneficiaries play along with them—but their goals are different. Some NGO workers consider the population is only interested in getting the economic compensation offered by the state; however, this is more complex. Rural communities see themselves as historically marginalized from the centre of the state, expecting to be paid attention and to become *visible* to the state. In this context, the National Compensation Program has become a means of getting the state's attention, which people imagine as the source of their much needed help. Therefore, the attention that they get for the massacre and exhumation becomes a means through which they intend to achieve other goals. In the case of Putis, the exhumation and the judicial process against the military personnel in the Putis' base in 1984 is a means through which they have achieved the status of minor municipality, which entitles it to have an elementary school and a health clinic.

It is also important to see how the language used by NGOs activists separates an inside and outside world, which often have contradictory discourses in which discourse and practice are not coherent (cf. García 2005). Therefore, it is important to not confuse activists' and people's voices.

“The leaner and meaner neoliberal Latin American state ... has looked to nongovernmental actors to implement these new governmental goals. In the process neoliberal multiculturalism has had the surprising effect of remapping Peruvian civil society in such a way that it seems to include the NGO and state officials (the active agents) but exclude the local communities (the passive beneficiaries)” (García 2005: 113)

In the same line of thought, the Peruvian state has conflated the PTRC, Human Rights activists and NGOs ideas to compensate the rural population for the 1980s internal conflict, but have barely listened to what the local communities have to say. Although

COMISEDH seems to intend to include communities in this program, the fixed demands of a letter in Spanish brought by a lawyer should not be considered people's voices. Rather, it is another way through which NGOs mask domination and the superior knowledge they consider themselves to have over the ignorant rural Quechuas.

Looking to protect the rural communities from the abuses of the state, Nolberto explains:

*"... The CMAN has made two trips to Putis, promising eight projects. Among them, there is one to make a trout farm, that is nonsense! To me that is a very rude thing, if you were deceived before and I sent a hoax, now it is done. But no! They have not even thought about mental health issues, on issues about memory. This is stupid, but that is how politicians move, they want to take advantage of the situation showing as if there ... in those cases everyone wants to take advantage."*²¹⁶ (Nolberto, Paz y Esperanza)

Therefore, it is not only that people consider that the state has deceived them, it is also a discourse circulating among the NGOs domains. Rather than listen to what people in Putis have to say about the state, and what they expect through establishing closer relationships, Paz sees the state as a danger, as a threat to its goals in Putis. In this quote, Nolberto looks to protect the community from the *engaño* (En. deception) that the state provides.

Finally, social mediation in the way it is performed by NGOs produces the rural Andean highlands as a container of backwardness and illiteracy, as a population that cannot speak by itself and that urgently needs a mediator to *speak for* them, and protect

²¹⁶ *"la CMAN ha hecho dos viaje a Putis, con promesas de ocho proyectos. Entre ellos hacer el criadero de truchas, eso es una estupidez! Para mí eso es una cosa muy grosera, si antes te engañaron y te mandaron con un engaño ahora te lo cumplo. Pues no! ni siquiera han pensado en temas de salud mental, en temas de recuerdos. Es una estupidez, pero así se mueven los políticos aprovechan la coyuntura quieren aparecer allí como si... en estos casos todo el mundo quiere sacar provecho."*

them, legitimated by the superiority of the Western knowledge.

As a way of Conclusion

Some challenges toward the current analysis of the rural Andes

Instead of a summary of conclusions from all the topics this research has developed; a more fruitful approach will be presenting the main ideas already discussed in frame of the challenges that as scholars we face. Although most of the details presented here respond to the particularities of the Andean highlands, the topics discussed are also problem in other regions, especially in those areas where indigenous population are not fully recognized as citizens, and where civil war and violence have struck them.

Rural Quechuas are daily racialized, by the state, *statelike* institutions, and often by scholars, who label them ‘marginal,’ ‘ignorant’ and ‘illiterate.’ Rather than understanding differences in horizontal ways, these have been transformed into hierarchies of difference. The result is that rural Quechuas continue to be placed at the bottom of the social and political structure, without a proper voice. Here the question is not if they can or not be listened; instead what needs to be asked is why NGOs and some scholars are obsessed to protect Quechuas as if they were minors in need. The problem of this social and political mediation is that NGOs and the state, in collusion with scholars, impose moral agendas that rural inhabitants accept, just for the sake of the help that will

arrive. Rural Quechuas are rarely recognized as intelligent and capable subjects, able to speak by themselves about their problems and their own projects to the state. When they accomplish this, they have passed through the 'de-indianization' process required by the Peruvian state and society.

For people in Chapi 'marginality' is a way to understand and experience the state as that they understand should act as 'guardian' and care provider. The idea of a state as guardian does not differ much from the NGO 'big brother' which protects them, but also provides them support and resources. These topics in the Peruvian postwar context have not been extensively discussed, and it is important to understand how relationships with the state have changed and how the state as institution is experienced and imagined in everyday life by actors in the countryside. The general belief that the state is in debt with the rural population, a contribution of the PTRC, has a direct influence in how the state is seen and what their direct responsibilities are toward 'war victims' to compensate them. My position about this is skeptical, although I firmly believe in the civil rights that 'war victims' should have, I also consider that populist arena in which the contemporary politics are produced, has produced a particular instability that does not have any guarantee of continuity. Thus, social programs and the compensation program may be suspended at the beginning of the next government.

When people in Chapi use 'marginality' they talk about their relationship with the state, a relationship that is accepted as hierarchical and racialized that compels them to 'de-indianize,' because their knowledge is backward and magical, in order to be accepted as citizens. At the same time, their use of 'marginality' is an attempt to be

visible and included into the Peruvian national society.

Scholars, Peruvian and North American, working in the Andes rarely talk about race and racial practices, probably because it is so embedded in the Peruvian imaginary that its importance is barely acknowledged. The superficial discussion of Peru as a racist country gets complicated when the problem of race and racial practices (in concrete) are proposed to be academically discussed inside governmental agencies, universities and research institutions.²¹⁷ In many cases, scholars and activists fear seeing themselves placed in the Peruvian racial hierarchy. However, personal demons should halt a deep analysis of how race in academia is denying the access to Quechuas,²¹⁸ which can be the beginning to recognize them as political and capable actors. As it has been extensively discussed in these pages, race in Peru does not work through phenotypes. Instead, it works through complex racial ideologies that have ground in a diversity of racial markers (race, place of residence) organized in dichotomies (educated vv. Ignorant, modern vs. backward, etc.).

It is not coincidence that J.M. Arguedas remains as the best example of the racism embedded in the Peruvian academia. It is true that there have passed almost five decades since the discussion of 'Todas las Sangres' his most controversial novel but it is still relevant to analyse. With other names and other stories, differences are transformed into hierarchies, and the superiority of the scientific knowledge still erases the possibility to have an Andean knowledge within the Peruvian academia.

²¹⁷ I met a Peruvian scholar who left a prestigious Research center in Lima because they did not considered important to discuss about racial practices in everyday life.

²¹⁸ Hilaria Supa is a Congresswoman, the only native Quechua speaker in the Peruvian Congress, who seem to be proud of wearing her regional sombrero and *lliclla* (En. shall) in the meetings in the Congress.

Scholars working in the Andes, Peruvian and North American, are not acknowledging (or do not want to acknowledge) the racial ideologies over which their work is constructed. There are some exceptions (de la Cadena 1998; Huayhua 2006; Seligmann 2001), and the Final Report of the PTRC. Although the Final Report recognized that the Peruvian society is extremely fragmented and race is an important element that caused the internal war, the emphasis on the race problem and how the state, activists, NGOs, and scholars do not approach this problem is timidly placed in the last volumes.

The twenty years of internal war have deeply affected the rural Andes; daily life in the postwar rural Peru is different. Theidon (2004) suggests that this was a war *entre projimos* [En. among neighbor, fellow man], I considered that she is on the wrong pathway of analysis. The internal war was between neighbors who had resentments, rivalries, hates; this was a violent and bloody war that deeply transformed structures of local communities. There were multiple conflicts, especially after the Agrarian Reform, and some people inside Andean communities started to get richer while others needed to work for the richer neighbors. The problem was not only the work a group needed to do, but the attitudes of *gamonal* that some rich neighbors adopted. In these scenarios, the Shining Path found its entryway to rural communities and to their young students.

Further research needs to be done on the role of 'humanitarian witness.' It is important to understand how scholars and activists disempower subordinate subjects, specially 'war victims.' Talking about atrocities, repeating testimonies, turning them into graphic images, have a genuine purpose in provoking sensibility in the general public, by

drawing it closer to these atrocities. However, propaganda, humanitarian witnesses and spokespersons do not make real changes. The problem of war and ‘war victims’ in Peru, implies talking about the grounded politics that has allowed this violence to happen; and involves assuming political and ethical responsibilities in the ground of the war. It also implies questioning about how Quechuas can become citizens, in a structure where only Spanish is the official language, when children are shamed of being from the Sierra, when the only way to progress [Sp. *superarse*] is to ‘de-indianize.’

Probably Arguedas had more to tell us know, if we are open enough to listen to him:

El cerco podía y debía haberse destruido el caudal de las dos naciones (Quechua e Hispana) se podía y debía unir. Y el camino no tenía por qué ser, ni era posible únicamente el que se exigía con imperio de vencedores [...]
Yo no soy un aculturado; yo soy un peruano orgullosamente, como demonio feliz, habla en cristiano e en indio, en español y en quechua. Deseaba convertir esa realidad en lenguaje artístico y tal parece, según cierto consenso más o menos general que lo he conseguido. (Arguedas 1976)

[The fence could and should have destroyed the flow of the two nations (Quechua and Spanish) they could and should join. And the path could not be, or needed to be only the one required by conquerors [...]
I'm not an acculturated, I am a proud Peruvian, a demon happy, who talks Spanish and Indian, who speaks in Spanish and Quechua. I wanted to turn this reality into artistic language and it seems, according to a more or less general consensus I've gotten]

Arguedas was recognized as a magnificent writer; however, he was never recognized as an anthropologist because he was too Quechua to be a social scientist. For the members²¹⁹ of the discussion of ‘Todas las Sangres’ he was too Indian, too Quechua to understand the changes the Peruvian society was envisioning in 1965 (IEP 2000 [1965]). As scholars, we are in debt to all those who--because they had different views and

²¹⁹ The social scientists and scholars participating in this discussion considered themselves to be Criollo/mestizo.

magical knowledge--we did not respect and consider as equal colleagues.

Appendices

Appendix 2- 1 Annual Average of the Coca production in Soles (S/.) per Kilo

Year	Valleys					
	Aguayti	Pichis-Palcazú- Pachitea- Satipo	Río Apurímac (VRAE)	Alto Huallaga	Tambopata – Inambari	Huallaga Central- Bajo Huallaga-Alto y bajo mayo
1998	3.77	sd	3. 63	5. 01	Sd	Sd
1999	5.28	sd	4. 94	7. 30	Sd	Sd
2000	7.05	sd	5. 52	8. 94	Sd	Sd
2001	8.87	sd	6. 44	9. 68	Sd	Sd
2002	9.68	sd	5. 26	11.61	Sd	Sd
2003	10.67	sd	5. 50	11.52	Sd	Sd
2004	9.35	6.36	8. 60	12.00	Sd	Sd
2005	10.66	7.49	7. 87	10.67	Sd	5.47
2006	7.61	6.66	5. 95	9. 84	Sd	6.60
2007	7.53	6.53	6. 29	9. 66	Sd	6.58
2008	11.79	6.26	7. 05	10.87	12.65	9.90
2009	10.65	6.09	6. 77	11.88	13.48	10.02
2010	9.85	6.52	6. 44	10.38	14.06	8.87
2011*	13.00	6.13	7. 68	S d	13.91	11.83

Gerencia de Desarrollo Alternativo Oficinas Desconcentradas
Sistema de Información y Monitoreo del Programa de Desarrollo Alternativo
sd: no data, \$1US=3 soles

Appendix 2- 3 Shining Path's letter to Chungui

¡Proletarios de todos los países, uníos!
¡Proletarios, naciones oprimidas y pueblos del mundo, uníos!

PRONUNCIAMIENTO DEL PARTIDO COMUNISTA DEL PERÚ, ACERCA DE LA ASOLAPADA INTERVENCIÓN MILITAR NORTEAMERICANA EN EL PERÚ; EN AYACUCHO, HUANTA Y EL VRAE.

(Mayo - 2008)

Al pueblo y a la nación peruana, al proletariado internacional y a las naciones oprimidas y pueblos del mundo. El Partido Comunista del Perú, marxista-leninista-maoísta; el Partido Comunista que José Carlos Mariátegui constituyó el 7 de octubre de 1928 sobre bases marxistas-leninistas, y que inició su reconstitución de 1964 a 1979, y que está desarrollando y culminando su reconstitución asumiendo la dirección de la guerra popular democrática prolongada del Perú, previa depuración y escisión del revisionismo de Gonzalo y toda su "Dirección Central" a partir de 1992 y 1999; se pronuncia sobre lo siguiente:

Al imperialismo principalmente yanqui y a sus lacayos, no les faltan "razones y motivos poderosos" para intervenir o agredir indirecta o directamente en cualquier parte del mundo, sobre todo en las naciones oprimidas para convertirlos en sus colonias. Esa es su historia, desde las últimas décadas del siglo XIX, todo el siglo XX e inicios del siglo XXI; en el que, el imperialismo yanqui a degollado por millones a la humanidad y a las masas populares de las naciones oprimidas; y hoy, vienen directamente al Perú y en concreto a Ayacucho y al VRAE, a reeditar su viejo historial de carniceros genocidas, antipopulares y anticomunistas.

Desde el término de la tercera guerra mundial en 1991, al erigirse EEUU superpotencia hegemónica única como consecuencia de su victoria sobre la otra superpotencia socialimperialista la URSS, desata una ofensiva general imperialista en contra principalmente de la revolución proletaria socialista mundial, en cuyos objetivos está, no dejar ni un individuo, comunista, revolucionario, organización, Partido, Partido Comunista y nación, que puedan servir a la revolución; y en esta mira están también, los llamados oposición a sus intereses neoliberales y de globalización. Todo sometido de manera prepotente, arrogante y chantajista, mediante guerras de agresión o mediante su carácter parasitario a través de sobornos políticos y económicos; es por eso que Bush vocinglera "o están con nosotros o están con los terroristas".

Los imperios siempre tuvieron como objetivo globalizar y colonizar el mundo, pero fracasaron y se hundieron; y hoy el imperialismo yanqui no va ser la excepción. Al imperio romano esclavista y al imperio feudal español, las condiciones políticas, militares y el desarrollo de la ciencia y la tecnología no les permitieron concretarlo; en cambio, al imperio yanqui capitalista se le presenta todas estas condiciones, por eso a sangre y fuego o mediante el parasitismo, afanosamente sueña con establecer un nuevo orden mundial bajo su control absoluto y contar con un ejército único que esté en condiciones de acuartelarse prepotente o arteramente en cualquier lugar del mundo, en el que esté en juego sus intereses neoliberales y de globalización. Sin embargo, a pesar de tener estas condiciones favorables, tampoco el imperialismo yanqui podrá globalizar y colonizar el mundo, por que se debate en agudas pugnas y colusiones con las demás potencias imperialistas principalmente con Rusia y las asiáticas, que le van pisando los talones en función de erigirse como nueva superpotencia y con los mismos objetivos de globalizar y colonizar en primer lugar a las naciones oprimidas.

Históricamente, todos los imperios intensificaron sus planes de globalización y colonización, ya en su etapa de inevitable descomposición y hundimiento, en colusión y pugna con imperios que le contienden, apuntando mediante guerras de conquista a colonizar sus zonas de influencia y estratégicas, ricas en materias primas que les permitan paliar la crisis y querer rebotar. Así, el imperio romano esclavista apuntó al imperio Ateniense y apoderarse de sus zonas de influencia y recuperarse apoderándose de sus tierras ricas en agricultura y su poderío militar; pero en contra de este deseo del imperio romano, se desató la resistencia y oposición de los pueblos otomanos, y terminó en una descomposición y se hundió. El imperio feudal español, también en medio de su descomposición y hundimiento, ya enfrentando en su seno Europeo a revoluciones burguesas de los países bajos, hizo grandes planes expansionistas apuntando a colonizar América, con el objetivo de saqueándole el oro y la plata "recuperarse" y prolongar su hundimiento; que tampoco logro y fue solución, por que se enfrentó a la resistencia nativa, levantamientos como la de Tupac Amaru y posteriormente las guerras de independencia burguesas y definitivamente se hundieron.

El imperialismo, principalmente el imperio yanqui capitalista es monopolista, parasitario y agonizante; quiere decir, en descomposición e inevitable hundimiento. Desde la década del 60 del siglo pasado, y más aceleradamente y voraz desde 1991; con su política neoliberal y su programa de globalización, a través de las privatizaciones y concesiones teniendo como objetivo monopolizar las riquezas financieras e industriales de las naciones oprimidas y colonizar la humanidad, para convertirlos en esclavos sumisos y disciplinados, y depredar los recursos naturales principalmente energéticos, y lo ejecutan también a como de lugar, a sangre y fuego o mediante el soborno y chantaje político y económico; para de esta manera prolongar su hundimiento. El imperio yanqui tiene bien claro esto: "quien monopoliza y domina el petróleo domina el mundo". Es por eso, que tras el auto atentado de las torres gemelas del 11 de septiembre del 2001, maquinaron "razones y motivos poderosos" inexistentes, para invadir la zona estratégica de Afganistán y posteriormente a Irak, nación oprimida rica en petróleo, y constantemente amenaza y chantajea con otra invasión bélica a Corea del Norte e Irán; y lo que está sucediendo, es que el más pintadito del mundo, está perdiendo estas dos guerras. Ahora, los yanquis, consideran a América Latina como su "patio trasero", o sea, como su base de apoyo colonizado; entonces, tienen planes de monopolizar las exploraciones y explotación del petróleo y el gas, por que muchas reservas ya no existen en el mundo, apuntando principalmente a Venezuela; es por eso, que anticipadamente están tomando posición política y militar, para establecer Estados y gobiernos obsescentes y títeres a sus intereses; y también quieren apoderarse de la amazonía "considerado pulmón planetario" en función de sus grandes planes del etanol, y del agua dulce "considerados el petróleo del siglo XXI"; son pues políticas y planes mundiales para prolongar su descomposición e inevitable hundimiento.

A partir de 1991, las naciones oprimidas de América Latina, tienen como característica ser colonia del imperialismo principalmente yanqui; dentro del cual, los más miserables títeres, vendepatrias y empedernidos recalcitrantes anticomunistas son, Alvaro Uribe de Colombia y Alan García Pérez del Perú. Los yanquis, basándose en estos sumisos criados yanquis, se están entrometiendo a su regalada gana en cualquiera de los países y en el nuestro; está destruyendo al pueblo Colombiano, y agita tambores de guerra en el Perú, Ecuador, Bolivia y Venezuela, en el que Uribe y García son el Ehud Olmert Americano.

Por tanto, no es como estrechamente vociferan algunos necios, sobornados y corrompidos vendepatrias, "que si vienen en misiones de ayuda humanitaria está bien", tampoco como dice el militaraje y humilde siervo Donayre "que si se entrometen en nuestros asuntos internos, yo soy el primero en alistarme al frente de mis tropas". Estos espíritus de pordioseros y mendigos y de bravucones vendepatrias, no son más que hipócritas y arteras poses que sirven a camuflar y embellecer a sus amos; parecen buenos y patriotas, pero en la realidad son totalmente farsantes y traidores. Este tipo de cínicos y demagogos civiles y militarajes, jamás defendieron la patria, siempre la despedazaron; en cambio, sí son tremendamente valientes y expertos en reprimir, asesinar y hacer genocidio al pueblo peruano y a las masas trabajadoras y campesinas. Sabiendo esta historia de los reaccionarios peruanos, ¿quienes realmente pueden y van a defender al territorio y pueblo peruano? Como siempre va a ser el mismo pueblo peruano, ayacuchano, huantino y el VRAE; por que en lo referente, a las Fuerzas Armadas y la Policía Nacional, el Estado y el Gobierno Peruano, el APRA y el genocida Alan García Pérez, más el exiguo número de empedernidos recalcitrantes vendepatrias y anticomunistas, es del todo seguro, que tomaran posición verbal y armada a favor de la invasión asolapada del imperialismo yanqui. En estas circunstancias, es urgente organizarnos, unimos y prepararnos en todos los campos principalmente armadamente, para defender la patria y el VRAE, para defender nuestras vidas y nuestras tierras y cultivos. No hay otro camino, tampoco otra solución.

Específicamente, ¿Qué va a pasar en el VRAE? ¿Qué van hacer la soldadesca yanqui en el VRAE? Algunos plantean "que vienen a poner orden". A quién ¿a los campesinos cocalleros, "narcotraficantes" y a los llamados terroristas (guerrilleros revolucionarios)? Poner orden significa, primero, utilizando a los campesinos del VRAE aniquilar a los guerrilleros; y segundo, luego de utilizar a los campesinos aplastar a los mismos campesinos. O sea, usar a las masas campesinas contra el Partido Comunista, usar a las masas campesinas contra las masas campesinas, usar a las masas campesinas contra los llamados narcotraficantes, terroristas o narcoterroristas. En toda su historia, las mil mañas genocidas de la política imperialista yanqui en el mundo, es usar a las masas contra las masas, por que solos no pueden; además, después de hacerse servir como carne de cañón, le sirvan también para exculpar sus ensangrentadas manos, enredándoles y haciéndoles pagar de todos sus crímenes y genocidios, a los propios campesinos en la llamada justicia.

Además; ¿Por qué todavía tienen que venir los yanquis con misiones de ayuda humanitaria en salud y educación? Entonces, ¿Para qué sirven el Viejo Estado Peruano, el gobierno Aprista y Alan García Pérez? ¿Para qué sirven Las Fuerzas Armadas y la Policía Nacional? Realmente, el pueblo peruano no necesita del imperialismo y sus lacayos. Para "atendernos" como a mendigos, nos empujan a la pobreza y a la extrema pobreza. Además, en nuestro país sólo "atienden" a los pobres de las zonas donde opera el Partido Comunista, y no es a nivel nacional; y a estas zonas, el imperialismo y sus lacayos, llenaron de ONG para sustituir al Viejo Estado Peruano en sus funciones sociales. Todas las ONG nos "atienden" como a pordioseros, pero su real objetivo no es eso, sino, netamente cumplen un papel contrarrevolucionario, controlándonos y ocupándonos gratuitamente a las masas populares en actividades comunales, para de esta manera pretender apartarlas del Partido Comunista. ¿Y por qué en salud? Para envenenarnos e idiotizarnos, y ser unos apáticos, laxos y no activos y rebeldes. Y además, ¿Por qué en educación? Para lavarnos la cabeza, y ser egoístas, oportunistas y pacifistas, individuos sumisos y disciplinados, y estar alegremente con la condición de esclavos y ser parte y defensores del neoliberalismo y de la globalización, por eso apuntan principalmente en estas últimas décadas a los jóvenes y a los niños. Todos estos negros objetivos, antipopulares y antinacionales, es su camuflaje y su embellecimiento de la llamada misión de ayuda humanitaria, por que su esencia son los planes y políticas globales de colonización de la humanidad y el aniquilamiento del Partido Comunista del Perú, para prolongar su descomposición y hundimiento; que quede claro, para prolongar en sangre, pero que no es ninguna solución y menos para el pueblo peruano, ayacuchano y huantino, y tampoco para las masas industriales, comerciantes, transportistas, estudiantes y campesinas del VRAE.

También plantean "que vienen a asesorar". ¿A quién? ¿A las Fuerzas Armadas y la Policía Nacional del Perú? Acaso, ¿todos los días no nos enseñan en que son las fuerzas estratégicas, victoriosas y titulares? ¿En que queda todo esto? ¿Es verdad o una farsa? Los hechos históricos y políticos, totalmente están demostrando que es una farsa. Además, están reconociendo su fracaso en las luchas antidroga y antisubversivo, inoperantes e incapaces como siempre recurren a sus amos, ahora ya no tan solo mendigando ayuda económica, sino, a que intervengan escalonadamente y de manera directa. Entonces, ¿en que queda el antiimperialismo del APRA y Alan García? El APRA, toda su historia ha sido pro imperialista y pro oligárquico, su antiimperialismo es simplemente rebozado de revolucionario y socialista, que le sirve para traficar demagógicamente en cada proceso electoral; y su pregonado "gobierno nacional, democrático y popular" es simplemente cinismo político, de un peón incondicional que representa los intereses del imperialismo principalmente yanqui y de sus lacayos nativos.

El APRA y el demagogo, caco y genocida Alan García Pérez, en su segundo gobierno se reaccionarizaron más, y acuñó leyes antipopulares y anticomunistas, criminalizando las justas protestas populares y tipificando los delitos de narcotráfico, terrorismo y narcoterrorismo, específicamente para las zonas del Huallaga y el VRAE; así, afianzando el camino para el genocidio y hacer impunes las acciones de los esbirros yanquis, y de las Fuerzas Armadas y de la Policía Nacional reaccionarias del Perú. Lo que tanto afanosamente pintan de negro y condenan de terrorismo y narcoterrorismo, en el mundo y en el Perú, son justamente esos países, partidos, organizaciones y personas, los auténticos nacionalistas, populares y revolucionarios.

En estas condiciones actuales y delicadas, el pueblo y las masas populares del Perú, tienen toda la responsabilidad de cuidar y defender a sus únicas organizaciones revolucionarias, el Partido Comunista del Perú y el Ejército Revolucionario de Obreros Campesinos y Estudiantes dirigido por el Partido; y hacemos un llamamiento a concretar un Frente Unido Democrático Revolucionario antiimperialista yanqui. Este objetivo político común, es lo que nos debe unir a todos; y comprender, que para poder defender y emancipar a la nación peruana, a Ayacucho, Huanta y el VRAE, existe un único y verdadero camino, la guerra popular democrática prolongada, que hace 27 años desarrolla y dirige el Partido Comunista del Perú.

¡Yankees go home!

¡Fuera yanquis de las naciones oprimidas y pueblos del mundo; de Afganistán e Irak, y de Sudán, Etiopía, Congo y Somalia!

¡Fuera yanquis de América Latina, de Colombia y del Perú!

¡Fuera yanquis de Ayacucho y del VRAE (Valle de los Ríos Apurímac y Ene)!

¡Desarrollar el frente unido democrático revolucionario americano antiimperialista yanqui!

¡Desarrollar la guerra popular democrática prolongada del Perú!

PARTIDO COMUNISTA DEL PERÚ,
MARXISTA-LENINISTA-MAOÍSTA.
DIRECCION DEL PARTIDO.


Appendix 2- 4
 'A town in the middle of pain'

Un pueblo en el centro del dolor

DAVID HIDALGO VEGA

La hermosa colina verde que baja desde el pueblo de Chungui es en realidad un sembrío de cadáveres. La gente del lugar sabe que debe haber más de trescientos, quizá quinientos o más cuerpos enterrados allí. Algunos traídos desde otros lados, otros ejecutados casi al borde de su fosa. Los vecinos más próximos no pueden olvidar que en alguna época el olor de la podredumbre los agobiaba, a unas horas más fuerte que otras, acaso para recordarles que la muerte no es el último suspiro, sino la última ráfaga de hedor. Mientras bajamos por una ladera, Marcelina Calle, una vecina cercana, señala el punto donde supone que está enterrada su hermana con sus siete hijos. Una estaca pintada de rojo finge de lápida. Al costado hay un altar improvisado con piedras. De pronto una culebra sale de lo profundo hacia la luz. "Seguro quiere tomar solcito", bromea alguien. La mujer musita algo en quechua y hace un gesto indefinible, como esas frases que solo tienen fuerza en su idioma. Un novelista diría que es como si le doliera la risa.

Lo llaman cementerio de los 'tucos'. El nombre nació en la base militar que durante años operó en un local de la plaza del pueblo. Era un apelativo de desprecio: el lugar donde iban a parar los presuntos terroristas. De presuntos culpables está empedrado este infierno, cabría decir aquí. El nombre ha sobrevivido, como tantas cosas en este lugar, a la fuerza. "Antes nose podía ingresar a esta zona. Los militares cuidaban la entrada", recuerda un comunero llamado José Najarro. Es el mismo hombre que por esos años vio el asesinato de quinque comuneros con un solo disparo de fusil. Ordenados en fila, ejecutados, enterrados. Lo vio sobre la misma colina que pisamos ahora, con remordimiento, sabiendo que hay restos humanos bajo la capa de pasto. Lo vio también más arriba, en la zona alta que todo el mundo conoce como Oreja de Perro. Alguna vez fue un insulto. Hoy solo es la frase que designa al centro del dolor.



SILENCIO. En el llamado cementerio de los 'tucos' acabaron muchos inocentes. Altares de piedra simulan



PERDIDOS. Para la reconciliación necesitan recuperar a sus deudos.

TIERRA ARRASADA
 Chungui fue un pueblo camino al holocausto. El último registro fúnebre señala 1.381 víctimas entre muertos y desaparecidos, 17% de la población de hace veinticinco años. Esto es, en proporción a Lima, un poco más que si hubieran masacrado a toda la población de San Juan de Lurigancho. El informe de la Comisión de la Verdad señala que la atrocidad cometida aquí por Sendero Luminoso "superó lo humanamente permisible". Un testimonio dice que, en cierto episodio, una patrulla del Ejército terminó jugando fútbol

con las cabezas de comuneros que acababan de asesinar. Hubo hombres quemados vivos, mujeres decapitadas, grupos enteros arrojados a los abismos. Hubo gente obligada a comer partes de su propio cuerpo y soldados que presentaban manos mutiladas como reporte de su misión. No se trata solo de la cantidad de muertes. Es que en este lugar retinó la más obscena crueldad.

En los territorios altos todavía es posible ver una cadena de caseríos fantasmas: Panto, Mandor, Oqoro, Santa Carmen. Hay antiguas comunidades enteras de casas quemadas y derruidas.

“ El último registro señala 1.381 víctimas, entre muertos y desaparecidos, 17 por ciento de la población de hace 25 años ”

Algún viajero podría pensar que se trata de ruinas más antiguas de lo que son, pero los sobrevivientes de ahora recuerdan quiénes vivían allí, qué hacían, eran sus vecinos. "Nadie ha vuelto porque en algunos pueblos mataron a casi toda la gente", dice Hugo Núñez, presidente de la Asociación de Víctimas de la Violencia de Belén Chapi, una comunidad de las alturas de Oreja de Perro. El hombre ha caminado dos días para llegar a Chungui desde su pueblo. A su lado hay otras autoridades llegadas de lugares tan o más lejanos: Mollabamba, San José de Bellavista, Tantarpatá, Churca, Putucunay, Orcomisedh, varios más. La ONG Comisedh los ha convocado para un taller de capacitación en derechos humanos.



JEFE. Antonio Mendoza trajo la voz de su pueblo machiguenga.

Se esperaba 25 representantes. Llegan 56, de diecinueve comunidades. "La expectativa evidencia la necesidad de atención que tiene la gente de esta zona", comenta Gisela Hurtado, encargada de diseñar el módulo de aprendizaje. "La idea es que asimilen experiencias sobre sus derechos para que las difundan en sus propias comunidades". Llegan con dolores y es de esperar que regresen con algo de alivio.

PLAZA DE RAPIÑA

La agenda de los debates está cubierta de preguntas dramáticas: ¿Cómo encontraron los cuerpos de sus familiares perdidos? ¿Qué sintieron al encontrarlos? ¿Qué sintieron al no encontrarlos? ¿Mantienen la esperanza? ¿Es posible la reconciliación? Antes de responderlas, el grupo observa videos de experiencias parecidas: la historia de una familia que no recuperó al padre perdido, el caso de una fosa edumada, el encuentro de dos viudas tras años de odio porque el marido de una participó en la muerte del marido de la otra. Dos motivadores anotan las opiniones de los comuneros. La reconciliación es posible, se lee en la pizarra, pero es tan difícil. "Estamos aislados, necesitamos una carretera, pero también medicinas", dice el jefe machiguenga Antonio Medina. Su pueblo está a merced de enfermedades y hambre en la ceja de selva. Su gente fue arrasada por Sendero y luego, en su huida, esclavizada por hacendados de Vilcabamba. "Hemos sufrido demasiado", reclama en su idioma sin perder la solemnidad de su tocado de plumas. "Esta fue una zona rica, ahora debemos comenzar de cero", precisa Ángel Quispe, gobernador de Chungui. Los mismos reclamos suenan en distintas voces: medicinas que reemplacen a los analgésicos de sus postas, profesores que enseñen a sus hijos, ingenieros que les expliquen cómo salir de la miseria.

El problema es que el último censo registra menos personas de las que hay en Chungui y Oreja de Perro. Ocurre que los censos no llegaron a las zonas alejadas. "Somos ocho mil habitantes, pero no nos consideran", reclama un hombre de Orcomsedh. El mayor signo de su soledad es que todavía hay trampas senderistas en los caminos y material de guerra abandonado que mutila gente cada cierto tiempo. El último herido fue un herrero que confundió un proyectil con un fierro y lo calentó. Hoy se recupera sin una pierna en Apurímac.

Sobre la plaza de Chungui hay un grupo de gente extraña, como estaría alguien cuyos sus gritos de pronto no tuvieran sonido. Es de noche. El escenario es de una hermosa paradoja: la pared que sirve para proyectar más videos fue años atrás el frontis de un centro de torturas; hacia el frente, un muro conserva heridas de metralla que atravesó algunos cuerpos. "Hubo una época en que esta plaza paraba llena de aves de rapina", comenta Jaime Gutiérrez, presidente de la comunidad local de Chungui. Ahora hay un grupo de sobrevivientes. Alguien tiene que ayudarlos.

Source: El Comercio, July 10th, 2005

Appendix 2- 5
A town in the middle of pain (picture)



Source: El Comercio, July 10th, 2005

Appendix 3-1
Chungui, La Convención, Andahuaylas



Appendix 3-2
The ELN guerrilla in Chapi, 1963

Communist type inscriptions, left by the raiders, on the walls of the hacienda house first block. The inscription says: "National Liberation Army- Land or Dead- we will overcome"




INSCRIPCIONES DE TIPO COMUNISTA, DEJADAS POR LOS ASALTANTES, EN LAS PAREDES DEL PRIMER BLOQUE DE LA CASA HACIENDA. ("Ejército de Liberación Nacional.- Tierra o Muerte.- Venceremos")

Source: National Army Archive (case ELN-1966, no file number)

Appendix 3-3

National Army's List of those who died and were killed 'in combat' by the army in 1965-1966



Source: National Army Archive (case ELN 1966, not file number)

Appendix 3- 4

Army documents about Edwin Garcia Miranda

Ciento noventa y cinco

SECCION ESTADISTICA Y ARCHIVO *195*

Lima, *9* de *Junio* de 1966.-

Informe N° 573.-
 Ref: Of. N° 429.-
 Señor Crl Pate del CG de la 2a. Zona Judicial del Ejercito-LIMA.-

Cumplo con informar a su Despacho que el civil Edwin Garcia, no registra antecedentes; pero si el civil Edwin Carlos Garcia Miranda:
 registra los siguientes antecedentes judiciales en esta Sección
 Delito: Ataque a Fuerza Armada.-
 Fecha de Apertura de Instrucción: 13 Mar 65.-
 Zona de origen: 2a. Zona Judicial de Policía.-
 Fecha de Condena: //
 Pena: //
 Efectiva — Condicional.
 Monto de la reparación civil: //

Dios guarde a Ud. *Li //*

LUIS APARECIBO DE BERNARDI
 Capitán CJM
 Jefe de Archivo

Tasciutos resentimiento

C R E
 CARTEL GENERAL
 CUZCO
 100800 Abr 68.

El Comandante General de la Cuarta Región Militar que suscribe deja constancia que:

En las operaciones habidas entre las Fuerzas del Orden y las de los extremistas en el área de responsabilidad de esta Región, estos últimos sufrieron la siguiente baja, según consta en los Partes de Acción de Armas que obran en poder de esta Comandancia.

<u>NOMBRE</u>	<u>ALIAS</u>
<u>Carlos Edwin GARCIA MIRANDA</u>	-----

LUGAR : Distrito CHUNGUI-Prov.LA MAR-Dpto AYACUCHO.
 FECHA - HORA : 301800 Dic 65
 CIRCUNSTANCIA : En Combate.

O-35001447-A
 ENRIQUE VALDEZ ANGULO
 General de Brigada
 Comandante General de la C.R.M.

Source: National Army Archive (case ELN 1966, not file number)

Appendix 4- 1
Exercise Baldomero Alejos' old pictures





Source: Baldomero Alejos Archive

Appendix 4-2

Attack to Ocobamba, November 2007

DOMINGO 4/11/2007
LA REPÚBLICA
POLÍTICA
3

ANÁLISIS

JAIME ANTEZANA
SOCIOLOGO

El autor fue el narco-senderismo

Sendero es una firma narco, una organización armada al servicio del narcotráfico. Ha crecido por el financiamiento del narcotráfico y cumple tres funciones: Protección a la cadena de traslado de la droga. Frenar y limpiar cualquier control policial. Actuar como firma narco.

Su objetivo ya no es la guerra popular, sino debilitar, atacar cualquier política antidrogas, control del tráfico ilícito en las múltiples rutas de caminos de herradura del valle del río Apurímac hacia el norte y el sur.

SL no es un riesgo para el Estado como organización armada porque no está articulado a una estrategia nacional.

El nuevo peligro está en el narcotráfico que financia a este grupo en sus acciones armadas y que a la vez está dando origen a bandas criminales que ya han tenido enfrentamientos con la Policía y el Ejército. Este Sendero no es más que una organización especializada para combatir contra la policía antidrogas. Esa es la complejidad de la nueva situación y por lo tanto el Perú ha iniciado un nuevo conflicto armado interno en torno a la coca. Ese es el nuevo peligro que el país va a enfrentar.

Con el sambenito del rebrote de SL se ha estado ocultando el avance del narcotráfico.

Luego vendrán las emboscadas de Machete, también nos pondrán de intereses de "firmas". Más adelante Carcapata, en Huancavelica, donde emboscamos una movilidad de control de carretera e incautación de droga. Un ataque similar ocurrió luego en Quinua y posteriormente la incursión en el puesto de seguridad de la mina Cobriza, donde fueron asesinados el policía

OCOBAMBA ES RUTA OBLIGADA DE NARCOS
Las mafias del VRAE sacan la droga por Apurímac.

ANÁLISIS

RUBÉN VARGAS
SOCIOLOGO

Todo fue obra del narcotráfico

El atentado de Ocobamba lo ha cometido la fuerza criminal del narcotráfico en una zona de libre tránsito de la cocaína que sale del sur del VRAE. Fue una respuesta a las intervenciones e incautaciones de droga que estuvo realizando el teniente asesinado. Ningún indicio nos dice que ha sido Sendero, no ha habido reivindicación del hecho, ningún panfleto, ninguna pinta. Es importante es saber quién

es el autor de este atentado para saber la magnitud del problema. Si es el narcotráfico estaríamos frente a un negocio que se atreve a realizar este tipo de atentados contra la fuerza pública y pone en dificultades al Ministerio del Interior porque es su responsabilidad luchar contra el narcotráfico. No puede haber seis o diez policías en una zona de alto tránsito de narcotraficantes.

La vinculación entre narcotráfico y SL es un hecho desde 1984. Sendero es un grupo con una estructura política clara. No cometamos el error de reducir a Sendero a un grupo de delincuentes comunes. Sendero es un grupo de asesinos, atacan a mansalva, etc., pero es un grupo armado formado en base a una ideología, a unas directivas claras.

Intervención de la PNP debe ser investigada

1] Las amenazas de que fue objeto el fallecido comisario del puesto policial de Ocobamba, teniente PNP Héctor Zegarra Bernaola, y sus pedidos de inmediato cambio de colocación deben ser investigados a fondo.

2] De igual modo, la actuación en general del personal policial del puesto. Esto, a propósito de las contradictorias versiones que nos llegan del lugar.

3] Una de estas versiones habla de una incautación declarada superior a los 80 kilos declarados por los interventores. De ser cierto este hecho, sería sumamente comprometedor.

4] Aún más grave son las insistentes informaciones sobre el presunto cobro de "cupos" que se estaría dando en la zona productora de droga de Apurímac, al estilo del Huallaga de los años noventa.

5] Inclusive se comentan supuestos acuerdos para liberar determinadas zonas de paso de la droga en horarios de 12 de la noche a 6 de la mañana.

FRENTE APURÍMAC

Un informe del presidente del Comité de Autodefensa de Puma-chuco (Apurímac) dirigido al comandante El del Cuartel Los Chaucos de Andahuaylas cuenta de la incursión en su localidad de una columna de 100 personas que dijeron pertenecer a un nuevo grupo subversivo denominado "Frente Apurímac". Esto ocurrió el 27 de setiembre del 2007, un mes antes del ataque a la comisaría apurímaña.

Este comportamiento nos ha alcanzado como un indicio de que se trataría del grupo que atacó la comisaría. Lo cual, de ser cierto, nos cambia el objetivo enteramente favorable al narcotráfico que tuvo el atentado del primero de noviembre.

OJO CON EL CAMBIO

El reciente ataque armado a la comisaría de Ocobamba (Apurímac) por su modalidad indica un avance táctico. De las emboscadas a convoyes policiales antidrogas se ha salido a incursiones aún más agresivas que incluyen el uso de

cohetes instalados. Tipo de ataques en los que las fuerzas de Sendero tienen experiencia. Lo que abonaría a afirmar que los autores del atentado de Ocobamba serían senderistas. Lo cierto es que no sólo ellos dominan esas artes. Los licenciados, ex polletas y ex miembros del C.A.D. reclutados para integrar los pelotones de sicarios, también conocen de esos maneseres.

NO DESCARTAR

Las precisiones son importantes. Los hechos indican que el Sendero del VRAE comandado por "Alipio" ha abandonado sus objetivos políticos tras la caída de "Feliciano" y se ha convertido no sólo en el brazo armado del narcotráfico sino en una "firma" dedicada a esa actividad delictiva.

Esto no anula la hipótesis según la información recogida por esta redacción de que en el mismo Ayacucho y en otros puntos del país se dan en estos momentos intentos de reconstrucción de la organización que liderara Abimael Guzmán.

Colaboración Elizabeth Prado.

2007 OCTUBRE 16. CASO: Pucallpa (Ayacucho).

HECHO: Siete "mochileros" fueron abatidos en un enfrentamiento con el Ejército. Los militares actuaron bajo la creencia de que se trataba de una columna senderista. **OBJETIVO:** Los "mochileros" trasladaban una carga de droga bajo la correspondiente protección de un pelotón de sicarios. Se les incautó 37 kilos de cocaína pero traían mucho más.

2007 OCTUBRE 28. HECHO: Quince soldados fueron atacados por 30 sujetos vestidos de negro. Murieron dos "mochileros". Inteligencia del Ejército da la versión de que se trataba de miembros de la columna de Alipio, pero los familiares de las víctimas lo han desmentido. Transportaban sacos con unos 80 kilos de droga. **ARMAMENTO:** En su huida dejaron armas, municiones y un radio transmisor de alta frecuencia.

2007 NOVIEMBRE 1. CASO: Ocobamba (Chiriquitos, Apurímac). **HECHO:** Un grupo armado de 60 a 70 individuos - muchos de ellos vestidos de negro - atacó y tomó a la comisaría de Ocobamba, con el resultado de un oficial PNP muerto y tres heridos. **OBJETIVO:** Escarmentar a los policías, entre ellos al teniente Héctor Zegarra, fallecido, porque el 16 de octubre les habían incautado 82 kilos de PBC.

MACHETE. Camioneta con cascoteo, cinco policías y tres civiles muertos.

Ricardo Mendoza y el vigilante Marco Davila.

Source: La Republica, November 4th 2007

Appendix 7- 1

Letter to the National Compensation Program

Socos, 29 de junio de 2008

Doctor
Jesús Aliaga Baldeón
Secretario Ejecutivo
CMAN
Presente.-

Estimado Dr. Aliaga:

Reciba los cordiales saludos de las autoridades de Socos, Vinchos, San José de Ticllas, Santiago de Pischa, abajo firmantes, reunidas en un Taller en el distrito de Socos organizado por COMISEDH.

Mediante la presente exponemos nuestras opiniones y propuestas sobre el proceso de reparaciones y registro.

Sobre el proceso de reparaciones

- Que se tomen medidas para incluir a las nuevas comunidades faltantes en reparaciones colectivas
- Muchos pobladores sufren de enfermedad mental, muchas personas han quedado traumatadas, por ello se meten en la borrachera para “adormecer el corazón”, porque hemos sufrido. Es necesario un doctor psicólogo que vaya de comunidad en comunidad. Sería necesario hacer una campaña de salud en las comunidades. Los ancianos no pueden acercarse al SIS. Sería necesario que se atienda prioritariamente a los ancianos. Y tomar en cuenta las enfermedades y dolencias producto de todo lo sufrido en la época del conflicto. SIS sólo nos da un calmante, no brinda una atención buena. Además, que haya atención integral con todos los especialistas y que brinde medicina adecuada.
- La mayoría de afectaciones se produjeron en los anexos y comunidades, y no reciben información sobre estos procesos. Las autoridades sólo se les acercan cuando llega la plata de las reparaciones colectivas.
- Las reparaciones colectivas e individuales deberían darse paralelamente.
- En algunas zonas las reparaciones colectivas son manejadas por las autoridades sin tomar en cuenta a la comunidad, sólo a sus intereses.
- Las autoridades comunales también deberían tener contacto directo con la CMAN. La CMAN no debería sólo acercarse a las autoridades.
- Que las informaciones recogidas por MIMDES, y otras instituciones estatales y organismos no gubernamentales sean tomadas en cuenta.
- Es necesario que venga la CMAN y el CR para hacer talleres de capacitación e informar sobre el proceso de reparaciones y registro.
- Que el Estado en reparaciones al acceso habitacional haga donaciones no préstamos, porque no tenemos dinero para pagar.
- Muchas viudas existen, han sufrido mucho, han perdido a sus esposos, han dormido en el campo, sufriendo, y nunca han recibido nada hasta el momento y necesitan sobre todo apoyo en educación y salud para sus hijos. Las autoridades no las apoyan, les exigen que hagan trabajos comunales. Aunque sea con s/ 100 deberían apoyarnos. Las viudas y ancianas son marginadas por las instituciones estatales que vienen.
- Implementar programas de atención para atención de personas en tercera edad.
- Implementar programas de becas para los estudiantes.
- Implementar programas de salud mental.
- Más presupuesto para los gobiernos locales para que apoyen a los afectados.

Sobre el proceso de registro

- Hacer convenios con la Municipalidad para hacer el registro
- Tomar en cuenta que en nuestra zona también hubieron afectados por tortura, bienes destruidos y no se considera esta situación. Hemos sufrido igual que en Huanta.
- Algunas personas se están haciendo pasar por la persona fallecida, utilizando sus documentos de identidad, lo que preocupa a los hijos es cómo harán el trámite de inscripción en el registro.
- La oficina de registro debe estar también en Huamanga para poder acercarnos.
- Muchos casos de víctimas asesinadas o desaparecidas sólo tienen como sobrevivientes a sus hermanos, deberían ser reparados ellos también.
- No se cuenta con documentos porque los registros fueron quemados o en otros casos no han sido registrados.

Finalmente, las autoridades firmantes nos comprometemos a:

- Evaluar y exigir los requisitos, los documentos necesarios para el registro.
- Facilitar ambientes para el registro y apoyar en el registro.
- Firmar convenios con el CR y como contrapartida reciben capacitación.

Source: Comisedh

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