

**Bound by Brand:
Opposition Party Support under Electoral Authoritarianism**

by

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DEDICATION

To KFGR and in loving memory of CPH

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP Justice and Development Party (Turkey)
CSS Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan
DFLP Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
FFS Front of Socialist Forces (Algeria)
FIS Islamic Salvation Front (Algeria)
FLN National Liberation Front (Algeria)
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
GPC General People's Congress (Yemen)
HAMAS Islamic Resistance Movement (West Bank and Gaza)
ICCS Islamic Center Charitable Society (Jordan)
IAF Islamic Action Front (Jordan)
JMP Joint Meetings Party (Yemen)
MB Muslim Brotherhood
MN Islamic Renaissance Movement (Algeria)
MRN Movement for National Reform (Algeria)
MSP Movement for the Society for Peace (Algeria)
MPCD Popular Constitutional Democratic Movement (Morocco)
PCPSR Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research
PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PJD Justice and Development Party (Morocco)
PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization
PT Workers' Party (Algeria)
RND National Rally for Democracy (Algeria)
SOE State-Owned Enterprise
WVS World Values Survey
YSP Yemeni Social Party (Yemen)

Chapter 1

Introduction

It is often believed that under electoral authoritarian systems opposition party success is almost entirely dependent upon the strength of the existing regime. Most models of authoritarian breakdown explicitly or implicitly assume that regime breakdown is the only means by which opposition parties or other organizations are likely to have significant levels of success. Within this narrative, the stability of electoral authoritarian regimes is understood to be dependent upon two critical factors: economic outcomes and the regime's repressive capacity. Lacking popular legitimacy, authoritarian regimes seek to justify their rule through their management of the economy or provision of stability. Second, regimes rely on the ability to repress opposition when necessary. As a result, relatively few models of opposition party success focus on specific characteristics of opposition parties or movements.

This dissertation examines this underlying assumption about the opposition in light of an existing and unresolved empirical puzzle. During the period from 1990 until the Arab Spring in 2011, Islamist parties in the Arab world exhibited dramatically different levels of popular support, despite operating under similar electoral authoritarian regimes that had records of poor economic outcomes and strong security apparatus. Further complicating this puzzle, following a negative economic shock in one case, support for the primary opposition party *decreased* rather than increased. These two empirical outcomes suggest that support for opposition parties under electoral authoritarianism depends on additional factors not accounted for by the existing literature.

This dissertation seeks to fill this gap by examining levels of support for parties with similar ideologies across five Arab countries. I theorize that support for opposition parties depends on two primary factors: the congruence of the party brand name with the salient issues within the political arena and the supply of competing credible political

alternatives to the opposition party. In the case of Islamist parties, I argue that their brand name is weakly associated with economic issues. Thus, differences in support for Islamist parties are a function of the demand for economic solutions and the supply of credible economic alternatives by other political actors. I demonstrate that this argument can account for differences over both space and time.

The Puzzle

In the 1960s and 1970s economic growth rates in the Middle East and North Africa were among the highest in the developing world. Beginning in the early-1980s most non-Gulf Arab countries have faced significant economic decline, culminating in widespread economic crises throughout the region in the late-1980s. Although the situation stabilized following after these crises, economic outcomes have yet to substantially improve. Over the last two decades unemployment and underemployment have plagued most countries in the region and levels of inequality have risen dramatically (see World Bank 2004).

Given these poor economic outcomes, most models would predict that regimes would be relatively feeble and, in turn, support for opposition parties would likely be relatively high. Yet, not only is strong opposition support not the norm in the Arab world, but Islamist parties – by far the most prominent opposition – have exhibited significant variation in levels of support. Empirically, this is evidenced by data from the Arab Barometer, which reveal that stated support varies significantly across five cases throughout the region as exhibited in table 1.1.

Table 1.1: Stated Support for Islamist Parties¹

	Jordan	Algeria	Yemen	Morocco	Palestine
Population²	1.4%	5.4%	9.1%	9.5%	41.0%
Voters³	1.5%	8.1%	12.8%	9.3%	42.1%

Source: Arab Barometer 2006-7 (www.arabbarometer.org)

These findings are further substantiated by the results from the most proximate election to this survey as exhibited in table 1.2.

¹ Item asks respondents which party if any “best represents you politically, socially and economically?”

² All members of society.

³ Voters are defined as respondents who reported voting in the most recent election.


Table 1.2: Vote Share for Islamist Parties in Parliamentary Elections

	Jordan	Algeria	Yemen	Morocco	Palestine
Vote Share	6.9%	15.6%	22.6%	16.4%	44.5%
Year	2007	2007	2003	2007	2006

By both measures, it is clear that support for the Islamist party in Jordan lags behind that of Algeria, Morocco, and Yemen, and that support for the Islamist party in Palestine is by far the highest.

Evidence from three of these five countries where data are available over time demonstrates that the snapshots of support in tables 1.1 and 1.2 are not an anomaly. As seen in figure 1.1, numerous data points from both elections and public opinion surveys confirm wide differences in support. In Palestine, support rose dramatically from 2000 to 2006 and tends to exceed support for the other two parties.⁴ Meanwhile, in Jordan, support decreased post-2003, declining to levels around five percent, and in Yemen levels of support have been more or less constant since the early 1990s.

Figure 1.1



⁴ It should be noted that the measure of support in Yemen is only for vote share; as can be seen in tables 1.1 and 1.2, this measure biases levels of support relative to survey results, likely as a result of surveys being representative of all citizens where as elections are only representative of citizens who vote. Thus, if the same measure were employed, support for the Islamist party in Yemen would likely be lower.

Thus, the puzzle underlying this dissertation is why, despite operating under conditions of electoral authoritarianism, have levels of support for Islamist parties varied greatly across cases?

The Argument in Brief

My dissertation assumes a rational choice framework in which ordinary citizens make decisions under conditions of limited information. The principal argument of this dissertation is that under conditions of electoral authoritarianism, information about opposition parties or actors is difficult to obtain. Due to low levels of information, opposition party strategy in mobilization and outreach is unlikely to have a significant effect on the beliefs of ordinary citizens, meaning that the party's brand name is likely to endure. Lacking additional information about parties, citizens make a rational calculation using information they infer from this brand name in choosing to support an opposition party relative to other potential alternatives.

Under these conditions, I argue that two contextual factors – the nature of the political arena, meaning what issues are of greatest concern to citizens, and the presence or absence of credible alternatives – account for the differences in the levels of support for opposition parties. Thus, opposition party support is not necessarily a function of regime weakness or of party strategy. Rather, changes in support are highly dependent upon broader contextual changes in the political environment.

I test this theory using the data on Islamist parties in five Arab societies. I argue that the Islamist brand, as popularly understood, has a critical limitation for political competition: it lacks a clear association with economic issues, particularly those of greatest concern to most citizens such as unemployment and inflation. Rather, the primary issues associated with the Islamist brand in the minds of ordinary citizens include instituting the *shari'a*, anti-Western and anti-Israel beliefs, opposition to the regime, and traditional social values.

This lack of association between the Islamist brand name and economic issues at the micro-level leads to testable predictions for political competition at the macro-level based on the principles of supply and demand. In contexts where the political arena is dominated by economic concerns, Islamist parties will be unlikely to have high levels of

support, especially when alternative political actors offer clear economic platforms. By contrast, in cases where economic issues are less salient in the political arena, there is a greater probability that Islamist party support will be higher.

Empirical results based on public opinion data from the Arab Barometer offer strong support for this theory. Regardless of party strategy over time, ordinary citizens tend not to support Islamist parties based on their policies on economic issues, unlike other parties with a clear brand name on economic issues. Second, at the macro-level there are strong linkages between Islamist party support and both the salience of economic issues within the political arena and the presence of alternative actors with credible economic solutions.

These findings are significant for the study of authoritarian regimes, as they demonstrate that opposition party strategy has limited impact on support under such conditions. Ideological shifts are unlikely to be transmitted to potential supporters. Thus, party support is largely independent from party strategy, instead being a function of political context and the nature of political competition. By implication, even for regimes significantly weakened by economic crisis, if political conditions are unfavorable to the dominant opposition party, then it is possible that the political system will continue to endure until opposition reemerges in another form.

Definition of Concepts

The dependent variable in this analysis is support for Islamist parties. This variable includes two concepts: Islamist parties and party support. Islamist parties are political parties that support political Islam, meaning the belief that Islam should play a greater role in the political system. Following Utvik (1993) these parties possess three key characteristics that distinguish them from other parties. First, all Islamist groups refer to themselves as part of the “Islamist movement;” second, they all call for an Islamist state ruled in accordance with the *shari‘a*; and third, they are organized in an attempt to achieve this goal.

Party support is defined as levels of popular support for the party. This definition is not equivalent to vote choice, but rather it is self-identified support for a party. Vote choice is not employed in the analysis that follows for three reasons. First, under

conditions of undemocratic competition many party supporters may choose to abstain from voting. Second, conditions of unfair competition conflate sincere support with strategic behavior based on the choice set available to a potential voter. The advantages of this proposed definition are that it includes all adult members of society and deemphasizes strategic support for the party or support based on specific candidates fielded in an election. Only individuals who state that the party itself is closest to their own position are considered supporters. Thus, this definition represents a more comparable measure across cases given that it does not depend on electoral rules, perceptions about biased elections, or other factors unique to political competition in each case.

In order to measure this dependent variable, I employ stated support for each party based on public opinion surveys. It should be noted that the results of these surveys should also be viewed with some caution since none of these societies are considered free. It has often been argued that individuals are unwilling to provide their true preferences due to fear from the regime (see Kuran 1995), meaning these results also could be biased. However, even if there is bias, the direction is known; individuals will be less likely to report support for an opposition party and the direction of this bias is the same across cases. Given the wide variation in levels of support exhibited in table 1.1, there is little reason to think that bias alone could account for these differences across cases.

Additionally, there are reasons to believe that the magnitude of any bias is small. First, in many surveys throughout the Arab world, respondents have provided feedback that is critical of the government. Most respondents to the Arab Barometer (2006-7) do not rate the government highly and state that it is undemocratic, regardless of nationality. This reflects the fact that regimes in the countries surveyed seek primarily to limit organized efforts to mobilize against the regime rather than to limit individual criticism of the regime, thus preference falsification is likely to be low.

Second, the act of revealing a party preference to a surveyor in the privacy of one's home is relatively costless. If an individual refuses to state that he or she most closely identifies with an opposition party under such conditions, it is difficult to believe that this person is likely to cast a vote or demonstrate his or her support in more visible

manners. Although this person may sympathize with the party, without being willing to take this action the respondent cannot be considered a supporter of the party in a meaningful sense.

While there are clear advantages to using support over vote choice, due to a paucity of data in some cases vote choice is employed as a proxy for support in chapter seven. As demonstrated in tables 1.1 and 1.2, relative levels of support and vote choice tend to be generally similar between cases.

As noted, the primary concern with employing vote share as a proxy for party support is that within non-democratic environments election results are more likely to be biased. Nevertheless, there is again evidence to suggest that in many cases this bias could be relatively minor. As Magaloni (2006) notes, in electoral authoritarian regimes, the party in power does not seek to win all of the votes unlike in single party regimes where elections are exercises in regime dominance (see Wedeen 1999). In multiparty authoritarian regimes one goal of holding elections is to maintain a democratic façade. Others have argued that another goal is to use the results for the purposes of the party of the state (Blaydes 2010). Elections thus provide some choice to citizens, some of whom routinely support opposition parties.

More importantly, in most elections in authoritarian regimes, the election outcome is not in doubt due to a biasing of the election process before election day (Sisk and Reynolds 1998). If the regime has successfully biased the process, then there is minimal incentive to use election fraud to control outcomes, especially if international observers are present. As such, often little fraud tends to occur on election day itself and the vote totals themselves are unlikely to be affected substantially through ballot stuffing or other such strategies in most cases.

Third, when election results are biased, once again the bias will be against the opposition party, meaning it is in a known and consistent direction. Any election fraud is almost certain to disadvantage opposition parties rather than occur randomly, meaning that the bias is in the same direction for all cases. Though the magnitude of the bias might vary to some extent, based on reports of the election process it is possible to estimate if the results of one election are likely to be substantially more biased than another.

Despite these potential pitfalls, it should be noted that chapter seven compares a single case study – Jordan – to evaluate changes in support for an Islamist party over time. Thus, once again, institutional factors are held functionally constant and there are few reasons to believe that the regime significantly altered its manipulation of elections or the election process in a different manner in each election. Thus, for the purpose of comparison, many of these concerns are held constant.

Research Design and Methods

Electoral authoritarianism is found in most regions of the world, but examining it in the Arab world provides a number of important advantages. First, Islamist parties are the dominant opposition party in electoral authoritarian regimes throughout the Arab world.⁵ Although other opposition parties exist, few have substantial levels of support. The traditional Arab left was greatly weakened following the weaknesses of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel-Nasser's policies and the Arab world's failure in the 1967 war with Israel. Thus, political competition has come to revolve primarily around pro-regime parties and candidates from Islamist parties. This is advantageous for the study because the similarities between the primary opposition parties in this region reduce the need to control for inter-party differences.

Second, although conditions vary between countries, economic outcomes have generally been poor over the last quarter-century with high rates of unemployment and poverty across this region excepting members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Official statistics indicate that unemployment rates were well over ten percent in most non-GCC countries by in the early 2000s and that youth unemployment ranged between approximately forty percent and seventy percent throughout the region (World Bank 2004, 72 & 90). This trend continued throughout the decade and unemployment remains higher throughout the Middle East and North Africa than in any other region (ILO 2011). Given these poor economic outcomes, electoral authoritarian regimes are more likely to be vulnerable to potential challengers (Magaloni 2006). This common factor provides

⁵ Opposition party is used to indicate any non-regime party. Although some opposition parties have cooperated with regime parties and some have served in government, they all represent alternatives to the dominant party or the regime. Under the logic of electoral authoritarianism, they thus represent competitors even during periods when they are aligned or cooperating with the regime.

the opportunity to examine Islamist parties' lack of support, despite seemingly fertile conditions to opposition parties.

Third, although Islamist parties are each unique, they all emerged from the broader Islamist movement that has broad similarities across countries. Although this movement does not have a unified leadership throughout the region, there are strong linkages between groups in many of the countries. Most prominently, the Muslim Brotherhood organization has branches in most countries throughout the region and the activities of the Islamist movement are similar as well ranging from charity to promoting religious activities. The long-standing existence of the Islamist movement throughout the region has resulted in a broad knowledge of its activities and of the Islamist worldview. This also reduces inter-party differences.

Fourth, due to different local conditions, the nature of the political context varies throughout the region. Although the countries share a number of common attributes, this does not extend to all aspects of political life. The nature of political systems and the salience of specific issues vary based on specific local conditions. As a result, in addition to variation on the dependent variable as detailed above, there is also variation on the key independent variables, which allows for a test of the theory proposed in chapter two.

The basic research design involves a comparison of five cases: Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, Palestine, and Yemen. The primary data come from two sources: public opinion surveys and fieldwork. In the first case, surveys based on the Arab Barometer, a seven-country survey project, are employed to examine societal trends in support for political Islam and Islamist parties. These are used to help evaluate trends both across and within countries. The surveys were all carried out in 2006 or 2007 and used a nearly identical survey instrument. Additionally, some supplemental surveys are used, primarily those conducted by the Center for Strategic Studies in Jordan and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey research.

In addition to these surveys, data were collected during fieldwork in Jordan and the West Bank. This collection included twenty-three semi-structured elite interviews with parliamentary candidates and elected officials, party leaders, and civil society leaders in both societies. Additionally, I conducted informal interviews with over fifty ordinary citizens about their attitudes toward the parties and politics more generally.

During the 2007 election campaign in Jordan, I visited the campaign headquarters of more than twenty candidates, collected campaign materials from over fifty candidates in five districts, and helped to design a post-election survey that forms the basis for chapter seven.

The Palestinian Case

It should be noted that the case selection includes Palestine, which unlike the other cases is under the Israeli occupation and is not internationally recognized as an independent state. Although this represents an important difference, a closer examination reveals since its inception the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) has functioned in much the same capacity as other regimes throughout the region. It governs a territory, oversees and operates a budget, and controls a security force. Moreover, it has operated in a manner similar to other Arab regimes. As Jamal (2007, 11) writes, by the late 1990s, the PNA represented “a classic authoritarian regime that reinforced the centrality of the government through a network that included both formal and informal patron-client relationships.” Thus, while not fully independent, the basic structure of the PNA reflects that of other regimes in the region and the techniques it employs are similar to that of other regimes.

Second, the relationship between the PNA and Hamas during the 1990s and later approximated that of other Arab regimes. Despite fundamental differences in worldviews, there was a mutual toleration between the PNA and Hamas that was similar to that of other Arab countries. As Mishal and Sela (2000, 169) write, “The [PNA’s] policy toward the Islamic opposition resembles the negotiated coexistence adopted by Jordan and Saudi Arabia toward the Islamic opposition in those countries”.

Third, there is an objection that unlike the other parties being studied, Hamas has not renounced the use of violence. The primary claim is that as a militant party, Hamas is not comparable to parties that have never participated in or have renounced violence. However, prior to the 2007 Palestinian civil conflict, which falls beyond the course of this study, Hamas did not use its militant wing against the PNA. Rather, its efforts were directed against the Israeli occupation. In fact, in this regard Hamas was no different from Fatah, the dominant party within the PNA who is associated with the al-Aqsa

Martyrs' Brigade, a militant wing that carried out numerous attacks against Israeli forces. In fact, most of the smaller parties such as Islamic Jihad, the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) also have engaged in militant activities. As such, all main parties in Palestine are linked to a use of violence against Israeli occupation. Within this militarized environment, Hamas' use of violence does not distinguish it from other parties. Rather, the primary distinguishing factor within the Palestinian political spectrum remains its embrace of religion, not its employment of violence relative to other political parties.

A fourth claim is that Palestine is unique from all other cases in the Arab world. However, as a partial result of the occupation, many Palestinians sought refuge in neighboring countries including Jordan. Although the actual number individuals of Palestinian origin living in Jordan is unknown, it is commonly believed that at least half of Jordanian citizens are of Palestinian origin (Cordesman and Moravitz 2005). These Jordanians of Palestinian origin do not live directly under the occupation, but they are affected by the occupation and many still have familial ties in the occupied territories. If the occupation alone were sufficient to explain higher levels of support for Hamas, then one would expect that given the large Palestinian population in Jordan, the IAF would not have greater support given its bellicose stance toward Israel.

In sum, while there are unique elements to the Palestinian case, there are many similarities to other Arab regimes, thus these elements do not prevent Palestine from being a valid comparison case in this research design. Rather, these elements can be controlled for partially by including Jordan in the case selection. Additionally, the argument I develop seeks to incorporate many of these supposed "unique" aspects into a more systematic manner as a means of gaining leverage to build a greater understanding of the dynamics of opposition party support.

Outline

The remaining chapters are organized in the following manner. Chapter two outlines the theory in greater detail and generates the hypotheses that are tested in the subsequent chapters.

Chapter three examines support for political Islam – broadly defined – across all

five cases. The analysis has a dual purpose. First, it explores the similarities and differences between the cases under study to evaluate whether or not some societies might be more likely to be receptive to the basic ideology of an Islamist party. Second, it seeks to understand the reasons underlying popular support for the concept of political Islam among what is the passive base, meaning those in society who are favorably predisposed to Islamist parties' basic ideology. Given their support for this belief, it is among these individuals that Islamist parties seek to activate or increase party support. This chapter demonstrates that levels of support for political Islam are relatively similar between cases, as are the determinants of this support. Thus, differences in support for political Islam alone are not sufficient to account for the variation in support exhibited between the parties themselves.

Chapter four examines party strategy over time. It begins with a discussion of the rise of political Islam and the development of the Islamist movement to examine the nature of the Islamist brand name. I hypothesize that, based on the historical development of this movement, there are reasons to believe that ordinary citizens are less likely to associate Islamist parties with economic issues relative to other policy positions. It subsequently examines the development of the Islamist movement in each country, particularly with reference to the roots of each of the primary Islamist parties within a country. Finally, it traces the party's strategy in each case with a particular focus on changes in strategy on economic issues. It demonstrates that there has been wide variation in this policy area compared to relatively similar strategies in other areas.

Chapter five tests the hypothesis first forwarded in chapter two that ordinary citizens do not associate Islamist parties with economic issues. Using public opinion data from the Arab Barometer, this chapter demonstrates that there is not a significant and substantively meaningful relationship between support for Islamist parties and attitudes on economic issues under conditions of electoral authoritarianism. In fact, in multiple permutations of the model, the results reveal that individuals holding opinions *contrary* to the party's stated position on economic issues are more likely to support the party. This stands in contrast to a number of other policy issues that show that party supporters are in line with party positions. Additionally, this chapter presents evidence that there is a significant and substantively meaningful relationship between the attitudes of ordinary

citizens on economic issues and support for non-Islamist parties with clear economic positions. This provides strong evidence that Islamist parties do not win support on economic policies.

In chapter six I test the empirical implication of this finding which predicts that in cases where economic issues are more salient and credible alternatives exist, Islamist parties are likely to have lower levels of support. By examining the supply of credible economic platforms and the demand for economic solutions within the political competition, this chapter demonstrates that the expectation of Islamist party support predicted with this model is consistent with empirical observations from the Arab world.

Although chapter six presents evidence that this model explains differences across countries, chapter seven seeks to test whether it can explain differences over time within a single country. Jordan is chosen as the case study for two reasons. First, the 2003 U.S.-led invasions of Iraq represented an important exogenous shock to the political system. In the years that followed, many Iraqi refugees fled to Jordan leading to a significant inflation, particularly for basic goods, which resulted in a rapid deterioration of economic conditions. Second, Jordan represents one of the few cases where public opinion data exist over time to allow for a comparison of the same case at two different points. Data are presented from two post-election polls. Although these two post-election polls do not allow for a direct test of the hypothesis, they do allow for a test of empirical implications that are consistent with the general hypothesis forwarded in this dissertation. Thus, in light of worsening economic conditions – which would normally be expected to make ordinary citizens more likely to support an opposition party – support for the IAF actually decreased given the weakness of the party's brand name on economic issues.

Chapter eight is a conclusion that suggests additional implications of this theory. It argues that this model can provide insight into why Islamist parties or candidates have different levels of support in different types of elections such as student elections, professional elections, or local elections compared to at the national level. Second, it argues that this finding is consistent with many of the seemingly unexpected actions of Islamist parties to form unions with secular parties in cases such as Yemen and Egypt. Although these cases are beyond the scope of the present study, they offer important

further tests of the theory it develops.

Chapter 2

Bound By Brand

Existing Accounts of Opposition Support under Electoral Authoritarianism

A long-standing theory in political science is that authoritarian regimes fail during periods of economic crisis (O'Donnell 1973; Gasiorowski 1995). Although any regime-type is likely to face challenges during periods of economic crisis, this problem is likely to be more acute for authoritarian regimes (Przeworski et al. 2000). Unlike democracies, these regimes lack the consent of their population to govern resulting in a problem of legitimacy (Hudson 1977; Epstein 1984). One key manner in which a regime can maintain legitimacy by generating positive economic outcomes, which can lead to an equilibrium known as the authoritarian bargain. Under the authoritarian bargain, citizens cede their rights to political input in return for positive economic outcomes (see Desai et al. 2009). Thus, the basic implication of this theory is that as long as economic outcomes remain positive, the population will remain tolerant of the regime and opposition parties are unlikely to succeed.

Although a decline in economic outcomes makes it more probable that an authoritarian regime will fail, Przeworski et al. (2000) note that this outcome is not sufficient for regime failure. Others have noted a number of specific factors that can lead to regime survival during such times. For example, Magaloni (2006) argues that regime stability is not only dependent upon economic performance but also the punishment regime. She finds that in countries with good economic performance over time, the equilibrium tends to be stable regardless of the punishment regime, but that those with a stronger punishment regime are more likely to survive short-term economic crises by falling back on repression to limit electoral gains by the opposition. Bellin (2005) has forwarded a somewhat similar theory specific to the Middle East and North Africa, arguing that the lack of regime transitions can be attributed largely to the coercive capacity of regimes throughout the region.

By focusing on the repressive capacity of the regime, these accounts give minimal role to the nature of the political opposition to the regime. Although possibly endogenous with coercive capacity, Bellin claims that political mobilization by non-regime actors is low in the Middle East and North Africa but does not analyze the opposition more extensively. For Magaloni, the critical variable is that the opposition is unified. In cases where opposition unity is higher, the probability of regime failure is greater during periods of crisis. While having a unified opposition to the regime would increase the probability of regime failure, there are reasons to believe other factors may also be important.

In an alternative approach, Greene (2007) underscores this possibility. He also attributes the breakdown of authoritarianism to periods of economic crisis, but his model relies on different mechanisms. Rather than focusing on the coercive capacity of the state, he argues that in the wake of economic crisis regime breakdown is likely to occur once a regime lacks the capacity to continue distributing economic rents, which he claims occurs largely through state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This loss of capacity severely weakens the regime's ability to bias outcomes and over time politics become more akin to a democratic polity where the party with the ideology nearest the median voter is most likely to win the election. Thus, his model predicts that opposition parties are likely to succeed when their ideological positions are more proximate to the median voter following a prolonged economic crisis.

Given that an individual's decision to support an opposition party can be assumed to be the outcome of a utility-maximizing calculation, Green is correct to focus more closely on the nature of ideological outreach. His rational choice model, however, implicitly assumes that there is near complete information available to ordinary citizens. Under conditions of electoral authoritarianism – even if the regime has been weakened by economic crisis – it is unlikely that ordinary citizens will have complete information about opposition parties. Rather, electoral authoritarianism tends to be a low information environment.

Information Costs Under Electoral Authoritarianism

It was long assumed that a goal of authoritarian regimes was to limit all forms of political competition. To this end, Przeworski (1991, 54-5) writes:

“A common feature of dictatorships, whatever mix of inducements and constraints they use, is that they cannot and do not tolerate independent organizations. The reason is that as long as no collective alternatives are available, individual attitudes toward the regime matter little for its stability...Only when collective alternatives are available does political choice become available to isolated individuals.”

Yet, a policy of non-toleration toward all collective alternatives is very costly for the regime. Although the existence of such organizations may increase the likelihood of regime failure, it also decreases the expected benefits of maintaining power through an increase in the associated costs. Regimes, assumed to be maximizing a utility function with long-term time horizons, are thus more likely to pursue a strategy that tolerates the presence of collective alternatives while seeking to prevent these groups from becoming credible or viable alternatives to the regime (see Blaydes 2010). This strategy, in addition to other factors, has resulted in the rise of electoral authoritarianism whereby opposition groups are allowed to participate in the system but only under conditions that are heavily biased against their success.⁶

One of distinguishing characteristics of electoral authoritarian regimes is that they seek to control access to power rather than eliminating all forms of political opposition (Schedler 2006). The strategies employed to control access to power can be wide-ranging. Schedler (2002) notes that they can include limiting the scope of elected office or those eligible for election, excluding opposition forces or fragmenting them, repressing political and civil liberties, biasing access to media and money, disenfranchisement, coercion, corruption, electoral fraud, institutional bias, tutelage, and reversal of office among others. Although the effects of such strategies are multifaceted, many of these tactics serve to limit the role political parties play in linking citizens with political power. Opposition parties frequently are excluded from competition, face limits on outreach in media, have campaign rallies cancelled, and are otherwise limited from reaching out to ordinary citizens.

⁶ Diamond notes that electoral authoritarian or “hybrid” regimes have proliferated in the last few decades and have now become the norm for non-democratic polities (Diamond 2002).

One effect of these strategies is to try to ensure that citizens have limited information about alternatives to the regime (Halpern 1994). Under such conditions, ordinary citizens may know opposition parties exist, but they are unlikely to possess significant information about the party or its platform. Media restrictions bias coverage in favor of the regime, painting opposition parties in an unfavorable light if they are covered at all. Other forms of outreach are also limited. For example, parties may be only allowed to campaign during short periods prior to an election, but even these events are subject to cancellation by the regime (Sisk and Reynolds 1998).

These strategies significantly raise the cost of obtaining such information about opposition parties. As a result, parties that are newly formed or otherwise lack a brand name are unlikely to achieve significant support due to the inability to communicate their message to potential supporters.⁷ On the other hand, those with existing brand names are unlikely to be able to change them significantly, unless they can circumvent regime attempts to limit their outreach efforts. Thus, within this low information environment, the choice set available ordinary citizens is constrained. Citizens possess near full information about the regime given their direct experience with its rule, but they possess relatively little knowledge of other political actors.

Although ordinary citizens may be dissatisfied with the performance of the regime, under conditions of bounded rationality, supporting the regime or abstaining from politics altogether may still be preferable to supporting an opposition party. Based on knowledge of an opposition party's brand name, a citizen may conclude that it is not a better option than the existing system. Additionally, if an opposition party's brand name is not strongly associated with a salient issue within the political arena, there is limited incentive for an ordinary citizen to support this party rather than support the existing regime or abstain. Therefore, there are clear reasons to expect that the nature of an opposition party's brand name will have a significant effect on its level of support under electoral authoritarianism.

The Islamist Brand Name

⁷ Popkin et al. (1976) demonstrate that even in high information societies such as liberal democracies where obtaining information about parties is relatively costless compared to electoral authoritarian regimes, many citizens rely heavily on brand names to inform political decisions.

Parties that take up the banner of Islam signal to potential supporters a general agreement with the basic tenets of the Islamist movement and of Islamic tradition. Much of this brand name comes from the *shari‘a* – literally meaning way or path⁸ – which is a legal and religious code that derives largely from interpretations of Islamic texts including the Qur’an or the *sunnah*.⁹ Additionally, secondary sources of the law include *ijmā’*, or the consensus of Islamic scholars, and *qiyās* or the process of deductive analogy. Due to the multiple possible interpretations texts covering a range of important issues, Islamic scholars continue to debate the proper means by which to derive the *shari‘a*. Within Sunni Islam alone, disagreements over the proper manner in which to conduct Islamic science and differences over the meaning of these texts led to the development of four separate schools of law (*madh‘hab*) within Sunni Islam: the Hanafi school, the Maliki school, the Shafi‘i school and the Hanbali schools. As a result of these and other disagreements, no definitive and codified version of the *shari‘a* is universally accepted throughout the Muslim world.

As with any religion, disagreements over the proper interpretation of religious teachings extend to a variety of issues. In the case of personal status law, for example, the Qur’an states that women should guard their modesty (24:30-31; 33:59). With no clear definition for “modesty”, there is wide variation in what is deemed acceptable for women within Islam. Under some interpretations, it is being almost entirely covered in a *burqa* or *niqab* while in other cases wearing the *hijab* is deemed acceptable under Islamic law.

Islam, like other religions, has undergone changes in its understanding and application with concepts often being redefined and applied to new contexts. In one such example, the Qur’an describes the concept of the “house of peace” (*dar as-salaam*) (6:127; 10:25) or paradise. During the Mongol invasions into Muslim lands, this concept was expanded into the house of peace and the “house of war” (*dar al-harb*) to describe places with Islamic governance compared to those without, respectively. In Ottoman times, the *dar al-harb* was reconstituted as *dar al-gharb*, or “house of the West”, giving voice to an anti-Western trend in Islamic thought. Given the differences in understanding

⁸ In archaic Arabic, the word means the straight path to the water hole, a concept that had extreme significance in the deserts of Arabia (see Weiss 1998, 17).

⁹ The habits or usual practices of the Prophet Muhammad.

across space and time, Aziz al-Azmeh (1993, 1) concludes, “There are as many Islams as situations that sustain it...”

A number of disagreements continue to exist between Islamist theorists, but the Islamist movement developed a framework based on Islamic concepts that could be employed for mass mobilization. Rather than focusing on detailed debates, the Islamist movement forwarded the goal of recapturing a golden age of Islam by undertaking a religious reawakening. This vision reduces the broad teachings of Islam into a program of reforms that can serve to achieve this desired outcome. Although multifaceted and broadly applicable, over time the Islamist movement came to be best known for a vision that was primarily anti-Israeli, anti-Western, culturally conservative and supportive of a very traditional form of Islamic law (Utvik and Tønnessen 2008). To this end, the Muslim Brotherhood – one prominent organization associated with this movement – has often devoted significant attention to symbolic issues such as alcohol consumption, the mixing of the sexes in public spaces, educational systems, and Israel (Sahliyah 2005). Since most regimes in the Arab world deviate from the Islamist ideal across a range of policies, the movement often embraces such issues as a means to mobilize public support. Growing out of the success of this movement, Islamist parties had clear incentives to forward a similar vision.

The Islamic Brand Name on Economics

Despite being known primarily for non-economic issues, initially the Muslim Brotherhood focused significant attention on economic issues. For example, a number of reforms proposed by Hassan al-Banna in a letter to King Faruq in 1947 centered on economic issues including raising the minimum wage and improving worker’s rights. The Egyptian Brotherhood also sought alliances with the emerging labor movement and highlighted the economic inequalities present in Egypt (Mitchell 1977).

The emphasis on economic issues began to decline, however, largely due to changes in the political environment. Hassan al-Banna was assassinated in 1949 and Gamal Abdel-Nasser led a crackdown on the Brotherhood, precipitating a change in its strategy and worldview. This reformulation can be seen in an influential tract that

appeared in 1964 entitled *Milestones*¹⁰ by Sayyid Qutb, a prominent member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Rather than seeking to outline the development of Islamic institutions, his emphasis is on bringing about an Islamic revolution. If an Islamic society could be established, he argues that Islamic institutions will be brought into existence through praxis. Thus, his vision he places little emphasis on bread-and-butter economic issues. Instead, central to the tract is an attempt to discredit political systems associated with foreign powers. He criticizes the West for materialism and its corrupting influence on Muslim lands. Qutb argues that adherence to Islam – which represents a complete system of life – is sufficient to resolve all present problems introduced by foreign influence. Unlike al-Banna, however, Qutb provides no details for specific calls for economic reform; the tract makes no mention of emerging problems such as unemployment or inflation. Additionally, although much of Islamic economic thought has derived from the ban on interest (*ribā*) or the provision of alms (*zakāt*), Qutb makes virtually no mention of either in this treatise; of the three references to *zakāt*, two are as part of a list of the pillars of Islam and in the third case in a quotation by the Prophet Muhammad that includes a list of other obligations. As for interest, the only reference comes as a condemnation of Jewish bankers.

Although economic issues played a lesser role in the thought of the Muslim Brotherhood and the broader Islamist movement after the 1950s, a number of independent Islamic theorists have sought to develop an Islamic vision to address modern economic challenges. The manner in which these problems have been addressed relies heavily on the concepts of *zakāt* and *ribā* as well as long-standing commercial jurisprudence. Rather than addressing many challenges directly, the problems are linked to a violation of an Islamic principle. For example, heavily borrowing from international financial institutions and Western governments has led to significant debts for many Muslim countries. Since these loans charge interest, much of the problem of foreign debt, and in turn poor economic conditions, is linked to the payment of interest. Thus, eliminating loans that accrue interest are proposed as a solution to a range of issues (Utvik 2006, 39).

¹⁰ *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* is loosely translated as “Milestones” or “Signposts on the Road”.

Similarly, scholars have used the concepts of protection of private property and *zakāt* as a means to address the fundamental problem of political economy: the proper balance between social equality and private property rights. Arguably the most common approach is a general social-democratic vision balancing the right to private property and the provision for all in society (see Nomani and Rahnema 1994). The Islamic solution to this issue underscores the benefits that would result from religious revival allowing both goals could be realized. If people became good Muslims they would not be greedy but would seek the common good by providing *zakāt* to the poor.¹¹ Thus, all citizens would be cared for but private property would still be protected. Along these lines, Yūsuf Kamāl, among others, argues that the solution is for the state to collect *zakāt* as at the rates set by God and that additional taxes are required of the wealthy only when this income is insufficient (Utvik 2006, 99).

Islam thus can be interpreted in a manner that is relevant to economic issues, but this occurs largely within a broad concept of building a moral economy (Roy 1994, 146). The result is a vaguely defined conception of better economic outcomes to which Islam represents the key intervening variable. Yet, outlining more tangible steps or developing a set of policy recommendations to reach this goal is more problematic for the movement. Religious frames can be adopted for certain institutions, such as international financial institutions that charge interest or domestic governments that accept their loans. Doing the same for unemployment or inflation, however, presents a greater challenge, but one that Islamist parties, as opposed to movements, must seek to resolve (Richter 2006).

In sum, economic issues represent a significant challenge for Islamist parties. Unlike many other political issues, there is no clear and concise religious frame on which to base the parties' platforms on economics. Since no clear frame has developed, particularly relative to positions such as being anti-Western or anti-Israel for example, the Islamist brand name on economic issues is weak. Having inherited this brand name, Islamist parties thus have a fundamental weakness, which means that ordinary citizens

¹¹ Summarizing Islamic macroeconomic theory, Roy (1994, 144-6) argues that what distinguishes the Islamic solution to the economy from other approaches is the primacy given to ethics. Islamic jurisprudence in the field of economics gives a primacy to a fundamental ethical transformation of individuals by which they realize that achieving material sufficiency is the goal as it provides a Muslim with the necessary means to pursue virtue. If all individuals acted in this virtuous manner, than the challenges of balancing private property and social justice would be resolved. For this reason, Roy concludes that the Islamic vision is little more than an impossible utopia.

cannot readily infer from the brand name of these parties how they would improve economic conditions.

Rebranding Islamist Parties

Party brand names provide important cues to potential supporters in determining party choice. The party brand allows potential supporters to evaluate how the party would most likely behave after winning election, for example (see Downs 1957; Woon and Pope 2008). Within low information environments, this is particularly true as ordinary citizens are most likely to make use shortcuts to inform their political decisions (Lupia 1994). As noted, the Islamist brand has a clear association on a number of social and political issues, including more traditional attitudes toward women, being anti-Israel and anti-West among others (Utvik and Tønnessen 2008, 106-10). Given the lack of an emphasis by the movement on economic issues and the lack of consensus, the strength of this brand name does not extend to most economic issues.

Thus, even if Islamist parties develop a clear platform detailing economic solutions, an even greater challenge is turning this platform into support for the party. Given the lack of a clear Islamic frame on which to rely, Islamist parties lack “bumper sticker” slogans on economic issues; their most common slogan, “Islam is the solution,” has no implicit reference to economic issues, unlike the Islamist frame that is understood on many social issues, foreign relations, or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Shadid 1988, 668-9).

Party rebranding is time-consuming and costly in high information societies, and often proves ineffective. As Philpot (2007) has shown in the American context, a relatively high information environment, attempted Republican rebranding on racial issues in the 2000s was largely unsuccessful. In the contexts under study, the ability for parties to inform citizens is even lower, meaning the party is not likely to reap benefits even if it can successfully develop a credible economic policy. Given restrictions on party activities, unless potential supporters undertake costly efforts to learn more about these parties, their brand image of Islamist parties is unlikely to change.

As a result, it is probable that changes in party strategy on economics are unlikely to have a significant effect on the overall brand name of the party. In low information

environments, changes in party ideological outreach should have very limited payoffs for an opposition party. Only citizens proximate enough to members of the party or willing to pay high costs are likely to be affected by an attempted rebranding by the party. Thus, differences in party strategy appear unlikely to be reflected by changes in relative support for the party. Empirically, it is expected that regardless of party strategy, support for Islamist parties should be uncorrelated with attitudes about economic issues.

Implications for the Macro-Level

Among Islamist parties operating in conditions of limited information under electoral authoritarianism, this argument does not expect that differences in a party's ideological outreach have a significant effect on explaining differences in levels of party support. Instead, the interaction between the political context and party brand name would be expected to have a greater effect on variation in levels of support between similar parties.


There are two elements of the political context that could affect the levels of support exhibited by Islamist parties. The first is the degree of congruence between the party's brand name and the most salient issues within the political arena. In cases where there is a higher salience, then the expectation is that it is more likely that Islamist parties will have higher levels of support. In cases where the salience is lower, then it is more likely that support for Islamist parties will be lower. As was demonstrated above, the most significant limitation of the Islamist brand name is its lack of association with economic issues, meaning that in cases where economic issues are of greater importance, the congruence of the Islamist brand name and the salient issues within the political arena is likely to be lower; by contrast, in cases where economic issues are less salient, the likelihood of success is expected to be higher.

Second, Islamist parties face different types of political competition in different political contexts. In cases where there are parties or candidates offering credible alternatives to an Islamist party on salient issues, then support for Islamist parties would be expected to be lower. On the other hand, if there few credible alternatives to the Islamist party exist, levels of support would be expected to be higher. For Islamist

parties, the most significant potential challenger is one offering a clear economic platform.

These expectations can be summarized in figure 2.1. This figure demonstrates that in cases where there is a high congruence of brand name and issue salience and a low supply of credible economic alternatives from political competitors, support for Islamist parties is expected to be higher. In the opposite case where there is a low congruence of brand name and issue salience and a high number of credible economic alternatives available to ordinary citizens, support for Islamist parties is expected to be low. In the intermediate cases, support is expected to be moderate.

Figure 2.1: Summary of Theoretical Predictions



It should be noted that the demand for economic solutions is not intended to be an absolute measure, but rather the salience of economic issues relative to other concerns. Thus, the variable is the associated degree to which economic concerns dominate the political arena that approximates the demand curve of ordinary citizens.

The supply of economic solutions depends on the choice set of candidates and parties available to ordinary citizens. Under electoral authoritarianism, political competition is restricted as detailed previously. Although some parties have strong economic platforms, many parties are not well known to ordinary citizens, given the restrictions under which these parties operate. The result is usually a context that has weak opposition parties and a high number of independent candidates (Lust-Okar 2006;

Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009). Despite the weakness of most parties, in some societies political competition revolves around economic issues in the form of patronage and rent-seeking behavior. Elected officials can provide patronage and those in positions of power can distribute economic goods to their supporters, leading to a political arena that becomes dominated by rent-seeking. Thus, parties and candidates that offer patronage provide clear economic “platforms” promising better economic conditions to their network of supporters if elected. In cases where this behavior is more common, Islamist party success would be expected to be lower given that they do not inherit a credible brand name on economic issues.

Rent-seeking behavior is found in many contexts, but it can be particularly strong where a common identity is present (Fearon 1999). Shared identities help reinforce the bonds that insure an elected individual is more likely to provide patronage to a supporter, meaning that the commitment becomes more credible. In the Arab world, this bond is most likely to be found in family or tribal identity (Lust-Okar 2006; Philips 2008). Given the strength of family identity within these contexts, sharing this identity with an official yields a credible expectation of receiving patronage (Kilani and Sakijha 2002). Thus, in cases where tribal or ethnic factors play a greater role in structuring political competition, there is likely to exist a greater supply of candidates with credible economic platforms which in turn decreases levels of expected support for Islamist parties.

Conclusion

This chapter began by examining the implications of the existing literature for levels of support for opposition parties under conditions of electoral authoritarianism. It demonstrated that there are assumptions within the literature that the nature of these parties is less important than their level of unity or that opposition parties are able to effectively reach out to citizens to position themselves near the median voter. This chapter has questioned both of these claims and argued that the frames ordinary citizens use to evaluate opposition parties should affect levels of party support. Most importantly, this evaluation is influenced by the brand name of a party.

Critically, in low information environments it is not expected that the brand name of a party can be influenced significantly. This lack of ability to reposition the party to

appeal to voters is likely to have significant implications for the overall levels of support for the party. Namely, the party's support is likely to be a function of its interaction with the political context. Thus, differences in the political context can explain differences in levels of support for parties with similar ideologies across a range of cases.

If true, an implication of this theory is that students of authoritarian regimes should carefully consider the nature of the political opposition. Although the strength of the existing regime may be a critical factor in explaining the potential for opposition success, it is not a sufficient factor. After all, even in cases where the opposition is relatively unified and economic outcomes are poor, opposition success is not universal. Rather, the strengths and weaknesses of the brand name of opposition parties also play an important role in determining levels of support for these parties.

Chapter 3

Understanding Support for Political Islam

The previous chapter implicitly assumed that a sizable segment of the population across a range of Arab societies has a favorable opinion toward the concept of political Islam. Second, the theory assumes that both the relative size and the determinants of support for political Islam are similar across cases. To confirm these assumptions, it is necessary to verify that both the expected correlations and assumed variances in these relationships are in fact present. After all, societies with higher levels of passive support for political Islam could represent more fertile environments for Islamist parties, likely affecting their overall levels of support. Similarly, if the determinants of passive support for political Islam vary between countries, it is possible that certain types of support for political Islam may lend themselves to being mobilized more readily than others, providing Islamist parties in some societies with inherent advantages over others. This chapter examines these possibilities.

Most existing studies of political Islam focus on understanding the factors underlying its support or on the nature of political parties or organizations that self-identify with this ideology. In the former, levels of societal support are generally found or assumed to be relatively high (see Esposito 1987; Ayubi 1991; Esposito and Voll 1996; Tibi 1998; Güalp 2001). These works provide a number of theories accounting for the general popularity of political Islam, although they rarely test their hypothesis against others simultaneously or within specific countries; rather, they provide general accounts of why political Islam is popular.

Another set of works has tested levels of support for political Islam, but has focused less directly on the reasons underlying this support (Tessler and Gao 2005; Jamal and Tessler 2008). These studies show that societal support for political Islam tends to be relatively high in a number of countries, but they do not evaluate whether the reasons for this popularity are similar across cases. Only recently have studies begun to test

determinants of support for political Islam empirically across the region using a large-n approach to account for variation in levels of support across countries (Tessler n.d.).

A third set of works focuses on more detailed case studies of Islamic recruitment at the micro-level (Wickham 2002; Wicktorowicz 2004; Robinson 2004; Singerman 2004; Clark 2004; Schwedler 2004). These studies tend to focus either on particular strategies used by these groups or the degree to which Islamist organizations are advantaged over other organizations. They do not, however, seek to account for overall levels of support at the societal level. Nevertheless, they offer valuable insights into the factors that may account for support for political Islam based on how Islamic outreach takes place.

Building on these existing studies, this chapter first examines levels of support for political Islam across five Arab societies using public opinion data, finding a high degree of similarity between these cases. Subsequently, using a large-n statistical approach it tests a number of the existing hypotheses about the factors leading individuals to support political Islam. Despite a few differences across cases, overall the findings reveal a high degree of consistency in both societal levels of support and the determinants of this support across cases. This provides strong evidence in favor of the two key assumptions made in chapter two and implies that the reasons accounting for different levels of support for Islamist parties is unlikely to be related to differences in passive support for political Islam at the societal level.

This chapter begins with a comparison of existing theories that can explain support for political Islam broadly. The third section operationalizes measures to examine relative support for political Islam among the case studies while the fourth section develops specific hypotheses that can be tested regarding the determinants of support for this concept. The fifth section constructs a model and then examines the various factors that are associated with political Islam across cases. The final section evaluates the similarities and differences found between these models.

Support for Political Islam in the Arab world

Although the rise of political Islam likely occurred as the result of a variety of factors, in the ensuing decades since the Iranian revolution the popularity of political

Islam has increased. More recently, public opinion polls have demonstrated that, on average, the majority of individuals in the Arab world believe that an increased role for religion in public life would have positive benefits for society (Jamal and Tessler 2008, 102).

While Islamist thought and ideology are complex and multifaceted, the ideology is often presented to the broader public in a simplified manner: Islam is the solution. Akin to a bumper sticker slogan in other contexts, this simple phrase largely summarizes the general claim that Islamists seek to signal: a return to the basic tenets of Islam is a necessary corrective for society as well as the appropriate means of governing it. More specifically, the *shari'a* contains the blueprint for society's proper ordering. Thus, the general appeal made by the Islamic movement represents a return to Islam by members of society as a means to reinvigorate the Islamic world.

Since Islamist parties are based within the broader Islamist movement, they take advantage of this association and make use of similar statements and symbols. Islam is the solution is a common frame that is used to a greater or lesser extent by each party, likely as it represents the most basic claim made by the party – that religion contains the answer to political and social problems. Logically, individuals within society who support this basic claim are also those who are more likely to support the party itself.

Thus, supporting the concept of political Islam in this general form represents a form of passive support. Believing that religion can or even should play a role in the political process does not necessarily mean that an individual is likely to take any concrete actions that seek to realize this outcome. Moreover, it does not mean that an individual is even likely to prioritize this goal over others that he or she holds. Yet, when an individual does hold such an attitude, it means that he or she is at least open to the underlying claim forwarded by an Islamist party and in turn that the individual is riper for recruitment by the party than someone who is opposed to religion in the political process. In other words, these passive supporters of political Islam represent the target base for recruitment for an Islamist party seeking to activate support.

Operationalizing Support for Political Islam


Although the basic claim forwarded by the Islamist movement is relatively simple, evaluating support for this claim is rather complex. First, it is possible to ask directly about individual support for implementing laws in accordance with the *shari'a* as demanded by the Islamist movement. In the Arab Barometer,¹² the prompt was phrased as follows:

Q4022: In your opinion, how important is each of the following principles as a guide for making the laws of our country?

The government should implement only the laws of the *shari'a*

The results can be seen in table 3.1.

Figure 3.1



As can be seen in figure 3.1, a majority of respondents support or strongly support the concept of law by *shari'a* in each case. In Jordan, Algeria, Morocco and Yemen, over eighty percent of respondents agree or strongly agree. In Palestine this percentage is only 55 percent, with a plurality of respondents disagreeing with this statement. The high levels of support across all cases except for Palestine are not overly surprising; the word *shari'a* has a very positive connotation in Arabic and literally means the proper way or

¹² See the section “Data, Operationalization and Testing” below for full details about the Arab Barometer.

right path. Likely, most ordinary citizens are not calling for an implementation of a Saudi-style system (see Sahliyah 2005; Arab Barometer 2006-7 q246.4), but rather are indicating general support for this as a traditional basis for law. In Palestine, the implications of this item are likely more divisive given that the survey was taken after Hamas's election victory in January 2006. Individuals indicating support for the *shari'a* were echoing one of Hamas's claims, meaning the question had implications in this context that it did not in the other cases. It should also be remembered that Hamas's support has been higher than in the other cases, meaning that if anything it would follow that support for the implementation of the *shari'a* would be expected to be higher in this case.


Second, it is possible to evaluate support for political Islam by the importance an individual places on voting for a religious candidate. If an individual believes that the level of religiosity is an important consideration, then it implies that he or she seeks more religious candidates to be elected to office and, in turn, desires a greater role for religion in public life. In the Arab Barometer, this item was phrased as follows:

Q2564: What factors would you consider when voting for candidates in an election for political office?

Religiosity (Very important, important, unimportant, not important at all)

Figure 3.2 presents the results:

Figure 3.2



In all cases a sizable majority of respondents indicates that they considered a candidate's religiosity when voting. Although it is possible that some respondents consider religiosity because they seek candidates who are not religious, high levels of religious self-identification throughout the region indicate that this is probably only a small minority of respondents (Arab Barometer 2006-7, q714a). Rather, the vast majority of citizens appear to believe that a candidate's personal religiosity is an important consideration in vote choice. By this measure, support for political Islam appears quite high throughout the region. With over three-quarters of respondents in all cases indicating that a candidate's religiosity is important, by this measure it appears that each of these political environments represents a relatively similar level of passive support.

A third approach to gauging levels of support for political Islam yields somewhat different results. When respondents are asked about specific characteristics that would be consistent with a greater role for religion in political life, relatively fewer individuals indicated support for the concept. In this case, individuals were prompted with the following items:

Q401: How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

1. Men of religion should *not* influence how people vote in elections [italics not in original] (Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)
2. It would be better for [country] if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office (Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)
3. Men of religion should have influence over the decisions of government (Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)

The summaries by country are shown in figures 3.3-3.5.

Figure 3.3




Figure 3.4





Figure 3.5




Except in Palestine, comparing these results to levels of support for making laws in accordance with the *shari'a*, support for the involvement of men of religion – meaning clergy or other religious leaders – in the political process is generally lower. In the case of men of religion influencing how individuals vote in elections, a majority of respondents in each society either opposed or strongly opposed the practice. It should be noted that in Jordan agreement with this statement was a somewhat higher than in the other cases, but this is likely due to factors specific to Jordan (see Robbins and Rubin 2011). Despite these differences in overall levels, the relative frequencies of each response tends to be relative similar across the cases.

Agreement with the statement that it would be better if more religious individuals held public office has somewhat different results across cases. In Palestine, a slight majority agrees or strongly agrees, while in Jordan and Yemen the results reveal a plurality of respondents having a negative opinion of this statement. In Algeria and Morocco a majority of respondents believe more religious officials would be beneficial to society, suggesting a somewhat different pattern. Thus, there appears to be some differences in the response pattern for this item.

Figure 3.5 demonstrates that there is a high degree of similarity across cases for the third item with a slight majority of those who responded to the question indicating they agreed or strongly agreed that men of religion should influence government decisions. The pattern of responses is relatively similar across cases, although in Jordan opinion was somewhat more divided than in the remaining cases.

Each of these three items probes a relatively similar underlying concept – the degree to which men or religion should have a voice in the political process. Each item represents a different facet of this concept and the similarities between these items allows for the combination of these items into an index. This was done by creating an additive index based on the response pattern and the strength of an individual's response on a given item. The results yield a summary response indicating the percentage of individuals who are favorable to the concept of political Islam, meaning those whose response pattern indicated that they were above the midpoint on this scale. The results are presented in figure 3.6.

Figure 3.6



These results indicate that a majority of respondents in all five cases hold attitudes consistent with political Islam if defined as a greater role for religion in public life. The overall level of support varies, but not overly significantly across cases; the lowest level of support is in Jordan is 52 percent compared to a high of 63 percent in Morocco. Importantly, however, these results indicate that if religious parties successfully

mobilized all supporters of political Islam, they could expect to have levels of support near fifty percent. Additionally, it is worth noting that in the two cases that revealed the greatest variation in chapter one – Jordan and Palestine – levels of support are relatively similar and are lower than the remaining cases. This implies that the differences between the cases on either end of the spectrum does not appear to be a result of Palestine representing a more fertile environment based on passive levels of support for political Islam.

Overall, this battery of questions finds a lower level of support for political Islam than items asking about the *shari'a*, although the level of support varies depending on the precise prompt. Respondents are significantly more supportive of men of religion influencing government decisions relative to these same men influencing how individuals vote in elections. Opinion was even more divided on the question of whether having more religious individuals hold public office would be beneficial.

In a third approach to measuring support for political Islam, it is possible to describe a system that involves the attempted application of Islamic law. In modern political systems, this system could either approximate the Iranian system where only religious parties or candidates compete in elections or a Saudi-style system where religious leaders (*'ulama*) hold significant power to enforce the *shari'a* and there are no parties or elections.¹³ As these two systems represent two logical implications of the full implementation of the *shari'a*, they represent an additional means by which to measure support for political Islam. In the case of the Arab Barometer, these systems were asked about in the following manner:

Q246: I'm going to describe various types of political systems that exist in the Middle East and ask what you think about each as a way of governing [country]. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing [country]?

2. A parliamentary system in which only Islamic political parties and factions compete in elections
4. A system governed by Islamic law in which there are no political parties or elections

¹³ Limited municipal elections did take place in 2005 in Saudi Arabia.

The results are shown in figures 3.7-3.8.¹⁴

Figure 3.7





Figure 3.8



As these figures reveal, support for a system implied by the basic claim of Islamists through the application of *shari'a* evokes a third level of potential passive support for political Islam. Figure 3.6 demonstrates that public opinion largely opposes a system similar to that of Iran where there are elections and political contestation, but where political competition is restricted to Islamic candidates or parties. In all four

¹⁴ These items were not asked in Morocco.

societies the plurality of respondents strongly opposes such a system. Less than a third of respondents support this system, although it should be noted that there is a higher percentage of missing data for this item than for the others, particularly in Jordan and Yemen.

By comparison, respondents appear much more favorable toward a fully Islamic system without parliament or elections. This is particularly at odds with findings from Tessler and Jamal (2008) and others (see Tessler 2002; Inglehart 2003; Tessler and Gao 2005) who find broad support for democracy across the Arab world. In the case of Yemen, the majority of those who stated opinions are favorably inclined toward this system. In Jordan, support for and disapproval of this system is evenly split while in Palestine a plurality strongly oppose this system, although nearly forty-five percent support or strongly support such a system.

A possible explanation for the differences between the response patterns in these two items is the result of the use of the word “*shari’a*” in the second item but not in the first. As demonstrated in figure 3.1, the concept of *shari’a* is highly popular among respondents. Thus, rather than contemplating the full system outlined by the question, it is possible that some respondents are cue on the word *shari’a* within this question itself. Given the high support exhibited for *shari’a* as a source of law (figure 3.1), it is likely that the inclusion this word explains the dramatic increase in support for a Saudi-style system relative to an Iranian-style system.

This analysis yields two key findings. First, regardless of the manner in which support for political Islam is operationalized, levels of support tend to be relatively consistent across all five societies. There are some differences, but these differences are unlikely to account for the dramatic variation in support for Islamist parties that ranges by more than forty percent across these cases. As such, we can reject the hypothesis that differences in levels of support for political Islam accounts for differences in levels of support for Islamist parties throughout the region.

Second, these findings demonstrate that levels of support for political Islam are highly dependent on the items used to operationalize the concept; the broadest conceptualization – the application of the *shari’a* with no qualifiers – tends garner greater support. By contrast, when existing systems of rule by Islamic law are described to

respondents, support for these items are relatively low. A third conceptualization – that religion should play a greater role in public life – yields an intermediate level of support.

Constructing Measures of Passive Support for Political Islam

The previous section demonstrated a general trend: as the implications of the application of political Islam are provided to respondents, support for the concept tends to decline. In order to develop a proper measure, this section evaluates relationship between these different ways of operationalizing this concept, seeking to build a measure of political Islam that is robust and conceptually captures which members of society comprise the target group for Islamist parties.

Appendix 3.1 presents the correlations between each of these items and the Cronbach's alpha for each of these relationships. Overall, Cronbach's alpha tends to be moderate for these items ranging from a low of 0.63 in Jordan to a high of 0.77 in Morocco. These results indicate that the concepts being captured by these variables have similarities but are lower than would be preferred for constructing an index.

Examining the correlations between the items reveals a more nuanced understanding. In each case, the two items with the highest correlation are the items asking whether or not men of religion should influence decisions of government and whether it would be better if more religious individuals held public office. In Algeria, Morocco and Palestine, this correlation exceeds 0.60 and in Jordan it is 0.55. The relationship is weakest in Yemen with a correlation of 0.48, which is still relatively strong.

Somewhat surprisingly, the item asking if men of religion should not influence voters has a lower correlation with both of these items in each case. Jordan and Morocco represent extreme cases where the correlations are functionally zero; in the remaining cases, the correlations have an absolute value of 0.20 or greater between these items. The exact reason for the variations in the relationship is not entirely known. However, there is some evidence at least in the case of Jordan this discrepancy might be the result of some respondents being aware of laws seeking to limit the use of mosques for political purposes (Robbins and Rubin 2011).

Although other factors could also explain this pattern, in any case the much stronger correlation between the items asking about “decisions of government” and “more religious leaders” among all but one of the cases can justify excluding the third measure, “decisions of voters” from the measure used to construct the variable of public support for political Islam. These two items prove robust across all countries and their high correlations imply that they are capturing a similar underlying concept. In this case, given that they are focused on religious leaders having a greater political power, this operationalization of political Islam can be summarized as those who support a greater role for religion in the political system.

For the two variables which detail two systems that could be the end goal of political Islam – an Iranian-style system and a Saudi-style system – there is a significant but weaker correlation between the two items. This is not entirely unsurprising as the two systems are distinct from one another, even if they both do represent a system with a strong role for religion within the political system. In all cases, the correlation between these two items ranges from 0.28 to 0.46. Given that the natures of the systems proposed are in fact quite different, this moderate correlation is not entirely unsurprising, especially considering the inclusion of the word *shari‘a* in one item but not the other.

Also of note, the correlation between these two items for the Iranian and the Saudi systems is relatively similar to their individual correlations with the two items “decisions of government” and “more religious leaders”. The shared response pattern between these items is moderate, but not overly high, implying that while there are some common elements, each of these items captures a significant amount of unique variance. Given that one battery proposes a different system of governance while the other proposes a greater role for religion within the existing system, this outcome is unsurprising.

Lastly, the correlation between the item asking if laws should be made in accordance with the *shari‘a* and the other variables tends to be moderate, ranging up to little more than 0.4 in some cases. This correlation remains less than the two strongest items, but is relatively strong across a number of items. Given that this question captures empirically the most passive form of support for political Islam, the level of correlation is to be expected; while virtually all respondents who indicated support for the other items measuring political Islam would also support this item, there are many who indicate

support this item but not for the remaining items based on the frequencies presented above.

Exploratory factor analysis can provide additional insight into the relationships between these variables. Five of the seven variables were included in the analysis.¹⁵ Rotated factor loadings are presented in appendix 3.2. For each society, one distinct factor is identified. It should be noted that the variables “decisions of government” and “more religious leaders” are both the most heavily weighted variables for each case. Nevertheless, all variables load on the same factor implying that the underlying construct has a common element. All of these items load relatively strongly onto this factor implying that it captures a latent support for a concept approximating political Islam.

Empirical Considerations in Constructing Measures of Political Islam

There remain four plausible ways to measure passive support for political Islam. The first remains the most broad – support for the *shari‘a*. This is the most basic demand of Islamist parties and the movement more broadly. Yet, it is also a platform that is forwarded by a number of other candidates and parties. Those opposed to using the *shari‘a* as a legal basis seem unlikely to support an Islamist party all else being equal, but simply holding this attitude is likely not sufficient to make an individual a member of the target group for Islamist parties. Support for the *shari‘a* is simply too broad.

A second potential approach is to use the battery asking about support for a greater role for religion in public life. After all, this is the basic claim, broadly speaking, that distinguishes the Islamist movement from other trends. The focus on religion being the answer to the problems facing society is the basic message communicated by these parties and the how they attempt to gain political advantage. Like their basic slogan “Islam is the solution”, this battery asks if a greater role for religion in politics would be better for the country without detailing specifics. Thus, it captures whether or not one sympathizes with the basic message being signaled to supporters.

A third approach is to use the “system” battery of items. Yet, relatively few within the Islamist movement openly advocate such a system. Some Islamist groups

¹⁵ The five are “*shari‘a*”, “Iranian system”, “Saudi system,” “religious leaders” and “decisions of government”

forward the goal of unifying the Muslim world under a caliph (see Taji-Farouki 1996), but more generally the movement has sought a religious reawakening within society (Mitchell 1977). Moreover, relatively little popular literature has focused on exactly what the ideal political system is beyond such generalities and Islamist parties do not seek to mobilize support speaking about how the *shari'a* would be implemented in such terms (Roy 1994, 42-4). For most respondents, there is relatively little direct familiarity with such systems, a fact that could also explain to a degree the significantly higher non-response rate for these items compared with the others.¹⁶ Thus, while these items do capture elements that are consistent with support for political Islam, in isolation they are less precise measures of support for political Islam than the battery asking about a greater role for religion in the existing system.

The fourth approach would be to use the index generated by the results of exploratory factor analysis. This approach is a more sophisticated means by which to seek to capture the latent variable “political Islam” which is partially captured by each of these variables. The use of the five variables to produce the index would increase confidence in the overall measure since it incorporates elements from the broadest conception of political Islam to the most specific.

At the same time this measure, while assumed to be measuring political Islam, leaves us with some uncertainty about the precise meaning of the latent concept being measured. This possibility is likely small, however, given the nature of the battery of five questions used to generate this outcome. A second possible concern is that the variables are weighted differently within each society, resulting in slightly different measures of support, thus the measure that is developed for each case would not be fully comparable across cases. Yet, given the similarity in factor scores for each item across the cases and the need to only compare levels of support for political Islam in a general manner, this consideration is not overly problematic. Despite these possible concerns, this combined index generated from factor analysis will be employed as the primary means to capture support for political Islam.

¹⁶ Evidence reveals that individuals in many non-democratic societies with no history of democracy are more supportive of democracy, on average, than those living in democracies (see Inglehart 2003). Since none of the respondents live in the systems that are described, their stated preferences are less well informed than for simpler items such as having more religious people in public office would be beneficial for the society.

Hypotheses Explaining Support for Political Islam

Although levels of passive support for political Islam tend to be relatively similar across these five societies for a range of measures, it is possible that the factors that underlie this support vary. If true, then despite similar levels of overall support the nature of the support for the concept would be different, perhaps providing some parties with advantages based on the factors underlying this passive support. As such, examining the determinants of support for political Islam is necessary.

The literature on political Islam has developed numerous theories that seek to account for the appeal of the Islamist ideology within the Arab and Muslim worlds over the last few decades. Broadly speaking, these can be divided up into five general explanations: personal religiosity; socioeconomic factors; frustration with existing political regimes, anti-Westernization or anti-globalization; and cultural conservatism.¹⁷ This section examines each of these theories.

The first explanation is also the most straightforward: individuals who are more religious are more likely to support an ideology that promotes a greater role for religion in public life. This theory is largely derived from the basic observation that if an individual is not religious, then it seems antithetical for him or her to support an ideology in which the basic premise is a greater role for religion in the political system. Although not all religious individuals are likely to support this ideology, a much higher percentage of religious individuals seem likely to be supporters of political Islam compared to non-religious individuals.

Religiosity can be understood in a variety of ways but the primary ways are personal belief, self-identification, or personal practice. Each of these proposes a distinct mechanism that could explain support, thus each must be tested to identify which explanations are valid. A first theory of why personal beliefs may lead to support for political Islam claims that in Islam the concepts of religion and politics are intertwined more deeply than in other religious traditions. For example, Gellner (1981, 1) writes:

Islam is the blueprint of a social order. It holds that a set of rules exists, external and divinely ordained, and independent of the will of men, which

¹⁷ It should be noted that these explanations of thought are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

defines the proper ordering of society...Thus there is in principle no call or justification for an internal separation of society into two parts, of which one would be closer to the deity than the other.

In a similar vein, Bernard Lewis (2003, 97) states:

Among the Jews, for whose beliefs Josephus coined the term “theocracy,” God was Caesar. For the Muslims, too, God was the supreme sovereign, and the caliph was his vice regent, “his shadow on earth.”

A number of political dictates within traditional Islamic thought provide additional justification for this theory. As such, given the historic development of Islam, it would follow that pious Muslims are likely to see no distinction between politics and religion. In empirical terms, this theory predicts that individuals who have stronger religious identities or who are more pious are more likely to support political Islam (H3.1a). Based on similar logic, it is also possible that individuals who wish to see particular aspects of traditional religious understandings incorporated or maintained in the country’s political system will be more supportive of political Islam (H3.1b).

A second possible mechanism is that social networks have a strong role in the rise and development of the Islamist movement. Islamists benefit from the existence of free space available at mosques or other religious centers, giving them greater ability to mobilize support through networks. Wickham (2004) demonstrates that the development of Islamist organizations is likely to take place via personal contact and direct appeals to individuals who are like-minded by those who are already involved. In this way, mosques and other organizations become the hubs of recruitment of new members of the Islamist movement.

Under this logic, personal piety is not the direct link, rather it is successful recruitment that leads to the growth of political Islam. Individuals who are more exposed to networks and organizations associated with political Islam are more likely to become supporters of the movement. As such, those who more routinely visit the mosque or another religious organization are more likely to be targets of recruitment and, in turn, successfully recruited. Thus, it is possible that network linkages through the nature of religious practice rather than personal piety specifically accounts for the growth of

political Islam. Empirically, this predicts that individuals who frequent religious institutions are more likely to support political Islam (H3.1c).

A second theory of support for political Islam focuses on socioeconomic factors to explain support. Ayubi (1991) argues that base support for political Islam comes from urban, educated, and relatively young individuals who were politically involved but lacked a movement to support after the failure of post-independence populist regimes throughout the Arab world. As a politically mobilized group with unfulfilled expectations, these individuals became the backbone of the newly-formed Islamist movement. Given trends over time, the number of individuals within this demographic has increased dramatically over the last twenty years (World Bank 2004). Similarly, Roy (1994, 85) notes that of individuals who join radical Islamist groups, the majority come from the “lumpen intelligentsia”, meaning that they are well-educated individuals who cannot find positions in society that meet their expectations. While support for political Islam broadly defined is not the same as support for militant Islam, it is important to note that Roy also finds that this group tends to be attracted to extremist forms of political Islam. Empirically, these theories imply that the young and well-educated are more likely to be supportive of political Islam (H3.2a).

Yet, a number of scholars have also argued that political Islam finds its support among the emerging middle class rather than among the intelligentsia. These accounts note that Islamic social activism is focused primarily on this group by providing them with a means to realize political or social goals. The lack of viable alternatives to Islamic activism in many countries means that for members of the middle class seeking to increase their political involvement, there are few options beyond the Islamist movement (Masoud 2008). To this end, Clark (2004) finds that many social services provided by the movement are not aimed at the poorest in society, but rather at the middle classes who are seeking alternatives to the poor services provided by the state and possess sufficient income to pay for these higher quality services. She notes that health clinics in Cairo, for example, charge modest fees for their services are filled with individuals who can afford such services. Empirically, this theory predicts that those with moderate levels of income will be more likely to support political Islam (H3.2b).

A third version of the socioeconomic argument claims that it is among the poor and marginalized that the Islamist movement is likely to win the greatest support. Demir (2005) notes that poverty and exclusion have provided a fertile breeding ground for Islamist movements. In light of poor economic conditions, individuals are more likely to seek help from any group promising a better future. Much Islamist rhetoric focuses on concepts of social justice and on providing for the poor through charity. With the decline of the Arab left, poorer individuals are likely to sympathize with a movement that focuses on such issues. Empirically, this theory predicts that poorer individuals should support political Islam (H3.2c).

A third theory explaining the rise of political Islam focuses on grievances toward the existing social and political order. These scholars highlight the increasing levels of resentment throughout the Arab world. For example, al-Suwaidi (1995) argues that Islamist groups will continue to grow “as long as Arab governments resist political participation and refuse to tolerate different political opinions” (92). Tessler (1997) reaches a similar finding, arguing that societal resentment is high and that most citizens have low levels of support for the regime. He argues that anger at poor economic outcomes and rampant corruption has led to low legitimacy of the regime in a political environment with few if any viable alternatives. As such, he argues that individuals are more likely to support any credible opposition movement against the government for strategic reasons, even if they do not necessarily support the specific beliefs of the movement. Like Ajami (1992), Tessler argues that the failures of the political left has resulted in Islamists being perceived as the only viable opposition movement, leading many members of society to signal their disapproval of the government by supporting political Islam. Empirically, this logic implies a strong correlation between low government approval and support for political Islam (H3.3a). Similarly, there should also be a correlation between perceived levels of corruption and support for political Islam (H3.3b).

While resentment toward the regime and an absence of alternatives may be sufficient to generate support for political Islam, a variant of this theory proposes a slightly different mechanism. As noted, Islamist charities provide basic services to the population, often exceeding the quality of government-run organizations. Sullivan

(1994) details how Islamic groups responded to the 1992 Cairo earthquake by providing important emergency relief to individuals who received no aid from the government. Clark (2004) highlights similar organizations in Jordan and Yemen and Levitt (2006) and Robinson (2004) highlight charitable activities of the Islamist movement in Palestine. Thus, there is evidence to show that in many cases Islamic charities provide similar services to those provided by the government and often the quality of these services is often better and the reach more extended. For citizens with little confidence in the government capacity or the quality of its service provision, it is possible that they come to support political Islam because of its broad service provision. Empirically, this mechanism predicts that individuals with lower confidence in government services should be more likely to support political Islam (H3.3c).

A fourth theory focuses on anti-Westernization and anti-globalization as the impetus for support for political Islam. This school argues that political Islam finds its justifications and reasoning rooted in anti-modernity and anti-Western philosophical discourse and seeks to revive an ancient and idealized past system to address the challenges brought on by these elements. For example, Burgat (1993) states that political Islam seeks “cultural differentiation from the West and reconnection with the pre-colonial symbolic universe.” Similarly, Ayubi (1991) argues that because of the upheavals brought by modernization, much support for political Islam is a result of it representing a reactionary force that seeks a return to an earlier and simpler time when more traditional religious and cultural values were upheld. Empirically, this theory predicts that individuals who reject the values of the West are more likely to support political Islam (H3.4a).

An extension of this argument highlights a number of specific factors that are associated with the West. In one case, anger at the U.S. and its foreign policy toward the region could also result in support for political Islam. The Islamist critique of Western forces extends to a perceived bias in U.S. foreign policy of supporting corrupt dictators based on economic or strategic interests. Islamists argue for a reorientation of their nation’s foreign policy to focus on building stronger relations with other Islamic countries and away from relations with a country, such as the U.S., that does not share

common values or interests. This rejection of specific Western elements could also lead to support for political Islam (H3.4b).

Additionally, it is possible that anti-Israel attitudes could account for support for political Islam. Although it may be considered differently in the West, within the Arab world the challenge of Israel is deeply rooted in the interference of the Western powers and the challenges of modern state-building. The Arab narrative understands Israel to be a largely European conquest within the Middle East as a result of European politics (Shafir 1996). Thus, Israeli's existence is often framed as the last European colony in the Middle East.

The Islamist movement uses Israel's existence to critique the failure of "secular" Arab regimes (Ajami 1992; Haddad 1992). Noting the discrepancies in size and population between Israel and the Arab and Muslim worlds, the movement attributes Israel's relative success to the reliance by Arabs and Muslims on secular strategies for development. They highlight the ability of "religious" armies to repel European invasions in the past, including the defeat of European crusaders, as well as the fact that Israel "embraces" its Jewish religious identity. By implication, if the Muslim world would embrace Islam once again it would be able to achieve victory over Israel (Shadid 1988, 668-9). In this way, the Islamist movement has sought to mobilize support for Islam in rejection of the modern creation of Israel in its midst. In empirical terms, this theory predicts that individuals who are more anti-Israel are more likely to support political Islam (H3.4c).

A fifth general theory accounting for the rise of political Islam focuses on cultural conservatism. Many elements within the Islamist vision represent more conservative elements within traditional Arab culture. Although there is disagreement among religious scholars on a number of issues, some cultural conservatives seek to use a traditional religious interpretation to support their worldview (Ahmed 1992). For example, there have been some Islamic scholars who have questioned the roles and rights of women as specified in religious texts. More specifically, there is no statement in the Qur'an requiring women to be veiled let alone to wear the *niqab*. Nevertheless, in areas such as the Gulf States most women do wear the *niqab* for a mix of cultural and religious reasons. Generally speaking, the Islamist movement has supported traditional

interpretations of the Qur'an that are also in line with cultural traditions. In fact, many have put a specific emphasis on veiling as a symbol of support for political Islam (Beinin and Stork 1997, 21). As a result, it is possible that individuals who are more culturally conservative are more likely to support political Islam (H3.5a).

In a similar vein, Islamists assert the primacy of Islam over other faith traditions. Although levels of tolerance for other religions or foreign elements vary greatly within the movement, there is a tendency for greater intolerance due to the basic nature of this ideology (see Kimball 2002; Swartz 1997). Like other monotheistic traditions, Islam presents a more closed view of alternative ideologies, leading to the possibility of an intolerant worldview. For individuals who are less tolerant, this ideology and justification for it could make political Islam appealing. Thus, this theory predicts that individuals who are less tolerant are more likely to support political Islam (H2.5b).

Model and Testing

The data used to test these hypotheses regarding the determinants of support for political Islam come from the first wave of the Arab Barometer public opinion survey. The survey was conducted in seven societies and collected in 2006 and 2007.¹⁸ In each case the sample was generated using a cluster technique, dividing the country into geographical areas and then using probability sampling to randomly select blocks within each area. In some cases, quota sampling was employed to ensure the representation of standard demographic characteristics. Within these blocks, twelve houses were randomly selected. Within each house, an individual over age eighteen was randomly selected using a Kish table. The interview was conducted face-to-face. Although response rates varied, in most cases all exceeded 90 percent and the number of individuals interviewed ranged between 1,143 and 1,300 all five cases examined in this study. Full details of the methodology for each survey can be found on the Arab Barometer website (<http://www.arabbarometer.org>).

The dependent variable is comprised of a five-item index generated using factor analysis. Given that these five factors, as detailed above, captured a similar underlying

¹⁸ Given the importance of confessional identity in structuring Lebanese politics, this case was excluded. Kuwait was excluded as political parties are not legal and so the item from the Arab Barometer on party support was not asked in this case.

concept in each society, the combined measure was used to operationalize the concept support for political Islam.

The hypotheses that were generated above were operationalized using items contained in the Arab Barometer survey instrument. Details for each are provided in appendix 3.3. In a small number of cases, one of the items was not asked in a society or the data collected for an item were unusable and the item was not used.

The purpose of this chapter is not to test these hypotheses simultaneously to evaluate which has the most important effect controlling for all others. Rather, it is to determine if there is a general similarity between the determinants of official Islam in each of the three cases to learn more about the nature of the passive base each party seeks to activate. Stated differently, in order to test the model outlined in chapter two it is not necessary to test whether personal piety, for example, should be a significant predictor of support for political Islam controlling for anti-Western attitudes; rather, it is necessary to evaluate whether or not the determinants of support for political Islam are similar or not between societies. The model in chapter two makes no predictions of the covariance structure or the relative importance of each variable for passive support of political Islam. As a result, each hypothesis is evaluated in isolation controlling only for basic demographic variables. Thus, each model was tested only with the primary independent variable of interest plus the control variables of age, education, income, and sex.

An important note relates to the timing that the survey in Palestine in June 2006. As previously discussed, the political context in this case varied from the others as the survey was conducted a few months after the Change and Reform Movement – the Hamas electoral list – won the majority of seats in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative elections. As a result of this election victory, Hamas formed a government, meaning that rather than individuals being supportive of political Islam due to frustration with the government, any frustration with the government is more likely to be reflected in a lack of support for political Islam. Thus, an alternative version of this hypothesis can be forwarded which is that individuals who are less satisfied with the government are less likely to support political Islam in this case. At the same time, it is not only possible but also likely that partisanship may affect ratings of the government. Although this survey

lacks the items to test for possible effects of this partisanship, it is important to note it may play a role in these results.

The analysis was performed using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. To control for clustering inherent in the data given that observations collected in the same block are not fully independent, White's robust standard errors were employed in the analysis.

Results

The estimated coefficients, standard errors and levels of significance are presented in appendix 3.4. Broadly speaking, there are a number of important similarities in the determinants of support for political Islam. Given that the five countries share many important differences, this high similarity is striking and suggests that the factors underlying support for political Islam are likely common throughout the region and perhaps beyond.

Beginning with the first hypothesis – that more religious individuals are more likely to support political Islam – there is support for this hypothesis, although not for all items in all cases. In the first variant of this hypothesis – personal piety – the relationship is significant in both Jordan and Palestine for all four measures being tested. In the remaining three cases, evidence exists in favor of this hypothesis, but only for the first part of the battery. In these cases, respondents who are more concerned about the level of religiosity of a potential spouse for their child are more likely to be supporters of political Islam at standard levels of significance. Yet, the items asking about personal religious belief, including whether an individual prays or how self-reported levels of religiosity, are not significant. One possible explanation is the fact that there is less variation on the second two items than the first two; within the Arab world self-reported levels of religiosity tend to be very high which has led researchers to seek alternative items to evaluate this variable in recent years.

The second proposed mechanism linking greater religiosity with support for political Islam is a belief that the government must make laws in accordance with the *shari'a* and religious tradition. Two possible items are identified: the beliefs that charging all forms interest must be banned and that the government is not doing a good

job of handling moral issues. In the first case, there is a strong correlation between agreement that interest should be banned and support for political Islam in all five cases at the 0.01-level of significance. As for moral issues, this item is only significant in Palestine and Morocco, although the sign for both indicates that those who are more supportive of political Islam are also more likely to agree that the government is doing a good job on moral issues. In Palestine, this is unsurprising given that Hamas was in government at the time of the survey. In Morocco, the finding is a bit more surprising but may stem from the fact that the Moroccan king maintains the title Commander of the Faithful and claims to uphold religious values. Nevertheless, the sign is opposite of what is expected, particularly given that other regimes such as Jordan also commonly appeal to religious legitimacy. In the remaining cases, the item is nearly significant at the 0.1-level in Yemen, but is highly insignificant in Algeria and Jordan. This outcome is somewhat surprising given that much of the Islamist critique of society is that existing regimes are failing to uphold Islamic virtues.

The third proposed mechanism linking increased religiosity and support for political Islam is the influence of networks and contact with other Islamists. In this case, mosque attendance was used as a proxy for involvement in religious activities. Although there are forms of religious organizations other than the mosque with which individuals could associate, Islamists tend to make a point to attend the mosque regularly, thus other individuals who attend mosque are likely to encounter them regularly. As table 3.1 demonstrates, this variable is statistically significant at the 0.5-level across four of the five cases, with the exception being Morocco. Thus, in the majority of cases there is strong support for this hypothesis. It is unclear why Morocco again represents an outlier, particularly as the sign on the coefficient is opposite those of the other cases. Nevertheless, for most cases it appears that mosque attendance is strongly correlated with support for political Islam.

Overall, there is compelling evidence that the personal religiosity is associated with support for political Islam across all five societies. In each case except for Morocco, the variables used to operationalize each of the three proposed mechanisms are significant at standard levels, and in the case of Morocco this is true for two of the three measures. Thus, there is evidence indicating that support for political Islam is linked

with being a more religious individual in all five societies. Although some differences were found in the case of Morocco, these findings are not strong enough nor consistent enough to offer compelling evidence that religious Moroccans are not more likely to support political Islam compared to less religious individuals.

In the case of the second general hypothesis – that socioeconomic factors have an effect on support for political Islam – the results are less consistent. Despite multiple claims linking support for political Islam to the intelligentsia or petite bourgeoisie (Ayubi 1991; Clark 2004; Masoud 2008), there is limited evidence for this claim within the survey data. In three cases – Jordan, Palestine, and Yemen – less educated individuals were more likely to support political Islam at the 0.05-level of significance, but in the two North African cases – Algeria and Morocco – this was not the case. In fact, the relationship was insignificant in both cases, implying that level of education is not linked to support for political Islam.

In the case of age, younger individuals tend to be more supportive of political Islam in all cases except Morocco, although this variable is only significant in Jordan. In Morocco, the relationship is functionally zero, indicating that there are no significant differences by age in likelihood of supporting political Islam. Additionally, sex is not significant in any of the five cases, but men are somewhat more likely to support political Islam in all cases except for Jordan.

As for income, in Palestine and Morocco, the relationship is significant and the negative coefficient indicates that poorer individuals are more likely to support political Islam. Again, this finding contradicts the intelligentsia for these two cases. Additionally, in Algeria the result is negative and approaches significance at standard levels ($p=0.18$) while in Jordan it is negative but insignificant. In the case of Yemen, the result is insignificant but the positive sign on the coefficient indicates that wealthier individuals are more likely to support political Islam and the p -value borders on being significant at standard levels ($p=0.11$). Thus, only in Yemen is there some evidence that is partly consistent with this hypothesis.¹⁹

¹⁹ It should be noted, however, that given that Yemen is substantially poorer than the other four cases (World Bank 2004). It is possible that the poorest in Yemen are below a baseline level of income that makes it likely for an individual to support political Islam. Although further research would be necessary, it is possible that this difference of income level could in part explain Yemen representing an outlier on this

Some researchers have theorized that support for political Islam may not represent a linear function of income. Most notably, it is hypothesized that the movement may win disproportionate support from middle-class individuals who can fulfill their political ambitions through the movement (see Clark 2004; Masoud 2008). To test this theory, a dummy variable was created for the group comprising the middle class in each society. Although significant at standard levels and positive in Yemen, the coefficient estimates are not significant in the remaining cases. Of those four, the sign on the coefficient is negative in each case except Algeria, but in no case does the result approach significance. Thus, other than Yemen, which is substantially poorer than the other countries, there is little support for this hypothesis.

It has also been theorized that poorer and more marginalized individuals are more likely to support political Islam. Although this hypothesis was tested previously by including income and found support in some countries, it is possible that the relationship is not linear. Thus, a dummy was created for poorer classes to further test this claim. The results are similar to income more generally, with the relationship being positive and significant in Palestine and Morocco, indicating poorer individuals are more likely to support political Islam. In Algeria and Jordan, the relationship is also positive but it is insignificant. In Yemen, the relationship is negative and significant, indicating that poorer people are less likely to support political Islam. Thus, outside of Yemen there is some support for the claim that lower classes are more likely to be passive supporters of political Islam.

Overall, the socioeconomic explanations are less consistent in predicting support for political Islam than personal religiosity, at least with regard to tests of significance. In the majority of cases, it appears that younger, less educated, and poorer individuals are more likely to support political Islam than other members of society. However, these findings are not overly strong, since in most cases these relationships do not reach standard levels of significance. Thus, it generally appears that support for political Islam is found throughout society and is not limited to a single or primary demographic. It should be noted, however, that this varies somewhat by case as education and income were significant in some cases and in Yemen the sign was reversed for income.

The third general hypothesis – that support for political Islam is the result of grievances – is tested through three primary mechanisms. In the first case, frustration with economic conditions is posited as the link between grievances against the existing system and support for political Islam. It is possible that frustration with the economic conditions of the country, with one's own economic conditions, or with expectations about future economic conditions could link these two variables. However, as the results demonstrate, there is actually mixed evidence for this theory. In the case of Yemen, it is clear that frustration with economic conditions is strongly linked to support for political Islam, as all three variables are significant at standard levels. What is noteworthy, however, is that support for political Islam is higher among individuals who perceive that their own economic situation is better but that the country's economic situation is very bad and that the future is bleak.

In Palestine, there is also general support for this claim as both the economic situation of the country and the economic future are significant. As noted above, however, the sign on these variables is positive, suggesting that individuals who support political Islam tend to be more optimistic about economic conditions, likely as a result of the success of the Hamas list in the parliamentary elections.²⁰

In Jordan, the signs on all of the coefficients imply that individuals who are more supportive of political Islam are more likely to hold economic grievances. Only one of these items – perceived economic condition – is significant at standard levels, however. The sign is opposite from the case of Yemen and this represents the only case out of the three that is not significant in Palestine. In the remaining two cases – Algeria and Morocco – none of these three variables approach standard levels of significance. Thus, empirical evidence indicates that economic grievances are not significant predictors of support for political Islam in either society. Overall, except for Yemen and possibly

²⁰ Empirical support for this claim comes from the analysis of a 2003 survey conducted in Palestine (PSR 2003). Although asking a much more limited set of questions, variants of the same five items that comprise the dependent variable in this analysis exist, as well as a single question asking the degree to which the respondent is satisfied with his or her financial situation. Full results are presented in appendix 3.5, but in this case—prior to Hamas's election victory when the Palestinian National Authority remained controlled by Fatah—the sign on the coefficient is reversed as expected for those who state that they would be more likely to vote for a religious-based party. Since this does not ask about Hamas membership specifically, it is a less precise test of this hypothesis. Likely as a result, the relationship is not significant at standard levels ($p=0.29$), but the direction and strength of this relationship confirms that prior to the Hamas electoral victory the nature of this relationship was in all likelihood reversed.

Palestine, there is not much evidence that support for political Islam is linked to economic grievances.

In the second potential link for this general hypothesis – that frustration over corruption leads to support for political Islam – there is greater consistency between the cases. In all cases except for Morocco, individuals who believe that corruption is more widespread are also more likely to support political Islam, a finding that reaches standard levels of significance. In Morocco, the relationship is insignificant but surprisingly the sign on the coefficient is opposite of what is expected. Again, Morocco represents an important outlier relative to the other cases.

On the second measure – that the government is seeking to eliminate corruption – the relationship is significant in three of the five cases: Jordan, Palestine and Yemen. As expected, the sign is opposite of the others in Palestine given that Hamas composed the government at the time of the survey. In Algeria and Morocco, there is virtually no correlation between these two items, suggesting that the importance of concern over corruption as a factor accounting for support for political Islam may be less in these two countries.

In the case of the final possible link between grievances against the existing system and support for political Islam – government performance – the evidence is mixed but broadly consistent with this proposition. The relationship is significant in all cases except Morocco. In Algeria, Jordan, and Yemen, the sign on the coefficient is negative, as expected, and demonstrates that support for political Islam is consistent with low levels of satisfaction with the regime. In Palestine, the relationship is positive and significant, which is also in line with expectations for this case.²¹

In Morocco, although the relationship is insignificant, the sign on the coefficient is positive, suggesting that individuals who are more satisfied with the government are more likely to be supporters of political Islam. In this way, Morocco represents an important outlier. In all likelihood, this is due to the fact that the Moroccan monarchy legitimizes its right to govern on a religious basis. As noted, the king is officially known

²¹ Evidence from 2003 in Palestine (using slightly modified items) reveals that the direction of this relationship is reversed prior to Hamas's electoral victory. Although the item is not significant ($p=0.28$), it does demonstrate that there was an important change in the relationship. Full details are provided in appendix 3.5.

as Commander of the Faithful and represents the highest religious authority in the kingdom. Although in practice a council of religious scholars offer guidance, ardent supporters of the monarchy are more likely to also be supporters of concepts consistent with political Islam than in other cases. This also may account for why levels of support for political Islam are highest in Morocco at over sixty percent as support comes from those who believe Islam legitimizes the existing regime and those who believe that the existing regime does not uphold the true vision of Islam. Overall, this is an important and somewhat surprising exception, especially given that the perceived strength of the opposition Islamist movement in Morocco (see Pellicer 2008).

When asking about the government's performance in five specific areas – how the government is doing managing the economy, creating jobs, decreasing inequality, improving health services, and improving education services – the trend was relatively similar to levels of overall satisfaction for the first two items. In Algeria, Jordan, Palestine, and Yemen the relationship was significant and the sign on the coefficient was in the expected direction. In Morocco, the relationship was significant but the sign was in the opposite direction as predicted by the hypothesis, indicating again that individuals who believe that the government is doing better managing the economy and creating jobs are more likely to hold beliefs consistent with political Islam.

The remaining three items are all significant and in the expected directions in Palestine and Yemen. In Yemen, this suggests that support for political Islam is strongly linked to government performance on a range of issues. In Palestine, it is more likely that results are being driven by support or opposition to the Hamas government, with respondents cuing off the word “government”. It is possible that these responses represent true opinions, but given that the Hamas government had held power for less than three months it seems likely that this response pattern is driven by a honeymoon effect for those supportive of political Islam and the new government. The only remaining case where a relationship is significant is for government performance on educational facilities in Algeria.

Overall, these findings strongly link a certain version of the grievance hypothesis – that the government is failing on managing the economy and on job creation – to passive support for political Islam. In some cases, grievances extend beyond to

additional issues, but these items are significant in all cases, although, as noted, the sign is in the opposite direction as expected in Morocco. Given the weakness of economic outcomes in the Arab world at this time, it is unsurprising that individuals who are economically frustrated with the current regime sympathize with political Islam, the primary viable alternative movement in the region.

Anti-Westernization appears to be very strongly linked to support for political Islam. For all five cases, all items present are significant at standard levels.²² This includes items asking about Western values and culture, an item about whether Americans are good people despite negative foreign policies, and an item asking about attitudes toward Israel. Thus, anti-Western attitudes are strongly correlated with support for political Islam in all countries.

The final general hypothesis is that political Islam is associated with a cultural conservatism, meaning that individuals who support political Islam are more likely to be more culturally conservative as well. With few exceptions, the items used to test this hypothesis have signs in the expected direction and most are significant at standard levels. The primary exception is Jordan where attitudes toward women do not have the same explanatory power as in the remaining cases. Although two items – men make better political leaders and university education is more important for boys – are significant, the remaining items asking about views toward women are insignificant and in some cases the sign is in the opposite direction of that which is hypothesized. In the case of Yemen, only one item – men and women should receive equal wages – is not significant while all items are significant in the remaining three cases. Overall, it appears that traditional attitudes toward the role of women are generally correlated with support for political Islam, although to a somewhat lesser degree in Jordan than the other cases.

There is also some evidence to suggest that intolerance is greater among supporters of political Islam. First, supporters of political Islam tend to be less tolerant toward members of other religions than opponents of political Islam. In all cases except Yemen, supporters of political Islam are more likely to agree that non-Muslims should have fewer rights at significant levels. By the second measure there is even greater

²² The data for two of the items in Yemen were unusable based on errors in executing these items by the local survey team.

consistency; the results show that supporters of political Islam are more likely to indicate that they do not wish to have a neighbor of another religion at standard levels of significance for all four cases where the item was asked.

In terms of tolerance toward other groups, there is some evidence that supporters of political Islam are less tolerant. In Jordan and Algeria supporters of political Islam are more likely to indicate that they do not wish to have a member of another race as a neighbor although this item is not significant in Morocco or Yemen.²³ In the case of having a neighbor who is an immigrant, supporters of political Islam were more likely to state they do not wish to have such a neighbor in all cases except Morocco.

Thus, there is evidence that a more conservative worldview characterized by intolerance toward other religious or racial groups is correlated with support for political Islam. Generally, the evidence reveals less tolerance for other religions than for other races, but in some countries both are significantly correlated. There is a very strong relationship with attitudes toward women's rights, however, in all cases with the partial exception of Jordan, which provides clear evidence that support for political Islam is associated with greater cultural conservatism.

Conclusion

The preceding analysis has demonstrated that although there are differences in the exact mechanisms linking these general hypotheses with support for political Islam, overall there are striking similarities in the profile of individuals who support political Islam across these many of these cases. For three of the five general hypotheses – personal piety, anti-Westernization, and cultural conservatism – support for political Islam is strongly correlated with such attitudes in all countries. This finding offers some support to Eickelman and Piscatori's (1996) thesis that the battle over "Muslim" politics is one over the use of symbols and cultural frames. The finding that those who are more anti-Western, more religious and more culturally conservative are also more supportive of political Islam suggests that cultural and symbolic issues explain support for political Islam to a significant degree.

²³ The item was not asked in Palestine.

For the remaining two hypotheses, there is a general consistency with the exception of Morocco. In the other four cases, political and economic grievances have explanatory power, as do socioeconomic indicators to a more limited extent. Based on these findings, it appears that support for political Islam is generally found among those dissatisfied with the existing regime. In terms of demographic indicators, the most notable difference is that within Jordan, Morocco, and Palestine more marginalized individuals are likely to support political Islam whereas in Yemen support is derived from wealthier individuals. Given that Yemen is by far the poorest country in the Arab world, it is possible that there is a different relationship between income and support for political Islam in this case, implying that among the very poorest this ideology has limited appeal. Meanwhile, in Algeria support appears to be relatively similar across all socioeconomic groups.

As discussed previously, Morocco represents an important outlier for the grievance hypothesis. Most importantly, individuals with attitudes consistent with political Islam tend to be more supportive of the regime. Generally, these findings are insignificant, but the sign on the coefficient is opposite what is expected. There are a number of possible factors that could account for this finding, but the most probable is the unique relationship that Morocco's monarchy has with religion. Although Jordan's king also claims direct descent from the prophet Muhammad, the links between the Jordanian monarchy and religion are not as strong as in the Moroccan case. Thus, differences in the perceptions of ordinary citizens about the role religion plays in the regime in Morocco could account for this difference and also explain the reason that support for political Islam is greatest in Morocco of the five cases as both opponents and supporters of the regime can also be passive supporters of political Islam.

Given that the findings are insignificant, it could be that two distinct populations are both supporters of political Islam on different bases. Individuals who support the monarchy are supporters of political Islam while those who support the Islamist movement's criticism of the regime also are supporters of political Islam. In this case, the primary difference would be whether or not the monarchy is a proper representative of Islam within the system. Given the literature on the Islamist movement in Morocco, however, it is clear that support for the primary Islamist movements is derived from their

opposition to the regime, providing some support for this hypothesis (see Munson 1986; Pellicer 2008; Wegner 2011).

Overall, the general conclusion that emerges from this analysis is that the size of the passive base of support for political Islam appears to be relatively similar between all five cases. For the purposes of the general hypothesis forwarded in chapter two, this finding has a critical implication: for the societies in which these Islamist parties operate, the size and nature of passive support for political Islam can be held functionally constant; no one party has a distinct advantage over another or would be able to mobilize support on a distinct issue that is unavailable to another party. No difference has been found that would appear sufficient to account for the differences in support for Islamist parties exhibited in both electoral behavior and in stated party preferences based on opinion polls as shown in table 1.1. Critically, there are very minor differences between Jordan and Palestine, the two cases with the greatest variation in levels of party support. Given that parties exist in relatively similar social environments, the next chapter examines how party strategy has varied over time in seeking to activate support for political Islam within political competition.

Appendix 3.1

Items in the Arab Barometer that capture support for political Islam:

Q2462:²⁴ I'm going to describe various types of political systems that exist in the Middle East and ask what you think about each as a way of governing [country]. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing [country]?

A parliamentary system in which only Islamic political parties and factions compete in elections (Very suitable, suitable, somewhat suitable, not suitable at all)

Q2464: I'm going to describe various types of political systems that exist in the Middle East and ask what you think about each as a way of governing [country]. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing [country]?

A system governed by Islamic law in which there are no political parties or elections (Very suitable, suitable, somewhat suitable, not suitable at all)

Q2564: What factors would you consider when voting for candidates in an election for political office?

Religiosity (Very important, important, not important, not important at all)

Q4022: In your opinion, how important is each of the following principles as a guide for making the laws of our country?

The government should implement only the laws of the *shari'a* (Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)

Q4011: How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

Men of religion should not influence how people vote in elections (Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)

Q4012: How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

It would be better for [country] if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office (Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)

Q4013: How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

²⁴ Item number as it appears in the Arab Barometer.

Men of religion should have influence over the decisions of government (Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)

Cronbach's Alpha by Country:

Cronbach's Alpha for items q2462 q2464 q4022 q4011 q4012 q4013:

Jordan: 0.626

Palestine: 0.755

Algeria: 0.759

Morocco: 0.765²⁵

Yemen: 0.666

Correlations between Items by Country:

Jordan							
	q2462	q2464	q2564	Q4022	q4011	q4012	q4013
q2462	1						
q2464	0.4033	1					
q2564	0.1735	0.1799	1				
q4022	0.1951	0.2337	0.3182	1			
q4011	-0.1202	-0.0046	0.0055	0.0522	1		
q4012	0.4078	0.2973	0.2825	0.2655	0.0067	1	
q4013	0.3470	0.2438	0.1998	0.1756	-0.0051	0.5457	1

Palestine							
	q2462	q2464	q2564	Q4022	q4011	q4012	q4013
q2462	1						
q2464	0.2853	1					
q2564	0.1410	0.1854	1				
q4022	0.2761	0.3190	0.2392	1			
q4011	-0.2421	-0.2405	-0.2248	-0.3245	1		
q4012	0.3119	0.2823	0.3167	0.4060	-0.5621	1	
q4013	0.2343	0.2627	0.3006	0.3859	-0.5373	0.6753	1

Algeria							
	q2462	q2464	q2564	Q4022	q4011	q4012	q4013
q2462	1						
q2464	0.4649	1					
q2564	0.1058	0.1852	1				
q4022	0.2647	0.3452	0.2374	1			
q4011	-0.1344	-0.1475	-0.0854	-0.1948	1		
q4012	0.3520	0.3685	0.2266	0.3764	-0.2136	1	
q4013	0.3645	0.3710	0.1839	0.4566	-0.2354	0.6217	1

²⁵ In the case of Morocco items q2462 and q2464 are not included in the analysis since they were not asked in this case.

Morocco					
	q2564	q4022	q4011	Q4012	q4013
q2564	1				
q4022	0.2862	1			
q4011	0.0254	0.0504	1		
q4012	0.2762	0.3758	0.0755	1	
q4013	0.2525	0.3478	-0.0169	0.6535	1

Yemen							
	q2462	q2464	q2564	Q4022	q4011	q4012	q4013
q2462	1						
q2464	0.3537	1					
q2564	0.0845	0.0863	1				
q4022	0.1320	0.3162	0.2146	1			
q4011	-0.2388	-0.3158	0.0367	-0.1628	1		
q4012	0.2232	0.2067	0.0112	0.1634	-0.2187	1	
q4013	0.2657	0.2933	0.0412	0.2192	-0.2521	0.4889	1

Appendix 3.2

Factor Analysis and Correlation²⁶

Jordan

<i>Factor</i>	<i>Eigenvalue</i>	<i>Difference</i>	<i>Proportion</i>	<i>Cumulative</i>
Factor 1	1.57985	1.44745	1.2280	1.2280
Factor 2	0.13239	0.15213	0.1029	1.3309
Factor 3	-0.01973	0.16505	-0.0153	1.3156
Factor 4	-0.18478	0.03646	-0.1436	1.1720
Factor 5	-0.22124	.	-0.1720	1.0000

Number of observations=825. Retained Factors=1.

LR test: independent vs. saturated: Chi2(10) = 731.40, Prob>Chi2 = 0.0000.

Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Factor 1</i>	<i>Uniqueness</i>
q2462	0.5897	0.6395
q2464	0.4958	0.7061
q4022	0.3599	0.8570
q4012	0.6920	0.5022
q4013	0.6148	0.5829

Palestine

<i>Factor</i>	<i>Eigenvalue</i>	<i>Difference</i>	<i>Proportion</i>	<i>Cumulative</i>
Factor 1	1.77769	1.58455	1.1541	1.1541
Factor 2	0.19315	0.27774	0.1254	1.2795
Factor 3	-0.08459	0.05713	-0.0549	1.224656
Factor 4	-0.14172	0.06254	-0.0920	1.1326
Factor 5	-0.20426	.	-0.1326	1.0000

Number of observations=1149. Retained Factors=1.

LR test: independent vs. saturated: Chi2(10) = 1302.42, Prob>Chi2 = 0.0000.

Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Factor 1</i>	<i>Uniqueness</i>
q2462	0.4249	0.7728
q2464	0.4362	0.7519
q4022	0.5531	0.6751
q4012	0.7615	0.3954
q4013	0.7219	0.4340

²⁶ In all cases the method is principal factors, the rotation is unrotated, and the number of parameters is nine.

Algeria

<i>Factor</i>	<i>Eigenvalue</i>	<i>Difference</i>	<i>Proportion</i>	<i>Cumulative</i>
Factor 1	1.98483	1.81057	1.1459	1.1459
Factor 2	0.17426	0.21526	0.1006	1.2465
Factor 3	-0.04100	0.13424	-0.0237	1.2229
Factor 4	-0.17524	0.03554	-0.1012	1.1217
Factor 5	-0.21079	.	-0.1217	1.0000

Number of observations=791. Retained Factors=2.

LR test: independent vs. saturated: Chi2(10) = 1032.38, Prob>Chi2 = 0.0000.

Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Factor 1</i>	<i>Uniqueness</i>
q2462	0.5328	0.6563
q2464	0.5819	0.6052
q4022	0.5575	0.6872
q4012	0.7076	0.4738
q4013	0.7422	0.4184

Yemen

<i>Factor</i>	<i>Eigenvalue</i>	<i>Difference</i>	<i>Proportion</i>	<i>Cumulative</i>
Factor 1	1.31170	1.07317	1.2043	1.2043
Factor 2	0.23853	0.24259	0.2190	1.423365
Factor 3	-0.00406	0.21422	-0.0037	1.4196
Factor 4	-0.21828	0.02044	-0.2004	1.2192
Factor 5	-0.23872	.	-0.2192	1.0000

Number of observations=709. Retained Factors=1.

LR test: independent vs. saturated: Chi2(10) = 490.40, Prob>Chi2 = 0.0000.

Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Factor 1</i>	<i>Uniqueness</i>
q2462	0.4554	0.7745
q2464	0.5193	0.6604
q4022	0.3564	0.8304
q4012	0.5648	0.6140
q4013	0.6235	0.5705

Appendix 3.3

Operationalization of Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: Individuals who are more religious are more likely to support political Islam

H1a: Individuals with higher levels of personal piety are more likely to support political Islam

1. Q5021: When you consider what a suitable spouse is for your son or daughter, would you say that each of the following is very important, somewhat important, or not important?

S/he doesn't pray (Very important, important, a little important, not important)

2. Q5022: When you consider what a suitable spouse is for your son or daughter, would you say that each of the following is very important, somewhat important, or not important?

S/he doesn't fast (Very important, important, a little important, not important)

3. Q703: Do you pray? (Yes, no)

4. Q715: In general, would you describe yourself as: (Religious, not religious)²⁷

H1b: Individuals who are more concerned with religious issues are more likely to support political Islam

1. Q5043: Today as in the past, Muslim scholars and jurists sometimes disagree about the proper interpretation of Islam in response to present-day issues. For each of the statements listed below, please indicate whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly with the interpretation of Islam that is presented.

Banks in Muslim countries must be forbidden from charging even modest interest on loans because this is forbidden by Islam (Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)

2. Q2476: Now let's speak about the present government in this country. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters:

Dealing with deteriorating moral values (Very good, good, bad, very bad)

²⁷ In Palestine a third option "in between" was included as a response option.

H1c: Individuals who frequent religious institutions are more likely to support political Islam

1. Q714: Do you pray at: (Mosque, mosque and home, home)

Hypothesis 2: Socioeconomic factors are linked to support political Islam

H2a: Members of the petite bourgeoisie are likely to support political Islam

1. Q703: Level of Education (Illiterate, elementary, primary, secondary, college diploma – two years, BA, MA)
2. Q716: Monthly income (local currency)
3. Q701: Age
4. Q702: Sex

H2b: Members of the middle class are more likely to support political Islam

1. Q716: Monthly income (local currency) coded into a dummy variable for 50th to 75th percentile

H2c: Members of the lower class are more likely to support political Islam

1. Q716: Monthly income (local currency) coded into a dummy variable for 0 to 50th percentile

Hypothesis 3: Support for political Islam is higher among individuals who have political or economic grievances

H3a: Individuals with economic grievances are more likely to support political Islam

1. Q101: How would you rate the current overall economic condition of [country] today? (Very good, good, bad, very bad)
2. Q102: What do you think will be the state of [country's] economic condition a few years (3-5 years) from now? (Very good, good, bad, very bad)
3. Q103: How would you rate the economic situation of your family today? (Very good, good, bad, very bad)

H3b: Individuals who believe corruption is more widespread are more likely to support political Islam

1. Q253: Here are some statements that describe how widespread corruption and bribe taking are in all sectors in Jordan. Which of the following statements

reflects your own opinion the best? (Hardly anyone is involved in corruption and bribery, not a lot of officials are corrupt, most officials are corrupt, almost everyone is corrupt)

2. Q254: In your opinion, to what extent is the government working to crackdown on corruption and root out bribes? (To a large extent, to a medium extent, to a small extent, not at all)

H3c: Individuals who are less satisfied with government performance are more likely to support political Islam

1. Q244: Using a similar 10-point scale, where 1 means very unsatisfied and 10 means very satisfied, indicate how satisfied you are with the performance of the current [country] government (1 = completely unsatisfied, 10 = completely satisfied)
2. Q2471: Now let's speak about the present government in this country. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters:

Managing the economy (Very good, good, bad, very bad)
3. Q2472: Now let's speak about the present government in this country. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters:

Creating jobs (Very good, good, bad, very bad)
4. Q2473: Now let's speak about the present government in this country. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters:

Narrowing the gap between rich and poor (Very good, good, bad, very bad)
5. Q2474: Now let's speak about the present government in this country. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters:

Improving basic health services (Very good, good, bad, very bad)
6. Q2475: Now let's speak about the present government in this country. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters:

Addressing educational needs (Very good, good, bad, very bad)

Hypothesis 3: Individuals who are more anti-Western are more likely to support political Islam

H4a: Individuals who believe that Western values are more harmful to society are more likely to support political Islam

1. Q609: Do you agree with the following statement:

Exposure to the culture of the U.S. and other Western countries has a harmful effect on [country] (Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)

2. Q608: Do you agree with the following statement:

The culture of U.S. and other Western countries has many positive attributes (Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)

H4b: Individuals who are more anti-American are more likely to support political Islam

1. Q607: Do you agree with the following statement:

Despite negative U.S. foreign policies, most ordinary Americans are good people (Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)

H4c: Individuals who are more anti-Israel are more likely to support political Islam

1. Q610: Which of the following statements best expresses your opinion about the problem of Israel and Palestine?
 - a. The Arab world should accept the existence of Israel as a Jewish state in the Middle East only when the Palestinians accept Israel's existence
 - b. The Arab world should not accept the existence of Israel as a Jewish state in the Middle East

Hypothesis 5: Individuals who are more culturally conservative are more likely to support political Islam

H5a: Individuals who have more traditional attitudes about women are more likely to support political Islam

1. Q5051: The following questions are your personal opinions about the principles that should determine the behavior and situation of women in our society. For each of the statements listed below, please indicate whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly.

A woman can be a president or prime minister of a Muslim country (Strongly agree, agree, disagree, disagree strongly)

2. Q5052: The following questions are your personal opinions about the principles that should determine the behavior and situation of women in our society. For

each of the statements listed below, please indicate whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly.

A married woman can work outside the home if she wishes (Strongly agree, agree, disagree, disagree strongly)

3. Q5053: The following questions are your personal opinions about the principles that should determine the behavior and situation of women in our society. For each of the statements listed below, please indicate whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly.

On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do (Strongly agree, agree, disagree, disagree strongly)

4. Q5054: The following questions are your personal opinions about the principles that should determine the behavior and situation of women in our society. For each of the statements listed below, please indicate whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly.

A university education is more important for a boy than a girl (Strongly agree, agree, disagree, disagree strongly)

5. Q5055: The following questions are your personal opinions about the principles that should determine the behavior and situation of women in our society. For each of the statements listed below, please indicate whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly.

Men and women should have equal job opportunities and wages (Strongly agree, agree, disagree, disagree strongly)

6. Q5056: The following questions are your personal opinions about the principles that should determine the behavior and situation of women in our society. For each of the statements listed below, please indicate whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly.

Men and women should receive equal wages and salaries (Strongly agree, agree, disagree, disagree strongly)

H5b: Individuals who are less tolerant are more likely to support political Islam

1. Q5042: Today as in the past, Muslim scholars and jurists sometimes disagree about the proper interpretation of Islam in response to present-day issues. For each of the statements listed below, please indicate whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly with the interpretation of Islam that is presented.

Islam requires that in a Muslim country the political rights of non-Muslims should be inferior to those of Muslims (Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)

2. Which of the following groups you do wish to have as neighbors?

Followers of other religions (Don't wish, don't mind)

3. Which of the following groups you do wish to have as neighbors?

People of a different race or color (Don't wish, don't mind)

4. Which of the following groups you do wish to have as neighbors?

Immigrants and guest workers (Don't wish, don't mind)

Appendix 3.4

Table 3.1: Determinants of Support for Political Islam

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Jordan</i>	<i>Palestine</i>	<i>Algeria</i>	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Yemen</i>
H1: Religiosity					
<i>H1a: Personal Piety</i>					
1) Spouse does not pray	-0.4574 (0.0574)***	-0.6054 (0.0500)***	-0.8402 (0.0827)***	-0.2185 (0.0342)***	-0.5017 (0.0902)***
2) Spouse does not fast	-0.4300 (0.0580)***	-0.5878 (0.0517)***	-0.5546 (0.1146)***	-0.4034 (0.0654)***	-0.5033 (0.0919)***
3) Pray	0.6597 (0.1900)***	1.2109 (0.2884)***	-0.0521 (0.2285)	0.0279 (0.1367)	-0.0856 (0.3051)
4) Religious	0.1426 (0.0774)*	0.8046 (0.1045)***	-0.0384 (0.1195)	-0.0330 (0.0819)	0.1041 (0.0740)
<i>H1b: Religious Issues</i>					
1) Interest	0.3148 (0.0701)***	0.3425 (0.0698)***	0.7765 (0.0974)***	0.2573 (0.0560)***	0.1804 (0.0690)***
2) Government moral issues	-0.0720 (0.0666)	0.4268 (0.0621)***	-0.1153 (0.1111)	0.0813 (0.0468)*	-0.0943 (0.0660)
<i>H1c: Mosque Attendance</i>					
1) Pray in Mosque	0.2864 (0.1301)**	0.3550 (0.0765)***	0.3845 (0.1314)***	-0.0233 (0.0850)	0.4545 (0.1110)***

H2: SES

H2a: Intelligentsia

1)	Education	1.8195 (0.4230)***	0.8381 (0.4024)**	0.2761 (0.5612)	-0.0059 (0.2314)	1.0970 (0.4337)**
2)	Income	0.3308 (0.3039)	1.0879 (0.2724)***	0.4765 (0.3600)	0.5937 (0.2399)**	-0.4536 (0.2783)
3)	Age	1.5457 (0.4942)***	0.4173 (0.4417)	1.0492 (0.8532)	-0.0366 (0.2233)	1.1376 (0.7340)
4)	Sex	-0.1749 (0.2094)	0.1532 (0.1608)	0.2062 (0.2460)	0.0464 (0.0925)	0.2329 (0.1697)

H2b: Middle Class

1)	Dummy Variable	-0.1245 (0.1617)	-0.2359 (0.1638)	0.2558 (0.2533)	-0.0215 (0.1066)	0.3851 (0.1682)**
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H2c: Poorer Classes

1)	Dummy Variable	0.2417 (0.1821)	0.6016 (0.1582)***	0.2815 (0.2336)	0.2445 (0.0922)***	-0.3809 (0.1672)**
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H3: Political Grievances

H3a: Economic frustration

1)	Economic situation	-0.0534 (0.0712)	0.2083 (0.0789)***	-0.1391 (0.1127)	-0.0549 (0.0724)	-0.1825 (0.0702)***
2)	Perceived economic condition	-0.1944 (0.0786)**	0.1006 (0.0716)	-0.1568 (0.1209)	0.0186 (0.0671)	0.2074 (0.0862)**
3)	Future economic conditions	-0.0676 (0.0649)	0.2350 (0.0615)***	-0.1397 (0.1003)	0.0177 (0.0588)	-0.2460 (0.0618)***

H3b: Corruption

1)	Corruption widespread	0.1276 (0.0708)*	0.1550 (0.0812)*	0.2171 (0.1077)**	-0.0748 (0.0561)	0.3553 (0.0812)***
2)	Government eliminating corruption	-0.1885 (0.0622)***	0.4655 (0.0548)***	-0.0481 (0.0887)	0.0349 (0.0467)	-0.2625 (0.0582)***

H3c: Government Performance

1)	Satisfaction with government	-0.0397 (0.0231)*	0.2090 (0.0164)***	-0.1356 (0.0346)***	0.0241 (0.0162)	-0.0863 (0.0225)***
2)	Government manage economy	-0.1960 (0.0721)***	0.5745 (0.0670)***	-0.2158 (0.0990)**	0.1153 (0.0459)**	-0.3636 (0.0701)***
3)	Government create jobs	-0.1416 (0.0692)**	0.5380 (0.0748)***	-0.3505 (0.1041)***	0.1107 (0.0512)**	-0.3366 (0.0690)***
4)	Government eliminating inequality	-0.0854 (0.0699)	0.5683 (0.0692)***	-0.1590 (0.1109)	-0.0570 (0.0528)	-0.3045 (0.0732)***

5)	Government health services	-0.1025 (0.0761)	0.6455 (0.0680)***	-0.1387 (0.0976)	0.0596 (0.0485)	-0.2194 (0.0632)***
6)	Government education facilities	-0.0431 (0.0830)	0.5616 (0.0697)***	-0.1771 (0.0960)*	0.0154 (0.0469)	-0.1477 (0.0660)**

H4: Anti-West

H4a: Anti-Westernization/Globalization

1)	Western values have harmful effects	0.2426 (0.0682)***	0.2809 (0.0675)***	0.6053 (0.0889)***	0.3027 (0.0497)***	
2)	Western culture has positive attributes	-0.4030 (0.1250)***	-0.5780 (0.1199)***	-0.6471 (0.1947)***	-0.3423 (0.1006)***	-0.3010 (0.1456)**

H4b: Anti-U.S.

1)	Despite negative foreign policy Americans good people	-0.2324 (0.1287)*	-0.5531 (0.1201)***	-0.5797 (0.1776)***		
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H4c: Anti-Israel

1)	Arab would should not accept existence of Israel	-0.4107 (0.1545)***	-0.8283 (0.1343)***	-1.6166 (0.2065)***	-0.2999 (0.0955)***	-1.3460 (0.1739)***
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H5: Cultural Conservatism

H5a: Gender Conservatism

1)	Woman can be Prime Minister	0.0389 (0.0647)	-0.4594 (0.0598)***	-0.8553 (0.0685)***	-0.1510 (0.0452)***	-0.3033 (0.0573)***
2)	Women can work outside home	0.0881 (0.0781)	-0.1668 (0.0861)*	-0.7866 (0.0865)***	-0.1538 (0.0489)***	-0.4417 (0.0737)***
3)	Men better political leaders	0.2922 (0.0682)***	0.5054 (0.0730)***	0.4684 (0.0897)***	0.2751 (0.0461)***	0.3214 (0.0788)***
4)	University education more important for boys	0.4309 (0.0611)***	0.2272 (0.0632)***	0.5101 (0.0846)***	0.2335 (0.0522)***	0.2590 (0.0675)***
5)	Equal job opportunities	0.0633 (0.0700)	-0.2715 (0.0736)***	-0.7010 (0.0795)***	0.0034 (0.0517)	-0.2506 (0.0676)***
6)	Equal wages	0.1060 (0.0762)	-0.1502 (0.0773)*	-0.4952 (0.0945)***	0.0847 (0.0570)***	0.0173 (0.0735)

H5b: Less Tolerant

1)	Fewer rights for non-Muslims	0.7186 (0.0698)***	0.4724 (0.0715)***	0.2540 (0.0808)***	0.2643 (0.0491)***	0.1087 (0.0745)
2)	Non-Muslim neighbor	0.5902 (0.1271)***		0.9375 (0.1636)***	0.7833 (0.0896)***	0.3375 (0.1176)***
3)	Neighbor other race	0.4955 (0.1313)***		0.5637 (0.2061)***	0.1651 (0.1571)	0.0389 (0.1467)

4)	Immigrant neighbor	0.3904 (0.1182)***	0.9666 (0.1827)***	0.1248 (0.1766)	0.2385 (0.1409)*
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Note: Table presents coefficient (β) estimates with standard errors in parentheses.

*Statistically significant at .1 level. **Statistically significant at .05 level. *** Statistically significant at .01 level.

Appendix 3.5

Table 3.2: Results from 2003 Survey in Palestine

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Palestine</i>
1) Satisfied with financial situation (q39)	0.0227 (0.0217)
2) Satisfaction with government (q34)	0.0350 (0.0329)

Note: Table presents coefficient (β) estimates with standard errors in parentheses.

*Statistically significant at .1 level. **Statistically significant at .05 level. *** Statistically significant at .01 level.

Variables used:

Q39: How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household? (Very satisfied, satisfied, neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, dissatisfied, very dissatisfied)

Q34: People have different views about the system for governing this country. In your opinion, how good of a job is the government doing? (Very good, good, bad, very bad)

Chapter 4

Changes in Party Strategy over Time

The previous chapter demonstrated that support for political Islam, broadly defined, is relatively similar across a range of Arab societies. Levels fall within a band of around ten percentage points, but in each of the five cases a slight majority of citizens tends to support political Islam. Second, as the chapter demonstrated, the factors underlying support for political Islam tend to be relatively similar; there is some support cross-nationally for most existing theories that have been offered to explain popular support for political Islam. Thus, the plausible hypothesis that differences in the level of support of Islamist parties result from variation in passive support for political Islam does not find much support.

As second potential hypothesis that could account for differences in levels of support for Islamist parties relates to party strategy. Despite seeking to activate support from relatively similar passive bases, Islamist parties may have pursued different strategies that resulted in varying levels of party support. As will be detailed, all parties are associated with the charitable activities of the broader Islamist movement within their societies, meaning that service provision is a constant between these cases. What does vary, however, is the party's ideological outreach and particularly how the parties seek to reach out to potential supporters on issues that are not strongly associated with their brand names. This chapter examines this variation in outreach to evaluate if these differences are related to empirical differences in levels of Islamist party support.

More specifically, the chapter begins with a brief summary of the two elements that have dramatically affected the Islamist brand name. The first of these is Islamic political and economic thought and the development of the *shari'a* or Islamic law. The second is the Islamist movement in the modern era, which incorporated elements of traditional Islamic political thought and extended the movement's brand name to a number of new issues. In particular, this section notes how the Islamist movement has

struggled to address modern economic challenges resulting in no strong inherited brand name on issues such as unemployment and inflation for Islamist parties.

The next section examines in greater detail the Islamist movement in each society prior to the emergence of the Islamist parties under study. In light of this background, it examines how the parties have sought to appeal to ordinary citizens on a range of issues with greater attention to party strategy toward economic issues. Examining changes to party platforms over time, the comparison reveals that party strategy has been relatively similar on most issues but has varied on economic issues. However, the chapter concludes by noting that these differences are not consistent with the empirical variation exhibited by support for Islamist parties, implying that differences in party strategy are not likely to explain differences in levels of support for Islamist parties across these cases.

The Shari‘a and Economic Thought in Islam

Beginning in 610 CE, the Prophet Muhammad began receiving divine revelations that were later recorded in the Qur’an, Islam’s holy book. Initially, these revelations tended to focus the nature of God but later revelations, particularly those received after 622 when Muhammad became the political leader of the city of Yathrib (later Medina), gave greater insight into social relations including issues such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance. For the first Muslim community, these guidelines became enshrined as a basic set of laws governing the community. Thus, in Medina and later in Mecca, Muhammad established the principle that religions and political power should be unified.

From this small community, Islam would expand rapidly, leading to an empire stretching from Spain to Central Asia in just over a hundred years. Although the first Muslim conquests began under Muhammad, his sudden death in 632 – only two years after the conquest of Mecca – occurred before the development of the institutions necessary to govern an empire had been developed. His rule was followed by, for Sunni Muslims, the four Rightly Guided Caliphs (*al-Khulafā’u r-Rāshidūn*), which is a period that is often upheld by Sunni scholars as a historical ideal for political governance (Esposito 1987, 136). Beginning during this period and continuing through the Abbasid Caliphate (750-1258) and beyond, Islamic scholars sought to develop a set of laws based

on Islam that could be used to govern society. These scholars pointed to a number of sources that would eventually produce a large corpus of legal interpretations that would form the basis of the *shari'a*.

The most important guideline within Islam is the Qur'an itself. If the Qur'an offers no clear directive, then jurists looked to the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad. These stories, called the *ḥadīth* and collectively known as the *sunnah*, served as the second basis for developing Islamic law. Third, the use of analogies (*qiyās*) was the third source for the *shari'a*. In cases where no clear analogous situation already existed, *ijmā'*, or consensus among Islamic scholars, could be used to determine the correct principle. Finally, *ijtihād*, meaning individual interpretation based on existing Islamic principles, could be used to develop a new law or principle. Combined, these five sources were used to derive what is now known as the *shari'a*.

The *shari'a* is well developed on a number of topics, including social justice and commercial law among others. Often there are considered to be five branches of the *shari'a*: ritual worship, transactions and contracts, morals and manners, beliefs, and punishments. Others, such as a member of the *Shafi'i* school, Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri (1302-1367), identified eleven primary areas: purification, prayer, funeral prayer, taxes, fasting, pilgrimage, trade, inheritance, marriage, divorce, and justice. As implied by this latter division, the *shari'a* is well developed on commercial law and trade and there are also other areas that have clear economic implications. However, relative to areas such as social issues, there is little development in the historical *shari'a* that bears directly on many modern economic issues.

The Shari'a and Modern Economic Theory

In applying the *shari'a* to modern economic issues, there are two primary principles from traditional Islamic jurisprudence that are most commonly employed: the prohibition of interest (*ribā*) and the provision of alms to the poor (*zakāt*). In the case of the former, the Qur'an specifically forbids usury (2:275). Over time, this injunction has led to the prohibition of all forms of interest as a result of there being no clear line between legitimate interest and usury. In the case of *zakāt*, the Qur'an requires that widows and orphans be provided with sustenance (90:14-5). Although the exact amount

that must be spent on the needy is not specified, early Islamic scholars set the amount at 2.5 percent.

Beyond these two prominent examples, there are also general injunctions about the means by which an individual can seek to make money (5:41-2) and the condemnation of greed (4:37). Muslims are expected to behave in a generous manner and not profit by unethical or sinful means. Additionally, over time Islamic tradition developed an extensive theory of just taxation that included differing tax rates for types of goods, as well as for members of different faith communities (see Shemesh 1967).

Over the last half-century, Islamic theorists have sought to apply these principles to develop an Islamic economic system. Often, poor economic outcomes are attributed to violations of principles from the Qur'an. For example, heavy borrowing from international financial institutions and Western governments has led to significant debts for many Muslim countries. Since these loans charge interest, Islamic theorists link the problem of foreign debt to the payment of interest. Similarly, some have argued that the problem of inflation is inherently related to the problem of interest, stating that if inflation were zero or approximated zero then there would be little need to charge interest. Thus, eliminating interest from the economy could theoretically solve the problem of inflation (Utvik 2006, 88).

Scholars have also used the principle of *zakāt* as the basis for a broad social-democratic vision that balances the right to private property with provisions for the poor (see Nomani and Rahnema 1994). The key mechanism, however, relies on a change in human behavior linked to citizens upholding proper Islamic values (Roy 1994). This theory envisions that if individuals were not greedy but rather looked after the common good by providing *zakāt* to the poor, all citizens would be cared for but private property would still be protected as individuals were themselves choosing to provide for those in need. Along these lines, Yūsuf Kamāl, a leading Islamic economic theorist, argues that the solution is for the state to collect *zakāt* at the rates set by Islamic tradition and that additional taxes are required of the wealthy only when this income is insufficient (Utvik 2006, 99).

In sum, Islamic economic theory promises a long-term solution based largely on a fundamental transformation in human nature through adherence to Islamic values. Thus,

Roy (1994, 144-6) argues that what distinguishes the Islamic solution to the economy from other approaches is the primacy given to ethics. The outcome is based on an ethical transformation of individuals by which they realize that achieving material sufficiency is the ultimate goal and that additional wealth should be used for the greater good. This theory supports the need for a grassroots awakening among Muslims that seeks to reassert religious principles and norms throughout society, although it offers few immediate and tangible solutions to dealing with major economic challenges facing many developing countries.

Thus, although there is a rich history of Islamic thought on economics, no clear and immediate solutions for decreasing unemployment, limiting inflation, or increasing economic development are available. In its development, economic theory has tended to focus on broader, longer-term issues. Moreover, these developments are relatively recent and have taken place at an academic level. It is unclear the degree to which, if any, the connections between well-known elements of the *shari'a* such as the ban on interest and *zakāt* and modern economic problems have become linked of the popular conception of Islam or the *shari'a*.

The Rise of Political Islam

The beginning of modern political Islam, as the term is commonly understood, traces its roots to Hassan al-Banna and the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Ismailiyya, Egypt, in 1928.²⁸ Al-Banna believed that external forces had corrupted the Islamic world and resulted in its relative weakness compared to the West. He created the MB with the goal of fostering a grassroots religious revival by encouraging Muslims to return to Islam in its purest form (Mitchell 1977). Al-Banna primarily focused on winning mass support as a means to alter society rather than on specific political goals. As such, the MB began as a grassroots organization with the primary goal of educating society about the true Islam rather than operating as a political organization.

²⁸ Others might trace it back to thinkers such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani or Muhammad 'Abduh. The former argued that Islam could be the basis for solidarity for the Muslim world to rise up against the West. The latter, a student of al-Afghani, additionally argued that the religious establishment corrupted the true meaning of Islam, necessitating a return to the foundational basis of the religion as practiced by Muhammad and his successors.

Rapid growth led to the founding of MB branches throughout Egypt and much of the Arab world. Within Egypt the organization's focus soon expanded to initiating top-down reforms that would facilitate the movement's grassroots efforts. The basic message, however, represented a critique against the religious and political elite, resulting in the Egyptian regime, like those in other countries, perceiving the MB as a threat. The Brotherhood represented a particular threat to Gamal Abdel-Nasser's twin visions of Arab socialism and Arab nationalism, leading to a violent crackdown against the Brotherhood's leadership (Mitchell 1977). This led to a shift in thinking among leading members, particularly Sayyid Qutb, and an increasing radicalization of the movement. Qutb began to shift the focus toward taking radical steps to bring about an Islamic regime. This in turn led to a rise in violent actions taken in the name of Islam by followers of Qutb.

Over time, the radical wing of the Brotherhood began to weaken. Sadat pursued a more conciliatory policy toward the Islamic movement than his predecessor Abdel-Nasser and elements of the movement began to focus their efforts on working for change within the existing political system. In the 1980s, members of the Brotherhood contested elections in Egypt, winning a number of seats in Parliament. However, radical elements within the Islamist movement remained and pursued violent strategies with the goal of overthrowing the existing regime.

Recently, a leading member of the Brotherhood defined the official goal of the organization as instilling the Qur'an and the *sunnah*²⁹ as the "sole reference point for everything relating to the ordering of the life of the Muslim family, individual, and community as well as the Muslim State all economic, social, political, cultural, educational, and also legislative and judiciary activities" (Hodaibi 2010). Thus, the organization continues to reaffirm its originally stated purpose of bringing about societal transformation, although efforts now include both bottom-up and top-down strategies.

The Muslim Brotherhood and Economic Policy

Initially, the Muslim Brotherhood gave a central role to economic issues, although social and political issues were of the greatest concern. In one of the earliest and most

²⁹ The sayings and teachings of the prophet Muhammed from sources other than the Qur'an.

prominent elucidations of the Brotherhood's political ideology, Hassan al-Banna, the movement's founder, presented fifty necessary steps in a letter to King Faruq of Egypt (al-Banna 2009). The first forty of these demands are many common policies supported by the Islamist movement covering political and social issues. The majority of these demands is general in nature, calling for "reform" in a general sense or targeting a highly symbolic issue. Examples of the form include a "reform of the law, so that it will conform to Islamic legislation in every branch" (no. 2) and a "conditioning of the people to respect public morality" (no. 12). Examples of the latter include ensuring that Arabic, the language of Islam, is the sole language of instruction in primary schools (no. 24) and an end to gambling (no. 14).

However, in the last section of demands al-Banna's letter to King Faruq outlined ten economic reforms. Specifically, he calls upon the government to raise *zakāt*, to prohibit interest, to undertake development projects in order to reduce unemployment, to protect the masses from large corporations, to improve salaries for junior civil servants, to eliminate redundancy within the public sector, to increase agricultural and industrial counseling, to raise the standard of living of ordinary workers, to exploit mineral resources, and to prioritize necessary projects over luxury items (al-Banna 2009, 78). Notably, only the first two demands were cast within a specific Islamic framework. Thus, it is clear that initially al-Banna sought economic as well as political reform.

Two years after this letter was issued, a tract entitled *Social Justice in Islam* by Sayyid Qutb, a student studying in the United States who would later become a leading thinker in the Egyptian Brotherhood, first appeared. At the time, Qutb was greatly concerned with questions pertaining to social justice and the proper Islamic ordering of society. In the volume, Qutb examines questions pertaining to the right to private property within Islam, how Muslims should use their resources, and an examination of *zakāt*. Thus, Qutb develops a clear vision for how a righteous Muslim should act and use his or her resources, but fails to address more significant macroeconomic issues. Some have likened Qutb's ideology toward a socialist vision given the focus on redistribution (see Caha 2003, 44-5),³⁰ albeit with greater emphasis on individual as opposed to

³⁰ This claim is most closely associated with later works given the focus on a "vanguard" which will bring about the Islamic revolution in *Milestones*. Numerous elements in his path to the creation of an Islamic

collective action in this process. Still, in this work primary imperative is for a change in individual nature that will produce this desired outcome.

Despite an initial focus on economic issues, following al-Banna's death in 1949, the movement began to place a lesser emphasis on this topic, particularly after Abdel-Nasser's crackdown. The most prominent outline of this renewed vision appears in an influential tract that began circulating in 1964 called *Milestones*³¹ by Sayyid Qutb. Central to the tract is Qutb's criticism of the West for materialism and corrupting influence on Muslim lands. Qutb reappropriates the concept of *jahiliyyah* – literally meaning ignorance and used to refer to pre-Islamic times – to describe the modern Islamic world. He argues for the creation of a vanguard, similar to the force the prophet Muhammad developed to combat opposing forces, to vanquish the forces of *jahiliyyah* in the modern era. The ultimate goal is to bring about the reinstatement of the *shari'a* – which represents a complete system of life – to resolve all present problems introduced by foreign influence. If the *shari'a* was reintroduced and Muslims would submit themselves to God, then Qutb argues that God will bring forth blessings and the result will be a just and harmonious society.

Another trend also emerges within *Milestones* and other works by Qutb that has important implications for how economic policy is understood. Despite seeking a just and relatively equal society, Qutb harshly critiques communism and socialism. His greatest criticism is that both are secular in nature as his basic claim is that religion is the only way to produce necessary societal transformation. Additionally, he also criticizes communism for its deprivation of individual choice and the inability to hold private property. This dual criticism highlights his belief that under an Islamic system, private property is protected but social justice can also be fully achieved.

Qutb's specific criticism of communism can be linked, in part, to the environment in which he was writing. His Islamist vision was created as a specific alternative to Abdel-Nasser's Arab socialism, especially given Abdel-Nasser's crackdown on the Islamist movement. Qutb's vision placed a much greater emphasis on religion, but in

society resemble Leninism, which is a key element underlying this claim. Additionally, it should be noted that Qutb fiercely rejected any association with socialism and was staunchly opposed to both socialism and nationalism in his writings.

³¹ *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* loosely translates as "Milestones" or "Signposts on the Road".

other ways there are striking similarities between the two visions. Arab socialism, in theory, has as its central goal the creation of an equal and just society. It also places an emphasis on the evils of Western capitalism and argues for independence from the Western financial system. Qutb's economic vision seeks many similar outcomes, albeit through religious as opposed to secular political actors. Despite this reality, Qutb claims that there is no similarity between the two systems as a result of their difference on the role of religion.

In sum, the dominant Brotherhood vision that emerged in the 1960s seeks to resolve all economic problems through a fundamental and long-term transformation of society. In the short-term, turning this vision into a policy platform presents a significant challenge. The primary tension results from the Islamist struggle to define the state's role in its economic vision; Islamists have generally upheld the sanctity of private property but have also argued that the society must provide for the basic needs of all. Yet, the Brotherhood does not clearly state that the provisions for the poor are the responsibility of the state. Instead, the Brotherhood has consistently sought to help the poor through Islamic charities, meaning that the role of the state in this provision – prior to it becoming an Islamic state – is less clearly defined. Within their broader ideology, this tension can be easily resolved: an Islamic state would be the proper instrument to provide charity for the poor. Prior to the establishment of an Islamic state, however, this vision fails to provide a firm position about the state's role in the provision of social services.

The challenge of turning this ideological vision into concrete policy positions most clearly emerged with the return of multi-party politics in Egypt in the 1980s. The dual goals of upholding private property and providing for the poor were forwarded by party platform, resulting in a relatively incoherent platform. Utvik (2006, 71-4) notes that contradictory positions made it virtually impossible to locate the party on a traditional left-right scale. As a result, no economic vision that could be directly translated into a clear and concise platform of policy position emerged from the Egyptian movement of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Muslim Brotherhood as a National Actor

Branches of the Muslim Brotherhood were founded in many Arab and Islamic countries after its founding in Egypt. National branches operated independently, but shared a similar ideology and were influenced by the Egyptian Brotherhood and those of surrounding countries. Despite these similarities, each national branch developed to reflect the specific characteristics of the society in which it was based. This section examines the development of the Brotherhood in each of the case studies in greater detail.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan

In Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1945 by Hajj ‘Abdullatif Abu Qurah. Abu Qurah, a wealthy merchant, was actively involved in supporting the cause of the Palestinians. Although he came into contact with members of the Egyptian Brotherhood almost a decade earlier, it was not until reading an article in *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, the Egyptian Brotherhood’s flagship publication, calling for Muslim *ummah*³² to wage *jihad*³³ against colonial and Zionist forces that he decided to reach out to al-Banna. Al-Banna was supportive and sent two emissaries to establish a Muslim Brotherhood organization in Jordan (see Boulby 1999, 40-2).

Despite the Egyptian Brotherhood’s broader agenda, the newly formed Jordanian Brotherhood had no real ideological objectives save for supporting the liberation of Palestine (Schwedler 2006, 66). After the annexation of the West Bank by Jordan in 1948, however, the dynamics of the movement began to change as the result of the influx of a Palestinian professional class into Jordanian politics. By 1954, the stated goals of Jordanian Brotherhood began to more closely those of their Egyptian counterparts:

1. Jordan is a part which cannot be divided from the Islamic world; 2. The Muslim Brotherhood refuses to accept any system which does not support Islamic principles; 3. The Muslim Brotherhood will not support any government until it implements the shari‘ah of God in Jordan; 4. The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan is part of the Egyptian movement; 5. The Muslim Brotherhood considers the Palestinian problem an Islamic problem and will mobilize all material and spiritual forces for the liberation of Palestine from world Jewry and the international crusaders. (Boulby 1999, 54)

³² Literally meaning community or nation, in a religious context *ummah* refers to all Muslims.

³³ Often translated as “holy war”, *jihad* literally means struggle.

This platform was sensitive to the existing challenges that confronted Jordan in the 1950s. First, the loss of much of historic Palestine to the newly formed State of Israel was a highly salient issue. Second, during this period, secular nationalist forces were highly popular with Sulayman al-Nabulsi, the leader of the National Front, which was in an alliance with the Ba'ath Party and the Jordanian Communist Party, serving as Prime Minister. These nationalist forces sought to follow the Egyptian example by promoting Arab socialism and weakening the role of religious elites in the political system. Thus, the Jordanian Brotherhood's platform was aimed primarily at confronting these two pressing challenges while framing them in religious terms.

Although the Jordanian Brotherhood competed in parliamentary elections in 1954 and 1956, its success was limited. Nevertheless, its alliance with the monarchy against the secular nationalist forces prevented it from being subjected to the law banning political parties following an attempted coup in 1957. As a result, the Brotherhood represented the only legal organization of its kind from 1957 until the re-legalization of political parties in 1992.

Due to the more restrictive political environment, the Muslim Brotherhood's explicitly political activities were somewhat limited. The movement continued to focus on the goal of the liberation of Palestine and at times came into conflict with the regime over its less hardline position toward Israel. Additionally, the Brotherhood sought to broaden its influence over social issues. For example, the organization actively sought to place its members within the Ministry of Education to try to influence school curricula (Boulby 1999, 84). Ishaq Farhan, a prominent leader of the Jordanian Brotherhood, was even appointed the Minister of Education in the 1970s.

Although overtly political activities were limited, the Brotherhood and broader Islamist movement focused significant efforts on building Islamic charities throughout the Kingdom. The most prominent of such organizations, the Islamic Center Charity Society (ICCS), was founded in 1963. The organization expanded quickly in the 1970s, due especially to the inflow of remittances from Jordanians working abroad in the oil sector. By the 1990s the revenues of the ICCS approached U.S.\$4 million per year (Clark 2004, 92), a large sum in a country of only four million people with a per capita income of U.S.\$1,604 in 1995 (WDI 2011). The ICCS provides mosque facilities and

focuses its activities on education, health, job training, financial assistance, and caring for orphans and the elderly. Local branches are present throughout the country and, although technically a separate organization from the Muslim Brotherhood, the activities of the ICCS are widely attributed to the Jordanian Brotherhood (Clark 2004, 93). Beyond the ICCS, a number of other Islamic charity organizations also exist, many of which are focused on providing health care and social services to the poor.

Following the Iranian Revolution, the Jordanian Brotherhood increased its political activities throughout the Kingdom (Robbins and Rubin 2011). Members of the Brotherhood contested a number of professional and student elections, with a number of strong results (Boulby 1999, 90). In 1984 by-elections were held to replace eight members of parliament from those elected in 1967. Of the six seats reserved for Muslims, candidates affiliated with the Brotherhood contested four and won three. The basis of their platform was opposition to opening negotiations with Israel, a long-term goal of the palace.

In sum, relative to the Egyptian Brotherhood, one critical difference with the Jordanian Brotherhood is the degree to which its focus has centered on the question of Palestine. Although this is an important issue for the Egyptian Brotherhood, this was the main reason for the Jordanian Brotherhood's founding and has played the greatest role in its development over time. Like the Egyptian Brotherhood, much of the membership of the Jordanian Brotherhood comes from educated professionals, but unlike Egypt, there is no great ideologue in the Jordanian movement. Prior to the political liberalization of 1989, most of the efforts of the Jordanian Brotherhood were charitable and focused on forwarding the cause of the Palestinians.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine

Islamic political activity in Palestine dates to at least the 1920s under the British Mandate, but the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood was established in Jerusalem in 1945. The movement spread quickly to most other major cities and by 1947 there were thirty-eight local branches and more than ten thousand members. During the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, some members of the Brotherhood took up arms and fought alongside Arab armies, but these efforts were relatively limited. By comparison to other

branches, the Palestinian Brotherhood did not place a significant emphasis on political activity (Mishal and Sela 2000, 16).

Following the Arab defeat, the West Bank came under Jordanian control while the Gaza Strip came under Egyptian control. As a result, the Palestinian Brotherhood was greatly influenced by the movement in Jordan and Egypt respectively. The history of the West Bank movement is highly similar to the Jordanian Brotherhood. In Gaza, Egyptian authorities pursued a similar policy toward the Palestinian Brotherhood as toward the Egyptian branch of the Brotherhood. Beginning in the mid-1950s the Gazan branch was suppressed by Egypt leading to a substantial weakening of the movement.

In 1967 Israeli forces captured the West Bank and Gaza Strip, leading to a greater focus on uniting the two branches. Israeli policy was relatively tolerant of Islamic social and political activity, resulting in the founding of the United Palestinian Brotherhood Organization. The group remained limited in its political activities in the years that followed, however. Rather, activity focused on building charitable institutions and increasing educational outreach. Within the Gaza Strip, the most important development was the founding of the Islamic Center (*al-Mujamma' al-Islami*), which came to serve as the center for Islamic religious and educational activities.

The goals of the Islamic Center, like those of the Brotherhood generally, were to promote grassroots societal change to bring about an Islamic reawakening. To this end, the Islamic Center created a network of schools and sponsored Qur'anic classes in the name of *dawah*.³⁴ Attention was also given to the poor and needy by creating charities including medical clinics, vocational centers for women, and sports clubs. Activities were centered on the mosque and provided a range of services to help those in need. In this way, the Islamic Center's activities were highly similar to those of the ICCS in Jordan and those of Brotherhood charities in other countries. Funds were raised locally but also came from external countries, particularly conservative Gulf countries that had a significant interest in both the Palestinian cause and in funding Islamic activism.

Throughout the 1980s, political activities of the Palestinian Brotherhood increased, similar to the trend in Jordan. Unsurprisingly, throughout its history the primary focus of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood has been on the

³⁴ *Dawah* means issuing a call or invitation in the name of Islam.

liberation of Palestine. The Brotherhood considers all of historic Palestine to be an integral part of the Muslim world and to belong to the Palestinians. The Brotherhood has consistently rejected negotiating away any part of Palestine and claims that such a policy position is defeatist.

The Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood highlights the fact that Muslims once before succeeded in liberating Palestine from the Crusaders after a ninety-two year occupation, which underscores the basic logic behind the concept of Islamic resistance. In a tract dating from the early 1980s, the organization more clearly detailed the theory of the “Islamic solution” to the occupation:

1. Since efforts to resolve the Palestine issue have failed, the only viable alternative is to return to true Islam, which is the only effective tool in the war with Israel.

2. The conflict is with an enemy that has utilized the weapon of a religious faith in its wars with the Palestinians; therefore the only effective response is to use Islam as a weapon in that conflict.

3. Islam proved a successful weapon during the early period of Islam and later by the Ottomans in their conquests of parts of Europe and, therefore, there is nothing to be feared if Islam is resorted to as a weapon.

If the Palestinians resort to Islam, there is sufficient evidence in the *hadith*³⁵ of the promise of victory. The practical steps that should be taken to achieve the Islamic solution include:

- a) The formation of a truly faithful and committed Muslim group within the Palestinian people; this group should have an understanding and awareness of the Palestine issue and of all the conspiracies against the Palestinian cause.

- b) This faithful group will expose the traitors, agents and proponents of nationalism and will bring about Palestinian awareness of the true nature of its battle with Zionism.

- c) The third step would be to carry out an educational program where the Palestinian masses will have full faith in God, and learn the full extent of the nature of this ‘religious conflict with the Jews.’ (Shadid 1988, 669)

Throughout this tract, the Brotherhood casts the conflict in religious terms, noting the Israeli success in using religion, highlighting the historic success of Islamic forces in Europe, and pointing out the failure of non-Islamic Arab nationalists.³⁶ Despite representing an oversimplification of history, this tract presents a strong position

³⁵ The sayings of the Prophet Muhammad.

³⁶ The reference to nationalist forces implies both the PLO in liberating Palestine after the 1967 defeat as well as the failures Egypt and Syria in the wars against Israel in 1967 and 1973.

outlining the importance of a return to Islam to achieve the primary Palestinian goal. Thus, by the 1980s the primary focus of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood was on the Israeli occupation.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen

The Muslim Brotherhood first gained a foothold in Yemen in the 1930s and 1940s, although the prominence of the organization was less than in Jordan or Palestine. Emissaries from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood advised elements of the opposition to the rule of the Imamate (Dresch 2000, 56). Officially, however, the organization was banned until the 1962 revolution and it played a minor role in politics until that time.

Following the revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood began to operate openly under the leadership of Shaykh ‘Abd al-Majid al-Zindani. The group, along with other conservative elements, supported the new republican leadership against the leftist revolutionary guard. Similar to the case of Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood had close relations with the political elite in North Yemen (Schwedler 2006, 70).³⁷

Amidst complaints that al-Zindani had lost sight of al-Banna’s original vision and turned the Muslim Brotherhood into a personality cult, he was replaced by Shaykh Yasin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Qubati in the late 1970s. Under his leadership, the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood actively supported the government of North Yemen against an insurgency fomented by the South Yemen regime. Largely due to this loyalty to the regime, the new President of North Yemen, ‘Ali ‘Abdallah Salih viewed the Brotherhood favorably and included many as prominent members of the General People’s Congress party when he founded it in 1982.

Like other branches of the Brotherhood, one of the primary functions of the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood is charitable work (see Bonnefoy and Poirier 2010). Through the Charitable Society for Social Welfare (*Jam‘iyya lil-Islâh al-Ijtima‘i al-Khayriyya*), the Islamist movement conducts charity work in poor neighborhoods and provides disaster relief. Like the two other branches, much of the donations for this

³⁷ As a result of the Yemeni civil war from 1962-9, Yemen was split into North Yemen (the Yemen Arab Republic) and South Yemen (the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen). Yemen was eventually unified in 1990 (the Republic of Yemen) through a merging of the two governments although a civil war in 1994 resulted in the former northern leadership seizing control of the key institutions of the state.

society come from the Gulf and through remittances from Yemeni workers, as well as through local fundraising. Beyond this social work, the society has founded a number of schools and even a university.

The Islamist Movement in Algeria

The Islamist movement in Algeria, like that in Yemen and Morocco, was less focused on the Palestinian cause. Rather, it initially followed the basic model established by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood calling for a grassroots societal revolution that could eventually bring about an Islamic system. As such, activities focused much more heavily on charitable outreach and educational development.

The most significant Islamist organization – which held a similar ideology with but was separate from the Muslim Brotherhood – was the Islamic Society (*al-Jamiat al-Islamiyya*), which was founded in 1968 by students and faculty at the University of Algiers (see Laremont 2000). Throughout the first decade of its existence its members focused on building charitable institutions as well as publishing articles and holding conferences to increase awareness of its ideology. The Islamic Society also founded and funded a number of mosques outside of government control.

The quality of provision by its charities soon exceeded that of the regime on a wide range of activities. For example, it began providing security for merchants operating in the old city (*medina*) in Algiers, providing scholarships for students, and hospitals. The organization also provided disaster relief following a major earthquake near Tipasa in 1989, responding more quickly than the government. Much of the funding for the Islamic Society came from the Gulf, as is also common in the other cases.

Beginning in 1979, the Islamic Society's strategy began to focus more significantly on political action. It sponsored a number of strikes at the Universities protesting the lack of complete Arabization in government affairs. In 1982 the organization staged protests over the revisions to the Family Code claiming that they should be made in line with Islamic principles. When the revised code was passed, it included provisions for the application of the *shari'a* to any family matter not specified in the code, recognized polygamy, and required women to obtain authorization from their husband or male relative for a number of legal processes (Laremont 2000, 189).

Throughout the 1980s the Islamic Society and other elements of the Islamist movement continued to pressure the regime, leading to a number of protests over the declining quality of life confronting ordinary Algerians. Following a wave of protests in 1988, the government initiated a process of liberalization that resulted in elections for municipal and national offices in 1990. A party that emerged from the Islamic Society (Laremont 2000, 186), the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), dominated these elections, leading to their eventual cancellation and a civil war between the regime and Islamist forces lasting throughout most of the 1990s.

The Islamist Movement in Morocco

The Party for Justice and Development (PJD) was established in 1997, but its roots were not in the Muslim Brotherhood movement, as the Brotherhood has never had a significant presence in Morocco. Rather, the PJD emerged from a social movement called *at-Tawhid wa'l-Islah*, a group whose ideology is similar to the Brotherhood and which has links to chapters of the Brotherhood in other countries (Hamzawy 2008, 7). The organization was relatively moderate and sought inclusion in the political process unlike the more militant *al-'Adl wa'l-Ihsan*, the other main Islamist organization present in Morocco.

With a minimal Brotherhood presence, the rise of the Islamist movement in Morocco occurred in the 1960s and 1970s in response to the perception that the regime led by the King, whose official title is the Commander of the Faithful (*Amīr al-Mu'minīn*), was not implementing policies that were fully in accordance with the *shari'a*. The most prominent organization at this time was the *Shabiba Islamiyya* (Islamic Youth) a radical group which advocated the use of violence, much like some elements of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and elsewhere during the same period. The regime crackdown on *Shabiba Islamiyya* led to the creation of a number of more moderate organizations, the majority of which would eventually unify under the name *at-Tawhid wa'l-Islah*.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s *at-Tawhid* sought to gain inclusion in the political system, but was restricted by the monarchy from participating in elections (Lust-Okar 2005). In the early 1990s *at-Tawhid's* leadership negotiated with the leadership of

a legal but long-dormant party, the Democratic Constitutional Movement, to have its members join and assume power in managing the party. In 1997 *at-Tawhid* members joined the party and in 1998 the party's name was changed to the PJD. Thus, the PJD forms the political wing of *at-Tawhid* and is the primary Islamist party in Morocco.

Unlike *at-Tawhid*, *al-'Adl wa'l-Ihsan* has not sought inclusion and remains a banned political movement. This group was founded in 1981 by Abdelsalam Yassine and refuses to acknowledge the monarchy's right to rule, instead calling for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate taking guidance from the four rightly-guided caliphs. Estimates suggest that the movement remains relatively popular and Moroccan authorities claimed that in 2006 there were 100,000 members throughout the country (Utvik and Tønnessen 2008, 18).

Like other Islamist movements, both *at-Tawhid* and *al-'Adl* have associated religious charities which could benefit Islamist participation in politics. Nevertheless, these networks are not as fully established as those in other societies, such as those associated with the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, Egypt, or Palestine (Pellicer 2008, 6).

In sum, despite some differences, the Islamist movements shared a number of important commonalities that laid the groundwork for the parties that would emerge in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In each case the Brotherhood undertook charitable activities aimed at bringing about an Islamic reawakening at the grassroots level. In Jordan and Palestine the Brotherhood developed an ideology that was deeply linked with the Palestinian issue whereas in the other three cases the Islamist movement focused more directly on bringing about Islamic governance under the *shari'a*. In all five cases, the basic ideology of the movement did not depart significantly from the framework laid down by members of the Egyptian Brotherhood such as al-Banna and Qutb. Most important for this study, none of these movements developed an economic ideology that was distinct from the Egyptian Brotherhood.

The Founding of Islamist Parties

In these countries Islamist political parties emerged within a few years of one another. In Palestine, Hamas was officially formed as a political party in late 1987, within days of the outbreak of the first Palestinian *intifada*. In Jordan, the Muslim

Brotherhood contested the 1989 elections, although political parties were not legalized until 1992 when the Islamic Action Front (IAF) was founded. In Yemen, the Muslim Brotherhood had been part of the umbrella governing coalition in the 1980s, but emerged as an independent party following the unification of North and South Yemen in 1990. In Algeria, the Movement of the Society for Peace (MSP) was founded in 1990 following political liberalization. In Morocco, the predecessor to the PJD was founded in 1992 before becoming the PJD in 1996. Thus, each appeared in a relatively similar regional and global environment and the temporal proximity of their founding resulted in a common ideology and brand name.

Hamas's Founding Ideology and Development

Hamas was founded at the outbreak of the first Palestinian *intifada* on December 14, 1987 when it issued its first communiqué. In 1988, Hamas issued its official Charter which more clearly details its vision. The Charter outlines a number of important goals, but equally notable is its virtual silence on economic issues. Given the environment in which Hamas was founded and the party's focus on resistance and liberation, this silence is not entirely surprising. However, what is surprising is that in the years since Hamas has not meaningfully changed its strategy on economic outreach.

Hamas's Charter begins by quoting from *sūra* 3:110-112 of the Qur'an (*Sūratu Āli-'Imrān*) where God states he has raised up the greatest community of believers among a community of evildoers who will be punished. The Charter links this to the modern Israeli-Palestinian problem, claiming that Israel will exist until Palestinian Muslims, one-by-one, stand up and eliminate it. This beginning not only demonstrates the religious nature of the movement, but also summarizes the primary claim of the remaining document, a claim which is then reiterated in article one by noting that Hamas "draws its guidelines from Islam."

In article two, Hamas clearly states that it is a wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine, linking itself to the past activities of the MB movement. It goes on to note that the Palestinian Brotherhood is linked to a global Muslim Brotherhood movement which provides "a profound understanding, by precise notions and by a complete comprehensiveness of all concepts of Islam in all domains of life: views and beliefs,

politics and economics, education and society, jurisprudence and rule, indoctrination and teaching, the arts and publications, the hidden and the evident, and all the other domains of life.”

Casting itself as a part this broader movement, Hamas links its identity to the wide-ranging ideology of the movement. This broad statement does not identify specific beliefs about the movement but rather alludes to the claim that Islam provides a blueprint for all of the challenges problems society confronts. The exact means by which Islam is the solution are assumed to be detailed in existing Brotherhood political theory.

Articles three through eight define the structure, support, and claims to universality of the movement. Notably, article six defines Hamas as a distinctly Palestinian movement, implying that Hamas’s own ideology may depart from that of the international Muslim Brotherhood in some important ways, a departure which the remainder of the document details. The primary difference in Hamas’s approach is that while it adopts the Islamist view that society has become *jahiliyyah* and requires the reinstatement of Islam (article nine), Hamas’s ultimate purpose is much more narrowly focused on the liberation of historical Palestine from the state of Israel compared to the broader Islamist vision of the international Muslim Brotherhood. Thus, in article twenty-three, the Charter underscores that even though Hamas may differ from these movements in some ways, it still stands in general agreement and support of these associated movements.

In justifying this position, Hamas’s Charter declares that historic Palestine is an Islamic *waqf* (article eleven) – meaning it is an inalienable religious endowment under Islamic law. This statement implies that Palestine is a religious gift from God and that it cannot be given away, through negotiations or other means, due to obligations originating from Islam (article thirteen). Thus, the political goal of the liberation of Palestine is given a clear Islamic frame, and this frame is presented as being completely compatible with the nationalist aim of establishing a free and independent Palestine (article twenty-four). To this end, Hamas states that the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) “is among the closest to Hamas, for it constitutes a father, a brother, a relative, a friend.” Yet, it again distinguishes itself from the PLO, a secularly minded organization, noting

that victory is only possible through Islam and calling upon the PLO to accept that Islam is the solution.

Hamas's Charter also emphasizes the unity of the Palestinian struggle by seeking to mobilize all members of community. The role of women is described in detail (article eighteen), for example. The document goes on to demand social solidarity from Palestinians against the enemies of Israel and outside powers. Throughout, it cites examples from the Qur'an and from Islamic history to justify its positions, again placing the conflict within a clear religious frame.

In sum, Hamas's Charter is almost entirely about defining the concept of religious opposition within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Charter begins by linking itself to the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamist movement, which offers the new organization greater legitimacy. Subsequently, the Charter represents a comprehensive theory of an Islamist approach to the existing conflict. Thus, Hamas both embraces the broader ideology while focusing its efforts on one particular issue. It should be noted that Hamas largely imports the Islamist framework to diagnose the roots of the problem and elucidate the only viable solution. In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the root cause is attributed to foreign actors who are from other religions, particularly Christians and Jews. Thus, the primary cause of the problem results from a religious division, which is well suited to a religious solution.

It should be noted that Hamas, responding to the local environment, sought to transform the Muslim Brotherhood's extensive ideology into a single issue related to the conflict. Only two specific references are made to economic issues. The first occurs in article two referencing the Islamist ideology, which the Charter claims, extends to economic issues. The second occurs in article eighteen when it notes that women must be faithful managers of household expenditures to help the struggle for liberation. Given the conditions of occupation, this limited ideological development is to be expected. Yet, it is important to note that in its initial outreach to Palestinians, Hamas did not seek to alter the Islamist brand name toward economic issues.

Over the next two decades, Hamas's ideology was not monolithic. Numerous volumes trace its changing ideology and strategy, as well as disagreements within its leadership on a number of critical issues (see Mishal and Sela 2000; Tamimi 2007;

Gunning 2008). Mostly, these changes had to do with Hamas's approach to Israel and the peace process. For example, rather than sign a permanent peace treaty with Israel, Hamas proposed signing a five-hundred-year *hudud* – a concept derived from the Qur'an where one offers a tactical truce to an opponent. Although Hamas's stated goal of Israel's destruction would remain unchanged under a *hudud*, in practical terms a permanent disengagement of hostilities would be the result. Nevertheless, Hamas's changing ideology was largely restricted to two policy positions: Israel and the PLO. Broadly speaking, Hamas remained silent on most other issues affecting the Palestinian population.

Hamas boycotted the 1996 Palestinian general elections, not contesting its first elections until the mid-2000s. It participated in five-stage local elections beginning in December 2004 and scheduled to run through 2006, although the final stage was never held. Although it did not run a candidate in the 2005 Presidential election, Hamas did participate in the 2006 Parliamentary elections in which it won a decisive victory in terms of seats in parliament.

As part of its outreach campaign Hamas's electoral list – Change and Reform – formulated a complete political platform, which was the first time that Hamas had produced a comprehensive document of this nature. Two versions were created; the first was the complete platform while the second was a shorter version that could be more easily distributed to potential supporters. The lengthier manifesto begins by quoting a verse from the Qur'an and a brief introduction justifying Hamas's decision to participate in the elections. The platform then proceeds to detail policy stances on eighteen distinct issues.

Much like Hamas's Charter, the 2006 election manifesto's first policy area details Hamas's fundamental worldview. It forwards the belief that Islam should be the basis for all parts of life and outlines the implications of its long-standing claim that Palestine represents a *waqf*. The second policy area describes domestic politics and calls for the safeguarding public liberties and the ending of cooperation with Israeli authorities on a range of issues agreed to under the Oslo Accords. These domestic priorities extend to protecting Palestinian prisoners captured by Israel and maintaining unity of the nation. In sum, these two policy areas focus largely on forwarding a hardline approach toward the

peace process and implicitly criticizing Fatah's policies toward Israel. Article three continues this trend by turning to external relations with the goal of increasing international support for the Palestinian cause.

Articles four through six propose changes to the manner in which the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) operates and how it interacts with Palestinian citizens. Article four highlights the problem of corruption within the PNA and links this to Israeli occupation by claiming that the occupation weakens the Palestinian cause and undermines national unity. Increased transparency and decentralization are promoted as policy solutions. Article five focuses on legislative policy and judicial reform, calling for the *shari'a* to be the main source of legislation, and for a separation of powers. Additional reforms include training for the judiciary and protections for its independence. Article six outlines public liberties and civil rights, calling on citizens to be equal before the law and establishing legal protections.

Articles seven and eight focus on education and religious instruction. Policies toward education include increasing the extent of instruction in religion, the humanities, and ethics and to reduce class sizes. In terms of religious instruction, reforms are proposed that would increase the status of imams and religious teachers to be equal to that of other members of the civil service, to increase the educational knowledge of these leaders, and to increase funding for mosques.

Articles nine through twelve turn to social and cultural issues, addressing social policy, cultural and media issues, women, and youths. Article nine calls for the expansion of social services for the poor and vulnerable, a strengthening of *shari'a* courts which oversee the existing Personal Status Law, a reorganization of *zakāt* committees, and it makes appeals for the fulfillment of social justice. Article ten calls for media protections, although it stipulates that the media should promote increased knowledge among the Palestinian public, particularly on issues related to the occupation. It also claims that the media should discourage adoption of Western norms or values. Article eleven states that women must be equal partners in the *jihad* against Israel and calls for the development of civil society organizations targeting women, the promotion of women's vocational training, and by protecting women from abuse by men. Article

twelve proposes the development of youth centers and sporting clubs to help immunize youth against corruption and immorality.

Articles thirteen through fifteen address policies towards housing, health and agriculture. Hamas seeks to create additional public housing and bolster the construction sector, partly as this will help reduce unemployment. As for health, Hamas seeks to provide health to the poor, increase the quality of public health care, and address environmental contamination. Its agricultural policy is to develop this sector with the aim of ensuring food security.

Finally, in the last three sections – articles sixteen through eighteen – Hamas details its economic, labor, and transportation policies. The first stated goal, underscoring its position on Israel, is to disengage Palestinian economic activities from the “Zionist entity.” This is followed by a promise to review existing economic and fiscal regulations and to develop policies that will encourage investment. Hamas also promises to establish a “resistance economy” and to ban economic activities that are immoral, including nightclubs and gambling. Economic agreements with non-Muslim countries will be reconsidered while trade with Arab and Islamic countries will be promoted. Infrastructure will be developed while public property will be used in a way that brings benefit to the general population. The prices of basic necessities will be evaluated and possibly subsidized, and taxes will be restructured.

As for labor, Hamas seeks to develop trade unions, set a minimum wage, and “implement a serious plan to deal with unemployment.” They pledge to increase knowledge of workers’ rights, to provide health insurance to all laborers, and to index wages to inflation.

Finally, Hamas promises to rebuild existing infrastructure, to open border crossings with Egypt and Jordan, and to reopen the Palestinian airport. The platform then closes with a brief statement underscoring Hamas’s ultimate goal of reinforcing the “method of resistance and engraving it in the minds, hearts, and souls of our people.” The movement again appeals to its religious nature, telling voters to remember that “Islam is the solution.”

As is evident from the organization of the longer version of the party platform, economic issues are not central to Hamas’s outreach. In fact, other than a short section

on transportation, the two primary articles dealing with economic issues come last. These policies tend to be broad and lacking detail, other than appeals to general Islamic issues such as closing down immoral economic sectors. External relations and Israel have a central role in line with Hamas's overall goal of "Islamizing" the economy to purge it of Western and Israeli elements. Finally, only twice is unemployment mentioned in the platform. Once occurs in the section on labor (article seventeen) where the party promises to devise a plan to address this issue while the second occurs in article thirteen in the discussion of promoting construction which yields, as a byproduct, job creation.

Hamas's policy platform revolves almost entirely on two issues: resistance to Israel and criticism of Fatah's government. The first four articles very clearly address these two topics and many of the remaining fourteen articles are cast within this framework. For example, many policies are justified as being necessary reforms to bring unity to society to forward the goal of resistance (see article eleven). Other cases, such as article four, are indirect criticisms of Fatah policies. This is done so as not to undermine the notion that Hamas is trying to foster unity rather than divisions within society, but to the average citizen the opposition to Fatah's government is very clear.

The strategy of focusing on the Israel and Fatah for the 2006 election was also made clear in a number of elite interviews. In an interview with the author, Omar Abdel Razeq, the Minister of Finance in the Hamas government admitted that Hamas's economic policy played minimal role in our election strategy or the result (Abdel Razeq 2008). Similarly, Nasser al-Din al-Shaer, the Minister of Education and Deputy Prime Minister in the Hamas government, reported that Hamas's most effective slogan during the campaign was: "The U.S. and Israel say no to Hamas, what do you say?" (al-Shaer 2008) Thus, in both their views, Hamas's election victory hinged on its position toward the peace process with Israel.

Overall, Hamas's strategy has been to play up its traditional brand name rather than seeking to modify it. The party has largely disregarded economic concerns in its outreach, seeking instead to focus efforts on activating support based on its staunch resistance to Israel. As a result, economic issues have come to play a minimal role in the party's outreach and this was not the primary determinant of support for Hamas prior to the 2006 Palestinian Legislative elections (see Lahloh 2007).

The IAF's Attempted Transformation

Emerging from the Muslim Brotherhood, the IAF inherited a similar brand name to the other parties. Yet, since the resumption of regular elections in Jordan in 1989, the IAF's³⁸ strategy toward outreach on economic issues has undergone a significant change. Over the last two decades, the party has significantly decreased its emphasis on economic issues. Thus, the party has largely abandoned its efforts to overcome its weak association with economic issues instead focusing on issues that are more strongly associated with the Islamist brand name.

Electoral life resumed in Jordan in 1989, after a hiatus of more than two decades, as the result of a severe economic crisis. Rising levels of debt resulted in high levels of inflation in Jordan and many other countries in the region. Combined with rising unemployment, riots broke out in the Ma'an in southern Jordan in a region considered to be pro-regime. In response, the Jordanian regime undertook a program of political liberalizations similar to what occurred in a number of other Arab countries during the same period (Brynen et al. 1995).

In the 1989 elections the Muslim Brotherhood fielded candidates in the elections and forwarded a lengthy and well-developed platform (Arabiyat interview). The platform itself begins with an overview of the history of the Brotherhood and its accomplishments, particularly its resistance efforts against Israel and other foreign influences. It also forwards the slogan "Islam is the solution" and argues that Islamic law should be the only source of legislation. The party, however, forwards a very open tolerant strain of the Islamic vision, calling for full equality of all citizens before the law and the protection of basic freedoms and rights including the right to worship freely and freedom of the press.

After calling for a number of political reforms, the platform's focus switches to economic issues, noting the extremely difficult economic situation. The first topic addresses the high foreign debt faced by the country – which was a key factor behind the protests that lead the regime to hold elections – calling for the an end to foreign

³⁸ Political parties were banned in 1989, but the Muslim Brotherhood participated as an organization. Since the IAF is the political party associated with the Brotherhood in Jordan and prominent members of the Brotherhood who ran in 1989 also founded the IAF in 1992, when parties were legalized, the IAF's platforms are compared to the Brotherhood's platform in 1989. Additionally, IAF is used to refer to both the party and the Brotherhood's political activities from 1989 until the party's founding.

borrowing and the prosecution of those who have enriched themselves at the expense of the nation. Inflation, the second economic issue addressed, receives somewhat less attention. The platform blames this problem on the greed of monopolists and calls for an end to such practices and for the government to find ways to help the poor deal with rising prices. Unemployment is the next topic addressed with the platform calling for an investigation into its causes, particularly among youths. Finally, the platform criticizes the high levels of inequality found in Jordan.

A number of proposed solutions are forwarded to resolve these problems. First, the platform states that it is necessary to purge the public sector of corrupt officials. Second, private property must be protected to encourage investment. Third, a national plan must be developed that seeks to limit imports and promote domestic industry. Fourth, more land should be reclaimed to promote domestic agriculture. Fifth, the tax system must be reformed to make it more progressive and limit inequality. Sixth, the provision of social services to the poor through *zakāt* should be further developed. Seventh, interest must be eliminated in the banking system. And finally, paper money must be replaced with coins per Islamic requirements.

The remainder of the platform details a number of key Islamist demands, including reform of the educational system to reflect Islamic ideals, censoring media from immoral subjects, bringing about social justice, and support for the Palestinian cause. Thus, the platform played to the Islamist base but also sought to transform the image of the movement by giving first priority to political liberalization and economic issues, two salient issues that were not strongly associated with the party's inherited brand name.

By the penning of its election platform in 1993, however, the party's focus had changed considerably from the 1989 platform. Some of this difference can be attributed to the fact that Muslim Brotherhood and independent Islamist candidates captured forty percent of the parliamentary seats in 1989 and Abdul-Latif al-Arabiyyat, a founding member of the IAF, had served as the Speaker of the House of Deputies. Thus, the IAF was seeking to defend its role in the previous parliament. In this context, the 1993 platform began by arguing for the importance of Islam in informing the political realm

and claiming that Jordan's ills can be explained by the absence of Islamic principles throughout all areas of society.

Subsequently, the 1993 platform details the successes of the Islamist bloc in parliament, highlighting a number of bills that were passed or proposed including those to limit corruption, ban alcohol, promote educational reforms, and increase political rights for citizens. The party outlines its commitment to continue working towards these and other goals and sets out policies toward a number of other areas.

Notably, unlike in 1989, economic issues do not receive a distinct article within the platform. Inflation and unemployment are not directly addressed. Rather, the four times unemployment are mentioned occur with regard to how educational or training programs affect unemployment. This strategy is surprising as economic conditions were only moderately better than in 1989.

It should be noted that the party placed a significant emphasis on programs that would help the poor, including the provision of basic services for these members of society and policies to decrease inequality. Overall, however, the party's platform came to reflect symbolic Islamist concerns, such as public morality, to a much greater extent than the 1989 platform.

After boycotting the 1997 elections, the IAF contested the 2003 elections with a platform that was relatively similar to its 1993 platform. This platform begins by forwarding the slogan "Islam is the solution" and outlining the importance of Islam to the political process. The opening of the platform calls for political reform, including constitutional changes leading to greater transparency and greater powers for the legislature as well as greater rights and protections of personal rights. This is followed by calls for educational reform, focusing textbooks and instruction about religious and cultural issues, while limiting foreign influences. The next article focuses on reforming state-sponsored religious institutions to ensure a greater quality of religious instruction and the fourth and fifth articles deal with social policies concerning families and the role of women. Thus, like in 1993, attention to economic issues is not given a primary role in the platform.

Like 1993, two key issues that affect ordinary citizens – unemployment and inflation – are given minimal attention in the IAF's 2003 electoral program. In the

section on economic policy, these issues are mentioned after plans to increase integration with other Arab and Islamic countries and eliminating Jordan's trade deficit. The platform calls for the development of a national plan to address unemployment and the development of an agency to oversee labor markets. Other mentions are made of unemployment, but in the context of positive externalities as a result of other policies. Inflation is addressed in a similarly brief manner; the IAF calls for inflation to be reined in and to implement cost-of-living adjustments for those who are employed.

Additional elements of the platform address issues such as protecting the rights of laborers and encouraging unions, proposed policies toward Israel and the Palestinian resistance, corruption, and Iraq, with these last three representing the longest and most detailed articles in the platform. Thus, traditional Islamist issues continue to form the bulk of the party's platform. This is also evidenced by the party's outreach after the election. As Abu Rumman (2007, 50) notes, over half of the IAF's statements on its website in the years 2005-7 focused on normalization with Israel, the Palestinians, Iraq, or other international issues, followed by nearly a quarter of statements focusing on political reform. Economic issues comprised only five percent of all such statements.

The 2007 platform was relatively similar to the 2003 platform with an initial focus on political reform and civil rights. As in 2003, this opening is followed by articles on educational policy, media policies, and how to reform the state's religious bureaucracy. The next set of articles focus on social policies affecting women and families, and health and human services. A lengthy article then addresses agricultural policy, calling on the government to increase the area under cultivation and increase Jordan's independence in food production.

Finally, article twelve deals directly with economic policy, again focusing on a range of issues. Most prominently, the party calls on increased integration with Arab and Islamic countries and the fostering of development, a long-standing Islamic goal. It also repeats calls to lower unemployment and to establish an agency to manage unemployment. Once again, it is stated that inflation should be reined in, but no specific plan is proposed to deal with this challenge. The remainder of the platform is highly similar to that of 2003.

In sum, Islamists in Jordan initially placed a significant emphasis on economic issues in electoral competition. Over time, however, the role of economic issues decreased dramatically in party platforms. Despite the fact that both unemployment and inflation represented significant issues affecting the lives of ordinary citizens, the party focused on other issues in its outreach, namely Israel, foreign relations, and criticisms of the government.

Islah's Attempted Transformation

At its point of entry into political competition, Islah lacked the same level of professionalism found in Hamas or the IAF. The party was less centralized and represented a coalition of three distinct factions, yielding a less developed political ideology initially. In its first platform, which was prepared for the 1993 parliamentary elections, Islah forwarded a program focused almost entirely on Islamic principles and heavily derived from religious texts. The main function appears to be to establish Islah as a religious party and to argue for the need for Islam to be the guiding principle of politics.

The platform begins by citing of a number of Qur'anic verses that highlight that all blessings come through Islam. It does not seriously address policy issues, but rather highlights the general need for reform³⁹ in Yemen. This includes free elections and a new constitution that is written "in light of Islam." The platform argues that Islamic guidance can address issues such as corruption, the selling of alcohol, the suffering of Palestinians, misery in society, and shortcomings in the fields of the economy, security and education. No specific means are specified and the platform does not propose specific policies. Rather the platform's fundamental claim is that a brighter future is possible, but only through Islamic governance.

Following the 1994 war in Yemen, however, Islah forwarded a clearer ideological vision with the publication of an extremely long and dense policy statement outlining its vision across a range of areas. This statement is divided into five sections: society, the state, the economy, security and defense, and foreign policy. The document – which is the better developed than the IAF's policy positions at the time – sought to provide a clearer vision of exactly how Islam should inform the political process in Yemen. Most

³⁹ *Islah* itself translates as reform.

sections begin with a reference to the Qur'an or a saying by the prophet Muhammad⁴⁰ that underscores the connection between Islam and the policy being discussed.

The section on society is divided into three parts that address culture and identity, information and media, and civil society. These sections include policies to ensure greater personal freedoms, reform the educational system, and strengthen unions and non-profit organizations. Additionally, proscriptions are made as to how to reestablish the mosque as the center of public life and to increase the number of mosques throughout the country. The next two sections address the provision of *zakāt* and other social services. Islah argues that *zakāt* should be overseen centrally to increase its effectiveness and that a social safety net must be created for vulnerable members of society. Finally, this section addresses policies toward women and youth. It argues that women are the primary caregivers in society and seeks to find ways to support them in this capacity as well as providing them with opportunities for work. Youth centers and organizations are also essential to prevent vices among the younger generation.

The second section concentrates on the role of the state and proposes an outline of the ideal state institutions. Islah argues that the state exists to protect human rights through the implementation of Islamic principles. This includes the application of many elements associated with democratic governance including the rule of law, pluralism and peaceful transitions of power, and checks and balances between the three branches of government.

The third section addresses economic issues, again stating that only through Islam can good economic outcomes be achieved. Islah argues for freedom in economic activity, the protection of private property, and for principles of social justice. Its fiscal platform focuses on limiting corruption and ensuring that taxes are collected while its monetary platform promotes the benefits of Islamic banking. Despite a number of detailed policy recommendations, this section largely overlooks issues that are of greater importance to the average citizen. One mention is made of inflation, which the party argues can be cured by requiring interest-free banking. Similarly, this section only makes two direct references to unemployment. In the first case, the policy statement argues that

⁴⁰ Or *hadith*.

it is imperative to address the issue of unemployment in rural areas and in the second it claims that the state budget should be used to reduce unemployment.

The final two sections address defense and security and foreign policy. Like other Islamist parties, Islah calls for building a unified country and strengthening links with other Arab and Islamic countries. The party calls for supporting the Palestinian cause and reorienting the country's alliances away from the West. Islah also calls for a unified military to increase the country's unity.⁴¹

Overall, this 1994 policy statement outlines the party's goals much more formally than what was forwarded only a year earlier. Nevertheless, like other Islamist parties, the policy goals it forwards tend to be relatively vague and strongly focused on social and political outcomes. Like the IAF, a significant focus is placed on political liberalization and issues related to the family. In the case of foreign affairs, Islah's stated policies are similar to that of the Islamist movement more generally. This trend also extended to economic issues where Islah focused on two primary issues – *zakāt* and Islamic banking – rather than focusing on more pressing issues such as unemployment and inflation. Given that GDP per capita was around U.S.\$261 in 1994 (WDI 2010), the lack of focus on economic development and issues of unemployment is striking.

For the next election – the 1997 parliamentary elections – the party produced a more concise statement of its goals based on the policy statement of 1994. This document still focuses heavily on religion and, like the 1993 platform, the 1997 platform begins with direct appeals to the Qur'an. As before, the party also places a great emphasis on political reform, arguing that political reform would increase the country's stability, promote social justice, and limit corruption. The 1997 platform provides a detailed analysis of the steps necessary to build the Yemeni political system, including increasing the rights guaranteed to citizens within the constitution, ensuring the separation of powers, and increasing the role of the legislative branch. Policies also address the development of civil society organizations and the reformation of the state bureaucracy. Thus, in these areas there are no major changes from previously stated policies.

⁴¹ Prior to the civil war in 1994 the military structure had not been fully integrated from the former North and the former South (Kostiner 1996). Thus, its integration was a key element in unifying the country as a whole.

There are important changes, however, in its fourth and final section, which outlines Islah's economic vision. Unlike in previous formulations of the party's goals, in this manifestation inflation is the most prominent issue within the section on economics. The party notes the severity of the problem and details the many ways in which it has ill effects on ordinary citizens. In response to this problem, Islah promises to take a number of key measures to limit corruption and regulate monetary policy in an attempt to tame inflation. Notably, they do not explicitly link inflation to the problem of interest, a common strategy of Islamic economic theorists and parties including Islah in its own 1994 policy statement (see Utvik 2006). Rather, in 1997 Islah claims the problem of corruption – an issue on which their association with religion affords them a clear advantage – is responsible for high levels of inflation. Thus, Islah claims that if the state did not bear the additional costs of incurred by corruption, then there be no need to inflate the currency.

Although not necessarily the root cause of inflation, this claim is important for two reasons. First, it could appeal to ordinary Yemenis who are unsure of the reasons behind inflation but are familiar with the presence of high levels of corruption. Second and more important, it represents an attempt at policy innovation on economic issues. Islah's reframing of this issue represents an attempt to increase the salience of the Islamist brand name on economic issues, which is a strategy that neither Hamas nor the IAF attempted to undertake during this period.

In addition to inflation, Islah proposes building a social safety net to care for the poor and needy. It proposes public works projects for the unemployed and increased spending on public services. Islah also develops a plan to increase economic growth by promoting the Islamic banking sector, outlining policies to attract foreign direct investment (from Arab and Islamic countries), and promoting business-friendly reforms.

Surprisingly, despite this innovation on its policy toward inflation and the detail of this section, which comprises one third of the entire platform, Islah never addresses unemployment directly. Rather, it simply appeals to strategies for economic growth. Nevertheless, Islah's 1997 platform represents a clear shift from previous strategies as it incorporates economic issues as a key part of its outreach.

By the 2003 parliamentary elections Islah, now a member of the Joint Meetings Party (JMP), changes its strategy once again. In its platform, economic issues are given first priority. Islah begins the platform by highlighting that there has been a severe economic recession, poverty abounds, unemployment is high, inequality remains high, and average wages are low. The platform continues by noting the poor state of a number of other indicators, including health and education, as well as massive levels of corruption.

After outlining the problems afflicting Yemen, Islah returns to its long-standing claim that addressing these issues requires reforming the political system. Most importantly, Islah highlights its support for a system based on the rule of law and the implementation of constitutional provisions. It also supports a strengthening of the judiciary and increased guarantees for the judiciary's independence. Additionally, local governing councils and civil society organizations are strengthened under Islah's vision, positively affecting the political process.

After discussing these political issues, the party directly addresses the economic challenges in the second section of policy proposals. In this section Islah proposes creating an effective partnership between the government and the private sector to stimulate economic growth, seeking to turn Yemen into a transport hub given its strategic position in global trade, and strengthening infrastructure. Poverty reduction is promised based on policies mentioned in prior platforms: developing a social safety net, effectively collecting and distributing *zakāt*, and rural development strategies. Economic stability is sought by reining in inflation and promoting savings and investment. Specific plans are also developed to promote agricultural development and support the fishing industry.

The remainder of the platform addresses issues outlined in the 1994 policy statement, including health and education and security and foreign policy. Each of these areas receives substantial attention but, unlike in prior platforms, each is given less prominence than economic issues.

It should be noted that Islah's relatively technical platform was unlikely to have been read extensively by potential supporters. However, these changes are significant in that they represent Islah's changing strategy. In the ten years since it was founded, Islah shifted from a party focused primarily on traditionally Islamic issues to one focused

heavily on economic issues and highly critical of the regime's performance. This change in focus is counter to the strategy pursued by the IAF in Jordan, which decreased its attention to economic issues during this time period or Hamas, which never gave serious attention to such issues. Thus, Islah's overall strategy was to increase its focus on economic issues, presumably in an attempt to win greater public support and capitalize on the economic discontent of ordinary citizens.

This changing identity was even more clearly manifested in the 2006 Presidential election. In this election the JMP nominated Faisal bin Shamlan, who was a member of the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) as its candidate for the presidency. This choice was striking given that Islah represented the dominant party within the coalition while support for the YSP was relatively small. However, the YSP is strongly associated with economic issues and this decision further demonstrates Islah's attempted transformation on economic issues.

MSP's Alternative Strategy

The Islamist party in Algeria affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood is the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP; *Mouvement de la Société pour la Paix* or *Harakat Mujtama' as-Silm*) was formed by Mahfouz Nahnah in 1990 and participated in the aborted elections a year later. The party won only 5.4 percent of the overall vote in an election dominated by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) (Boubekour 2007, 2). Although the FIS remains banned, it should be noted that two smaller Islamist parties remain legal in addition to the MSP as a result of the split of the Ennahda movement: the Movement for National Reform (MRN) and Ennahda proper (Bouandel 2002, 101). The MRN movement, under the leadership of Abdallah Djaballah, had success in the 2004 election winning nearly ten percent of the overall vote, but in all other elections post-1991 MSP has fared better than any other Islamist party.

The MSP participated in the 1995 presidential election, the first election following the aborted 1991 election. Nahnah, the party candidate, won just over twenty-five percent of the vote, finishing second to the army-supported candidate, Liamine Zeroual. Despite declarations by international observers that the election was generally free and fair, Nahnah and the MSP claimed that he had won an outright majority (Bouandel 1997).

Despite its criticisms of the regime, following the 1997 parliamentary elections the MSP agreed to form a coalition with the long-ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) and National Rally for Democracy (RND), which was made up largely of former FLN members. Since 1997, the MSP has remained in the governing coalition, leading many to suggest it has been co-opted by the regime (Utvik and Tønnessen 1998, 21), placing its strategy at odds with most other Islamist parties in the Arab world.

Since joining the coalition the MSP has largely supported the coalition's official policies. Despite a number of ongoing economic challenges including unemployment of over thirty percent (World Bank 2004), the MSP had campaigned on highlighting government successes in economic outcomes. For instance, due to the increasing price of hydrocarbons on world markets in the early- and mid-2000s, the regime received a significant increase in rents leading to heightened government spending. In the 2004 elections, President Bouteflika, the incumbent candidate supported by the MSP, campaigned heavily on what he claimed were improving economic outcomes as a result of these expenditures (Bouandel 2004). In its campaigning on his behalf, the MSP echoed his claims highlighting the economic achievements of the regime.

Like Islah in Yemen, the MSP has increased its focus on economic issues since its inception. Its slogan is "knowledge, justice and work" rather than the more common "Islam is the solution." Yet, in comparison to many other Islamist parties, its platform lacks detail and precision. Nevertheless, the broader focus of the document remains instructive. In its 2007 platform, the first section concentrates on political reforms, followed by a section on reforming the institutions of the state. These sections are brief and unfocused, calling for seven specific reforms in total.

The third section outlines the economic vision of the party. Given its pro-government stance, the platform does not highlight the economic challenges facing the country, but rather forwards a number of policies that could increase economic development. These include increasing funds for poorer regions and encouraging investment. Like other Islamist parties, it also calls for developing an Islamic banking sector and focuses on the positive role of *zakāt*. Specifically, it seeks to make *zakāt* donations tax exempt. No mention is made of the problem of inflation, although the party proposes two policies to address unemployment. These policies provide

unemployment benefits for university graduates with no job and align training programs with the needs of the job market to reduce unemployment. No mention is made of the high rate of unemployment itself, but the party underscores the fact that it has a potential solution to this ongoing problem.

The remainder of the platform focuses on social development and foreign policy, suggesting a number of policies that are similar to those of other Islamist parties. For example, the MSP calls for greater attention on the Palestinian issue as well as on the U.S.-led foreign presence in Iraq. It also calls for greater cooperation with other Arab and Islamic countries.

Overall, a critical difference between the MSP and other Islamist parties is its strategy vis-à-vis the regime. Rather than opposing the regime, the MSP has sought to influence outcomes from within the governing coalition. The MSP remains committed to a number of Islamist issues, although rather than criticizing the regime's performance on these issues it seeks to forward them as part of the coalition. In terms of the economy, the MSP has vigorously sought to win support based on its economic policy, even including "work" in the party slogan. Thus, rather than seeking to win support by criticizing government performance, a key difference between the MSP and its Islamist brethren in other countries is that it has sought to capitalize on government successes to increase its popularity.

The PJD's Attempted Transformation

Participating in its first elections in 1997, Morocco's PJD forwarded a platform and outreach that focused heavily on religious issues. In fact, the party was well known for debating narrow theological issues or its opposition to symbolic issues such as alcohol. After winning only 4.1 percent of the overall vote, the party joined the governing coalition. Yet, it did not expand its issue set. Rather, as Hamzawy (2008, 12) writes about this period:

Some of the issues raised by PJD MPs then [1997-2002] included the issue of non-Islamic banking, alcohol consumption, Islamic education, immoral practices in the tourism industry, and reforming the cinema to ensure that it complied with Islamic teachings.

Thus, the PJD's early history was relatively similar to that of Islah in Yemen, which began as a narrowly focused religious party. Moreover, like Islah, the PJD served as a coalition partner to the government following its first election, albeit with limited influence within the government.

By the 2002 elections the party sought to transform itself into a party with a broader appeal while serving in opposition to the governing coalition, though its signal to potential supporters was still cast in strongly religious terms. Its 2002 platform provides a lengthy and detailed vision centered on five sections: authenticity, sovereignty, democracy, justice, and development. The first three sections echo the unofficial motto of the regime: God, country, king. In the case of authenticity, the PJD argues that Islamic principles should be further enshrined in the constitution, mosques should receive greater funding, and education and public life should have greater influence from Islam. In the case of sovereignty, the PJD outlines plans for keeping Morocco internally strong and for developing a foreign policy both based on links to Arab and Islamic countries and more supportive of the Palestinian cause. In the third case, rather than focusing on the monarchy, the party calls for democratic reforms, including a strengthening of parliament and political parties, further enshrining human rights, and building civil society. Thus, the PJD's platform underscores its differences with the regime.

The last two sections are derived from the two principles found in the party's name: justice and development. Within the section on justice, issues focus on corruption and the establishment of a basic welfare system. For example, there are calls for fairness in hiring practices, health care for all, an agency to combat poverty, an independent judiciary, improving conditions for families, and the provision of basic housing for all citizens. The final section, on development, focuses on the party's economic goals. These include realizing sustainable economic development, improving the quality of education to foster economic and human development, reforming the monetary and banking system to more closely adhere to Islamic principles, establishing a system to distribute *zakāt*, and developing the agricultural and fishing sectors, among other goals.

Thus, beginning in the 2002 the PJD sought to transform itself from a party that focused rather narrowly on religious issues to one that was engaged in a range of important issues. Nevertheless, the party's extended platform continued to focus first on

religious issues, leaving economic issues as the final topic addressed. Still, the party clearly placed an increased focus on economic issues compared to before.

In the 2007 election, the PJD continued its focus on a broad set of issues, although the focus on economic issues was again the last. In this platform, the PJD's first section addresses the enhancement of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and other religious institutions, arguing that the Ministry should become more religious and that more mosques should be constructed. It should be noted, however, that the party no longer calls directly for the implementation of *shari'a*, but rather for the "protection of Morocco's Islamic identity". The next section addresses promoting a national culture with high levels of participation. This includes encouraging artistic development, a fair distribution between regions, and protecting the rights and freedoms of individuals. The third section addresses the media, calling for improved quality of journalism and greater legal protections for this sector.

The next sections address a range of social issues. The fourth section covers women and children, calling for equality between men and women and stopping domestic abuse, among others. The fifth section calls for improvements in the health sector such as bringing medical access to rural areas, increasing access to and availability of prescription drugs, and increasing the numbers of doctors and nurses. The sixth section deals with policies toward youths. The PJD supports increasing the number of youth houses, increasing the number of sports clubs, targeting drug addiction, and reducing poverty and unemployment among this population.

Seventh, the party seeks to promote human development by furthering democratic development, promoting community development in rural areas, encouraging private sector investment, and changing the voting laws. Eighth, the party seeks to increase the quality of the state's welfare system by increasing medical coverage and reforming the pension system. Finally, the state also seeks to alleviate poverty and increase the quality of life for ordinary citizens by reducing corruption, unemployment, and indexing salaries to the cost of living, among other proposals.

Overall, in 2007 the PJD's outreach continued to focus on a broad set of issues and had significant similarities to the 2002 platform. Nevertheless, unlike *Islah* in Yemen, for example, the party continued to place economic issues last in its list of policy

priorities. At the same time, however, it clearly refocused its outreach efforts away from primarily religious appeals and seriously engaged in a number of important policy debates including that over the 2005 amendments to the family code (*moudawana*). This general transformation has been echoed by the party's activities in parliament (Hamzawy 2008, 12).

Islamist Parties in Comparative Perspective

In sum, parties inherit relatively similar ideologies based on their association with the Islamist movement, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. Based on their self-stated association with religion and the broader Islamist movement, Islamist parties have a brand name that yields advantages on a number of policy issues. For example, support for *shari'a*, which is fairly popular (see chapter three), is closely linked to the parties. Additionally, the parties have high credibility in calls against corruption, given that men of religion are generally perceived to be less corrupt. They are seen as being anti-Western, particularly relatively to the existing regimes and pro-Palestinian, and they are in favor of reform. The parties all inherit clear, relatively popular positions on these topics.

Unsurprisingly, Islamist party platforms have tended to emphasize a number of these inherited strengths. Over both space and time, Islamist party platforms have emphasized that Islam should structure the political process to improve outcomes. Often this has taken the form of calling for the implementation of the *shari'a* or other Islamic principles. Second, all platforms denounce corruption and provide numerous policies aimed at eliminating it from the society. Often, a range of social ills is blamed on the effects of this single issue. Third, Islamist parties tend to emphasize links with Arab or Islamic countries at the expense of the regime's alliances or relations with Western countries. Typically this takes the form of promoting trade and investment from these countries over more traditional sources such as the U.S. and Europe. Finally, all of the parties reference the Palestinian cause in their outreach. This is true even in the most geographically remote of cases, demonstrating that these parties are strategic and that they seek to capitalize on their known strengths.

By comparison, parties are less associated with economic issues given that the Islamist movement does not have a strong association with solutions to major economic problems such as unemployment or inflation. Moreover, it is unclear how Islam is the solution to these problems, leading parties to offer few serious policy solutions. Although the Islamist movement does provide charity in all five cases, their expenditures do not match regime expenditures, nor does this relief provide solutions to these most pressing economic issues. As such, Islamist parties – if they hope to win popular support – must seek to address these issues.

Although none of the parties provided clear and detailed solutions, some parties have chosen to place a greater emphasis on economic issues in an attempt to overcome the lack of association between their inherited Islamist brand name and solutions to economic problems. These differences in strategy can be summarized in table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Party Strategy Over Time on Economic Issues

Party	Strategy on economic issues
Hamas (Palestine)	Never emphasized
IAF (Jordan)	Decreased emphasis
Islah (Yemen)	Increased emphasis
MSP (Algeria)	Reversed position and increased emphasis
PJD (Morocco)	Increased emphasis

Overall, the dominant trend has been to increase the emphasis given to economic issues over time with three of the five parties – Islah, the MSP, and the PJD – significantly increasing the attention given to economic issues in their outreach to ordinary citizens, as evidenced by the importance given to it in their platforms. In the case of the IAF, the party has decreased the importance of economic issues in its party outreach, while in the case of Hamas the party has never emphasized economic issues.

Second, although the attention given to economics has varied, generally the message has been relatively consistent. Relatively few detailed or concrete policy solutions are proposed, but rather Islamist parties, generally acting as opposition parties, seek to capitalize on government’s failings in these areas. As Hamzawy (2009, 16-7) writes:

Islah has confined its parliamentary activism on social and economic policies to criticism of the government and largely failed to increase effective parliamentary oversight powers or develop alternative policies. Failure to develop alternative, concrete policy measures in the socioeconomic realm brings Islah closer to the majority of Islamist parties and movements that participate in Arab politics. The Moroccan Party for Justice and Development, the Egyptian and Jordanian Muslim Brotherhoods, and Algerian Islamists all have been heavily criticized for their inability to develop concrete policy platforms that address issues such as poverty, unemployment, and social services.

Thus, the major difference in economic strategy between the parties is one of the degree to which economic issues are emphasized by the parties, rather than the content or quality of the proposals.

Conclusion

Chapter two theorized that under conditions of electoral authoritarianism opposition parties are unlikely to be able to alter significantly their brand name due to restrictions on their outreach by the regime. Nevertheless, it is clear that the parties have pursued differing strategies aimed at dealing with the weakness of the Islamist brand name that they all inherited at their founding.

If parties are able to successfully change their brand name based on this economic outreach, then it would be expected that Islah, the MSP, and the PJD are the ones most likely to successfully mobilize support based on economic issues. These parties, unlike the IAF and Hamas, have been actively seeking to change the party's brand name through their outreach by increasing the focus on economic policy. If, on the other hand, the effect of these policies has been similar, it would follow that party strategy is not a key factor in explaining differences in party success under conditions of electoral authoritarianism.

Chapter 5

The Economic Challenge for Islamist Parties

Chapter two theorizes that the brand name inherited by Islamist parties is not strongly associated with economic issues. Chapter four revealed that some Islamist parties have sought to rebrand their image by focusing more heavily on economic issues in outreach. Using survey data, this chapter empirically tests whether or not support for Islamist parties is correlated with attitudes about economic issues. It demonstrates that in multiple countries supporters of Islamist parties are actually more likely than non-supporters to believe that the government is doing well on economic issues, indicating that support for Islamist parties is not linked to their positions on economic issues. In substantive terms, statistical estimates reveal that the change in the likelihood of voting for an Islamist party based on economic issues is smaller than for other political and social issues or differences in demographic characteristics. Thus, this chapter concludes that support for Islamist parties is not linked to attitudes about economic issues among ordinary citizens.

The Economic Challenge

Chapter two theorized that Islamist parties – due to their self-identification with the Islamist movement – are not likely to win support based on economic policies because of their brand name. The basic theory underlying this hypothesis is that popular conceptions of Islam and the *shari'a* are not strongly associated with common solutions to modern economic challenges. Rather, popular understandings have a greater association with solutions to social issues or foreign policy challenges (see chapter three; Roy 1994, 144-6). For economic issues, the Islamic frame is not as clear and concise. Islamic scholars have dedicated many volumes to defining Islamic perspectives on a number of modern economic challenges, yet no consensus has emerged among scholars

and theorists. Thus, no clear economic narrative has become associated with the Islamist movement.⁴²

It is commonly asserted that the Islamist movement stands for justice and equality and promises better economic outcomes for the poor.⁴³ Some have even used Qur’anic verses to advocate Islamic socialism, borrowing heavily from Marxist thought.⁴⁴ Yet, relying on other verses in the Qur’an, other modern theorists, such as Yūsuf Kamāl, uphold the sanctity of private property.⁴⁵ This tension has led to suggestions of a “third way” between the traditional left and right focusing on a moral economy based on Islamic teachings. This approach has largely concentrated on increasing ethical behavior rather than traditional economic theory as noted in chapters two and three (see also Nomani and Rahnema 1994, 21).

Although a vaguely defined social-democratic vision is the most common economic vision put forward by Islamic theorists, this development is relatively recent and focuses little on practical solutions to common problems (see Roy 1994, 145). Thus, the Islamist frame provides no clear solution for decreasing unemployment, limiting inflation, or managing the economy. In terms of outreach to potential supporters, Islamist parties lack “bumper sticker” slogans on economic issues; their most common slogan, “Islam is the solution,” has no clear reference to economic issues. By contrast, this slogan has a clear relevance on a number of social issues, on foreign relations, and on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The lack of cohesive narrative for Islamist parties on the economy is a barrier for winning support. Even in high information environments such as the U.S. or Europe, there is evidence that citizens rely on “shortcuts” to help them in political decision making with limited information. Gathering and processing political information carries

⁴² For example, Utvik (2006) notes that by the 1980s a bibliography of works on this topic exceeded one thousand items. He details the struggle to cope with the basic problem in political economy of property rights versus social justice from an Islamic perspective. Although there is a great variation of interpretations of Islamic economics (see also Roy 1994, 133-40), Utvik (2006, 74) argues that in Egypt Islamist parties would generally fall in the middle of a traditional left-right scale.

⁴³ It is often assumed that Islamists are strong supporters of social justice and benefiting the poor, yet many Islamist parties and groups including the AKP, the PJD, and the Brotherhood in Egypt have upheld market-friendly platforms as well (see Patton 2006; Zeghlal 2008, 33; and Utvik 2006, 75).

⁴⁴ See Abdul Hasan Bani Sadr (1982) for one such example.

⁴⁵ See Utvik (2006, 81-101) for a detailed discussion of Kamāl’s theory. It should be noted that Kamāl, like most others, also seeks ways to minimize inequality by focusing on *zakāt* and other means, among which are an increase in ethical behavior as individuals follow the true Islam.

a cost (see Downs 1957) thus, for many individuals, shortcuts are the primary means for making decisions on political matters (see Popkin 1993; Lupia 1994). Within low information societies, the costs of obtaining information are even higher, providing ordinary citizens with fewer opportunities to receive information or to learn about opposition political actors. This is particularly true in countries operating under electoral authoritarianism, where non-regime parties are severely limited in their outreach and mobilization efforts (see Schedler 2006).

Within the low information environments present in most Arab countries, information about opposition parties is particularly costly to obtain. As a result, it is likely that many citizens rely on available shortcuts to process information about these groups. Given the clarity of Islamist positions on many non-economic issues and the fact that most “bumper sticker” slogans tend to underscore their religious identity, it is unlikely that most ordinary citizens will associate them with solutions to the country’s economic problems. Even when a party does develop policies to address these issues, it is unlikely that citizens will clearly associate them with these policies and, in turn, it is unlikely that Islamist parties will be able to increase their support based on this platform.⁴⁶

Models of Party Choice

Most models of party identification focus on behavior in or surrounding elections in democratic societies (Campbell et al. 1960; Fiorina 1981; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). This framing is natural given the ability to use a free and fair election to evaluate the preferences of ordinary citizens and to model their decision-making. Partisans are assumed to cast votes in the election for their preferred party with most models assuming that deliberate abstention has little if any role.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ As discussed in chapter two, this theory is not meant to imply that voting or party support in these contexts is primarily ideological in nature; personalistic voting is the norm in for a large number of citizens in these cases. In non-democratic contexts, the regime uses elections to demonstrate its strength (Wedeen 1999) and many voters engage in rent-seeking behavior (Lust-Okar 2006). Given the biased nature of elections, opposition parties face incredible barriers (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009). Yet, given the resource disparity between regimes and opposition parties, increasing their levels of support requires that opposition parties appeal to voters ideologically (see Greene 2007, 26-7). As such, this chapter examines elements of Islamist parties’ ideological appeals to ordinary citizens.

⁴⁷ Abstention is generally assumed to take place when citizens feel indifferent toward both candidates, or when they feel alienated from them (see Plane and Gershtenson 2004)

In light of the unfair nature of electoral competition in Arab countries, abstention can send an important political message (Dris-Ait-Hamadouche 2008). Within these contexts, a number of parties may boycott elections and call for their supporters to abstain (Alves 1985). In other cases, citizens may abstain because their preferred candidate is banned from participation (Robbins and Tessler 2012). As a result of these additional complexities, examining partisanship based on vote choice has significant limitations. As such, although I examine partisanship using citizens' stated party preference in the absence of an electoral context, I draw on insights from electoral behavior models to derive hypotheses that could extend to party identification more broadly defined.

One approach within the literature on party identification relies on spatial elements, claiming that an individual will determine his or her vote choice based on the relative positioning of the parties (Downs 1957; Converse 1964; Enelow and Hinich 1984). This calculation can take place sincerely or strategically, but in either case the voter seeks to maximize utility based on a comparison of his or her personal preferences and the relative positioning of the parties. One of the general assumptions of this model is that parties align on a one-dimensional spectrum, normally a left-right economic scale. Other spectra are theoretically possible, but multiple spectra violate a basic assumption of the model. However, it is difficult to place most Arab political parties on a single spectrum in this case (see Willis 2002), particularly a clearly defined left-right scale.

Since there is not a single clear spectrum in this case, an approach like that of Greene (2007) can be employed whereby the general concept forwarded by spatial modeling is applied to a multidimensional spectrum. Although not all individuals are likely to vote ideologically in the contexts under study (see Kilani and Sakijha 2002, 58), a broader sense of party identification is more likely to be ideologically based. Many party supporters in Arab contexts are likely to make their choice based on spatial proximity and it is assumed that party support is due in part to choosing the party most closely aligned to an individual's true preferences. Overall, this framework yields the expectation that supporters of Islamist parties should be those whose preferences most closely align with the party's platform.

A second set of approaches posits citizens vote retrospectively or prospectively. The former theorizes that an individual is less concerned about the economic policy of the opponent than in rewarding or punishing the incumbent party based on economic performance (Fiorina 1981; McKelvey and Ordeshook 1993; Lohmann et al. 1997) while the latter assumes that an individual evaluates the economic policies of both parties and chooses the platform most likely to have future success (Achen 1989; Lockerbie 1992). In the retrospective version, Islamist parties – as the largest opposition parties – should receive a significant boost from individuals who are displeased with the economic performance of the present regime. Yet, likely due to the contexts in which it was developed, this theory implicitly assumes that the primary opposition party has a known economic platform.⁴⁸ It is unclear what the implications would be for the model if voters did not associate the opposition party with an economic position. Nevertheless, what is clear is that if Islamist parties do have clear economic platforms, then this theory predicts that they should win support from individuals who are less satisfied with government performance on economic issues.

In a prospective voting model, the understanding of an opposition party's economic platform plays a crucial role in determining party preference. The individual, even if he or she is displeased with government performance on the economy, evaluates which party is more likely to improve economic performance in the future. This means that individuals who believe that the Islamist party would do better than the government if elected would be more likely to support an Islamist party. Although a different mechanism, the empirical implications of this theory are similar to retrospective voting: individuals who support an Islamist party should be more dissatisfied with government performance on the economy.

A third trend in the voting literature examines the influence that party identification has on its supporters. Individuals who support a certain party generally come to identify with that party's position on a range of issues and view new political events through ideologically biased frames (Lodge and Hamill 1986; Rahn 1993; Green et al. 2002). As a result, supporters do not formulate their opinions and then decide

⁴⁸ For example, in the U.S., the Republicans are presumed to be to the right of center and the Democrats to the left of center on a traditional left-right economic spectrum.

which party to vote for but they are also influenced by the parties to adopt certain positions based on their party preference. Bargsted (2011) has demonstrated that this finding not only holds for long-established democracies, but also to varying degrees in newly democratized systems outside of the U.S. and Western Europe. Given that it applies in multiple contexts, there are reasons to believe that it should apply to Islamist parties in the Arab world. If true, this theory implies that Islamist party supporters should come to reflect the more prominent policies forwarded in their platforms and outreach. Thus, if Islamist parties do forward a clear economic platform that wins support, then this theory predicts that supporters of the party will reflect these beliefs.

Overall, these theories lead to relatively similar expectations. In the case of retrospective voting, there should be a correlation between the attitudes toward government performance on the economy and support for Islamist parties.⁴⁹ Under the second and third theories, if Islamist parties have a clear and known economic platform, then this platform should be reflected in the attitudes held by party supporters. One testable implication of this expectation can be formalized as hypothesis 1:

H5.1a: On average, supporters of opposition Islamist parties should be more likely than non-supporters to hold negative attitudes of government performance on the economy.

By extension, in cases where Islamist parties are not in opposition but are aligned with the government, the following hypothesis can be tested:

H5.1b: On average, supporters of pro-government Islamist parties should be more likely than non-supporters to hold positive attitudes of government performance on the economy.

Data and Case Selection

The data used to test these hypotheses come from the first wave of the Arab Barometer public opinion survey (Arab Barometer 2006-7). The survey was conducted in seven societies and collected in 2006 and 2007. In each case the sample was generated using a cluster technique, dividing the country into geographic areas and then using probability sampling to randomly select blocks within each area. In some cases, quota

⁴⁹ It should be noted that this expectation is dependent upon the assumption that the opposition party has an economic platform as previously noted.

sampling was employed for standard demographic characteristics. Within these blocks, twelve houses were randomly selected. Within each house, an individual over age eighteen was randomly selected using a Kish table. The interview was conducted face-to-face. Although response rates varied, in most cases they exceeded 90 percent and the number of individuals interviewed ranged between 1143 and 1300 in all cases.⁵⁰ Full details of the methodology for each survey can be found on the Arab Barometer website (<http://www.arabbarometer.org>).

Due to the timing of the survey, Palestine is not an instructive test of the theory forwarded in chapter two. The unprecedented nature of Hamas's victory in parliamentary elections in January 2006 led to a unique political context in which this poll was conducted in June 2006 as a regime change had just occurred. Although, as demonstrated in chapter three, most indicators were similar in Palestine to other cases, the one strong exception concerned questions that involved evaluations of the government. The direction of the relationship between support for Hamas and the regime is reversed from previous polls. In this context, Hamas is clearly viewed as the party in government. More importantly, however, the context was highly polarized such that any item including regime producing by far the greatest effects. As is described in the discussion of operationalization, this situation does not allow for a useful test of the specific hypotheses generated by this chapter.

Moreover, it should be noted that, as detailed in chapter four, of all the parties under examination Hamas does the least outreach on economic issues. Analysis of its outreach and the determinants of its support in the 2006 election have shown that its support was primarily a function of its position on the Israeli occupation, followed by its stance against corruption (Lahloh 2007). Thus, if the theory presented in chapter two holds for other cases, it would be highly surprising that Palestine would be an exception if data were available for testing from before the 2006 elections when Hamas was not viewed as the party of government in Palestine.

Despite not being a strong test case for this analysis, the findings from Palestine are reported for the sake of comparison. They are not discussed in detail, however, given

⁵⁰ It should be noted that only 750 respondents were sampled in Kuwait but this case is excluded from the present analysis.

that the important differences for this case. The other four cases detailed in previous chapters are used for testing: Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, and Yemen.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable in the analysis that follows is support for an Islamist party. The Arab Barometer contains the following item asking about party choice:

Q220: Which of the listed political parties best represents you politically, socially and economically?

The question was asked in an open-ended format with the interviewer recording the name of the party if one was given.⁵¹ The responses were then coded to reflect whether an individual supported an Islamist party.⁵² A full list of the parties that were coded as Islamist for each country is presented in Appendix 5.1.

It is important to note that this item does not ask about vote choice or vote intent if an election were to be held. Rather, it asks which party most closely represents the views of the respondent. This wording has numerous advantages in evaluating support for Islamist parties over asking specifically about voting behavior in past or future elections. First, given the timing of the polls, none of the four test countries had a parliamentary election in the previous three years. As has been demonstrated in other contexts (Abelson et al. 1992), respondents are often unable to accurately report voting behavior, even if they asked only a few months after the election. Asking about vote choice in a past election would likely induce bias based on faulty memories. Second, without any impending elections at the time of the polls, asking about future vote intention could also induce bias, especially given the high number of independent

⁵¹ In the English codebook the translation of *al-qā'mah* is "listed." This word is often used in conjunction with candidates or political parties that are standing for election and can be translated as "list," "roster," "register," "index," or "slate". In this context, "registered" is probably most appropriate, implying that the party is legal or operating. Still, it should be noted that some respondents stated parties that were not legally recognized as parties by the regime. Regardless, in the Arabic version this question wording implies that a list of parties should be provided by the interviewer and in each country the question was asked open-ended.

⁵² Islamist parties are political parties that advocate a greater role for Islam in the politically system. Following Utvik (1993), these parties are distinguished by three key characteristics: 1) all refer to themselves as part of the Islamist movement; 2) all call for an Islamic state in accordance with the *shari'a*; and 3) all are organized to achieve this goal. See chapter one for a more complete discussion.

candidates who often run in these four cases. Determining vote choice in the absence of the full slate of choices creates a challenging counterfactual for the respondent.

Third, since the element of voting is removed from this question, it significantly eliminates other considerations such as strategic voting. Individuals are asked for their sincere preferences in each case, meaning that the increase in support, which is seen around election periods for Islamist parties (see figure 1.1 and chapter seven),⁵³ does not affect the analysis. Much of this temporary increase in support is likely due to the specific slate of candidates the party presents or other election-specific factors. This question wording limits support to individuals who feel that the party is closest to their own interests and the most likely to be among the core supporters of the party.

The distribution of the variable across four countries is presented in table 5.1:⁵⁴

Table 5.1: Distribution of the Dependent Variable					
	Algeria	Jordan	Morocco	Palestine	Yemen
N Islamist Party Supporters	66	16	121	488	106
N Sample	1,152	1,129	1,277	1190	1,174
Percentage	5.4%	1.4%	9.5%	41.0%	9.1%

Operationalizing the Hypotheses

The basic theory forwarded by this dissertation implies that attitudes about regime performance on issues affecting a modern economy should have little or no predictive power in regard to support for Islamist parties. Such a finding would indicate that Islamist parties do not win support based on economic issues. On the contrary, if there is a strong and significant relationship between these two variables, indicating that those who are more concerned about economic issues are more likely to support Islamist parties, then this would indicate that Islamist parties' support is associated with attitudes on economic issues.

As chapter four demonstrates, Islamist parties in have pursued differing strategies to deal with the challenge their weak economic brand name presents. Generally

⁵³ See figure 1.1 in chapter one.

⁵⁴ The overall levels of support are reasonably reflected in the vote shares for the most recent election, considering voter turnout and the bump in support that is likely to occur once a specific slate of candidates is named by the party. This similarity increases confidence in the level of support for these parties, as exhibited by the frequency results from the Arab Barometer (also see figure 1.1).

speaking, however, their most consistent strategy has been to criticize regime policies that have led to weak or uneven growth, high inflation, and a lack of jobs while proffering vague policy solutions (see Hamzawy 2009, 16-17). In the case of the MSP, the party sought (at the time of the survey) to win support by emphasizing the economic growth that resulted from the increased revenues from hydrocarbons during Bouteflika's presidency (Bouandel 2008). Thus, to varying degrees, Islamist parties have sought to increase party support based on the government's performance on economic issues, thus facilitating the testing of H5.1.

Given this focus, items asking about government performance on economic issues are the most likely to be correlated with support for an Islamist party. Two such items appear in the Arab Barometer. The first asks specifically about how the government is managing the economy while the second asks about how the government is doing creating jobs. The items are as follows:

Q247: Now let's speak about the present government in this country. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters:

1. Managing the economy (Very good, good, bad, very bad)
2. Creating jobs (Very good, good, bad, very bad)

If Islamist support is related to attitudes on economic issues, then the results from the model should reveal a significant and substantive effect for these variables on the likelihood of supporting an Islamist party.⁵⁵

Control Variables

Multiple iterations of the model are developed for testing these hypotheses. The first variant of the model includes one of the variables measuring attitudes toward economic issues as well as with standard demographic items such as age, education, income, and sex. Additional country-specific control variables are included for Jordan Palestine, and Yemen. In Jordan this is whether a respondent is of East Bank origin or of

⁵⁵ A similar model can be constructed for the case of Algeria. If the MSP is successful in mobilizing support based on its economic positions, then this relationship should exhibit a strong correlation but with the opposite sign as the opposition parties.

Palestinian origin.⁵⁶ In Palestine it is whether a respondent lives in the West Bank or Gaza. In Yemen it is whether a respondent resides in the former Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) or the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen).⁵⁷ This specification allows for a test of H5.1 under minimal restrictions to examine if economic issues are significant predictors or have sizable predicted effects on the likelihood of supporting an Islamist party.

Both of the primary independent variables of interest are not included in the same model as the question is not which item has a greater effect when tested simultaneously, but rather if either item is significant and substantively meaningful effect on the dependent variable. If tested simultaneously in the same model, covariance between the two items would decrease the predicted effect of both, thus making it is less rigorous test of the theory.

Additional Variables

In a second specification, these models are expanded to include a number of additional variables specific to the Islamist parties' platforms. The inclusion of these variables allows for a more complete test of H5.1 by facilitating a comparison between the size and effect of economic issues and the size and effect of other issues specific to the Islamist brand name. This specification allows for a test of the basic theory proposed in chapter two which implies that non-economic issues should play a greater role in predicting the likelihood of voting for an Islamist party relative to economic issues.⁵⁸

Three of the five variables chosen follow from the hypotheses forwarded in chapter three concerning why individuals may support political Islam generally. These are attitudes toward the role of women, anti-Westernization, and anti-corruption. Given the similarity between Islamist party ideology and that of the broader Islamist movement, it is natural that these items could also explain why some individuals are likely to support Islamist parties. The fourth item relates more specifically to the call for reform (broadly

⁵⁶ The IAF tends to win greater support in areas with a higher percentage of citizens of Palestinian origin in elections.

⁵⁷ Given that the difference in the two regimes' ideologies prior to unification, political culture differs between the former North and South Yemen.

⁵⁸ Additionally, all independent variables are scaled so that the minimum value is zero and the maximum value is one.

defined) made by many Islamist parties as detailed in chapter four. The final item relates to the likelihood that individuals have used *wasta*,⁵⁹ implying that they are more likely to seek to elect an associate in the hopes of receiving direct economic or political benefits.

The items employed in this case are as follows:

Women's Role: The Arab Barometer contained a seven-item battery on attitudes toward the role of women in society. Since all of these items seek to capture a single underlying variable, an index was constructed. Three of the seven items had intraitem variation and were strongly correlated with each other across the five cases. Factor analysis also revealed that there was a single underlying common element for these three items. The items are as follows:

Q505: The following questions are your personal opinions about the principles that should determine the behavior and situation of women in our society. For each of the statements listed below, please indicate whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly.

- 2) A married woman can work outside the home if she wishes.
- 3) On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do.
- 5) Men and women should have equal job opportunities and wages

Based on the results of factor analysis, these items were combined into a country-specific index representing attitudes toward the role of women.

Western Culture: Two items ask about attitudes toward Western culture, but one of these items was not available for all cases.⁶⁰ As such, a single item is employed for this variable:

Q607: Do you agree with the following statement: "The culture of U.S. and other Western countries has many positive attributes" (Agree, disagree)

⁵⁹ *Wasta* is a term that literally means "intermediary" refers to the use of personal connections to intercede on one's behalf. It can be similar to networking to find a job, for example, or constituent services from an elected official whereby he or she intervene with a government agency on behalf of the constituent. More often, however, it implies a sense of patronage whereby an individual receives a job solely because of his relation to the connection or receives some other benefit such as a government contract by virtue of his connection to the official. For further discussion of *wasta* see Kilani and Sakijha (2002).

⁶⁰ In repeated iterations the specification of the second item for the countries for which data were available had no substantive effect on the results.

Corruption: Islamist parties and the Islamist movement more generally often criticize the government for its efforts on corruption. Given the relatively high rates of corruption found throughout the region (Transparency International 2006) and the widespread belief that religious leaders are less likely to be corrupt, Islamist parties are likely to win support based on their anti-corruption platform (see chapter three; Fahmy 1998; Lahloh 2008; Ryan 2008). Islamist parties are likely to benefit from their anti-corruption stance among those who believe that the existing regime is not seeking to eliminate this problem. As such, the following item is used to operationalize the benefit Islamist parties receive from their association with being uncorrupt:

Q254: In your opinion, to what extent is the government working to crackdown on corruption and root out bribes? (To a large extent, to a medium extent, to a small extent, not at all)

Reform: Beyond these standard items, a number of Islamist parties have broadly been calling for reform⁶¹ – albeit often not clearly defined – of the existing system. In fact, parties in Yemen and Algeria, as well as Hamas’s electoral list (Change and Reform) in 2006 even include the word “reform” (*Islah*) as part of their official name. In their platforms more generally, there are calls for reform of the political systems of the region (Utvik and Tønnessen 2008, 106). Often, these calls do not specify the desired reform, but when they do one of the demands they generally make is to call for political liberalization that would provide them with a greater opportunity to compete in elections. Given that they are often calling for reform more ardently than many other political actors, it is possible that their supporters would be more sympathetic toward reforms than non-supporters. The item used to operationalize supporting reform is as follows:

Q225: How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

2) Political reform should be introduced little by little instead of all at once (Strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree)⁶²

⁶¹ Parties tend to frame reform as reforming the system to become more Islamic, as this system is held up as the idea.

⁶² Item is the second in a batter of items in the Arab Barometer.

It should be noted that this item asks about the speed of reform as opposed to the need for reform. Ideally, the item would focus specifically on the need for reform. Lacking such an item, however, this item is a sufficient proxy, as individuals who believe that greater reforms are necessary are more likely than those who do not to favor a faster rate of reform; logically, if an individual believes that little reform is necessary, he or she is unlikely to agree that political reforms should be implemented rapidly.⁶³

Wasta: The inclusion of *wasta* in the model serves primarily as a control variable given the fact that numerous accounts of political behavior in the Arab world argue that seeking patronage is the primary goal of most voters and party platforms and ideology plays a small role in political competition (see Lust-Okar 2006). *Wasta* often takes the form of patronage for those individuals who are associates of or are otherwise linked to an elected official or other powerful figure in society. Although this chapter focuses on party identification rather than vote choice, it is possible that many party supporters who are closely connected to members of the party support the party in the hopes of receiving *wasta* in some form. As such, this can serve as a partial control for this possibility.⁶⁴ A single item was used to measure this variable as follows:

Q216: During the past five years, have you ever used *wasta* to achieve something personal, family related, or a neighborhood problem? (Yes, no)

Data Analysis

The dependent variable in this analysis is a binary variable coded so that one indicates support for an Islamist party and zero indicates support for another party or no party at all. This coding scheme does not facilitate analysis using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, but rather a maximum likelihood estimation technique such as logistic regression. Results of two different logistic regression estimations cannot be directly compared to one another in the manner that is possible using OLS. Comparing tests of

⁶³ It should be noted that the use of this item is not meant to imply that all Islamist parties are necessarily calling for massive change or revolution. Rather, it seeks to test whether or not individuals who believe that reforms to the political system should be implemented more urgently are more likely to support an Islamist party.

⁶⁴ It should be noted, however, that this item is sensitive and some respondents may be unwilling to admit to having used *wasta*. In frequencies, the rates of self-reported use of *wasta* range between 22 percent and 32 percent for the four countries in the sample indicating that a sizable minority of individuals is willing to admit to use of this practice. Nevertheless, some caution should be employed in interpreting the finding for this variable.

significance is valid, although with the caveat that each the test of significance is unique to the exact values for each variable being used to estimate the outcome for a particular model. However, it is possible to estimate predicted or marginal effects to compare changes in the likelihood of supporting for an Islamist party for each of independent variables. These changes in likelihood can be validly compared across different models.⁶⁵

Since the results of the analysis vary depending upon the characteristics of the overall sample, great care is necessary in determining set of respondents against whom supporters of Islamist parties should be compared. There are multiple possibilities for the sample, including individuals who are politically active, those who vote, or those who are partisans. These possibilities are excluded, however, for two reasons. First, given that one of the goals for the Islamist party is to win support among those who are politically active and also to mobilize individuals who are not politically active, their target audience includes members of both groups. Second, and more importantly, the item asking about party support does not ask if individuals intend to vote for the party, but rather to which party are they closest. Even if a respondent chooses to abstain from participation due to the unfair nature of competition or for some other reason, he or she can still prefer the Islamist party relative to others. Thus, the ability of the party to activate support in this manner is not dependent upon whether an individual will choose to vote for the party in an election.

In light of these considerations, there are two samples that merit consideration for use in testing these hypotheses. First, there are all members of society, as even individuals who are not passive supporters of political Islam⁶⁶ may choose to support an Islamist party based its platform or for other reasons. This specification thus accounts for the possibility that agreement with the party's religious worldview is not a necessary condition for party support. The second possibility is citizens who favor a greater role for religion in public life, meaning that they are passive supporters of political Islam. Given

⁶⁵ It should be noted that the small sample size of Islamist supporters in Jordan is a cause for some concern, as is the relatively small sample size in Algeria. Given these small sample sizes, there is greater uncertainty in these cases, resulting in a larger confidence interval than is desired. The sample size of Islamist supporters for the remaining cases is significantly larger, resulting in fewer concerns in this regard.

⁶⁶ Meaning those who have a favorable predisposition toward political Islam in concept as discussed in chapter three.

that these parties self-identify as religious, this is the group of citizens who have a greater propensity to support the party. By isolating only those who are more likely to support the party the additional factors underlying support for the party can be more easily identified. As such, both comparison groups are employed in the analysis.

Results

Restricted Model for all Citizens

The results are presented in Appendix 5.2. Table 5.2 through 5.5 present the restricted version of the model, examining the primary variables of interest – how well the government is doing managing the economy and creating jobs – along with the standard demographic indicators of age, education, income, and sex. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 present the results of these two variables with a sample of the entire population, while tables 5.4 and 5.5 present the results for individuals who are passive supporters of political Islam. Each table presents the coefficient and standard error estimates for each variable in the logistic regression.⁶⁷ Additionally, a third value is reported, which is the predicted effect of a change from the minimum to the maximum for each variable with all others held at their means.

As can be seen in table 5.2, among all respondents the variable managing the economy was negative and significant at standard levels in only one of the four countries – Jordan. In the remaining three cases, the estimated coefficient was positive but insignificant in two of the three – Algeria and Morocco – and negative but insignificant in Yemen. The sign on the coefficient for Morocco is unexpected, especially given that the PJD had shifted its platform to focus more significantly on economic issues beginning in 2002.

By comparison, demographic variables are significant in a number of cases. Men are more likely to support Islamist parties than women in all countries and are significantly more likely to do so in Morocco and Yemen. Similarly, in all cases younger

⁶⁷ It should be noted that tests of significance for logistic regressions are specific to the point at which the estimates are being considered. Tests of significance are specific to the values assigned to each variable at this point and it does not imply that these levels of significance hold true for all other possible values for each variable. Since the results presented in the table are centered around the mean of each variable, these tests are useful indicators of the likely significance of a variable around these points. However, a more complete understanding of the relative importance of the variable can be gained through an examination of predicted effects or predicted probabilities.

individuals are more likely to support Islamist parties, but only in Morocco is this relationship significant.

In Jordan two demographic variables – income and education – are significant at standard levels with income being negative and education being positive. This is somewhat surprising given that chapter three demonstrated both that support for political Islam tends to be higher among the less educated in Jordan at standard levels of significance and that there is no statistically significant relationship between support for political Islam and income. Thus, support for political Islam and the IAF have different bases in Jordan. Interestingly, in all other cases income, although insignificant, is positive, suggesting that support comes from those who are relatively better off. Education, on the other hand, varies with positive coefficient estimates in Jordan and Morocco but negative ones in Algeria and Yemen.

It is worth noting that the predicted effects for the variable managing the economy are relatively small in all cases. Although this variable is significant in Jordan, the change in likelihood of supporting the IAF between an individual who rated government performance managing the economy as very good and one who rated it as very bad is only a -1.6 percent decrease in likelihood of support. This change is the smallest of all four countries with the change in likelihood of supporting their respective Islamist parties ranging from -4.8 percent in Yemen to 2.2 percent in Morocco and 4.8 percent in Algeria.

Compared to the demographic variables, the size of these predicted effects are relatively small. In no case is an individual's rating of government performance on managing the economy the variable most likely to lead an individual to support an Islamist party. In the case of Algeria and Jordan, income has the largest effect of any of the variables at 5.3 percent and -6.8 percent changes in likelihood, respectively, while in Morocco and Yemen age has the largest effect of any of the variables at -6.5 percent and -12.4 percent changes in likelihood, respectively.

Table 5.3 presents the results for the model, including the variable government performance on creating jobs for all respondents. The results of this model bear a high degree of similarity to those for managing the economy. In the case of the variable creating jobs, the estimated coefficients for Jordan and Yemen are negative – with only Jordan being significant at standard levels – while the coefficient estimates for Algeria

and Morocco are positive but insignificant. In terms of demographics, comparing the results for creating jobs to the previously described results for managing the economy, the signs are similar for all items and the tests of significance similar with the exception of education in Algeria. Although still negative, this item is significant at the 0.1-level of significance in this model, whereas it was insignificant in the previous specification.

There is also a strong similarity between the results of the two models with regard to the size of the predicted effects. This outcome is particularly true for the demographic variables, as all differences in predicted probabilities between the two models (5.2 and 5.3) were less than three percent. In the case of the primary independent variable of interest – creating jobs – the predicted effects were also generally similar in size to managing the economy; the change in the predicted likelihood of an individual supporting an Islamist party for someone who rated government performance on this issue as very bad compared to very good was only 2.7 percent in Algeria, -1.9 percent in Jordan, 4.0 percent in Morocco and -3.5 percent in Yemen. Thus, the predicted change in effect is small for both models, especially when compared to the predicated change associated with one or more demographic variables in each case.

Restricted Model for Passive Supporters of Political Islam

Tables 5.4 and 5.5 present the results for the same model limited to the population of passive supporters of political Islam.⁶⁸ Overall, the results are relatively similar to those of the population as a whole. For both primary variables of interest – managing the economy and creating jobs – Jordan is the only country that is significant, although both Jordan and Yemen have negative estimated coefficients. Additionally, the coefficients for these two variables are positive but insignificant in Algeria and Morocco. The remaining demographic variables are similar to the analysis for the entire population as well with the only two changes in sign being to age in Jordan in table 5.4 and to education in Yemen in 5.5. In Yemen, the value is close to zero for both items, meaning the change in sign is not the result of significantly different estimations. In Jordan,

⁶⁸ Passive supporters of political Islam are defined as those individuals who are favorable toward political Islam broadly defined. The measure for political Islam was created using a number of items relating to political Islam through an index developed using factor analysis as detailed in chapter 3. Those whose values were above the midpoint of this index are coded as being passive supporters of political Islam and included in the population used for this analysis.

however, age is nearly significant in the model restricted to supporters of political Islam suggesting a potentially important difference between the two comparison groups for this variable.

Although these models exhibit relatively little difference in the signs on the coefficients or tests of significance, there are some important differences when comparing the predicted effects between the two models. Comparing the findings for the model with the variable managing the economy (tables 5.2 and 5.4), there are minimal differences in the predicted effects of a change from the minimum to the maximum value for the primary independent variable of interest. There are, however, a number of important changes among the demographic variables. First, the in the model restricted to passive supporters of political Islam, the predicted effect of income on support for political Islam nearly doubles in Morocco from 5.5 percent to 10.2 percent, indicating that among the passive base of support, wealthier individuals are more likely to support the PJD. Similarly, the relative importance of education also increases in Morocco, from 4.1 percent to 7.3 percent. For Algeria, age exhibits a change going from -3.0 percent to -6.2 percent while in Yemen it nearly doubles in size from -12.4 percent to -24.8 percent.

Similar trends are also seen comparing the predicted effects for the two models for creating jobs. Most notably, in the model for passive supporters, age is a much greater predictor of a change in likelihood of supporting an Islamist party in Algeria with a change from -8.5 percent in the restricted model for the entire population, compared to a change of -16.4 percent among passive supporters of political Islam. With regard to the main variable of interest – the rating of government performance in creating jobs – the only substantial change in predicted probabilities is in Algeria where the full model revealed a 2.7 percent change compared to 7.9 percent change in the model limited to passive supporters of political Islam.

Notably, in all cases the predicted probabilities for changes in the likelihood of supporting an Islamist party for managing the economy and creating jobs are substantially less than that for demographic variables. Although both creating jobs and managing the economy have, in this restricted model, a small effect in the change in likelihoods, the second set of estimations reveals that the predicted effects are close to zero. The one exception is for the variable creating jobs in the model for passive

supporters of political Islam in Algeria, where this variable accounts for a moderate level of change in likelihoods.

Full Model for all Citizens

The results of the two versions of the full model – which includes the five additional independent variables – for all respondents are presented in tables 5.6 and 5.7. For the model including managing the economy, there are two important changes. First, the estimated coefficient for Yemen changes from negative in the restricted model for all citizens to positive in the full model for all citizens, indicating that when other variables that are related to the Islamist platform are included, individuals who support the party are somewhat *more* likely to say that the government is doing a good job managing the economy. This coefficient is insignificant at standard levels, but the direction of the coefficient is contrary to what would be expected if Islamist parties did in fact activate support through outreach on economic issues. This strongly implies that in both cases support for the party is not associated with attitudes on government performance on this economic variable. Additionally, the coefficient for managing the economy follows the same pattern of being both positive and insignificant in Morocco – the same as it was in the restricted model for all citizens and again contrary to expectations if Islamist parties activate support based on their economic platform.

The second important change in this model relates to Algeria where the predicted effect changes from being positive but small (4.8 percent) to virtually zero (0.3 percent). Thus, considering other factors related to the Islamist platform, this variable is insignificant and an individual's opinion on how well the government is managing the economy has no substantive effect on support for an Islamist party. Additionally, it should be noted that although the sign on the coefficient is positive, the MSP is part of the governing coalition, meaning this sign is not unexpected, as it is in the case of Morocco and Yemen.

The remaining results for the this variable are strikingly similar to those for the restricted model; the coefficient for managing the economy in Jordan remains negative and significant, but with a very small predicted effect (-1.7 percent) and the predicted effects in Morocco and Yemen remain close to zero as well. Thus, in this model as well

as the restricted model, there is clear evidence that individual attitudes toward the government's performance on economic issues have little predictive power regarding support for an Islamist party.

By comparison, other variables generally have greater explanatory power in support for Islamist parties for these cases. For Algeria, the variables for women's rights and political reform are significant, although the sign on the coefficient for reform indicates that supporters of the MSP do not support rapid reform. Most likely, this is due to the MSP's role as a junior partner in the governing coalition. Notably, of these two significant variables, only reform has a large substantive effect at a 12 percent change in likelihood, whereas the other variables included in this version of the model all have predicted effects of 3.3 percent or less.

In Morocco, two variables are significant – anti-Westernization and using *wasta* – although the size of the predicted effects for each is relatively small. Still, the size of the predicted effect for being anti-Western is the largest of the policy variables and larger than the predicted effect for managing the economy. However, given that the sign of the coefficient for managing the economy indicates that supporters of the party have attitudes that are *more* supportive of government performance on the economy compared to non-supporters, this result runs contrary to the idea that the PJD was activating support based on its economic platform.

In Yemen, women's rights and corruption are significant with relatively large predicted effects of 22.2 percent and 9.5 percent respectively. In fact, the predicted effect for managing the economy is among the smallest in the model. This result is not entirely unexpected given that the sign on the coefficient for managing the economy in Yemen is similar to the case of Morocco.

In Jordan, none of the additional variables included in this model are significant and all have small predicted effects. Although the size of the predicted effect for managing the economy remains small, it is slightly larger than each of the additional opinion variables. The predicted effects of these variables are significantly smaller than the effects of the basic demographic indicators such as income and education, although the overall predictive power in Jordan remains relatively weak, perhaps due to the relatively small sample size of Islamist party supporters in Jordan.

In the case of the model including the variable creating jobs (table 5.7), there are a number of differences compared to the model for managing the economy (table 5.6) with respect to the sign and significance of the primary variable being tested. In the case of Algeria, the sign is negative, suggesting that supporters of the MSP – part of the governing coalition – are more likely to rate government performance on creating jobs as poor. It should be noted, however, that this variable is highly insignificant and that the predicted effect is functionally zero. Nevertheless, the sign is the opposite of what is expected by conventional wisdom given the MSP's position in government.

In the case of Morocco, the sign is also the opposite of what conventional wisdom expects, although in this model it is significant. Despite being significant, the size of the predicted effect is relatively small at an increased likelihood of only 3.3 percent, meaning that this variable has little substantive effect on the likelihood of supporting an Islamist party. Nevertheless, to the extent that this variable has a predicted effect, it predicts that individuals who are more critical of the government's performance on creating jobs are less likely to support the PJD.

In Yemen, the sign on the coefficient is negative, which is the opposite of the sign on managing the economy in table 5.6. The estimated coefficient is highly insignificant, however, and the substantive effect is only a 3.7 percent predicted change between an individual who says the government is doing a very bad job compared to a very good job.

In Jordan, as before, the estimated coefficient is negative and significant, although the predicted effect continues to be relatively small. Thus, there is largely no change from the restricted model or from the previous model that included managing the economy.

Overall, the results for the additional variables included in this model are generally similar to those presented in table 5.6. Although the tests of significance vary slightly, the predicted effects are similar across all cases. In all cases but Jordan, one or more of the additional variables included in this model have a larger predicted effect than the variable creating jobs. Similarly, in these two versions of the model at least one demographic variable has a larger predicted effect than the two main variables of interest.

Full Model for Passive Supporters of Political Islam

When limited to passive supporters of political Islam – the base of individuals whose attitudes are sympathetic to Islamist parties – the results of the full model are somewhat different but still reveal the same basic pattern (see tables 5.8 and 5.9). For the variable managing the economy, the coefficient estimate for Jordan is negative and significant, although the predicted effect of this variable remains small.

For the remaining three cases, however, the sign on the coefficient for each is the opposite of what would be expected if H5.1 is correct. In Algeria the sign is negative, even though the MSP is part of the governing coalition, while in Morocco and Yemen, where Islamists serve as opposition parties, the sign on the coefficient is positive. In Algeria, the predicted effect is very small, and while not large in Morocco or Yemen, the predicted effects are larger at 4.3 percent and 6.4 percent respectively. Thus, individuals who support opposition Islamist parties are somewhat *more likely* to believe that the government is managing the economy well. This result clearly suggests that among the passive base, Islamist parties are not capitalizing on economic discontent among the population or winning support among those who are economically disaffected within society in these two cases. This is especially true given that chapter three demonstrated that support for political Islam – broadly speaking – is significantly and positively correlated with the belief that the government is poorly managing the economy in both of these cases.

Meanwhile, for the regime-aligned MSP in Algeria, individuals who support the party are somewhat *less likely* to believe that the government is managing the economy well. Thus, the MSP is not capitalizing on activating supporters based on the positive elements of economic performance by the regime. This provides evidence that individuals support the party in spite of economic performance, basing their support on other factors. This finding further confirms that economic attitudes play no significant role in explaining support for Islamist parties.

Additionally, the size of these predicted effects remains smaller than the predicted effects for other variables in the model for each of the four cases. In Algeria, the largest predicted effect comes from the variable for political reform (-12.9 percent). The sign on this coefficient indicates a preference for slower reform which is consistent with a party

in government, further highlighting the weakness of the party in winning support on managing the economy. This is especially true given that Algeria's economy grew robustly from 2000 until the time of the survey in 2006 (WDI 2006).

In Jordan and Morocco, demographic variables have much more explanatory power than policy variables, but both cases highlight that the IAF and PJD have been unable to use economic discontent to mobilize passive supporters of political Islam into active supporters of Islamist parties to any substantial extent.

In Yemen, there are clear differences based on policy issues and demographic issues that dwarf the predictive power of the variable managing the economy. In this case, attitudes toward the role of women (49.1 percent predicted change) and frustration over corruption (20.3 percent predicted change) are much more likely to lead supporters of political Islam to support Islah, particularly among younger men. Given the size of the predicted effect for managing the economy and its sign being opposite of what would be expected if H5.1 is true, it is clear that Islah does not win support based on economic issues relative to other factors.

The results for the model including the variable creating jobs are generally similar (table 5.7), although there are important differences for the primary variable of interest. In this case, the signs are as would be expected by H1 in Algeria and Yemen, although Morocco still remains opposite of what is expected by H1. Although the sign for creating jobs is reversed from managing the economy in Algeria, the overall predicted effect remains extremely small, meaning that there is little substantive difference between the two different operationalizations of H1 being tested.

In Yemen, however, there is an important difference in this specification – the sign is reversed in this operationalization and there is a moderate predicted effect of -7.6 percent for a change from the minimum value to the maximum value for this variable. By comparison, however, this change is very small relative to the much larger predicted effects for changes in the attitude toward women's rights and corruption, and it is also smaller than the change for three of the five demographic variables.

In Jordan and Morocco, there is no change in the direction of the variables, although Morocco is no longer significant. The size of the predicted effect is slightly

greater for Morocco than the previous model, which is similar to Jordan, although both changes are only approximately one percentage point.

The remaining variables are essentially unchanged from the previous model in terms of sign, significance and predicted effect for all cases, meaning that for each of the four countries other variables have significantly larger effects on the likelihood of supporting an Islamist party than does opinion about the government's success in job creation.

Overall, across the variety of model specifications and different comparison groups, the consistent finding is that H1 is not confirmed; in no specification does either economic variable have both a statistically significant and substantively significant effect. In almost all cases the change in predicted effect is small overall when compared to other policy and demographic variables. Moreover, in the full version of the model, the signs of the estimated coefficients are the opposite of what is expected in at least two – and in one specification, three – of the cases under examination. This provides very clear evidence that Islamist parties fail to win support based on their economic policies, which is consistent with the theory that ordinary citizens do not associate Islamist parties with solutions to economic challenges.

Further Tests of this Theory

Although attitudes on economic issues are not strongly correlated with support for Islamist parties, it is possible that this finding is true for parties in the Arab world more generally. As noted in the discussion of *wasta*, evidence exists that electoral competition in the region revolves to a significant extent around patronage (Blaydes 2010; Lust-Okar 2006; Willis 2002), indicating that economic-based support should not be expected for any party. In light of these considerations, an additional test is useful.

Although Islamist parties are the most prominent opposition parties throughout the Arab world during the period under study, other opposition parties are present in a number of Arab countries. Most notably, leftist parties, which were very prominent in the years after independence, continue to operate. By definition, leftist parties are likely to have a clear economic position and association in the minds of ordinary citizens, especially compared to Islamist parties. By extension, a logical implication of the

general theory being tested is that that support for these parties should be correlated with economic attitudes such as how the government is doing managing the economy and creating jobs. This can be formalized into the following hypothesis:

H5.2: Supporters of opposition leftist parties should be more likely than non-supporters of leftist parties to have a negative assessment of regime performance on issues affecting a modern economy.

H5.2 hypothesizes that the attitudes of supporters of parties with a clear economic platform in Arab countries should demonstrate clear differences with non-supporters on these economic issues. Most notably, this should apply to parties of the traditional Arab left that are strongly associated with economic issues. Note that with regard to H5.2, in Jordan and Morocco, leftist parties are not popular, resulting an insufficient number of self-identified supporters with which to test this hypothesis. In Algeria and Yemen, however, there exist a sufficient number of supporters to test this claim.

In Yemen the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) – an opposition party which formed an alliance with Islah in 2005 called the Joint Meetings Parties (JMP) – was the governing party in the former PDRY (South Yemen) until unification in 1990. The PDRY was a communist regime and the YSP, although it has adapted to a changing political environment, retains this historical legacy and association. Forty-six respondents (3.9 percent) in the sample self-identify as supporters of the YSP.

In Algeria the leftist opposition parties include the Worker's Party (PT) and Front of Socialist Forces (FFS). Although only forty respondents (3.5 percent of the sample) self-identify with either of these parties, resulting in a relatively small sample size, combining these parties' supporters allows for an examination of the success of these parties on economic issues, offering some additional leverage on this question.

The final case is the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria, which represents the party of the state since independence. As its name implies, the primary purpose of the party was to win independence from France but subsequently the party adopted a socialist-nationalist ideology under Boumédiène (Roberts 1984).⁶⁹ Although the party has lost a significant portion of its ideological grounding in recent years, its legacy is

⁶⁹ It should be noted that the FLN's vision of socialism was less Marxist than that of the YSP. The FLN also upheld an Islamic identity as central to its governing strategy.

strongly socialist. Although not an opposition party, the FLN is included in this analysis because it is a party with a clear association with economic issues. It also enables a comparison to the Islamist MSP as both are parties in the current governing coalition. 161 respondents (13.2 percent) in the sample self-identify as FLN supporters.

Tables 5.10 and 5.11 present results for the restricted model and a modified version of the full model for all respondents.⁷⁰ As can be seen in the restricted model for managing the economy (table 5.10), the signs of the coefficients are as expected if H5.2 is correct and each is significant at the 0.01-level. For each of the three comparisons, the change in the predicted effect for managing the economy is the greatest of any variable in the model with the exception of age in the case of Yemen. This stands in stark contrast to the findings to all of the Islamist parties where the predicted effect for managing the economy was generally close to zero and smaller than one or more demographic variables in each case.

In the full model, the findings are relatively similar. The signs and significance levels for managing the economy are the same as for the restricted model. In this case, the predicted change in likelihood of supporting one of these parties is largest for managing the economy compared to the other policy variables. Similarly, for both socialists and the FLN in Algeria, the predicted effect is larger than for any of the demographic variables, while for the YSP the size of the change in predicted effect is slightly smaller than for age and approximately the same as for education.

In the case of the model that includes the variable creating jobs (table 5.11), the findings are relatively similar to managing the economy in the restricted model. The signs and significance for the variable creating jobs are the same and once again the predicted change in likelihood for creating jobs is the largest of any variable for socialists in Algeria, less than only age in Yemen, and functionally the same as income for the FLN and much larger than for the remaining variables in all cases.

In the full model, the same holds true with the exception of socialist opposition in Algeria. In this case, the sign of the predicted coefficient is negative, but the relationship is not significant at standard levels. The size of the change in the predicted effect also

⁷⁰ Attitudes toward the role of women and anti-Westernization are excluded as these are not central to the platform of leftist parties and there is no theoretical reason that justifies their inclusion in the model.

decreases dramatically, no longer representing the variable with the greatest predicted change. However, the results are highly similar for supporters of the YSP in Yemen and the FLN in Algeria to both the restricted model for jobs and the full model that includes managing the economy.

Overall, these results demonstrate that for parties with clearer economic associations – including those both in opposition and in power – there is a strong connection between economic attitudes and support for the party; in five of the six models this relationship was not only in the expected direction and significant, but also this economic variable in the model had one of the largest if not the largest changes in the predicted effect of supporting the party. These results stand in clear contrast to the case of Islamist parties where, in most cases, the economic variables were insignificant, they had a small change in predicted effect, and in multiple cases the coefficient estimate had the opposite sign than is predicted by H5.1.

Further Tests – The Case of Jordan

Jordan represents the only case of the four where the economic variables are statistically significant at standard levels with the coefficient estimate in the direction expected in H5.1. Although the predicted change in effect was extremely small, this section further considers these results. Among the four cases, Jordan is unique – support for the party is the lowest of all of the countries with less than two percent of all respondents stating they support an Islamist party. In essence, support for this party is reduced to the very core supporters, which allows for a further test of the theory detailed in chapter two.

Chapter two hypothesized that Islamist parties struggle to win support on economic issues because they do not inherit a strong brand name on the issues and cannot change this perception given the low levels of information under electoral authoritarianism. Importantly, this theory does not imply that it is impossible for Islamist parties to become associated with economic issues; rather, it implies that only individuals with the most detailed knowledge or closest association to the party would be the group most likely to be familiar enough with the parties' economic platforms to make this connection and thus update their image of the party to include economic issues.

Because support is so low in Jordan, it represents a unique case where only extremely loyal supporters of the party remain. It is likely that many of the IAF's supporters are more familiar with the party itself, either through a relationship to a member of the party⁷¹ or at least a more detailed knowledge of the party, than are supporters in other cases. A more detailed knowledge of the party means that these individuals are likely to be cognizant of the economic platform forwarded by the party, unlike the broader public. Essentially, these individuals are not operating in a low information environment with respect to the party. If true, this would imply that the negative and significant relationship between the regime's management of the economy and support for the party would be a function of knowledge of the party's platform. This can be formalized in hypothesis 5.3:

H5.3: Individuals who are both knowledgeable of the party platform and more dissatisfied with government performance are more likely to support an Islamist party.

Similarly, in the second model – creating jobs – if this small but loyal group of supporters is well connected to the IAF, then their support for the IAF may be a function of the hope of having a friend or associate win a parliamentary seat. Given the role of *wasta* in the political system in Jordan, these individuals may hope to receive a job or other benefits associated with having an associate in parliament. Although there is evidence that IAF candidates and officials do not provide *wasta* to the same extent as many other candidates, the party still seeks to provide benefits to its supporters (Patel 2006). By extension, those who are frustrated with the government's inability to create jobs may hope that if an associate is elected, he or she may receive benefits including possibly a job as a result. This hypothesis can be formalized in hypothesis 5.4:

H5.4: Individuals who are both frustrated with the government's ability to create jobs and are seeking *wasta* are more likely to support an Islamist party.

⁷¹ Official party membership in Jordan is extremely low – there are only a few hundred official members of the IAF. As such, in this context, party membership generally connotes a person very connected to the party and its leadership.

The item used to operationalize this additional hypothesis for knowledge of the party platform represents an indirect measure as no questions were included that asked about an individual's knowledge of any party platforms directly. The item is as follows:

Q212: Was there a real difference in the electoral platforms of the candidates in the elections? (Yes, no)

Although not directly about Islamist parties, since the IAF represents the primary non-regime party in Jordan, individuals with knowledge of its platform are more likely to respond to this item in the affirmative. However, it should be noted that only sixty percent of self-identified IAF supporters in Jordan responded in the affirmative.

For H5.4, the same item used for *wasta* in the previous analysis (Q226) is employed. The nature of both of these hypotheses requires interacting the variables operationalizing managing the economy and platform in the first case and job creation and *wasta* in the second case. Once again, a logistic regression technique is employed. Given that this model specification introduces a high degree of collinearity, the restricted model including only demographic variables is presented. The results for the full sample and the sample limited to supporters of political Islam are presented in tables 5.12 and 5.13 respectively.

Table 5.12 reveals that with the inclusion of these interaction terms, neither the variable for managing the economy nor the variable for creating jobs is significant. By comparison, the variables for platform and the interaction term in Jordan Model 1 are not significant, although both approach standard levels of significance ($p=0.128$ and $p=0.117$ respectively). In the case of creating jobs interacted with *wasta*, the signs indicate that who have used *wasta* are more likely to support the party while the interaction term is negative. Both are significant at standard levels.

When the model is restricted to supporters of political Islam, the results for managing the economy and creating jobs remain insignificant. In the case of Jordan Model 2, both using *wasta* and the interaction term remain significant at standard levels. The primary difference in the results occurs in Jordan Model 1 as both platform and the interaction term are significant in this case. Thus, these findings offer preliminary evidence suggesting that H5.3 and H5.4 are correct given that the variables for managing

the economy and creating jobs are insignificant while the interaction is significant (or approaches significance) at standard levels.

A more thorough test involves comparing the predicted probabilities for different values of the both interacted variables. These results, with the remaining variables held at their means, are presented in table 5.14. For the model including all respondents, an individual who both believes there was a difference in platforms and who believes the government is doing a poor job on the economy is most likely to support an Islamist party. By comparison, this individual is 4.6 times more likely to support the IAF than an individual who believes that there is no difference in the platforms and who believes that the government is doing a very bad job managing the economy. This difference is significantly greater than the difference between an individual who believes the government is doing very good managing the economy and one who believes it is doing a very bad job but who both believe there is no difference in platforms. The latter such individual is only 1.3 times more likely to support the IAF in Jordan.

The differences are even more dramatic when the sample is limited to supporters of political Islam. In this case, an individual who believes there is a difference in the platforms and the government is doing very badly managing the economy is 6.7 times more likely to support the IAF compared to an individual who believes there is no difference in platforms. There is also functionally no difference between the likelihood of supporting the IAF based on the rating of the government's performance on the economy if an individual believes there is no difference in platform.

These findings confirm H5.3 and shed light on the findings from the original models. Although there is a significant relationship between believing the government is doing a poor job managing the economy and supporting the IAF, this relationship is a function of knowledge of the IAF's platform. If there is no such knowledge, then there is little or no change in the likelihood of supporting the IAF based on one's attitude toward government performance; on the other hand, if an individual rates the government poorly and realizes that there is a difference in platforms, then he or she is more likely to support the IAF.

The results for interacting creating jobs and *wasta* are somewhat similar. In the model that includes all respondents, an individual who has used *wasta* and believes the

government is doing poorly creating jobs is 4.6 times more likely to support the IAF than a similar individual who has not used *wasta*. In this case, an individual who has not used *wasta* but believes the government is doing poorly creating jobs is 5.7 times more likely to support the IAF than a similar individual who believes the governments is doing well creating jobs. These results are relatively similar in the model limited to supporters of political Islam. In this case an individual who has used *wasta* and believes government is doing poorly creating jobs is 5.2 times more likely to support the IAF than a similar individual who has not used *wasta*. Likewise, among individuals who have not used *wasta*, one who believes the government is doing poorly creating jobs is 5.5 times more likely to support the IAF than one who believes the government is doing well creating jobs.

The findings from this interaction offer clear support to H5.4, although not quite as strongly in the case for H5.3. In this case, there is a clear increase in the likelihood of supporting the IAF for individuals who believe the government is doing poorly creating jobs and who have used *wasta*, compared to all other possibilities. Nevertheless, unlike in the previous case, the likelihood remains greater of supporting the IAF for individuals who believe the government is doing poorly creating jobs compared to those who believe it is doing well for both those who have and who have not used *wasta*. Despite this change in likelihood, the results in the tests of significance and the findings based on relative probabilities presented in table 5.14 clearly demonstrate that attitudes about creating jobs are related to the use of *wasta*, implying that much of the correlation between support for Islamist parties and creating jobs can be explained by rent seeking among individuals who likely have a close association with an IAF candidate or party member.

Conclusion

This chapter has presented evidence from four countries where Islamist parties are operating under conditions of electoral authoritarianism. It demonstrates that in each of these countries attitudes toward government performance on economic issues have a weak correlation with support for an Islamist party with the exception of Jordan. More importantly, however, the change in the predicted likelihood of supporting an Islamist

party if an individual believes the government is performing very badly on economic issues compared to very well – all else being equal – is small in all cases and in no case is it the strongest predictor of support for the party compared to other variables included in the model.

These findings stand in sharp contrast to the reasons for supporting long-standing leftist parties. In the case of leftist parties, support is generally correlated with the two economic variables being tested and of all of the variables included in the model, the economic variables generally have the greatest or second-greatest change in the predicted likelihood of supporting the party. This finding indicates that leftist parties, which have a stronger economic association in the minds of ordinary citizens, attract supporters on an economic basis whereas Islamist parties do not.

In sum, these findings offer strong support for the claim that Islamist parties, due to their brand name, struggle to translate economic attitudes into party support. In no case do Islamist parties benefit significantly among those who are more discontented with the government's economic performance or, in Algeria, where an Islamist party is part of the regime, where individuals were more contented with economic policy. In fact, in two of the four cases for the full model, the expected sign on the coefficient was the opposite of what was predicted by H1, indicating that only individuals who are less concerned about poor economic outcomes are likely to support the party. Thus, Islamist parties appear to be limited by their ability to appeal to individuals who are concerned about economic issues.

Although Islamist parties inherit this weakness, these findings do not necessarily imply that Islamist parties cannot overcome this basic challenge, or that they are not seeking to address this issue, albeit with limited success. As chapter four demonstrates, Islamist parties have sought to address this challenge by pursuing a variety of strategies. Over time, a rebranding of the party is possible, but in low information environments, it remains a significant challenge.

Overall, despite this variety of party strategies, none of the parties have been able to rebrand themselves to capture individuals who are disgruntled on economic issues. Jordan is the only case where there is a significant relationship between economic concerns and party support and where the sign is consistent with party policy. Yet, even

though the relationship is significant, the substantive effect is minimal. It should also be noted that, with the exception of Hamas, the IAF has made the least effort to rebrand itself as a party with a strong position on economic issues. Given the IAF's de-emphasis on economic issues, the significant correlation between economic issues and party support is likely explained by the fact that support in Jordan is lower than in the other cases, implying that only core supporters remain. As the final section demonstrates, there is an interaction between knowledge of electoral platforms and support based on frustrations over how the government is managing the economy.

The implication of this finding is that even among these core supporters, mobilization on economic issues is a function of higher levels of information among some supporters. The significance of this interaction implies that if ordinary citizens were aware that the IAF has an economic platform, then there would likely be greater support for the party among those with economic grievances; for this very limited group of supporters with high information, it appears that the IAF has been able to translate economic concerns into support. In low information environments, however, the ability to reach out to the broader population is limited, meaning that the IAF has not been able to rebrand itself among the vast majority of citizens. This reality may explain why party leaders have pursued a strategy that does not emphasize economic issues, cognizant of the limited benefits to such a strategy in the short term.

Overall, under conditions of electoral authoritarianism Islamist parties are not well poised to capitalize on the economic frustrations of the population at large. Although these parties have been the most significant non-regime parties in most Arab countries where parties are legalized, they have existed without mobilizing support based on economic frustrations with the reigning regimes. As the next chapter will demonstrate, this inability to win support on economic policies at the micro-level has significant macro-level consequences.

Appendix 5.1

Parties were coded using two approaches. First, if a party self-identified as an Islamist party it was coded as Islamist. This does not mean that if a party makes broad generalizations about support for Islam or certain elements of the *shari'a* it is coded as Islamist, but rather if the party uses Islam as one of or the primary identity for the party. The second strategy was to follow conventions in the literature on the parties and whether or not they are generally considered to be Islamist parties by other scholars.

Responses Coded as Islamist by Country:⁷²

Algeria:

MSP: Mouvement de la Société Pour la Paix (*Ḥarakat Mujtama' as-Silm*)

It should be noted that unlike the other parties in this chapter, the MSP joined the governing coalition in 2004 and was a junior partner in government when the survey was taken in 2006. Thus, the relationships for this party are expected to be somewhat different for the economic variables examined in the chapter. Ideally, a comparison would be made to two other Islamist parties (Mouvement du Renouveau National (MRN) (*Harakat al-Islāh al-Wataniyya*) and Mouvement de la Renaissance Islamique (*Harakat an-Nahdah*)) which serve as the opposition. Unfortunately, only eight respondents indicated support for the MRN and none for an-Nahdah. As such, these respondents were excluded from analysis in this chapter.

Jordan:

Islamic Action Front (*Jabhat al-'Amal al-Islami*)

Muslim Brotherhood

Hamas⁷³ (Palestinian Hamas)

Islamist Bloc (*al-Kitlah al-Islamiyyah*)

Morocco:

Parti de la Justice et du Développement (*Hizb al-'Adala wal-Tanmiyya*)

Palestine:

Hamas (*Harakat al-Muqāwamah al-'Islāmiyyah*)

⁷² Only Islamist parties that were identified by one or more respondents are coded.

⁷³ It should be noted that at the time of the poll in 2006, the IAF and the Palestinian Hamas were technically the same party, though the leadership structure was not united. The formal dissolution of the union took place soon after the 2007 parliamentary elections in Jordan.

Islamic Jihad

Yemen:

Islah: Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Islah) (*at-Tajammu al-Yemeni lil-Islah*)

JMP: Joint Meetings Party (Ahzab al-Liqa' al-Mushtarak)⁷⁴

al-Haqq: Truth Party (*Hizb al-Haqq*)

⁷⁴ Although this coalition represents a coalition of opposition parties including Islah and the Yemeni Socialist Party, these respondents were coded as Islamists since the JMP is led by Islah. Only two respondents, however, cited the JMP as their closest party as the vast majority named a party within the coalition.

Appendix 5.2

Table 5.2: Restricted Model Iteration 1
Logistic Regression with Support for Islamist Party as DV for all Respondents

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Algeria</i>	<i>Jordan</i>	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Yemen</i>	<i>Palestine</i>
Government is doing well managing the economy	1.2063 (1.3226) <i>0.0484</i>	-2.4380 (1.1104)** <i>-0.01638</i>	0.2627 (0.2937) <i>0.0216</i>	-0.5276 (0.3218) <i>-0.0481</i>	2.5776 (0.3289)*** <i>0.5979</i>
Income	1.3227 (2.2909) <i>0.0530</i>	-10.0577 (4.8429)** <i>-0.06757</i>	0.6648 (0.5412) <i>0.0547</i>	0.1936 (0.6092) <i>0.0176</i>	-1.2213 (0.8490) <i>0.2833</i>
Education	-1.2175 (0.9837) <i>-0.0488</i>	4.8132 (1.4545)*** <i>0.03234</i>	0.4991 (0.4231) <i>0.0411</i>	-0.4989 (1.0049) <i>-0.0455</i>	0.3501 (0.5345) <i>0.0812</i>
Female	-0.8479 (0.5192) <i>-0.0312</i>	-0.7753 (0.6847) <i>0.0104</i>	-0.6129 (0.2079)*** <i>-0.0514</i>	-0.8874 (0.3604)** <i>-0.0828</i>	0.3234 (0.1924)* <i>0.0754</i>
Age	-0.7360 (1.3414) <i>-0.0295</i>	-1.5447 (1.6230) <i>0.0104</i>	-0.7848 (0.4731)* <i>-0.0647</i>	-1.3582 (1.2110) <i>-0.1239</i>	0.2525 (0.4418) <i>0.0586</i>
Palestinian origin/ North Yemen/ West Bank		0.6583 (0.5802) <i>0.0054</i>		0.5077 (0.6712) <i>0.0404</i>	0.5078 (0.2094)** <i>0.1207</i>

Constant	-2.5543 (0.8116)	-4.6900 (0.9549)***	-2.0887 (0.2840)***	-1.4662 (0.7436)**	-1.8296 (0.2976)***
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Note: Table presents coefficient (β) estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Predicted effect of a change from the minimum value to the maximum value with other variables held at their means is presented in italics.

*Statistically significant at .1 level. **Statistically significant at .05 level. *** Statistically significant at .01 level.

Table 5.3: Restricted Model Iteration 2
Logistic Regression with Support for Islamist Party as DV for all Respondents

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Algeria</i>	<i>Jordan</i>	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Yemen</i>	<i>Palestine</i>
Government is doing well creating jobs	0.6694 (0.8234) 0.0273	-3.2204 (1.1352)*** -0.0188	0.5029 (0.3186) 0.0398	-0.4127 (0.5522) -0.0354	2.4336 (0.3494)*** 0.5676
Income	1.4756 (2.2063) 0.0601	-10.2924 (4.9902)** -0.0602	0.7084 (0.5394) 0.0561	0.2131 (0.6232) 0.0183	-0.8167 (0.8012) -0.1905
Education	-1.8660 (0.9596)* -0.0760	4.8987 (1.3953)*** 0.0286	0.5177 (0.4210) 0.0410	-0.1752 (1.0379) -0.0150	0.2134 (0.5287) 0.0498
Female	-0.5496 (0.4698) -0.0213	-0.6793 (0.6965) 0.0041	-0.6186 (0.2076)*** -0.0499	-0.9282 (0.3445)** -0.0825	0.2497 (0.1870) 0.0585
Age	-2.0898 (1.3876) -0.0851	2.0005 (1.7472) 0.0117	-0.9257 (0.4731)* -0.0733	-1.4856 (1.1911) -0.1276	0.2516 (0.4378) 0.0587
Palestinian origin/ North Yemen/ West Bank		0.6454 (0.5706) 0.0046		0.5367 (0.6757) 0.0398	0.3625 (0.2079)* 0.0861
Constant	-1.6471 (0.7257)**	-5.0059 (0.8854)***	-2.1246 (0.2657)***	-1.7156 (0.7303)**	-1.5250 (0.2752)***

Note: Table presents coefficient (β) estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Predicted effect of a change from the minimum value to the maximum value with other variables held at their means is presented in italics.

*Statistically significant at .1 level. **Statistically significant at .05 level. *** Statistically significant at .01 level.

Table 5.4: Restricted Model Iteration 3
Logistic Regression with Support for Islamist Party as DV for Supporters of Political Islam

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Algeria</i>	<i>Jordan</i>	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Yemen</i>	<i>Palestine</i>
Government is doing well managing economy	0.8489 (0.9376) <i>0.0493</i>	-2.4288 (1.1810)** <i>-0.0242</i>	0.2027 (0.3789) <i>0.0164</i>	-0.2274 (0.4791) <i>-0.0330</i>	2.1672 (0.3797)*** <i>0.5396</i>
Income	1.0337 (2.5269) <i>0.0601</i>	-9.6124 (4.9486)* <i>-0.0463</i>	1.2569 (0.6390)** <i>0.1022</i>	0.0098 (0.9487) <i>0.0014</i>	-0.6007 (1.2093) <i>-0.1495</i>
Education	-0.8464 (1.0949)* <i>-0.0492</i>	4.7450 (1.3925)*** <i>0.0473</i>	0.8913 (0.5912) <i>0.0725</i>	-0.2006 (1.2172) <i>-0.0291</i>	0.2370 (0.7465) <i>0.0590</i>
Female	-0.9304 (0.5839) <i>-0.0498</i>	-0.8927 (0.6876) <i>-0.0096</i>	-0.6355 (0.2661)** <i>-0.0530</i>	-0.9581 (0.3944)** <i>-0.1373</i>	0.1403 (0.2534) <i>0.0349</i>
Age	-0.9304 (0.5839) <i>-0.0619</i>	1.9356 (1.5982) <i>0.0193</i>	-0.4609 (0.5759) <i>-0.0375</i>	-1.7097 (1.3371) <i>-0.2480</i>	-0.0538 (0.5856) <i>-0.0134</i>
Palestinian origin/ North Yemen/ West Bank		0.7413 (0.5754) <i>0.0093</i>		0.3881 (0.6388) <i>0.0515</i>	0.4748 (0.2928) <i>0.1167</i>
Constant	-2.0794 (0.9201)**	-4.3629 (0.9565)***	-2.2713 (0.3651)***	-0.8572 (0.8029)	-1.0209 (0.4190)**

Note: Table presents coefficient (β) estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Predicted effect of a change from the minimum value to the maximum value with other variables held at their means is presented in italics.

*Statistically significant at .1 level. **Statistically significant at .05 level. *** Statistically significant at .01 level.

Table 5.5: Restricted Model Iteration 4
Logistic Regression with Support for Islamist Party as DV for Supporters of Political Islam

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Algeria</i>	<i>Jordan</i>	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Yemen</i>	<i>Palestine</i>
Government is doing well creating jobs	0.4867 (0.3376) 0.0263	-3.1736 (1.0960)*** -0.0270	0.4081 (0.4056) 0.0312	-0.2059 (0.6339) -0.0272	2.0366 (0.4481)*** 0.5075
Income	1.1657 (2.5312) 0.0632	-10.4150 (5.4599)* -0.0885	1.3781 (0.6314)** 0.1053	0.0121 (0.9694) 0.0016	-0.1606 (1.1013) -0.0400
Education	-1.7842 (1.0596)* -0.0968	4.9911 (1.4074)*** 0.0424	0.9173 (0.5872) 0.0701	0.2200 (1.213) 0.0291	0.0974 (0.7727) 0.0243
Female	-0.6749 (0.5327) -0.0348	-0.7923 (0.6849) -0.0072	-0.6127 (0.2659)** -0.0481	-1.0313 (0.3833)*** -0.1372	0.0950 (0.2559) 0.0237
Age	-3.0292 (1.6222)* -0.1643	2.6645 (1.7920) 0.0226	-0.6078 (0.5858) -0.0465	-1.9311 (1.2129) -0.2555	0.1120 (0.5616) 0.0279
Palestinian origin/ North Yemen/ West Bank		0.6719 (0.5759) 0.0070		0.4256 (0.6499) 0.0508	0.3774 (0.2905) 0.0932
Constant	-1.2861 (0.7858)	-4.7584 (0.9136)***	-2.3551 (0.3442)***	-1.0928 (0.7712)	-0.8132 (0.3849)**

Note: Table presents coefficient (β) estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Predicted effect of a change from the minimum value to the maximum value with other variables held at their means is presented in italics.

*Statistically significant at .1 level. **Statistically significant at .05 level. *** Statistically significant at .01 level.

Table 5.6: Unrestricted Model Iteration 1
Logistic Regression with Support for Islamist Party as DV for all Respondents

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Algeria</i>	<i>Jordan</i>	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Yemen</i>	<i>Palestine</i>
Government is doing well managing economy	0.1963 (1.0416) 0.0034	-2.3518 (1.0562)** -0.0174	0.4074 (0.3337) 0.0343	0.2971 (0.4639) 0.0248	2.4022 (0.3722)*** 0.5571
Less supportive of women's rights	1.9316 (1.0737)* 0.0333	0.1537 (1.0588) 0.0011	0.3087 (0.4713) 0.0260	2.6544 (0.8860)*** 0.2217	0.9796 (0.5747)* 0.2272
More anti-Western	-0.4853 (0.8174) -0.0084	0.6167 (0.7635) 0.0046	0.6100 (0.3606)* 0.0514	0.3516 (0.2890) 0.0321	0.0317 (0.3535) 0.0074
Government not fighting corruption	-1.1682 (0.9515) -0.0202	-0.8231 (0.9782) -0.0061	0.2668 (0.3460) 0.0225	1.1332 (0.5604)** 0.0946	-1.3907 (0.3866)*** -0.3225
Political reform should proceed rapidly	-7.4561 (3.1209)** -0.1287	1.6890 (1.0879) 0.0125	-0.2703 (0.4053) -0.0228	0.5268 (0.3627) 0.0440	-1.0666 (0.4192)** -0.2473
Used <i>wasta</i>	-0.7083 (0.5697) -0.0118	0.5360 (0.5482) -0.0046	0.3561 (0.2163)* 0.0314	-0.1261 (0.3674) -0.0105	0.2803 (0.3133) 0.0664
Income	0.3982 (2.4119) 0.0069	-10.3256 (5.0588)** -0.0763	0.8987 (0.6583) 0.0757	0.2991 (0.6624) 0.0250	-0.5274 (0.9254) -0.1223

Education	-1.7060 (1.2125) <i>-0.0295</i>	4.9555 (1.7141)*** <i>0.0366</i>	0.4892 (0.4589) <i>0.0412</i>	-0.5344 (0.9125) <i>-0.0440</i>	0.3112 (0.5992) <i>0.0722</i>
Female	-0.6256 (0.6371) <i>-0.0100</i>	-0.3970 (0.6891) <i>-0.0029</i>	-0.4479 (0.2402)* <i>-0.0379</i>	-0.9259 (0.3629)** <i>-0.0807</i>	0.5030 (0.2171)** <i>0.1178</i>
Age	-0.8141 (1.8340) <i>-0.0141</i>	2.1304 (1.8246) <i>0.0157</i>	-0.9787 (0.5225)* <i>-0.0825</i>	-0.9252 (1.6138) <i>-0.0773</i>	0.6938 (0.5139) <i>0.1609</i>
Palestinian origin/ North Yemen/ West Bank		0.3741 (0.6214) <i>0.0031</i>		1.1339 (0.9415) <i>0.0703</i>	0.3593 (0.2314) <i>0.0849</i>
Constant	-0.8497 (1.5604)	-5.5442 (1.0165)***	-2.9242 (0.5358)***	-4.7527 (1.4950)***	-2.2288 (0.5352)***

Note: Table presents coefficient (β) estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Predicted effect of a change from the minimum value to the maximum value with other variables held at their means is presented in italics.

*Statistically significant at .1 level. **Statistically significant at .05 level. *** Statistically significant at .01 level.

Table 5.7: Unrestricted Model Iteration 2
Logistic Regression with Support for Islamist Party as DV for all Respondents

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Algeria</i>	<i>Jordan</i>	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Yemen</i>	<i>Palestine</i>
Government is doing well creating jobs	-0.1882 (0.3593) <i>-0.0048</i>	-3.0296 (1.0921)*** <i>-0.0206</i>	0.2463 (0.1202)** <i>0.0202</i>	-0.4454 (0.7584) <i>-0.0365</i>	2.0574 (0.3669)*** <i>0.4777</i>
Less supportive of women's rights	2.2321 (1.0081)** <i>0.0567</i>	0.0530 (1.2648) <i>0.0004</i>	0.2606 (0.4709) <i>0.0213</i>	2.4462 (0.8291)*** <i>0.2003</i>	0.9118 (0.5699) <i>0.2117</i>
More anti-Western	-0.8526 (0.7811) <i>-0.0216</i>	0.4714 (0.9006) <i>0.0032</i>	0.5552 (0.3630) <i>0.0455</i>	0.3317 (0.3079) <i>0.0296</i>	0.0767 (0.3624) <i>0.0178</i>
Government not fighting corruption	-0.9620 (0.8787) <i>-0.0244</i>	-0.8019 (0.9749) <i>-0.0055</i>	0.3533 (0.3507) <i>0.0289</i>	0.8932 (0.5793) <i>0.0731</i>	-1.5865 (0.3530)*** <i>-0.3683</i>
Political reform should proceed rapidly	-5.6800 (2.2705)** <i>-0.1287</i>	1.9840 (1.1954)* <i>0.0135</i>	-0.2574 (0.4036) <i>-0.0211</i>	0.5580 (0.3721) <i>0.0457</i>	-1.0349 (0.4120) <i>-0.2403</i>
Used <i>wasta</i>	-0.8296 (0.8787) <i>-0.0202</i>	0.4350 (0.5372) <i>0.0033</i>	0.3938 (0.2151)* <i>0.0340</i>	-0.1642 (0.3750) <i>-0.0133</i>	0.1813 (0.2966) <i>0.0427</i>
Income	0.1157 (2.3355) <i>0.0029</i>	-10.2348 (5.0395)** <i>-0.0697</i>	0.8659 (0.6572) <i>0.0709</i>	0.1877 (0.6928) <i>0.0154</i>	-0.0977 (0.8763) <i>-0.0227</i>

Education	-1.7149 (1.1280) <i>-0.0435</i>	4.7050 (1.7327)*** <i>0.0321</i>	0.4908 (0.4591) <i>0.0401</i>	-0.4151 (0.9317) <i>-0.0340</i>	0.1741 (0.5827) <i>0.0404</i>
Female	-0.1935 (0.5589) <i>-0.0048</i>	-0.2838 (0.7689) <i>-0.0019</i>	-0.4647 (0.2399)* <i>-0.0383</i>	-0.8922 (0.3511)** <i>-0.0807</i>	0.4422 (0.2114)** <i>0.1036</i>
Age	-0.8107 (1.6780) <i>-0.0206</i>	2.4433 (1.9400) <i>0.0166</i>	-1.0082 (0.5226)* <i>-0.0826</i>	-1.0506 (1.5486) <i>-0.0860</i>	0.6218 (0.4984) <i>0.1443</i>
Palestinian origin/ North Yemen/ West Bank		0.3819 (0.6130) <i>0.0029</i>		1.1229 (0.9499) <i>0.0684</i>	0.1814 (0.2309) <i>0.0426</i>
Constant	-0.4874 (1.6139)	-5.6346 (1.1894)***	-3.2307 (0.5678)***	-4.2597 (1.4711)	-1.6794 (0.4673)***

Note: Table presents coefficient (β) estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Predicted effect of a change from the minimum value to the maximum value with other variables held at their means is presented in italics.

*Statistically significant at .1 level. **Statistically significant at .05 level. *** Statistically significant at .01 level

Table 5.8: Unrestricted Model Iteration 3
Logistic Regression with Support for Islamist Party as DV for Supporters of Political Islam

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Algeria</i>	<i>Jordan</i>	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Yemen</i>	<i>Palestine</i>
Government is doing well managing economy	-0.4678 (1.2241) <i>-0.0130</i>	-2.2662 (1.0160)*** <i>-0.0267</i>	0.5297 (0.4550) <i>0.0425</i>	0.4316 (0.5230) <i>0.0641</i>	1.7757 (0.3942)*** <i>0.4406</i>
Less supportive of women's rights	0.5068 (1.4235) <i>0.0141</i>	0.3658 (1.1614) <i>0.0043</i>	0.0010 (0.6330) <i>0.0000</i>	3.3015 (1.6131)** <i>0.4905</i>	0.6737 (0.7508) <i>0.1672</i>
More anti-Western	-0.4068 (0.9686) <i>-0.0113</i>	0.2677 (0.8014) <i>0.0031</i>	0.5317 (0.4928) <i>0.0427</i>	0.4086 (0.3880) <i>0.0650</i>	0.0042 (0.4561) <i>0.0010</i>
Government not fighting Corruption	-1.3130 (1.0807) <i>-0.0366</i>	-0.9559 (1.0437) <i>-0.0112</i>	0.2179 (0.4485) <i>0.0175</i>	1.3691 (0.6521)** <i>0.2034</i>	-1.4068 (0.4326)*** <i>-0.3491</i>
Political reform should proceed rapidly	-6.8202 (3.1550)** <i>-0.1902</i>	1.5374 (1.1519) <i>0.0181</i>	-0.0935 (0.4946) <i>-0.0075</i>	0.0843 (0.6172) <i>0.0125</i>	-0.7503 (0.5275) <i>-0.1862</i>
Used <i>wasta</i>	-0.7556 (0.7088) <i>-0.0195</i>	0.7201 (0.5811) <i>0.0103</i>	0.5992 (0.2868)** <i>0.0524</i>	-0.2031 (0.3467) <i>-0.0298</i>	0.2462 (0.3587) <i>0.0605</i>
Income	-0.0267 (1.2241) <i>-0.0007</i>	-9.7157 (4.9012)** <i>-0.1143</i>	2.3134 (0.8761)*** <i>0.1857</i>	-0.4310 (1.1555) <i>0.0640</i>	-0.4758 (1.1911) <i>-0.1181</i>

Education	-1.8694 (1.8694) <i>-0.0521</i>	4.9951 (1.6455)*** <i>0.0588</i>	0.7707 (0.6441) <i>0.0619</i>	0.1649 (1.3363) <i>0.0245</i>	-0.0165 (0.8029) <i>-0.0041</i>
Female	-0.9644 (0.7605) <i>-0.0244</i>	-0.5596 (0.7020) <i>-0.0068</i>	-0.3837 (0.3169) <i>-0.0311</i>	-1.0123 (0.4248)** <i>-0.1488</i>	0.2808 (0.2901) <i>0.0695</i>
Age	-1.8190 (2.5322) <i>-0.0507</i>	2.4715 (1.7001) <i>0.0291</i>	-0.9329 (0.6702) <i>-0.0749</i>	-0.9456 (1.6398) <i>-0.1405</i>	0.4954 (0.6787) <i>0.1229</i>
Palestinian origin/ North Yemen		0.4387 (0.6617) <i>0.0059</i>		1.1014 (0.9398) <i>0.1258</i>	0.3522 (0.3007) <i>0.0866</i>
Constant	1.0146 (1.7730)	-5.0707 (1.2274)***	-3.2155 (0.7221)***	-4.8122 (1.9216)**	-0.6687 (0.5509)

Note: Table presents coefficient (β) estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Predicted effect of a change from the minimum value to the maximum value with other variables held at their means is presented in italics.

*Statistically significant at .1 level. **Statistically significant at .05 level. *** Statistically significant at .01 level.

Table 5.9: Unrestricted Model Iteration 4
Logistic Regression with Support for Islamist Party as DV for Supporters of Political Islam

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Algeria</i>	<i>Jordan</i>	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Yemen</i>	<i>Palestine</i>
Government is doing well creating jobs	0.2868 (1.2929) 0.0132	-2.9932 (1.0765)*** -0.0321	0.7060 (0.4792) 0.0548	-0.5243 (0.8792) -0.0756	1.6033 (0.4821)*** 0.3985
Less supportive of women's rights	1.2849 (1.3153) 0.0590	0.1236 (1.4234) 0.0013	-0.0387 (0.6324) -0.0030	3.0996 (1.5632)** 0.4468	0.3589 (0.7186) 0.0892
More anti-Western	-0.7869 (0.9260) -0.0361	0.2677 (0.8014) 0.0031	0.5029 (0.4937) 0.0390	0.3184 (0.4480) 0.0485	-0.0465 (0.4669) -0.0116
Government not fighting Corruption	-0.6005 (1.0202) -0.0276	-0.9559 (1.0437) -0.0112	0.2570 (0.4540) 0.0199	1.1988 (0.7109)* 0.1728	-1.5117 (0.3934)*** -0.3758
Political reform should proceed rapidly	-4.9054 (2.2846)** -0.2252	1.8297 (1.2427) 0.0196	-0.0919 (0.4887) -0.0071	0.0210 (0.6168) 0.0030	-0.8939 (0.5246)* -0.2222
Used <i>wasta</i>	-0.8477 (0.6879) -0.0357	0.6446 (0.5827) 0.0083	0.6054 (0.2869)** 0.0513	-0.2496 (0.3412) -0.0354	0.1296 (0.3450) 0.0321
Income	-0.6433 (2.8477) -0.0295	-9.7989 (5.0024)** -0.1052	2.3379 (0.8745)*** 0.1814	-0.6431 (1.1309) -0.0927	0.0497 (1.1214) 0.0124

Education	-1.7383 (1.2726) <i>-0.0798</i>	4.7154 (1.6783)*** <i>0.0506</i>	0.7340 (0.6411) <i>0.0569</i>	0.2687 (1.3402) <i>0.0387</i>	-0.2349 (0.7956) <i>-0.0584</i>
Female	-0.3119 (0.6329) <i>-0.0138</i>	-0.4292 (0.7646) <i>-0.0047</i>	-0.3932 (0.3158) <i>-0.0309</i>	-1.0120 (0.4287)** <i>-0.1450</i>	0.2446 (0.2885) <i>0.0606</i>
Age	-2.3107 (2.1863) <i>-0.1061</i>	2.9250 (1.8437) <i>0.0314</i>	-0.9620 (0.6689) <i>-0.0746</i>	-1.0957 (1.6175) <i>-0.1579</i>	0.5750 (0.6555) <i>0.1429</i>
Palestinian origin/ North Yemen/ West Bank		0.4165 (0.6374) <i>0.0051</i>		1.1485 (0.9884) <i>0.1255</i>	0.2201 (0.2987) <i>0.0545</i>
Constant	0.1810 (1.6987)	-5.0339 (1.3651)***	-3.1880 (0.6949)***	-4.2720 (1.9923)**	-0.1757 (0.4963)

Note: Table presents coefficient (β) estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Predicted effect of a change from the minimum value to the maximum value with other variables held at their means is presented in italics.

*Statistically significant at .1 level. **Statistically significant at .05 level. *** Statistically significant at .01 level.

Table 5.10: Model for Leftist Parties Iteration 1
Logistic Regression with Support for Leftist Party as DV for all Respondents

<i>Variable</i>	Model 1			Model 2		
	Socialists <i>Algeria</i>	<i>Yemen</i>	Algeria <i>FLN</i>	Socialists <i>Algeria</i>	<i>Yemen</i>	Algeria <i>FLN</i>
Government is doing well managing economy	-4.4605 (1.2359)*** <i>0.0069</i>	-2.4775 (0.6670)*** <i>-0.1087</i>	2.0667 (0.4523)*** <i>0.2876</i>	-3.2203 (1.3649)*** <i>-0.0531</i>	-2.4700 (0.6947)*** <i>-0.1167</i>	1.6956 (0.5408)*** <i>0.2391</i>
Corruption				1.8037 (1.1996) <i>0.0297</i>	0.6163 (0.4759) <i>0.0358</i>	-0.9012 (0.4674)* <i>-0.1271</i>
Reform				-1.1258 (1.3555) <i>-0.0186</i>	-0.1056 (0.5081) <i>-0.0048</i>	-1.0483 (0.6374)* <i>-0.1479</i>
<i>Wasta</i>				1.1768 (0.5922) <i>0.0229</i>	-0.6163 (0.4759) <i>-0.0358</i>	0.5745 (0.2654)** <i>0.0844</i>
Income	-0.3545 (2.6353) <i>0.0069</i>	-0.1705 (0.9351) <i>-0.0075</i>	1.8248 (1.2484) <i>0.2539</i>	-0.0406 (2.9986) <i>-0.0007</i>	-0.5047 (1.0588) <i>-0.0238</i>	1.2341 (1.3234) <i>0.1741</i>
Education	1.3751 (1.3516) <i>0.02660</i>	2.2700 (1.0712)* <i>0.0996</i>	-0.1180 (0.5832) <i>-0.0164</i>	1.2953 (1.6093) <i>0.0214</i>	2.5758 (1.0389)** <i>0.1217</i>	-0.3093 (0.6977) <i>-0.0436</i>
Female	0.6642	-0.2847	-0.3289	1.0414	-0.0047	-0.1889

	(0.5090) <i>0.0143</i>	(0.3784) <i>-0.0126</i>	(0.2582) <i>-0.0444</i>	(0.6140)* <i>0.0211</i>	(0.3689) <i>-0.0002</i>	(0.2869) <i>-0.0261</i>
Age	0.9703 (1.5815) <i>0.0188</i>	3.4558 (1.2193)*** <i>0.1516</i>	0.1294 (0.7437) <i>0.0180</i>	1.4455 (2.0252) <i>0.0238</i>	3.2136 (1.3560)** <i>0.1518</i>	0.6977 (0.8503) <i>0.0984</i>
North Yemen		-1.0524 (0.4289) <i>-0.0657</i>			-0.8790 (0.4284)** <i>-0.055</i>	
Constant	-3.4678 (1.0979)***	-2.8956 (1.0296)***	-2.4693 (0.4900)***	-5.7615 (1.8107)***	-2.5599 (1.0984)**	-1.7771 (0.7162)**

Note: Table presents coefficient (β) estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Predicted effect of a change from the minimum value to the maximum value with other variables held at their means is presented in italics.

*Statistically significant at .1 level. **Statistically significant at .05 level. *** Statistically significant at .01 level.

Table 5.11: Model for Leftist Parties Iteration 2
Logistic Regression with Support for Leftist Party as DV for all Respondents

<i>Variable</i>	Model 1			Model 2		
	Socialists		Algeria	Socialists		Algeria
	<i>Algeria</i>	<i>Yemen</i>	<i>FLN</i>	<i>Algeria</i>	<i>Yemen</i>	<i>FLN</i>
Government is doing well creating jobs	-1.9990 (1.0421)* -0.0608	-2.4979 (0.9015)*** -0.1094	1.7700 (0.4449)*** 0.2523	-0.6332 (1.1097) -0.0169	-3.0735 (0.8910)*** -0.1197	1.2846 (0.5099)** 0.1823
Corruption				1.6409 (1.0242) 0.0438	0.5240 (0.8060) 0.0204	-1.1683 (0.4389)*** -0.1658
Reform				-0.2902 (1.1701) -0.0077	0.5868 (0.3651) 0.0229	-1.1871 (0.6352)* -0.1684
<i>Wasta</i>				0.9289 (0.5497) 0.0279	-0.2488 (0.5101) -0.0095	0.5392 (0.2615)** 0.0794
Income	-0.1064 (2.4355) -0.0032	-0.3886 (0.9564) -0.0170	1.7861 (1.2483) 0.2546	0.0159 (2.9513) 0.0004	-0.8045 (1.1139) -0.0314	1.1959 (1.3216) 0.1697
Education	1.8630 (1.2960) 0.0566	2.3946 (1.0812)* 0.1048	-0.5834 (0.5598) -0.0832	1.5587 (1.5256) 0.0416	2.1254 (1.3555) 0.0828	-0.5298 (0.6662) -0.0752
Female	0.5924	-0.3628	-0.4024	0.9297	-0.2037	-0.3604

	(0.4785) <i>0.0195</i>	(0.3498) <i>-0.0161</i>	(0.2527) <i>-0.0556</i>	(0.5672)* <i>0.0292</i>	(0.3998) <i>-0.0080</i>	(0.2878) <i>-0.0494</i>
Age	0.7186 (1.5347) <i>0.0218</i>	3.4086 (1.1599)*** <i>0.1492</i>	0.5089 (0.7112) <i>0.0725</i>	0.5321 (1.9324) <i>0.0142</i>	3.9007 (1.4773)*** <i>0.1520</i>	0.9353 (0.8245) <i>0.1327</i>
North Yemen		-0.9053 (0.4077)** <i>-0.0535</i>			-0.6451 (0.5221) <i>-0.0313</i>	
Constant	-4.3352 (1.0525)***	-3.1407 (0.9354)***	-1.9421 (0.4497)***	-6.1422 (1.6237)***	-3.7029 (1.7228)**	-1.1501 (0.6404)*

Note: Table presents coefficient (β) estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Predicted effect of a change from the minimum value to the maximum value with other variables held at their means is presented in italics.

*Statistically significant at .1 level. **Statistically significant at .05 level. *** Statistically significant at .01 level

Table 5.12: Interactive Model for Jordan Iteration 1
Logistic Regression with Support for the IAF as DV for all Respondents

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Jordan Model 1</i>	<i>Jordan Model 2</i>
Government is doing well managing economy	-0.0159 (1.6171)	
Platform Differentiation	1.7182 (1.1281)	
Managing Economy x Platform Differentiation	-3.4331 (2.1917)	
Government is doing well creating jobs		-1.5733 (1.2312)
Used <i>wasta</i>		1.6371 (0.7111)**
Creating jobs x <i>wasta</i>		-6.1176 (3.2981)*
Income	-10.1596 (5.0676)**	-10.3500 (5.2257)***
Education	5.5743 (1.6748)***	4.8497 (1.5045)***
Female	-0.6976 (0.6995)	-0.4579 (0.7005)
Age	0.3562 (1.8398)	2.1930 (1.7624)
Palestinian origin	0.9833 (0.5953)*	0.6328 (0.5693)
Constant	-5.2872 (1.9529)***	-5.7511 (1.0345)***

Note: Table presents coefficient (β) estimates with standard errors in parentheses.
Predicted effect of a change from the minimum value to the maximum value with other
variables held at their means is presented in italics. *Statistically significant at .1 level.
Statistically significant at .05 level. * Statistically significant at .01 level.

Table 5.13: Interactive Model for Jordan Iteration 1
Logistic Regression with Support for IAF as DV for Supporters of Political Islam

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Jordan Model 1</i>	<i>Jordan Model 2</i>
Government is doing well managing economy	0.1551 (1.5886)	
Platform Differentiation	2.0739 (1.1717)*	
Managing Economy x Platform Differentiation	-3.9205 (2.2563)*	
Government is doing well creating jobs		-1.5173 (1.2984)
Used <i>wasta</i>		1.7804 (0.7688)**
Creating jobs x <i>wasta</i>		-5.7329 (3.2866)*
Income	-9.1548 (5.3124)*	-11.1997 (5.7331)**
Education	5.2506 (1.5567)***	5.2585 (1.5228)***
Female	-0.8451 (0.7264)	-0.5379 (0.6951)
Age	1.0178 (1.9229)	2.9915 (1.7448)*
Palestinian origin	1.0449 (0.5957)*	0.6797 (0.5933)
Constant	-4.8993 (1.9595)**	-5.7311 (1.1312)***

Note: Table presents coefficient (β) estimates with standard errors in parentheses.
Predicted effect of a change from the minimum value to the maximum value with other
variables held at their means is presented in italics. *Statistically significant at .1 level.
Statistically significant at .05 level. * Statistically significant at .01 level.

Table 5.14: Predicted Effects for Jordan

All Respondents:

	Government Performance Managing Economy	
Platform	Very bad	Very good
No Difference	0.009	0.007
Difference	0.041	0.002

	Government Performance Creating Jobs	
Wasta	Very bad	Very good
Not used	0.012	0.002
Used	0.054	0.000

Passive Supporters of political Islam:

	Government Performance Managing Economy	
Platform	Very bad	Very good
No Difference	0.012	0.011
Difference	0.079	0.003

	Government Performance Creating Jobs	
Wasta	Very bad	Very good
Not used	0.015	0.003
Used	0.078	0.000

Chapter 6

Macrolevel Implications

The previous chapter demonstrated that despite varying strategies toward economic issues, Islamist parties fail to mobilize significant support based on these issues. This stands in sharp contrast to parties with clear economic brand names, such as leftist parties, which are able to mobilize support on this basis. These contrasting findings – in addition to evidence from Jordan that knowledge of the IAF's platform has a critical moderating effect in the relationship between support based on economic issues and support for the party – strongly suggests that Islamist parties have a critical weakness on economic issues in their inherited brand name and that under conditions of limited information – characteristic of electoral authoritarianism – they are unable to alter this association in the minds of ordinary citizens. This micro-level relationship, however, cannot in and of itself explain the initial puzzle presented in chapter one – what accounts for variation in the support for Islamist parties across either space or time?

This chapter examines the implications of this micro-level relationship at the macro-level to help account for differences in levels of support for Islamist parties. This chapter demonstrates that the variation in support for Islamist parties is a function of the demand of ordinary citizens for economic solutions and the credible supply provided by other economic actors. As theorized in chapter two, when economic issues are important (demand for economic solutions is high) and there is ample supply of alternative solutions (high supply of credible alternatives), then levels Islamist party support are likely to be low; in cases where economic issues are not central (demand is low) and few alternative exist (supply is low), levels of Islamist party support are likely to be high; and in cases where one is high and one is low, levels of Islamist party support are likely to be moderate. Thus, in this chapter I argue that the consequences of this micro-level relationship, when aggregated, account for the differences in support for Islamist parties in the Arab world.

Congruence of Islamist Platforms and Issue Arenas

As demonstrated in chapters three and four, the Islamist movement is strongly associated with a number of issues likely to concern ordinary citizens. For these issues, such as the problem of high levels of corruption or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is clear how Islam represents the solution. Islamist parties – even if they do not have clear policy programs to deal with these issues – have strong associations with them and thus provide ordinary citizens with a more credible brand name than other candidates or parties.

However, as demonstrated in chapters four and five, Islamist parties are not strongly associated with solutions to many modern macroeconomic issues, making this the primary weakness for Islamist parties. This weakness is particularly important given that economic outcomes have tended to be poor across the Arab region throughout the last three decades. In particular, high rates of unemployment and inflation have plagued the region (World Bank 2004). Given that economic concerns are the principal weakness for the Islamist brand, the degree to which the issue arena is centered on economic concerns can serve as a proxy for the degree to which there is congruence between the Islamist brand name and the most salient issues in political competition.


The demand for solutions to economic problems can be operationalized through an item present in the Arab Barometer asking respondents what represents the most important challenge facing their society. In the Arab Barometer the item was as follows:

Q248 In your opinion, which of the following is the most important problem facing [country] today? (Economic situation such as unemployment and inflation; Corruption; Authoritarianism; Ending the U.S. occupation of Iraq; the Arab-Israeli conflict; Other: please specify)⁷⁵

As can be seen in figure 6.1, the importance of economic issues varies significantly by context.

⁷⁵ It should be noted that in Palestine the question was the same but the response options varied. In the place of the U.S. occupation of Iraq and the Arab-Israeli conflict it included “ending the Israeli occupation” and “ending the security chaos”. Although distinct issues, for the purposes of comparison these are both considered to be elements of the occupation in the analysis that follows.

Figure 6.1



In Jordan, nearly two-thirds of ordinary citizens stated that economic concerns were the most important problem facing the country. By comparison, in Palestine less than forty percent of respondents stated that these were the most important concerns. Unsurprisingly, in Palestine the most important issue was the Israeli occupation with nearly half (49.0 percent) of respondents citing this as the most salient issue. In the remaining three cases, Algeria, Morocco, and Yemen, the importance of economic issues was between these two extremes, ranging from around fifty to fifty-five percent of respondents. Thus, demand for economic solutions is greatest in Jordan and least in Palestine, with the other three cases occupying a position between these two extremes.

Supply of Credible Economic Alternatives

Throughout the Arab world, electoral competition is not primarily based on policy platforms (Baaklini et al 1999). Thus, few if any political actors are likely to offer potential supporters a credible policy alternative on economic problems. Rather, the most credible economic alternatives exist in the form of promises of patronage. For this reason, much of political competition revolves around economic rents or promises

concerning the improvement of access to services for either individuals or the local community.

Islamist parties tend to be less engaged in these activities than other actors (Patel 2006; Hamzawy 2009). Inheriting a brand name associated with being uncorrupt, Islamist parties seek to capitalize on this clean image by claiming that they will eliminate corruption from the political process. Chapter four demonstrated how this claim plays a key role in their outreach, but it also limits the belief that if elected they will use their position to benefit supporters.

Given the focus on patronage politics dominant parties, rather than functioning as a link between the citizen and the political process, tend to operate as a mechanism that help ensure that the autocrat or the regime maintains power (Wedeen 2008). Nevertheless, despite this function, membership in political parties is extremely low (Lucas 2006; Arab Barometer 2006-7 item q202). Instead of using parties expressly for this purpose, the tendency is for regimes to structure political competition around elections and use parliament for the purposes of economic distribution, leading parties to establish elaborate apparatuses for distributing rents (Lust-Okar 2006).

Within such an environment, membership in the party itself is not the key to receiving economic patronage. Rather, networks of kinship generally structure competition. These can take the form of extended families or, in a broader form, tribal identities (Ibn Khaldun 1958, 261-5; Dresch 1989; Gellner 1990; Fandy 1994). This cleavage divides members of society into those who share close kinship with an individual and those who do not.

This form of identity shares certain features with ethnic, sectarian or regional identities within the political sphere (see Horowitz 1985; Chandra 2007). In these cases, candidates and parties make two forms of appeals to potential voters. First, if elected, the candidate or party claims it will institute policies that further the interests of the group identity to which it is appealing (see Chandra 2004, 11). This could take the form, for example, of arguing for positive discrimination for the group, seeking to protect the group's interests in light of policy changes, or to otherwise aid the group vis-à-vis state policy. Second, the candidates or parties can promise to channel state resources as

patronage to members of their group (Bates 1981). In this case, the policy platform promises material goods to supporters upon election in exchange for their support.

On the other hand, although most members of an ethnic or religious group share an approximately equal status as group members, creating some stability over time within the group (Fearon 1999), tribal cleavages are defined by the strength of an individual's blood relation to another individual. Individuals have greater loyalty to those who are more proximate within the family tree and lesser loyalty to those who are more distant (Khoury and Kostiner 1990). As a result, in a given situation an individual is most likely to support an individual based on proximity within the family or tribe. In political terms, an individual might support a cousin in one election but, if the individual's brother ran against the cousin in the subsequent election, the individual's candidate of choice would likely change.

One significant characteristic of tribal identity is that all members of society inherit it and one's identity is immutable⁷⁶ and family lines are well established. The parents give an individual's first name, but middle names represent a list of the individual's male lineage back many generations. Thus, the exact family and line within a tribe can be established. In most instances, this ability leaves very little question as to the exact proximity of one individual to any other individual within the larger kinship grouping. Thus, unlike ethnic or some other forms of identity politics, tribal identity limits the ability to defect from one coalition for another without the support of a broader faction of the family grouping.

Although candidates who appeal to a tribal identity may be considered to be non-ideological, they do in fact offer a clear political platform. On the basis of shared kinship, this platform offers potential voters the promise of the distribution of material resources from the state and from their position (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009). The closer the family relationship of a potential voter to the candidate, the more likely it is that an individual will be rewarded with the spoils of political office.

Based on existing cultural norms, this form of patronage politics also offers a clear and verifiable manner in which to distribute regime patronage. The concept of *wasta*, literally meaning an intermediary or connection, has a strong place in Arab

⁷⁶ A possible exception is through marriage.

societies (Cunningham and Sarayrah 1993; Sa'eda and Sakijha 2002). Under this institution, individuals are expected to provide benefits to those to whom they are most closely related. Although this does not provide for a verifiable system to ensure individuals support the most proximate candidate by kinship, it does provide strong incentives given the knowledge that the individual would provide material benefits.

The system, however, is largely costless and self-reinforcing. If individuals believe that other individuals will act in this manner, then the incentive, if they participate in elections at all, is to also act in such a manner in the hopes of receiving the greatest possible benefit. This norm is so strong in some regions, such as rural parts of Jordan, that one local elite in ar-Ramtha, near the Syrian border, indicated to the author he could predict the outcome of the elections simply based on his knowledge of the size of each tribal group.

This norm also leads to the structuring of competition based on tribal alliances by political elites. During an interview one local elite near Wadi Musa in southern Jordan indicated that his tribe was not large enough to form a winning coalition in his district over the large and dominant tribe. As a result, his tribe and three others had formed a coalition whereby each tribe was allowed to select a candidate every fourth election in order to ensure that they could have a representative in parliament. He indicated that at the time the rotational system had succeeded in three consecutive elections with the agreed upon candidate winning each time.

Since tribal politics lends itself to patronage and is otherwise largely non-ideological, competition structured on this principle can be used to bolster the regime. If a balance can be struck whereby tribal interests are balanced or tribal leaders are incorporated into the system, then this represents minimal threat to the regime. Tribal leaders have little incentive to defect from a system that provides them an opportunity to receive patronage on a regular basis. Tribes thus can serve as pro-regime elements that structure the political system, which in turn serves the interests of tribal leaders since these institutional arrangements strengthen the salience of tribal identity among ordinary citizens. As such, a number of regimes have sought to encourage tribal politics as a part of their governing strategy (Schwedler 2006; Lust-Okar 2006).

As a result, while parties associated with the regime exist in a number of countries, party identity and loyalty is of less importance in the patronage system than tribal identities and networks. Relative to support for a party, tribes offer a more credible means by which individuals come to expect patronage. Therefore, in the absence of serious debate on policy issues by most parties, patronage distributed through tribal networks represents the primary credible economic alternative within these political systems.

Differences in the Credibility of Patronage based on Tribal Identity

Tribal voting is present in all of the political contexts under examination, meaning it is functionally a constant. The degree to which it represents a credible alternative on economic issues, however, is likely to vary. Critically, the credibility of the alternative depends on the expected benefit an individual is likely to receive. If the benefits of having a member of one's tribe in a high position are perceived to be substantial, then tribal candidates offer a more credible economic platform. If, on the other hand, the benefits are perceived as being inconsequential, then the economic platform of a tribal candidate becomes less credible. In other words, in systems where *wasta* plays a greater role, the promises of economic benefits forwarded by tribal candidates will be greater, whereas if *wasta* plays a lesser role, there are minimal potential benefits and the tribal platform loses credibility.


Thus, the supply of credible economic alternatives can be operationalized by a variable found in the Arab Barometer which asks the following:

Q506.2: What is the importance of a person's family or tribal affiliation in obtaining a government job in [country] relative to other factors? Please indicate whether each is more important, equally important, or less important as a person's experience and professional qualifications.

Although a job is only one potential benefit that might result from supporting a tribal candidate, it represents a clear and significant benefit and can inform the differences in the perceptions regarding the relative importance of tribal voting in each society. In cases where a higher percentage of individuals believe that tribal affiliation is as important or more important than qualifications, then the supply of credible economic

alternatives is greater. In cases where fewer individuals believe tribal identity matters, then the supply of credible economic alternatives is lower. Figure 6.2 presents the results for each of these five cases.

Table 6.2



As table 6.2 demonstrates, tribal identity is seen as being most important in the case of Jordan, with approximately half of all respondents stating that it is as important or more important than qualifications in obtaining a government job. Given the wide literature on the role of tribes and *wasta* in the Jordanian system, it seems reasonable that this perception is greatest in this case (Lust-Okar 2006; Robbins 2009). At a somewhat lower level, around thirty-five to forty percent of respondents stated that tribal identity is as important or more important than qualifications in Yemen, Morocco and Algeria. By contrast, just over twenty percent of individuals believed this is the case in Palestine. This much lower number is likely due to the fact that in Palestine regional identity is as important, if not more important, than tribal identity (see Sayigh 1977; Brand 1995).⁷⁷

Since the provision of basic goods and services based on family or tribal linkages are the most significant credible economic platforms within political competition, the theory predicts that in cases where this platform is more credible, such as Jordan, Islamist


⁷⁷ Regional identity in Palestine tends to be based around major cities within the territories. Additionally, there are important divisions between those from the city and those from the countryside.

parties should have lower levels of support. In cases where there is a lower supply of a credible economic alternative, levels of Islamist party support – all else being equal – are predicted to be higher.

Theoretical Predictions

The original theory presented in chapter two predicted that support would be higher in environments where economic concerns were less important – meaning issue congruence between the Islamist brand name and the key issues in the issue arena was higher – and where there were fewer credible economic alternatives active in political competition. These predictions were summarized in the following figure (6.3).

Figure 6.3: Summary of Theoretical Predictions



Mapping the differences in the political context of each of these five cases onto this figure yields the following results (figure 6.4).

Figure 6.4: Mapping the Countries Based on the Predictions of the Model





Figure 6.4 reveals that in Jordan the political context is less favorable to Islamist party support. In this case, there is a relatively high demand for economic solutions as well a relatively high supply of credible economic alternatives based on patronage through tribal politics. On the opposite extreme is the case of Palestine where there is substantially higher congruence between the Islamist brand and the prominent concerns in the issue arena, as well as relatively few credible alternative economic platforms forwarded by competitors. As a result, under conditions of electoral authoritarianism, it is expected that Hamas would have a much greater potential for strong support than the IAF. Finally, in the three remaining cases – Algeria, Morocco, and Yemen – levels of Islamist party support are predicted to be relatively similar to each other and to fall between these two extremes.

Figure 6.5 presents the same predictions with comparisons to the stated level of support for Islamist parties based on the Arab Barometer survey.

Figure 6.5: Comparison of Predictions to Levels of Support for Islamist Parties



Compared to self-stated levels of support, the results are largely consistent with the predictions. In Jordan, support is by far the lowest, at only 1.4 percent, whereas in Palestine support is the highest, at 41.0 percent, - relative positions generally in line with the relative predictions for each society based on the theory in chapter two. In Morocco and Yemen, support is a little less than ten percent. Given the relative proximity of both cases in figure 6.5, this result is expected. In Yemen, there is a somewhat higher congruence of the Islamist brand name with the salient issues in society relative to Morocco, but there is also a somewhat greater supply of credible alternatives based on tribal voting compared to Morocco. Given these differences, it follows that these two are relatively similar in terms of overall levels of support. Moreover, the levels of support for Yemen and Morocco fall between Jordan and Palestine, although being somewhat closer to levels seen in Jordan. This greater proximity to Jordan was also predicted based on differences in these two macro-level variables structuring the political environment.

The final case, Algeria, has a somewhat different level of party support than what was predicted. In this case, the model predicted that support should be somewhat higher in Algeria than in Morocco and Yemen, most likely at a bit more than ten percent.

Instead, support is shown to be at 5.4 percent. There are a number of factors unique to the Algerian case which could possibly explain this discrepancy in predicted levels of support relative to actual levels. First, this is the only case where the Islamist party was a regime partner at the time of the survey. Although this may yield some benefits to the party, much of the Islamist platform and narrative centers on being an alternative to the regime. This is more challenging for the MSP.

Other possible factors that could explain this difference are the unique history of Islamism in Algeria. After a brutal civil war between supporters of the FIS and the military-backed regime, a war that cost more than 100,000 Algerians their lives, fears of a return to such violence could yield a lower level of support for Islamist parties. The potential costs of a return to such conflict affect the party-support calculus for ordinary citizens, leading to lower levels of support Algerian Islamist parties. A second potential explanation is that the split in the Islamist movement between three parties has splintered support overall.

Although this model does not seek to account for election results for reasons stated in chapter two, comparing the results of the 2007 parliamentary elections in Algeria to those in Morocco is instructive. Taken only a few months apart, these elections occurred within a similar international environment. Additionally, at the societal level Algeria and Morocco share a number of important characteristics, in spite of their institutional differences (Hermassi 1972). Critically, the turnout rate was relatively similar between the two elections at around 35 percent in Algeria and 37 percent in Morocco. Within these elections, Islamist parties in Algeria captured 15.6 percent of the vote while the PJD in Morocco won 16.4 percent of the vote.

The similarities between these two elections provides some additional empirical evidence to suggest that levels of support for Islamist parties in both societies is relatively similar, a result which is broadly in line with the predictions of the model. Although the split in the Islamist parties or the other factors cited may yield lower levels of allegiance to a specific party in Algeria, in the end the Algerian Islamist parties receive a similar level of overall support compared to the PJD in Morocco.

Conclusion

In sum, differences in factors relating to both the supply and demand of economic solutions within the political arena correlate strongly with overall levels of Islamist party support. As demonstrated in chapter five, the Islamist brand name is weak on economic issues and these parties do not capitalize on economic discontent, unlike other parties with strong economic brand names. Moreover, within low information societies, Islamist efforts to change this association have had limited success. This chapter has shown that this micro-level relationship has significant implications at the macro-level based on different levels of supply and demand for economic solutions. In societies where there is low demand and low supply, Islamist party support tends to be higher, whereas in cases where there is high demand and high supply support for Islamist parties tends to be lower.

Within many settings, it appears that support for Islamist parties tends to be around ten percent of society. In these cases economic concerns are the dominant, but not overwhelming concern; other issues such as corruption or international events also influence individual preferences to a significant degree. These issues provide Islamist parties a foothold in the political system and yield a small but important base of support. Without an external shock or some form of additional information becoming available to ordinary citizens, this level of support appears likely to endure.

In the two outlying cases – Jordan and Palestine – specific factors appear to account for these differences in levels of support. In Palestine, economic concerns are secondary to the status of the Israeli occupation. Within such a political arena Hamas was able to win support based on its position on the peace process while downplaying economic issues. However, it should be noted that Hamas's dramatic increase in support (see figure 1.1) occurred during and immediately after the second Palestinian *intifada*, or the time when the Oslo Peace Process began to collapse. This highlights the fact that an absence of economic concerns is necessary, but not sufficient, to explain differences in support for Islamist parties. Rather, public opinion had to shift to support Hamas's rejection of the peace process. When this took place, however, the conditions specific to the Palestinian political arena were highly favorable to Hamas.

This finding has important implications for one of the key assumptions of this dissertation – that the Islamist brand name is generally in line with public opinion on most non-economic issues, such as corruption and policy toward Israel and the West. Palestinian public opinion toward Hamas’ position on the peace process during the 1990s represents a case where this assumption does not hold. Thus, a low supply and a low demand for economic solutions are necessary, but not sufficient conditions, for high levels of support for Islamist parties; this relationship creates conditions under which Islamist parties *can* be successful but ultimately support depends on the congruence of the Islamist brand name with the most salient non-economic issues under such conditions.

The model also predicts extremely low support in the case of Jordan and, as expected, support for the IAF is by far the lowest of any case. In this case, economic concerns predominate and there is a high supply of economic solutions. Yet, support was significantly higher for the IAF in the 1990s and early 2000s. As the next chapter details, Jordan experienced a massive economic shock as a result of the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. As a result, around half-a-million Iraqi refugees flooded Jordan, an influx of people roughly ten percent of Jordan’s overall population. As a result, inflation and unemployment increased dramatically in a very short period of time, which the model predicts would lead to a decline in support for the IAF after the invasion of Iraq.

Overall, this chapter presented evidence about the political arenas of five Arab societies and the results strongly supported the theory that the weakness of the Islamist brand name on economic issues is strongly correlated with the levels of support for Islamist parties across space. Although very little data are available to test this theory over time, the next chapter tests does so in the case of Jordan to provide a more complete test of the overall model.

Chapter 7

Accounting for Changes in Support Over Time

Chapter five presented evidence demonstrating that ordinary citizens tend to not associate economic platforms with Islamist parties. Chapter six demonstrated that this micro-level relationship has implications for the macro-level outcomes, given differences in the political arenas between societies. This chapter seeks to test implications of this theory for changes over time, evaluating whether or not it can also explain dynamic changes in support for Islamist parties under electoral authoritarianism.

Data from both public opinion surveys and from election results confirm that support for the IAF in Jordan declined precipitously from the early-2000s to the late-2000s. Although no public opinion data are available prior to 2001, based on election results it appears support remained fairly steady from 1989-2003 at around fifteen percent of the electorate. A number of Jordan-specific theories have been developed in an attempt to explain this decline. This chapter compares the cross-national theory presented in this dissertation to these country-specific explanations and argues that the cross-national theory forwarded in chapter two accounts for the variation exhibited over time better than these country-specific alternatives.

Most existing theories have focused on variables specific to the regime or the political system to explain the decline of the IAF in Jordan. My theory predicts that a change in the nature of the political arena is more likely to account for the party's decline in support. More specifically, my theory predicts that the IAF's decrease is likely to be the result of an increase in concern about economic issues among ordinary citizens. The resulting decrease in support for the IAF is because the issue arena in Jordan became less congruent with the Islamist platform .


This chapter presents evidence from two post-election public opinion surveys conducted in Jordan following the 2003 and 2007 elections. As noted, the model developed in this dissertation is for *support*, not vote choice since vote choice depends on

factors specific to each particular election. However, due to a scarcity of data with which to evaluate this theory over time, this chapter relies on voting behavior, comparing the determinants of vote choice for the IAF between 2003 and 2007.⁷⁸ It should be noted that there were no significant differences in the political parties or candidates running in the two elections and the electoral rules remained consistent between the two. The results presented below, however, are for a different dependent variable than in the previous analyses in the dissertation.

The results of this chapter are consistent with the theory forwarded in chapter two. This chapter demonstrates that changes in the electoral arena led to an increasing concern about economic issues as a result of an exogenous shock. The timing of this shock correlates strongly with the decline in support for the IAF. Thus, this chapter finds evidence that this model not only explains cross-national variation, but also accounts for changes in levels of support for Islamist parties over time.

Existing Theories of IAF Decline in Jordan

Support for the IAF declined dramatically between 2003 and 2007 (see figure 7.1) as measured by both vote share and more recently by public opinion surveys.



Sources: Clark 2004; CSS 2001, 2004-7; Author's calculations from al-Ghad 2007

⁷⁸ For example, in a pre-election poll prior to the 2011 elections in Tunisia, nearly twice as many respondents stated that they would vote for the Ennahda, the primary Islamist party, as stated that they most closely identified with Ennahda (Robbins and Tessler 2011). Thus, there is a clear empirical difference in the concept captured by these two variables.

According to members of the IAF and many scholars, this decline in support can be accounted for primarily as a result of government repression and fraud (Kofahi 2008; Gharaybeh 2008; Susser 2008; Ryan 2008). However, generally the decline is understood as a more long-term phenomenon given that a number of scholars rely on the declining number of seats in parliament rather than on vote share or public opinion polls in studying the party's declining support (Lust-Okar 2006; Lucas 2006; Ryan 2008). This section examines the two most prominent existing theories of decline for the IAF.

Changes in Electoral Laws

Regime manipulation takes a number of forms in Jordan, but the most prominent in these theories involves the change to the single non-transferable voting system (SNTV) in 1993, otherwise known as the “single vote” (*sawt wahid*) by Jordanians (see Amawi 1994; Lucas 2005; Lust-Okar 2006). This change in electoral systems was instituted by the regime after Islamists won forty percent of the seats in parliament in 1989 under a bloc voting system where the number of votes allotted to each citizen was equal to the district magnitude and district magnitude varied from two to nine. As with any bloc voting system, a significant advantage accrued to political entrepreneurs who were able to form coalitions of candidates or create official lists within a district. Most importantly, given the fact that virtually all other civil society organizations had been banned,⁷⁹ the Muslim Brotherhood was well suited to pursue this electoral strategy. As the most organized political force in Jordan prior to the 1989 elections – the first national elections in twenty-two years – the Brotherhood could build a dominant coalition. Its strategy was to seek out popular local candidates to include in the coalition which was comprised of Christian candidates and other minorities in some areas (Arabiyat). Thus, based on this electoral strategy, the MB and independent Islamists won two-fifths of the seats despite winning only 15.6 percent of the overall vote (Clark 2004, 88).

The general logic for the change to the *sawt wahid* system in 1993 was that individuals had cast their “first” vote for their tribe and subsequent votes for the Brotherhood list in the 1989 elections, leading to a vast overrepresentation of Islamists in

⁷⁹ Political parties remained illegal until 1992.

parliament (Robinson 1998, 397). The switch to a SNTV system meant that individuals would vote for the Brotherhood candidate only if it was their most preferred candidate, which according to the regime would yield a more representative parliament. Despite these changes, the actual vote share for the newly formed IAF and independent Islamist candidates actually rose slightly in 1993 to 16.0 percent (Clark 2004, 89). As expected, however, the percentage of seats in parliament decreased significantly to 27.5 percent, although this share was still a much greater percentage than the overall Islamist vote share.

Despite this continued overrepresentation of Islamist candidates relative to their vote share, the effect of the law was to increase competition from independent candidates with a strong local popularity (Lust-Okar 2006). In multi-member districts, an individual candidate must only receive a relatively small percentage of the vote to guarantee election. In an extreme case such as Irbid-1, where the district magnitude is nine, a candidate can secure victory with just over 11 percent of the vote.⁸⁰ Given the relatively small populations of each district,⁸¹ this equates to a relatively small number of actual votes necessary to win election, in some cases less than 5,000.

Due to frustrations over the electoral law among other reasons, the IAF joined a coalition of parties boycotting the 1997 election (Wiktorowicz 2002, 237).⁸² Despite no changes to the SNTV system, the IAF decided to participate in the 2003 elections, as did many other parties. Despite lacking representation in parliament from 1997 until 2003,⁸³ the IAF and independent Islamists (some of whom were formerly IAF candidates)⁸⁴ won 21.8 percent (22 of 110) of the seats while the Islamic Center Party also won two additional seats (see Ryan and Schwedler 2004).

Although this change represents a drop in the percentage of seats won by Islamists, between 1993 and 2003 the total number of seats in Jordan's parliament increased from 80 to 110. Thus, traditional Islamists (excluding the Islamic Center Party) won the same number of seats as in 1993. Considering that the regime gerrymandered

⁸⁰ It should be noted that in most multi-member districts district magnitude is much lower.

⁸¹ Irbid had a population (including those not yet of voting age) of approximately 400,000 in 1993.

⁸² It should be noted that a number of IAF figures broke the boycott and ran as independents.

⁸³ Although parliamentary terms are four years, the palace may dissolve parliament and rule for up to two years under the constitution. Thus, Jordan lacked a parliament from 2001-3.

⁸⁴ For example, Abdel Munim Abu Zant in Amman-2.

the new districts to limit Islamist success (see Lust-Okar 2006), maintaining the same number of seats suggests at most a slight decline in support from 1993. This reality is also borne out by fact that public opinion polls conducted at the time of the election suggest that the IAF and independent Islamists won 16.2 percent of the overall vote (CSS 2003), which is similar to their shares in the previous two elections (Clark 2004, 88).

By comparison, the 2007 election represented a major shift in levels of support for the IAF. The IAF won only six out of 110 seats (5.5 percent) and their overall vote share was just over 6.9 percent according to official results (ad-Dastour 2007). Opinion polls taken between 2003 and 2007 also indicate that the overall support for the IAF decreased steadily during this period (CSS 2003-7), suggesting a longer-term decline rather than simply a poor election performance in 2007. Additionally, many of the IAF's candidates were individuals who had run before and won election,⁸⁵ implying other dynamics led to this result.

Overall, the notion that the change in electoral system has undermined support for the IAF does not appear to be consistent with these results. In the 1989, 1993 and 2003 elections under a similar system the IAF had won around 15 percent of the vote. If this law were to be the primary cause of the decline of the IAF, then one would expect to have seen it affect vote share more dramatically beginning in the 1993 elections. This is especially true for 2003 since the IAF boycotted the 1997 election, forcing its supporters to either abstain or to vote for another candidate. If the SNTV system accounted for this decline, the expectation would be for the decline to have occurred in 1993 or 2003 election rather than in 2007.

Direct Repression

The second primary theory that explains the IAF's decline over time is the effects of direct repression and electoral fraud. The IAF has vociferously forwarded this justification to explain its declining support (NY Times 2007; Abu Rumman 2008, 64-5). In interviews with top party officials, this factor and the *sawt wahid* were constantly

⁸⁵ In 2007 the IAF ran a number of candidates who had won election in 1989 or 1993. For example, Abdul Latif al-Arabiyyat, one of the original founders of the party, ran for election despite not standing in the 2003 election (see Jordan Times 2007).

offered as the primary reasons for the party's decline in support (Arabiyyat 2008, Gharaibeh 2008, Kofahi 2008).

A number of analysts and scholars also cite government repression as the primary reasons for the IAF's decline. The government has pursued a number of tactics aimed at undermining the success of the party (Abu Rumman 2008, 66-67). In July 2006 the Islamic Center Charity Society (ICCS) was officially taken over by the government amidst ongoing corruption allegations dating back nearly a decade. Only a month earlier the government arrested four Islamist parliamentarians in the wake of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's death. Similarly, prominent Islamists such as the independent Layth Shubleit have repeatedly claimed that they are subject to extensive government surveillance (Jordan Times 1999).

While it is possible that these elements weakened support for Islamists, there is no clear evidence that these efforts were greatly increased in the period between 2003 and 2007 in a manner that would dramatically decrease support for the IAF. The most damaging event for the movement generally was the government takeover of the ICCS.⁸⁶ Yet, to varying degrees elements associated with this charity such as the Islamic Hospital in Amman, the charity's largest facility, had endured government interference throughout the previous decade.⁸⁷ Additionally, while the loss of this organization in 2006 was a severe blow to the Islamist movement, table 1.1 makes clear that the decline of the IAF began prior to this takeover (see figure 1.1).

An alternative version of this hypothesis posits that there was vote rigging in the 2007 election and there is some evidence suggesting that vote totals were altered by a variety of means (Susser 2008, 5-6). A number of prominent candidates who had won office in the past did not win in this election and received significantly lower vote totals than before (Abu Rumman 2008, 66-7). Notably, Abdul Munim Abu Zant – a Palestinian candidate in Amman-2 and a popular local *imam*⁸⁸ – won the most votes of any candidate in all of Jordan in 2003 yet did not win election in 2007, finishing seventh in his district

⁸⁶ See Clark (2004) for a detailed account of ICCS activities in Jordan.

⁸⁷ For example, the regime co-opted Bassam al-Amoush, a former IAF parliamentarian who left the party over disagreements about its 1997 boycott, and appointed him to serve as the head of a committee investigating corruption at the Islamic hospital in Amman. At the time, it was widely believed that these charges were politically motivated. In fact, al-Amoush later resigned over his refusal to state that there was rampant corruption at the Islamic Hospital.

⁸⁸ An *imam* is a worship leader at a mosque.

(Abu Zant 2008).⁸⁹ Additionally, Ruhayyal Gharaybeh, the Deputy Secretary General of the IAF, did not win election despite the fact that an exit poll conducted by the Jordan Center for Social Research (JCSR), in conjunction with the International Republican Institute (IRI), predicted he would be a “sure winner” (JCSR 2008, 17) of one of four Muslim seats in Amman-3. Officially, Gharaybeh finished fourteenth in the balloting for the district.

Nevertheless, as demonstrated in the case of Gharaybeh’s election, even if polling data are not fully reliable, ordinary citizens appear willing to tell survey researchers outside the polling station that they voted for an Islamist candidate. Although survey data do not exist in sufficient detail to evaluate the quality of the election within each district, it does confirm that even if no government manipulation took place, the IAF was unlikely to fare well in 2007 compared to previous elections; in a post-election survey (CSS 2007) the IAF received only 8.0 percent among voters which is similar to the official share of 6.9 percent for IAF candidates overall (ad-Dastour 2007). Thus, rigging the election would alter official outcomes, but not voters’ intentions, meaning it is not sufficient to explain the decline in support the IAF has experienced, as documented in opinion polls.

Overall, the two primary existing hypotheses for the decline of the IAF appear to have limited success in explaining changes in societal levels of support for the IAF over time. Although both have likely contributed to the IAF’s challenges, the empirical evidence is not consistent with either theory.

Empirical Predictions for Jordan over Time

The previous chapters have demonstrated that regardless of their strategies, Islamist parties operating under conditions of electoral authoritarianism have been unable to successfully mobilize support based on dissatisfaction with the government’s performance on key economic indicators. They have also shown that at the macro-level this limitation on parties has important implications – Islamist parties receive lower levels of support in cases where the supply of credible economic alternatives and the demand

⁸⁹ It should be noted that although he was previously associated with the IAF, he ran as an independent in 2007.

for economic solutions are greater. Although these results only speak to cross-national trends, the theory also predicts that as the nature of the political arena changes under electoral authoritarianism, support for Islamist parties should increase or decrease accordingly.

Jordan represents an important case on which to test this theory. As detailed above, support for the IAF was relatively constant during the period from 1989 until 2003, and then it decreased dramatically from 2003 to 2007. Given the sudden magnitude of this decline, from just below fifteen percent to a five percent, this theory predicts that some significant change must have taken place during this time affecting either the supply or demand for economic solutions.

In fact, a major exogenous shock significantly affected economic conditions in Jordan that did not affect the other cases in this study. As a result of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, economic conditions deteriorated significantly. This chapter proceeds with the hypothesis that the decrease in support for the IAF can be explained as a result of the shift in preferences based on the effects of this external shock to the political arena.

The Political Contexts and the Campaigns

Relative to the 2007 campaign, the nature of the political arena in 2003 was favorable for the IAF. The 2003 election was conducted in the midst of the al-Aqsa *Intifada* (2000-2005) in Israel and the occupied territories, meaning anti-Israeli sentiment running high throughout Jordan and the entire Arab world (see Stewart 2007). Second, it was conducted less than three months after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, which was highly unpopular throughout the Arab world (see Telhami 2003), yet before Jordanians experienced the long-term outcomes from of this event. The IAF made both of these issues central to their campaign strategy, criticizing the regime for its policy of normalization toward Israel and for not taking stronger action to oppose the U.S.-led invasion. In 2003 the saliency of both of these issues was higher than usual and, to the benefit of the IAF, these issues both had a high congruence with the Islamist brand name on positions toward Israel and the West.

By 2007, the relative saliency of both of these issues declined dramatically. Although, the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories continued, the *Intifada*

ended in 2005 and the level of daily violence had decreased substantially. The Iraq war continued, but its saliency had decreased. The U.S. was engaged in a violent insurgency and the country was on the verge of civil war. The invasion had also affected Jordan directly with a leading member of the insurgency, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, bombing three tourist hotels in Amman in November 2005. Unlike 2003, there was no central debate over the merits of the invasion and the shock over the U.S.'s actions had largely subsided. As such, neither issue was of paramount concern to the vast majority of Jordanians.⁹⁰

On the other hand, economic issues became increasingly salient. Most importantly, the emigration of Iraqi refugees to Jordan increased dramatically following the U.S. invasion and an estimated 450,000-500,000 (UNHCR 2011) – around ten percent of Jordan's total population – were living in Jordan by 2007. This refugee influx led to shortages in basic goods and a dramatic increase in inflation (see figure 7.2). Official figures reveal a nearly two-and-a-half times increase in the average rates of inflation between 2000-3 (2.1 percent) and 2004-7 (4.9 percent). However, the trend was sharply upward and by 2008 inflation had reached 14.9 percent according to official statistics (WDI 2011). Particularly hard hit were basic necessities like food, housing prices, and fuel (CSM 2006). Moreover, the cost of new housing increased dramatically, which is not fully reflected in the manner in which inflation is calculated in official statistics (Saif and DeBartolo 2007, 12-3). Evidence shows that the cost of apartments increased by around forty to fifty percent in the first half of 2006 (al-Ghad 2011). Thus, the economic conditions for ordinary Jordanians declined sharply during this period.⁹¹

Combined with already high unemployment levels, particularly youth unemployment (World Bank 2004), economic issues increased in salience between 2003 and 2007. In fact, evidence from the Arab Barometer 2006-7 indicates that two-thirds of Jordanian respondents stated that economic issues such as unemployment and inflation were their greatest concern, the highest percentage of any country surveyed.⁹²

Despite these changes to in the political context, the IAF's campaign strategy was relatively similar to its 2003 strategy and had strong similarities to Hamas's successful

⁹⁰ See Arab Barometer 2006-7, item q248.

⁹¹ For a more detailed examination of the increase in consumer prices see figure 8 of Saif and DeBartolo (2007, 13).

⁹² Ibid.

2006 campaign (Ryan 2008). Throughout both of these campaigns, the IAF emphasized a number of electoral messages. First, they campaigned under their long-standing slogan “Islam is the solution,” highlighting their religious worldview and drawing a clear association with Hamas.⁹³ Second, they heavily emphasized their anti-Israeli positions, stating their support for Palestinians and calling for Jordan to reevaluate its relationship with Israel, which represents an implicit call to end normalization.⁹⁴ Third, the IAF campaigned vigorously on a message promoting political reforms that aimed to create a more representative system that included the concerns of all citizens.⁹⁵ Thus, there is no reason to believe that the IAF’s brand name changed between these election years.

If the theory forwarded in this chapter is correct, then two empirical results are to be expected. First, at the macro-level, there should be an observable change in the political arena that is marked by the increasing salience of economic issues and the decreasing salience for other issues. Second, at the micro-level, a number of relationships are to be expected. First, the IAF should be negatively associated with economic voting, a relationship that would not be expected to change significantly between the two elections. Second, given the lower salience of non-economic issues, such as opposing the peace process, the importance of these issues in explaining vote choice for the IAF should decline. These expectations can be formalized as the following hypotheses:

H7.1: Support for the IAF is likely to be unassociated with economic voting in both 2003 and 2007.

H7.2: The importance of anti-Israeli attitudes in explaining support for the IAF is likely to decrease between 2003 and 2007.

⁹³ The IAF and Hamas were technically two branches of the same party until shortly after the 2007 elections. In practice, leadership was not united, but information sharing was strong between the parties and many IAF candidates highlighted their unity with Hamas during the campaign.

⁹⁴ Officially, the IAF called for the reevaluation of the treaty but in campaign speeches some candidates, especially those in heavily Palestinian areas called for the outright abrogation of the Wadi Araba Treaty.

⁹⁵ This is not meant to imply that other issues were not addressed in either platform (see chapter four). In fact, a host of other topics were addressed, but less prominently than these three. Among them, plans for dealing with environmental degradation, improving agricultural output, addressing concerns in the mining sector, and others. There were also sections mentioning economic issues in both years, but only briefly and without any detailed plans for how to address these problems (also see Abu Rumman 2008, 61-3). As such, it is fair to say that the primary issues in both platforms are religiosity, political reform, and policy toward Israel.

Data and Testing

Macro-Level

The data used to test these hypotheses come from two post-election surveys carried out by the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) at the University of Jordan. The 2003 survey was carried out from June 23-29, following the parliamentary election that took place on June 17. The 2007 survey was carried out November 29-December 4, following the parliamentary election on November 20. The survey questionnaires were highly similar, though the 2007 survey added a few items, including beliefs about the performance of the previous government and more detailed items regarding participation in elections and the electoral process. Overall, the main themes of each survey were attitudes toward democracy, the electoral participation, and media usage.⁹⁶

The sample was collected using a three-stage cluster technique based on the 1994 Jordanian census. In this technique, Jordan is divided into strata representing rural and urban populations in each governate.⁹⁷ In addition to these strata, the five main cities (Amman, Wadi as-Sir, Irbid, az-Zarqa, and al-Rusaifeh) each represented an independent stratum. In addition to this division, the population of Jordan has been divided into blocs or clusters with each bloc containing, on average, eighty families. The national census provides maps detailing the location of each house within each cluster.

For both surveys a sample of clusters was randomly selected using probability sampling proportionate to the size of each cluster. Clusters were organized according to the size of the cluster and the geographic location to guarantee the representation of all strata and all cluster sizes. After selecting the clusters, twelve homes in each cluster were sampled. In 2003 eighty clusters were selected and the total sample included 1,500 adults. In 2007, 100 clusters were selected with each containing twelve houses. The sample size was 1,200. Within each house, one resident over the age of eighteen was randomly selected using a Kish table. All interviews were conducted face-to-face in Arabic and interviewees were assured of complete confidentiality. The response rate in


⁹⁶ Additional details about the 2007 poll can be found at <http://www.jcss.org/SubDefault.aspx?PageId=37&PollId=258&PollType=2> (accessed June 25, 2011) and about the 2003 poll at <http://www.jcss.org/SubDefault.aspx?PageId=37&PollId=42&PollType=2> (accessed June 25, 2011).

⁹⁷ Governate is the literal translation of *muḥāfaẓah*, meaning a first-level administrative division.

2003 was 93.5 percent and in 2007 was 94.4 percent, yielding final samples of 1,403 in 2003 and 1,133 in 2007.

In order to test whether or not there was a significant change within the issue arena, two items are examined. No items asked directly about economic issues, such as unemployment or inflation. However, one item in the survey is consistent with a major element of economic voting in Jordan: voting for a kinsman. As previously noted, tribalism plays a significant role in the Jordanian system and, as discussed in chapter six, individuals voting for a candidate along these lines are primarily hoping to receive a tangible economic benefit in the form of *wasta*. Thus, although this item is not directly related to rent-seeking behavior – the dominant form of economic voting in Jordan (see also Kilani and Sakijha 2002; Lust-Okar 2006) – it functions as a proxy for voting for economic factors. The results for this item are presented in figure 7.2.

Figure 7.2: Tribal Voting in Jordan




As can be seen in figure 7.2, the importance voters placed on having a tribal affiliation with a candidate increased by a little over ten percentage points between the

two surveys. Thus, there is evidence that the importance of economic voting increased between the two elections, which is consistent with hypothesis 7.1.

As a measure of ideological voting, attitudes toward the peace process with Israel are employed. Islamists have a strong brand name on this issue and given the large number of Palestinians living in Jordan, it is likely to be one of the more salient issues in electoral competition. Figure 7.3 presents the change in the percentage of voters who did not take a candidate's position toward Israel into consideration in their vote choice. As can be seen, the salience of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the minds of voters decreased dramatically between the two elections. In 2007, the percentage of voters who did not take this issue into consideration increased by nearly twenty percentage points, compared to four years earlier. Combined with the increase in rent-seeking behavior, this finding suggests that there was an important change in the issue arena between these two elections, most likely as a result of the influx of Iraqi refugees. This altered issue environment was less congruent with the Islamist brand name in 2007 than in 2003, which the model would predict would lead to a decline in support for the IAF during this period.

Figure 7.3: Voting Choice based on a Candidate's Position on Israel in Jordan



Micro-Level

The dependent variable in the analysis that follows is vote choice for an IAF candidate. This item varied slightly in the two surveys. The following item was used to evaluate the dependent variable in 2003:

For which party or candidate did you cast your vote?

- 1) Islamic Action Front
- 2) Islamist candidate not affiliated with the IAF
- 3) Nationalist orientation
- 4) Leftist orientation
- 5) Other (specify candidate)

And the following was used in 2007:

For which of the following orientations did you cast your vote in the parliamentary elections?

- 1) Islamic Action Front
- 2) Islamist candidate not affiliated with the IAF
- 3) Nationalist orientation
- 4) Leftist orientation
- 5) Tribal candidate
- 6) Independent loyalist
- 7) Independent opposition
- 8) Other

Although these response options differed somewhat, for the purposes of this paper there is no reason to believe that these differences significantly affected the results, particularly given the coding. In the analysis that follows, respondents who backed the IAF or independent Islamists were coded as 1 while all others were coded as 0.⁹⁸ Table 7.1 presents the distribution of each of these items for both years for self-reported voters.

⁹⁸ It should be noted that non-voters are excluded. This is done by necessity based on the nature of the independent variables employed. The nature of these variables is detailed below.

Table 7.1: Vote Choice in Jordan

	2003	2007
Islamist Candidate	155	43
Non-Islamist Candidate	802	494

Source: CSS 2003, 2007.

The dependent variable was only asked among respondents who reported that they had voted in the prior election. The percentage of voting respondents who indicated that they supported the IAF in 2003 was 16.2 percent, compared to 8.0 percent in 2007. Of the entire population for each, 11.0 percent reported voting for the IAF in 2003 and 3.8 percent in 2007.

As noted above, no item on economic issues appeared on either survey. As a result, a proxy is used, as detailed above, which asks respondents if they considered the tribal affiliation of the candidate for whom they voted. The item employed is as follows:

Did any of the following reasons affect your decision to vote for the candidate in the last parliamentary elections?

Because s/he is a member of my tribe/family (Yes, no, not sure)

The second hypothesis posits that due to the lower salience of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in 2007 compared to 2003, the IAF is less likely to be able to activate support on this basis in 2007. The item, which was identical in both surveys, used to operationalize this variable is as follows:

Did any of the following reasons affect your decision to vote for the candidate in the last parliamentary elections?

Because s/he opposes the peace process with Israel (Yes, no, not sure)

Standard demographic items were included as controls. These included age, education, sex, and income.

As a result of this operationalization, there are two important items of note. First, the items querying which factors affected how an individual voted are asked in reference to voting for a specific candidate. Therefore, these items were asked only of voters, meaning that non-voters are excluded from the analysis. Although it would be preferable

to compare characteristics of those who voted for the IAF to both other voters, as well as to non-voters, only the former is possible. Second, the two surveys did not include any items regarding support for political Islam broadly, meaning that the sample cannot be limited only to those individuals who are passive supporters of political Islam. Thus, the population that the model is tested on is all respondents who reported voting in each election.

In statistical terms, this difference is likely to weaken any effects seen in the data. Islamist parties are primarily seeking to activate citizens who passively support their basic assertion that there should be a greater role for religion in public life. The party's challenge is to turn these passive supporters into active supporters. Since this group can choose to vote for the party or abstain, the dynamics of changing support for the IAF between the two elections are likely to be found amongst this group of individuals. As shown in chapter five, the predicted effects of policy variables are greater when the sample is limited to passive supporters of political Islam. Not being able to limit this model to individuals who have a greater predisposition to support an Islamist party means it is necessary to implicitly assume that each respondent has an equally likely chance of supporting the IAF. Since it is known that the population is heterogeneous in respect to this key variable underpinning Islamist support, there is additional noise in the estimation process. The interpretation of the results should take this consideration into account, especially given the differences seen between these two iterations in chapter five.

Results

The results of the full model are presented in table 7.2 for both 2003 and 2007. With regard to the first hypothesis, it is clear that IAF candidates are significantly less likely to be supported by individuals who take tribal relations into consideration. The relationship is negative and significant in both years. The predicted effect is also of the greatest magnitude of any of the variables in both years. Thus, despite a decrease in magnitude, it is clear that in both years individuals who are concerned about receiving patronage are unlikely to support the IAF.

The results in table 7.2 offer strong support for the hypothesis that the IAF was less able to activate support based on anti-Israeli sentiment in 2007 compared to 2003.

Although the item was positive and significant in both years, the size of the predicted effects varied significantly. In 2003, respondents who took a candidate's anti-Israeli position into consideration were over four times more likely to support the IAF in the 2003 election compared to the 2007 election. In 2003, the change in likelihood was nearly the same magnitude as for considering tribe, but in 2007 this was significantly smaller. Thus, the IAF's strong anti-Israel brand name failed to activate support to the same degree in 2007 as in 2003.

This finding offers strong support for H7.2. Moreover, it is highly consistent with the expectations based on the generalized model. In this instance, as the importance of economic issues in Jordan's political arena increased, the saliency of the Israeli issue declined. Thus, although a relatively high percentage of respondents still considered the Israeli issue in their vote choice, the likelihood that it resulted in a vote for the IAF declined. Most likely, this was due to the fact that many of these individuals were more concerned about inflation or unemployment, issues which are incongruent with the IAF brand name.

Disaggregated Results

The previous table presented the results for all Jordanians, but some have argued that the vote calculus for Jordanians of East Bank origin is different than for Jordanians of West Bank (Palestinian) origin (see Lust-Okar 2006). To control for this possibility, the sample is disaggregated by origin to compare the results for East Bankers and for those of Palestinian origin separately. The results of the logistic regression estimation and predicted effects for Palestinians are presented in table 7.3 and for East Bankers in 7.4.

In the case of the Palestinians, consideration of tribal affiliation is negative but insignificant in 2003 and negative and significant at the 0.1-level in 2007. This difference is reflected in a change in predicted effects, with a change in likelihood for a respondent considering tribal affiliation of -13.0 percent in 2003 compared to -21.0 percent in 2007. This change in predicted effect implies that Palestinians who were directly seeking patronage were less likely to vote for the IAF in 2007, which is the expected outcome given the change increasing economic challenges between the two

surveys. Although not direct proof due to the use of a proxy variable, this evidence is consistent with the claim that Palestinians who were more concerned about economic outcomes were less likely to support the IAF in 2007 than in 2003.

In the case of anti-Israeli sentiment, the effects were more pronounced. As demonstrated in table 7.3, this relationship was positive, and significantly correlated with voting for the IAF in both years, although the correlation was much stronger in 2003. This difference is also borne out by examining the predicted effects. In 2003 a Palestinian voter who considered the candidate's stance toward Israel was 27.3 percent more likely to support the IAF than a voter who did not. By comparison, the size of this effect decreased dramatically in 2007 when a Palestinian voter who considered the candidate's stance toward Israel being only 14.4 percent more likely to vote for the IAF than one who did not. Although the IAF continued to vehemently oppose the Jordanian peace treaty with Israel, its ability to activate support on this issue from Palestinian voters was much lower in 2007 compared to 2003, likely due to the lower salience of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict between the two surveys. As such, even those of Palestinian origin were less likely to support the IAF on the basis of one of its major policy positions.

None of the demographic variables are significant, although education has a relatively large predicted effect (15.0 percent) in 2003. By 2007 there is virtually no predicted effect for education, or for any of the other variables. It is unclear why such a dramatic change in the likelihood took place for education between the two surveys.

The relationships are somewhat different among respondents with East Bank origins. In the case of tribal voting, the coefficient is negative and significant in both years. The size of the predicted effects, however, are less than among Palestinians. For East Bankers, the change in predicted effect is only -11.1 percent in 2003 and -7.2 percent in 2007. This could be due to a combination of two considerations. First, tribal identity tends to be stronger among Jordanians and is thus more reflected in their vote choice (see Robbins 2009b, 16). Second, it has been noted that in East Bank areas, the IAF generally runs candidates from prominent tribes, even though they tend not to emphasize their tribal identity (Abu Rumman 2008, 59). As such, it is possible that many voters who do support the IAF are also voting for members of their tribe. Thus, although not supporting the official tribal candidate, a respondent could still take the IAF

candidate's tribal identity into consideration. Nevertheless, this does not detract from the finding that there is a relatively small change in the size of the predicted effect between 2003 and 2007 which supports H7.1.

In the case of considering a candidate's position on Israel, the coefficient estimate is significant in 2003 but not in 2007. This suggests that, as in the case of Palestinians, East Bankers were less likely to support the IAF on this basis in 2007 than 2003. This is also borne out by comparing the predicted effects; in 2003 an East Banker who considered a candidate's position on Israel was 10.4 percent more likely to support an IAF candidate whereas in 2007 the change in predicted likelihood was only 2.4 percent, which is virtually indistinguishable from zero. As such, it is clear that amongst this population as well the IAF did not benefit from its strong anti-Israel brand name.

Conclusion

Taken together, these findings are consistent with the predictions of the general model forwarded by this dissertation, providing evidence that not only does the model account for differences across space, but also differences across time within a single case. This chapter has presented evidence at both the macro- and micro-level, demonstrating that the congruence of the issue arena in 2003 was more favorable than in 2007 for the IAF. As the salience of economic issues increased in importance as a result of the influx of Iraqi refugees, conditions became less favorable for the IAF as its brand name was less congruent with the issue arena given the predominance of economic concerns.

At the same time, the salience of anti-Israel sentiment decreased with the end of the al-Aqsa *Intifada*. This not only resulted in a steep decline in the percentage of voters who considered a candidate's position on the conflict, but also meant that even among those who did consider it, it was not a compelling enough concern to translate into support for the IAF as it was in 2003. Although not directly tested in this chapter, it would follow that anger over the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, an issue that was congruent with the Islamist brand name in 2003, was no longer highly salient in 2007. Thus, there was a significantly lower congruence between the Islamist brand name and the issue arena in 2007 relative to 2003, resulting in a lower level of expected support for the IAF.

Not only does is this model consistent with the changes in support for Jordan between these two elections, it can better account for the timing of this decline in support than other existing theories. In terms of the most prominent such theory – that changes in the electoral rules made in 1993 account for the decline – there is no reason that changes in the electoral law should be felt so dramatically between 2003 and 2007 but not in previous elections. Similarly, the Jordanian regime did not dramatically increase pressure on the IAF or its supporters during these years and, even if this did have some effect, repression itself cannot account for the differences in predicted probabilities exhibited in these models. If anything, increased repression would mean that IAF support should be reduced to the hardcore base that would be more likely to support the party based on its hardline policy toward Israel, not less. This result is contrary to the repression theory.

Additionally, this theory offers clarity on the fact that the IAF did not more aggressively attempt to appeal on economic issues but instead attempted to increase the salience of issues such as Israel and the U.S. presence in Iraq. Interviews with representatives confirmed that the IAF was aware of polling data on economic issues (Gharaibeh 2008, Kofahi 2008) and that they were aware that economic concerns predominated among Jordanians during the 2007 election. For example, Ruhayyel Gharaibeh, the IAF Secretary General in 2007, accepted that economic issues were of great importance but simply stated that the IAF included these in their platform. When pressed about why it was not the focus of the platform or of campaign speeches, he simply repeated that it was included in the platform and they had a position on it.

The theory proposed in chapter two offers insight into this decision. It is highly unlikely that IAF elites miscalculated their approach by not recognizing the importance of economic issues in this campaign. Rather, it is more likely that the IAF leadership was cognizant that it was unlikely to be able to alter this brand name to mobilize support based on economic grievances. Thus, despite the small likelihood of seeing significant returns through rebranding, the party focused on other issues that were more easily incorporated into the Islamist frame, seeking to increase their salience in the course of campaigning.

Although specific to Jordan, the findings of this chapter apply more generally. As the issue arena changes under electoral authoritarianism, it appears that levels of support for Islamist parties are likely to be affected. Given government restrictions on mobilization and outreach, levels of support for Islamist parties depend largely on the success of their brand name relative to the most salient issues in the political arena. In the case of Jordan, the exogenous shock to the economy that resulted from the U.S.-led invasion significantly altered the political conditions, resulting in a decline in support for the IAF, which is what would be predicted based on the theory forwarded in chapter two.

Appendix 7

Table 7.2: Determinants of Vote Choice in Jordan

Logistic Regression for DV voted for IAF candidate by year for all Jordanians		
<i>Variable</i>	<i>2003</i>	<i>2007</i>
Voted for tribe	-1.7038 (0.2653)*** <i>-0.2032</i>	-2.323 (0.5276)*** <i>-0.1246</i>
Voted for anti-Israel candidate	1.1512 (0.2559)*** <i>0.1995</i>	1.0642 (0.4098)*** <i>0.0482</i>
More educated	0.5638 (0.5246) <i>0.0744</i>	-0.3390 (0.8408) <i>-0.0154</i>
Older	0.0577 (0.0436) <i>0.0076</i>	-0.0145 (0.0136) <i>-0.0007</i>
Female	0.3583 (0.2011)* <i>0.0473</i>	0.0641 (0.3190) <i>0.0029</i>
Income	-0.0004 (0.0008) <i>-0.0001</i>	-0.0002 (0.0005) <i>-0.0000</i>
Constant	-2.6031 (0.6382)***	-1.4169 (0.7366)*

Note: Table presents coefficient (β) estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Predicted effects are presented in italics with a calculated change in likelihood from the minimum to the maximum value of each independent variable holding all others constant at their means.

*Statistically significant at .1 level. **Statistically significant at .05 level.

*** Statistically significant at .01 level.

Table 7.3: Determinants of Vote Choice in Jordan among Palestinians

Logistic Regression for DV voted for IAF candidate by year for Jordanians of Palestinian Origin

<i>Variable</i>	<i>2003</i>	<i>2007</i>
Voted for tribe	-0.8207 (0.5084) <i>-0.1302</i>	-2.2073 (1.1582)* <i>-0.2096</i>
Voted for anti-Israel	1.4548 (0.4222)*** <i>0.2727</i>	1.0541 (0.6226)* <i>0.1436</i>
More educated	0.8007 (0.7483) <i>0.1501</i>	-0.1561 (1.3548) <i>-0.0213</i>
Older	0.0520 (0.0593) <i>0.0096</i>	-0.0003 (0.0185) <i>-0.0000</i>
Female	0.3168 (0.2412) <i>0.0098</i>	0.4034 (0.5412) <i>0.0559</i>
Income	-0.0006 (0.0011) <i>-0.0001</i>	-0.0000 (0.0008) <i>-0.0000</i>
Constant	-2.6229 (0.8179)***	-1.6073 (1.1890)

Note: Table presents coefficient (β) estimates with standard errors in parentheses.

Predicted effects are presented in italics with a calculated change in likelihood from the minimum to the maximum value of each independent variable holding all others constant at their means.

*Statistically significant at .1 level. **Statistically significant at .05 level.

*** Statistically significant at .01 level.

Table 7.4: Determinants of Vote Choice in Jordan among East Bankers

Logistic Regression for DV voted for IAF candidate by year for East Bankers		
<i>Variable</i>	<i>2003</i>	<i>2007</i>
Voted for tribe	-1.5515 (0.3456)*** <i>-0.1109</i>	-2.0046 (0.5551)*** <i>-0.0724</i>
Voted for anti-Israel	1.5322 (0.3067)*** <i>0.1036</i>	0.8848 (0.5732) <i>0.0240</i>
More educated	0.8079 (0.7438) <i>0.0546</i>	-0.3660 (1.3292) <i>-0.0099</i>
Older	0.0576 (0.0587) <i>0.0039</i>	-0.0391 (0.0179)** <i>-0.0012</i>
Female	-0.0761 (0.2630) <i>-0.0051</i>	-0.2357 (0.4632) <i>-0.0064</i>
Income	0.0002 (0.0009) <i>0.0000</i>	-0.0011 (0.0013) <i>-0.0000</i>
Constant	-2.8234 (0.8123)***	-0.4898 (1.0463)

Note: Table presents coefficient (β) estimates with standard errors in parentheses.

Predicted effects are presented in italics with a calculated change in likelihood from the minimum to the maximum value of each independent variable holding all others constant at their means.

*Statistically significant at .1 level.

**Statistically significant at .05 level

Chapter 8

Conclusions

The preceding chapters began by demonstrating that support for political Islam as a concept – or passive support – tends to be relatively similar across these five cases both in the determinants of support and the levels of support. Even though there are some differences in the relative importance of determinants across the cases, none of these variations alone are sufficient to explain why comparable determinants of support for political Islam result in differences in support for Islamist parties. Second, these differences do not appear correlated with overall levels of support for Islamist parties. Support for Hamas, the Islamist party in Palestine, was shown to be by far the highest of any case, yet passive support for political Islam was the lowest in Palestine of the five cases. Thus, chapter three makes clear that differences in the societal support for political Islam cannot alone account for differences in support for Islamist parties.

Chapter four follows by testing the basic hypothesis that support for Islamist parties can be accounted for by differences in party strategy. As the examination of the platforms makes clear, Islamist parties generally forward relatively similar platforms, particularly with regard to their emphasis on religious and social issues. In early platforms, parties largely embraced the brand name associated with the Islamist movement which centered heavily on symbolic issues such as the implementation of the *shari'a*, a rejection of Western culture and practices, and opposition to Israel. Each of the parties promised that if the principles of Islam were implemented, then social, political, and economic outcomes would be improved.

Nevertheless, despite these broad promises, examination of the nature of the broader movement and the original party platforms reveals an underlying challenge for the Islamist brand name: there is no clear economic vision. Dating back to Sayyid Qutb, individuals involved with the Islamist movement has sought to develop a clear, coherent Islamist economic vision. Given that modern economic challenges are not readily cast

within a clear religious framework, this effort has been piecemeal with religious scholars and theorists developing a theory of a moral economy that depends on an individual transformation from being self-interested to seeking the best outcome for society. In this framework, the challenges of the modern economy are resolved through a grassroots effort to increase religious adherence and practice. Although this vision can function for a movement, it does not serve a party well as it does not offer any direct solutions to immediate economic challenges.

In the time since their founding, Islamist parties have sought to deal with this fundamental challenge in a variety of ways. Most notably, some have sought to change the brand name of their party to one that has a greater economic association. This has been the strategy of al-Islah in Yemen, the PJD in Morocco, and the MSP in Algeria. Over time, each of these parties has increased the focus of their outreach efforts to include significant attention to economic issues in addition to more the traditional social issues associated with Islamist parties. However, lacking a clear religious frame for economic issues, these parties have been largely reactive, most commonly limiting their economic platforms to criticizing government performance on these issues. On the other extreme, Hamas in Palestine has never focused its outreach on economic issues and only included a cursory mention of these issues in its election manifesto in 2006 when it won the largest share of the vote in parliamentary elections. In Jordan, the IAF has pursued a strategy that has decreased the attention given to economic issues over time, seeking instead to highlight issues that were closely related to the party brand name including anti-Israel, anti-U.S., and anti-corruption policies.

Despite these differences in party strategy, demonstrated in chapter four, statistical analysis reveals that there is no significant association between support for Islamist parties and their stance on economic issues among the three countries that have increased their focus on economic issues. Moreover, in multiple iterations of the model for all three cases, support for Islamist parties is correlated with support on economic issues in a direction that is *opposite* of the party's stated position; in Yemen and Morocco, support for Islamist parties is higher among respondents who believe the government is doing well on economic issues and in Algeria support for the MSP is higher among respondents who believe the government is doing poorly on economic

issues.⁹⁹ Although these relationships are not significant at standard levels, the sign on the coefficient estimates strongly implies that despite their increased criticism of government economic policies, these Islamist parties have not capitalized on societal discontent with government economic policies.¹⁰⁰

This failure of parties is all the more striking given the prolonged economic crisis that has confronted the region since the late 1980s. Retrospective voting models, for example, would suggest that given the failure by the government to address pocketbook issues would lead to support for the dominant alternative party, meaning the Islamist party in these cases. Nevertheless, this does not appear to be the case in these countries. This finding is even more remarkable given that parties of the Arab Left, which were largely discredited as a result of the 1967 Six Day War, have a significant and substantive relationship with economic discontent in these same societies. Thus, parties of the Arab Left, which have a clear economic brand name, do not exhibit the same correlation as Islamist parties. There are two key implications of this finding. First, opposition parties in these societies can win support on this basis and second, it is clear that Islamist parties do not; dissatisfaction with the economic performance of the government is not a significant factor leading an individual to support an Islamist party.

There are two cases where economic discontent is significantly related to support for Islamist parties. First, the relationship is highly significant in Palestine. This finding, however, is most likely explained by the fact that the survey was taken after the election which was a deeply polarized period in Palestinian politics. Rather than responding to the economic performance of the government, which was led by Hamas at the time of the survey, respondents appear to be responding to the mention in the item about the government. Second, given that economic conditions had not changed substantially after three months of Hamas's rule and, if anything, had worsened, there is strong evidence for honeymoon effect for the Hamas government among supporters. Third, analysis of the election (Lahloh 2007) and interviews with party leaders both confirm that the election did not turn on Hamas's economic policy.

⁹⁹ At the time of the survey in Algeria, the MSP was part of the governing coalition.

¹⁰⁰ Or in the case of the MSP, capitalized on any achievements by the regime in the economic sphere.

In Jordan, despite a decreased emphasis on economic issues over the years, there is a small but statistically significant relationship between attitudes toward the government's performance on economic issues and support for the IAF. Given that the IAF has decreased, although not eliminated, its emphasis on economic issues over time, this result is surprising. Yet, further examination of this finding reveals that there is an interactive effect between knowledge that parties have differences in their platforms and attitudes about economic issues; respondents who believe that there are differences in platforms between competing candidates and who believe the government has handled the economy poorly are more likely to support the IAF, while those who do not believe there are differences in platforms are no more likely than other citizens to support the IAF. In Jordan, a similar outcome is exhibited for the relationship between government performance on job creation and the use of *wasta* by a respondent.

Taken together, these findings suggest that respondents who are familiar with the IAF platform and who have close connections to the party are more likely to support the party on an economic basis while other respondents are not. This offers evidence in support of the mechanism offered in chapter two to explain this relationship – low information environments – is in fact at work; individuals who have information about the party by knowledge of differences in their platform or through their network likely update their preferences to reflect the full party platform. The IAF does have a position on economic issues and this is reflected in the attitudes of its close supporters, but not in those with less knowledge of the party itself.

Cross-nationally, chapter six demonstrates that this lack of association between Islamist parties and economic issues has important implications for their overall levels of support. In cases where economic issues are highly salient, it is expected that Islamist parties will not have a high appeal to ordinary citizens since the parties' brand name is less congruent with the concerns of many ordinary citizens. This challenge for the party is exacerbated under conditions where alternative political actors offer credible economic solutions that can address citizens' concerns. Under such conditions, it is expected that party support is likely to be low. By contrast, if economic issues are not highly salient and if there is a low provision of credible economic alternatives, the Islamist brand name is less of a disadvantage. Under such circumstances, the congruence between the Islamist

brand name and the issue arena is likely to be higher, resulting in a greater probability of high levels of party support. Meanwhile, in the intermediate range for both variables, support for the party is expected to be more moderate.

Empirically, the measured levels of support for Islamist parties closely match the predictions based on the model. Support for Hamas in Palestine is predicted to be by far the highest while support for the IAF in Jordan is predicted to be by far the lowest. Support for the remaining three cases is predicted to be moderate and relatively similar, which is in fact the result. The only partial exception is Algeria. Given that this is the only case with multiple Islamist parties competing in elections, this division could partially explain this difference.

Although chapter six demonstrates that the model holds up cross-nationally, it does not demonstrate that it holds up over time. Empirically, there are two cases that exhibit clear changes in levels of support over the time period for which data are available. First, support for Hamas increased dramatically from 2000 to 2006 (see figure 1.1). Yet, over this same period it is unlikely that concerns about economic issues changed dramatically. What did change was the attitude of Palestinians toward the Peace Process with Israel during this time (PCPSR 1995-2006). With the failure of the Oslo Accords and the al-Aqsa *Intifada*, Palestinian opinion became more congruent with Hamas's rejectionist stance toward Israel relative to Fatah's more peaceful stance. This case offers a test an assumption in the general model, which is that the Islamist brand name is highly congruent with the issue arena on all issues except the economy. In the Palestinian case, attitudes toward the peace process have varied over time and when they became more similar to Hamas's position, support for Hamas tended to increase.¹⁰¹ The model, however, correctly predicts that the possibility of Islamist success is greater in Palestine given that the economy is a much less salient issue than in the other cases.

Second, there is a change in support in Jordan between the early and mid-2000s. In this case, the model would predict a change in the salience of economic issues between the two elections resulting in a decline in support for Islamist parties. As chapter seven

¹⁰¹ Operationalizing attitudes toward the peace process itself is difficult based on survey data. PCPSR has the most consistent polls of Palestinian public opinion, but their questions related to the peace process change over time to reflect the most recent events in negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. Thus, there is not a comparable item over time that can be used to measure changes over time. However, it is clear from the polls that support for negotiations and faith in the process decreases over time.

details, Jordan experienced an exogenous economic shock that did not affect any of the other four cases: the fallout from the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. The resulting inflow of refugees peaked during the period of greatest violence from 2007-8 in Iraq. This population influx led to a sharp rise in inflation and levels of unemployment increased in the years following the invasion. Deteriorating economic conditions resulted in an increasing salience of economic issues among Jordanians, particularly in light of the decreasing salience of foreign relations with the end of the al-Aqsa *Intifada* in 2003. Combined, the model predicts that these factors would lead to lower levels of predicted support for Islamist parties by the mid-2000s relative to the early 2000s and earlier. As chapter seven demonstrates, the predictions of the model closely matches changes in support for the IAF during this period, more accurately accounting for the timing of this drop than existing accounts.

Generalizability

The cases examined in this dissertation are limited to the Arab world, yet they also exhibit a high degree of diversity. The sample includes monarchies and republics, countries with different forms of colonial heritage as well as limited or no colonial heritage, and middle-income countries as well as poor countries. There is also a significant diversity of culture between the Maghreb cases, those of the Mashreq, and on the Arabian Peninsula. What these countries do share is the presence of the Islamist movement which tends to be relatively similar in its ideology and position in the socio-political system. Thus, the key similarities among these countries are the nature of the Islamist party and movement, as well as societal levels of support for political Islam in general.

Given the robust nature of this model across a variety of cases, there are reasons to believe that it can extend beyond Arab countries to other electoral authoritarian countries. Certainly, this is true for the general finding that the nature of opposition parties is an important factor in their underlying success under conditions of authoritarianism. Citizens may not prefer the opposition, but will make a rational calculation between the regime and what is known about the dominant opposition party. Often, this is likely to be little more than its brand name, meaning that the party brand

name is of very significant importance in deciding to support the party. Although regimes bias the system against opposition parties under electoral authoritarianism, the party's brand name may serve as another limiting factor for the opposition.

An extension of these findings also is in line with a number of existing studies, but can increase their scope of cases. Within the study of electoral authoritarianism, opposition party support is often linked to regime stability or duration. To a large extent, these are two sides of the same coin; if opposition parties have high levels of support that approach fifty percent, then the regime is highly unstable regime change is more likely. If support remains low or within a moderate range, then regimes are likely to be stable, at least vis-à-vis the formal political system.

As noted in chapter two, a number of recent studies have sought to better understand the fall of electoral authoritarianism and the manner in which opposition parties finally succeed. Magaloni, for example, argues that electoral authoritarian regimes are fundamentally weakened during economic crisis but can remain in power during limited economic downturns if they have the necessary coercive or repressive capacity. Although this model explains a number of cases throughout the world, it has limited explanatory power in the Arab world. In fact, Magaloni implicitly excludes this region, despite its large number of electoral authoritarian regimes, from her case selection entirely (2006, 21). Given the poor economic conditions which have pervaded much of the region for two decades, her initial model appears to have limited explanatory power for these cases.

Greene (2007) also develops a theory based on economic breakdown, but he finds that as economic crisis continues, the mechanisms used to maintain control over access to power – particularly the use of patronage – declines over time. He argues that as these mechanisms are weakened, the bias built into the system is reduced and the political system will come to resemble a democratic system. Assuming that citizens possess a high degree of knowledge about the parties, he models the fall of electoral authoritarianism using spatial models. Thus, based on an extension of the median voter theorem, when the opposition party captures the political center, that party is likely to win the election leading to the regime's downfall. Thus, economic crisis eliminates the regime's advantage resulting in a system that comes to resemble a democracy. Yet, like

Magaloni, Greene excludes Arab countries from his sample of cases. Moreover, this model also has limited explanatory power under such conditions given that the prolonged economic crises have not led to opposition victory in elections in most cases.

Despite important differences between these two models, both attempt underscore the fact that economic crisis is expected to lead to regime breakdown and ultimately opposition party success. Both seek to identify different mechanisms that allow for the regime to continue to survive after economic crisis, but which ultimately lead to the breakdown of authoritarian rule and opposition party success. Given this framework, neither can explain the outcomes in most Arab countries outside the monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

The argument proposed in this dissertation is not in opposition to either of these accounts; rather it identifies another factor that can help account for the longevity of electoral authoritarian regimes. Namely, not all opposition parties are the same. Ordinary citizens may have a preference for democracy under authoritarianism (Jamal and Tessler 2008), but survey evidence indicates that generally they are more concerned about immediate problems such as economic outcomes relative to than political liberties. They do not simply support an opposition party because it might lead to the downfall of the regime; rather, they support an opposition party that they believe might be able to solve their most pressing problems. Thus, regime change is more likely to occur when the opposition political party has a brand name that is associated with the most pressing problems in the lives of ordinary citizens.

This finding highlights another caution for the study of electoral authoritarian regimes which is that some models assume high levels of information about parties and political competition. Greene assumes that information is high enough that ordinary citizens are capable of placing parties on the political spectrum on a set of political issues. Magaloni in fact demonstrates that by the late 1990s voters in Mexico were able to identify right and left of center parties accurately. In less established party systems or in those where the regime does not actively promote an ideology, information about opposition parties is likely to be significantly lower. For example, despite the IAF having been the dominant opposition party in Jordan for fifteen years, according to a poll contracted by the International Republican institute (IRI) in 2006, fewer than two-thirds

of citizens stated that they had even heard of the IAF and barely a third of citizens reported knowing of the next largest opposition party (JCSR 2006). Thus, there is incomplete information about opposition parties in many authoritarian systems.

Limiting information about opposition parties is thus an effective way to prevent them from altering their brand name as a means to limit their popularity. The party has limited possibilities for rebranding, curtailing its ability to control its image; only if political conditions arise that are favorable to the party does it have a chance of appealing widely to ordinary citizens. In Mexico, the PRI and PAN had a long-established competition, but in other cases regimes seek to limit any information about the party rather than seeking to undermine it directly. If a party has a brand name that is poorly suited to the relevant issues in the political arena, this strategy may be optimal for limiting opposition party success as it provides citizens with little to cue off beyond the party's brand name.

Although these two factors, the brand name and the information level of society, may not be important in the Mexican case, their relevance in a number of cases in this examination of the Arab world suggests that they are likely important in a number of other cases. Including these two variables to the models proposed by Magaloni and Greene could increase not only the number of cases that can be explained, but also increase the accuracy of these and similar models more generally. In sum, although the evidence that is presented is limited to the Arab world, there are many reasons to believe that the findings are generalizable to a much larger set of cases.

Additional Implications

Beyond contributing to the literature more broadly, this theory has a number of implications for the Arab world. First, it goes toward resolving a long-standing paradox in the region: Islamists generally do well in university and professional association elections, often winning outright majorities, but not in elections at the national level. It is often assumed that that this difference is accounted for by one of two factors (see Jamal 2012; Schwedler 2007). The first is preference falsification, with individuals choosing to misrepresent their true preferences at the national level or by not participating at all fearing government retribution. The logic behind preference falsification is that at the

national level authoritarian regimes seek to control outcomes and punish defectors whereas they do not for associational elections which are less visible and are not for positions of significant power. Cognizant of this difference, citizens represent their true preferences in associational elections but not at the national level. The second explanation is that the regime biases outcomes at the national level using vote fraud and ballot stuffing while they do not intervene directly into associational elections for the same reasons cited above regarding the relative insignificance of these elections. Thus, it is argued, associational elections can provide a clearer picture into the true preferences of citizens and their support for Islamist parties.

A deeper examination of both these arguments reveals a number of contradictions. First, there is little reason to believe that regimes are unconcerned about elections at all levels. In the 2008 student body elections at the University of Jordan, for example, Islamists were permitted to participate but under heavy restrictions by the regime. The regime sought to carefully manage the outcome to prevent an overall Islamist victory. Elections of this nature are highly symbolic and the regimes do not ignore these outcomes.

Second, if individuals fear retribution for telegraphing their true preferences, associational elections present greater risks in voicing a true preference relative to a national election. Professional associations lack anonymity and have known memberships; if Islamist candidates win it is relatively costless to the state to repress the associates of the elected candidate. Similarly, given minimal security procedures, it is equally possible for the regime to learn of the vote choices of members.

By comparison, in national elections support for Islamist candidates is more anonymous. A much larger number of individuals cast votes and it is possible to cast a ballot for an Islamist candidate with more, if not greater security, than at the associational level. Moreover, many thousands of individuals routinely vote for an Islamist party or candidate in national elections without suffering direct retribution. Visibly associating with an Islamist candidate may lead to retribution, but this is also true in associational elections. Thus, there is no reason to believe that citizens vote their conscience in associational elections but check their conscience at the door of the polling station for national elections and falsify their preferences. If anything, due to their small size,

associational elections present a greater risk of being identified as a supporter of an Islamist candidate than national elections.

In contrast, this theory provides a simple solution to this paradox: the salient issues in associational elections differ greatly from those in national elections. The most salient issues in national elections are most often economic whereas this is not the case in associational elections. Symbolic issues or corruption are more likely to dominate the campaign during university or associational elections. Given the key weakness of the Islamist brand on economic issues, the implication of this model is that they are likely to fare much better in elections that do not hinge on these issues. Thus, the expectation of this model is that Islamist success in these types of political competitions would tend to be greater than at the national level.

In sum, rather than relying on preference falsification in one type of elections but not others or on massive and politically unnecessary vote fraud, this explanation relies on the fact that citizens are concerned about different issues in different types of elections. Thus, citizens maximize their utility in both situations, a far simpler explanation for this variation than other existing accounts.

After the Arab Spring: Islamist Electoral Success

Since the onset of the Arab Spring, Islamist parties have won a number of strong showings at the ballot box with Ennahda in Tunisia receiving by far the most votes of any party in elections for the constituent assembly and Islamist candidates from the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Freedom and Justice Party and the Salafist al-Nour party winning nearly two-thirds of all votes in parliamentary elections. Islamist candidates have also had strong showings in elections across a number of other countries as well. Given these successes, many have argued that support for political Islam and Islamist parties must be high across the entire region (Fitzsimons 2012; Quandt 2012) which stands in contrast to many of the findings from the previous chapters.

As noted in chapter one, this study focuses on the period between the legalization of Islamist parties and the Arab Spring. During this period, authoritarianism dominated the Arab world offering few alternative visions for modes of governance. After an initial period of recalibration in the late 1980s and early 1990s, regimes throughout the region

achieved a period of relative stability (see Yom 2009). These systems were largely unchallenged, outside of Palestine, prior to the Arab Spring and the nature of political systems were known and understood by ordinary citizens who made their political calculations using this information.

The Arab Spring was a watershed event for the region. For the first time in over forty years, a regime was toppled by internal political actors with the fall of Ben Ali in Tunisia. With the subsequent fall of Mubarak in Egypt, these events altered the political calculus: real change was possible and Tunisians and Egyptians provided a roadmap. The demonstration effect of these two revolutions affected how uprisings played out in other countries (Patel and Bunce 2012). The importance of social media prior to and during the revolutions increased the availability of information about politics and political developments throughout the region. Authoritarian learning also took place with regimes gleaning information from the fall of regimes in other countries. Regimes in a number of countries undertook a set of reforms including constitutional reforms or holding elections under new electoral rules.

For these reasons and others, it is not expected that the full findings from this dissertation would necessarily hold. The higher level of information available to citizens weakens one of the critical mechanisms in the model. Second, changing electoral rules or completely new electoral systems, as were in place in Egypt and Tunisia, are likely to affect political calculations of citizens; in both of these cases, the long-standing party of the regime was banned from running and, given the unknowns about the newly-developed political system, it was challenging to evaluate the ability of candidates to deliver on promises of patronage based on tribal or family networks. Moreover, the credibility of such candidates was also undermined by the requirement that candidates be associated with a party in many of these cases. Thus, there are differences in the post-Arab Spring environment that do not align well with key elements of the model.

Despite these critical differences, initial findings from survey research suggest that the model may be more robust than might be expected. First, survey evidence suggests that Islamist parties may not be as popular across all of society as election results indicate. In the case of Tunisia, the second wave of the Arab Barometer was taken in October 2011, shortly before the constituent elections. In this survey, using the exact

same item that served as the dependent variable in chapter five, only 11.9 percent of Tunisians stated that Ennahda, the main Islamist party, was the party that best represented their aspirations for political, social and economic development. This level of support is highly similar to those of other cases such as Yemen and Morocco and relatively similar to Algeria as well.

In contrast, 19.9 percent of Tunisian respondents in the survey stated that they would *vote* for Ennahda in the upcoming elections. In the actual elections, Ennahda received just over forty percent of the vote with a turnout rate of around fifty percent. Assuming that individuals with a strong party preference are more likely than uncommitted individuals to vote in the election, the results of the Arab Barometer, which is was representative for all Tunisians, are highly similar to the actual electoral results.

Thus, it appears that that Ennahda's victory can largely be attributed to the relatively low voter turnout for a first election¹⁰² combined with high levels of strategic support. The low level of turnout is likely attributable in part to the relative weakness of political parties. The long-time party of state, the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD), was banned following the Jasmine Revolution. Nineteen parties in total, in addition to a number of independent lists of candidates, contested the elections with the vast majority being newly formed parties with no history of electoral contestation. With less than a year between the Jasmine Revolution and the elections, most of these new parties lacked a strong constituency. Without strong political parties to link voters to the political process, it is likely that many Tunisians decided not to vote, lacking knowledge of which party best represented their beliefs.

With relatively little information about many of the parties competing in the election, Ennahda inherited a number of advantages. Within this environment, one of the key strengths of Ennahda was likely its brand name was strongly associated with opposition to the former regime. Second, Ennahda was known to have been the most organized and to be the most effective at getting-out-the-vote. Additionally, one international observer was informed that some voter support came from the fact that Ennahda was seen as the party most likely to prevent the former regime from returning to

¹⁰² By comparison, in South Africa's 1994 election turnout was around 86 percent.

power (Robbins and Tessler 2011). Thus, the political environment was highly favorable for Ennahda.

In light of these factors, it would be expected that Ennahda would have electoral success and, if anything, would have had higher levels of success than those actually achieved and the results suggest that much of Ennahda's success was explained to a large extent by its mobilization strategies and strategic support rather than its direct ideological appeal. Thus, despite initial perceptions, the finding that only 11.9 percent of Tunisians sincerely support Ennahda appears well within reason.

Overall, these data suggest that despite electoral success, Ennahda lacked a high degree of societal support in the weeks before the election. Given that the vast majority of Tunisians were most concerned about the economy (68.1 percent), the model proposed in this dissertation would predict that sincere support for Ennahda, given its brand name, would not be overly high which the Arab Barometer confirms.¹⁰³

The results for Egypt are relatively similar to those of Tunisia based on the Arab Barometer. Unlike Tunisia, however, the poll was conducted in June 2011, well before parliamentary elections in Egypt. Nevertheless, only 3.2 percent of respondents stated that either the Muslim Brotherhood or the newly formed Freedom and Justice Party best represented their aspirations for political, social and economic development. Based on the model, this low level of initial support for the party is not unsurprising as at the time 84.2 percent of respondents stated that economic concerns were the greatest challenge facing Egypt.

Although it is clear that support for Freedom and Justice likely increased in the following months, the key finding for this model is that initial support was extremely low. In other words, when economic concerns predominated among the Egyptian public and before campaigning had begun in earnest, there was not an initial wave of support behind the Brotherhood or its party, likely due to the weak association between the Islamist brand name and the key demand by citizens: economic solutions. Over time, however, as the campaign continued it is possible that Freedom and Justice was able to

¹⁰³ The model's second variable – credible economic alternatives – is less relevant in this political environment. Given the nature of the new system, any promises of *wasta* would be less credible as citizens were unsure about the nature of the new system. Thus, the likelihood of this factor structuring political competition is significantly lower.

inform citizens of its full platform, which includes programs to address economic issues. But, like Tunisia, it is also likely that much of Freedom and Justice's success – as well as that of al-Nour – is likely due to the association of the Islamist brand name with opposition to the regime combined with the strong grassroots network and electoral experience of the party (Masoud 2008).

In sum, as noted in chapter one, there are important differences between predicting electoral success and predicting overall levels of party support. In Egypt and Tunisia, as well as other countries, Islamists are by far the best-organized parties that are not associated with the regimes that dominated prior to the Arab Spring. Electoral outcomes depend heavily on the choice set available to ordinary citizens whereas overall levels of societal support do not. The results of the relatively hasty manner in which elections were conducted in Egypt and Tunisia surely hinged to a significant degree on the weakness of most non-Islamist political parties. By comparison, overall levels of support at the societal level are relatively consistent with the theory forwarded in the model.

Nevertheless, the Islamist breakthrough is very important for Islamist parties in Egypt and Tunisia. If power is fully devolved to the parliament or an elected president, then ordinary citizens will come to have greater information about these parties and will update their perceptions of the party's brand name. If an Islamist party can improve economic outcomes as a result of the Arab Spring, then its brand name will likely be updated in the perceptions of citizens to include good management of the economy.¹⁰⁴ If on the other hand economic outcomes are poor, then the party brand name will likely alter to reflect this, at least in the short-term. Thus, citizens will over time come to have high levels of information about the parties in power. As such, the lack of association between economic issues and the Islamist brand name would no longer be expected to hold.

¹⁰⁴ For example, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey held power during Turkey's economic transformation in the early 2000s following the economic crisis of 2000-1. As a result, citizens are likely to have a positive association between the party and its management of the country. For this reason, despite economic concerns being the most important issue in Turkey prior to the 2007 election, support for the AKP remained high (see IRI 2007).

Changes in Passive Support for Political Islam

Despite the electoral success of Islamist parties, there is evidence that suggests support for political Islam has decreased as a result of the Arab Spring. Although the majority of surveys in the second wave of the Arab Barometer were conducted before or in the early days of the Arab Spring, four were conducted in the months after the events in Egypt and Tunisia. In all four of these countries – Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco – support for political Islam is well under fifty percent, ranging from a low of 25.3 percent in Tunisia to a high of 37.1 percent in Egypt (see Tessler and Robbins n.d.).

Due to political conditions prior to the Arab Spring, it was not possible to carry out surveys in Egypt and Tunisia in the first wave of the Arab Barometer, meaning it is not possible to evaluate if support levels changed over time. In the other two cases, however, data are available for both waves that reveal a dramatic decrease in support for political Islam in the five years between surveys (Tessler and Robbins n.d.). In Algeria, support for political Islam declined by 34.2 percentage points and in Morocco support fell by 27.6 percentage points.

Although it is not possible to determine the precise change that is directly attributable to the Arab Spring, there was no similar decline in support for countries surveyed before or during the early days of the Arab Spring.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, the data from the first wave of the Arab Barometer do not appear to be outliers as in surveys conducted in both Algeria in 2004 and Morocco in 2005 reveal similar levels to those in the first wave (see Carnegie Middle East Governance and Islam Dataset 2012). Additionally, there is no obvious variable that would directly affect Algeria and Morocco but not other countries in the region which could account for the massive decrease in support for political Islam in these countries between the two waves. Thus, the most likely explanation is that the difference is due to the timing of the surveys relative to the Arab Spring.

Given relatively similar levels of support for political Islam in the four countries surveyed after the Arab Spring, cumulatively these findings suggest that societal support for political Islam has decreased as a result of the Arab Spring. This tentative finding

¹⁰⁵ There was a slight decline in support for political Islam in most countries with Yemen being the only notable exception (see Tessler and Robbins n.d.).

offers further support for the claim by Tessler (1997) and al-Suwaidi (1995) that much support for political Islam is strategic. The Arab Spring provided Arab citizens with an example of an alternative pathway toward change that did not involve political Islam. Although the model in this dissertation is not directly about societal support for political Islam, this finding is consistent with an extension of this model; it suggests that as other alternatives become known to ordinary citizens to address their economic grievances, support for political Islam decreased.

The Nature of the Arab Spring

Another observation from the Arab Spring is that, despite being the most significant opposition force in the region, initial protests were not led by Islamist parties or the Islamist movement. Although Islamists participated to a degree in the demonstrations in Tahrir Square, for example, they were not the organizing force behind the uprisings. Despite the significant attention these events have received, few have questioned why this was the case.

The initial protests that led to the Arab Spring occurred following the self-immolation of Muhammad Bouazizi in Sidi Bouzid, a provincial town in central Tunisia. Following this act, regular protests began to take place in Sidi Bouzid eventually spreading to the capital Tunis. With the fall of Ben Ali on January 14, 2011, similar protests began to break out in many Arab countries. The degree to which the protests were organized is debated. In Egypt, social media played a role in organizing the protests and in helping activists to communicate (Lynch 2011). Nevertheless, in no case did a well-established central leadership with clear objectives the driving force behind the protests (Shah and Sardar 2011).

The logic of collective action dictates that collective action is much more likely to take place when institutions exist that can organize interest groups and lower the costs of collective action. Without such organizations, individuals are able to defect more easily lowering the likelihood of collective action. Additionally, without a clear goal proffered by leadership of some form, the costs of collective action are increased. Nevertheless, the protests of the Arab Spring can best be summarized as a leaderless form of collective action.

As the Arab Spring made clear, citizens in the Arab world were deeply frustrated with the political and economic outcomes that existed throughout the region. In countries where data are available youth unemployment ranged from forty to seventy percent and in some cases such as Egypt nearly ninety percent of the unemployed were first time job seekers (World Bank 2004). Particularly among the youth population, the region was a tinderbox waiting for a spark.

Much of the literature on the Islamist movement highlights its broad networks of activists and strong organizational advantages (Wickham 2004; Masoud 2008; Singerman 2004). It is also claimed by some that the Islamist movement wins support based on economic grievances (Evans and Phillips 2007). If both of these claims were true, then it would be expected that the Islamist movement would be a key actor in overcoming the collective action problem and channel economic grievances into political action. Yet, when economic protests did break out, the Islamists had no significant leadership role in them.

It is clear that due to the association with religion, the Islamist movement has access to a free space not available to most other actors (Evans and Boyte 1986) and the strength of the Islamic network has been clearly established (Clark 2004). It seems unlikely that, relative to the organizational capacity of the leadership of the Arab Spring, Islamist networks did not possess such a capacity. Rather, as argued in the previous chapters, it seems much more likely that citizens did not associate the Islamist movement with solutions to its economic grievances. The social work of the Islamist movement may win sympathy, but in the end, despite massive frustration over economic outcomes, the movement did not aggregate these individual frustrations into large-scale protests. This stands in contrast to routine protests organized by the movement against Israel or those against the cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad that appeared in a Danish newspaper in 2005. Despite possessing the capacity to lead people to the streets, the Islamist movement never successfully harnessed economic anger despite being the main opposition to the regime for over twenty years.

The previous chapters suggest a clear reason for this outcome: Islamist parties are not strongly associated with economic issues in the minds of ordinary citizens. Citizens do not look to Islamist organizations for this reason and even when elements of the

Islamist movement such as Islamist parties try to mobilize support on this basis, they are not generally successful. As a result, another means was found to express economic grievances, despite the fact that such action likely would have been easier and less costly had it been led by the Islamist movement. This outcome is also highly consistent with the general theory forwarded in chapter two.

Conclusion

Nearly a year after the onset of the Arab Spring, the *Jordan Times* (2012) reported on a meeting of the Islamic Action Front in preparations for the expectation that the party might soon join the government as part of a wave of concessions made by King Abdallah II. In addition to a number of other strategy decisions, the author, who attended the meeting, states:

During Saturday's session, Islamist leaders also focused on ways to best translate the movement's slogan 'Islam is the solution' into political and economic programmes as the IAF eyes the rise of Islamists to power through the ballot box in countries across the region."

Although all parties update their ideological outreach, it is striking that after nearly a quarter-century of political competition in Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF are still struggling to translate their bumper sticker slogan "Islam is the solution" into the policy platform.

If there were a clear Islamist brand name on economic issues, then one would expect the party's primary goal would be to communicate their message to citizens rather than struggling with how to make this connection in the first place. As the preceding chapters have suggested, the IAF is not alone in this dilemma but it affects most Islamist parties. Thus, the lack of a clear association between economic issues and the party's brand name represents the fundamental challenge for parties taking up the banner of Islam.

In sum, the nature of opposition parties and their brand names can limit levels of societal support for these parties in low information environments which are often characteristic of authoritarian regimes. In the case of Islamist parties, a weak association between economic issues and the Islamist brand name has resulted in a major challenge

for parties campaigning under the banner of religion. Critically, this relationship can explain variation in support for Islamist parties across both space and time in the Arab world. Moreover, given that Islamists are by far the dominant opposition movement throughout the region, this relationship also sheds some light onto the persistence of authoritarian regimes; lacking an opposition that could capitalize on economic downturns, regimes could survive for a significant period of time despite poor economic outcomes. Thus, these findings imply that the nature of opposition parties should receive greater attention in the study of electoral authoritarian regimes.

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