Environment, Development, and Citizenship:
Narrative Processes as Environmental Revolution and Political Change
in Post-colonial Trinidad & Tobago

by

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I the Stream
by
Cristo "Atekosang" Adonis
(Included here at his request)

I, the stream do have a story to tell
I once ran and sang happily over lovely stones and mosses
Between beautiful banks covered with luscious trees, ferns and bushes
That was a time, the people who lived close by treated me with reverence
and with love
The fishes used me as their home; the animals came to drink of my water
and even the birds from above
We all lived in perfect peace and harmony.
I meandered my way to meet my big sister, the river,
and we entwined, to meet our mother the sea.
One day we awoke in surprise
To our peaceful place came strangers, who had already planned our demise
We being a simple and peaceful nature
thought they were beings from above
So my friends and I treated them with respect and love;
I quenched their thirst, soothed their sore bodies,
whilst my friends gave them shelter and food.
All these things we did because they appeared to be harmless and good
But then everything changed; we saw their true ways and habits
They cut the trees and plants on my banks, their waste in me they dumped;
I ran no more, but crawled, I sang no more but whispered; I began to dry.
Their waste began to poison my friends:
man, animals, birds, fishes and plants
We all began to die
My sister, the river also became ill and now even our mother the sea is
suffering from that evil.
We weep!
We scream!
We plead!
For a healing,
Oh Great Spirit,
Send a healing!
So we can be once more, as we were
Then and only then, will there be a once more pleasant story to tell!

DEDICATION

to
Carl, Gwenny and Mum

and for

Bannie
David
Michelle

and all of the
generations of
sentient
beings
to
come

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My friends and supporters have reminded me repeatedly that the dissertation is not intended to be the work of a lifetime, but a path through to the next stages of my life, an assignment to be completed with a distinct purpose. In my case, it actually has been a work of a lifetime and a labor of love, while also marking a significant and life transforming moment in my life. I began this work many years ago with the unspoken belief, expectation and narrative that it would be a very solitary process – one that I would complete alone. Imagine my surprise to have learned the simple and elegant truth that is quite to the contrary; that while I ultimately must give birth to this work myself, the process is practically impossible to complete with any measure of success and self care absent the support, commitment and I daresay, love of many others.

Among this community of others stand five people, without whom this process would have been absolutely impossible for me to complete, the strong and inspiring women who comprised my dissertation committee: Co-chairs, Dorceta Taylor and Muge Gocek, and Rebecca Hardin, Victoria Johnson, and Sandra Levitsky. Both individually and as a whole, they have brought me forth to this life-changing experience as a budding scholar, and they have model for me, with professionalism and grace, the character, talent, and deep commitment to both the intellectual life and that of making a tangible difference in the world through thought, sound research methods and action. I stand on the shoulders of giants. I am inspired by the skilfulness of your craft as researchers, educators and mentors.

Dorceta, I have known the longest, having met her at a very different juncture of my life and academic career at Michigan. Even as a newly minted masters degree student from SNRE with plans of continuing to the doctoral program, Dorceta mentored me in the summer of 1993 to make sure that my internship at the USEPA would count toward my research career. That advice spurred me to turn my master's degree into what became the agency's white paper on brownfields, and she actively mentored me throughout that process. I thank her for her many years of enduring support and encouragement and for shaping and enabling my teaching experience through her Environmental Justice Methods and Women in Environment courses. I appreciate her thoroughness, dedication to her students and the warmth that accompanies it. She has driven me to do my best work.

I first met Muge when I took her Sociological Theory course many moons ago and in 2007, when I was on the verge of leaving the doctoral after a long hiatus, it was Muge who encouraged me to complete the program. I distinctly remember that phone call while on a business trip to Tobago, in which she quickly reengaged me, seamlessly drawing my field experiences in Trinidad out of me and making sense of it theoretically. Muge made it all seem intriguing and remained critical and seamlessly conversant with my intellectual trajectory in this work, even when I could not see it all clearly myself. I am forever indebted to her for the steady and substantive quality of her intellectual support that has seen me through from start to finish. Equally significant was her quiet professionalism in negotiating the administrative processes associated with demonstrating progress toward the degree and obtaining departmental funding. I would not be here without her persistent confidence in me.

PREFACE

Environment, Development, and Citizenship: Narrative Processes as Environmental
Revolution and Political Change in Post-colonial Trinidad

Karen Ann Cecilia DeGannes

In this work, I explore how Trinidad and Tobago's (T&T) citizens fit environment and

development debates to the realities of their local geographical and historical context and to their

lives through an exploration of their narratives. I study these narratives to understand how those

who create them have weighed choices about continuing the down streaming of the oil and gas

(O&G) sector, based upon a "development by invitation" model versus the need to address

urgent, pressing, and proliferating environmental concerns. I also explore the role of the state in

these matters and how environmental narratives become redirected or co-opted for political

purposes. Over the past decade, Trinidad and Tobago's citizens have increasingly sought greater

Government transparency and voice regarding industrial development and its impacts on human

health, communities and the natural environment. They have also questioned decision making

about how best to use the nation's natural resource wealth. Widespread flooding has increased

(in rich and poor neighborhoods, alike) due to illegal quarrying and unmanaged development of

the Northern Range, and despite over one hundred years of petroleum and petrochemical

industry development, and the presence of multinational companies, T&T as of this writing, still

had not adopted air and hazardous waste pollution laws. The 'development by invitation' model

has been the critical centerpiece of the nation's path to economic independence in the post-colonial period. My case study is the T&T Government's efforts to site several large, energy-intensive, heavy industrial projects including the manufacture of iron and steel, and the proposed construction of aluminum smelters during the recent economic boom. I explore the narratives that underpin the debates that ensued to halt these projects and reshape the development agenda thereby demonstrating that environment is as much a cultural conception as a scientific one; and these cultural understandings are significant for specifying the nature of environmental problems as they are understood in local contexts.

Narrative analysis uncovers the inherently different, often divergent understandings about the merits and demerits of the extant heavy industrial development strategy in T&T. What is interesting is that these debates are about a development agenda that is at least four decades old and has been embraced by the major political parties that have administered government since Trinidad received its independence from Great Britain in 1962.

I propose that environmentalism has come about as a silent or passive revolution in contemporary T&T and illustrate how this passive revolution has come about. Elite groups of Trinidadian citizens construct meaning about the natural environment through narrative contests, *contentious narratives* (Tilly 1998) and *narratives of risk* (Beck 2006), while other voices are silenced or are seemingly acquiescent. The work further develops the concept of *environmental capital*, and shows how environmental narratives effect the allocation of power by enabling some elite actors to impose their meanings as legitimate, and to reorganize and co-opt environmental capital for electoral gains. The project employs a synthetic framework that draws on Gramscian conceptions of passive revolution, Bourdieusian perspectives on habitus and capital, critical theories of race, gender, class and risk-based domination and oppression, and the uneven

development of post-colonial societies. As is necessary for any meaningful work on the region, I engage and employ the works of Caribbean environmental anthropologists, social scientists, and writers of West Indian critical literature. Data from primary and secondary sources are analyzed in this work, including archival data, ethnographic interviews and secondary data from the World Values Surveys 2006 and 2010 for T&T.

Four chapters comprise this work. In Chapter I, I provide a background and context for the central questions of this research, and I propose that the recent national election in T&T represents a passive environmental revolution that is atypical of natural resource- (specifically, oil- and gas-) rich developing economies. That is, environmental issues emerge to trump the development agenda without the violent revolt or armed conflict typical of many natural resource rich developing economies and rentier states. In Chapter II, I present the theoretical, methodological and conceptual foundations of this research and in so doing, I show how conceptions of the environment are not only based on scientific categories but shaped and defined by social, cultural and place-specific phenomena that are best captured through analysis of narratives and narrative processes. In Chapter III, I illustrate how competing stories about the environment become a defining resource, in the formation of symbolic environmental capital mobilized by elites to influence both development policy and political (specifically, electoral) outcomes. I then demonstrate that in the process of narrative contestation, environment and development become interdependent or conjoint and overlapping social facts, rather than mere oppositional categories and social positions. In Chapter IV, I close the work by exploring the implications of the research findings for the future of environment and development in T&T and other point source, resource-extractive developing economies, the limitations, and the theoretical relevance of the research.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation	Definition
ALCOA	Aluminum Company of America
ALUTRINT	Aluminum Trinidad and Tobago
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India and China - the new market economies
CARICOM	Caribbean Community and Common Market
CEC	Certificate of Environmental Clearance
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CEPEP	Community-based Environmental Protection and Enhancement Program
CL	CL Financial Group
CLICO	Colonial Life Insurance Company Trinidad Limited
COP	Congress of the People (political party)
CPI	Consumer Price Index
CSCAR	Center for Statistical Consultation and Research - The University of Michigan
DEWD	Development and Environment Works Division
E&P	Exploration and Production
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EMA	Environmental Management Authority

Abbreviation	Definition
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GORTT	Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago
HYPE	Helping You Prepare for Employment programme
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOC	International Oil Companies
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
JCC	Joint Consultative Council for the Construction Industry Trinidad and Tobago
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSJ	Movement for Social Justice (political party)
MuST	Multi-sector Skills Training programme
NAPA	National Academy for Performing Arts
NAR	National Alliance for Reconstruction (political party coalition)
NEC	National Energy Corporation of Trinidad and Tobago Limited
NEP	National Environmental Policy
NGC	National Gas Company of Trinidad and Tobago
NIMBY	Not In My Back Yard
NJAC	National Joint Action Committee (political party)
O&G	Oil and Gas
PLIPDECO	Point Lisas Industrial Port Development Company
PNM	People's National Movement (political party)
POS	Port of Spain (Capital of Trinidad and Tobago)
PP	People's Partnership (political party coalition)
R	The R Project for Statistical Computing
SABIC	Saudi Basic Industries Corporation

Abbreviation	Definition
SEA	Secondary Entrance Assessment examination
T&T	Trinidad and Tobago
TOP	Tobago Organisation of the People
TTMA	Trinidad and Tobago Manufacturers Association
UDECOTT	Urban Development Company of Trinidad and Tobago
UN	United Nations
UNC	United National Congress (political party)
URP	Unemployment Relief Programme
US	United States of America
UWI	University of the West Indies
VSEP	Voluntary Separation of Employment Packages
WVS	World Values Survey
YAPA	Youth Apprenticeship Programme in Agriculture

ABSTRACT

Environment, Development, and Citizenship: Narrative Processes as Environmental Revolution and Political Change in Post-colonial Trinidad

Karen Ann Cecilia DeGannes

This research explores how different groups of Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) citizens construct meaning about the natural environment, given a national development policy based on natural resource extraction. Environment is conceptualized as a cultural category, a view that is supported by decades of theorizing and empirical research in environmental history and anthropology, American rural sociology, French postmodernism, Caribbean literature, and British and American environmental sociology. Leveraging the works of conflict theorists, I argue that environmental meanings are manufactured through a process of elite narrative contests while less dominant grassroots voices seldom define national understandings of environmental struggles and agendas. Narrative and storytelling, therefore, represent the locus of resistance, opportunities for compromise, hybridity, and adaptation in any given locality and socio-historical moment. Competing stories and narratives about the environment become a defining resource as symbolic environmental capital mobilized primarily by elites to shape development policy and electoral outcomes.

I show how what comes to be seen as the truth, with regard to environmental claims in T&T depends upon, not only information that is scientifically negotiated, but deeply embedded

culturally specific issues and conflicts that are observable in the competing environmental narratives or stories that are told (constructed) by elite actors in the local milieu. Environmentalism is therefore a contested cultural terrain. Narrative processes are key to illuminating the nature of more fundamental understandings about both environment and development. Though political elites have sought to define environment and development tensions as race, class and political party conflicts in T&T, analysis of local narratives using DICTION 6.14 and data from the World Values Survey demonstrate that more fundamental issues are at play, such as a shift from modernist understandings of environment and development to a more risk and justice-based approach.

The research is a case study of present era T&T society. I specifically examine the rise of environmental claims associated with new industrial park development, and efforts to site large, heavy industrial plants, as part of the received, modernist development policy strategy of down-streaming T&T's oil and gas sector.

CHAPTER I:

INTRODUCTION

"It must now directly engage social debate, for the culture of nature - the ways we think, teach, talk about and construct the natural world - is as important a terrain for struggle as the land itself." (Alexander Wilson, 1991:87)

A majority of social science theorizing has cast environment and development as opposing objectives for most industrializing nations or late developers. The moral of the story in this line of theorizing typically suggests that in these countries, the imperatives of development usually win out over environmental concerns. In Trinidad and Tobago, an interesting, potentially revolutionary and intellectually puzzling set of events occurred in 2010. Through the process of a national election, the citizens of this hydrocarbon-rich, twin-island, developing nation-state not only elected their first woman prime minister,[1] they also made a rare choice to prioritize environmental protection over a seemingly winning and successful industrial development agenda, one based upon development by invitation.

The dissertation is an exploration of this intriguing intellectual and socially relevant outcome. My basic research question is how does one explain the T&T experience? How did T&T, a noted "Caribbean Tiger" growing at "Chinese rates," become one of the first natural

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[1] As Maxine Williams perhaps correctly noted, however, "Trinidad and Tobago Voted for Change, Not Gender." Guardian.co.uk. Published Wednesday 26th, May 2012. See http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/may/26/trinidad-tobago-election-result. Accessed November 2012.

resource-rich, developing nations to "choose" protecting the natural environment over the pressing economic and political imperatives that typically support the primacy of the development agenda?[2] What conditions and mechanisms led to this outcome, and is the T&T case anomalous or does it mark a new trend underway in developing nations with natural resource wealth that are also undergoing the 21st-century variant of neoliberal globalization? From a theoretical perspective, by using a narrative approach, I also explore questions about how conceptions of the natural environment are both shaped by culture and in turn, define cultural phenomena.

The Antecedents of Election 2010

In the 1970's a group of local businessmen based in the South's oil producing region saw an opportunity to build southern ports to do away with the need to pass goods through the narrow road networks leading from Port of Spain. They also saw the need to bring more economic development and vibrancy to the southern region of Trinidad, and to decentralize economic power from Port of Spain. The Eric Williams People's National Movement (PNM) government initially opposed this effort but with some political negotiations, he finally agreed to allow the construction of PLIPDECO and the Port at Savonetta; now a major industrial site in T&T. The Point Lisas Industrial Port Development Company (PLIPDECO) project eventually became a success as part of Williams' oil and gas sector nationalization and down-streaming experiment. As many commentators have pointed out, the success of this development agenda came only

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[2] Costa Rica is also world renown for having chosen an environmental protection-based approach over the industrialization and resource extraction models of development. Researchers in the field suggest that Costa Rica is notable for its strong institutional arrangements and environment-centric approach that de-emphasizes and balances (against ecology, human rights and transparency) natural resource extractive industry as an engine for development. For instance, open pit mining for gold is illegal in Costa Rica. See, for example, Evans (1999), Zarsky (1999), Silva (1997) and Thrupp (1990). Nor is environment a settled and conflict-free process in Costa Rica. See Campbell (2002) and Oetzel (2005). The question I pose here is more relevant to late developers that have chosen the point source resource extraction path.

after a painful economic bust period that was so detrimental to Trinidad and Tobago that it had to seek assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to survive the drastic economic downturn. PLIPDECO today remains the engine of the nation's export oriented growth.

In the year 2006, ALCOA proposed to build a large smelter in a green-field site in south Trinidad and caused a stir. Local accounts described ALCOA's staff showing up at villagers' homes with armed security guards, hardly leaving a friendly impression. The PNM government had completed an elaborate process of obtaining broad input on the development of its Vision 2020 plan and sought to put elements of the plan in place, including building out the value-added components of the growing natural gas sector. One of the consequences of the government's public involvement process for the 2020 Vision was that academics at the University of the West Indies (UWI) at Saint Augustine, and many local professionals weighed in and made detailed proposals to the government on how to effectuate an orderly process for guiding T&T's future development. Based on the interviews conducted with some of these academics and public officials during my T&T fieldwork, it appears that in the PNM government's haste to get things done, they perhaps ignored some of this guidance and may have left a bitter taste in the mouths of those who thought that their involvement would be considered seriously. It probably also was not helpful that Prime Minister Manning and his team were increasingly strident about getting their proposed mega industrial projects built despite the public's concerns about the health and environment issues that were incumbent to the development policy agenda. When ALCOA withdrew its proposal for the south-Trinidad smelter plant after a spate of public protest in 2007, Prime Minister Manning made a Christmas Eve announcement to the public that smelters would still be built in Trinidad.

By then, the overnight clearing of Union Estate by the National Energy Corporation (NEC) had left a notable mark in the public's psyche. Along with the growing perception that large amounts of public dollars were being wasted on these mega projects that had been rushed past the Environmental Management Authority's (EMA) Certificate of Environmental Clearance (CEC) process. The schedules and budgets of many of these projects had doubled and tripled. Public support (or the lack of significant grassroots and political opposition), the necessary social license needed for these projects to move forward to construction and operation in an orderly manner, began to wane.

These conditions - the lack of due process, transparency and accountability to the public served to feed the polarization of Prime Minister Patrick Manning and what the Opposition, the UNC, came to identify as his development agenda, which included the construction of aluminum smelters, like the ALUTRINT project. ALUTRINT was a joint venture between T&T, China and Venezuela, then subsequently, T&T, China's National Machinery & Equipment Import & Export Corporation, and Votorantim Metais, a Brazilian concern. Part of the issue with ALUTRINT involved the perception of a high degree of risk, which its proponents were unable to overcome despite spending large amounts of advertising and marketing dollars to redress the problem. In reality, ALUTRINT faced a number of problems, including the perception that the project was given to the son of the Prime Minister's trusted industrial advisor to manage (nepotism), the perception that the environmental review was done hastily and with government interference to speed it up, and therefore was not credible.

There was also the perception that the government had made too many concessions to give away the nation's natural gas for next to nothing in order to attract a toxic, polluting, energy hungry industry, and that many of the jobs promised would not be for locals but for Chinese

workers. Academics at UWI and others called upon the government to conduct and make public

a cost benefit analysis of the project.[3] There were legitimate environmental issues raised about

the plant, but when the certificate of environmental clearance for ALUTRINT was overturned,

the local court cited the lack of proper public consultation and inadequate attention to the

cumulative impacts of the project as the key rationale for its decision.[4] ALUTRINT, and

afterwards, the Essar steel project and all of the Manning administration's large construction

proposals became open for scrutiny and increasing public discontent. These projects lost favor

not just based upon their scientific merits, which could not be properly adjudicated either way

because of the intentional weakness of local environmental regulatory institutions. These projects

lost their social license or legitimacy, and in the process, thereby represented the first significant

challenge to the consensus that undergirded the oil- and gas-focused mode of accumulation that

has lasted in T&T for some 40 years.

Reports that T&T's natural gas reserves were likely dwindling also led opponents of the

government's oil- and gas-based development policy, and those opposed to the PNM-led

government administration itself, to question the rationale and motives for attracting foreign,

industrial investments where the primary locational incentive was a cheap supply of natural gas

and a free license to pollute or increase risk to public health. Altogether, this constellation of

issues produced and exacerbated many contradictions in the economic order of the day and gave

the appearance of a level of disorder and corruption that drove Trinbagonian's call for a regime

change. The political climate continued to worsen thereafter with allegations of impropriety in

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[3]Allaham, Aabida. (2011, Feb 4). "We have a right to know: Activists want government to produce Alutrint's records." Trinidad Express online edition. http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/We_have_a_right_to_know-115305434.html. Accessed December 2012.
[4] *People United Respecting the Environment (PURE) and the Rights Action Group (RAG) v The Trinidad and Tobago Environmental Management Authority and ALUTRINT*, Trinidad and Tobago High Court of Justice, CV 2007-02263. See Bethel, Camille. 2010 (October 12). "Smelter is No More: $4B DOWN THE DRAIN?"*Trinidad Express Newspapers*. http://www.trinidadexpress.com/business-magazine/smelter_is__no_more__4B_DOWN_THE_DRAIN_-104830479.html

the government's use of funds for construction of large projects, triggering the Uff Commission of Inquiry, then, the CLICO bankruptcy happened and implicated wrong-doing on the part of senior members of the government –the PNM, led by Prime Minister Patrick Manning and his cabinet - in the process.

It was under these circumstances that Prime Minister Manning called a snap election, a mere 2.5 years into their most recent five-year term of government and lost the election to a coalition formed by the opposition party, the United National Congress (UNC), along with the newly formed COP and three smaller parties. The COP, a middle-class party comprised of the educated, mixed-race and more urban citizens of Port of Spain and the east-west corridor (an area along the foothills of Trinidad's northern range), had contested elections as an independent party in 2007, garnering many votes in the north but without winning a seat. In 2007, the COP captured enough of the swing vote from the UNC to enable the PNM to obtain a narrow win. By 2010, the UNC opposition party had learned from the 2007 result and sought to capture the middle-class swing votes of the east-west corridor that have shaped the deadlock election outcomes that had become all too characteristic of T&T politics since the mid-1990s.[5] As the anti-smelter issue was raised to a public crescendo in the lead up to the 2010 national election, the UNC opposition formed a coalition to oppose, and eventually overcome the dominant PNM party administration. Table 1.1 below provides a summary of the May 24, 2010 national election results and Table 1.2 provides detailed results by electoral district, candidate and party affiliation. The People's Partnership coalition comprised of the UNC, COP and TOP together

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[5] See Ryan (2003) for a discussion of T&T's deadlock electoral politics. Deadlock refers to a tie in the number of parliamentary seats won by any two political parties contesting the national elections (usually the PNM and UNC in recent times). There were 36 seats available to be contested. When a tie occurs, the President of the Republic of T&T has the authority to select a winning party to lead the nation, although the matter remains the subject of debate. In an attempt to redress the problem, the T&T Parliament changed the number of available seats to 41 (an add number), 39 seats in Trinidad and two in Tobago, in 2003. See Government of Trinidad and Tobago, Elections and Boundaries Commission, Background page. http://ebctt.com/background.php. Accessed January 2013.

captured 74% of the eligible ballots while the incumbent PNM achieved a mere 26% of the

vote.[6]

Table 1.1 May 24th, 2010 Summary Electoral Results

Party	*ECB Count*	*Percentage*
PNM (incumbent)	188564	26%
UNC/PP	419,462	58%
COP/PP	88,426	12%
TOP/PP	27658	4%
TOTALS	**724,110**	**100%**

 Compiled from T&T Elections and Boundaries Commission data for the May 24, 2010
Parliamentary Elections. Accessed January 2013 at: http://ebctt.com/historicalData.php.

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[6] The Elections and Boundaries Commission's website also contains Parliamentary After Election Reports that were
prepared by a CARICOM Electoral Observer Mission comprised of 30 observers from different countries in the
region and two members of the Elections and Boundaries commission staff. Three independent candidates and seven
parties, including the PNM, COP, UNC,TOP, the New National Vision, the National Democratic Organization, and
the Trinidad and Tobago National Congress Party registered to contest the very abbreviated election. The formation
of the People's Partnership, brought political parties such as the NJAC and the MSJ into the electoral campaign
process. The election was called on April 16th, 2010 by Prime Minister Manning and was held just over a month
later on May 24th, 2010. The CARICOM Observer Mission's report noted irregularities on the part of both parties
during the election including the misuse of government resources for campaigning by the incumbent PNM party.
This report also indicates that the PNM complained that the PP had significantly greater financial resources to wage
their election campaign – an alleged ten-to-one ratio in financing in favor of the PP. See GORTT, 2010. Report of
the Elections and Boundaries Commission on the Parliamentary Elections held on Monday, 24th May 2010.
Accessed December 2012, at
http://ebctt.com/ftp_uploads/reports/Parliamentary%20After%20Election%20Reports/Report%20of%20the%20E&
BC%20on%20the%20Parliamentary%20Elections%202010%20(24th%20May%202010).pdf, pages 5-6.

Table 1.2 Detailed Results for May 24th, 2010 National Election by District, Candidate & Party Affiliation

Electoral District	Revised List of Electors	No of ballots Accepted	No of ballots Rejected	Candidates Declared Elected and their Party Affiliation	
Arima	24115	15057	73	Rodger Dominic Samuel	C.O.P
Arouca/Maloney	25019	17150	46	Alicia Hospedales	P.N.M.
Barataria / San Juan	25394	17692	76	Fuad Khan	U.N.C.
Caroni Central	24601	18743	50	Glenn Ramadharsingh	U.N.C.
Caroni East	25166	18705	57	Tim Gopeesingh	U.N.C.
Chaguanas East	23653	17553	58	Stephen Cadiz	U.N.C.
Chaguanas West	25715	20211	70	Jack Austin Warner	U.N.C.
Couva North	27680	21216	70	Ramona Ramdial	U.N.C.
Couva South	26400	19818	59	Rudranath Indarsingh	U.N.C.
Cumuto/Manzanilla	26896	20406	121	Collin Partap	U.N.C.
D'Abadie/O'Meara	26019	18047	74	Anil Roberts	C.O.P.
Diego Martin Central	27465	17232	33	Amery Browne	P.N.M.
Diego Martin North/East	27647	16741	68	Colm Imbert	P.N.M.
Diego Martin West	28366	17187	61	Keith Christopher Rowley	P.N.M.
Fyzabad	25802	20186	59	Chandresh Sharma	U.N.C.
La Brea	24057	17031	67	Fitzgerald Jeffrey	P.N.M.
La Horquetta/Talparo	23959	16432	51	Jairam Seemungal	U.N.C.
Laventille East / Morvant	27426	14976	62	Donna Cox	P.N.M.
Laventille West	26330	13448	46	Nileung Hypolite	P.N.M.
Lopinot/Bon Air West	24447	17501	58	Hayne Douglas	C.O.P.
Mayaro	26433	20176	129	Winston Peters	U.N.C.
Moruga/Tableland	26450	20309	124	Clifton De Coteau	U.N.C.
Naparima	25394	19168	62	Nizam Baksh	U.N.C.
Oropouche East	27181	20799	62	Roodal Moonilal	U.N.C.
Oropouche West	23427	17714	58	Stacy Roopnarine	U.N.C.
Point Fortin	24607	16841	47	Paula Gopee-Scoon	P.N.M.
Pointe-A-Pierre	23504	17878	81	Errol Mc Leod	U.N.C.
Port of Spain North / St. Anns West	23154	13301	43	Patricia Mc Intosh	P.N.M.
Port of Spain South	23711	12648	52	Marlene Mc Donald	P.N.M.
Princes Town	25259	19200	72	Nela Khan	U.N.C.
San Fernando East	22813	15845	48	Patrick manning	P.N.M.
San Fernando West	23554	17099	49	Carolyn Seepersad-Bachan	U.N.C.
Siparia	26657	19825	82	Kamla Persad-	U.N.C.

				Bissessar	
St. Anns East	26940	16164	103	Joanne Thomas	P.N.M.
St. Augustine	25582	19226	58	Prakash Ramadhar	C.O.P.
St. Joseph	25943	18647	64	Herbert Volney	U.N.C.
Tabaquite	26775	19660	67	Surujrattan Rambachan	U.N.C.
Tobago East	20424	13172	61	Vernella Alleyne-Toppin	T.O.P.
Tobago West	23674	14486	59	Delmon Baker	T.O.P.
Toco / Sangre Grande	27298	18025	44	Rupert Griffith	U.N.C.
Tunapuna	25191	18595	67	Winston Dookeran	C.O.P.
TOTALS:	**1040128**	**724110**	**2691**		

Source: Trinidad and Tobago Elections and Boundaries Commission website.
http://www.ebctt.com/historicalData.php. Accessed January 2013.

Late Developers, Environment, Development and the Resource Curse

The "Third World" development debate about why some nations have faster-growing economies or have industrialized sooner than others is an old one. The foregone conclusion for a majority of researchers in this field suggests that industrialization via neoliberal marketization is always appropriate and desirable, though scholars of alternative development and proponents of a "return to the local" would disagree.[7] The academic and social debates about environment and development are likewise decades old and have been written about profusely and eloquently elsewhere.[8] The resounding conclusion of empirical scholarship on the subject is that with few exceptions, poorer nations tend to prioritize economic survival and economic growth over environmental protection.

Development is typically viewed by its developing-nation proponents as a necessity to alleviate the real social and humanitarian hardships of severe poverty or the devastation of war. With changing climate conditions, including the resulting drought and famine in some regions, development is also seen as a necessity for adaptation and mitigation of the impacts of global climate change. Governments in many late-developing nation-states face the challenge of acquiring the economic means for meeting the essential needs of citizens for resources, such as basic infrastructure services including roads, electrification, access to clean and reliable water supplies, job creation, health care, education, and opportunities for the creation of local wealth, thereby improving the overall standard of living and securing valuable foreign exchange for participating in global trade and importing food, even if at the cost of environmental damage or ecological harm.

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[7] See, for instance, the edited collection on this subject by Ray DeYoung and Thomas Princen (2012).

[8] Most notable are the seminal studies by the Club of Rome, Donnella and Dennis Meadows, Jorgen Randers and William Behrens III, in *The Limits to Growth* (1972), which sparked a lively and ongoing debate about human population growth, the global economy and the environment.

Of course, the debate is far more complex in the context of globalization. For many Third World nations, World Bank policies and International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan programs have provided the financing for economic development, but often with onerous requirements and costs.[9] Developing nations repeatedly assert their right to pursue modernization and economic growth and to attain mobility in the global economic and class structures[10] without imposition of environmental standards from the advanced industrialized nations of the North or West, who, they insist, enjoyed the privilege of industrializing in an era without such constraints, and who they sometimes view as imposing these standards to further limit or stymie the growth of rising Third World economies. A bloc of Third World nations continues to call for developed nations to pay for the environmental damage that has resulted from their unfettered industrialization, but to date, with only limited results.[11]

The situation is no different in Trinidad and Tobago - a nation that supported similar claims at the Copenhagen Climate Summit and where environment and development were traditionally cast as competing objectives, especially after the creation of the nation's environmental regulatory agency - the Environmental Management Authority (EMA) - which, came about as a conditionality to a World Bank loan. Development and environment have become contested terrains in the local T&T context and have more recently become enmeshed with other structural forms of social inequality and conflict. These cultural-environmental conjunctions are explained in Chapter II.

Environmental conflicts are often best evidenced in the stories people tell or otherwise communicate about them in the process of making sense of them. That is, they are best observed

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[9] See, for instance, Susan George (1992).
[10] For an informative discussion on the subject broadly and its application to Tunisia and Morocco, see Gregory White (2001).
[11] See Martin Kohr (2010) and Naomi Klein (2009) in *Censored 2011*.

in cultural artifacts, including the narratives and discourses of the participants. To the extent that it is characterized and defined by such social processes, the natural environment is also an increasingly important site of cultural production and social integration. Economic development and growth, and environmental protection and sustainability, are themselves recognized in social science literature as master narratives (Somers and Gibson, 1994) in which many of us are socially embedded and thus shape how we think of who we are and our place in both nature and human civilization.

Alexander Wilson contends that environment as cultural and environmental movements have "undermine[d] the social consensus for growth, development and the promotion of commodified relations with the land" (1991:87). Wilson's observations seem to cohere with the contemporary experience in Trinidad and Tobago, a Caribbean nation and late developer whose post-colonial prosperity is grounded in its petroleum- and natural gas-based economy. Some argue that the jury remains out on whether or not Trinidad and Tobago has succumbed to the *natural resource curse*[12] or what others call *Dutch Disease* or *Nigerian Disease*. Hayman and Carini (2011) summarize the matter succinctly,

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[12] I do not offer a comprehensive review of the natural resource curse literature and debate here. Instead, I highlight a few key points relevant to my current research agenda. The idea originates with Mahdavy (1970),who studied petroleum income and revenue in Middle Eastern nations. More recently the idea was expanded by Friedman (2006) in his popular article and best seller. However, a growing body of work suggests that other factors also explain both the regime type and growth outcomes in resource-rich nations. Notable among these are Haber and Menaldo (2011), who state that natural resources are a "blessing" for regime selection (that is, they do not foster dictatorships) when natural resource reliance is aptly treated as an endogenous variable. In fact, they classify Trinidad and Tobago as a resource-blessed country because it remained democratic during a resource boom (2011:6, 25). While one may not take Haber and Menaldo's findings lightly, especially their results for T&T, it remains plausible that key social and historical variables were not captured in their explanatory models, including the voice and accountability measures of institutional quality for especially the state apparatus, under apparently democratic conditions. Alexeev and Conrad's (2011) study of natural resource rich economies in transition instead shows that these voice and accountability variables are significantly negatively affected by natural resource wealth, while finding that there is no evidence of a natural resource curse for all countries. These studies nevertheless remain the exception rather than the rule among studies in the field. Williams (2011) has also demonstrated "a strong, robust, negative causal association" between point resource export revenues and a transparency index developed based on data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators and the IMF's International Financial Statistics (2008) and drawing on methods developed by Kaufmann and Belver (2005) Islam (2006) and refined in a model by Williams (2009).

"You know the drill. A country discovers huge minerals deposits. International oil [or gas] companies (IOCs) scramble to sign exploration and production (E&P) contracts. The country's leaders say the resources will transform the economy, promote development and bring prosperity. The resources are exploited and the country descends into a self-perpetuating cycle of corruption, misery, conflict and negative growth. This phenomenon is so well established, it's now seen as almost inevitable."

Dutch Disease and Nigerian Disease are two subcategories of natural resource curse arguments and models. The former relates to whether or not wealth or revenues are reallocated to the local manufacturing sector as opposed to the extractive commodity sector. Generally, allocation flows to the former over the latter in resource cursed economies. See Williams (2011:490) and van Wijnbergen (1984). The Nigerian Disease model suggests that natural resource revenues are wasted by governments that lack the institutional capacity to deploy windfall gains efficiently or to manage large resource revenues sustainably. See Atkinson and Hamilton (2003). While both models may well apply to T&T, the latter Nigerian Disease model is more salient given the circumstances surrounding the 2000 - 2007 boom period and its aftermath in the 2010 National Elections. See Williams (2011:490), Auty (2001, 2007) and Isham, Woolcock, Pritchett and Busby (2005). As Williams notes and as discussed below, Auty has suggested that natural resource economies based upon point resource extraction such as oil and natural gas, coal, iron ore, etcetera (versus diffuse ones like agriculture), are more likely to be controlled by governments and thus, more likely to experience higher levels of rent-seeking behavior.

The Rentier State - Institutional Autonomy, Transparency, and Accountability

The propensity for rent-seeking in this context has challenged the economic and social development efforts of several petro-economies, evidenced by their slower than anticipated rates of growth when compared to relatively resource poor countries. Studies in the field fairly

consistently find a negative relationship between natural resource wealth and democracy, transparency and, voice and accountability in government institutions.[13] Yet, in many developing nations, and especially, those where natural resource extraction forms the basis of their economies or that manifest the characteristics of what Ulrich Beck (1992) has called *risk societies,* environmental despoliation is viewed as a necessary consequence on the path to development.[14] Cable, Shriver and Mix (2008) extend Beck's risk society concept by examining the role of the state. They show how key state agencies and other influential stakeholders in risk societies tend to select technologies and control information thereby - whether intentionally or not - narrowing the range of environmental discourse to preserve order or the status quo. This tendency is magnified in rentier states. According to Hazem Beblawi (1990) and other analysts, rentier states are those where,

- the state government is the primary recipient of external rents in exchange for the extraction of the country's natural resources (in the T&T case, the government is the principal receiver of oil and gas revenues or rents)
- the local economy substantially relies upon, or is heavily dependent upon rents from outside (foreign investment) rather than on its own strong domestic manufacturing and production
- the sector that generates rents employs only a small proportion of the local population, and
- the rent producing sector is the predominant source of GDP (Beblawi 1990:87-88; Beblawi and Luciani 1987)

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[13] Sachs and Warner (2001) have shown that other omitted variables linked to geography and climate do not provide alternative explanation for the natural resource curse. However, Bearce and Hutnick (2011:689) show that what is termed the resource curse more likely stems from labor imports (immigration) associated with resource production and not the "resource endowments, per se." See also Alexeev and Conrad (2011).

[14] See also Cable, Shriver and Mix (2008). While Beck's original opus focused primarily on the large industrialised nations, in his more recent work, he applies the risk society concept to contemporary societies the world over. See Beck (2006).

Trinidad and Tobago is the largest single supplier of liquefied natural gas to the United States market.[15] The country's oil and gas sector accounts for 40% of gross domestic product (GDP), comprises 80% of the local economy's exports, and employs 5% of the local workforce.[16] Smith (2004:236) classifies Trinidad and Tobago among nineteen countries that depended on oil exports for 10% or more of GDP for at least five years between 1974 and 1999. His analysis thereby captures the effect of T&T's earlier oil boom. Many of the major oil and gas sector firms are joint partnerships or other forms of collaboration between foreign investors, large multinational corporations such as British Petroleum, British Gas, Repsol, BHP Billiton, Chevron, Centrica, EOG Resources[17], GDF SUEZ, Talisman, Atkins, Petro-Canada, Canadian Superior Energy and Shell, and the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.[18] These arrangements make the state the primary recipient and trustee of oil and gas rents or revenues from international trade.

A significant proportion of Trinidad and Tobago's employment is with the civil service or government sector. Auty (2001) has demonstrated that there is a positive correlation between oil and gas booms and employment growth in government jobs, which have become part of the rentier state's system of patronage. Patronage refers to circumstances whereby various political or government regimes use these rents to "buy legitimacy"[19] or to otherwise maintain social order. In T&T, patronage may take many forms but dominant among them are employment in

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[15] United States Government, Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. "Fact Sheet: US Relations with Trinidad and Tobago." July 12, 2012. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35638.htmAccessed November 2012.

[16] United States Government. Central Intelligence Agency. Updated November 13, 2012. Trinidad and Tobago *The World Factbook*.https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/td.html Accessed November 2012.

[17] Formerly ENRON Oil & Gas, Company.

[18] Trinidad and Tobago Energy Exchange. 2012. "Oil and Gas Companies," *Trinidad and Tobago Energy Guide: A directory of the oilfield and energy sector*. On line edition. http://www.energyguidett.com/O-P_oilfieldServ.html Accessed November 2012. See also, "Trinidad & Tobago Exploration Activities Abound" written by Ted Moon, Technology editor. *Offshore*. http://www.offshore-mag.com/articles/print/volume-66/issue-7/special-report/trinidad-amp-tobago-exploration-activities-abound.html Accessed December 2012.

[19] Smith (2004: 242).

the government sector based on a combination of political party affiliations, race relations, class

membership and status, the growth and persistence of Unemployment Relief Programme [20]

(URP) and the expansion and formalization of Community-based Environmental Protection and

Enhancement Program[21] (CEPEP), a low wage, temporary contract work program, and

government contracting arrangements for both services and construction of commercial and

industrial mega-projects. Make-work programs were started by the PNM government led by Eric

Williams in response to the social unrest of the Black Power Movement in the 1970s. In 1971,

the Development and Environment Works Division (DEWD) was created in the Ministry of

Transportation and was criticized for the "relative ease with which money could be obtained"

and for creating a bad work ethic among youth (Hosein and Tewari 2004:14).

Officially launched by the PNM's Manning Administration in 2002, a newer incarnation

of DEWD - CEPEP's annual budget requests and allocation have been sustained at high levels

under both prior PNM Administrations and under the current People's Partnership government.[22]

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[20] URP refers to the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago (GORTT) Unemployment Relief Programme.

[21] CEPEP refers to the Community-based Environmental Protection and Enhancement Program. See GORTT, Ministry of Housing and The Environment, CEPEP Company Limited home page. http://mphe.gov.tt/agenciesdivisions/ccl.html Accessed November 2012. See also Javeed, Asha. 2012. "It Pays to Work for CEPEP", Story created June 9, 2012, TrinidadExpress.com. http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/It_pays_to_work_at_CEPEP-158331465.html Accessed November 2012; Gordon, Zahra, 2012. "Independent Senator Charges: CEPEP Funding Criminal Activities", Trinidad and Tobago Guardian, eEdition, Published Friday, September 28, 2012, http://guardian.co.tt/news/2012-09-27/independent-senator-charges-cepep-funding-criminal-activities Accessed November 2012; Trinidad and Tobago News Bulletin Board, 2005. "Senator: URP, CEPEP Breeding Ground for Gangs", First published in the www.newsday.co.tt on Saturday 30th April, 2005. http://www.trinidadandtobagonews.com/forum/webbbs_config.pl/noframes/read/2835 Accessed November 2012. For more official information on CEPEP, see the CEPEP webpage on the Ministry of Housing and the Environment's website at http://mphe.gov.tt/about-us-ccl.html. Accessed November 2012.

[22] See Rambally, Rhonda Krystal. 2012 (Sunday, September 23). CEPEP Wants $700 m in Budget", Trinidad and Tobago Guardian online. http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2012-09-23/cepep-wants-700-m-budget Accessed November 2012. To the PP Administration's credit, there have been efforts to bring some financial accountability to the program. See CEPEP's 2009 and 2010 audited financial report, http://www.cepep.co.tt/Financial1.pdf. Accessed January 2013.The PP government has also made efforts to sharpen the environmental focus of the organization but they have nevertheless, expanded it rather than limiting its reach and much of the expansion has been in the UNC's and PP's constituency areas. Some of this expansion had begun under the previous PNM-Manning Administration. See also, "Manning: CEPEP Wage Hike in Budget." The Trinidad Guardian newspaper, Friday, 10th August 2007. Guardian online: http://legacy.guardian.co.tt/archives/2007-08-10/news6.html Accessed November 2012. This

The T&T Auditor General's Report in 2008, indicated that CEPEP had spent some $1.6 billion in public money between the years 2004 and 2006 "with no proper accounting procedures in place."[23] As the *Trinidad and Tobago Newsday* newspaper reported, the Government was funding CEPEP at these levels in exchange for "cut grass and painted stones." The article explains that CEPEP workers typically work four hours a day and are paid above minimum wage, earning at least $20TT per hour. The newspaper goes on to state that,

> "Not only has CEPEP failed to reach any of these goals in the past five years, but the programme hasn't even made the country noticeably cleaner and less unkempt. In January 2007, after the release of the Auditor-General's Report, this newspaper wrote: "If the Patrick Manning administration is serious about transparency and morality in public affairs, it will immediately appoint a forensic investigator to examine the disbursement of contracts in the CEPEP. We wait to see what action the Government will take – or not take."[24]

Then Prime Minister Patrick Manning provided the government's rationale for shielding both CEPEP and URP from impending budget cuts. He stated that their aim was to use these programs to mitigate the impacts of anticipated increases in unemployment levels. According to some news reports, the URP budget outstrips that of CEPEP. In 2009, URP was funded at $442 million while CEPEP received approximately $300 million. The lion's share of the T&T Government's budget allocations for social service programs, however, go to the Senior Citizens' Grant amounting to $1.6 billion in 2009.[25] The programs are also therefore important

article quotes then Prime Minister Manning promising to increase CEPEP wages in the 2008 Budget. The Prime Minister described CEPEP as "...the single most significant intervention that Government has made in the lives of female heads of households who have children to support." Then UNC (Opposition Party) Leader, Basdeo Panday responded to these comments, describing them as a smokescreen. Mr. Panday went on to state, "As I understand, CEPEP cannot raise their wages. That is given to contractors. What is required is for workers to have the right to join a union. Only then can they ensure that they are not ripped off as they are now. Talk of a pay increase is only an election smokescreen. There'll be many more like this to come."

[23] See "Questioning CEPEP" 2008 (November 3). *Trinidad and Tobago Newsday* on line. http://www.newsday.co.tt/news/0,89197.html Accessed November 2012.

[24] Quoted in "Questioning CEPEP" 2008 (November 3). Trinidad and Tobago Newsday on line. http://www.newsday.co.tt/news/0,89197.html Accessed November 2012.

[25] See The *Trinidad Express Newspaper* Online Edition. Taitt, Ria Political Editor. (2011, Feb 5). "$742M Spent on URP and CEPEP." Trinidad Express Newspapers.

tools for maintaining social order given the nature of the current hegemony in T&T. Prime

Minister Manning stated that there would be no cuts to CEPEP or URP, despite his concurrent

announcement of $5.3 billion worth of budget cut backs in anticipation of a revenue shortfall in a

comparable amount that resulted from the global financial crisis. Instead, Mr. Manning later said

that his administration would expand CEPEP to create employment opportunities, because he

expected unemployment to rise due to international financial instability."[26]

At that time, Kamla Persad-Bissessar, speaking in the Parliament as the Leader of the

Opposition had a different view of CEPEP, URP and the PNM's motives for delivering these

social service programs, as well as their performance:[27]

> "CEPEP was introduced at a time when employment was around 10 per cent, and
> declining as a result of sustainable well-paid private sector jobs. When the
> programme was introduced it had no impact on the employment figures, because
> the jobs were not sustainable. They were short-term contracts. In order to make
> the jobs qualify for being counted, the Government extended the contracts to one
> year. Although the contracts were for one year, the jobs were not paying, and
> productivity was not at desired levels.
>
> Mr. Speaker, CEPEP and the alphabet soup of programmes such as MuST,
> HYPE and YAPA have not taken participants on to better lives. CEPEP workers
> have remained in CEPEP. The highest they may reach is at the level of a gang
> supervisor. They cannot own a company; to do that you have to be a PNM
> financier."
>
> An inspection of these sites will find individuals performing tasks for which they
> do not have qualifications and for which they are not fully remunerated. While
> these programmes have created an artificial illusion that the unemployment
> problem has been solved, the truth is that it has a tremendous damage to the
> labour market.

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http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/_742m_spent_on_URP_and_CEPEP-115361104.html. Accessed November 2012.

[26] The Trinidad and Tobago *Express Newspaper* reported the information reported here. See http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/CEPEP_must_now_account_to_Parliament-115476574.html. Accessed December 2012.

[27] Given that the key methodological approach of this research is based upon narratives, it is important that the narratives of key actors are represented in the text as they are and unmediated by the author in an effort to preserve the nature of the stories being told. Long versions of texts, while not typical of dissertations are preserved in this work, for the purpose of maintaining the integrity of the narrative (including the British spelling of words as they appear in the original texts) for the reader review.

Interviewed by the Guardian in an article on August 03, 2006, National Canners Limited Managing Director, Jeremy Matouk, said labour shortages are preventing him from increasing his production capacity by 50 per cent.

Matouk said the difficulty in sourcing reliable, skilled-labour is artificial and said: "The problem won't be that bad were it not for government's 'make-work programmes.'" He said he had workers who have left full-time jobs for the make-work programmes. He said this was causing wages to increase without increasing productivity.

Kiss Baking Company director and then TTMA President, Paul Quesnel, in the same article said employers are being forced to "sweeten the pot" to keep workers. He said: "That is causing the cost of doing business to escalate. The cost of producing what you produce goes up and when you have to sell it, you become less competitive."

Mr. Speaker, that is how the Government's mismanagement of the labour situation and their politically expedient tactics have affected the price of bread. Perhaps, the only way for the private sector to remain competitive and raise productivity is to do like the Government and hire foreign scab-labour. While that might bring down the price of goods and services, the population may find itself unemployed and broke.

Mr. Speaker, one of the stated aims of the CEPEP programme when it was introduced was that it would create entrepreneurs. Since 2002, there have been arguments from all quarters that the method was not consistent with the concept of entrepreneurship. It leaned more towards profiteering. The evidence is here and it is buttressed by the findings of the Auditor General's special report on CEPEP and documents sourced through the Freedom of Information Act.

The general theme is that not many entrepreneurs were created. The majority of CEPEP contractors were established in some form of business before joining the programme. Most of them are not involved in environmental maintenance and landscaping. A significant number of them have been identified as PNM supporters, activists and financiers. Indeed, in this very House, we have gone through the list and that is recorded in the Hansard."[28]

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[28] The Hansard, Friday, August 24, 2007, 561-563. The excerpt is from the Opposition Leader's statement to the Trinidad and Tobago Parliament on the Appropriations Bill (Budget). Pdf accessed on line at: www.ttparliament.org/hansards/hh20070824.pdf Accessed November 2012. See also, Rampersad, Curtis Ed. 2010 (July 28th). "Make Work Programmes Taking Fast Food Staff Away." Business Express, Trinidad Express Newspapers. http://www.trinidadexpress.com/business-magazine/99443099.html Accessed November 2012; and "Worrying Downside to URP and CEPEP". Created August 17, 2012. Express Editorial. Trinidad Express Newspapers, http://www.trinidadexpress.com/commentaries/Worrying_downside_to_URP_and_CEPEP-166616846.html Accessed December 2012.

Not only does the UNC Opposition Leader raise the matter of the efficacy and political motivations behind the promotion of the CEPEP "make work program" and other social programs, she also raises the point about the Manning administration's lack of accountability to the public on key government decisions and the lack of proper consultation:

> "Where was the consultation when he [Prime Minister Manning] decided that he was going to bless himself with a $200 million play house? Where was the consultation when he travelled to Africa and agreed to help them fight poverty? Where was the consultation when he raised their salaries? Where was the consultation when he made his wife, the Minister of Education? Where was the consultation when he decided that 30 per cent of the children writing the SEA must be failed? Where was the consultation when he signed the MOU to build aluminum smelters here? Where was the consultation when he gave preferential gas prices to Alcoa, condemning future generations of this country to that commitment? Where was the consultation when he met with known criminal gang leaders and renamed them community leaders, offering them prime jobs in URP and CEPEP contracts? Where was the consultation when CEPEP contracts were being shared among PNM groups and friends?"[29]

The concerns raised by the then Opposition Leader, and now current Prime Minister about CEPEP and similar social programs, as well as the need for accountability, transparency, consultation, and voice validate the empirical research findings on T&T's experience as a late developing country that has experienced the dynamics of the natural resource curse. Her speech also illuminates some of the linkages among the government's pursuit of rent-seeking behaviors, how social programs are deployed to promote processes of political patronage, and how these choices in turn impact local manufacturing, labor markets, and the lives of everyday citizens. What is interesting is that the conditions described above continue to be largely unchanged, even under the new People's Partnership government, led by the Persad-Bissessar administration. The tables have merely turned with the PNM now in opposition and asserting the need to redress

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[29] The Hansard, Friday, August 24, 2007, p. 574. The excerpt is from the Opposition Leader's statement to the Trinidad and Tobago Parliament on the Appropriations Bill (Budget). Pdf accessed on line at: www.ttparliament.org/hansards/hh20070824.pdf Accessed November 2012.

similar problems, while neither side seems to offer remedies that would address the opportunity

structures that create these problems in the first place.[30] They rather revert to narratives that

suggest that the solution lies with having their own political party or particular charismatic party

leader in charge, or they employ coded notions of race. Meanwhile, programs like CEPEP

continue to be used by various government administrations as political resource mobilization

tools. For instance, according to a recent article in one of the national newspapers,

> "Opposition Leader Dr Keith Rowley and PNM General Secretary Ashton Ford
> yesterday said Government was instructing CEPEP and URP workers to come to
> the Waterfront Parliament in support of the Prime Minister (Kamla Persad-
> Bissessar) for the debate on the motion of no confidence. Ford said Balisier House
> in Port of Spain was being flooded with calls from supporters who said they were
> being told to abandon their jobs in CEPEP and URP and come down to the
> Parliament building or risk losing their employment. Ford said: "People are
> confused because they don't want to be identified with a corrupt Government, but
> if they don't come out they would not get paid or they might be fired. ... Just as
> they (the Government) were using taxpayers money for ads, they are using it to
> mobilize to give the impression that they have support." Rowley said this practice
> was used in the UNC's last anniversary celebration where there was a registration
> tent where CEPEP and URP workers were required to register on arrival. "People
> have to feed their families and will respond to save their income and if the
> Government wants to take that as support, then they are free to do so," he said.
> He added that the PNM knew how to read this and the people who were being
> forced to go outside Parliament knew how to speak whenever the time comes.""[31]

Though blog-posts attract the most attentive respondents with a point of view likely to support

one extreme or another, it is clear that the underlying problems facing T&T are not lost on the

local populace, as demonstrated in these blogposts written in response to the article excerpted

above:

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[30] In addition, the PNM-led opposition criticized the Prime Minister and her Administration for seeking out trade relations with India.

[31] Taitt, Ria (Political Editor). 2012 (March 1). "Rowley: CEPEP Workers Under Pressure". Trinidad Express Newspapers. http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/Rowley-CEPEP-workers-under-pressure-141125173.html Accessed December 2012. See also,

"They demonised URP and CEPEP, and now they are looking to use the same set of workers to satisfy their objectives. When in Government, it is easy to utilise past methods which they condemned before."[32]

"...CEPEP workers was only good to paint stones. Now they are supposed to be part of a mobilization effort. I hope the citizens of our country remember this in 2015."[33]

"If the citizens are true to themselves, they would come to the conclusion that the country cannot succeed without sustainable economic development plans. Does the UNC government have any? TRINIDAD & TOBAGO, think about the future of our country."[34]

Since the issues of CEPEP and URP funding are very political, it is difficult to obtain both the annual allocations and expenditures for each year from a reliable source, short of a Freedom of Information Act request to the appropriate government authorities. The amounts reported Table 1 for each year are sourced from the national newspapers and vary among newspaper sources. Annual budget statements from the Ministry of Finance do not consistently report allocation amounts.

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[32] Addy_OS_V2.0 blogpost on trinidadexpress.com. http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/Rowley-CEPEP-workers-under-pressure-141125173.html Accessed December 2012.

[33] TRINBAGO blogpost on trinidadexpress.com. http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/Rowley-CEPEP-workers-under-pressure-141125173.html Accessed December 2012.

[34] TRINBAGO blogpost on trinidadexpress.com. http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/Rowley-CEPEP-workers-under-pressure-141125173.html Accessed December 2012.

Table 1.3 CEPEP Budget Allocations and Expenditures 2004 - 2012[35]

CEPEP Budget Allocation & Expenditures	Year	Amount (TT$)
Allocated	2004	$225 million
Expenditure	2005	$244 million
Expenditure	2006	$423 million
Expenditure	2007	$350 million
Allocated	2008	$328 million
Allocated	2009	$330 million
Allocated	2010	$319 million
Allocated	2011	$320 million
Allocated	2012	$560 million

Sources: The CEPEP budget allocation and expenditure were culled from the following series of newspaper articles:
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/It_pays_to_work_at_CEPEP-158331465.html;
http://www.newsday.co.tt/news/0,89197.html Accessed November 2012;
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/_742m_spent_on_URP_and_CEPEP-115361104.html;
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/_240m_MORE_FOR_CEPEP-156928605.html;
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/Partnership_s_PNM_budget-102713729.html; and
http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2012-09-23/cepep-wants-700-m-budget. All accessed December 2012, except as
otherwise indicated.

Government patronage is not only achieved via spending on these social programs.

According to Auty (1999) the T&T Government accounted for 50% of all formal, local

employment after the second oil and gas boom. The number is likely to be higher if one could

account for the government's share of informal employment (URP and CEPEP), as well. Gelb

(1988: 278) likewise, demonstrates that during T&T's second oil boom the public sector wage

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[35] See, Javeed, Asha. 2012 (June 9). "It Pays to Work at CEPEP" Trinidad Express Newspapers on line edition.
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/It_pays_to_work_at_CEPEP-158331465.html Accessed November 2012.

bill almost doubled between 1981 and 1982, amounting to some TT$3.1 billion. He notes that this 1982 figure was four times that of the Government's wage bill in 1978 – a mere four years earlier. Robinson et al (2006) assert that Trinidad and Tobago and a small group of other resource-rich nations, unlike Botswana, Chile, Malaysia, Oman, and Thailand, failed to adopt institutional policies that would help them to evade the "low growth trap" (Abidin 2001).

The reason for this omission, according to Robinson and colleagues (2006), can be attributed to two factors; including 1) whether or not the country has low or high quality institutions[36] during a boom; and 2) the incentives facing politicians in that moment. They go on to suggest that low quality institutions make it easier for politicians to make poor policy choices during boom periods, the result being inefficient redistribution of boom income in order to influence political outcomes.[37]

The major sources and pathways of patronage are also, not surprisingly, the subject of repeated media scrutiny, numerous corruption investigations and commissions of inquiry. The President of the Joint Consultative Council for the Construction Industry (JCC)[38] notes that lack of accountability in T&T's system of public procurement is also a source of institutional weakness and a site for government patronage to select contractors. The JCC called for the new PP government to keep its campaign promise to pass rules and regulations that would "establish arrangements for an efficient procurement system ensuring transparency and accountability by

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[36] Here I define weak institutions as those that have only limited autonomy and authority to act in carrying out the mandates of their portfolios on a rational, legal basis rather than one based upon patronage, partisanship and cleavages of colonial patrimonial bureaucracy, such as family and friendship ties, or relationships based upon a particular socioeconomic group membership such as one's race and ethnicity, religion, the area of the country that one is from geographically, or one's gender or place of schooling.
[37] See also Evans and Rausch (2000).
[38] The JCC includes the Association of Professional Engineers of T&T, the T&T Institute of Architects, the Board of Architecture of T&T, the T&T Society of Planners, the T&T Contractors Association, and the Institute of Surveyors of T&T. See "Public Procurement Reform" at http://afraraymond.com/ Accessed November 2012.

all government departments and state enterprises...."[39] Citing a series of instances where public

money has been wasted due to: 1) huge cost over-runs on virtually every large construction

project; 2) the plethora of unfinished projects, and among them, the International Waterfront

Project; and 3) the severe burden that these projects place on the National Treasury.

As JCC President, Afra Raymond asserted, "[t]he continuing delay in completing the

accounts for these State Enterprises shows how difficult it is to work out exactly what the State

owes and to whom."[40] The degree of fiscal waste and mismanagement represented by these and

other projects evidences T&T's current exposure to what scholars in the development field term,

Nigerian Disease. The selection technologies, institutional processes and the control of

information by the state in risk and rentier societies such as T&T, have the effect of narrowing

the range of environmental discourse, and limiting access to due process, thereby preserving the

status quo (Cable, Shriver and Mix 2008).

One might argue that these theoretical perspectives apply to the case of Trinidad and

Tobago and the case of the ALUTRINT smelter project under the more recent, dominant

government regimes (the UNC, PNM, and currently, the People's Partnership). According to

these theorists, where there are high quality institutions, politicians are less capable, and it is

relatively more politically unattractive to redistribute boom income and wealth for political

purposes via patronage systems. They also assert that the public's ability to effectively demand

accountability from politicians exerts some influence over these outcomes. While the weak

institution thesis certainly explains part of Trinidad and Tobago's experience, it sheds little light

on how and why these institutions come about at all, given the opportunities and constraints

facing politicians and the rentier state. It does not account for the role of culture and meaning in

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[39] See http://afraraymond.com/ which cites page 18 of the People's Partnership Manifesto.
[40] See http://afraraymond.com/ which cites page 18 of the People's Partnership Manifesto.

determining how politicians, and citizens make sense of development, environment, or progress and how they see themselves fitting into these situations and their eventual outcomes.

T&T has indeed exhibited weak government institutions associated with the development and environmental review processes in the most recent decade. News media coverage of key events, such as the overnight bulldozing of the Union Industrial Estate greenfield site within hours of the NEC's receipt of a CEC from the EMA, or then Prime Minister Patrick Manning, who announced that Trinidad will have aluminum smelters, despite public protest over the ALCOA smelter proposed for south Trinidad, or rumors about staff sex scandals or bribes being paid to expedite the issuance of CECs, or the local court's overturning of the ALUTRINT Smelter CEC based upon the finding that the regulatory body failed to adhere to proper standards for environmental impact assessments (EIAs), are cases in point. Some 28-30[41] different government agencies can be involved in the CEC process for any given case in point.[42]

As one foreign business man opined during my field work in Trinidad, EIAs "should not cost so much, all you have to do is cut and paste from an EIA that was completed for another nearby project." What was troubling, as well, is that he indicated that a local environmental management professional had given him this advice, and thereby set the expectation about the seriousness of meeting local environmental requirements. He further stated that the environmental compliance procedure added no value to his project's bottom-line but rather was a time-consuming and costly administrative requirement. The entire institutional and cultural environment surrounding environmental permitting for large industrial projects had become imbued with this ethic. While T&T was being lauded for its trailblazing leadership in the region

[41] See GORTT, EMA, "Participatory Bodies". http://www.ema.co.tt/cms/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=55&Itemid=63 Accessed November 2012.
[42] See Cabral, Jose M. 1997. "Environmental Management Strategy for Infrastructure Agencies in Developing Countries." Vol 15 (December), pp. 362-365. (361-376).

on certain environmental issues, such as its involvement in the United Nations Convention on

Biodiversity, its creation of a RAMSAR[43] global wetlands protection site, the involvement of

leading scientists from University of the West Indies in the Nobel Peace Prize winning

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change[44](IPCC), and other efforts in the international

policy arena, the lack of consistent implementation of basic environmental quality standards

made these international efforts appear to be mere categorical conformity aimed at maintaining

its image with international stakeholders. Meanwhile, on the ground, effective environmental

management, due process and stakeholder engagement seemed elusive.

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[43] RAMSAR refers to the Ramsar Convention to which T&T is a contracting party. T&T's Nariva and Caroni Swamps in Trinidad and the Bucco Reef/Bon Accord Lagoon Complex in Tobago are listed under this Convention as a Wetland of International Importance. According to the Ramsar database: Caroni Swamp. 08/07/05; Trinidad; 8,398 ha; 10°34'N 061°27'W, a protected area, is an extraordinarily important wetland near the capital Port of Spain, "since it is ecologically diverse, consisting of marshes, mangrove swamp (5,996 ha), brackish and saline lagoons, and tidal mudflats in close proximity. A total of 20 endangered bird species have been recorded in the site, including the Scarlet ibis (Eudocimus ruber), Comb duck (Sarkidiornis melanotos), White-tailed kite (Elanus leucurus), Snail kite (Rostrhamus sociabilis), and the severely threatened Peregrine falcon (Falco peregrinus). The swamp has been modified by attempted reclamation, and there is some seasonal cultivation on the landward fringe. Caroni Swamp is important economically for oyster and fish harvesting, for hunting and for ecotourism. Ramsar site no. 1497. Most recent RIS information: 2005.Nariva Swamp. 21/12/92; Trinidad; 6,234 ha; 10°23'N 061°04'W. Added to the Montreux Record, 16 June 1993; removed from the Record, 7 January 2002. Forest Reserve. Extensive complex of freshwater swamp forest, permanent herbaceous swamp, seasonally flooded marshes, and mangrove forest. The area supports a rich fauna: at least 13 species of birds, notably Ara ararauna (at least highly endangered; probably extinct); various mammals, including Trichechus manatus (endangered), and reptiles. The fishery provides a livelihood for local people. Human activities include rice, watermelon and marijuana production, felling of mangroves to supply bark to the tanning industry. Subject of a Ramsar Advisory Mission in 1995. Ramsar site no. 577. Most recent RIS information: 1997.Buccoo Reef / Bon Accord Lagoon Complex. 08/07/05; Tobago; 1,287 ha; 11°10'N 060°57'W. Restricted Area (in the process of being designated as Environmentally Sensitive Area). Located on the southwestern coast of Tobago near Scarborough, this site contains several under-represented wetland types such as coral reefs, seagrass beds and mangrove forests. Endangered and vulnerable species in the area include various types of coral (Acropora palmata, Diploria labyrinthiformis, D. strigosa and Siderastrea siderea) as well as the critically endangered Hawkbill turtle (Eretmochelys imbricata) and at least 119 fish species. As the major tourist attraction in Tobago, the reef continues to be adversely affected by intense tourist activity and pollutant discharges. So far the restricted area status and existing management plan have been unable to prevent these impacts. Ramsar site no. 1496." Most recent RIS information available is for the year 2005. The information above was quoted from http://www.ramsar.org/cda/en/ramsar-about-sites/main/ramsar/1-36-55_4000_0__ Accessed December 2012.

[44] Dr. John Agard, a biologist and professor at the University of the West Indies (who also served as Chairman of the EMA Board) and Dr. Roger Pulwarty, a Trinidad and Tobago national and atmospheric scientist at NOAA, received the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize for their work on the Fourth Assessment Report on Climate Change. They shared this Prize with none other than former US Vice President Al Gore. IPCC is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. See http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg2/en/ch16.html , http://sta.uwi.edu/pelican/60under60/jagard.asp and http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg2/en/ch3.html, respectively. See also "Trinis Share Nobel Prize" http://legacy.guardian.co.tt/archives/2007-10-16/news8.html.

The role of social and socioeconomic impacts, cumulative effects assessments and appropriate methods for the conduct of, and standards for the evaluation of local EIAs remain obscure and haphazardly applied. In his paper on environmental management strategy and infrastructure for developing nations, Cabral (1997) states that the "nonexistence of national standards and criteria of acceptable levels of air, water and land quality" in Trinidad and Tobago constrains the performance of environmental impact assessments.

Critical to this constraint is the lack of, or the relative inaccessibility of objective data on current baseline ecological conditions against which projected baseline conditions created by proposed projects can be measured. The fact that this basic information either does not exist at all, in the proper form or is hard to access - often siloed in one government bureaucracy or another, in the offices of private firms with first mover privileges in the field, or the private possessions of elites - makes rational, scientific decision-making on the likely impacts of any project difficult to assess. The circumstances that Cabral described in his 1997 study remain largely true today.[45] National baseline environmental quality remains legally undefined in key areas, making questionable the legal basis for enforcement. Basic scientific, environmental information is still *de facto* private information in T&T, which frustrates the EIA process, making it expensive and time-consuming for both project proponents and regulators.[46] The proponents of each major project would be required to gather the full range of relevant environmental data, where it does not already exist, if the assessment is to meet EIA standards that are common in Core nations or late developers with stronger institutional frameworks for

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[45] Cabral (1997:364).

[46] In 2010, I suggested to the National Energy Corporation and staff at the EMA, that the NEC should complete baseline environmental data gathering and analysis for all of its planned industrial park projects and simply recover the cost of obtaining the baseline data in its lease arrangements. This would provide sound reliable, readily available data for new industrial estate entrants, and speed up the environmental review process. The proposal did not gain traction, however.

environmental protection. The relatively limited familiarity and experience of local "experts" with the level of performance that is required, the EMA's still limited ability to effectively adjudicate the quality of EIAs in part due to resource constraints,[47] and the limited experience of the entire national environmental regulatory framework's institutional apparatus with implementation - that is, the "establishment and coordination of the inter-institutional actions and mechanisms demanded by the process"[48] - is a continuing liability to effective environmental management and protection in T&T. Not that *protection* is necessarily the stated goal, either - even if that is what the public increasingly expects of the government bureaucracy on environmental matters. Local activist, Attillah Springer, speaks candidly in her blog about the extent of the ongoing environmental challenges in T&T:[49]

> "Most Trinidadians have forgotten, if they ever even knew, that in 2004 when the 800 acres for the Union Industrial Estate was being cleared during the Easter weekend, the workers who were assigned to clear the land are re-ported by witnesses from the communities to have bludgeoned startled monkeys to death as they tried to flee the invading bulldozers. Eight years have passed and still no one has been brought to book for that crime. Nor for the crimes that followed, with the people of those communities having to deal with the respiratory effects of living in a dustbowl. The EMA in typical fashion said, well it wasn't that many turtles anyway. That is not a great departure from the general modus operandi of the EMA. Who, to be fair, is true to its name and has no real interest in protecting the environment. Protection of turtles is a far less important thing than managing the staff who kill them. Protecting a community is far less important than managing

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[47] A case in point is the $100,000 TT maximum that the EMA is allowed to require from project proponents whose CEC applications are determined to require a full blown EIA. Given the EMA's limited technical capacity, it is often required to augment its environmental review and compliance team with external expertise. Much of that expertise is hired from outside T&T and this fee is seldom sufficient to cover the cost of these outside professional services. This puts the agency in the bind of either limiting the use of these necessary outside sources of expertise to build or augment its capacity to respond effectively to the demands of complex, often controversial projects that have not been constructed on the island before, or going to its line Ministry for budget allocation to cover such costs. Under the PNM administration, this latter course of action may have opened the EMA to greater than usual scrutiny by the administration's cabinet, as well as criticism, if not outright threat against its very survival.
[48] Cabral (1997:364).

[49] Given that the key methodological approach of this research is based upon narratives, it is important that the narratives of key actors are represented in the text as they are and unmediated by the author in an effort to preserve the nature of the stories being told. Long versions of texts, while not typical of dissertations are preserved in this work, for the purpose of maintaining the integrity of the narrative (including the British spelling of words as they appear in the original texts) for the reader review.

the expectations of the big money who want to set up their plants to make more money and give a few low-paying jobs to the surrounding communities as if that in any way can compensate them for their loss of quality of life. It's hard for me to go back to sleep after the news sounds a Trinidad alarm in my heart. I am haunted by grinning dogs with turtles' flippers in their jowls. But the dogs have human faces and the corbeaux are wearing suits. And the turtles are the lives of all of us. Waiting to be managed or pushed out of the way."

Figure 1.1 Union Industrial Estate

Source: http://www.nec.co.tt

For Springer, the unbridled killing of the monkeys and other wildlife to clear the site for

the Union Estate was carried out by contractors working for a state agency that has responsibility

for the creation of industrial estates, the NEC. According to local accounts, the Union Estate site was cleared almost immediately after the NEC had received an approved CEC for the project. What observers say about this incident was that the NEC managed to have the site bulldozed practically overnight upon receipt of the CEC (environmental permit), which meant that they had dotted the proverbial i's and crossed the scientific and regulatory t's - the necessary administrative procedures - to move forward and they did so with an implied vengeance. Locals from the area described driving by in the evening and seeing the greenfield site that they had been accustomed to, and the next morning, driving by to see the scraped red earth and a multitude of dead or dying animals and razed trees. Others stated that bulldozers simply entered and scraped down every living thing on the site from all sides. It is difficult to find actual newspaper coverage of this story. Based upon the accounts provided by locals from various walks of life, it left a vivid and disturbing mark upon the public psyche. As it was difficult to find news stories on the event, whenever I hear it, I wonder how it could be true, and so poignant and yet so difficult to recover in the public record.

In none of my conversations with locals, including those in the regulatory bodies, could anyone explain the rationale for the approach undertaken by the NEC. It certainly was legal - it met the letter of the law and the NEC's CEC passed regulatory muster with the EMA and the twenty-odd other government agencies that had some responsibility for the CEC approval. To the present day, environmentalists and others question the process for clearing the estate and it seems to have sent an unspoken but loud and clear message, that the EMA's science-based CEC process, failing to stave off the carnage, was lacking.

Home-grown Expertise & Institutional Weakness

T&T's environmental experts have come out of the basic scientific disciplines with degrees from the University of the West Indies and earn environmental experience by having been repeatedly selected to fill the environmental compliance niche based upon basic scientific credentials, such as an advanced graduate degree or doctoral education in biology, physics or engineering, but also based on affiliation, and class status. Very few of the environmental review experts have had the usually requisite combination of formal environmental education and training coupled with experience in performing professional environmental review, quantitative risk assessment, or the conduct of public review, engagement and comment outside the still nascent and weak institutional conditions of T&T. Cabral (1997) correctly suggests that these shortcomings would be overcome with experience, however, increasing levels of experience, absent formal, rational-legal institutional frameworks that encourage the raising and adherence to standards and licensing, may not be sufficient to effectively address the problem. Additionally, the lack of environmental protection institutions that are independent and accountable from the political imperatives of the rentier State, creates a scenario for dueling experts making it difficult for the public to discern who is telling the truth about the scientific merits and hazards of just about any project that is targeted as being potentially environmentally harmful, even when the motivations for these claims are without merit and are politically motivated. The public is unable to discern the relative differences among projects that are likely to be harmful or dangerous to the fence-line (abutting) communities, workers or society at large and those that are not. The institutional capacity and processes that are necessary to resolve this problem, are simply not put in place because there is no political will to do so, and likewise, no resources are allocated by these institutions to provide appropriate redress. In this situation, those who can erect the most

convincing narratives about any proposed project win the legitimacy and social license that comes with the support of the masses, no matter how misguided, and despite the actual scientific facts associated with the effort. Environmental review of development proposals and projects in this present era is therefore adjudicated by sociocultural phenomena rather than via a scientific, evidence based, rational approach.

The role of the EMA and its autonomy remains ambiguous in part because the agency's CEO and Board decisions are subject to final review by the Minister of the Environment, and for controversial projects, the CEO of the EMA might even be contacted by the Office of the Prime Minister, according to some local observers. The EMA, at best therefore, has only a limited autonomy and authority, and despite the regulatory requirements to share decision-making with some 29 other government agencies, the public still looks to the EMA to be the final arbiter of a broad range of environment and development issues. The fragmented nature of the EMA's jurisdiction over environmental matters remains largely obscure from the public, nevertheless. The role of other key agencies, such as the Town and Country Planning Division of the Ministry of Planning, which has responsibility for development plans, zoning and land use, the Forestry and Wildlife Divisions of the Ministry of Agriculture, the Drainage Division of the Ministry of Works, and the Water Resources Agency, a unit within the Water and Sewerage Authority, are among some of the key responsible agencies who share jurisdiction and responsibility with the EMA for many large projects, but whose roles, responsibilities and regulatory scopes over particular projects remain obscure or too convoluted to be easily understandable to the public.

What makes things even more complicated is the tendency of some new government administrations to rearrange some of these agencies into different ministries when it is politically expedient to do so. For instance, the environmental portfolio was grouped with the utility

infrastructure portfolio to form the Ministry of Public Utilities and the Environment under one PNM government, and then Environment was joined with the Ministry of Planning in a subsequent PNM administration. Under the current PP Government Administration, the portfolio is under the Minister of Housing and Environment. The institutional instability of the portfolio certainly does not promote the creation of a strong, autonomous and accountable institution. As Cabral (1997) noted, and based upon the observation of my fieldwork in this arena, despite modest gains at the EMA due to a committed staff, the institutional arrangements for environmental management in T&T remain unsuitable for the types of projects that form the basis of its development by invitation strategy. The environmental regulatory regime remains unfit for implementing the more involved environmental reviews required of complex petrochemical industry and other major infrastructure projects, including the expansion or repair of major roads, highways and bridges, where baseline data are insufficient to properly assess the significance of potential environmental effects, or where projects are proposed for environmentally sensitive areas.[50]

Additionally, confidential conversations with agency staff about strengthening standards raised issues around the dissolution of the agency by the PNM Administration, if the EMA sought to carry out too strong an environmental protection agenda. That is, a regulatory agenda perceived by the Administration as being too tough or an approach that appeared to be too slow at generating the CEC approvals necessary for any major industrial development. Senior staff salaries in the EMA in 2010 were far lower than that paid to senior government staff who administer the CEPEP program, and the fines set by law for environmental violations were relatively insignificant in the context of the environmental crimes perpetrated. For instance, one company constructed its large box retail commercial building without applying for the CEC as

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[50] Cabral (1997:370).

required and faced a fine of $100,000 TT dollars (roughly $15,750 US) for a project that was valued at millions of dollars. The CEC rules are also routinely ignored by other government agencies, such as the Urban Development Company of Trinidad and Tobago (UDECOTT),[51] which applied for a CEC without providing complete information on the project description, thereby failing to disclose the construction of a hotel. That a government agency would fail to uphold the law and apply for a CEC as required is untenable. It is even moreso when the agency that fails to comply with the environmental laws of the land, share the same ministerial portfolio as the Ministry of the Environment. This was the case with the Ministry of Housing and its housing development projects.

The EMA has also been the brunt of public ostracism for lack of proper enforcement of environmental policies, not just on the matter of EIA review and the permitting of mega-projects, but its inability to enforce laws that protect endangered leatherback turtles, sensitive habitat areas such as the Aripo Savannah (a designated Environmentally Sensitive Area under the UN Convention on Biodiversity signed by T&T in 1992) and other areas of environmental sensitivity. Baptiste and Nordenstam (2010) and Baptiste (2008) in her study of wetlands protection of the Ramsar site in Trinidad, demonstrated that spatial proximity to the site of ecological impact of oil and gas development shapes rural attitudes about whether or not the affected wetlands should be monitored or actively protected by government environmental policies and regulations.

The Authority seems to be most vigilant about noise pollution rather than the protection of these sensitive areas. As the author of a letter to the *Newsday* newspaper opined, "It is time someone reminds the EMA they are not only responsible for shutting down fetes and noisy bars.

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[51] See Bagoo, Andre. 2008. "EMA Fines UDECOTT" *Trinidad and Tobago Newsday*, (Wednesday, April 30, 2008). http://www.newsday.co.tt/news/0,77949.html

They are the caretakers of the environment, including plants, animals, and all land and sea."[52] In

response to the letter that this comment is excerpted from, a blogger responded by asking, "how

many votes is "the environment" allowed in an election?"[53]

Consequences of the Tension between Development and Environment

Tensions between development and environment in petro-economies, and the resulting

conflicts associated with rent-seeking behaviors among internal factions and/or the strategies of

the rentier state, itself have often resulted in violent struggles and armed conflict involving local

elites, multinational corporations, governments, international aid institutions, and

environmentalists.[54] The research on this subject indicates that natural resource rents create the

conditions for attracting rent-seeking behaviors, which can be destabilizing to the host society.

Typically, developing countries whose economies are predominantly dependent on the extraction

and export of primary commodities via the legal or illegal exploitation of natural resources, are at

"substantially higher risk of violent conflict and poor governance."[55] The particularities of local

conditions do influence the degree to which this outcome is likely to occur.

The mere presence of the rentier state, does not however, create the opportunity structure

for social instability. More recent work on rentier states shows that intermediate variables such

as political, social and cultural processes matter, and in some instances, the rent seeking

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[52] Singh, J. 2012. "None in Authority Cares About the Environment." Created July 14, 2012. Triniadad and Tobago Newsday. http://www.trinidadexpress.com/letters/None_in_authority__cares_about_the_environment-162491936.html Accessed November 2012.
[53] See blog post by Trikidadian at http://www.trinidadexpress.com/letters/None_in_authority__cares_about_the_environment-162491936.html Accessed November 2012.
[54] There is a large and fairly robust literature on this subject. For example see Azam (1995), Beblawi and Luciani (1987), Belbawi (1990), Collier and Hoeffler (1998), Collier and Hoffler (2004), Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000), Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (2009), Fjelde (2009), Humphreys (2005), Le Billon (2001 and 2003), Robinson, Torvik and Verdier (2006), Ross (2004), Sachs and Warner (2001)Smith (2004), Tridimas (2011), Tullock (1980), and Fearon and Laitin (2003).
[55] Bannon and Collier (2003: ix).

behaviors of actors including the rentier state can also create conditions for stability.[56]

Institutional quality or independence and autonomy from the imperatives of government regimes (Smith 2004), the available levels of resource rents, and the government's ability to make credible commitments have also been identified in current research, as critical conditions that determine whether or not countries with natural resource based economies, and managed by a rentier state will experience conflict or stability (Bjorvatn and Naghavi 2011).

Political Destabilization

A notable example of the more typical outcome - destabilization - is the experience of the state, grassroots and international environmental and social justice movements, and Shell Oil in Nigeria.[57] Algeria, Venezuela and Iran some scholars argue, likewise fit this destabilization thesis.[58] For many developing nations, environmental conflicts tend to be among the central causes[59] of social unrest - a concentration of challenges from the local classes. From the worldview of those who support a neoliberal development agenda, environmental challenges tend to be about what Freudenberg (2005:100) terms "necessary harms" on the path to economic growth, development and prosperity. This necessary harms approach appears to have become the *de facto* policy of previous T&T governments, and in particular that of the PNM Administration that was ousted in the 2010 National Election.

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[56] See Bjorvatn et al (2011).

[57] See Effiong (2010), Nwokeji (2007) and Nwaobi (2005) on Shell Oil and other oil companies' behavior and violence in Nigeria. Smith, David. 2011. "Shell Accused of Fuelling Violence in Nigeria by Paying Rival Militant Gangs: Oil Company Rejects Watchdog's Claims that its Local Contracts made it Complicit in the Killing of Civilians" *The Guardian*, World News, October 2. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/03/shell-accused-of-fuelling-nigeria-conflict Accessed September 28, 2012. Or see Demer, Lisa. 2011. "Oil Spills and Violence Plague Shell Operations in Nigeria." *Anchorage Daily News*, December 5th. http://www.adn.com/2011/12/04/2202761/spills-violence-follow-shell-in.html Accessed September 28, 2012. More broadly, see Bannon, Ian and Paul Collier, Eds. 2003. *Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions*. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

[58] See Smith (2004:242).

[59] Others include poverty, access to jobs, health care, and basic amenities such as reliable electricity and potable water supplies.

Ross (2001) and others have found that oil and gas wealth is associated with authoritarian government and weak democracy, but as mentioned above, local conditions and temporality do matter, thereby highlighting the need for a more non-reductionist approach to explaining the variation in any single developing nation's development performance at any given point in time. This is not to say that key empirical trends do not matter - such as the opportunities and constraints facing Third World nations under neoliberalization, the inherent push for particular forms of marketization and the incorporation of resource rich late developers into the core/periphery system and political economy. It is however, an acknowledgment of the contingency that is still nevertheless apparent in the Third World development process, in part simply because conditions change, and also because the shifting milieu of local economic, political, cultural and social conditions do matter in shaping development patterns. This contingent nature of development outcomes and the role of culture and meaning making about environment and development are what I demonstrate to be the situation in Trinidad and Tobago.

Evidence shows that T&T has, up through the year 2005, maintained a strong democracy despite its natural resource wealth and across oil and gas booms (Haber and Menaldo 2011), though one might argue that this finding really depends on how one defines democracy. If democracy is merely defined as the nations ability to hold democratic elections - a point statistic, the definition employed in most of these studies, then the findings hold. If democracy is defined to reflect issues of transparency, accountability and public voice in decision making about key policy issues, the findings may well differ. Earlier work and more recent studies on the oil and gas developing economies and democracy, including Robinson, et al. (2006) suggest that the issues that face resource rich nations and specifically, Trinidad and Tobago involve: 1) policy failures as a prime cause of underperformance (Lal and Myint 1996); 2) sharp increases in public

sector (government) spending during boom periods (Gelb, 1986; and 1988); 3) politically

motivated strategies to expand the public sector; 4) the resulting fiscal over-extension of the

State (Auty 1999; 2001); 5) the lack of proper institutional development to support the economy

through boom and bust cycles; 6) the need for staffing the Government bureaucracy with trained

technocrats based on merit and not merely with political appointees in exchange for patronage;

and 7) the need for continuity of key sectoral policies across political regimes. Raymond's

(2012) account of the local situation however, supports and concretizes the rentier hypothesis for

Trinidad and Tobago, and validates many of these research findings:

> "Our society is beset by large-scale corruption, which sustains wrong-headed
> decision-making. The wider social consequences of that toxic culture are now
> hatching, with a vengeance, in the naked violence and wily crimes which pre-
> occupy our head-space.
>
> The killing-fields of East POS, the decimation of African urban youths, the URP
> and CEPEP gangs and the battle for turf are all part of this picture.
> As long as our society continues to applaud and reward dishonest, corrupt
> behaviour, we will continue sliding downhill.
>
> The structure of our economy is that most of the country's foreign exchange is
> earned by the State in the form of oil & gas earnings. The rest of the society
> relies on the State and its organs to recycle those earnings for the benefit of those
> of us not directly engaged in the energy sector.
>
> For that reason, the State casts a very long shadow in our country, far more so
> than in other places. Virtually every substantial business relies on the State and
> its organs for a significant part of its earnings. A healthy connection with the
> State is essential for good profits.
>
> But that is where the particular problem is, since the conduct of the State and its
> organs is often found to be lacking in the basic ingredients of fairplay,
> accountability and transparency."[60]

International metrics also provide evidence of the salient symptoms of institutional

weakness discussed by Raymond, Robinson et al, Lal and Myint, Auty and others. For instance,

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[60] Raymond, Afra. 2012. Weblog "An Overview on the CIVIL SOCIETY submission to the Joint Select Committee on PUBLIC PROCUREMENT". http://afraraymond.com/ Accessed November 2012.

the US State Department's webpage listed a statement on Trinidad and Tobago's investment climate, highlighting some of the manifestations of these so called, 'necessary harms,' T&T's penchant for *The Nigerian Disease*, and/or other local conditions that created the opportunity structure for silent environmental revolution. The State Department cited the 2011 Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom, which ranked Trinidad & Tobago 13th in the Western Hemisphere and 63rd out of 179 countries worldwide. This Index gave over-dependence on the petrochemical industry and an opaque regulatory system as the key factors that negatively affected the nation's score. T&T ranked 81st out of 139 countries evaluated by another comparable metric, the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Index. The Forum's Global Competitiveness Report identified crime, government bureaucracy, a poor work ethic, and corruption as the four key issues that influenced the score. A third score card, Transparency International's 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), ranked Trinidad & Tobago 91st out of 178 countries. This score represented a decline from T&T's rank at 71st in the year 2010. The perception of corrupt government officials was the primary reason for the drop in this rating scheme.

The crime, government bureaucracy, poor work ethic, and corruption to which the US State Department's statement refers all point toward the weakness of political institutions and a lack of transparency, accountability and the public's voice and meaningful engagement in decision making on key questions about the use of the nation's natural resource wealth, future development options and the protection of the natural environment. As stated in the local newspapers, the current rankings place Trinidad and Tobago behind Jamaica, Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia and St. Vincent - all neighboring nations that have relatively less well developed natural resource extraction based economies, if any at all. In the period before the

most recent boom (in 2001), T&T ranked 5.3 out of 10, which was far better than the 3.2 it

garnered on the CPI in 2011. The 2011 score also represents a worsening of its ranking over its

year 2010 score of 3.6, based on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index. [61]

In Table 1.3 below, Auty (2007) demonstrated that T&T's performance on the World Bank's

Institutional Quality Index was fairly good compared to a group of other selected oil-rich and

comparator nations.

Trinidad and Tobago also obtained a Revenue Watch ranking of 61.9, just below

Venezuela and Iraq, and is grouped among nations that have partial transparency.[62] Despite the

change in political regime from the PNM to the PP, a coalition government comprised of the

primary opposition party, the United National Congress (UNC), the new middle class, pro-

environment/anti-smelter party, namely the COP, and other smaller parties, the nation's rankings

on key indicators of social stability and development continue to decline. This result may

indicate that perhaps the roots of T&T's economic development and environment problems

persist or that evidence of changes that may have been made is lagged and may become apparent

in subsequent rankings. This latter explanation may be less likely the case, given current media

coverage on the PP government's performance and challenges as discussed in Chapter III.

Local and foreign business investors, alike lament that the economy seems to be stagnant

and the coalition government has begun to show signs of distress and splintering as one of the

smaller parties, The Movement for Social Justice, has pulled out of the administration. More

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[61] "A 'Precipitous Drop'." *Trinidad Express Newspaper*, n.d.
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/A__precipitous_drop_-134883803.html. "Transparency International Survey
Shows: T&T down in Corruption Rankings." *The Trinidad Guardian Newspaper*, n.d.
http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2011/12/02/transparency-international-survey-shows-tt-down-corruption-rankings.
[62] Revenue Watch Index 2010. Accessed in November 2012 at http://www.revenuewatch.org/rwindex2010/map.html
Created in partnership with Transparency International, the RW index measures government disclosure and
management of oil, gas and minerals by ranking the degree of transparency in 41 nations. "Index rankings are based
on the availability of information in seven key categories of natural resource governance: access to resources,
generation of revenue, institutional setting, state-owned companies, natural resource funds, sub-national transfers
and status of the country's engagement with the EITI."

recently, a hunger strike by an academic from the University of the West Indies who was a leader of the anti-smelter movement and is now protesting the location of a highway expansion, has caused yet another rift within the PP government.

Table 1.4 Index of institutional quality 2004, oil-rich countries and some comparators.

Country	PCGDP (US$PPP 2004)	Voice + accountability	Political stability	Effective governance	Regulation burden	Rule of law	Graft	Overall index
Oil-rich								
Nigeria	1113	-0.65	-1.48	-1.02	-1.26	-1.44	-1.11	-6.96
Angola	2308	-1.02	-0.95	-1.14	-1.4	-1.33	-1.12	-6.96
Azerbaijan	3390	-0.97	-1.52	-0.81	-0.57	-0.85	-1.04	-5.76
Indonesia	3485	-0.44	-1.38	-0.36	-0.68	-0.91	-0.9	-4.67
Venezuela	4750	-0.46	-1.1	-0.96	-1.24	-1.1	-0.94	-5.8
Algeria	5930	-0.91	-1.42	-0.46	-0.93	-0.73	-0.49	-4.94
Kazakhstan	6280	-1.21	-0.11	-0.63	-0.89	-0.98	-1.1	-4.92
Trinidad + Tobago	10,360	0.49	0.04	0.47	0.61	0.17	0.02	1.8
Saudi Arabia	13,230	-1.63	-0.6	-0.06	-0.34	0.2	0.15	-2.27
Comparators								
Malawi	632	-0.5	-0.33	-0.81	-0.57	-0.29	-0.83	-3.33
Chad	1337	-1.09	-1.2	-1.29	-0.84	-1.15	-1.14	-6.71
Mauritania	2241	-1.16	0.26	-0.22	0.04	-0.62	0.02	-1.68
Morocco	4253	-0.55	-0.23	0.03	0.26	0.05	0.02	-1.14
El Salvador	4894	0.26	0.25	-0.22	0.2	-0.34	-0.39	-0.24
Malaysia	8970	-0.36	0.38	0.99	0.44	0.52	0.29	2.26
Chile	9810	1.09	0.89	1.27	1.62	1.16	1.44	7.47

Source: Auty (2007: 632)

As Sen (1998), Siglitz (1999) and others have demonstrated, transparency - defined as the basic right of the governed population to know and be informed about their government's doings and the reasons for that action - is a critical enabling condition for human development.[63] Additionally, transparency alone is insufficient, but still a necessary ingredient in the creation of a consolidated and accountable state apparatus. Scholarship on the subject increasingly, suggests the importance of the state as an intervening variable in determining whether or not natural resource extractive economy will prove blessing or curse.[64] Hammond (2011:348) has shown that corruption, mismanagement and authoritarian government are "not consequences of resource riches per se" but really depend on the nature of local political conditions at any given point in time. He also suggests that the remedies are multidimensional, and entail sound, accountable governance that is primarily focused on the public welfare and undergirded by sound economic management practices. Siegel (2005:45) points to the important role that international actors, whether from the private, government or civil sector play in shaping the rentier state's reputation and investment concerns - thereby reversing tendencies toward the natural resource curse. In Figure 1.2 below, Haber and Menaldo (2011:7) show that T&T remained democratic during oil booms in the 1970s and between 2000 and 2005. Table 1.4 is sourced from Auty (2007;632) and provides an index of institutional quality for nine oil-rich nations including T&T. It also includes indices for seven comparison nations, all based on 2004 data. Table 1.5, sourced from Haber and Menaldo (2011: 6) provides a categorization of 53 resource reliant countries by whether or not they were found to be resource blessed, cursed or neutral based upon this study.

The mixed findings for T&T in the empirical literature suggests that there may be variability in the degree of the resource curse based upon factors other than fiscal reliance and

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[63] See Kaufmann and Bellver (2005) for a sound treatment of transparency and development.
[64] Hayman and Carini (2011).

polity as operationalized by Haber and Monaldo (2011). Alternatively, the measures of democratization used may not have been nuanced and robust enough to capture variables such as the lack of voice and transparency or the presence of institutional weakness that matter for evaluating the quality of democracy as opposed to whether or not democratic elections were held during the boom periods.

While T&T certainly shares the features of many petro-economies, it remains unique in that despite evidence of poor transparency and accountability, the rise of environmentalism has not, to date, come about through violent revolution or other forms of brutal civilian unrest. Instead, Trinidad and Tobago has experienced something akin to a silent environmental revolution (Gramsci 1971; Green 2003; Tugal 2009; Hesketh 2010) that has apparently halted the nation's rush to achieve its Vision 2020 - a mandate to attain "developed nation" status by 2020. What explains this unusual and poignant result?

Figure 1.2 T&T Levels of Democracy and Fiscal Reliance During Oil Booms

FIGURE 1. Trinidad and Tobago

Polity

Fiscal Reliance

Total Resource Income Per Capita

Source: Haber and Menaldo (2011:7)

Table 1.5 Resource Blessing, Curse or Neutrality for 53 Resource Reliant Countries

Patterns of Potential Resource Blessings and Curses

Panel A: Potentially Resource–blessed Countries

Remained Democratic during a Resource Boom	Democratized during or after a Resource Boom	Remained at Threshold of Democracy (Polity = 80) during a Resource Boom	Polity Increased by at Least One S.D. during or after a Resource Boom
Jamaica	Botswana	Estonia	Algeria
Lithuania	Ecuador	Namibia	Angola
Netherlands	Mexico		Iran
Norway	Mongolia		Kyrgyzstan
Papua New Guinea	Peru		
Trinidad and Tobago	Russia		
	Venezuela		

Panel B: Potentially Resource-cursed Countries

Democratizes after Resource Boom Collapses	Polity Increases by One S.D. When Resource Boom Collapses	Democracy Fails during or after a Resource Boom	Polity Decreases by One S.D. during or after a Resource Boom
Bolivia	Dem. Rep. of Congo	Belarus	Congo
Indonesia	Guinea		
	Liberia		
	Zambia		

Panel C: Neither Blessed nor Cursed

Inconclusive: No Discernable Pattern, or Movement in Polity Precedes Movement in Resources	Country Is Autocracy before Boom, and Remains So Afterward
Azerbaijan	Bahrain
Chile	Cameroon
Malaysia	Egypt
Niger	Equatorial Guinea
Nigeria	Gabon
Tunisia	Iraq
Ukraine	Kazakhstan
	Kuwait
	Libya
	Mauritania
	Morocco
	Oman
	Qatar
	Saudi Arabia
	Tajikastan
	Turkmenistan
	United Arab Emirates
	Vietman
	Yemen

Note: Polity refers to normalized combined Polity score (0 to 100).

Source: Haber and Menaldo (2011:6)

The Recent Boom: Trinidad's 'By-Invitation' Model for Economic Independence

Emmanuel Wallerstein (1979) first described "semiperipheral development by invitation" in an attempt to distinguish his World Systems theory of Third World development from some of the extreme strands of dependency theory, which were criticized for homogenizing the experience of developing (peripheral or semi-peripheral) nations, perhaps overstating their inability to act independently of the political, economic, cultural, and social imperatives of nations in the core.[65] Core regions in this line of thought are defined as the relatively wealthier metropolitan centers of the industrialized "North[66]." The periphery is defined by the nature of dependency relations to the North, and includes the majority of poorer countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, Oceania, and Asia.[67] The countries in the periphery are primarily low cost, raw material producing sectors for the nations of the core, center or North. Raw materials refer to both point and non-point natural resources, ecosystem sinks, and labor.

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[65] For seminal scholarship on dependency theory, refer to the writings of French economist François Perroux, especially his *Power and Economy* published in 1973 (Pp. 139). His articulation of the reasons why economic theory had paid only scant attention to power, including his characterization of power have its basis in three intellectual aspects of dissymmetry - 1) inequality of action and reaction, 2) imperfect reciprocity and 3) imperfection of independence, are highly relevant arguments that underpin the foundations of dependency theory approaches to development. Perroux's argument is that the whole logical structure of equilibrium growth models, which forms the rationale and justification for the veracity of modernist views of development, relies upon the unequal distribution of power and social inequality among workers and capitalists (and their Third World managers). He illustrates that rates of profit and wages are less so the result of 'invisible hand' market discipline, but more typically the result of power relationships, while still taken as exogenous variables in economic theory and models. He asserts that multinational firms or other economic groupings acting in the global economic system also avail themselves of organizational arrangements that are also formed by and imbued with power relationships, and the global practices of these entities - whether flows of goods and services, capital, information and processes - fundamentally engender their cultural ascendency, and their ability to exert influence to shape both the rules of the market (Perroux refers to this as the "game") and to persuade or even coerce authorities, including the State in some Third World countries, to act in their favor. See the English language review of Perroux's *Power and Economy* written by W.E. Kuhn. (Dec 1977:909-912). See also the writings of Swiss sociologist Volker Bornschier (1979, 1980, 1985) on the long term effects of multinational corporations on poorer nations in Latin America, Africa, Asia, which he saw as negative. For a review of a few key efforts in a rather profuse field of research in this area see also works by Karl Polanyi (1944, 1957, 1966), Kurt Rothschild (1971), Galtung (1971), Samir Amin (1976), sociologist and former Brazilian President, Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1979), Andre Gunder Frank (1967 and 1998), Seers (1981), Walden Bello (1998, 1999, 2003, 2009), Walter Rodney (1968, 1970, 1972, 1973), Arno Tausch (2003, 2010) and others. Latin American and other Third World or South-centered social scientists have contributed significantly to this body of research.

[66] Friedmann, J. 1966. *Regional Development Policy: A Case Study of Venezuela*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

[67] Tausch (2003:467).

Peripheral nations also tend to be subject to high penetrations of foreign capital (typically in the form of transnational corporations). They are often fairly technologically or scientifically dependent upon core economies and their productive capacities tend to be focused on the extraction and the export of commodities as required by their location in the global division of labor. These relations also apply to countries in the semi-periphary, however, this subgroup differs perhaps most significantly in the degree of penetration and use of foreign capital accepted from the core, and by their ability to equalize exchange relationships with core countries and transnational corporations, in the short term. The BRIC [68] nations tend to fit this latter category.[69]

There has been since the mid-1980s, impasse in the sociology of development literature resulting from the apparent impasse between modernist and postmodern scholars on the degree of social mobility and the medium- and long-term qualitative differences between the capitalist core countries and Third World nations. As Nicos Mouzelis (1988) described it, these perspectives respectively produced either an exceedingly optimistic, evolutionist and liberal, neoclassical economic model or an overly pessimistic, Marxian version that yielded an impenetrable economic and social domination and dependency. Both of these paradigms ultimately proffered untenable and reductionist results and came to be viewed by students of development theory, as limited in their ability to explain the variation in empirically observable

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[68] BRIC refers to Brazil, Russia, China and India which are noted as the up and coming Third-World economies. The BRIC nations held their first summit in Russia in 2009 and a second summit in Brazil in 2010. In 2009, the investment firm, Goldman Sachs coined the term BRIC in a report that showed that BRIC nations accounted for 65% of the expansion of global GDP and will likely continue that trend in the near future. Perhaps for geopolitical reasons including Trinidad's economic and financial links and dependencies with the United States and Canada, there has been less or no involvement with Russia, the 4th of the BRIC nations. See http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/topics/brics/lead-global-recovery.html Accessed September 28, 2012. Goldman Sachs. 2009 (May 29). "BRICs Lead the Global Recovery". *BRICs Monthly*, Issue No. 09/05, 2009. See also Goldman Sachs Global Economics, Commodities and Strategy Research at https://360.gs.com Accessed September 2012.

[69] See Arno Tausch 2003:467-471.

Third World development experience.[70] Since then a growing scholarship on both sides has sought to better understand the role of social facts such as politics, the role of institutions, including the state, and have relied on more socio-historically specific and processual methods for examining these variables. Additionally, dependency theorist, Neil Smith (1984; 3rd ed. 2008) has proposed that the apparent uneven development[71] in many Third World countries is not an inevitable result of the quest for development per se but is instead a consequence of the particular mode of production or set of investment relations between core and periphery regions under modern capitalism.[72]

In the context of his ongoing intellectual contributions to this debate with proponents of the more radical strands of dependency theory, Wallerstein proposed an alternative to the dominant neoclassical view. He argued that Third World nations did have sufficient agency to shift position or be more upwardly mobile within the global system via three major mechanisms.[73] These are 1) import substitution industrialization secured by strong tariffs and other protective trade barriers; 2) self reliance – which, Wallerstein saw as akin to isolation; and 3) semi-peripheral development by invitation, whereby middle income nations like Trinidad and Tobago and the larger and growing BRIC economies, could grow through competition with other developing nations, in order to attract foreign direct investment based upon locational advantages and enticing trade concessions.

In the years since it obtained its independence from Britain in 1962, successive Trinidad and Tobago governments have pursued a petro-sector-focused, economic *development by*

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[70] See Mouzelis (1988:23-24) and Zhao (1994:212).
[71] Leon Trotsky is credited for the conception of uneven development and Neil Smith is said to have provided the first clear and durable definition of the term, thereby emphasizing the role of space, place and location or the geography of capitalist accumulation and its impact on development and nature. Smith defines the term as the "geographical pattern of inequality" that results from the "locational synchronization of profit" (1984: xi).
[72] Smith, Neil (1984: x-xiv).
[73] See White (2001:13), Wallerstein (1979).

invitation model as the nation's strategy for building a prosperous, vibrant, post colonial society

to assert its economic independence from Britain. This has been the conventional national

narrative around Trinidad's oil and gas sector success. According to this view, Trinidad has

thereby, forged a nation out of the disparate collection of groups that remained in the ebbing

years of British colonial plantocracy and rule. By this development narrative, T&T thus, proves

Wallerstein's point by attributing its economic growth and success to the development by

invitation model. As the narrative goes, in so doing, T&T has not just shifted but improved its

position in the global economic system.

As *Energy and Infrastructure,* an industry web-zine recently reported on T&T's

nationalized Natural Gas Company (NGC),

> "Trinidad and Tobago, over the last three decades, have developed a successful
> gas-based economy where new emerging players have taken notice and are
> seeking the country's assistance in developing a similar type of industrial base.
> The most recent initiative is an offer from Ghana in West Africa, where NGC is
> actively pursuing a new business opportunity."[74]

Successive Trinidad and Tobago governments then, have all to a large degree operated -

whether knowingly or not - from this neoliberal, modernist world view of development. At the

height of its most recent boom period in the mid-2000s, one could easily find captains of the

world's largest industrial conglomerates traversing the lobbies or meeting rooms of Trinidad's

Hilton, Hyatt, or Marriott hotels, or could find them sitting in the waiting rooms of senior

government officials, especially the Minister of Energy and Energy-related Industries, the

Minister of Public Utilities, or the Office of the Prime Minister. Skilled, university educated

Trinidad and Tobago nationals, many of them engineers, likewise, remain ubiquitous in the

global oil and gas sector having been recruited and deployed to work for large multinationals, in

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[74] See http://www.energyandinfrastructure.com/index.php/sections/profiles1/336-the-national-gas-co-of-trinidad-and-tobago-ltd Accessed November 2012.

sometimes unexpected or relatively far flung places such as Ghana, Texas, and Alaska, USA,

Senegal, Bucharest, Romania, the Netherlands, and many of the oil rich nations in the Middle

East, including Saudi Arabia.

After many years of economic growth and development enabled by its petroleum and

natural gas wealth, environment and development seem to be at an impasse in T&T. Trinidad,

the more industrial of the twin island nation, is hardly the typical island paradise that tourists

imagine. Trinidad and Tobago's economic development success was heralded as a model to be

admired and emulated by other natural-resource-rich developing nations. Ministers of energy,

minerals and industry from Tanzania, Ghana, Uganda, and other natural-resource-rich

developing countries (especially those with a colonial past and those who identify with an

African or Indian diaspora) have looked to Trinbagonians[75] to learn the secret of their post-

colonial industrial success. Emerging economies, among them China, Russia, Brazil, and India

(all four of the BRIC nations) have sought to trade with, and make significant capital

investments[76] in Trinidad and Tobago, and commercial, financial and petrochemical sector actors

from core regions such as, Britain, the USA, and Canada maintain long-standing interests and

relations with this nation-state. T&T's major trade partners in 2011 were the USA, Brazil,

Russia, Gabon, Canada and China.[77] Trinidad and Tobago also manages to maintain a cordial but

distant relationship with Venezuela, one that has endured many governmental administrations

and regimes since the 1960s. Over this period, its major trade exports were petroleum and

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[75] Trinbagonians is a term that many locals use to describe the peoples of Trinidad and Tobago.

[76] Both Brazil and China were major investors in the ALUTRINT aluminum smelter project - the focal point of the anti-smelter movement before and during the turning point National Election in 2010. The current People's Partnership Government and previous governments have actively sought to strengthen trade relations with India. The Essar project, which also received negative and boisterous attention from the anti-smelter environmental lobby in the national media was proposed by a major Indian investor.

[77] See CIA (2012)*The World Factbook*. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/td.html Accessed November 2012.

petroleum products, liquefied natural gas, methanol, ammonia, urea, steel products, beverages, cereal and cereal products, sugar, cocoa, coffee, citrus fruit, vegetables, and flowers.[78]

This commitment to being fully economically independent from former colonial powers is an important theme in Caribbean political life and thought dating back to the pre-independence era, as evidenced in the speeches and writings of leaders of the labor and political independence movements.[79] The inability to employ locational and natural resource advantages to attain economic independence is also the dominant rationale given for why some of the English, French, and Dutch Caribbean islands remain protectorates to the present day, and why economies of other Caribbean islands who achieved independence from Britain, Spain or the Dutch have faltered upon the removal of trade preferences for colonial era commodities such as sugar, bananas and cocoa. The notable regional exceptions to this trend include Jamaica and Barbados, which both have some degree of natural resource wealth including bauxite and oil, respectively, as well as on thriving tourism sectors. Many indices suggest that Trinidad and Tobago has achieved a fair modicum of success with this *development by invitation* approach, including sixteen consecutive years of real growth in gross domestic product (GDP), however some locals suggest that success has also come at too high a price.

T&T's experience of successful economic (GDP) growth, in the 1970's and the early to mid-2000s after relying upon this development by invitation approach tied to the down-streaming of the oil and gas industry should not be dismissed casually, given the economic evidence. It must also be said, that when one reads the literature from the post- independence period closely, it is clear that the local architects of the development by invitation model took the

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[78] CIA (2012) *The World Factbook*.https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/td.html Accessed November 2012.
[79] See the writings and speeches of Eric Williams, Michael Manley, Lloyd Best, CLR James, Marcus Garvey, O. N. Bolland, Bridget Brereton, Selwyn Ryan, George Weekes (1965).

modernist agenda seriously and saw this approach as the path most likely to assist in achieving

their aim for autonomy, not just for Trinidad and Tobago, but as a regional Caribbean agenda for

economic and political independence.[80] They overwhelmingly embraced the modernist

development agenda for many reasons, among them a fierce commitment to realize the dream of

Caribbean independence and unity, and also to eschew the radical neo-Marxian thought that was

espoused and debated among many Caribbean and Latin American leaders starting in the 1950s

and continuing to the present. Caribbean leaders who entertained the neoliberal development

model, thereby, avoided the negative economic consequences of alliances with Russia, the East,

and those places that espoused socialism and communist rule, generally. US hegemony in the

region looms large, as many Caribbean leaders have long become familiar with the consequences

of US economic sanctions on Cuba and Venezuela, and perhaps most poignantly, the US

invasion of Grenada. With the break up of the Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the

growing trend toward neoliberal marketization in the East, this agenda became cemented even

deeper, and legitimated as the appropriate policy in the region, and particularly in T&T, with its

deep reliance upon US and British foreign investment capital in the oil and gas sector, and its

critical need for access to US markets.

Other social and political factors also explain T&T's rapid economic growth and sudden

decline. Among them: 1) that T&T might be approaching a nadir in the spatial and "temporal

progression from high to low profit rates" that is endemic to the uneven development

characteristic of neoliberal, capitalist globalization (Neil Smith, 1984); 2) that the decline is due

to a failure of the State and the weakness of other important institution; and 3) that the decline is

part of the boom and bust cycles that define economies based upon natural resource extraction.

The neoclassical, modernist view of T&T's progress is that it should, in fact move steadily from

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[80] See for instance, Meeks (1993).

its middle-income status to the developed stage,[81] except that in this period, this is not so, and the events that have transpired may well be path changing for the nation's development agenda.

A Theoretical & Empirical Dilemma

The broader questions posed by this research can be illustrated by recent events described in a popular international magazine. In its August 24, 2006 issue, *The Economist* provided a snapshot of an important juncture in the country's development, aptly entitled "Trinidad and Tobago, A Caribbean Tiger."[82] The author described the cash pouring into Trinidad, then "the biggest supplier of liquefied natural gas to the United States, and the world's top exporter of methanol and ammonia.". An economy growing at "Chinese rates,"Trinidad and Tobago, unlike Chavez's Venezuela, the article went on to state, welcomed private, foreign direct investment, a direct reference to its development by invitation model. A Trinidad-German partnership secured a [US] billion-dollar loan for a new chemical complex, "Essar from India wants to spend a similar amount on a second steel mill...and ALCOA, and Alutrint, the latter, a Trinidad-Venezuelan joint-venture, each plan new aluminum smelters" - all of these projects, heavy industrial, energy-intensive, and some would say, "dirty" or toxic industries. "The government's aim," stated *The Economist*, "was to use [cheap, natural] gas to turn Trinidad into a developed country by 2020." Hence, economic development under the aegis of neoliberalism emerged as the most significant political aim, with limited consideration for the potential salience of environmental issues or the particularities of the changing local social conditions. The cumulative sociopolitical, economic and ecological impacts of the scale and timing of these and

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[81] For a general set of statements on this perspective, see Walt W. Rostow (1960) and Simon Kuznets (1955).
[82] http://www.economist.com/node/7835911 The Economist magazine. Last accessed January 10, 2011.

other large, ambitious projects also received only scant attention by the Government at the time. They were simply necessary harms. As one observer put it, the then Prime Minister described T&T's weak environmental regulatory framework as a trade advantage.[83]

The author of the article did not fail to capture the downside ironies of Trinidad and Tobago's economic success, however; hours of traffic gridlock[84] (due to lack of sufficient infrastructure), the previous year's 390 murders in a population of just 1.3 million (escalating violence), and no potable water in mains for days in rural areas. *The Economist* quoted the then Prime Minister, Patrick Manning, "an oil geologist ", as insisting that, "We know what we are doing", and observes that implementing mega-projects appears to be easier than reforming routine public services like hospitals and health care. As the United States Central Intelligence Agency's 2012 *World Factbook* subsequently stated,

> "The previous MANNING administration benefited from fiscal surpluses fueled by the dynamic export sector; however, declines in oil and gas prices have reduced government revenues which will challenge the new [People's Partnership] government's commitment to maintaining high levels of public investment."[85]

First Environmental Success

In a prescient twist, the author noted that some Trinidadians feared that economic growth was happening too fast. The news article in *The Economist* ended with its author noting that perhaps the biggest threat to Trinidad and Tobago's prosperity might be its fractious politics - a mirror of Trinidad's racial divide between Afro- and Indo-Trinidadians and it quoted the nation's first Prime Minister, noted sociologist, Dr. Eric Williams in an earlier era saying that "money is

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[83] Confidential interview with author January 16, 2012.
84 He captures the gridlock caused by poor infrastructure but misses an opportunity to reference the political gridlock that has plagued TT as it has become what some describe as a bipolar, single party state. See Selwyn Ryan (2003).
[85] United States, Central Intelligence Agency. (2012) *World Factbook: Central America and Caribbean – Trinidad and Tobago*. On-line. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/td.html Accessed December 2012.

not the problem." Yet, Trinidad and Tobago's intensive, further foray into a risk-society-based, economic development model soon thereafter began to show signs of political fissure and unraveling of the social fabric[86] of the society as evidenced by the growth in violent crimes, ecological disasters such as widespread flash flooding, and conflict over environmental issues. Perhaps the necessary harms began to exceed some, heretofore, unacknowledged threshold. In June 2009, for the first time in the nation's history, environmentalists scored what they termed a victory: a Trinidad and Tobago court overturned the CEC - the environmental permit, and necessary initial entry point to the local development process - for the ALUTRINT aluminum smelter project.[87]

Today, none of the major industrial projects referenced by *The Economist* article, and planned as part of further downstream development of the oil and gas industry have been constructed. ALCOA, Essar, and ALUTRINT, were all subject to very high profile, sustained public criticism, controversy and public protests. In April 2010, the ruling PNM - the longest serving political party in the nation -led by Prime Minister Patrick Manning, called a snap election a mere two and a half years into that government's most recent five-year term. On May 24th, 2010, Trinbagonians[88] overwhelmingly rejected the PNM-led government and elected the People's Partnership, Trinidad and Tobago's first woman-led government.

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[86] Freudenberg, William R. 1984. "Boomtown's Youth: The Differential Impacts of Rapid Community Growth on Adolescents and Adults." *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 49, No. 5 (Oct.), 697-705.

[87] *People United Respecting the Environment (PURE) and the Rights Action Group (RAG) v The Trinidad and Tobago Environmental Management Authority and ALUTRINT*, Trinidad and Tobago High Court of Justice, CV 2007-02263. See Bethel, Camille. 2010 (October 12). "Smelter is No More: $4B DOWN THE DRAIN?", *Trinidad Express Newspapers*. http://www.trinidadexpress.com/business-magazine/smelter_is__no_more__4B_DOWN_THE_DRAIN_-104830479.html Accessed September 28, 2012.

[88] This is the inclusive name applied to citizens of Trinidad and Tobago. While the two islands formally comprise a single nation state. The islands have quite different social and colonial histories and subcultures.

A key issue during the political campaign was the industrial and economic development policy, which had as its foundation the down streaming[89] of the oil and gas sector and development by invitation. The decision to build energy intensive industry as the development strategy was called into question by the results of this National election and, thus, changed the trajectory of T&T's prized economic development agenda. Or did it simply delay it? Although the PP embraced the anti-smelter platform leading up to the election and has worked to keep its campaign promise regarding the construction of the controversial aluminum smelters during its short term in office, its development policy, not surprisingly remains the same as that of previous administrations'. To be fair, the concept of *path dependence* would dictate that no current Trinidad and Tobago government can credibly promise to revisit the development by invitation model, without upsetting the entire premise on which the nation's entire post- independence wealth and relative political influence in the region, and elsewhere, have been based. That is, given T&T's historical investments and embeddedness in global hydrocarbon and petrochemical supply networks, it is not surprising, for instance, that Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) and Sinopec, the China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation have approached the PP government to construct a methanol to olefins down-streaming complex valued at $5.3 billion

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[89] Down streaming is a term used in the oil and gas industry to describe one of its components - the refining of crude oil and the development, sale and distribution of gas derivatives (the by-products of further processing of natural gas) such as ethane, butane, propane, etc. Natural gas in its unrefined state usually contains water, nitrogen, helium, carbon dioxide, hydrogen sulphide and other compounds. With the down streaming of natural gas, some of these compounds are separated to produce other products for the market. See www.naturalgas.org. Last accessed of November 2, 2011. Other components of the industry include the upstream (that is, the part of the sector devoted to the search and recovery of oil and gas resources) and the mid-stream (processing, storage, market development and transportation operations) of the sector. The mid-stream is often included as part of down streaming. See PetroleumOnline.com. http://www.petroleumonline.com/content/. Accessed November 2, 2011. For an interesting article on the issues associated with down streaming, see "Oil & Gas (3) – The Downstream Dilemma" – Written by Nasir Ahmad El-Rufai, Nigerian Muse, Friday, 28 October 2011 10:30. Last accessed on November 2, 2011 and available at http://www.nigerianmuse.com/20111102002047zg/nm-projects/energy-development-project/the-downstream-dilemma-by-nasir-el-rufai/.

US.[90] The government committed to a three-month time-table for finalizing a gas supply agreement - one that would entail "heavily discounted gas prices" - between SABIC/Sinopec and the NGC.[91] Or that Metaldom, the Dominica-based steelmaker, in collaboration with the NEC, a government entity charged with the creation of industrial parks to house foreign direct investment projects, and Dearborn (Michigan) based Severstal North America, which is owned by the Russian vertically integrated steel and mining company, OAO Severstal, and T&T-based, Neal and Massy Holdings, has proposed another mega-project for Trinidad.[92] These are just two examples of multiple mega-industrial projects that continue to be entertained by the new PP government with little public engagement or significant efforts to shore up environmental institutions and processes necessary to evaluate and enable these types of complex industrial projects. Ironically, the new projects are being proposed to replace the ALUTRINT smelter project, thereby, recouping some of the staggering $4 billion in sunk costs[93] and hopefully, creating much needed local employment in the Union Village/LaBrea area of South Trinidad. On the face of the matter, however, the underlying issues and needed remedies remain the same. These and other energy intensive mega projects will continue to hit the news media and generate

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[90] See JEDDAH 2012. "SABIC, Sinopec in talks with Trinidad over methanol plant". REUTERS Edition: US, Saturday, Feb 11, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/11/sabic-sinopec-trinidad-idUSL5E8DB0CO20120211 Accessed November 2012. See also http://www.icis.com/blogs/asian-chemical-connections/2012/02/by-malini-hariharan-more-news.html. In March 2012, a month after official negotiations began, the Energy Minister made a public statement that T&T would not accept SABIC/Sinopec's request for a natural gas supply price that was 36%-53% below the T&T Government's price, amounting to less that US $1/MMBtu. The actual price, however, was not communicated to the general public. See http://www.icis.com/Articles/2012/03/27/9545355/trinidad-will-grant-no-subsidies-for-new-projects-minister.html Also accessed in November 2012.
[91] See Williams, Curtis. 2012. "NGC: Gas Agreement Between SABIC/Sinopec in Three Months", The Trinidad and Tobago Guardian Online. Published April 26, 2012. http://m.guardian.co.tt/business-guardian/2012-04-24/ngc-gas-agreement-between-sabicsinopec-three-months Accessed November 2012.
[92] See "Latin Steel Firm Metaldom Announces Steel Complex in Trinidad" Bajan Reporter, January 13, 2012. http://www.bajanreporter.com/2012/01/latin-steel-firm-metaldom-announces-steel-complex-in-trinidad/ Accessed November 2012.
[93] One source of these sunk and ongoing costs is the take or pay agreement that the GORTT signed for the power plant at LaBrea that was to serve ALUTRINT. The new Union Estate Power Station (UEPS), owned by Trinidad Generation Limited, a subsidiary of AES Global, Inc. came on stream on August 1, 2012. See Dhalai, Richard. 2012. "New Power Station on Stream", Trinidad and Tobago Newsday, http://www.newsday.co.tt/news/0,146601.html Accessed November 2012.

conflict in T&T until a government administration opens up a public dialogue about development choices in the face of declining natural gas reserves - an area of debate - and growing concerns about ecological and public health risk, and the proper use of the nation's remaining natural resource reserves.[94] According to the National Gas Company,

> "Trinidad's natural gas production currently stands at 4.3 billion cubic feet per day, of which 60 percent is used for liquid natural gas production, with the remaining 40 percent sold by NGC primarily to local petrochemical producers of ammonia and methanol, power generation facilities and iron ore reduction facilities."[95]

The government's natural resource development policy also continues to be one of expansion as Petro-Canada, BP and others active in T&T pursue environmental and other government approvals to explore for oil and gas in the deep waters off of Tobago, with very limited if any meaningful public engagement on the matter.[96] See Figure 1.3 for a map of oil and gas exploration blocks surrounding Trinidad and Tobago. The election narrative and outcome also point to the significance of the environment, the need for transparency in government decision-making, and the right of the people to have a say (voice) in how the nation should develop and if, when, and how it should use its natural resource wealth. It was also a call for greater accountability which was hotly debated and promised by the challengers in the national election. This constellation of issues was catalyzed in the anti-smelter movement and in a divisive and

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[94] The issue of the efficient use of the nation's natural gas resources is discussed in this news article in the T&T *Guradian*. Williams, Curtis. 2012. "NGC: Gas Agreement Between SABIC/Sinopec in Three Months", The Trinidad and Tobago Guardian Online. Published April 26, 2012. http://m.guardian.co.tt/business-guardian/2012-04-24/ngc-gas-agreement-between-sabicsinopec-three-months Accessed November 2012.
[95] See website of the Natural Gas Company of Trinidad and Tobago, Ltd. Article by Russ Gager. Energy & Infrastructure. http://www.energyandinfrastructure.com/index.php/sections/profiles1/336-the-national-gas-co-of-trinidad-and-tobago-ltd Accessed November 2012.
[96] Petro-Canada discovered a natural gas deposit in Block 22, 14 miles off the northwest coast of Tobago in 2008. The field was estimated at a yield capacity of between .6 and 1.3 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Dorwich-Phillips, Laura, Ed. 2007. *Trinidad & Tobago Business Guide 07/08*. Port of Spain, Trinidad: Prospect Press/MEP, p. 43. See also Hilyard, Joseph. 2009. *International Petroleum Encyclopedia*. Tulsa, OK: Pennwell Corp, p. 135. The T&T Government has also begun construction of an eco-industrial park at Cove Estate in Tobago to be fed by a natural gas pipeline from Trinidad.

charged campaign marked by ongoing struggles over racial, class and other forms of social inequality.

As elsewhere, locally defined cultural issues that are place- and temporally-specific, reflect the particular historical realities that have shaped both the locality and the people in it, and these are heightened during electoral contests. What is unusual in this case is that the question of environmental protection (in the form of an anti-smelter movement) appeared to trump the well-established development agenda in a national electoral campaign. This outcome stands in stark contrast to the result that one would anticipate given extant scholarship on both development in postcolonial societies, and in oil- and gas-rich developing economies, alike.

Figure 1.3 Map of T&T Oil and Gas Exploration Blocks.

Source: Trinidad and Tobago Ministry of Energy and Energy Affairs. See
http://www.energy.gov.tt/content/Activity_Map.pdf. Accessed December 2012.

Oil and Gas Down-streaming

Some scholars have suggested that T&T's oil and gas down streaming is not merely a question of that nation's development trajectory, but alongside the natural resource wealth found in Jamaica and Guyana, is important to the overall self-sufficiency, stability, progress and autonomy of the Caribbean as a region (and each of its nation states) to control its own internal and external affairs (Meeks 1993, CARICOM Secretariat 2012). Yet, the commitment to this agenda of regional economic independence varies by the Administration that is in government in the CARICOM[97] member states, at any given time. In the T&T context, some observers have suggested that the Indian-based political parties tend to be less concerned about these regional integration and stability issues because their constituency sees itself as a minority group in the context of the racial composition of the Caribbean region.[98] This is an interesting point and the argument holds only if one accepts a key basic premise, namely, that leaders of Indo-Trinidadian based political parties, such as the UNC, prioritize race and racial affiliation over that of national identity, nationhood and regional unity. It remains unclear that this is altogether the case, especially if one embraces an understanding of the high degree of diversity that exists within Indo-Trinidadians as a group, as discussed in Chapter III. Additionally, temporality matters on this question. It may well be that Indo-Trinidadians are no more or less regionally patriotic than any other racially defined groups of Trinbagonians. This question is also addressed briefly with

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[97] CARICOM refers to the Caribbean Community and Common Market. It is an organization comprised of 15 member states from the Caribbean region that was formed in 1962, after a fifteen-year effort to form the British West Indies Federation, an earlier attempt at regional coordination and integration had failed. These earlier attempts at integration, as today, are by no means intended to be isolationist or exclusionary, as the founding nation states of CARICOM - Jamaica, then British Guiana, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago - clearly expressed their desire to strengthen trade relations and cooperation with the rest of Latin America, Africa and Europe. See CARICOM's "History of the Caribbean Community" page at
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/history.jsp?menu=community Accessed November 2012.
[98] Confidential interview with author on January 12, 2012.

comparison data from the 2006 and 2010 World Values Survey in the bar charts contained in

Figures 1.4.1 and 1.4.2.

Figure 1.4 Self-identified Race and Geographic Identity for Indo- and Afro-Trinidadians by WVS Year, 2006 and 2010.

Figure 1.4 (Con't) - Self-identified Race and Geographic Identity for Indo- and Afro-Trinidadians by WVS Year, 2006 and 2010

It is readily observable based upon the WVS sample responses for both years that Afro-
and Indo-Trinbagonians both exhibit a high degree of national identity identify strongly as locals
and as Caribbean peoples. Though Afro-Trinbagonians were more strongly identified as
Caribbean peoples than their Indo-Trinbagonian counterparts in 2006, they are nevertheless
generally comparable on their responses about Caribbean identity.

Members of the Congress of the People (COP), the newest political party on the scene,
which became part of the winning coalition government, ran on a "no smelter" platform –
referring primarily to the Alutrint aluminum project.[99] According to a local newspaper account,
T&T had already sunk a whopping US $4 billion[100] into the project and had committed itself to
several long term contracts[101] with off-shore based interests for power supply for these projects –
costs that would now be incurred and ongoing whether or not the smelters were built, due to the
take-or-pay agreements that were made with suppliers.

Experience

Hence, the issue of environmental sustainability, perhaps for the first time in the nation's
history, played a key role in an election and seemed to trump the nation's prized economic
development agenda. At the same, the success of the anti-smelter lobby has not necessarily
brought redress to the most pressing environmental problems (quarrying, flooding, pollution).
Likewise, the abandonment of $4 billion in sunk costs certainly raises the matter of the waste of

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[99] "No smelter" activism started with the ALCOA proposal to build an aluminum smelter in South Trinidad.
ALCOA withdrew that project proposal in the wake of public controversy and protest. No smelter activists also
protested the proposed steel facility.
[100] See Bethel (2010).
[101] Government of Trinidad and Tobago, EEA:(10)10 2nd. (2010, July 16th). EEA: 14/6/6 Vol X. "Review and
Status of ALUTRINT Smelter Project"., p. 2. Note for Cabinet. "the on-going power supply agreements that amount
to $33million US/year. This represents only a part of the sunk cost or wasted investment from the cancellation of the
project.

resources that is often associated with *Nigerian Disease*.[102] This is a theoretically and empirically fascinating development, given that economic imperatives usually overshadow environmental ones throughout the environmental and social science literature. According to this line of theorizing - some applying Maslow's hierarchy of needs at a societal level - only more developed nations can afford to prioritize environmental concern over the more basic needs of securing livelihoods through economic development. In his empirical work in the field Hajer (1999) for example, found that environmental protection continues to be trumped by economic competition in international policy arenas. How then do we explain the experience in modern day Trinidad?

The Timing

The election outcome and the economic stagnation and decline that followed were puzzling. How could the current impasse between environment and development, come about within less than a decade, and despite record industrial growth and economic success? Theorists such as Putz, et al (2011), Hamilton (2010), Karl (2007), Ramsaran and Hosein (2005), Seydlitz and Laska (1994) would suggest that the decline is correlated with global commodity boom and bust cycles that are inherent to petro-economies. That these boom-bust cycles play a significant role is quite clear, often evidenced in Trinidad with the closure of major industrial manufacturing plans for maintenance when commodity prices fall below a given threshold.[103] In the present instance, however, the crisis begins in the midst of the boom. How could this be explained?

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[102]Atkinson and Hamilton (2003).

[103] Javeed, Asha. Idle Pt. Lisas Plants Could Boost Inflation. The Trinidad and Tobago Guardian, Friday, 7th November, 2008. http://legacy.guardian.co.tt/archives/2008-11-07/news11.html Accessed September 15, 2012. Zaworski, Frank. PotashCorp to Idle Two Trinidad Ammonia Units for Maintenance. ICIS News, 19th May, 2009. http://www.icis.com/Articles/2009/05/19/9217695/potashcorp-to-idle-two-trinidad-ammonia-units-for-maintenance.html Accessed September 15, 2012.

Specifically, how did this tension between economic development and environment attain such salience amongst the electorate?

Economic and Fiscal Explanations

Official sources from within and without claim that T&T's current economic downturn stems from declining energy prices, the CL Financial/CLICO bankruptcy, and the failure of global financial markets due to the subprime mortgage crisis.[104] Yet a cursory review of the country's economic trend data shows that GDP began to decline in 2007, well ahead of the CL Financial/CLICO[105] collapse (that occurred in January 2009), the fall of oil and gas prices, and the failure of subprime markets in 2008. The CL Financial/CLICO bankruptcy itself is arguably the sort of matter that implicates the rentier state arrangements, weak regulatory institutions, and lack of accountability, transparency and voice that plague some natural resource rich late developing countries.[106] In addition, oil and gas prices have since rebounded from 2009 to early 2010 levels.

As Afra Raymond, President of the JCC stated in a blog post on the issue,[107]

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[104] International Monetary Fund. (2011). *Consultation Report*. Prepared for the Government of Trinidad and Tobago; TT Central Bank, TT Budget Speeches (2010 and 2011).
[105] For details on the CLICO bankruptcy, see *The Uff Report* 2010.
[106] For a detailed description of the CL Financial/CLICO matter, see *The Uff Report* and *The Coleman Commission Report* (forthcoming, http://www.clfhcuenquiry.org/) - the official reports prepared for the Government of Trinidad and Tobago. For a highly detailed critical analysis of the matter, see http://afraraymond.com/ Accessed November 2012. The Coleman Commission's enquiry also includes investigation of irregularities associated with the Hindu Credit Union.
[107] See http://afraraymond.com/ Accessed November 2012.

"The equation for our reality check is –

<div align="center">Expenditure of Public Money</div>

Minus   Transparency

Minus   Accountability

_____

Equals   CORRUPTION"

Corruption, whether perceived or real, has plagued almost every administration in T&T. In recent decades, it has been mostly focused on large construction and industrial projects planned for Trinidad and involving local political and business elites and foreign investors. Notable among these are the Piarco International Airport expansion, the rapid rail, ALUTRINT, the construction of NAPA, the proposed highway system extension from Mon Desir to Debe, and other major industrial developments. As a leader of one of the largest industrial concerns, and a member of the economic power elite once advised me, "Environment will not be good business in Trinidad. If you want to make money, you have to bring in a major project with investors and take a cut from the deal."[108] This approach has taken root in T&T and is the *modus operandi* for extracting rents, in which the state is active in selecting the parties who will benefit from these deals – allegedly, among the beneficiaries are many of the politicians, themselves. This focus on extracting rents, according to many observers who were interviewed for this research, also

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[108] Personal communication, December 8, 2005 based upon field-notes.

explains the attractiveness and the government's penchant for approval of mega projects, regardless of which party or administration leads political office.

While economic and fiscal explanations are certainly important in deriving answers to some of the broader questions presented above, they account for neither cultural factors nor many of the observed outcomes. They are likewise, insufficiently contingent on the salient local realities and social facts. Additionally, most of the work on these questions has considered economic variables and/or employed economic approaches which are useful but limited for capturing phenomena that are culturally and socially embedded (Granovetter, 1985). Moreover, these approaches do not provide adequate examination nor explanation for the fractious politics to which *The Economist* writer refers, and the rise of the anti-smelter movement, nor do they adequately explain why major industrial development projects aimed at further stimulating growth cannot seem to obtain the "social license" and in particular, the "environmental capital" - needed to carry on in the post election period, under the new PP-led Government.

Cultural Factors

The author of *The Economist* article offered two explanations that are important clues to, if not complete explanation for this dilemma. First, he cited cultural factors, in particular, race and second, he takes note of the fractious politics that now characterize elections, as the potential culprits for instability within the country. His observations help trigger a series of intriguing questions that require answers. For instance, in a land where the imagined community[109] created,

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[109] I employ Benedict Anderson's (1983; revised and expanded in 1991:6-7) conception of imagined communities as a means for explaining how nationalism comes into existence. Anderson posits that national identities are socially constructed, and imagined by the people in a given geographic (or now, virtual) community. It is important that the people involved see themselves as part of this group or nation. Impliedly in the TT case, there is a shared meaning of multi-racial and multi-ethnic community, at least from the point of view of our aspirations. See also Edward W. Said's conception of imagined geographies. (Orientalism. Penguin Books, 1979; Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2003) Said presents a critique of the Western colonial notions of the Orient (primarily Asia) as a geography that is open, Edenic, virgin territory having no prior history or if any, only a "savage" one, that is available for 'development', resilient and in need of (externally imposed) organization, governance, and modernization. This

and the culture of multi-ethnicity disseminated through the words of the national anthem proclaims, "here every creed and race finds an equal place…,"[110] how applicable are apparently Western notions of racial inequality and race politics, and how does the negotiation of local culture that is place-specific account for the events leading up to the fractious politics that radically changed the government and halted (or drove underground) Trinidad's rush to achieve developed nation status? In addition, how do social categories and cleavages such as race, ethnicity, class, gender, neighborhood of origin, high school attended, last name, and other signifiers of social status relate to local conceptions of environmentalism, development, and progress and as such, impact the political outcome?

Connecting Culture and Environment

In sum, what is the role of culture and meaning-making about the environment and development in shaping the current political trajectory of Trinidad and Tobago? As Fischer and Hajer (1999) have asserted, environmental politics is very much about cultural discourse, and I would add, narrative or meaning making processes. Even if one assumes that fractious race relations could singlehandedly explain the almost sudden flip of the T&T economy - from a Caribbean tiger with some 16 consecutive years of real GDP growth,[111] to one characterized by financial crisis,[112] stagnation,[113] as "in trouble,"[114] a failed state,[115] and on the brink of social

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Orientalist view provided justification for colonial domination, rule and objectification. Said thus sees imagined geographies as tools of power and argues that all geographies are thus socially constructed with the purpose of exercising control over some geographies by characterizing them as inferior, subordinate and/or feminized. As discussed in Chapter III, Caribbean scholars make similar claims about colonial formulations of the West Indian landscape and its peoples.

[110] Trinidad and Tobago National Anthem. Words and lyrics were authored by Eric Castagne (1916-2000). This anthem was originally composed for the failed West Indies Federation (1958-1962).

[111] See the US State Department's webpage on Trinidad and Tobago. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35638.htm. Accessed November 2, 2011.

[112] Financial crisis in Trinidad and Tobago (TT) is said to be in part attributable to the CLICO and Hindu Credit Union bankruptcies, the aftermath of the 2008 US and European led, global financial market failures, and corruption

unrest, how race mattered in this process remains unclear. How do race, ethnicity and other formations such as class, matter? Do they matter as underlying causes or do they merely mask other important explanations? Do institutions matter?[116] Does risk and the increasing awareness of risk inequality matter - not just within T&T but between T&T and the core nations and investors with whom there might be an uneven balance of economic or political power in trade? Ambiguous also, is the nature of the relationships among the major sets of social actors in relation to the environment and how they come to understand what the environment is? For example, how do the anti-smelter activists and proponents, on the one side conceive of the environment and development compared to government officials and/or captains of industry in the oil and gas sector on the other? These questions have not been understood nor analyzed in depth if at all. Likewise, the question of how members of the leading political parties understand

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in the construction sector. While the CLICO and Hindu Credit Union failures play an important role in the state of the local economy, they do not fully explain all of the change in the economy's overall performance over the period. Nor do they explain the rise of environmental issues such as the "no smelter" lobby during and after the most recent Elections. The CLICO crisis occurred before the election of the People's Partnership Government. See the "Uff Report" for an official investigation and findings on corruption in the TT construction sector. Government of Trinidad and Tobago. March 2010. "Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Construction Sector Trinidad and Tobago".

[113] Trinidad and Tobago's GDP growth fell from 13.3% in 2006 to 5.5% in 2007, even before the global crisis hit. GDP fell further to 3.5% in 2008, -3.2 % in 2009, an estimated 1.1% in 2010, and a projected 1.9% in 2011. Sourced from UN Trade Data and blx.com (http://www.blx.com/paginasInfoLatam.aspx?PAG_ID=38&CAT_ID=5113) both accessed on Nov 13, 2011. Oddly, this information is not readily available from TT Central Statistical Office or TT Central Bank. See also (CIA *World Factbook 2011*).
http://www.theodora.com/wfbcurrent/trinidad_and_tobago/trinidad_and_tobago_economy.html

[114] See for example, Ramdass, Anna. November 9, 2010. "TT Economy in Trouble", *Trinidad Express Newspapers*. The article quotes Independent Senator Dr. Rolph Balgobin, who asserts that infrastructure projects alone would not help the economy, that the economy was entering a period of stagnation, and that the officially stated unemployment rate of 6.7% was likely, incorrect because it included part time employment of workers through State programs (like CEPEP) and the number should be closer to 17 to 20%. Economist and UWI Lecturer, Dr. Patrick Watson also described the economy as being in "uncharted waters" and on "shaky ground." See Louis B. Homer, June 30th, 2009. "Economy on Shaky Ground", *Trinidad Express Newspapers*.

[115] Diamond, Jared. 2012. "What Makes Countries Rich or Poor" A review of *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty* by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. Crown Publishers. The review appears in *NY Review of Books, June 7, 2012*.

[116] Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) suggest that weak or "extractive institutions [the incentive structures they create] and the politics that keep them in place", in fact explain a great deal about why some nations or places are poorer, less prosperous and less powerful than others.

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environment and its relationship to the nation's development choices compared to the anti-smelter lobby, remains ambiguous.

Main Arguments

I posit that in 2010, Trinidad and Tobago underwent a passive or silent environmental revolution that had as one of its critical turning points,[117] the national election in 2010, and an understanding of how this passive revolution occurred could be achieved by exploring the role of culture and narrative processes in social and environmental change. I further argue that this approach is critical for obtaining meaningful answers to the questions presented in the paragraph above.

(i)   Passive Revolution

Passive revolution refers to a partial cure, short of full-blown class revolution, enabled by the capitalist state in response to the contradictions produced by the accumulation processes articulated by Marx and Engles in their theory of historical materialism (1978, Tucker, ed.). Antonio Gramsci (1971) coined the term passive revolution to describe circumstances where the capitalist state intervenes (such as call an election 2.5 years into a 5 year term) to reorganize social relations in order to diffuse the concentration of challenges from the lower classes (here defined broadly) in response to the alienation and oppression inherent to capitalist modes of accumulation, the division of labor and growing risk inequality. The state's interventions tend to preserve or restore class domination. Applying the concept to Mexico's twentieth century experience of neoliberal policies, Hesketh (2010:399) describes how in that case, not only were

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[117] Andrew Abbott (1992: 25) and John Goldthorpe (1997). Abbott elaborates on Goldthorpe's conception of the "turning point", defining it as a necessarily narrative process defined by two discrete points in time. Abbott sees social reality as structural and cultural processes in which actors proceed through trajectories to their end. Turning points are discontinuities or breaks in the trajectories.

the revolutions passive but silent in the face of a severe debt crisis. Silence refers to the degree to which less powerful voices are further submerged while capitalist voices are privileged, thereby worsening levels of class exploitation (Hesketh 2010 quoting Green 2003 [1995]). In Trinidadian society, the contours of contentious development policy, and risk and rights-focused environmental debates are largely defined by elite actors. Local elites tend to have more access to the media, to technical and scientific information, and to formal environmental organizations and institutions. They are privy to the negotiations, information and documents of governmental decision making hierarchies, and policy formation processes, and to legal and political resources. While grassroots narratives and understandings about the environment are also part of the narrative frameworks and cultural contestation about how the environment is understood by locals, these grassroots narratives are seldom visible/audible and, therefore, are less accessible to the larger public.

(ii)   Risk Society and the Rentier State

Writing about how and why scholarly critiques of Carnival culture have not been acknowledged or embraced by T&T society, including the academy, Ramcharitar (2011: 209) offers that the state participates in producing standardized answers to only a decidedly limited set of questions focused on race, certain forms of oppression, folk-nationalism and economy, which results in a "nihilistic tribalism" and preserves extant class arrangements. The basis of the economy and hegemony in post-colonial T&T is a deliberate policy of inviting off-shore capital to extract oil and gas resources - *development by invitation*. The technologies, processes and substances involved in hydrocarbon extraction and processing necessarily entails exposing some actors (workers, fence-line communities, ecosystem actors and processes, and others) to noxious or toxic compounds both for economic development and the acquisition of foreign exchange

with which to purchase food and other commodities not currently produced on the twin-island nation for its people.

Defining risk as ambivalence, Ulrich Beck (2006:329, 330) suggests that in risk societies, governments decide - formally or informally - to deliberately exploit the vulnerability of civil society in the name of economic development and growth. The risk exposure or danger faced by the society then, results not from accident, uncertainty, unknowing or chance but instead from the deliberate policy of the state, science and business. "Being at risk is the way of being and ruling in the world of modernity..."[118] In Chapter III, I show that in contemporary T&T (i.e., from roughly 2001 to the present) narratives about the environment have increasingly also become narratives of risk and risk inequality. Interestingly, this risk inequality is seen both from the viewpoint of how T&T is situated in the geopolitical distribution of environmental and ecological risk associated with neoliberal globalization and from the vantage point of how environmental harms are distributed locally. Both types of risk are determined and mediated by the specifics of local socio-historical realities and by culture.

The Role of Culture in Environmentalism, Politics, and Economic Development

It is well acknowledged in social science scholarship that cultural phenomena like narratives are important because they provide social actors – both individuals and groups -- with a sense of reality, purpose and place (Patterson and Monroe 1998:315, 321). As such, the role of culture and environment in shaping the conceptions of development in the political arena warrant further study. In particular, if down streaming as development policy - designed as an antidote to underdevelopment, dependency and colonialism – was a success in T&T, it is still unclear how

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[118] Beck (2006:330).

the "no smelter" movement formed and acquired apparent political power in such a relatively short period of time. As well, the future trajectory of T&T remains unmapped as a consequence of the interaction of the factors discussed above.

How are culture and meaning-making relevant to local, modern day environmentalism and environmental debates? How do processes of environmental meaning-making work and how do they affect political and economic development outcomes? To address these questions, I explore how different groups of Trinidadian elites, and the silences or gaps created by the absence of non-elite voices in the national discourse, construct meaning about the natural environment over time. I further explore how and why environmental meanings vary across - and within - social groups and geographies; and how particular constructions of meaning are converted into symbolic or material "environmental capital" that can be used in the exercise of power. I interrogate processes of environmental meaning making, using this middle-income, hydrocarbon rich, "developing", country where an environmental issue has brought about political change and halted the generally accepted approach to development policy, as an exceptional case.

Conceptual Boundaries of the Environment

My starting point is to conceptualize the environment, not only a natural science category, but a cultural one. This view is well supported by several decades of theorizing and empirical work in environmental history and anthropology, American rural sociology, French postmodernism, and more recently Caribbean literature, and British, and American environmental sociology. I further draw on the works of conflict theorists to support my central premise that environmental meanings are manufactured through a process of elite narrative

contests; narrative and story telling, in particular being the locus of resistance, and providing

opportunities for compromise, hybridity, and adaptation in any given socio-historical moment.

My aim is to show the importance of narrative and *narrativity* (Somers 1992: 594) in the social

production of environmental meaning and for social theorizing about environmental problems. I

explore conceptions of the environment as they are culturally negotiated on the one side and

mediated by economic development on the other.

Margaret Somers (1992:593-4) states that analytic narratives all contain a beginning,

middle and end, that is, they are temporally sequenced facts or events that bear some relationship

to each other or other social phenomena. Narratives also entail causal emplotment (a central plot)

and have protagonists (usually the story-teller/s) who lead in the action that is taking place in the

story. Somers presents narrativity as a social conception capable of capturing and meaningfully

embracing historicity, time, and space in social phenomena. In other words, narratives or stories

can be powerful social-analytic tools because they are inherently relational – they show how we

make sense of social phenomena by assuming a set of relations among them, and they are

temporal (i.e., sequenced and place specific).

Elements of a Synthetic Approach

Understandings about how environmentalism works as a cultural construct are also

relevant for informing the approaches and tools available to societies, and decision-makers, to

mitigate and/or adapt to today's changing ecological conditions. I examine these puzzles through

synthesis of a relational, multi-actor, intersecting interests approach to the construction of

meaning about the environment. Many of the salient theoretical conceptions from American and

British sociology, such as race and class, do not readily apply to the historical realities and in

particular, the by-products of post-independence, neo-colonial social formations in Caribbean societies, including Trinidad.[119] I have therefore, selected Bourdieu's flexible, relational conceptions of *habitus*, *field*, *capital*, and *symbolic power* as key elements of an orienting framework. I also adapt perspectives from the new cultural sociology, plantation economy elite class formation and race relations theories. Of necessity, I draw upon the rich multi-disciplinary literature on the subject matter from history, anthropology, and literature, especially the works of Caribbean scholars.

Using this synthetic approach, I employ a combination of methods and techniques including participant observation (in Trinidad society as a native informant), analysis of archival data, descriptive analysis of relevant data from two waves of World Values Survey (WVS)[120] data, and ethnographic interviews (with key local actors from elite and grassroots groups) to explain and articulate how environmentalism, in the form of anti-smelter activism, emerged as a major issue not only to reshape economic development, but also to change political rule. I utilize social constructionist and historical perspectives, principally informed by narrative theory to compare how and why environmental narratives are constructed by competing sets of elites in Trinidad and Tobago, the immediate consequences of these constructions for their efforts to gain political power, and the post-election struggle to deliver on the promise to (re)define the nation's economic and industrial development and environmental agenda.

The remainder of this chapter reviews the environmental literature on the Caribbean in general and T&T in particular, with the intent of locating this work in the context of existing research in the relevant fields.

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[119] For a detailed and highly relevant exegesis on this point and proposed alternative model, see Best and Polanyi-Levitt (2009).
[120] World Values Survey (2006 and 2010).

Environmental Literature on the Caribbean and Trinidad and Tobago

Most of the current research and theorizing about the environment in middle-income, resource-rich developing nation-states, the West Indies as a region, and Trinidad and Tobago in particular have focused on the status of particular environmental problems.[121] As such, four strands of research on the environment stand out: 1) environmental status studies; 2) political status studies in relation to the environment; 3) general surveys of environmental awareness, attitudes and values; and 4) cultural studies that take into account history and literature in an attempt to reveal how environmental issues are locally negotiated.

Environmental Status Studies

The first strand comprised environmental status studies and includes works about the local flora, fauna, ecosystem resources or natural features produced by botanists, soil and stream scientists, ornithologists and others.[122] This research tradition has also recently included environmental assessment studies focusing in particular on the health of reef systems, fisheries, marine ecosystems, floodplains, forest cover loss, climate change impacts, sustainable tourism, evolutionary ecology, and the like. This body of environmental benchmarking and assessment continues to be important because it is focused on environmental conditions particular to the

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[121] See for instance Watts, David. 1987 [paperback version 1990; Reprinted 1994]. *The West Indies: Patterns of development, culture, and environmental change since 1492*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press; see also the cultural "disorder" studies conducted on the Third World by Moran (1996), and others. Moran's work follows in the tradition of anthropologist, Roy Rappaport's ecological anthropology.

[122] Wadsworth, F.H. 1954. *General Papers Fourth World Forestry Congress*, pp.65-72 is among the earliest writing in this genre; and Beard, J.S. 1955. "The classification of tropical American vegetation types". *Ecology* 36: 89-100, is a classic in the field and is among the earliest and still frequently referenced studies of flora in the region. For naturalist studies on Trinidad and Tobago, see for example, Beard (1946a; 1946b [cited in Fairhead and Leach 2003:53-55, 115, 129-130]), Julien Kenny (1978-79), Barcant (1970), Beard (1946), Boos (2001), Murphy (1997), Aitken (1973), and Quesnel et al. (1996), Ffrench (1992), Duncan (1994) Barrow (1994).

Caribbean, and as such is essential for monitoring the causes of physical environmental and

ecosystem stress or change in the region.[123]

Political Status Studies

A second and related strand of research builds upon political status studies, that explore

the Caribbean region's involvement in formal, global environmental policy regimes, the use of

market mechanisms, national, and rural policy development, conservation challenges, levels of

public involvement, the role of foreign aid, World Bank and IMF structural adjustment policies,

and the like.[124]

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[123] A recent and typical example of works in this genre includes Magurran, Anne E., 2005. *Evolutionary Ecology: the Trinidadian Guppy*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, c2005, xi, 206 p. : ill., maps ; 24 cm. Many of the contemporary environmental status studies such as the "Global Environmental Outlook", are still carried out by international aid agencies such as the United Nations (UN) Development Program, the UN Environment Program, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, the US Geological Survey (in the case of Puerto Rico and the Caribbean Water Science Center), the World Bank, the Global Environmental Facility; the United States Department of Agriculture, the US Environmental Protection Agency, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Canadian Development Bank; and others. Faculty from the University of the West Indies (Mona, Cave Hill and St. Augustine) tend to have some degree of involvement in many of these studies or other universities in Canada, the United States or Britain. Climate Change studies on the region are usually coordinated through the Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre (a project of CARICOM – the Caribbean Community Common Market) and draws on local scientific expertise, mostly from the UWI system. The following are examples of agency-led status studies: LACFC. 2003. State of Forestry in the Latin American and Caribbean Region 2002. FAO Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean; UNEP. 1999. Global Environment Outlook 2000. Latin America and the Caribbean. United Nations Environment Program; Yocum, C. 1995. Meeting conclusions and recommendations. In: Lugo and Yocum (eds.) Economics of Caribbean forestry: Proceedings of the Seventh Meeting of Caribbean Foresters, June 13-17, 1994. Río Piedras, PR: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, International Institute of Tropical Forestry. p. 4-6; FAO. 2000; FAO. 2000. Global Forest Resources Assessment 2000. Main Report. FAO Forestry Paper 140. Other examples of contemporary environmental status work include Ariel E. Lugo, Ralph Schmidt, and Sandra Brown. 1981. "Tropical Forests in the Caribbean". *Ambio* Vol. 10, No. 6, The Caribbean, pp. 318-324; Cropper, J. 1997. "Regreening the foothills of the Northern Range Part I: first assessment of the potential for implementation of a programme of revegetation of squatter and low-income communities on the hillsides of the East-West corridor in Trinidad", unpublished report submitted to UNDP (cited in Fairhead and Leach 2003 and available at the TT EMA library); Driver, Thackway. 2002. "Watershed Management, Private Property and Squatters in the Northern Range, Trinidad, IDS Bulletin 33(1): 84-93.

[124] Several of these studies employ traditional cost benefit or environmental status evaluation and often provide little attention to environment and development in Trinidad and Tobago. Much more has been written about the Eastern Caribbean, Guyana, and Jamaica. Sally Lloyd-Evan's piece, "Gender, Ethnicity and Small Business Development in Trinidad: Prospects for Sustainable Job Creation". In F. M. McGregor, David Barker and Sally Lloyd-Evans. *Resource Sustainability and Caribbean Development*. Kingston: The Press, University of the West Indies, is a partial exception. Lloyd-Evans provides a detailed insight on gender, race and small business in Trinidad but does not address the issue of environment. See David Barker and Duncan F.M. McGregor. 1995. Environment and

Environmental Assessments

In the third strand of research on the environment I include broad based assessments of natural resource wealth impacts, values and attitudes, political economy and critical studies that focus on the relationship of oil exports to democracy and freedom, i.e., the resource curse[125] (Gelb 1986; 1988 p.139; Lal and Myint 1996; Ross 2001; Auty 2001:132 and 2007; Karl 2007), and studies of Dutch Disease (*The Economist* 1977; Corden and Neary 1982; Torvik 2001 and 2002). These are accompanied by other macro level analyses that often lump nations together - the resolution of analysis being too broad for responding to nuanced, place specific questions - with scant attention given to the particularities of historical experience, the admittedly, small but still significant differences in geography and degrees of geographic, social and political isolation, and the changing delineation of social groups, institutions, culture and social-structural issues.

Notably, the Ingelhart et al., WVS (2006 and 2010) addresses the issue of resolution and provides otherwise unavailable and useful macro level data on local levels of awareness, values and attitudes. The WVS remains however, a limited tool and is silent on the historically- and geographically-specific trajectories of class, race, ethnicity, religion, risk inequality, and other social formations that shape environmental attitudes, values and even degrees of awareness in these geographies. Evaluations of the ecological impacts of World Bank environmental conditionalities for project finance as compared to the ecological despoliation caused by World Bank induced trade and export policies (Dore 1997) as critiques of neoliberalism and neoliberal

Development in the Caribbean: Geographical Perspectives. Kingston: The Press, University of the West Indies as an exemplar of some of the work in this tradition. Other examples include, Simms, Andrew. 2006. Up in Smoke? Latin America and the Caribbean: The Threat from Climate Change. See for instance, Romero and West (2005); Hayden (2002); Sutcliffe and Huber (1998); Lederman et al. (2005); and Collinson (1997).

[125] A revised study by Ross (2009) modifies his previous findings on the resource curse while the findings of Haber and Menaldo (2011) seem to largely debunk this theory for a number of oil rich nations, including Trinidad and Tobago. As discussed in Chapter III, Gelb (1986 and 1988), Robinson, Torvik and Verdier (2006) and Auty (2007) provide much more nuanced and relevant analyses of the resource curse for Trinidad and Tobago.

institutions, are also included in this third strand of macro level studies.[126] Most relevant of these

works to the instant project is the edited volume by Collinson (1997) devoted to the rise of

ecological crises, the impact of the global environmental movement/s in the region, and

environmental conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean region.[127] Though it does not

address environmental risk per se, this work nevertheless represents a significant contribution to

the field.

Cultural Studies

Topics such as how people of color, or for that matter, Caribbean peoples understand and

create meaning about environmentalism and their local geographical settings are still

understudied in the mainstream North American social science literature and tradition even less

so in mainstream American sociological research and theory, as noted by Taylor (2009);

DeLoughrey, Gosson and Handley (2005) and others. The eco-dependency critique derived by

scholars in the 1960s and 1970s as a competing explanation for underdevelopment in the region,

and the global rise of sustainable development and the further environmental critique of the

Bretton Woods institutions and their role in the region, produced a radical, Latin American

environmentalism (Dore 1997) in the 1980s.[128]

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[126] Dore, Elizabeth. 1997. "Capitalism and Ecological Crisis: Legacy of the 1980s", in *Green Guerrillas: Environmental Conflict and Initiatives in Latin America* by Helen Collinson.

[127] Authors in the edited volume by Collinson also address the rise of ecological crises, the impact of the global environmental movement/s in the region, and environmental conflicts in Latin America and Caribbean region.

[128] It is significant that much of contemporary environmental awareness in Latin America and the Caribbean grew out of 1) the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm – subsequently, North American and European environmental groups and movements, pressured their governments, international aid and lending, and technical cooperation bodies to support more benign environmental policies in Latin America; and 2) the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro (and the World Social Forum held at the same time). These latter events brought the role of sustainable development and the role of social issues to the fore for protecting and preserving the natural environment and ecosystems (Kaimowitz 1997:22).

In the 1990s, growing out of this radical environmentalism, a small group of primarily Latin American and Caribbean historians and literary scholars began a fourth strand of Caribbean environmental research focused on the origins of contemporary regional environmental history in "Green Imperialism" and on colonial experience (Grove 1995). They center on the environmental discourse/s and meanings contained in West Indian literature (especially that which is created by West Indians) and its importance in re-claiming the Caribbean landscape[129] (Glissant 1999) thereby making sense of nature's role in the Caribbean people's past and present. These theorists' preoccupation with the historical and current experiences of colonialism brought to the foreground the need for analysis of the social systems in which mass production techniques from the North were imposed in the region and their inherent ecological impacts. For instance, Dore (1997:8-9) concludes that, "it is not the size of the production unit but who controls it and for what purposes" that matters. Sociologist Barbara Deutsch Lynch's (1996) conceptualization of Caribbean environmentalism is consistent with these literary critiques and the tradition of radical environmentalism based upon historical studies on colonialism in the region.

In their book, *Science, Society and Power*, British anthropologists Fairhead and Leach (2003) and other work on waste dump siting conflicts in Barbados by Hilary Beckles (1997) begin to bridge this gap by offering one of the earliest – next to Lynch (1996) - assessments of how environmental meanings are negotiated in the Caribbean. Fairhead and Leach specifically compare the experiences of Trinidad and Tobago to that of Guinea, West Africa.

A Cultural Sociology of Nature and the Environment

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[129] Grove, Richard H. 1995. *Green Imperialism: Colonial Expansion, Tropical Island Edens, and the Origins of Environmentalism, 1600-1860*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

This dissertation critically draws upon these four strands of environmental studies to situate what happened and continues to happen in T&T today. By extending the fourth strand, I generate and explicate a cultural sociology of nature, the environment and environmentalism with emphasis on the West Indies in general, and Trinidad and Tobago, in particular. My specific aim is to augment the thin belt of largely historical, literary and more recent sociological research with empirical data, employing in the process, the imagination, theoretical perspectives and analytical tools from sociology. After all, if *The Economist's* assertion about the function of Trinidad and Tobago's fractious cultural politics is correct, then the role of culture and cultural artifacts including those that help us to understand how meanings are made, warrant further examination.

Experiences of the two most recent national elections and observation of the 'no smelter' activism, and political and economic challenges during the period from 2004 to present day life in Trinidad and Tobago place me in the social milieu of the conditions termed, "fractious politics." As in many other locales the world over, the environment, environmentalism and its supporting science continue to comprise contested terrains and sources of social conflict.[130] The

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[130] There is a cottage industry of US-based and international research on environmental conflict and conflict resolution. Conventional works on environmental conflict include but are not limited to: the relationship between environmental scarcity and violent conflict (Homer-Dixon 1994); environmental change as a cause of acute conflict (Homer-Dixon 1991; Smil, Gladstone and Reed 1992); the significance of local and national actor spaces in environmental conflict and politics (Murdoch and Marsden1995); the relationship of climate change to armed conflict (Raleigh and Urdal 2007); and the role of community involvement (Crowfoot and Wondelleck 1990); and mutual gains (Fisher and Ury 1981: Susskind and Cruikshank 1987; Susskind and Field 1996), environmental conflict resolution (O'Leary and Bingham 2003) and joint fact finding (Susskind, McKearnan and Thomas-Larmer 1999; Fairman 2006) approaches to solving environmental disputes. As Lashley and Taylor (2010) have shown, most of the focus on conflict resolution has ignored issues such as race, class and gender. Collinson's edited collection of essays in *Green Guerrillas* represents a series of essays on environmental conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean. A summary of the opposing view on environmentalism is captured in a speech by Václav Klaus, President of the Czech Republic, on *Environmentalism and Other Challenges of the Current Era*, presented at the CATO Institute on April 20, 2007 are a good case in point. He argues that environmentalists present a major threat to individual freedom, free markets and peace because of their beliefs assumptions and ideology that include: 1) "disbelief in the power of the invisible hand of the free market" and a belief in the state power and direction; 2) "disregard for the role of important and powerful economic mechanisms and institutions, primarily those of property rights and prices", to effectively protect nature; 3) "misunderstanding of the meaning of resources and of the difference between potential natural resources and real ones that can be used in the economy; 4) Malthusian

environment is also shaped and defined by culture. Environment then, is also culture in particular contexts.

It is this *cultured-ness* of both our fundamental connection to, and understandings of our relationship to nature, as well as the consequences of ecological outcomes for human societies, that brings the natural environment under the purview of social science and within the broad definition of social problems.[131] Indeed, Foucault (1973a; 1973b), Latour (1993:6), Haraway (1991), and others have suggested that to draw a sharp distinction between the social and the natural would be reductionist, and therefore, unjustifiable in the scientific analytical project. William Cronon (1992:1349) captures the essence of the matter in his acknowledgment that "human acts occur within a network of relationships, processes, and systems that are as ecological as they are cultural."

To the extent that it is imbued with, shaped by and defining of culture, the environment is also an important site of contemporary cultural conflict about relations of power. Comaroff and Comaroff (1992:28), Childs and Williams (1997:185) and more recently empirical work on Columbia by Eloisa Berman Arévalo and Mirjam A. F. Ros-Tonen (2009), posit that power and culture are often inseparable. In fact, Arévalo and Ros-Tonen show how environmental discourses are embedded in micro-politics that constitute a discursive battlefield. It is interesting that their analysis is of relations among the members of multi-sectoral partnerships working in support of a common environmental agenda. They observe that discursive shifts occur to reflect the power balances within the partnership at given moments (2009:733). To the extent that

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pessimism over technical progress; 5) belief in the dominance of externalities in human activities; promotion of the so-called precautionary principle, which maximizes risk aversion without paying attention to the costs; 6) underestimation of long-term income growth and welfare improvements, which results in a fundamental shift of demand toward environmental protection and is demonstrated by the so-called environmental Kuznets Curve; and 7) erroneous discounting of the future…." http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9301 Accessed November 30, 2011.

[131] According to Hajer (1995:18), environmental problems are indeed socio-ecological problems.

power and culture are inseparable and since environment is also a cultural category, environmental narratives are also inseparable from power.

Additionally, since environmental conflicts, and the narratives created about them, inform access to cultural, social and political, symbolic and material resources and therefore, represent an important locus of opportunity for fundamental social change. Alexander Wilson states that the degraded biosphere is not by itself an adequate political subject; instead environmental movements must in the present historical moment "directly engage social debate, for the cultures of nature – the ways we think, teach, talk about and construct the natural world – is as important a terrain for struggle as the land itself" (Wilson 1991:87).

The contemporary focus on the environment thus presents a counter-culture movement against conventional notions of modernity, and in part[132], a challenge to the basis of European and North American scientific, cultural, political, and economic hegemony. Lynch (1996) proposes that

> "environment (the physical landscape, its biota, and its landforms) and environmentalism (awareness of, concern for, and action in the name of the environment) are cultural constructions subject to conflicting interpretations and that control over these interpretations is at the heart of contemporary political struggle in Latin America and the Caribbean" (Lynch 1996:225).[133]

In addition, based on her interviews with local youth activists, Gabriel Hosein (2007:125) aligns Trinidad's 'no smelter' protests with the broader, local, land rights movement and views this environmental claim as a strategic opportunity for advancing youth and gender rights. She states that "At the moment, it is the land rights movement, and particularly the opposition to the

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[132] I say "in part", because in the case of Trinidad, some of the activists in the environmental movement are themselves European expatriates.
[133] In Erna Melanie DuPuis, Peter Vandergeest (1996).

construction of aluminum smelters that offer the best hope for politicizing, empowering and uniting young men and women in the Caribbean" (Hosein 2007: 125).

Subjectivity

The insights presented by these scholars are consistent with my own direct experience over a six-year period of participant observation as a senior environmental consultant to the T&T government, and to large, private industrial organizations. The land rights movement to which Hosein refers has deep roots in urban/rural, industrial/agricultural, rich/poor dichotomies (real and/or imagined) asserted by some Trinidadians and Tobagonians who claim that successive governments have subjected them to economic and infrastructural neglect, and marginalization.

In contemporary Trinidad and Tobago, environmentalism is no longer limited to specific issues about cleaning up garbage, saving turtles, or the production of textbooks and glossy magazines on local flora and fauna for consumption by elite horticulturalists and bird-watching foreigners. This is not to say that external influences do not matter, because as I discuss in subsequent chapters, they do. Contemporary T&T environmentalism is nevertheless, very much immersed in local politics, and now shapes the path of social, economic and in particular, industrial development. As such, environmentalism has become enmeshed with our dialogue about the future. It now encompasses a view of environmental threats that are global and requires local decision-makers to examine, advocate for and create responses and interventions at the local level, that is, on the ground.

The state of affairs in T&T is also an increasingly common phenomenon in Anglophone Caribbean environmental politics. Hilary Beckles (1997:190) points to the complex milieu of

international players, agendas, poor public consultation, and racial challenges[134] on the one side

and manufactured scientific uncertainty on the other that plague the environmental decision-

making process in the region. Describing a distinctly Caribbean environmental justice paradigm

through the claims, struggle and politics surrounding the siting of a waste dump in contemporary

Barbados, Beckles observes that:

> "conscious of a history of marginalization, they had good cause to consider
> themselves 'dumped' on by an urban-based political process that sees little
> political mileage in environmental conservation and ecological issues"
> (1997:190).

Based on this literature review of environmentalism on the one side and the insights of scholars

on the significance of culture and meaning making in negotiating environmentalism on the other,

I articulate the conceptual building blocks of my research agenda, its theoretical underpinnings

and methods in Chapter II.

Significance of the Research

The questions examined in this work are significant not only to Trinidad and Tobago's

environmental and national development policy-makers, but also to the geopolitical region and

global oil and gas networks in which T&T is embedded. It is also relevant for similarly situated –

in the context of globalism and environment – hydrocarbon-rich developing countries in Africa

who endeavor to model Trinidad and Tobago's relative success in developing their natural

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[134] Beckles quotes one participant describing on of the leading environmental activists, a white farmer resident in the area where the new dump is to be located, as follows, "a disrespecting 'Caucasian' male with a problem regarding black people in government" (1997:191).

resource wealth and achieving economic independence in the post-colonial era.[135] Caribbean environmental economist, Dennis Pantin has also suggested that due to their varied socio-political and ecological systems, fragile ecosystems, and frequent experience of natural hazards such as hurricanes, island economies and societies, like those in the Caribbean provide unique sites for research on sustainable development (Pantin 1994:10). The central questions of this research are also germane to broader understandings about how to create effective environmental governance and policy structures and how to effectuate the change desired to create a more ordered or adaptive[136] relationship between human societies and the material ecosystems upon which we exist depend to and for our livelihoods. This work also comes at a crucial juncture in Trinidad and Tobago's socioeconomic and political development and will hopefully shed light upon some of the important dilemmas politicians and other decision-makers face, locally and abroad.

Cultural, place-specific understandings of environmentalism, help to explain why, despite the existence of clear, preponderant scientific evidence of ecosystem threats and problems and the requisite solutions, societies often seem to be unable to respond with appropriate and/or timely redress. The question of how we make sense of the environment is significant because at a very basic, instinctual level, our understandings of phenomena shape how we perceive the world around us, and determine whether or not we perceive a given set of experiences or information as environmental problems to be solved, in the first instance. Ongoing policy debates about climate

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[135] In 2010, I participated in a trade mission to the African Union's Business Forum during its annual meeting held in Kampala, Uganda, and four East African nation states. Our delegation included the Trinidad and Tobago High Commissioner for the Region. The purpose of our visit was to maintain long-standing ties with these African Governments and to respond to their keen interest in Trinidad and Tobago's ability to harness its natural resource wealth strategically, to support economic development. While there are widely ranging views on the relative success of that strategy within Trinidad and Tobago, many in the international arena view TT as an economic success story. See also, for example, "Trinidad and Tobago Shows Interest in Ghana's Oil and Gas Industry", 2009 (December), Africa News Service and the Ghanaian Chronicle; and Melita Marie Garza, 2003. "Trinidad and Tobago Steps Up to Fill U.S. Need for Natural Gas", Knight-Ridder/Tribune News Service, October 30th, 2003.
[136] Roy Rappaport (1977:49-71).

change are a case in point. How we come to understand environmental phenomena also defines how we conceive of environmental issues and the solutions that are available and appropriate for redressing them. Indeed, it may well be that understanding the cultural nature of environment is key to unlocking our ability to bring about timely environmental change.

CHAPTER II:

Theoretical and Methodological Approach

Overview of Theory and Methods

In this chapter, I spell out the theoretical approaches and arguments that are foundational to this work, define key concepts and mechanisms and present the reader with a rationale for my methodological choices. This dissertation presents a historical and cultural sociology of the environment based on the conceptual building blocks of 1) environment as a culturally contested category in Bourdieu's relational method based upon his conceptions of habitus, field, capital and symbolic power, 2) the role of narratives, narrativity (Franzosi 1998:517; Somers 1992:592), risk societies (Beck 2006), and the state in risk societies (Cable, Shriver, and Mix 2008) and contentious conversation (Tilly 1998) as a means through which to conceptualize *how* culture works in the production of what comes to be considered 'the environment', 3) theories of plantation economy elite and middle class formation, 4) race, ethnic, and gender relations theories and 5) analytical frameworks on the creation of cultural and symbolic capital.

Method

The overall method is a case study [following Abbot (1992)[137] and Flyvbjerg (2004)] of environmental meaning formations in Trinidad and Tobago, though it more appropriately aims to be a Bourdieusian field analysis. Within this case study, archival and secondary data are used to perform historical analysis of key structural features, and the relational fields of environment and development in the context of T&T society. I evaluate secondary data from the WVS to shed light on present day attitudes, values and perceptions held by local actors about the environment, to corroborate archival data sources, and generally, to triangulate the many types of information gathered to perform the research. I use the WVS to explore how these attitudes and perceptions have changed during the most recent part of the study period (2006-2010), in the context of the social structural features identified. Lastly, I cull, review, code and analyze archival and ethnographic interview texts, national news media articles, blog posts, and oral histories to identify and categorize narratives of, and stories told about the environment by different locally relevant categories of actors, including both elites and non-dominant voices. I conceptualize these actors as embedded in the field (Bourdieu) and turning points (Abbott) defined by the environmental conflict associated with the development by invitation policy, contentious stories about the construction of smelters and other heavy industrial development, the government's policy of oil and gas sector down streaming, and growing public concern about, voice, transparency and risk.

The mixed-methods approach used in this research also includes participant observation in Trinidad society as a native informant from January 2005 to early 2012. Semi-structured, ethnographic interviews and oral histories were conducted with a broad swath of actors representing business, government, the non-profit sector, community leaders, prominent civil

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[137] I specifically rely on case studies as defined by Abbott (2001:129) in his essay, "What do Cases Do?"

servants and transnational actors. The emerging 'texts', as well as archival data were professionally transcribed and analyzed in depth based on a framework for narrative assessments informed by both cultural sociologists and environmental anthropologists and historians. See Table 3.3 in Chapter III.

The narrative assessment is tailored for the analysis of environmental texts as expressed by Cronon (1992). The central premise of this approach is that understanding the discursive terrain of environmental actors is an important venue through which we can grasp why environmental policies and governance emerge in a particular manner. The dissertation, therefore, makes a unique contribution to the literature by conceptualizing how and why various elites and groups that are silenced, do or do not determine the course of economic development and environmental sustainability.

Data Collection and Sampling

The research involves three broad sets of data. The first, includes archival data including newspaper articles, government documents, speeches, books, legal documents, environmental impact statements, literary works, plays, poems, photographs, film, oral histories, poems, novels, web blogs on life in Trinidad and Tobago written by local authors, and the like. The second includes available and accessible, quantitative, secondary data on Trinidadian values and attitudes, as well as demographics derived from the World Values Surveys 2006 and 2010 for Trinidad and Tobago. Where appropriate, these data were augmented by secondary statistical data from other sources including the T&T Central Statistical Office and other government or academic sources.

The third set of data was derived from in depth, ethnographic interviews. Analysis was also informed by field notes collected over the past two years based upon participant observation by the author, an environmental professional who has practiced in T&T over the past seven years. Participant observation on a sustained basis by a native observer enables the deeply informed, thick descriptions, relations and contexts, to which Clifford Geertz (1973) refers, which are essential to: 1) gain appropriate access to a wide cross section of social networks and groups for data collection; 2) avoid or minimize various types of bias that could arise in the information gathering process, especially when sensitive topics are involved (see Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000); and 3) to get the interpretations right – that is, the ability for deep cultural sensitivity and comprehension that enables the researcher to recognize situationally specific nuances in the boundaries of social relationships, language and behavior in decoding the narratives of the various actors. Geertz opined that the latter point is especially necessary for interpretative approaches to culture. It is also important to, as Göçek (2010) has suggested, distinguish between rhetoric and social practice in collecting data, and avoid over-reliance on formal sources of information such as the state. Instead, Göçek encourages researchers to seek out new sources, such as oral histories, memoirs, and literature, poems, songs and other repositories of local knowledge. Ethnographic interview questions were designed following Atkinson (2001), Andrews (2007) and Mishler (1986), relying upon a combination of structured (for some of the demographic variables only), semi-structured and un-structured formats. As these scholars note, fixed formats or closed ended questions do not facilitate the development of narratives (Ayres [2008] 2012). Stratified snowball sampling was the best possible recruitment strategy for the ethnographic interviews, given the local context (that is, it is often difficult to get an interview without a referral from a trusted source). A referral is generally more likely to

generate willingness on the part of some of these interviewees because references to networks always matter in getting access to key individuals. Despite the confidentiality requirements of the HSRB that inhere to the process, much of the business in Trinidad and Tobago is conducted in fairly tightly-knit networks of individuals who have known each other since their kindergarten years, who have then attended some of the same high schools, and who largely come from particular regions of Trinidad like the north (Port of Spain). Sampling method selection was informed by participant observation and the author's understanding of the contours of relevant, local, social networks and identities. Thirty-five interviews were conducted with respondents that were all engaged in local public life in one form or another. These respondents were selected to reflect a cross section of the society on the basis of social formations and variables such as race, class, religion, party, elite, grass roots, gender, and the like - which are themselves socially constructed (Taylor 2009).

Analysis of Empirical Data

Descriptive analysis was performed on two sets of WVS data for Trinidad and Tobago to provide a broad backdrop on local attitudes and values about environment and development during the study period - roughly 2001 to 2012 with emphasis on the years 2006 through 2012. The WVS data analysis also serves to ground and parse some of the competing theories about key social formations such as race, class, religion, and political party and how they work. Additionally, the WVS results help to demonstrate areas of variance or convergence between political narratives on environment, development and other temporally relevant social issues. Variables pertinent to the research were selected from the WVS for both years 2006 and 2010,

and were analyzed using the cross tabs, ggplot, chi square test, box plot, and other functions in the R Project for Statistical Computing (R)[138] package that is available as freeware. R is a robust data management and statistical application language and environment that is supported by Center for Statistical Consultation and Research (CSCAR) at the University of Michigan.

Many of the questions in the year 2006 WVS survey were modified in 2010 making the calculation of significance tests for some variables untenable. The descriptive statistics for each year were nevertheless analyzed and interpreted in the context of the broader research objectives, including demonstrating the multi-collinearity of race, religion and party as independent variables. There are also limitations to the use of WVS data due to the manner in which the questionnaire is structured and administered from one wave year to the next. Smaller countries that participate in the WVS more sporadically tend to have little input in modifying the wording of some of the questions in the instrument, especially if they are core questions. While the reasons for this approach may be quite valid given the challenges of administering a globally relevant survey that allows for broad comparisons across countries and regions, there remain challenges that affect the overall applicability of some of the questions to the local context. For instance, questions about whether or not Trinbagonians identify politically with the right, left or center are of scant importance to local political cleavages. At the same time, it would have been useful to ask respondents which political party/ies they most identified within 2006 and 2010. Had that been included, the analysis here might have been even better informed on this particular variable and more compelling.

Ethnographic interviews and the relevant archival data (including oral histories) were transcribed by professional teams. Thirty five interviews were conducted between July 2011 and January 2012. Eighty-five percent of those interviewed through the snowball sampling process

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[138] See http://www.r-project.org/ Accessed September 2012.

were male, and the remainder, females. This result is an indication of the gendered, and specifically male-dominated nature of development and environment as discursive fields among elites and the grassroots, alike. It is also a fairly raced discursive field, with the snowball sampling yielding a sample of 45% Afro-Trinidadian, 27% Indo-Trinidadian, 16% mixed-race, 7% Caucasian, 2% Syrian, and 2% Amerindian.

In many cases, interviews were transcribed more than once, both by US based native English speakers and Trinidad and Tobago based English speakers. This approach while costly, time-consuming and laborious was necessary to enable appropriate coding and the creation of data dictionaries for the computer assisted analysis of some of the narrative variables. Ethnographic interviews and other machine-readable, electronic archival information were coded against a set of criteria developed by culling narrative analytic frameworks that apply to contentious conversation, environmental and risk narratives, and those accepted as sound narrative practice from the fields of cultural and environmental sociology and environmental anthropology and history. Broad frameworks for the analysis of narrative texts following Andrews (2007), Riessman (2007) and Mishler (1996;1999) were engaged. Mishler (1996) was especially relevant to the recovery of marginalized narratives from non-elite groups alongside the matrix of oppression framework espoused by Hill-Collins (1991) and others in that tradition. Each interview was analyzed and then grouped, and then analyzed again in the context of the groupings, both manually and via the use of the DICTION 6.14 text analysis software program, initially developed by Professor Roderick Hart (2000, 2001).[139] I ventured further detailed, computer assisted text analysis of the Interview and archival data using plug in routines developed for the R Statistical Computing Package - including qdap, transvenn, data frame and

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[139] See http://www.dictionsoftware.com/ Accessed in August and September 2012. "...DICTION is a dictionary-based language analysis program that analyzes the implied meaning of a text by searching it with the assistance of some 40 dictionaries..." Given (2008).

word clouds, however that work remains exploratory and requires additional time and scope for refinement and will be presented in subsequent research efforts.[140] Grouping criteria were derived from observation, theory and the results of the initial narrative assessments. The historical analysis draws on both the literature review presented later in this chapter and archival data. Grounded theory (Charmaz 2005; Bryant and Charmaz 2007), historical discourse and deconstruction methods (Foucault 1973b; White 1987), and a social relations or critical ethnography approach (Madison 2005; Cook 2008) were engaged for the qualitative analyses in this research.

Conceptual Building Blocks and Definitions

Defining Environment & Environmentalism

Conceptually, I share William Cronon's (1992:1349) view that, as a social scientist whose primary project is the environment, there must be acknowledgement of that part of nature

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[140] What is qdap? Why is it appropriate for this analysis? Qdap compares proportions of the interviewee's language use across word clouds. This essentially weights the word frequencies. Word clouds are constructed via frequency of word counts. The more often a person uses a word, the more frequently it is used. Or likewise, we see words that we do not expect to be used frequently that rise to the surface. It is appropriate to use a word cloud to tell a story about the language being used by an actor or group of actors where the word choice ranges are more complex or more numerous. Clouds allow the conversation to be observed or seen in a very small space. Clouds give a measure of word frequency. Word webs are essentially networks. Looks at proximity of *turns of talk*. From the beginning of the interviewee's response to the end of that response. Webs tell the story of what words are associated with the target words identified by the researcher in the formation of keyword dictionaries derived from ethnographic interview or archival data. The lines in word webs are the connections to other words. Webs provide information on the proximity and frequency of the words. They show words that are clustered together. Word lists are frequency counts of keywords. Transven provides a Venn diagram of overlapping language, terms or concepts among some range of individuals or groups of actors. It provides a means of testing the degree of overlap among narratives about environment and development by type of actor. To run qdap, interview and archival data transcripts were put together as a dataframe. Dialogues were merged using the key merge function. Qdap results were also analyzed against speech characterizations derived from DICTION 6.14. Demographic variables were developed based upon the habitus categorizations in Figure 7. These variables were culled into one dataframe to run the computer assisted sections of the analysis. Utilizing the frequency word clouds, and other functions in qdap enables better understanding of the relationships that are in the data. Qdap was developed by Tyler Rinker.

that is not anthropocentric and which the natural and physical sciences have helped us to better comprehend (even if imperfectly, in their efforts to "approximate the mechanisms of nature").[141] Many environmental sociologists, historians and anthropologists, alike therefore, add "plants, animals, soils, climates, and other nonhuman entities…[as] the coactors and codeterminants" of history, culture and social life (Cronon 1992:1349). These scholars do not intend to personify nature but rather they recognize different modes of action that are not purely limited to humans and exert at least partially exogenous influences over life on the planet. The physicality of nature is part of human habitus. Nature then is an actor in the field of human/nature and human/human power struggles. I consequently recognize the salience of the natural world in and of itself and its objective effect on people and societies and the real and tangible ways in which people affect it (for better or worse).

For the sake of clarity, I utilize Max Weber's (1978:20-21) conception of *ideal type* to define what I mean by the environment.[142] Namely, that it refers to the natural and physical reality of the biosphere, the ecosystem and ecosystem services, land, flora, fauna, oceans, rivers and the like. This physical definition is cast broadly enough to encompass environment so as not to negate those properties such as gravity or the properties of ocean or atmospheric currents that are not always readily observable or comprehended by direct human experience. As a variable of analysis in this research, environment is specifically operationalized to include local narratives about the siting of aluminum smelters, the rapid development of new industrial parks, large, industrial manufacturing facilities, oil, natural gas, land tenure and rights, pollution, threats to human health and the environment, and public access to decision processes in Trinidad and

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[141] Cronon (1992:1349).
[142] I also share William Cronon's (1992:1349) view that as a social scientist whose primary project is the environment, there must be acknowledgement of that part of nature that is not anthropocentric and which the natural and physical sciences have helped us to better comprehend.

Tobago. These are some of the local definitions of the environment I derived based upon a content analysis of almost a decade of print news media, in depth interviews with locals from various walks of Trinidad and Tobago life and based upon the limited literature and other sources of information that exists - web blogs, UWI conferences and lectures, etc.

By using this definition of environment, my intent is not to assert what Riley Dunlap refers to as a *weak* constructivist approach[143] (2000:31).[144] Indeed, the very definition of nature as social construction or fixed universal category is an ongoing site of struggle in both American and Canadian environmental sociology (Buttle 1993; Dunlap 2000; Hannigan 1995:3). Dunlap asserts that this weaker approach is widely used by American environmental sociologists who analyze the important roles played by actors in raising awareness of environmental conditions as problems "without denying the objective existence of such problems" or adjudicating the relative validity claims (reflected in works by Albrecht 1975; Dietz, et al. 1989; Schoenfeld, et al. 1979) and many others. Strong constructivist studies, he suggests view both the environment and human/nature relations as "purely social construction, and thus purely a byproduct of language, discourse and power relations (2000:31).

Instead, I assert that the issue of when the environment should be considered as a physical category depends on the relationality of the context and is itself an empirical question. It therefore cannot be asserted as a fixed, universal category that is exogenously determined. One challenge in many of these debates is the constructivist threat to the reality of serious, objective environmental threats. Thus, climate change and its impacts are objective scientific facts while

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[143] See his essay, "Cautious Constructionism", in *The International Handbook of Environmental Sociology Part 4*, edited by M.R. Redclift and Graham Woodgate (1997 [2000], latest edition 2010). Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.
[144] For scholarly surveys and statements on environmental sociology, see Redclift 2010; Taylor 2009:15-16; Hannigan 2006; Dunlap, Buttle, Dickens and Gijswijt 2002; Irwin 2001; Lynch 1996; McCarthy and King 2009; Bell 2011; Gould and Lewis 2009a and 2009b; White 2004; and others)

also being socially constructed. If we view it as purely social construct, those who choose to dismiss the science and not act to mitigate can argue that it does not really exist. But so many other things that are important also fit this category, such as the notion of markets. Another challenge is that all forms of constructivist theory are lumped together and viewed as so phenomenological in perspective that it becomes impossible to distinguish the exogenous physical reality from human creations. Dunlap and others suggest that this perspective also limits sociology's role in the analysis of environmental problems (2000:31). Glassner (2000), however, asserts that in mainstream sociology today, constructivism has attained the status of a generally accepted approach. He suggests that the meaningful questions that remain in constructionism are where these cultural productions take place and to what effect. In this research, I assert that narrative analysis provides a compelling response to these questions.

Key to the resolution of constructivist debates on the matter is not so much the question of *what* constitutes nature, but rather a dire need for understanding within the discipline about *when* or under what conditions or fields of relations is nature as an *actor* and a constructed category rather than a relatively fixed, flat physical category.[145] That cultural factors shape, if not define place-specific constructions of geographies, natures, environments and environmental claims, does not however, negate the existence and legitimacy of a physical nature, the natural environment or ecosystem that 'objectively' or in 'reality' exists, outside of socially constructed categories (Cronon 1992; Glassner 2000; Tilly 1998). At the same time, both Foucault's notion of *discourse*, its co-creation in the dialectic between knowledge and power[146] (in the form of institutional practice), and Latour's (1993) challenge to the divisions made between the social

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[145] By environmentalism, I mean "awareness of, concern for, and action in the name of the environment" as characterized by Lynch (1996:225)

[146] Fairhead and Leach (2003:14), further suggest that Foucault's notion of 'discourse', resulting from the co-evolution of forms of knowledge and institutional practices, applies to modern notions of environment.

and the natural are both applicable and relevant. Latour proposed to solve this problem through a hybridizing conception of social reality, actors and relations. He emphasized that any analysis of power must consider both the intellectual and institutional configurations (derived from knowledge) that obscure the continuities between natural and social, people, technologies and institutions, and the strength and scope of these categories. As he states in *We Have Never Been Modern*,

> "The ozone hole is too social and too narrated to be truly natural; the strategy of industrial firms and heads of state is too full of chemical reactions to be reduced to power and interest; the discourse on the ecosphere is too real and too social to boil down to meaning effects," (Latour 1993:6).[147]

Conceptions of nature are shaped in both "abstract" and "objective" scientific terms and by transformations in the physical landscape and in society (Sedrez 2009: 266),[148] specifically the social relations among groups of social actors and landscapes. Conceptions of environment then, are imbued with the related effects of place- and temporally-specific power and knowledge.

Where to draw the conceptual line between the constructed and the material environment represents a fundamental analytical and political site of conflict in the great majority of, and surely the most relevant environmental debates, including Global Warming. In the context of broader American (and many Caribbean) societies, we have been unable to decide, despite overwhelming scientific evidence, and despite the substantial risks involved (especially for low-lying West Indian nations), questions such as, is the planet really experiencing human-induced climate change? Are humans really responsible for these changes or are events such as the dozens of tornadoes seen in the US, and the widespread flooding in large portions of Thailand and Italy, in 2011, acts of God? Are the predictions from climate models likely to happen? Or are

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[147] Quoted in Fairhead and Leach (2003:14).
[148] Sedrez, Lise. 2009. "Latin American Environmental History: A Shifting Old/New Field" in Edmund Burke and Kenneth Pomeranz, *The Environment and World History*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press

these models flawed, in which case, shall we just wait and see? Noted ecological anthropologist Roy Rappaport (1977) has long puzzled over this apparent "maladaptation" in modern human societies, which he framed from the viewpoint of culture.

Culture in the Social Sciences, Environment, and Environmentalism

Cultural sociologists are concerned with understanding *how* people come to interpret the natural world and environmental problems (in contrast to practitioners of cultural studies who offer interpretation of the *ways* in which people interpret the world) (See Berger 1995). A growing number of social science scholars, and many from the health professions and medical sciences[149] point to the increasing significance of culture, and specifically to narrative in understanding scientific phenomena and experience.

Environmental historian William Cronon addresses the broad question directly in his (1992) essay on the place of stories in environmental history and in his 1996 edition, *Uncommon Ground*. The work of environmental historian and philosopher Carolyn Merchant traverses the role of consciousness and cultural symbols in notions of place, science and the role of gender in understandings of environment (1980; 1989, 2nd Ed. 2010; 1996; 2003). British geographer Doreen Massey's contribution to the environmental meaning-making project explores the social construction of space, place and identity (1994; 2005). In addition, Dutch political scientist, Maarten A. Hajer's classic (1995) book, *The Politics of Environmental Discourse,* demonstrates how discourse is changing global environmentalism from the antagonistic debates of the 1970s to a new perspective based on ecological modernization, but modernization nevertheless. In his

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[149] See for instance, the collection by Brian Hurwitz, Trisha Greenhalgh and Vieda Skultans, *Narrative Research in Health and Illness* (2004).

1999 work, *Living with Nature*, Hajer and Fiscler take this agenda further, suggesting that environmental protection continues to be trumped by economic competition in international policy arenas *because underlying cultural and political questions about environmental policy underpin the dynamics of environmental crisis* [emphasis mine]. Anthropologists James Fairhead and Melissa Leach (2003) demonstrate that local, place-specific understandings of environmental issues matter in just and effective environmental governance.[150] They further demonstrate that place specific meanings are germane to examinations of the continuity between politics and identity[151]. Fairchild and Leach present an analytical framework for the emerging roles of local knowledge and legitimization about climate change in the environmental governance institutions of the Republic of Guinea in West Africa and in Trinidad and Tobago, West Indies.

While the contributions of environmental anthropologists have been rich, as pointed out by Vidich (1990), the modes of knowing in that discipline sometimes create blind spots such that the meanings associated with ethnographic data can remain inaccessible for symbolic analysis, especially when such analysis occurs outside the context of the salient histories and structural arrangements.[152] He suggests that analysis of:

> "a society's cultural symbols and their meaning absent a "history of its classes, its religious origins and differences, the sources of its racial [or ethnic] conflicts, and its massification and bureaucratization clearly neglects crucial features of the historical and cultural reality under investigation."[153]

In Sociology there has been a resurgence of theoretical and empirical work on culture – the most prolific focus has been in the areas of urban poverty and inequality in the American

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[150] For a review of current academic debates on knowledge and expert institutions, see Giddens (1991); Fisher (2000); Beck (1992); Wynne (1996).
[151] Fairhead and Leach (2003: 1-2).
[152] Vidich makes the point in a review of Constance Perin's (1988) work, *Belonging in America: Reading Between the Lines*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
[153] *Belonging in America: Reading Between the Lines*. by Constance Perin, Review by: Arthur J. Vidich Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 19, No. 3 (May, 1990), pp. 441-442, p. 442.

educational system. (See for example, Lamont 2009, 2000, 1992; Wilson 2009, Small 2009, 2004 and 2002; Young 2004; Harding 2010 and 2007; Carter 2005; and others[154]). Polletta (2008, 2006, 2005, 1998), has applied this approach to the understanding of American politics and protests, social movements, and domestic abuse, Tilly (1998) has employed it to analyze contentious conversations, Glassner (1998) has engaged cultural perspectives to examine fear and fear mongering in American culture, Taylor (2009) has employed it to explain social inequality in American environmentalism and social movements, Small (2002 and 2004), and others have also employed this cultural approach to the study of public and community participation and social movements. Sociologists have even deployed culture in explanations of romantic relationships and adolescents in poor neighborhoods (Harding 2007 and 2010). Culture is also important in state formation in that it finds its basis in the "shared meanings and interlocking habits of communication" among its people (Axelrod 1997:204; Deutsch 1953, 1969). Although the convergence of meanings and communication habits may only be partial, such convergence and the legitimacy that results from the shared sense of imagined community that it engenders are key to both nationalism and state formation (Axelrod 1997; Anderson 1991; Giddens 1979). Further, culture has been shown to be important to explaining succession conflicts, transnational integration, and domestic cleavages (Axelrod 1997: 204-5).

Lamont (2010:13-14) and others cohere in the view that there is as yet, no explicit, unifying definition of culture as a sociological concept and there is no expectation of a near-term consensus. Instead culture sociologists have undertaken what Lamont terms the pragmatic approach by utilizing well-defined key terms that are recognized as cultural conceptions. Within the realm of the new cultural sociology, including environmental sociology, then, and deploying

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[154] This literature is vast and well articulated repeatedly elsewhere, my aim here is to simply point to a subset of the key exemplars of works in the field.

constructionism[155] as an overarching approach, researchers perform their craft by interrogating cultural elements such as discourse, framing, values, repertoires, symbolic boundaries, cultural capital, symbols and narrative as key analytical tools for understanding how culture works. In the instant case, I deploy these tools to explore how culture shapes environmental issues and conflicts, and environmental governance and change. Below I present analytical perspectives that undergird this research and are defined by the following concepts.

(i)   Frames

With its intellectual foundations in the earlier works of Shutz (1962) and Berger and Luckman (1966), Erving Goffman's (1974) seminal work on the subject defines frames as a way of perceiving and understanding "how the world works" (Young 2004 [cited in Small, Harding and Lamont 2010:14). The foundational idea being that our actions are shaped by how we come to make sense of, and interpret ourselves, the world, and our surroundings. Frames then condition what aspects of social life are important and visible to us and which are not and can vary for individuals who are exposed to the same conditions. Our prior experiences shape how we interpret any given set of circumstances and define our expectations about behaviors, relationships, and the outcomes or consequences of various types of behavior. Framing theorists suggest that if we can know what frames are shaping the behaviors and attitudes of particular groups and individuals in a given context, we can explain the variation in their interpretations, understandings, decision-making and experiences. Frames help to explain the T&T competing

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[155] David Cameron's (1995, 297-299) essay on "The Making of a Polluter" in Michael D. Mehta and Eric Ouellet. Eds. 1995. *Environmental Sociology Theory and Practice*. Ontario: Captus Press Inc is perhaps an earlier example that employs notions of social constructionism to explain changes of perception of industry and environment in the context of a North American town; so is Dorceta Taylor's (2009:15-21) work, *The Environment and the People in American Cities, 1600s – 1900s*. Specifically, her other works on the development, and changing meanings of urban parks in the United States (2009:223-250), and the rise of the environmental justice paradigm (2000).

elite narratives that form the basis for this research. My aim is to examine the differences in the frames used concerning environmental issues and in particular, the anti-smelter debates.

(ii)   Signs, Signified and Code (Things, Concepts and Signs)

The conceptions of signs and signifiers derive from the field of semiotics and the seminal, intellectual work and tradition that has blossomed around the ideas of Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1894, 1916).[156] Semiotics is the study of the "role of signs in social life"[157], whether visual, text, sounds, narrative, body language or otherwise[158] and the political, cultural and social structures in which signs are given meaning by human actors. I employ Jean Baudrillard's (2001) theory of sign exchange to evaluate the political, development and environmental narratives employed by various elite groups in T&T. In so doing, I draw on the Piercean[159] approach, which recognizes that both the codes and the contexts in which these meanings are constructed matter (Chandler 2002:xiv)[160] As Chandler explains, "realities cannot be separated from the sign-systems in which they are experienced."[161] I use Baudrillard's system to evaluate the voices in these debates that are less popular or silenced. The components of his semiotic system are derived from Saussure (1983) and comprise: 1) the sign itself which is also referred to as the signifier; 2) the meaning that is attached to the sign, also referred to as the

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[156] Much of the translations of Saussure's (1857-1913) work to the English language was completed by British linguist, Roy Harris. As noted by Chandler and others, the history and theory of signs

[157] Chandler (2002:2) quoting Saussure (1983:15-16).

[158] Chandler (2002:2). It should be noted that there remains considerable variation in the field regarding the definition of semiotics and its methods. As I have selected a constructionist approach to my overall analysis of narrative and environmental meaning making as highly relevant to this research, I have also chosen a line of semiotics theorizing that is consistent with this constructionist viewpoint. My intent here is to present the approach briefly rather than provide a thorough exegesis on the subject - a huge field that crosses several academic disciplines.

[159] Charles Sanders Pierce (1839-1914). Piercean semiology draws on the tradition of John Locke rather than Saussure.

[160] See also Roman Jakobson (1952:555)

[161] Chandler (2002:xv).

signified; and 3) the object itself, namely the referent or code.[162] Signs tend to be narrative in nature in that the syntax of a given sign is usually arranged to give the sign its meaning, that is, the syntactic form given to a sign gives coherence to how its meaning is socially constructed or what it comes to represent in a given set of circumstances and temporal moment. Attention to these components of constructionist semiotics is relevant to this research enterprise because they offer a means for analyzing representations in and of different types of people, places, objects, behaviors, symbols, language, text and the like. The use of representations is also fundamental to the construction of meaning in narratives, and how meaning is exchanged and transformed in a social or cultural system of actors. Drawing out the semiotic subprocesses that are at play in narratives provides a precise tool then, for this type of analysis. Based upon my discussion earlier in the chapter then, I invoke both Foucaultian and Sausserean systems of representation in this work. The former in the sense that I see the narratives analyzed here as emblematic of power relations that are historically grounded and culturally particular to the given moment, and the latter system in that the mechanics of language and meaning making matter. These objects (people, places, things, events, text, images), the sets of mental conceptions we have about them, and the social context that defines how we shape and exchange our mental and linguistic representations about them and the nature of relationship among them, are the stuff of meaning making.

(iii)   Repertoires

Referring to repertoires of social action, this concept is defined as modes of action and meanings by Hannerz (1969) or a "toolkit" for action Swidler (1986) and others. The central idea

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[162] Following Chandler, I retain Saussure's use of the terms signifier and signified rather than those proposed by Harris' translation - signal and signification, respectively.

is that people tend to have practiced or learned routines or repertories of actions and strategies (how to drive a car, how to make a cup of tea) and the breadth of these repertoires shapes the likelihood of participating in or taking action. Swidler (1986) distinguishes this action tool kit from our values and norms, demonstrating that the poor share middle class values but have access to a different set of routines and strategies for action. Repertoires may vary in their size and scope providing some individuals with a greater range or variety of strategies for action. Cultural theorists posit the usefulness of repertoires, but identify the need for further development of the concept to explain how and why certain elements of repertoire are selected over others when deciding on a course of action. Lamont suggests that these situational opportunities and constraints could explain these selection processes, but also points to weaknesses in the concept due to the lack of a robust definition in Swidler's (1986) version of the term, which creates ambiguity when distinguishing it from other terminology such as habits, skill, and styles. (Lamont and Thevenot 2000; Small, Harding and Lamont 2010:16; DiMaggio 1997; Van Hook and Bean 2009).

(iv)   Symbolic Boundaries

This concept refers to both the axes along which social actors (people, objects or practices) categorize themselves or are categorized by others. These categories in turn, provide guidelines for the conditions under which the groupings interact as articulated by Lamont and Fournier (1992: 12 [cited in Small, Harding and Lamont 2010:17]). These authors suggest that symbolic boundaries comprise a "system of classification that defines a hierarchy of groups and the similarities and differences between them" (2010:17) and how they relate to each other. Symbolic boundaries form a necessary, but insufficient basis for the boundary demarcations

evident in the structure of occupations, neighborhoods, patters of marriage and class and racial cleavages (2010:17).

      (v)   Class and Elite Theory

Following Dorceta Taylor (2009) and others, I invoke Pierre Bourdieu's definition of class as "habitus" and cultural capital to describe the tropes and worlds of the Trinidad elites whose narratives I explore in this research. I thus define class as 'a set of common conditions in daily life that produce conditioned dispositions and behaviors such as tastes and responses to certain types of calls to action.' According to Bourdieu, class habitus is produced and reproduced through and within a range of social institutions, families, schools, work places, and other spheres that reinforce relatively uniform modes of thought and action.[163] A Weberian definition of class also works in this context because such groups are in part defined by their subsequent common market positions and life chances, but also because some members of modern day Caribbean elites acquire that status simply based upon their racial and ethnic heritages and not necessarily based upon any economic, political or other social basis of power.[164] While Bourdieu captures the cultural location of these actors, Weber helps articulate their economic and political location. Likewise, analyses of class based upon 'positionality' - following Talcott Parsons (1951), Ralf Dahrendorf (1959) and others - in the extant status hierarchies within authority and power structures found in Trinidadian society, apply as well, especially in relation to their social location. Still, among these approaches, the articulation offered by Bourdieu, nonetheless, offers greater analytical purchase for the contemporary context in Trinidad. Power elites are a part of

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[163] Bourdieu, Pierre.1984. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul; Taylor, Dorceta E. 2009. The Environment and the People in American Cities, 1600-1900s: Disorder, Inequality and Social Change. Durham: Duke University Press, p. 14.
[164] Noting that American Maecenas have counterparts in Latin America and elsewhere, a similar observation was made by Joseph Bensman and Arthur Vidich in their (1970:33) article on the new middle classes in the US.

very bounded fields in Trinidad and Tobago. There is the paradox of simultaneously knowing

who they are and knowing nothing about these groups at all. In fact, at a recent lecture at the

University of the West Indies – St. Augustine, a renowned lecturer lamented the unavailability of

(public) data on income and ethnicity, referring to concerns that for the Central Statistical Office

to produce such information for public consumption could be problematic.[165]

There are palpable north-south allegiances and rivalries among the elites of Trinidad and

Tobago. I have selected interviewees cognizant of the habitus of the northern elites versus the

southern ones. In the two subsequent chapters I explore the environmental stories of these

competing elite groups as well as the voices that tend to be silenced or not usually heard in

popular local environmental discourse.

(vi)   Plantation Economy & The Rise of a New Middle Class

The rise of a new T&T middle class and its potential effects on the rise of new social

movements and politics is yet to be studied by local social historians. The rise of this new middle

class is not surprising in the context of the country's relative economic development success over

the past three decades. It is notable that local politics is relatively oblivious to the development

of this phenomenon. However, as Meighoo correctly opines

> "A new generation of politicians has come forward to participate in the formal
> political system, providing a basis for democratic sustainability. An in-depth
> sociological analysis of the various fractions [sp] of the new participants would be
> instructive and illuminating (for example, looking at occupation, regional origin,
> family political history, educational background, ethnicity, religion).
> Unfortunately, such an analysis will not be carried out here." (Meighoo 2009: 20)

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[165] Cite UWI Lecture

This research is a step in the direction of sociological research to which he refers employing sociological theories of the new middle class as espoused and informed by the particularities of middle class formations in Trinidad based on work by Braithwaite (1975); Ryan (1991); Hintzen (1994). Few studies of Caribbean societies, and especially the social conditions in Trinidad and Tobago center on the rise of the new middle class, despite growing evidence of this group as an often, decisive feature in modern day T&T society. There has been much more emphasis placed on race and ethnicity and more recently on gender and aging – which are much needed developments as well. Social scientists and pundits alike reference the rise of a new middle class, especially along the East-West corridor in Trinidad and its relevance to political and other socially meaningful outcomes, but it is yet to be properly studied. One reason for this omission could be the preoccupation with race and politics or the reality as well, that any meaningful discussion of the new middle class would require opening a discourse about labor and labor practices, which is a highly charged subject in contemporary Trinidad. As well, one important barrier to the completion of such analysis is the very limited availability of detailed, reliable data on income and race in Trinidad and Tobago.

Poulantzas' (1975:293) articulation of the "new petty bourgeoisie" or managerial class relies upon his three bases of 1) having a capitalistically unproductive economic role (though this merits a detailed examination in the T&T case), 2) its work of political supervision and control, and 3) its ideological role as mental labor – the contrast, of course being the split in Marx between the owners of the means of production and workers, the proletariat who do not own those means. It is a more complex picture in T&T given its off shore oil and gas based economy, and its colonial history and institutions. I therefore, augment Poulantzas' structural view of the new middle class with the conceptions offered by both Eric Olin Wright and the broader power

relations perspective articulated by Bourdieu, and others. Wright (1978:78) and Guglielmo

Carchedi (1977) offered the following articulations on what they termed, the contradictory class

locations of the new middle class, an idea whose roots can be traced to the work of Harry

Braverman's[166] processual approach to class formation. Wright (1978:61-90) articulates three

primary processes

1. The progressive loss of control over the labor process by the direct producers of
   labor;
2. The development of complex bureaucracies as hierarchical authority structures
   within capitalist societies;
3. The specialization and differentiation of functions that were originally embodied
   in the capitalist class.

The result of polarization of these processes according to Wright gives rise to the new

middle class, who occupy three contradictory class locations in modern capitalist societies: 1) as

managers and supervisors who do not own the means of production but exercise control over

money, physical resources and labor; 2) semi-autonomous workers whose social location

straddles the proletariat and petit bourgeoisie, for instance, having control over their work

product but not owning the means of production; and 3) small employers who straddle the

bourgeoisie and petit bourgeoisie because they exercise control over workers (hire, manage and

fire) but are also directly involved in the production process as workers (Wright 1978:74-84).

In the context of T&T these theories may have some purchase, but provide only partially

explanations for new middle class development. Kari Polanyi Levitt (2010) and other followers

of Lloyd Best's (2010,) articulation of the plantation economy theory would assert that this

framework does not apply to Trinidad and Tobago, but instead posit that the plantation economy

system more aptly describes class and other social formations in T&T. While I tend to agree with

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[166] Braverman, Harry. 1974 [1998]. *Labor and Monopoly Capital*: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Best's conception, I suggest that T&T in the modern age is more of a hybrid of the two systems of class formation and I opt to engage class as an element of Bourdieu's habitus, following Taylor (2009) and others, because it is well recognized that a fractured or separate analysis of class based on economic relations alone would not capture the reality of these formations in Trinidad. Lloyd Best proposed the plantation economy model as a Caribbean-centric theory of social organization based upon the particular history of these islands and their historical relationship to early and contemporary waves of globalization. Best and Polanyi-Levitt see the consecutive waves of globalization, whether via colonialism and slavery in the era of imperialism or the neoliberal globalization of the present, as creating dependency, which has become a deep rooted feature of Caribbean societies. These features are still reflected in the social structure of these islands, including Trinidad and Tobago. Boom and bust cycles that are endemic to plantation economies are in large part responsible for the shape of institutions and the society. The resources or "crop" that is exploited in plantation economies tend to be foreign owned or controlled and targeted for export oriented. The "crop" that is in production need not be agricultural produce such as cocoa and sugar which were produced by Trinidad in the colonial era. Best and Polyani-Levitt suggest that in contemporary T&T society, oil and gas have merely replaced these agricultural staples, but the social relations of the plantation economy – both internal and external – remain essentially the same. In a plantation economy, while the boom periods are unsustainable, it recovers with enough frequency to destroy any nascent efforts by the local society to adjust during the bust periods, making structural change nearly impossible to achieve. Thus, as Girvan (2009:2) has indicated, it is a theory of permanent dependency.[167] Proponents of this model suggest that the social relations of the society reflect the hierarchy of

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[167] Girvan, Norman (2009). "Foreword, Plantation Economy in the Age of Globalisation." In Lloyd Best and Kari Polyani-Levitt, Essays on the Theory of Plantation Economy.

the plantation system, where those who have closer ties to the foreign owners, have higher social and economic status. Plantation economy theorists posit that change in such systems can only be achieved through rejecting passive incorporation into the system of globalization – implying self-reliance and the cultivation of the local "residentiary" sector.[168] This model promotes an isolationist perspective, but is this realistic given Trinidad and Tobago's current role in the current global political economy? Would path dependence allow it?

Recent modifications to the plantation economy model (now version IV), indicate that the picture is far more complex and more a question of which groups are able to exercise hegemony or power on the basis of the changing configurations of these social formations, at any given historical moment.

(vii)   Coloniality of Citizenship and Creolization

Like frames and repertoires, habitus represents the raw resources (symbolic, social, material and otherwise) from which actors, in particular social locations, draw for constructing their stories and informing social action but it is much more relational in orientation than the typical conceptions of frames. Bourdieu acknowledged that actors do not always act in a manner consist with their habitus, in the same way that actors may not always behave in ways consistent with their frames. In addition, habitus shapes the opportunities and constraints facing various actors (material, temporal, geological, and otherwise). These constraints in turn shape the repertoires, discursive practices, performances and narratives employed by various actors. Habitus helps to explain how and why meaning gets assigned to the collection of stories and how new stories are constructed, memorialized and become overarching narratives that harden into structures, social facts, property and property rights. Environmentalism, like much else in human

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[168] Ibid.

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experience, is ultimately about the stories people create and tell, whether they are scientists, politicians, grass-roots activists, or others, in order to make sense of their social and material worlds, and their relationships to the rest of humanity and to nature, including the place and the moment in which they exist.

I adopt a few minor but consistent variations to Bourdieu's conception of *habitus* that do not overextend nor contradict theoretical boundaries. The first is to include the broad notion of citizenship and in particular, the *coloniality of citizenship* (as defined by Kamugisha 2007) in the repertoires available to, and the constraints facing actors. The concept of coloniality of citizenship (belongs to the relatively new literature in symbolic anthropology) and is defined as varying degrees of group belonging in the context of larger T&T society and history. Coloniality of citizenship[169] is consistent with Bourdieu's conception of habitus when considered relationally with his two related conceptions of capital and "field of power". According to Kamugisha (2007:20) the concept is "mobilized as a description of the complex amalgam of elite domination, neoliberalism and the legacy of colonial authoritarianism which continue to frustrate and deny the aspirations of many Caribbean people". It therefore challenges imperialist, colonialist canonical discourses and conceptions of nature and power.

Secondly, I add the complimentary conception of *creolisation*, initially articulated by C.L.R. James (1966), Kamu Brathwaite (1971; 1974), Mintz and Price (1976), Green (1986) Bolland (1998), Glissant (2011; 1999, 1989) and others West Indian writers. Creolization or the creole society model, is understood to be place specific in its application within the region, and as I will show in Chapter III, applies even within these small nation states, but is highly relevant

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[169] Kamugisha, Aaron. 2007 (October). "The Coloniality of Citizenship in the Contemporary Anglophone Caribbean", Race & Class, 49, 2: 20-40.

to understanding local culture. As Smith (1961[1965]) explains, "[t]he Creole complex has its historical base in slavery, Plantation systems, and colonialism."[170]

Creolization has engendered both convergent and divergent narratives of the Caribbean nationalist project in the past. That is, some social analysts have blamed creolization for the fragmentation and failure to create a unified Caribbean nationalist culture (see Smith 1961), while others have viewed it as a necessity in the nation-building project. In the present day consensus of scholarship, however, Creolization is articulated as a central tenet of Caribbean historiography and proponents have expanded the conception to include all of the peoples, "slaves, peasants, freed people and labourers [who] were active agents in the historical process [es]"(Bolland 1998:3-5) of liberation, creating a history of their own, juxtaposed against that of the colonial oppressors, and in the process, hewing out of their experiences, a West Indian nationalism. Its proponents present it as a historicizing, dialectical process of social and cultural change. In some current formulations, Creolization is defined as a "West Indian cultural production" (so that white settlers are also classified as Creole – it is inclusive), and is key to "the region's negotiation of complex ethnic [and racial] legacies". (DeLoughrey, et al. 2005:1-32) Transplantation and settlement are important contributors to how West Indians understand their sense of place (and this links to coloniality of citizenship) and their environmental ethos.

Caribbean scholars usually fall into two intellectual camps that mirror broader sociology of development debates. The first embraces the plantation economy view of modern day Caribbean society and the second group sees the region as comprised of plural societies. George Beckford (1972:10) and others who support the former view (such as Patterson 1967:70) employ Goffman's conception of "total institution" and apply it to the plantation economy (Bolland1998:5). They argue that while the sugar and cocoa plantation economies of the region

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[170] Cited in O. Nigel Bolland (1998:2).

have largely disappeared (especially with the removal of EU protections for agricultural products from their prior colonies), the plantation economy system of relations persists and exhibits characteristics of dependency upon the capital investment markets and inputs of the metropolis. This dependency leads to underdevelopment, poverty and powerlessness in the region (Bolland 1998:6). As previously discussed, the radical dependency perspective has been broadly challenged and limited in more recent scholarship that recognizes the present-day hybridity of societies like T&T. Critiques of this world view take issue with the privileging of institutional approaches over other areas of social life. They also point out the dependency model's partial inconsistency with the actual historical experience of plantations. Other proponents of the plantation thesis reject the stronger interpretation of the persistent economic links to the capitalist mode of production, but acknowledge that the plantation persists in social and cultural formations that cannot be understood outside the places in which they exist (Bolland 1998:6). Nor for that matter can they be fully comprehended by those who are unfamiliar with their milieu. Plural society theorists emphasize the cultural and institutional stratification inherent in West Indian societies on the basis of hierarchies shaped by history, class, color, race and ethnicity and how power is distributed among them. Contemporary definitions of creolization as processes of cultural change in the region have now largely replaced both the plural society and plantation economy as perspectives on nation building in the region (Bolland 1998:10).

(viii)   Conceptions of Human Action and Situationality

Third, I specify the conception of human action espoused by Jasper (1998) in *The Art of Moral Protest*. Jasper presents the actors in social movements as more complicated and multifaceted, moral beings who think, are capable of behaving artfully and strategically, who

plan and are aware of their actions, learn from their mistakes, are beings capable of a range of

emotions, and are capable of innovation. He emphasizes the importance of the conditions in

which actions take place in shaping behavioral choices and outcomes. Classical theorists have, in

contrast, characterized models of human action too narrowly, casting actors in one of five

socially disembedded and under-socialized modes of action as

1) rational, self-interested utility maximizers with guile (per resource mobilization theorists);
2) thoughtless followers of the crowd who mimic each other and at moments become caught up in a "collective frenzy…of rapid social change"[171];
3) hopeless victims of a particular set of political and economic arrangements (process theory);
4) in identity crisis caused by post-industrial conditions (as some new social movement theorists imply); and
5) dispassionate, strategic fabricators of meanings and discourses as implied in some applications of framing theory).

Jasper's intent is not to debunk the works of these theorists but rather he creates an

opening for a more nuanced, conditional, and perhaps temporally and place-specific notion of

human behavior. While the actors in my research are not all movement actors, I find Jasper's re-

conceptualization of the underlying theory of human action more congenial and fitting for my

efforts here, especially given my focus on symbolic capital. It is also consistent with more

comprehensive and in-depth readings of Bourdieu's work (see for instance Steinmetz 2011 and

2010).

To say that members of the grassroots or elites informed and acting out of their habitus

are always rational actors is to run afoul of Bourdieu's observation that "habitus is not

necessarily adapted to its situation nor necessarily coherent"(2000b: 160 cited in Steinmetz

2011:51) and adheres to an unnecessarily limited conception of human behavior and rationality.

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[171] Jasper (1998:p).

Jasper's proposed approach to human action is more attuned to and perhaps enhances Bourdieu's dispositional view of human action.

Fourth, following (Martin 2010; Freire 1970[1995] and Gruenewald 2003), I assert that "situationality" and the "critical pedagogy of place" matter as elements of habitus and are inter-related with the conception of coloniality of citizenship. According to Paulo Freire:

> "People as beings "in a situation," find themselves in temporal-spatial conditions which mark them and which they also mark. They will tend to reflect on their own "situationality" to the extent that they are challenged by it to act upon it." (Freire 1970/1995, p. 90, as quoted in Gruenewald 2003a p. 4).

Employing Gruenewald's critical pedagogy of place (2003a), Martin examined the spatial-temporal-socio-historical cultural contexts of place, and has proposed that "the genealogical approach to the history of individuals in communities (and the extent to which they are able to obtain and integrate a full symbolic and material citizenship in those communities) underscores Gruenewald's theory of a critical pedagogy of place." In all contexts, but in the particular context of peoples who arrived in the Caribbean islands under differing circumstances and at different times, understandings of place are important to how we locate or see ourselves and each other as a part of a larger community (Martin 2010:257-268; Aikenhead, Calabrese Barton and Chinn 2006: p 403). This context, I argue, is part of their habitus.

For Martin the focus is on indigenous people and newcomer settlers, in Trinidad the story is more involved since all groups are relative newcomers, but the conditions under which they came differ and have shaped their historical and present day relations to land and land tenure – as well as their citizenship. I consider the situationality of larger groups of people who share the land and resources known as Trinidad and Tobago, but specifically Trinidad, the present day site of oil and gas based industrialization, and the anti-smelter protests. How the environment comes

to be understood in any given place, is neither a mere question of science nor based upon fixed notions of the physical features of a given geography. Instead, what constitutes the environment at any given time period is shaped by place-specific, cultural, structural and historical factors that are reflected in environmental discourse and narrative.

Understandings of the environment and environmentalism in Trinidad and Tobago have represented, for the last decade, a contested cultural terrain among competing sets of actors, elites and grassroots, alike. These elites, the local establishment, are defined by the intersection of their class, racial and ethnic, religious, and political party membership - among other types of locally relevant social cleavages. Structural, historical, institutional and cultural factors intersect to generate an inherent tension between economic development and environmental sustainability in the bipolar, socio-political context of modern-day Trinidad and Tobago. Narratives - the stories people tell in the process of sense-making - are important mechanisms by allowing us to examine how our sense-making is informed by habitus, and matter for elucidating how what I term, environmental capital is produced and distributed in Trinidad and Tobago society.

(ix) Environmental Capital

Environmental questions in Trinidad and Tobago are byproducts of situated practices and claims making. The anti-smelter controversies in Trinidad are representative of prominent, unresolved cultural conflicts specifically manifest in competing interpretations of both the environment and economic development. Some of the major competing definitions of environment at play in local Trinbagonian discourse during the study period are presented in Chapter III. Various local[172] elites, primarily, political groups, academics, non-governmental

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[172] I recognize that conceptions of local and global are ambiguous and may perpetuate false dichotomies. While there is truth in this charge, I nevertheless follow Bruno Latour (1991) who asserts that conceptions of local and global

organizations and business elites vie for *control* over the shape that these different interpretations should take because the winning interpretations of environmental debates have the effect of creating and/or re-allocating social, political and economic, but most importantly symbolic and experiential *capital*[173]. In the subsequent chapters, I demonstrate that in the particular case of the anti-smelter protests in Trinidad, the question of environment should be understood as a field of social and cultural struggle among elites, while the voices of the grassroots coming up from below to challenge the growing disorder, corruption and perceived risk associated with the development regime, are largely silenced, coopted or absent. I further show that the agglomeration of these environmental risk, transparency, voice and accountability narratives provided an opportunity for creating, what I conceptualize as, environmental capital. In the power vacuum that resulted from both the increasing challenges to the PNM led government and its premature calling of the National Election in 2010, powerful elites were able to co-opt salient environmental narratives that challenged the existing development model through the anti-smelter protests. These political elites were then able to capture the cultural environmental capital that was formed in that environmental narrative process. They thereby gained access to a popular legitimacy and leveraged the anti-smelter environmental narrative, "reorganiz[ing] [it] as another kind of capital"[174], per se, in this case, they were able to *transform* the dominant anti-smelter narratives into political capital, to attract the new middle class and gridlock breaking

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allow discursive space for place-based, experiential knowledge while still accommodating knowledge that is less-place specific and universal, which serves the important purpose of establishing the larger meanings from the findings of scientific and socio-scientific research and scholarship.

[173] I define "property" following Pierre Bourdieu's conception of cultural capital. Bourdieu expands Marx's formation of the mode of production based on economic capital to argue that yet another very significant type of capital is produced in the formation and reproduction of classes and social groups, that is cultural capital. I further this line of theorizing by developing the notion of environmental capital. Environmental property or capital is not merely material nor is it broadly cultural, but is specifically symbolic, and necessary for the creation social assets, including legitimacy (Weber 1978), and social license. See Premdas (2007: 11-12) for an interesting, case relevant perspective on symbolic power.

[174] (Swartz 2008:50).

votes, in the context of a bipolar[175], single party political regime (Ryan 1996, 2003; Meighoo 2008). I also assert that these elites, whether intentionally or not, in the circumstances, used the environment as an opportunity to compete with incumbents for the legitimate access to the state apparatus and authority to run the nation.

Environment, Social Location and Social Constructionism

"[A]lmost no one any longer disputes that meaning is produced through social constructions." Glassner (2000: 590)

The logical next step in this conversation on cultural conceptions of nature and the environment brings us to the broader framework of social constructionism. This approach developed as a critique and alternative formulation to the modernist view of knowledge and science, which emphasized evidence based knowledge, meaning, world views and discourses, the majority of which have their origins in European culture and was developed by men of a particular class status. Social constructionists problematized modernist views of science, knowing and evidence by calling in to question its very definition, and pointing out the power

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[175] The bipolitarity to which I refer involves the perceived political ethnic conflict that has marked T&T elections. Some social analysts in the region propose that this has been the state of affairs since the late colonial/early post independence period when the PNM (viewed as a pro Black or Afro-Trinidadian, more urban based party) won the General Elections in 1956 over the People's Democratic Party (viewed as a pro Indian/Indo-Trinidadian, party with a strong rural and labor base). Ryan has written extensively on this question and is a leading authority in the field. Most notably, he has written several exegeses of the racially based deadlock that has come to plague Trinidad and Tobago politics and National Elections. While there has certainly been an increasingly racially charged tone to National Elections over the past two decades, I tend to agree with Meighoo's (2008) very thoughtful and evidence driven analysis that the race conflict arguments have been overextended as the almost ubiquitous explanation of many of the country's ills. It is too readily used as a catch-all or go-to social explanation for all sorts of social phenomena and perhaps in error. Racial and ethnic conflict do however play a role and are very likely used to leverage movement resources in the achievement of other underlying aims or as a band-aid to assuage other deeper structural problems facing the nation.

relations and cultural judgments that are embedded in them (Rorty 1991). In other words, social constructionists value a multiplicity of knowledges and ways of knowing and generally reject that there is a singular meta narrative about knowledge, evidence, and science. Instead, they articulate a world where humans create frameworks of meaning, interpretive repertoires or discourses about the lived experiences that shape action (White 2004:11). See also the seminal work of Berger and Luckman (1967), and more recent work by Gergen (2009). The social world is also created, shaped and re-constituted by particular discourses, as is understanding of the physical world. It is pointless to conceive of one true or universal knowledge that transcends human geographies, constructions of meaning and time (Giddens 1987; Schmidt 2001:135-139; Gergen 2009). Indeed, it is through these created sets of meanings that we as humans are able to relate to our social and physical worlds.

It is not an intellectual stretch therefore to establish that concepts, issues, terminology, events, roles and identities, germane to this research, among them, terms such as, environmentalism, environmental problem, polluter, sustainability, "green", environmentalist, engineer, scientist, development, nature, natural resource, and land are social constructions that do not have fixed social meanings (See Redclift 2010; Taylor 2009:15-16; Hannigan 2006; Dunlap, Buttle, Dickens and Gijswijt 2002; Irwin 2001; Lynch 1996; McCarthy and King 2009; Bell 2011:206-225, 227-251, and 1994; Gould and Lewis 2009; White 2004; Cronon 1996; Merchant 1996; Spirn 1996 and others).

Narratives, Stories and Environmental Conflict

Narrative has a long tradition and central role in West Indian society, and in particular, Trinidad and Tobago's culture. This familiarity with story-telling is manifest in its music (calypso, soca, chutney, rapso, and chutney soca) and its celebrated literature, poetry, and expressive and performance arts – with Trinidad Carnival is a notable example.

> "The lyrics of traditional Calypso music are generally quite political in nature, but because of strict censorship, are cleverly veiled. Calypso lyrics, in fact, are so carefully structured on events of the day that musical historians can date many of the traditional Calypso songs based on their lyrical content."[176]

There likewise, exists a long, rich and growing body of social science and historical research that has explored the centrality of narrative and narrativity in Trinbagonian and West Indian cultural forms. In a societal context in which narrative is so rich and relevant to the cultural fabric and understandings of nationhood, it is all the more necessary and appropriate to examine the influence and role of narrative as mechanism in more non-traditional aspects of social discourse, such as nature and environmentalism.

"Is Just A Movie": The Narrative Power of A Single Image

> "Trinidad is nice, Trinidad is a paradise...but I hear some people talking about Revolution Day, changes on the way...." (Calypsonian, Anthony Emrold Phillip - Brother Valentino)

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[176] Megan Romer, contributor, Worldmusic.com. http://worldmusic.about.com/od/genres/p/calypso.htm Accessed on October 31st, 2011.

When one reads about the Caribbean in travel journals or imbibes the messages conveyed in television commercials, and other popular media about the region, images and phrases such as the following readily come to mind: a sunny tropical place; picturesque and warm; with white sand; remote; secluded beaches; emerald waters and perhaps a hammock strung between two palm trees. Island nations have been characterized by outsiders for their fun-loving, musical and hospitable peoples and are conceived as gems, emerald and spice isles, spaces for letting go of inhibitions, or for taking a great escape. This view presents one set of stories about the region. At times, Caribbean peoples seem to share these received images of themselves and their nation-places for convenience, economic expediency, the cultural predominance of these stories, or perhaps for other less well understood reasons.

These images, however, stand in stark contrast to the region's colonial past, though some might argue that they are, in-fact, contiguous, if not path dependent.[177] The particular history of each of these West Indian nations brings to the fore a different set of rich stories, which are specific to the varied groups of peoples who came to the region, the particularities of each group's arrival and post arrival experiences, and to each country's collective national experiences and legacies. When compared to the popular, even ubiquitous paradise images for which the region is well known, the realities of the Caribbean region's not so distant past, and its present geopolitical and socioeconomic status, pique the observer's curiosity, especially when one considers that many Caribbean nations achieved independence from colonial rule only as recently as the 1960s. Even today, some of these nations, notably the French islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe, and the country of Guiana north of Brazil, on the South American

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[177] By using this concept here, I mean to say that West Indians' images of ourselves are shaped by and contingent upon specific historical events and processes that inhere in the present from our past.

mainland, remain colonial dependencies, prefectures, departments and/or possessions.[178] A close examination of the region's history forces the question of how, or through what transformational processes do people displaced, recover a sense of place and how do they conceive of themselves, their relationship to nature and the natural environment? How do they carve meaning, self identity, responsibility for, and understanding of their relationship to place from the colonial and post colonial experience?

In his novel, *Is Just A Movie*, celebrated Trinidadian writer, Earl Lovelace, who is popular with locals, offers us a glimpse into the collective psyche of a people displaced in his characterization of Kangala, a calypsonian who has lost his voice. Lovelace explains the power and role of the *kaisonian* in local Trinidad and Tobago society as s/he who reduces "the powerful by ridicule...show[s] their absurdities by parody....Make[s] their meanings meaningless and give[s] meaning to meaning."[179] The calypsonian, then by controlling meaning and speaking out freely against the powerful classes, symbolizes the local society's great equalizing force - the power of the people or the governed to speak out for truth and justice. What are we to conclude then, when Lovelace introduces the claypsonian/kaisonian who has lost his voice in the immediate post independence period and the aftermath of the failed Black Power rebellion? As Kangala explains,

> "But everything was against me. I was singing, but nothing came of my songs. Then that too ended, not a sound came from my voice, not a new note spun from my head. I looked around to see those who had dreamed with me steaming into safe harbours. They rebuilt

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[178] See http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107543.html. For Département d'outre-mer de la Martinique, normally called Martinique or http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/martinique.htm or http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/367084/Martinique/54677/Tourism-and-trade . For Département d'Outre-Mer de la Guadeloupe or Guadeloupe, see http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/247616/Guadeloupe or http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/country_profiles/4252578.stm. See also Marshall, Bill, ed. 2005. France and the Americas: Culture, Politics and History. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, Inc. (pp. 778, 535 and 542).
[179] Lovelace (2011:3)

the pyramids, they reconstructed Hanuman, they parted the ocean and stuffed the Middle Passage back into oblivion." (Lovelace 2011:4)

Lovelace's Kangala and other characters tells a story of disillusionment borne of the perceived failures of the local, and specifically, Black-led, nationalist governments that grew up in the immediate post independence era in many of the English-speaking Caribbean nations. These sons of the soil sought to give birth to not only newly Independent nations in the region but to build a cohesive Federation of nations coming out of the colonial experience as a means to bolster the region against future waves of globalization via colonialism or otherwise. As one of local with whom I interviewed noted, those were "the heady days of Black Power and all of those isms that were very popular in the 1960s'' [and 70s]. Many of those who became the region's first local leaders were intellectuals, influenced by the US Civil Rights, Peace and Environmental movements and the liberation movements in nations on the African continent. Many of them had met, were influenced by, or perhaps even worked with or were followers of "...the big names, Martin Luther King, Jr., Malcolm X."[180] They were "part of the ferment" in these places, as students or young university lecturers, and many had returned home to the Caribbean to create change, while others migrated to Africa to work with, or study the independence, liberation and Pan-Africanist movements led by Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya, and Julius Nyerere in Tanganyika (now Tanzania).[181]

In the case of Trinidad, the disillusionment to which Kangala refers specifically implicates the inability of the nascent locally run government to forge a truly multi-ethnic society, one not racially divided to benefit the imperatives of foreign investment capital. In the wake of the failure, Blacks and Indians alike retreated to the imagined, distant and supposedly

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[180] Confidential interview with author on January 26, 2012.
[181] Confidential interview with author on January 26, 2012.

safe communities of their ancestral heritages. Blacks or Afro-Trinidadians donned dashikis[182] and (re) discovered *Kente* cloths and the imagined community of a distant Motherland Africa signified by its pyramids and Indians returned to the iconic gods of the great south east Asian traditions, in the process erecting symbolic homages to Hanuman. In so doing, they numbed the pain from their dashed efforts to seize a true independence and to realize their franchise, their right to occupy, take responsibility for and shape this land called Trinidad and Tobago as an authentically Creole nation. In that moment, they instead embraced the self-eroding, imposed erasure of their common ground in the Middle Passage, retreating from the project of constructing a new society, a new integrated Trinidadian and Tobagonian society - a new world society. While the failure of the Black Power Revolution in 1970 remains significant for the condition of political development in T&T, it is not as fatal an outcome for that historical moment, upon further consideration of the formation of both Trinidad and Tobago as colonies, especially Trinidad which, according to many accounts appeared to lay dormant for much of colonial period.

From late 2004 to early 2012, I regularly returned to Trinidad and Tobago, for business and research pursuits. As a returning national and a student of environmental sciences and sociology, I developed keen interest in how locally situated Trinbagonians make sense of the natural environment, how they define environmental issues, what constitutes environmentalism in the local context, and how these understandings relate to the country's development agenda? In the T&T case, this is an agenda predicated upon exploiting its rich natural resource base and particularly, down streaming it's oil and natural gas industry.

I began a process of piecing together an obscure if not entirely non-existent ecological history of these islands in the periods before, during and after the colonial experience. I sort this

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[182] Though, during the 1970 Black Power Movement, Indians who were in the Movement also wore dashikis.

ecological history into four major historio-temporal categories, as shown in Figure 2.1: 1) the period of cultivation by the islands' early inhabitants[183]; 2) the era of large-scale mono-crop agriculture and the cultivation of sugar cane, coffee and cocoa during the early plantation economy and the early advent of the oil and gas extraction; and 3) the post-colonial, mid industrial era. The contemporary era is one that still remains largely in social and economic flux, is as yet, undefined, and occupies an interstitial space characteristic of turning points (at the end of long social trajectories or regimes of operation and administration). This era is and perhaps in the near term may well be subject to on-going social debate and contest.

Moreover, I sought to understand how Trinbagonians, a people who were previously subject to colonial rule and the plantation system of economy, many, the descendants of groups who were relocated and/or displaced in that process, formulate their own sense of place, space, and temporality in the contemporary era, given the context of that history. I see these as necessary preconditions for the creation of local understandings of both environment and development. Noted geographers David Harvey and Doreen Massey, and environmental historian Carolyn Merchant, have each, in their own research, demonstrated the necessity, significance and relevance of an understandings of space, time and place to one's conception of the natural environment and one's relationship to it.

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[183] This early era of human occupation summarizes a vast historical period that spans at least 7000 years. If these were to be disaggregated here, I would instead propose nine ecological eras however, as this ecological history is not properly the central focus of this volume, I retain the abbreviated version. For an excellent, thorough, accessible and current survey of this period, see Basil Reid's (2007) volume, Popular Myths About Caribbean History where he puts to rest, long outdated and misinformed information about the region and Trinidad and Tobago's earliest inhabitants. Interestingly, the oldest human remains in the Caribbean region were found in South Trinidad (Banwari man), still a too well kept secret that is of historical and cultural relevance to the region. See Reid (2007:20-41).

Figure 2.1 Major Historio-Temporal Periods of Ecological Change in Trinidad and Tobago

I. Pre-colonial Cultivation by Early Inhabitants (Ortoiroid, Saladoid, Barrancoid, Troumassoid, Suazan Trousmassoid, & early Island Carib Colonization) 5000 B.C. - 1492 A.D.

II. Early and late Colonial Period Characterized by Large-scale Mono-crop Cultivation of Coffee, Cocoa, and Sugar Cane - Advent of Oil and Gas Extraction Early: 1492 - 1775 Late: 1776 - 1962

III. Post-Colonial Era and Era of Heavy Industrial Development 1963 - 2000

IV. Contemporary Era of Heightened Environmental Risk Awareness & the Search for a New Mode of Development 2001 - present

Merchant's radical ecology offers one perspective on the dominant image of these post-colonial places as paradise, suggesting that they represent the West's attempt to impose a recovery narrative, whereby the colonizers of the past or their descendants posit themselves as heroes who seek to re-discover or re-create a Garden of Eden type purity to places previously altered or despoiled by the imperatives of capital, plantation economy and its social antecedents and byproducts. Merchant's point of view certainly resonates when one considers that much of the early biological studies on the West Indian region and Trinidad and Tobago were completed by interested and often quite dedicated British, other European or Canadian expatriates. Members of this loose group produced much of the work identified in the introductory chapter as comprising the first strand of or earliest environmental scholarship on the region and T&T. As I

will demonstrate in Chapter III, this group also created the earliest civic associations that could be classified as environmental in T&T, having founded the Horticultural Society and various field naturalist groups.

Doreen Massey's work in particular, points out that space, time and place matter because both individual and collective identities are constituted through engagement, relationships, and practices of interaction including "non-relations, absences and hiatuses". She also asserts that responsibility is relational and depends on the individual or group's notions of the past in which their identities are formed. [184] In other words, cultivation of identity, responsibility and rootedness to place comprises relational processes and are in this manner similar to narrative in the sense that they are cultivated through interaction with others. Massey's definition of identity is notably consistent with Margaret Somers' definition of identity as captured in her conception of narrativity.

David Harvey proffers that understanding conceptions of space, time, place and their relevance to the environment, are essential to attaining social justice. By social justice he means, the social change that addresses past and present social ills.[185] In his essay, *Searching for the Invisible Man*[186], Jamaican historian Michael Craton provides what remains one of the most poignant and lucid statements on the challenges faced by both the Caribbean slave societies of the past, and for that matter, the contemporary era societies in the ex-British West Indies or Anglophone Caribbean. Craton ends the article with a perhaps, overly pessimistic, assessment of the incomplete creolization (that is, a place-specific identity and belonging creation) process in most of these nation-states. The point is nevertheless, well taken. Other Caribbean scholars, and writers have likewise lamented this incomplete process of cultivating belonging, rootedness to

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[184] Massey (2004:5 ,9)
[185] Harvey (1996:127)
[186] Craton (1978)

place or what CLR James (1996), Aaron Kamugisha,[187], Kamu Brathwaite (2002) and others call the coloniality of citizenship for West Indian peoples. My inquiry here, then, is an exploration of how Trinbagonians can seek to *produce* nature in socially just ways that overcome the powerful legacies of oppression and other forms of privilege from the colonial era, claim a complete citizenship of place, and fully integrate (that is, bring into equal participation) the environmental and other responsibilities that inhere to completing the process of belonging, owning and full enfranchisement. I sought therefore, to piece together a small part of Trinidad's recent ecological and social history and to link it to its present day social, environmental and development dilemmas during the recent boom and the period of environmental crisis.

The Importance of Stories and "Danger of a Single Story"

Narratives or stories are a taken-for-granted part of social life and human existence. Indeed, some social historians and philosophers have suggested that it is the very propensity and need to create stories that make us human (see for example Cronon,1992). We are the story-telling animal (Swift 1983). At a basic, instinctual level, we all know what stories are and what they do, and we use them to make sense of, and to organize everyday life. Although some theorists draw a distinction between the terms narrative and story, following Polletta (1998) and

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[187] The coloniality of citizenship is a concept developed by Aaron Kamugisha, Professor of African and West Indian thought at UWI, Cave Hill, Barbados. The term refers to the denial of full citizenship to many persons in the Anglophone West Indian nation state – not primarily in a formal legal sense, but in the variety of practices, "tropes of belonging and identity" contests that shape the aspirations of West Indian people. Kamugisha states that coloniality of citizenship is a complex amalgam of elite domination, neoliberalism and the legacy of colonial authoritarianism that still persist in present day English-West Indian nations. Kamugisha, Aaron. "The Coloniality of Citizenship in the Contemporary Anglophone West Indian". *Race and Class* 2007 49: 20.

others, I use these terms interchangeably. Bal (1977:5-6) subdivides narrative into three levels, *histoire, recit*, and *narration*.[188]

Stories are foundational sociological, hermeneutic devices because social constructions are produced in narrative processes. Unlike the hermeneutics of Plato, stories do not only apply to simple interpretation, but instead to our construction and transformation of the social world in which we exist and our relationship to it. Stories are processes of social production - and re-production of the social world, the self and the relationship between the two. As Franzosi (1998:517), quoting Barthes (1997) points out, narratives are "international, transhistorical and transcultural…." Narratives also contain "a great deal of sociology behind a handful of lines"…are "packed with sociological information," and "much of our empirical evidence is in the form of narrative…."(1998:519).

Yet, narratives are less well understood as mechanisms than they should be perhaps because they are so ubiquitous, are ostensibly 'known,' and therefore, taken for granted as 'understood.' They may well hold a key for unlocking our comprehension of issues as broad as why, despite the preponderance of scientific evidence about various types of ecosystem challenges, human societies are unable to create and act upon effective, often attainable solutions to these challenges. Narrative as a sociological device could also help to resolve dilemmas in sociological theory such as, how to specify in detail the linkages between agents and structures and micro-and macro processes. Conflict theorists tell us that they also provide important information about cultural capital and contests to control material and symbolic capital.

Most environmental conflict models do not take into account the elite struggles that generate environmental conflicts (Taylor 2009). As Mohr (1998) suggests, the mechanism

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[188] Other linguists such as Genette (1980:9-26); Rimmon-Kenan (1983:3-15); Todorov (1977:111); and Cohan and Shires (1988:53-54) have offered definitions for narrative. Cited in Franzosi (1998).

through which control contests are carried out is in the social production and re-formulation of *narratives* or *stories* about nature, science, development, justice, land, citizenship and nationhood. Narratives then, help articulate the location and effect of environmental conflicts. Analyzing the specific constructions of competing elites around the concrete issue of the anti-smelter controversy also enables one to distinguish between the social productions of certain environmental claims and their causes on the one side, from the important objective realities that are often obscured by these contests over meaning, on the other (see for instance, Goode 1994; Ross 1998).

Narratives as the socially produced meanings of environmental terms, texts, symbols, actions or performances, change over time based on the shifting circumstances in a given group, or society. The contents, characteristics and conditions in which these constructs are formulated constitute a series of *relational* and *conversational,* following Tilly (1998), *narrative* or story formation processes that are relevant to understanding why they are created by particular sets of actors, at a given point-in-time, and what these constructs mean. Narrative assessments can provide insights into the meanings attributed to cultural artifacts themselves, to the underlying structures of meanings. They also provide information about the similarities and differences among cultural artifacts as well as the processes through which existing structures are preserved (Mohr 1998:345). Historical narratives provide information on the sites and outcomes of relevant, prior contests.

I focus the narrative analysis on meaning-making in groups and institutions and employ a synthetic approach to interpretation building on theorizing and the empirical observations of Michèle Lamont (2000) and colleagues on cultural capital (Lamont and Small 2008; Lamont and Lareau 1988) broadly, boundaries (Lamont and Molnar 2002; Lamont and Fournier 1992), and

the symbolic and social structures integral to conceptions of culture (William Sewell 1999; Robert Wuthnow 1993; Berger1995). I also engage Margaret Somer's exegeses of narrative and narrativity in social theorizing generally, and specifically, with respect to class formation theory (1990; 1992). I follow Dorceta Taylor's (2009) application of frame analysis and master frames (Goffman 1986; Snow and Benford 1992) and elite theory to the environmental field, as well as Charles Tilly's work on contentious conversation (1998). A set of conceptual approaches and methods from anthropology (Fairhead and Leach 2003) and environmental history (William Cronon1992), that are pertinent to narrative analyses about the environment, nature, and landscapes and sensitive to issues of temporality, place specificity, and the nature of emplotment, (i.e., progressive versus declensionist narratives in scene setting), also inform my analytical framework. Many of the analytical variables in this research, such as habitus, symbolic and cultural capital, and narrative stories themselves are, as George Steinmetz (2011) has pointed out, inherently historical. Drawing on these traditions, my main purpose is to critically examine present day and historical[189] environmental narratives to craft a detailed, empirically rich and nuanced analysis. I focus the analysis by exploring the specific competing narrative structures produced by elites in Trinidad and Tobago surrounding the anti-smelter controversies between the year 2000 and the present.

Axelrod (1983) has pointed out that fundamental human communication is a mechanism that sustains or changes differences. He quotes Rogers (1983:274; and Homans 1950), "the transfer of ideas occurs most frequently between individuals …who are similar in certain

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[189] As the concepts environment and environmentalism are relatively modern, any historical review of narrative constructions would necessarily have to trace back to the antecedents of these terms. Instead, I will therefore identify and map the historical productions associated with nature, land and other temporally and place specific terms used in Trinidad and Tobago and the wider Caribbean, as appropriate.

attributes and beliefs, education, social status, and the like." Thus, narratives also, under particular conditions reinforce or re-make boundaries.

The relational, iterative process of narrative contestation among Trinidadian elites over issues such as land rights, the appropriate use and valuing of the twin-island nation's oil and natural gas resources, and whether or not to build aluminum smelters as part of an industrialization strategy to attain developed nation status by the year 2020, produces a legitimate, winning narrative in a particular historical moment, that has the effect of re-arranging a pre-existing set of social relations and re-allocating symbolic, environmental capital which is in effect a type of *property*.[190] Therefore, social formations are the result of discursive contests.

The Nigerian writer, Chimamanda Adichie, inspired the subtitle for this section with her 2009 TED lecture that cautions of the "danger of a single story" and provides a fitting introduction to yet another debate in sociology that is salient to the current project.[191] This debate perhaps extends across all of scientific enterprise and centers on questions of objectivity and power. The story of island nations as sites of blissful paradise have come to represent what sociologists define as a meta-narrative, a single, overarching story imbued with power because of its articulation by powerful elites or the members of a dominant culture. Its taken-for-granted nature, its ability to apply a singular and dominant definition or image to a place, a set of peoples or a set of events also provide evidence of the power of this single image of island equals paradise. Adichie emphasizes that it is virtually impossible to talk about the single story without invoking notions of power and argues that like our economic and political worlds, the stories that we tell ourselves, and each other are defined by the principle of *Nkale* or power. According to Adichie,

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[190] Here I define property following Nobel Prize winning economic historian, Douglas North. That is,
[191] Chimamanda Adichie, 2009. "The Danger of a Single Story", TED Talk last accessed on May 21, 2012. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D9Ihs241zeg&feature=youtube_gdata_player

"Power is the ability, not just to tell the story of another person but to make it the definitive story of that person. The Palestinian poet ... Balducci writes that if you want to dispossess a people, the simplest way is to tell their story and to start with "secondly". Start the story with the arrows of the Native Americans and not the arrival of the British, and you have an entirely different story. Start the story with the failure of the African State and not with the colonial creation of the African State and you have an entirely different story.

Stories have been used to dispossess and to malign but can also be used to empower and humanize. Stories can break the dignity of a people but stories can also repair that broken dignity" (Adichie, TED Lecture 2009).

Adichie's statement above addresses the silencing of weaker voices and narratives that is sometimes implicit in dominant or singular stories. She also shares how stories can likewise empower and heal. The narrative enterprise is therefore significant for drawing the researcher to the critical elements for examining and the empirical purpose of the story as a pedagogical tool. It is clear therefore that stories matter, who tells them, when they are told, and how many stories are told are all indicia of whether or not the given narratives are power imbued. Adichie goes on to note that people *generalize* from stories of the silenced, because their stories are fewer and it is often the case that the few become *representative* of all that is silenced. She suggests that to insist on a single, stereotypical, negative story is to flatten the lived experience, to render the character, the setting, the plot incomplete. One story is not the only story. Where you start the story matters and media coverage tends to immerse itself in a single, usually dominant story.

"The problem with stereotypes is not that they are untrue but that they are incomplete. I have always felt that it is impossible to engage properly with a place or person without engaging all of the stories of that place or person" (Adichie, TED Lecture 2009).

The aim of narrative analysis, therefore, as Foucault has also suggested is not to define any given account as true or untrue but to uncover the multiplicity of stories, and this is likewise

the aspiration of this research. Chinua Achebe (2000)[192] calls this, "a balance of stories." To tell the single story of development and environment in Trinidad and Tobago as simply about either racial conflict, or class inequality, or merely its placement in the neoliberal geopolitical world system alone, is to tell an incomplete story; to represent a bias or limited set of understandings as the single truth. Adichie says that this narrow approach "robs people of dignity. It makes our recognition of our equal humanity difficult. It emphasizes how we are different, rather than how we are similar."[193] People and places that wield cultural and economic power globally often enjoy representations of themselves via multiple stories, whereas less powerful cultures and economies do not have the luxury of representing their multiple stories about themselves, unless the people from there tell the stories themselves.

Critical theorists of class, race, gender, sexuality, and subaltern voices have employed, directly or indirectly, Michel Foucault's formulation of discourse as inherently imbued with power (see for instance, Ho 2000; Hill-Collins, 1991; Comaroff and Comaroff 1992; bell hooks 1989; Barkley Brown 1989). The works of several noted West Indian literary critics and critical social theorists elaborate on postmodernist and post structuralist traditions, with focus on de-centering the dominant colonial point of view, making room for a multiplicity of voices and viewpoints including that of women, racial and ethnic minorities, and others who have experienced various forms of social inequality and oppression. Ironically, Foucault, Latour, Derrida, Deleuze, Guattari and many other, middle and upper class white, men from colonist nations are credited for their pioneering work calling into question the naturalness, and objectivity of western discourse, thereby, illuminating the false dichotomies, and power imbued social relations that they often entail. Gocek (1994) has posited that the approaches developed by

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[192] Katie Bacon. "An African Voice" Interview with Chinua Achebe in The Atlantic Online. August 2, 2000. http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/unbound/interviews/ba2000-08-02.htm Accessed October 2012.
[193] (Adichie, TED Lecture 2009).

critical race and gender theorists (Hill-Collins, Barkley Brown and others) are well suited to the study of oppression in third world societies, where it is important to engage a variety of different voices to uncover the complex matrices of domination and oppression. She asserts that centering the experience of the subject can be liberating in struggles to reform and resist social inequality and oppression.

These frameworks, designed to uncover the suppression of non-dominant knowledges are thus, employed to explore the silences in Trinidadian production of environmental discourse and narrative. As Ramcharitar (2011:208) has observed, the relationships of power among various local groups, and deconstruction are very important tools to be deployed in any historiography of the Caribbean. Using this Third World focused critical theory approach as a starting point, I identify the environmental knowledges and experience of non-dominant groups in contemporary Trinidadian society. Deconstruction of dominant group narratives, an exploration of otherist narratives (Capper 1995:287, 293), and the frameworks of public secrets (Taussig 1999) and silencing (Zerubavel 2006; Jaworski 1993; Braithwaite 1999) are engaged to explore the knowledge bases that are transparent and visible versus those that are not in environment narratives as sites of cultural production. The analysis also considers what Lyotard (1984) observed as the discontinuous sets of pragmatics (actors/creators and contexts) involved in the verification and legitimization of knowledges.

Both Adichie and Cronon (1992) emphasize that where a story starts and ends are critical to its overall shape, plot and temporality, and such seemingly simple nuances are nonetheless power imbued. Still, Hall (1981:233) reminds us that there are no permanent or "once and for all" victories in cultural contests for control. Winners generally assume a strategic position at a given moment that is always open to be won or lost. Christine Ho demonstrates that this is in fact

the case with struggles over the meanings of *mas*, calypso and *pan* in Trinidad and Tobago (Ho 2008:3). Following Hannah Dekker Linnros, (in Olof Hallin, 2001), I approach cultural conflict as both a discursive and structural struggle, in which representations of nature and the environment are used not only to legitimize, but also question institutional policies and development plans. The prevailing narrative at a given social moment then, hardens into new social structures, institutions, and decisions that allocate symbolic and material property rights until they are unseated in a subsequent struggle. Actors drawing from and recreating counter-narratives that have emerged in conflict with the hegemonic, institutional discourse set subsequent contests in motion. I trace these conflicts over the environment and the construction of smelters to class and elite formation processes in Trinidad and Tobago.

Following Somers (1992), Steinmetz (2011), Franzosi (1998), Glassner (2000), and others, I contend that the narrative properties of some stories encapsulate structure and agency, historicity, and temporality. In addition, the manner in which stories are formulated by competing groups of elite and grassroots actors, alike can expose valuable, often obscured information about why the narrative exists – its purpose. Restated, the relationship between elite actors, as creators of the stories and who they are in the world, that is, who they are culturally - and what interests they represent in the social and physical world is important in the formation of environmental narratives, as are the silences. It is important to note however, that as Bourdieu himself pointed out, people do not always act in ways consistent with their cultural repertoires nor is such action always rational, premeditated or willful, rather it varies temporally and based upon specific social (and physical) conditions (Steinmetz 2011). Narratives are invariably shaped by the *habitus* (Bourdieu) or *cultural repertoires* (that is, elements of social position and the elements that comprise the toolkits from which actors draw, shaping thinking and doing, under

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particular conditions (Lamont 1996:550) of each set of elites who are involved in this process of social meaning making.

Framework for Narrative Analysis

On the basis of these theoretical and conceptual foundations, I developed a framework and procedure for the narrative analysis that follows. I first reviewed all of the texts that were culled for the project, ethnographic interviews, news articles from the archives of the *Trinidad Express*, *Trinidad Guardian,* and *Trinidad and Tobago Newsday* , rare papers held in the West Indiana Collection at the Library at UWI, St. Augustine, blog posts of pro and anti-smelter proponents, transcripts from separate lectures and symposia on the environment at UWI, historical monographs from the library and archive of the Trinidad and Tobago Energy Chamber, government documents including recent budget speeches, and newspaper reprints or web-based versions of documents such as the Uff Report, the T&T Court decision overturning the Alutrint smelter project's Certificate of Environmental Clearance, and the like.

Socio-ethnic Categories

I selected and categorized the relevant texts according to explicit indicators or statements of political party affiliation, where available, by how environmental issues were defined, by the articulated world view on development, and by constellations of variables that would indicate a T&T relevant set of nine socio-ethnic formations - a broad proxy for habitus - based on the categories articulated by Lloyd Best (1991) and more recently re-stated by Meighoo (2008) in Table 2.1. While these categories are far from unproblematic, they nevertheless remain salient because they capture the complex combinations of social, geographical and historical structures

that shape local Trinbagonian identities - imagined or otherwise. See Table 2.2 for a re-articulation of these categories.

Table 2.1 Socio-ethnic Categories Articulated by Best (1991) and Meighoo (2008)

Socio-ethnic *Habitus*
1. The Afro-Saxon Community of the East–West Corridor, brought up on College Exhibition education and Christian churching . . .
2. The Garveyite Black Power Community, occupying the fringes of Afro-Saxon society in Port of Spain, drawn to Low Church-cum-Shango religion, largely excluded by economic circumstances from the College Exhibition education, and conscious of a distinct 'class' difference between itself and the Afro-Saxon mainstream . . .
3. The 'Grenadian' working class in the oilfields . . . A classic European Marxist proletariat, they had nothing to sell but their labour to the multinational corporations such as Shell, Texaco and BP . . . they were not all Grenadian, but their dominant ethnic spirit was the militancy of the Grenadian immigrant.
4. The **Tobagonians** whose leader in the 1950s had been APT James and who had always been conscious of a different set of habits and perspectives . . .The Tobagonian was as militant as the Grenadian, but he enjoyed the African metaphysic of the Garveyite and he was a distinctly rural person brought up, much like the Hindu in Caroni, on the discipline and the vicissitudes of agriculture.
5. The Hindu in Caroni was concentrated in the rural areas but not like the Tobagonian in small-scale agriculture. Like the Grenadian in the oilfields he too was proletarian on the sugar plantation but while he sold his labour he also had a certain relation to land and to some of the disciplines of small-scale agriculture. Above all, unlike theMuslim and the Presbyterian, he retained an Oriental religion falling outside of the Middle Eastern Judaic-Christian framework and was therefore less inclined than were the Muslims and the Presbyterians, to become involved in the urban world of San Fernando and the East–West Corridor.
6. The Muslim, though Indian by race and Oriental by origin, moved comparatively easily into the urban heartlands occupied by the Afro-Saxon. . . .
7. The [mainly Indian] Presbyterians, even more than the Muslims, have functioned as a part of the Afro-Saxon community because they had made a deliberate decision to join the mainstream of College Exhibition education and Christian churching in order to enjoy the fruits of what, under colonial condition, was regarded as the most valid and legitimate segment of the society . . .
8. The last of the ethnic groups is composed of the small white and off-white minorities, operating on the fringe of British Administration, enjoying influence on the grounds of their 'high' colour and their prestigious origin, outside of the subservient slave and indenture areas of Africa and India. This group has taken its title from its dominant ingredient, the French-creoles, even though it is extremely mixed and was driven together more by mainstream perceptions than by its admittedly very real convergence of largely economic interests . . .
9. Finally, in Trinidad and Tobago, there is the group which does not easily fit into any of the ethnic or tribal interests. It is a group of (post-war) nationalist or (pre-war) internationalist intellectuals. The only popular base for this group lies among those displaced individuals whose mixed cultural exposure abroad, mixed race, mixed ethnic origin, or mixed marriages, place awkward hurdles in the way of any easy association with ethnic politics.

These nine habitus categories should be thought of as Weberian ideal types and it should be

noted that they each map to particular racial groups and local geographies. See Figure 2.2 below.

Figure 2.2 Trinidad and Tobago Map with Habitus Categories.

Source: Google Maps

On the basis of field-level participant observation as a native informant, and based upon

information provided by respondents, I update Best and Meighoo's categories by adding to the

nine above, three more groupings: 1) a relatively wealthy enclave of local "Syrians" who came to

Trinidad as merchants in the colonial period and today own or operate many of the large

manufacturing sector businesses in T&T; 2) the new Indo-Trinidadian upper- and upper-middle

classes who have attained considerable wealth over the last two decades, owning and/or

controlling large businesses in the manufacturing sector, support services for the oil and gas

industry, and the heavy construction industry; and 3) the foreign expatriates who are guest workers in the oil and gas and related sectors and tend to be at the technical journeyman, professional and managerial levels, are typically Canadian, American, typically from Texas, or European - primarily French, English. While the general tendency in the regional social science literature has been to lump Syrians together with Trinidad whites, in reality Trini-"Syrians" self-define as a distinct group and despite their wealth, have strictly defined group boundaries by attempting to limit or not formally recognize marriages or unions with non-Syrians, and doing so with the discipline of access to wealth and resources. A local social historian provides a rationale for this difference.

> "There was a major conflict between the Syrian and white [communities], which the Syrians won, an economic conflict. AnsaMacal is Sabga, which is the Ansa, and McEnearney, which is French-creole, but actually, English Creole, right? Ansa bought them out when they were in [financial] trouble. And the Syrian community systematically moved to buy out the major French-creole and white businesses in the country, and they have done so. I would say yes, from the '70s so that the French-creole is no longer an economic force in the country. The Indians and the Syrian [are the major economic forces in the country]. Now, again, when you say Syrian, we mean Syrian Lebanese..., but we don't make a distinction between Syrian and Lebanese. Of course, they do."[194]

Syrians own the large, popular malls in Port of Spain and the East-West corridor, and like many of the "French-creole" and other member of the small white and off-white elite, are intricately interwoven with the local rentier state upon which they are dependent for their wealth. These are the shiny new malls to which a 2001 *Wall Street Journal* article lauding T&T's LNG successes, referred. Upper class business and manufacturing groups in the local economy are characterized by some researchers and popular culture as beneficiaries of government largess and waste, especially in oil and gas boom periods. Ansa McAl has also become a key local partner

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[194] Confidential interview with author on January 12th, 2012.

for large foreign investors in the oil and gas industry, such as SABIC (Saudi Arabia) and Sinopec (China) discussed in Chapter I.

There also exists a small Trini-Chinese group of merchants, manufacturers and senior managerial staff in the oil and gas or banking sectors who are largely urban, Port of Spain-based, educated in the prestige schools and are seen as an appendage to the Trini-white and off-white community. A revised set of habitus community categories are included in Table 2.2.

Intra-group stratification is also applicable to all of these communities but especially relevant for my purposes here, to elites. Within group stratification is determined by a series of different factors, including gender, regional-identity, profession, and so on. Major within group boundary defining characteristics are elaborated below. Elites who control wealth and political power through their patronage (especially the funding of political campaigns) mostly comprised of the sons and (less often the daughters) of the old guard aristocratic families or descendants of the older colonial families or commercial classes of Trinidadians of French-creole, Syrian or Chinese heritage. In addition, there are the powerful elites of the south (San Fernando) who grew out of the solidly middle class families that were created as a consequence of the growth of the oil and gas based industry in that region and the opening up of the University of the West Indies to locals who demonstrated capability in engineering and the sciences, many of whom received full scholarships from industry or government and were then employed by the companies.

Table 2.2 Revised Habitus Categories Based on the Original Articulation by Best (1991) and Meighoo (2008)

	Habitus Community Group	Location	Typical Schooling	Religious Affiliation / Church	Economic Status (in T&T context)	Urban /Rural	Mainstream / Non-Mainstream	Recent Immigrant	Militant
1	Afro-Saxon	East-West Corridor	Local Prestige Schools/College Exhibition Education	Christian	Middle & Upper Middle	Urban	Mainstream	No	No
2	Garveyite Black Power	Fringes of Port of Spain	Excluded from College Exhibition Education due to class status	Low Church - cum - Shango religion	Lower-middle and Lower	Urban	Non-Mainstream	No	Yes
3	The "Grenadian" Oilfield Workers	The oil-gas producing South	Mixed & Stratified - based on position of employment in large multinational oil and gas companies like Shell, Texaco, BP and their modern-day counterparts	Low Church - Spiritual Baptist - Shango (Orisha) religion	Working Class - "a classic European Marxist proletariat" of the oilfields	Southern urban/Rural	Non-Mainstream	Sometimes	Yes
4	The Tobagonians	Tobago	Public Education	Low Church - cum - Shango religion	Working Class, Lower-middle and Lower Classes	Rural/Small Scale Agriculture	Non-Mainstream	No	Yes
5	The Hindu in Caroni	Central & South Trinidad	Hindu or Public Schools	Hindu Temple	Working Class - "a classic European Marxist proletariat" of the sugar plantations previously owned by Tate & Lyle - but with a certain relation to land - indenture	Rural/Large and Small Scale Agriculture	Non-Mainstream	No	No

	Habitus Community Group	Location	Typical Schooling	Religious Affiliation / Church	Economic Status (in T&T context)	Urban /Rural	Mainstream / Non-Mainstream	Recent Immigrant	Militant
6	The Muslim - Indian by Race, Oriental by Origin but traverses the world of the Afro-Saxon	Port of Spain / East-West Corridor	Public Education or College Exhibition	Muslim / Christian or Presbyterian	Middle & Upper Middle	Urban	Mainstream	No	No
7	The [Mainly Indian] Presbyterians	Port of Spain / East-West Corridor	Local Prestige Schools/College Exhibition Education	Presbyterian / Christian	Middle & Upper Middle	Urban	Mainstream	No	No
8	The White and Off-white Minorities (French Creoles)	Port of Spain	Local Prestige Schools/College Exhibition Education	Christian / Catholic	Upper Middle & Upper	Urban	Mainstream	No	No
9	The Post-War Nationals & Pre-war Internationalist Intellectuals	Port of Spain / East-West Corridor	College Exhibition Education / Foreign Universities	Mixed	Middle & Upper Middle	Urban /Rural	Mixed	No	Yes
10	Trini-Syrian	Port of Spain	Local Prestige Schools/Local Exhibition Education	Christian / Catholic	Upper Middle & Upper	Urban	Non-Mainstream	No	No
11	New large scale Indian merchants	East-West Corridor/ Central & South Trinidad	Hindu or Public Schools	Hindu Temple or Muslim	Upper Middle & Upper	Urban Fringe/ New Urban Central & South	Non-Mainstream	No	No
12	Foreign expatriots from O&G and related sectors	South, Port of Spain West	Technical training or University education in country of origin	Various	Upper Middle & Upper	Urban	Mainstream	Yes	No

Hence, the resulting elite networks bring together historical factors predicated on a heritage of wealth and power and new opportunities for socioeconomic status mobility. It was commonplace in informal business meetings, to be asked about where one's family was from regionally or where one went to high school. A 'correct' answer might then spur repartee about the well-known stories that prestige school graduates have about each other - whether a 'convent girl' or a 'Bishops girl' with descriptions of the distinguishing characteristics of each. Or for males, whether or not they graduated from high school at "Pres" (Presentation College, a leading boys school of the South) versus one of the northern, elite boys' schools such as the Queen's Royal College, St. Mary's College or Fatima College makes a difference in the stratification that then occurs within the elite group. These school-based alliances are lasting (in the form of "old boys" and "old girls" clubs for each of the leading schools) and are used to define and enforce the boundaries for access to many decision-making arenas in T&T. In such arenas, elite group membership can be transformed into economic or cultural capital on the basis of access.

Positionality based upon one's location in status hierarchies significantly impacts the manner in which social issues are constructed in a society. Both the set of identities, as well as the set of problems, concepts, meanings and terminologies each group employs to formulate understandings of the environment are thus contextually determined, that is, they are time and place specific. It is methodologically important to articulate these context-bound processes because they ultimately determine the meanings and the boundaries of the environmental debate in Trinidad and Tobago. Critical to understanding that meaning-making process is an understanding of the social worlds (including the positionality) of the actors who are now, and were also in the immediate past involved in these debates.

Professions - The Elite Cabal: The Role of Professions in Setting the Development Agenda

Writing about Dutch Disease in Trinidad, Hosein and Tewarie (2004:13) describe this as the "cabal effect" whereby the rentier state accumulates money that is not the private property of the government and is often not incentivized to spend excess boom economy revenue to the benefit of the country. They propose that under boom conditions, monopoly conditions which certainly apply to the local manufacturing sector and public policy distortions are more likely to occur, encouraging unproductive profit-seeking, in the form of bribes paid to government in exchange for protectionism vis a vis foreign trade, and monopoly positioning that overrides normal market competition, lobbying for contracts for certain large projects, and other activities that ultimately cause a deadweight loss to the economy. This cabal to which Hosein and Tewarie refer is represented by the Trini-white and off-white, Trini-Syrian, Trini-Chinese and the new large scale Indian manufacturing and box retail upper class enabled by the Afro-Saxon elites in government, or who comprise the managerial class in some of these firms. These are arguably the beneficiaries of the current regime of accumulation in T&T.

Profession is another important ascribed status of some elite T&T society. A majority of the elites shaping oil and gas policies in Trinidad and Tobago are either engineers or geologists. Social boundaries associated with who had access to the development (and by default environmental) policy formation arenas were enforced by elites from these two professions, usually men, and bonded by other network affiliations such as whether or not they golf, run or play cricket, rugby or soccer together now or did so in high school, whether they play *mas* in the same Carnival bands or attend the same Carnival season fetes, or grew up in the same neighborhood or village. This was especially prevalent during the earlier years of the present era when the Trinidad environmental protest movement became polarized by key events and groups

such as Smelter Caravan, Trinidad and Tobago Civil Rights Association, and People United

Respecting Environment mobilized to fight the aluminum smelters and other mega-projects

proposed as part of the down-streaming trajectory. Occasionally and gradually some lawyers and

economists were also admitted to these elite ranks, but typically, the oil and gas industry and

Trinidadian industrial development were the domains of engineers and geologists; that is, they

were given the 'standing' to create, advise or change that policy domain. This tradition dates

back to the PNM government led by Eric Williams. Some respondents have even credited that

one individual, Ken Julien, an engineer who earned the trust of Eric Williams and subsequent

PNM leaders, as the architect of the down streaming policy, many of them suggesting that he

also handsomely sought his own financial and personal interests and gains in the process. Julien

served as head of the NEC, and the President of the University of Trinidad and Tobago (UTT),

and created a variety of consulting businesses that provided services to the GORTT and the oil

and gas sector.

One respondent offered what I came to understand as a popular local, grassroots narrative

about how local development by invitation works, about Ken Julien and his relationship to the

PNM, and the perception of corruption in the development process:

> "You see, ALUTRINT was a political thing, and you see Ken Julien and his son
> should have never been [involved] in that. They would've stood a better chance if
> he was not involved. Ken Julien['s] name in those circles is a red flag to a bull.
> Ken Julien is finished in this. He's [now] very unpopular, and he hasn't been
> altogether honest with the people of this country. The credibility of these fellas is
> lacking. Patrick [Manning] made him important. And Ken Julien epitomized what
> people saw as corruption and indecency and dishonesty. He's a real tragic figure.
> There's an arrogance about him and so on. Anyway, [by] his son, being head of
> that organization [ALUTRINT] people saw Ken Julien trying to [manipulate the
> situation], and he couldn't make that work. I don't know much about Alutrint. I
> know it was supposed to be more of a downstream plant than Alcoa and it
> would've certainly had much less of an impact. But there's also the issue of - a lot
> of our best lands, agricultural lands - people being displaced - was being taken

and used... as industrial sites. Point Lisas was a whole reclaimed area and there was no bitching about that. But from the time [you threaten the livelihoods of] farmers and fishermen and that kind of stuff you have serious challenges.

They...were dishonest with the Point Lisas Industrial Estate. For those industrialists down there, they built the Caroni-Arena Dam, which we [the people] paid for, and they were not honest enough to include that as part of the business plan for the industrial estate. We had to sell them because a lot of PNM people were put in charge. None of those plants ever delivered. It's only when they were sold [to foreign interests] that they started to function properly. And they were sold in a fire sale. Ken Julien made money going in and -- well, the selling of it [sic].

All those plants -- the electrical supplies, all the big energy -- we had to provide the energy infrastructure. We had to provide the water, and Point Lisas was getting cleaner water when [other people had a hard time getting any]. That Caroni-Arena [dam project] -- the big pipeline turned left and went down to Point Lisas. And they were getting potable water down there. When they built the Desalcott plant -- that was supposed to be built by the people [foreign and domestic investors] on Point Lisas. Government took that over because of some corruption, and they built that, so -- the first set of water was going to Point Lisas, and we [i.e., the national treasury] were paying -- it was a take-or-pay arrangement, but the government had to pay for [it].... So the first set of the Desalcott output was sent to Point Lisas, and -- the government had to take everything else they produced. And in signing those agreements Desalcott made sure that they over produced. They had much more than was needed in Point Lisas. So government was forced to buy that from them. It was owned by Karamath. They signed an agreement with Karamath, this take-or-pay arrangement, and based on that business plan, Karamath got it financed. I believe Republic Bank and all of them put up money because it was a sweetheart arrangement. You couldn't lose. Whatever you produced, government guaranteed to take it from you. So in effect, we were subsidizing those plants in Point Lisas. And those plants in Point Lisas were getting -- they were getting potable water. Desalinated water is as good of water as you can get. It has everything removed. And these fellas in their cooling towers down there in Point Lisas -- they were using ... better quality water than we were getting in Port-of-Spain. And we were subsidizing that. But it's much more than that -- Jesus. "[195]

It is no accident that both Ken Julien and one of his sons, who obtained the post as CEO of Alutrint became the target of anti-smelter protests because of the appearance of favoritism or even impropriety. Dr. Julien is however, recognized for the significant role he has played in

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[195] Confidential interview with author on January 27, 2012.

spearheading the success of the down streaming strategy. He is so well recognized for this work that his consultancy services now extend outside both T&T and the region as he promotes similar strategies in various African nations and elsewhere, showing those governments how to turn a nascent oil and gas industry into profits with which to build their nations' infrastructure and economies. The success of his approach has also produced a group of local followers who earn their livelihoods by providing advice to oil and gas based late developers. An alternative narrative however, exists about Ken Julien and his pivotal role in the development of the Point Lisas industrial estate and these tend to be the dominant narratives in the local oil and gas and business sectors, as well as in international circles. For instance, an article published in the U.S. edition of the *Wall Street Journal* on March 13th, 2001, describes T&T's success in becoming a "big supplier of liquified natural gas to the U.S." and credits Dr. Julien among those who made this possible. The author of this piece provides a contrasting story of Ken Julien:

> "...former chairman of Trinidad's national gas company, who had been working to develop the island's gas resources since the mid-1970s. The tall, burly Dr. Julien was the chief architect of the Point Lisas Industrial Estate, a coastal collection of some 20 natural-gas-fueled plants that help make Trinidad the world's largest exporter of methanol and ammonia, both of which are used in the chemicals industry.   Dr. Julien, now 68, says.... "We were both small guys who had to deal with the massive Amoco and British Gas," Dr. Julien explains. Mr. Shearer, [a Harvard MBA working for an LNG company, Cabot[196]] he adds, "had an obsession that the LNG business was going to happen [in Trinidad], and he wanted to be a part of it."The pair won over Patrick Manning, then Trinidad's Prime Minister. But it proved much tougher to persuade Amoco and British Gas, the big producers on the island, which were needed as investors in and suppliers to the project. Amoco, which three years ago was acquired by British Petroleum PLC, was skeptical that the U.S. would ever provide strong demand for LNG. "Amoco had to be brought screaming to the LNG table," Dr. Julien recalls. "Amoco senior management was not convinced that this gas business could really

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[196] Cabot LNG business had struggled after having serious environmental accidents in the US. According to the same article in the Wall Street Journal, Cabot had to overcome the troubles associated with an LNG-fueled fire in Cleveland in 1944 that killed 128 people and coverage of its Boston area LNG terminal on *60 Minutes*, warning about its explosive potential, in 1978. Trinidad became the site of Cabot's come back from its haunted past.

work in Trinidad," confirms Robert Riley, who now heads operations on the island for BP Amoco.

"The big oil companies are used to dealing with smaller players by keeping them in their place," Negotiations dragged on from 1993 through 1996 and often grew testy. Dr. Julien played diplomat, beating his hands on the table to punctuate points. "When he spoke," says Mr. Houston, "people listened."

But Amoco continued to waver. The company's chairman and chief executive, Larry Fuller, worried that even if LNG demand in the U.S. were strong enough, Trinidad wouldn't have enough gas to satisfy the demand.

In the fall of 1993, Trinidad's Dr. Julien accompanied Prime Minister Manning to Amoco's Chicago headquarters for a final sales pitch. Mr. Fuller was still worried. "This was a big gamble for us," he recalls. But Mr. Fuller was impressed by what he calls Mr. Manning's "forceful" arguments. "I still had reservations after the meeting," Mr. Fuller says, "but everybody left committed to go forward with the arrangement."

Beyond agreeing to supply the plant with gas, Amoco acquired a 34% stake in the facility for $340 million. The other original major investors were Cabot, British Gas, and the Trinidad government.

In June 1996, Trinidad broke ground at Point Fortin. To keep the project within its $1 billion budget, engineers eliminated oversized jetties, fancy administration buildings and extra loading arms that pump gas into ships. The first LNG shipment left for Boston in April 1999.

The facility has been such a success that the Trinidad government, overcoming its past hesitations about the plant's size, has approved a tripling of its capacity by the end of 2002. The island projects that its share of revenue from the plant and from taxes on gas exploration will average $300 million a year during the next two decades. By 2003, LNG-related income to the government is predicted to cover at least 10% of the country's annual budget.

BP Amoco now sees LNG as an "extremely attractive way" to turn its huge gas reserves in Trinidad into profits, says the company's Mr. Riley. The company's reserves here have tripled since 1992, to 21 trillion cubic feet of gas -- more than it has in all of North America. With recent higher U.S. gas prices, LNG from Trinidad today easily produces profits.

In January, on a remote harbor in Port Fortin, two hours from Trinidad's capital, two loading arms were pouring super-cooled liquid gas into the hull of a 950-foot ship, The Matthew. Within hours, the vessel, painted red, white and blue, was headed for Boston with enough gas to satisfy 27,000 residential customers for a year. The plant is also shipping gas to Puerto Rico and Spain.

But Trinidad will have to hustle to maintain its strong position in selling to North America and Europe. Nigeria, with far greater reserves, is expanding its liquefaction capacity. Venezuela and Norway are in discussions about building liquefaction plants that could compete in the U.S."[197]

It is important to include a significant portion of the narrative here for the purposes of not only illustrating competing Ken Julian stories, but to illuminate the nature of T&T's dominant development story, which stands in stark contrast to the development critiques and environmental narratives of the new middle class and less popular voices. It is an important narrative that stands at the core of both the PNM's strident commitment to its development by invitation and down streaming policies and is at the center of the environmental risk narratives that have come about in opposition or as a counter point. The risk-based version of the development story instead emphasizes the hidden consequences of that success. By the mainstream account, the down streaming development policy worked and worked exceedingly well. Yet, it is a story that is silent on the environmental externalities and human impacts that T&T has experienced or the potential future risks associated with the siting of these LNG facilities. Nor does the mainstream account portray how the personal interests of the actors involved were negotiated or addressed, given the context of the rentier state and its weak, opaque regulatory institutions. The Point Lisas and LNG stories then, constitute the core narrative against which newer environmental debates are juxtaposed. They represent more than a mere alternative view on Ken Julien's role in creating the T&T development agenda. The non-mainstream stream story that became popular during the 2010 election, characterized Julien as part of a cabal of corruption associated with the PNM leadership. In the mainstream story, he is a

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[197] Barrionuevo, Alexei. (2001) "How Trinidad Became A Big Supplier Of Liquified Natural Gas to the U.S." *Wall Street Journal*, Online edition, Tuesday, March 13. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB98443474293628576.html Accessed December 2012.

hero, *the diplomat* in a David and Goliath story, who helped a small island nation to put itself on the map by convincing the behemoth, BP-Amoco to site its facility in T&T despite the odds.

The cast of actors in the non-mainstream account are the people, the government and a series of local and international elites who appear to rig the government bureaucracy to their benefit while some citizens struggle for access to basic services like reliable supplies of potable water. The speaker suggests that the public is paying for the infrastructure to which they do not gain access or from which they do not benefit. Instead, that infrastructure is used to subsidize and support industry owned by off-shore investors rather than the people. It is implicitly a risk and injustice narrative.

Ken Julien, an engineer by training, served on the National Energy Task Force - a Cabinet level body that makes key decisions for the nation, including decisions about projects proposed by multinational interests such as ALCOA. Both Ken Julien's image and his name remain signifiers for how development has come to be understood in T&T. Despite the respondent's claims that Ken Julien has become untrustworthy in the post 2010 national election period, he recently gave an exclusive interview in one of the major national newspapers, the *Trinidad Express* in which he explained the three critical crises facing the local oil and gas sector and the nation.

The Express refers to him as T&T's energy czar and states that he feels that the country's life-blood, the energy sector is undergoing a crisis. Echoing the observation in the final paragraph of the *Wall Street Journal* some eleven years before, Dr. Julien suggests three causes for this crisis, 1) low gas prices on the global market (T&T needs to see a gas price at $4US + to earn profits), 2) T&T's relatively small gas reserves [some 20 trillion cubic feet (tcf)] compared to Qatar's 800 tcf, neighboring Venezuela's 200 tcf or Malaysia's 80 (tcf). Not to mention, the

newer gas discoveries in east and west-African nations, and the growth of shale gas exploration in the United States and Canada. T&T's early mover privilege in the contemporary LNG industry will therefore, no longer ensure its monopoly position as a new generation of gas supplies enter the global market.

The first two causes of risk to the energy sector according to Dr. Julien, are beyond T&T's control. He however, cites curtailment of natural gas supplies to existing industry located at Point Lisas as the third cause of crisis, which is squarely within the government's control. Curtailment, he suggests, increases the risk of not attracting more foreign direct capital investment that would otherwise come to T&T, given its existing infrastructure. He likens T&T's oil and gas down-streaming policy to a relay and states that those who are the brightest, most energetic and most capable of running the final leg of that relay against these new global competitors may well disappear (migrating to other regions for O&G sector work that pays more competitive salaries), unless there is a re-commitment to the growth of the energy sector - without politics. Recalling the only other coalition government to have been elected to national office in T&T, he opined that the National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR) efforts to de-emphasize the role of the energy sector as the engine for development proved to be a costly mistake.[198] His statement seems to come as a warning, perhaps even an admonishment to the current PP government at a time when the economy appears to be stuck for a number of reasons, of which not all are necessarily based on international market trends, as Julien correctly notes.

There is, therefore merit to some of the urgency that pro-smelter, pro-down-stream development proponents expressed in the debates leading up to the 2010 election. They pointed out that T&T needed to act in a timely fashion to build out the gas sector downstream industry by

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[198] "T&T Energy Facing Three Major Crises, Says Julien." *Trinidad Express Newspaper*. Accessed December 2012. http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/t_t_energy_facing_three__major_crises__says_Julien-149601765.html.

attracting investors, given T&T's sunk infrastructure costs and to do so before competitors stepped in to captured those investors and their capital. It is also highly likely that this third leg of the downstream development relay could have proceeded had T&T bolstered the autonomy, effectiveness and strength of the critical regulatory institutions that are necessary for some semblance of order, due process, genuine public engagement and transparency in the process. This approach to state intervention, rather than an election, might have been lessened the build up of challenges from the lower and new middle classes, which came about as a consequence of the PNM government's rush to approve these projects without the appropriate safeguards in place and without due process or at least the perception of due process from the viewpoint of the public. The clearing of the Union Estate is a stunning case in point. Instead, the insistence of the PNM leadership that they "knew what they were doing" came to be perceived as a form of arrogance, which together with the lack of transparency, and due process simply pushed the degree of alienation and perceived oppression and risk inherent to T&T's O&G based economy and the division of labor to unsustainable levels. Doubtless, experts like Dr. Julien do offer a valuable set of information and approach that is relevant to T&T's development debates because they possess both the necessary skill and experience to interpret trends and the sociopolitical landscapes of the global O&G markets in the context of what would be in T&T's best interest. Still, this is clearly not enough. In most advanced and many advancing economies, these basic institutions have become essential to balance and protect the health and welfare risks that large industrial projects of this nature present to the public. It is significant however, that despite the fact that the PNM was swept out of office in part due to environmental issues linked to the down streaming policy, Julien fails to note this as a source or explanation of the crisis facing T&T.

Migration and Class Habitus

The risk of losing talent for the third leg of the relay to which Dr. Julien refers cites a group that has become increasingly important to both O&G sector development and the rise of a new environmentalism in T&T. The new, new middle class, described by Best (1991) and Meighoo (2008), is a group that does not readily fit the pre-existing class hierarchy, and is necessarily more individualized than more traditional or early modern T&T society has been, to date. Beck (1992) offers an analytical framework for understanding risk societies and it entails three key, inter-related elements: ubiquitous risk, individualization, and reflexive modernization. He utilizes this model to illustrate social phenomena driven by the increasing intentional risks produced industrialized or industrializing society, the inability of science to properly detect risks that are increasingly minute. Beck argues that this trend produces a fundamental re-ordering of social positions in society, and transforms the cultural meanings of risk.

T&T is well-known for its brain drain[199] due to the limited availability of the economy to absorb them, and the increasing number of local students seeking university education in the USA, Canada and elsewhere. T&T has one of the highest tertiary education emigration rates in the region (Mishra 2006:13). During the recent boom period between 2000 and 2007, the PNM government, based upon its 2020 Vision, sought to attract its educated nationals to return home and many did, including this author. These educated returning nationals comprise a newer installment or layer to the group that Best (1991) and Meighoo (2008) classified as internationalist intellectuals who seem not to fit easily into the local social structures. Both the

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[199] See Reis, Michele. 2007. "Vision 2020: The Role of Migration In Trinidad and Tobago's Plan for Overall Development", Institute of International Relations, St. Augustine: University of the West Indies. 8th Annual Conference "Crisis, Chaos and Change: Caribbean Development Challenges in the 21st Century" SALISES, March 26-8, 2007. See also, Mishra, Prachi. 2006. Emigration and Brain Drain: Evidence From the Caribbean. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, Working Paper (WP/06/25).

older and newer members of this group comprise the new, new middle class in T&T, which is concentrated in pockets around Port of Spain, the East-West corridor, the new urban Central and new urban South. This group is also not well accounted for by Best, who wrote in a much earlier period when these trends may not have existed or may not have been as apparent. As Reis (2007:3,6) showed however, T&T still needs to develop a migration database that informs the government's decision-making process. To wit, the most recent information she is able to present in her analysis is from the late 1990s. See Table 2.3.

Table 2.3 Percentage Rates of Tertiary-Educated Caribbean Migrants

Country	Tertiary Educated Share of Total Migrants	Migration Rates of Tertiary Educated
Dominican Republic	22.6	14.2
Jamaica	41.7	67.3
Trinidad and Tobago	**46.7**	**57.2**
Guyana	40.7	77.3

Source: Adapted from Reis (2007:9) based upon data presented in Carrington and Detragiache (1998:14, 16, 19, 22).

Perhaps the government's neglect of proper information gathering on such questions is unintended, though some observers suggest that it is a more intentional choice, across administrations, to not know. For instance, the issue of measurement and the intentional unavailability or inaccessibility of basic social data that reports on income by racial categories, or on immigrants and emigrants suggested that this is an intentional, even if informal policy. These choices are emblematic of the narrowing of the range of social discourse on sensitive social issues; behavior that Cable, Shriver and Mix (2008) describe as typical of the state in a

risk society. As access to jobs, especially those that have a livable wage was a sensitive matter even during the most recent gas boom in T&T. There was broad based criticism of the PNM government's decision under Prime Minister Manning to bring in large numbers of Chinese contract construction workers to construct large national projects such as the National Performing Arts Academy, the new Prime Minister's Residence, and the proposed Alutrint smelter project.

The government's response to this criticism was that foreign workers could complete the project on an expedited schedule.[200] Not surprisingly, members of the new, new middle class, returning with their North-American notions of environmentalism, concern about access to living wage jobs, the government's failure to ensure more transparent decision-making with adequate levels of public input, and about the corruption that has facilitated waste of public revenue from the sale of the nation's natural resource trust, began a contemporary round of challenges to the contradictions in the current regime of accumulation. By regime of accumulation, I refer to the combination of interests and relationships comprised of:

- the rentier state that itself perpetuates the risk society by enabling rules and institutional arrangements that give primacy of the economy and the collection of rents over the management of hazards, and protection of the populace from the proliferation of threats associated with the oil and gas based, heavy industry focused development by invitation model,
- local elites who have access to and influence over the government's decision making powers, that have the effect of distributing the rents earned from the oil and gas sector exports, and
- the multinational community that benefits from exploiting the social and cultural structures that allow them to externalize the cost of risks associated with doing their line of business, and to thereby, maximize profits.

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[200] Government officials stated that the projects needed to be completed in time to host the Summit of the Americas in April 2009 and the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM), which T&T hosted in November of 2009. For the PNM government leadership, T&T's ability to host these two important international meetings was also symbolically important for showcasing the success of its development model, legitimizing its leadership role in the Caribbean region and demonstrating its relevance in the global political economy. These are all significant issues for the Afro-Saxon leadership as a means of asserting T&T's independence and the success of its quest for self determination.

The fundamental role of measurement, consistency and transparency is a recurrent theme that came to the surface in my interviews. As discussed in greater detail below, had the T&T government - regardless of the party in power held less tight a grip on the control of certain key national demographics such as migration, as Reis (2007) has shown, certain important structural and cultural shifts in the society and its attitudes might have been more discernible. More current data on these types of trends would enable local social scientists to better understand and predict these shifts that have in this instance, proven so significant for the governance. Absent the information needed for this sort of inquiry, the government (governing party and opposition alike) is blind to the changing social dynamics of the nation, such as the impact that a newly returning wave of expatriates would have on demands for transparency, voice, balanced development, stronger government institutions and environmental compliance. This lack of information and adequate measurement and broad availability of social data and metrics also limits the range of explanations available to governments, political parties, businesses, the non-governmental sector and the nation as a whole, for understanding the causes of and potential avenues of resolution for important social dilemmas.

Applying Beck's framework to the new middle class in T&T would suggest that this group is unlikely to trust the ability of older institutional structures - including older collective notions of race, class or religion associated with traditional or early modern T&T society, to actively redress the growing and ubiquitous risks inherent in the government's choice of development policy. They are also unlikely to have faith in its ability to ensure due process and adequate environmental protection for T&T society. This group is largely represented in the newly formed Congress of the People political party that first contested elections in 2007 but did not win any seats. The COP and three other parties - the Tobago Organization of the People

(TOP), the labor-based Movement for Social Justice, and the grassroots based, Black nationalist party, National Joint Action Committee - were instrumental in the UNC-led, People's Partnership government's defeat of the incumbent PNM government in May 2010. In Tobago, the new, new middle class is represented by the TOP.

Political Structure

For the majority of its recent history, T&T has had a two-party system of government; that is, there have been two dominant political parties. I selected interviewees to reflect a range of political party affiliations including members of the People's National Movement, the party of Dr. Eric Williams that brought Trinidad and Tobago to independence from Great Britain in 1962, and that has dominated the political agenda for much of the period since independence. There have been some 60+ other parties created in Trinidad and Tobago which are now either dormant or defunct, including the National Alliance for Reconstruction - another coalition government - which was the ruling party between 1986 and 1991.

The PP represents a tenuous collaboration among competing racial, class and environmental/risk interests that joined forces to defeat the Manning PNM government. After months of media coverage suggesting that the coalition government might not hold, the MSJ withdrew from the PP in June of 2012 and the social commentary and unrest surrounding a series of issues that also plagued the PNM government including the construction of mega projects, and the need for government to intervene to better manage perceived environmental and societal risks and ails persists. Table 2.4 below categorizes each party in the PP by its primary habitus community. The categories are ideal types and are not intended to imply that members of other

habitus communities are not supporters of the party, just those that are more likely to be supporters than not.

Vidich suggests that analysis of a society's cultural symbols and their meaning absent a "history of its classes, its religious origins and differences, the sources of its racial [or ethnic] conflicts, and its massification and bureaucratization clearly neglects crucial features of the historical and cultural reality under investigation."[201] It is not enough to merely know these categories but rather, it is necessary to understand how they relate to each other. The communities represented by the twelve habitus communities described above represent the complex social stratification arrangements that exist in T&T and necessarily imply hierarchy.

Table 2.4 People's Partnership Coalition Government Party Membership by Habitus Communities.

PP Coalition Member Party	Habitus Community Most Represented
UNC	5. Primarily the Hindu community in Caroni
COP	9. A combination of an earlier generation of post war nationalists, pre-war intellectuals, the new, new middle class of returned expatriots and others who do not readily fit ethnic, racial structure of traditional or early modern T&T society
TOP	4. Tobagonian new middle class
NJAC	2. The Garveyite Black Power Community
MSJ	3. The Grenadian working class in the oilfields

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[201] Perin, Constance. 1990. *Belonging in America: Reading Between the Lines*. Review by: Arthur J. Vidich *Contemporary Sociology*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (May, 1990), pp. 441-442, p. 442.

These hierarchies and each actor's particular combination of relevant traits varies according to the specifics of the situation. For the purposes of this research I focus on how social stratification intersects with the dynamics of the rentier state's activities and its position on development and environment to understand particular outcomes. Social stratification defines group boundaries and in-group access to information, other scarce resources and participation in the rentier state's meaning-making and decision-taking processes. The twelve habitus communities discussed above represent the internal social geography and "institutional" boundaries created by the colonial plantation economy, slavery and indentureship. Carried forward to the present day by the T&T government's failure to properly address longstanding demands from the public and the UWI-based intelligentsia for land and constitutional reform, the lasting legacies of these arrangements in contemporary T&T society create an uneven distribution of people, resources and risks.

Habitus: How the Intersection of Race, Religion and Class Matters

These habitus communities must also be understood in the context of the complex intersections among different social identities for any individual or group. For instance, several interview participants cited the difficulty of isolating racial discourse from religious or class discrimination, citing several examples. One of these included efforts by the Hindu Sanatan Dharma Maha Sabha (a major local Hindu organization) to dismiss an Indian principal of the Tunapuna Hindu School because she allegedly refused when told not to admit African children to the school, but to admit "illegal Guyanese children" who were likely Indian. In response to the Principal's charges, Satnarayan Maharaj, the Maha Sabha's leader, told the press that the Board's

direction regarding the students was not race but religion based, as they wanted to ensure that

Hindu children attended the school.[202] As one local social scientist explained,

> "the race thing got mediated by religion at several times in our history...the Spanish invited the French to come because they were Catholic to keep out the British. Even freed black French from Martinique. So, the religious thing trumped race. So...race has always been mediated by all kinds of stuff. [U]nder certain kinds of pressure, race in the end -- I think if you were talking about the rights of an African slave, or a slave or working class person of African origin, that it will be difficult for religion or anything else to trump that. I think the British, French, the Spanish, whites, would rally to resist that threat. And it probably is still like that. The Syrians came. They were Catholic and so on. And so color became critical so...because of religion and color they were afforded a place below the French-creole but above the Indian and black."[203]

Although race is mediated by other forms of social stratification and is therefore highly correlated with factors like religion, this condition is not necessarily fixed or unchanging. The results of a comparative analysis of WVS data for Trinidad and Tobago is illustrative of this point.[204] Applying a Chi squared test for independence to compare the T&T survey responses on key demographic variables in 2006 and 2010 produced the following results in Table 2.5 and Table 2.6, respectively.

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[202] For coverage on this story, see http://guardian.co.tt/news/2011/11/24/principal-claims-harassment-maha-sabha-board, http://guardian.co.tt/news/2012-04-19/embattled-principal-willing-return-maha-sabha-school, http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/SAT_BLOCKED_BLACK_CHILDREN-133665408.html, and http://www.stabroeknews.com/2011/archives/11/12/tt-maha-sabha-denies-instructing-principal-not-to-allow-black-children-in-school/ All accessed December 2012.

[203] Confidential interview with author on January 12, 2012.

[204] The World Values Survey was developed by Ronald Inglehart at the University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research (ISR). It consists of a series of survey designed to measure cross-national norms, values and attitudes on a broad number of salient issues including gender, politics, economy, levels of happiness, trust, etc. It also contains demographic variables such as education levels, race, income, religion, and the like. The data analyzed here are from the 2006 and 2010 WVS surveys for Trinidad and Tobago. See Inglehart, Ronald, et al. WORLD VALUES SURVEYS AND EUROPEAN VALUES SURVEYS, 1981-1984, 1990-1993, and 1995-1997 [Computer file]. ICPSR version. Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social Research [producer], 2000. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2000, 2006 and 2010, generally. See also the World Values Survey Association online http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/. Accessed December 2012.

Table 2.5 Summary Chi Squared Test Table for 2006.

	p.value	Independent
Gender & Race1	0.5180	TRUE
Gender & Race2	0.2193	TRUE
Gender & Education	0.0615	TRUE
Gender & Class	0.0562	TRUE
Gender & Religion	0.0073	FALSE
Race1 & Race2	0.0000	FALSE
Race1 & Education	0.0367	FALSE
Race1 & Class	0.3372	TRUE
Race1 & Religion	0.0000	FALSE
Race2 & Education	0.0003	FALSE
Race2 & Class	0.8098	TRUE
Race2 & Religion	0.0000	FALSE
Education & Class	0.0001	FALSE
Education & Religion	0.7382	TRUE
Class & Religion	0.0379	FALSE

Independent equals TRUE whenever the p-value is greater than 5%, indicating the null

hypothesis cannot be rejected and we therefore accept the assumption that the variables are

independent. As Table 2.5 shows, in 2006, the bi-variate pairings of key social stratification

indicators such as gender and race, race and education, race and religion, education and class,

and class and religion were correlated with each other - that is, not independent. While these

relationships remained largely stable in 2010, there were nevertheless, minor changes. See Table

2.6.

Table 2.6 Summary Chi Squared Test Table for 2010.

	p.value	Independent
Gender & Race2	0.716230	TRUE
Gender & Education	0.304738	TRUE
Gender & Class	0.130690	TRUE
Gender & Religion	0.002736	FALSE
Race2 & Education	0.000660	FALSE
Race2 & Class	0.101265	TRUE
Race2 & Religion	0.000000	FALSE
Education & Class	0.000000	FALSE
Education & Religion	0.000372	FALSE
Class & Religion	0.299093	TRUE

Table 2.7 Comparison of pair-wise correlations among key demographic variables - Trinidad & Tobago WVS 2006 and 2010.[205]

Variable Pairs	2006	2010
Gender & Religion	Yes	Yes
Race 1 & Education	Yes	-
Race 1 & Religion	Yes	-
Race 2 & Religion	Yes	Yes
Race 2 & Education	Yes	Yes
Education & Class	Yes	Yes
Class & Religion	Yes	No
Education & Religion	No	Yes

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[205] Race 1 was defined as a series of x ethnic groups including..... and Race 2 measures race in terms of Indo-or Afro-Trinidadian or other. The WVS questionnaire was changed in 2010 and no longer included a race 1 variable.

Over the four-year span between the two studies, the relationship between class and religion appears to have shifted from dependent (correlated) in 2006 to independent in 2010, based upon these WVS sample data. as shown in . Although this only applies to one pair of variables it is nonetheless sociologically interesting. A comparison and review suggest, however, that the difference could be attributed to sampling bias or variations in the sampling distributions. See Table 2.7 for a summary. See **Figure A-1 and A-2** in the Appendix for a comparison of the two sample distributions.

In the analysis chapter that follows, I introduce the reader to my own researched, sense-making about the T&T dilemma, how environmental issues managed to overshadow the development agenda in the 2010 national election, and why, despite this development, T&T's development agenda and economy appear to remain stuck in the same debates. Drawing on my analysis of archival, ethnographic interview and World Values Survey data, I offer an informed explanation of how the silent revolution came about by explicating the connections between local geographies and habitus communities and their respective narratives of environment and development. I identify and compare the key characteristics of their narratives across social groupings, in instances comparing the assumptions implied to both sets of narratives to the result I derived from analysis and comparison of the 2006 and 2010 WVS. Each of the thirty-five[206] individual interview narratives that I collected during fieldwork warrant detailed exposition in that they are intriguing biographies that also richly reflect T&T's recent ecological, sociocultural and economic history. My aim here, however, is directed to the specific dilemma described above, and the incumbent constraints of time and space necessitate a detailed exploration of

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[206] All thirty-five interviews and another group of 36 texts were analyzed and inform the analysis however, sixteen interviews were excluded from the DICTION 6.1 analyses discussed in Chapter III. Interviewees who requested not to be audio recorded comprise a large share of this group, followed by interview transcripts where the transcription after three different sets of transcriptionist reviews were still not sufficiently complete to warrant inclusion in a detailed lexical analysis.

these stories elsewhere. By introducing the reader to key elements of the story - settings, key actors, plots, and the geographies in contention in the environment and development debates - for the interviewees grouped by the political affiliation, habitus communities, and perspectives on environment and development, I present the analytical narrative that this research itself represents.

I would therefore be remiss if I did not remind the reader that my own effort here, while social-scientific in nature, represents a particular set of discursive alignments and presents my own narrative, shaped by my particular life experiences as a Trinbagonian expatriate, environmental professional and business woman, schooled in US universities, and a social history and standpoint that places me, a descendent of the French-creole, white-off white, Tobagonian, and the Grenadian immigrant communities in T&T, who was raised as an Afro-Saxon, but perhaps best fits among that highly heterogenous group that comprises the new, new middle class, whose members do not easily fit the traditional local ethnic, class, racial, religious or other cleavages. Let the reader beware, "[i]s only a (story)".

CHAPTER III:
Encounters - The Land and the People:
Habitus, Environment and Development

"Human life as part of the broader biosphere, but as one mere element within it, presupposes the constant interaction of human beings with, and as an inseparable part of, their environment (Lakoff 1987: 215). So 'environment' is defined as relative to how human beings interact with 'physical reality'. The former is an anthropocentric notion, while the latter is independent of all animate beings. 'Physical reality', 'ecology', 'biosphere', 'environment', just to list such terms … underline[s] the difficulty of grasping the location of human existence at the level of individual words or concepts. It is hence perhaps no surprise to see the issue of relating to 'climate change' as humans[,] as being, at least partially, a linguistic or discourse predicament." (Alexander 2009:2)

An airplane approach by daylight, along one of the major intercontinental routes from the US shows a break in the vast aquamarine and indigo deep of the Atlantic Ocean. The break, a set of small islands that are the last in the Caribbean archipelago to be encountered before reaching Venezuela on the South American mainland. These islands are the tail of the Lesser Antilles. (See a map at Figure 3.1.) The largest is Trinidad. Its sister isle, Tobago, is not typically visible from this approach, as it stands some 23 miles to the northeast. While Trinidad and Tobago holds itself out to the world as one nation where the wealth generated from the export of oil and gas is shared by societies on both islands, it is also well understood that cultural, socioeconomic and political differences exist between the two major islands. These differences derive in part from their divergent historical development both before and since they were joined as one colony by the British in 1888. Tobago has a more homogenous Afro-Trinbagonian population, and is much smaller in size than Trinidad.

Not yet visible to the viewer, is the collection of even smaller islands that dot the small, seven-mile[207] swath of sea between Trinidad's northwestern peninsula and the Venezuelan mainland. At this point the Northern Range reaches out like an extended arm to the South American continent, recalling its Miocene geological legacy[208].

Figure 3.1 Map of T&T in the context of the Lesser Antilles and the South American mainland.

Source:
http://www.bing.com/images/search?q=map+of+trinidad+and+tobago+with+lessor+Antilles+and+South+america&id=1F732608A4B6710D3F66A216F62DE4E0F10C0C24&FORM=IQFRBA#view=detail&id=1F732608A4B6710D3F66A216F62DE4E0F10C0C24&selectedIndex=0

Encountering Trinidad's Northern Range from the east by air, at first reveals a dense expanse of rain forest of Pui, Pine, Teak, Bamboo, Cedar and Crapaud trees. At points, this range of hills

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[207] See the Trinidad and Tobago webpage on the CARICOM website.
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/trinidad_tobago.jsp?menu=community Accessed November 2012.
[208] Liddle, Ralph Alexander. 1928. *The Geology of Venezuela and Trinidad*. Fort Worth: J.P. MacGowan.

that include the island's tallest peaks, plunge abruptly into the converging waters of the Atlantic

Ocean and the Caribbean Sea. An attentive observer might glimpse the white sand beaches of

Maracus Bay, Las Cuevas or Blanchisseus -place names that are indicative of Trinidad's past as

a colonial possession of Spain for over 300 years (1492 – 1802) and France. Based on their

shared Catholicism, Spain offered land grants and tax breaks to French Catholic planters to help

'settle' Trinidad and thereby make it more profitable from exports of sugar, coffee and cotton,

starting in 1776 until 1797, when Britain wrested the island from Spain and France. Until then,

Trinidad's population remained largely Amerindian, likely Island-Caribs as described by Reid

(2007:40-41) and also, very likely the ancestors of Cristo "Atekosang" Adonis, whose poem

appears at the beginning of the dissertation. The migration of French planters and the African

workers who they enslaved changed the structure of Trinidad society dramatically, increasing the

population by 640% while the Island-Carib population declined by 50% over the same period.

Island-Caribs represented 75% of Trinidad's population before the entry of the French planter

class and the mass importation of African slaves who comprised 56% of Trinidad's population

by 1797.[209] Though Britain's influence was the most recent, these older Spanish and French

names and the descendants of each of these groups , Island-Caribs, French-creoles, Spanish-

Creoles and Africans - though to varying degrees - remain part of T&T society (but particularly,

Trinidadian society) to the present day.[210]

In many cases, their stories, especially those of the non-dominant classes and racial or

ethnic groups are not formally captured or documented anywhere except for the oral histories of

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[209] Sandra W. Meditz and Dennis M. Hanratty, editors. 1987. *Caribbean Islands: A Country Study*. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress. http://countrystudies.us/caribbean-islands/ Accessed December 2012.

[210] As a consequence, Trinidad had a very different and rather more politically stable colonial past when compared to Tobago. Political rule in Tobago changed during the colonial era in no less than twenty-two times, more frequently than any other island in the West Indies. Such political instability has impacted the pace of economic and industrial development on the two islands. Tobago, which was not ceded to Trinidad until the late 18th century had a different colonial past that has also shaped its present day society.

the peoples, themselves. For instance, little is know of what transpired in Trinidad during the 310 year period of apparent dormancy from active plantation economy. Yet, the local oral histories and geographies provide clues to the struggles that may have ensued between early Spanish settlers, the small group of Africans they enslaved on Trinidad and the Amerindian natives who remained a majority until the introduction of French planters.

Narratives on the Environment

In my fieldwork I met and interviewed people who represented each of the habitus communities described in Chapter II, many of them religious, political or local community leaders, government officials, environmental activists, and members of the local service, manufacturing and oil and gas sectors. By performing analysis of their narratives and that of local texts (media, books and others), I have developed a typology of local understandings of the environment, presented in Table 3.1 below. These typologies are not fixed social facts but instead represent a collection of efforts by local people to make sense of environmental issues, nature itself and their relationships to nature and environment in a particular temporal moment. These understandings can also be read as manifestations of the underlying social processes that are shaping local bodies and geographies at this juncture in Trinidad and Tobago's history. They are therefore not fixed cultural realities, but phenomena that are contingent and subject to change.

Five Environmentalisms – A Model

Competing groups of elites have different notions of environment based on their understanding of how they fit into society, as individuals and members of groups and based on their relationship to nature, environment, natural resources, ecosystems and their incumbent services, the bush, the sea, the river, the outdoors, the forest, the country-side, the city, and the like. Environmental understandings also how citizenship works and what rights inhere to different groups in society. These five environmentalism cross cut, compete and intersect at varying points in time. These are ideal types. They overlap in various settings, social actors, relations, and temporalities. On the basis of both the thirty-five ethnographic interviews that I conducted and a review of an expansive collection of archival data from media and other sources, and several years of participant observation as a practitioner in the environmental field, I assembled the following broad typology of environmentalisms observable in contemporary T&T. The environmentalisms link local habitus groupings as social fields, which provide the boundaries for individual and group experiences of nature and the environment. Environmentalism therefore implies potential for an experience-based, relational form of capital in the analysis that follows later in the chapter. These five environmentalisms can be further understood as ranging from instrumental forms to more relational ones, an individual's placement along this conceptual axis is conditioned by his or her sociocultural habitus, temporality, agency and chance. For example, where an individual's or group's environmental understanding falls along this axis from instrumental to relational may be mediated religious beliefs and formations – all social facts that are contingent and shape human relationships with nature and what comes to be understood as the environment.

Table 3.1 Five Environmental Typologies by Habitus Category

Environmental Typology	Description	Dominant Story Tellers	Implied Temporality/ies	Primary Geography	Risk Narrative	Development Narrative	Politics	Perceived Site of Conflict	Silenced or Elite?
Agricultural environmentalism (possibly separate out)	Rural (large or small scale or subsistence farming, hunting and fishing), government sponsored reforestation programs a) instrumentalist (I) self-interested b) spiritualist (S)	Garveyite Black Power Militants, Tobagonians & Indians from Caroni, the east and south	Instrumentalists = past, present Spiritualists = multiple, complex temporalities - past, present & future with focus on balance/justice	North coast, central plains and swamplands (Caroni), the rural south/ south east villages	I = No S = Yes	I = status quo, modernist, down-streaming development by invitation but also cultivate/grow the agricultural sector with oil and gas revenues S=balance - alternative development	Depends on regional location and racial / ethnic heritage or orientation Likely PNM if non-Caroni-Indian, UNC, otherwise	Legal access and rights to ancestral lands or lands tilled or owned by forebears Lack of infrastructure S = Politics - political contests	Silenced spiritualists are more silenced
Party environmentalism	Environmental issue - when expedient - is a resource mobilization tool to be captured for winning votes Rentier NIMBYism "Jump up issues" - controversial development project focused	Opposition parties that formed the current PP coalition government UWI anti-smelter protesters, Indians from Caroni	Present and near future	LaBrea, Union Village, places that were the sites of environmental protest	No	Status quo - modernist down-streaming and development by invitation agenda	UNC/PP/ COP/TOP/ NJAC/ MSJ (until MSJ withdrew from the PP)	Political contests	Elite

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Table 3.1 (Con't) – Five Environmental Typologies by Habitus Category

Environmental Typology	Description	Dominant Story Tellers	Implied Temporality/ies	Primary Geography	Risk Narrative	Development Narrative	Politics	Perceived Site of Conflict	Silenced or Elite?
Colonial Mimicry - a manicured, controlled, beautification environmentalism	Early post-colonial nature conservation movement, botanical and horticultural societies, wildfowl trusts, bird watchers, beatification and wildlife protection, CEPEP, the early post colonial sanitation movement	Afro-Saxon middle & upper classes White/off-white French Creole Foreign expats in oil & gas sector	Making present conditions like (an imagined) past	Elite sections of urban Port of Spain (Savannah, St. Ann's, etc.) & Wild bird habitat areas on oil and gas lands, parks, green areas like football fields, painted rocks, areas where the grasses have been mowed and neatened	No	Status quo - modernist down-streaming and development by invitation agenda	PNM	Urban encroachment on the "wild" and wild habitats Protecting against the necessary and manageable consequences of modernization and progress	Elite
Development Environmentalism	Sustainable development - industrial environmentalism	Afro-Saxon middle & upper government elites Foreign expats in oil & gas sector, Grenadian oil field workers	Present focused for benefits / future focused for costs	oil and gas producing regions or areas marked for exploration (land and sea)	No	Status quo - modernist down-streaming and development by invitation agenda	PNM/UNC	Governance interference in local policy affairs by foreign entities - World Bank/ IMF, and locals with a political agenda against the ruling political party (PNM or UNC)	Elite

Table 3.1 (Con't 2) – Five Environmental Typologies by Habitus Category

Environmental Typology	Description	Dominant Story Tellers	Implied Temporality/ies	Primary Geography	Risk Narrative	Development Narrative	Politics	Perceived Site of Conflict	Silenced or Elite?
Risk & EJ focused, integrative environmentalism	A new rights based form of environmentalism that emphasizes risks to current and future generations of T&T peoples, demands redress of T&T's growing environmental deficit in the context of its colonial and post colonial legacies, inter-generational justice	The new, new middle class, internationalist intellectuals, returning T&T expats	Multiple, complex temporalities - past, present & future with focus on balance/ justice	Everywhere - locally, if an understanding of how the local is reflected in global environmental problems and solutions	Yes	Balance - alternatives to uneven development based upon a set of social arrangements - a more complete citizenship - belonging to place - that fosters sustainable livelihoods	NJAC and smaller off-radar NGOs and parties	The local ecosystem and ecosystem resources	Silenced

The short vignettes that follow provide the reader with a brief context for the five environmentalisms presented above. Contexts are important for providing the reader with an understanding of the manner in which understandings about nature and local environment concerns are shaped by the lived experiences and social locations of actors at any given point-in-time, and are therefore highly contingent on particular experiences - even while created in stories that come to represent the experiences of particular social groups. While the central contention of this work is that environmental meanings are cultural and social constructs, as Stedman (2003:671) has demonstrated, these constructions are not purely social. Instead, the physical characteristics of the landscape also shape an actor's creation of meaning or sense-making about his/her relationship to the physical place or attributes of nature and environment. This relationship is fundamental to place-based understandings of the landscape and environment as a concept.

Two Agrarian Environmentalisms - Silent Voices - Rural Non-Mainstream

I first introduce a Trinidadian whose family owns lands in the Northern Range of Trinidad. He was born, raised and schooled in one of the small coastal towns one would fly over in the path of a flight from North America. During our conversation he tells me the story of how his great grandfather's family fled both the Caracas earthquake of 1812 and the oppressive regime of José Tomás Boves during the Venezuelan struggle for independence from Spain and settled in Trinidad. Of this he stated, "José Boves killed more [people] than the [1812] earthquake in Venezuela."

"So my great grandparents and them -- they fled Venezuela and they came to Trinidad, ... in Trinidad is only Spanish names, Diego Martin, Maracas, Las Cuevas. In fact, there is a statue of the Virgin Mary on the North coast there that is a place they call Shodu. It is hidden in the bush. They brought that. It is still there. And I was thinking sometime this week that we should have that as a heritage site, because it is still in the bush there where they brought the Venezuelans when they came to Trinidad. So they went to places like Santa Cruz, Lopinot, Caura. They settled and they went further up, Matelot, Blanchisseuse, Toco and all over Trinidad...."

He then explained that the lands that were carved out and farmed by his great grandfather were granted to him by the order of Queen Victoria:

"Well, what happened -- I think they was squatting because -- well, they occupied land. After slavery was abolished Queen Victoria decreed that the people who were occupying the lands [should] mark it off. That is how my great grandparents have several acres of lands in Matelot. They call it [the]Crown Grant Initiative. That is where they get most of the lands, and the villages... were created, too."[211]

An interesting revelation from this interview was the discovery that the oral history of his family that he heard as a youngster is true, and he had just learned this in the days before our conversation. He produced a series of old papers, with words that read as an earlier version of the English language. The words were all hand written and one of the documents was a parcel map of Matelot. These documents recently obtained from the government archive, and showing his family's lands granted to his great grandfather by Queen Victoria, also included his great grandfather's will, which gave some of the parcels to the Roman Catholic (RC) church for the construction of a church and school in the village. This respondent also discovered that in exchange for this land grant, the RC church had agreed to perform a mass (religious service) for his great-grand-parents during a particular time each year and he had recently succeeded in his efforts to convince the church to honor his great-grandfather's will.

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[211] Confidential interview with author, January 26, 2012

His family, after fleeing prosecution in Venezuela under Spanish rule, had cultivated large, northern Trinidadian estates and according to him, based upon the swath of papers he had obtained, likely enslaved African laborers for the cultivation of nutmeg, cocoa, bananas, coffee, shoots, ground provisions like cassava. They also hunted and fished. This family history would usually suggest that his social status would be in the small white or off-white minorities, but for his rural upbringing, "in the country" or in "the bush", as locals would say. The social disconnection that his relatively darker skin color and lack of prior knowledge about his "prestigious" Spanish origin creates, however, also separates him from the imagined community of Trinidad whites, and places him outside of their group boundaries. He had not completed a formal high school education but was active in his local community. After the death of his father, he ventured out to Port of Spain as a young man to seek wage employment due of a lack of jobs in the small coastal town where he was born. After working in a wholesale goods job in the warehouse district in the old Charlotte Street and George Street corridors of the capital, Port of Spain, he eventually obtained an entry-level job in the government service where he stayed for over 25 years. One of his motivations for originally going to Port of Spain was to demand basic infrastructure (electricity, proper paved roads, running water, access to a doctor and health services for delivering babies, sporting facilities, and secondary school access) for his village from the government at the time. These social distances including his self-described militancy - organizing his local rural community to demand rights of access to basic infrastructure services and funding - place him in the social community of Garveyite Black Power militants.

The notions of environment that he described are informed by his rural village orientation, subsistence lifestyle and involvement in fishing, hunting, small scale agriculture, and the ability to have legal access to his ancestral lands. It is an understanding of the environment

informed by the specifics of the intersection of his social and physical locations. Environment is not a separate matter from the fabric of his everyday life and his rural understandings seem to persist despite exposure to urban life in Port of Spain. Although he obtained a government job in "town", Port of Spain, he chose to return to his village to live and commuted to work. While likely pervasive among Trinbagonians who live outside of town, his is not the dominant environmental discourse represented in the anti-smelter and antidevelopment debates. It is nevertheless an older, colonial and early post colonial era framing of an earlier local consensus about land, nature, environment and human relations with these.

Continuing that airplane approach over the North coast, one might next encounter seemingly random patches of lands cleared for farming, or the stark contrast of red earth exposed by a gaping quarry site - a frequent cause of the massive floods that have become so frequent during the rainy season in Trinidad. Then, almost instantaneously, the lower reaches of the mountain range appear. At its base stand small houses, some on stilts, and a collection of other structures of varied sizes, many of them aligned in rows or hatched in an irregular pattern. Drawing closer to a landing at Piarco International Airport, the collection of cinder block homes and warehouse-type buildings, with tin roofs, become clearer. They seem to radiate out from, and are bisected by the East-West Corridor, a major transportation arterial, that quickly gives way to sugar cane fields, tropical savannah and a straggle of swamp lands, punctuated by coconut and tall mangroves, to the South and East. The East-West Corridor is the geography of the new middle classes, comprised of the Afro-Saxons, Muslims with Afro-Saxon ways, Presbyterians and *Presbyndus*[212], the post war nationalists and pre-war internationalist intellectuals described by Lloyd Best (1991), and the new expats. This is not to say that representatives of these habitus communities are not also to be found elsewhere on the islands of Trinidad and Tobago, however,

[212] This term refers to Hindus who have grown up Christian in the Presbyterian church.

they are often associated with this northern, east-to-west region of Trinidad in the imaginations of local folk. The residents of these foothills of the Northern Range also comprise the swing voters in many a national election (Ryan 2003:229-234).

The eastern reaches of the Northern Range, and parts of south-rural Trinidad is also home to the small communities of Trinidadians who trace their lineage back to the Island-Carib civilization that populated the islands before Columbus' arrival and for 310 years before Spain welcomed in the French plantocracy. I interviewed the shaman for one of these communities. Like the respondent above, he was educated in the public schools in his village, and traverses the contemporary realities of T&T society while working to preserve the culture of native peoples on the islands. After a four-year stint with the police-service, he trained in agriculture and now works as a supervisor in a government sponsored reforestation program while serving as a tour guide for foreign visitors and students with a research interest in Amerindian culture and ecology in T&T. The following short statement provides insight on how he defines the environment and the causes of local environmental issues. Referring to his government and tribal occupations on which he replants the forests, he says,

> "But thank God we are good depositors. We keep depositing. And we don't feel that we are dominant over anything. We share this space with everything, the wild animals, the fishes in the sea, in the river, all about. So that is how we look. That is our spirituality. That is our way of life. That is how we believe. That is what we think. That is how we survive. That is why we are still surviving."

> "We need the forests in order for us to live, to survive. I'm not talking merely for getting raw material. I am the medicine man of my community, and it's almost impossible for me to get medicine now because of what has been done to the environment. I have to go very far to get [medicinal] trees [and] plants. I have to plant plants... in my garden because ...people [are] using chemical, or quarrying, or [there are] loggers and all these sorts of things."

"My community [is] involved in handicraft, and it is becoming more and more hard for us to get [raw materials], because we harvest in a sustainable way for continuity, but because, again, of those hazard[s] it is becoming difficult."

"[I]f you go there and you see the craters that w[ere] done by people taking out aggregate; digging out, quarrying, some legal, some illegal, it will make you cry. It makes me cry because we have to go further and further into the forest to get those. Pretty soon we might get none. And other than that, the loggers have cut down trees, and when they are finished with that, they dump garbage in the area."

This speaker also left his village for employment in Port of Spain but after a short period in town, decided to return to the village and the land. His family had also been involved in cocoa cultivation. From his viewpoint, politics is the primary cause of environmental problems facing T&T society and the government, and the role of cash in the economy is a key factor that drives the problem. He sees the cash-focused, rentier economy and the weakness of local environmental institutions, especially the regulatory and natural resource ministries, as having a direct impact on the destruction of the natural environment. Referring to his reforestation unit's work, he says,

"We are under the Ministry of the Environment. We have changed ministr[ies] so much. We were under the Ministry of Public Utilities. Then we went under the Ministry of Agriculture. And then they put us under the Ministry of the Environment, which I thought was very good. But those people only talk environment; they don't mean environment. They only talk. They only talk. Because the same person who is in charge of environment allows people to -- he's the minister of housing, and housing ha[s] been built in areas that they should not be built in. They [are] cutting down hills and they cutting down mountain[s] or whatever and they're building houses."

Notable in his narrative are the fragmentation and discontinuity of environmental policy implementation and the contradictions that demonstrate why T&T has week environmental institutions. The fragmentation issue is significant because, as he described, it becomes the justification for getting nothing done. Instead, officials simply refer those with complaints to other branches in the government bureaucracy that may have partial responsibility for the matter.

While some of these conditions may seem intentional, they also points to the nature of the post colonial bureaucracy which remains largely patrimonial, where incumbents appear to "own" their posts and once vacated, can arrange to be replaced by a close friend or family member - usually in exchange for some form of patronage, as well. While the entire government bureaucracy may not function in this manner, there is a widespread perception and some clear examples that it does. People wait in long lines for an opportunity to speak with a line minister to request as favors what the organization is legally mandated to do. This set of arrangements creates and reinforces a system of patronage where citizens are put in the position of requesting a favor for an action that should otherwise be routine.

As this respondent further explained, there is no consistent budget applied to his reforestation program, despite its existence for over seven years and the difficulty workers - many of them single mothers- face receiving payment from the government ministry in charge. Throughout his and other interviews, I received commentary on the government's make-work environmental program, CEPEP and the widespread perception that it is used for patronage to the benefit of those in power.

> "So that's why I tell you it's politics. And you hear they opening other programs all about the place and paying people quite a lot of money just to go and scratch at the side of the road or painting somebody house."

It is notable that this speaker described himself, not as being pro-environment and opposed to development. Instead he stated that he supports both modernity and development but wants to see these objectives achieved through balance and with transparency and justice. When asked, he indicated that he does not see himself as belonging to any movement, environmental or otherwise. He suggested that some of the key actors who were associated with the environmental struggles covered in the news media, including the anti-smelter debates were not always

perceived as genuine or seemed like they were involved because "they want to be movie stars" to get on TV or be in the newspaper. Genuine environmentalists, in his view were those who worked diligently in smaller groups outside of the limelight to protect wildlife, to stop the quarrying, and support human welfare - those who live an "environmentalist life" rather than simply paying it lip service.

These two interviews represent the voices that are not often heard in environmental debates in T&T and stand in stark contrast to the anti-smelter and anti-industrial development debates that developed when the PNM government attempted to further the down streaming policy for oil and gas. While nuanced, it is also important to note their differences. The former has a close relationship to the land in terms of rights of access and raw materials for subsistence and livelihood. While this is also true of the latter, there was also a distinctly spiritual connection to the land, the forest, streams, birds, fish and all of nature and an understanding of nature as a sibling, rather than something to have dominion over. This difference may be accounted through noting their religious or spiritual differences, the former, the descendants of Roman Catholics fleeing persecution from Spain. The latter are the descendants of the native Amerindian tribal peoples. Religion and spiritual belief structures therefore are intervening and defining variables that explain the differences in understanding about each speaker's relationship to nature and the environment. These differing ideological structures also therefore shape their narratives. They represent separate sociocultural and socio-ecological subcultures that co-exist in the forest ecosystems and watersheds of Trinidad's Northern Range.

A Representative Example of Indo-Trinidadian Habitus & Environment

The Indo-Trinidadian communities in the eastern (Chaguanas), central (Caroni) and southern (Rio Clara, Claxton Bay, Princess Town and other) parts of Trinidad are classified within the framework of agricultural environmentalism - many of them farmers of rice, sugarcane and vital contributors to local food supply including animal husbandry and poultry farming. Like the two respondents described above, their understandings of environment are defined by a close proximity to the land and nature for livelihoods and also as a way of life. Many of the more rural/suburban members of this community participate in subsistence or small scale farming, while some operate or manage fairly large agricultural concerns. As Baptiste (2008) has demonstrated in her surveys of some of these farmers, proximity to sensitive habitats increases the propensity to support environmental protection of the resource rather than mere monitoring. One explanation for this outcome may be that those who are closest to these ecosystems have a shorter chain[213] of information or experience shorter feedback loops about their impacts upon the local environment - in part, because they are in close relationship with, and reliant upon it. However, as the demographics of T&T change, increasingly there are proponents of the risk-based approach to environment across the spectrum of social groups, especially among those who have been educated at UWI and/or abroad.

One such respondent from the Indo-Trinidadian areas of central and south, described how at the age of eight while tending to the animals his family reared, he found a patch of ground in his community where old lead batteries from cars had been repeatedly discarded - a dump site with toxic wastes. He noticed that the goats that had eaten *baggie* and other vegetation growing at this site became sick - lethargic, ceased to ruminate, had dilated eyes, and began to froth at the mouth, as if poisoned. This memory and his recollection of the deaths of seven children who had

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[213] See Cronon (1991:207-259).

played in the waste dumped by a battery 'recycling' plant on Demerara Road, shaped his subsequent educational interests at university (in the natural sciences at UWI and in Europe) and his career (in politics, government and the O&G sector). In his view, local environmentalism began with the advent of the local oil and gas industry. He cites the petrochemicals left on the surface of land and bodies of water, the removal of forests and vegetation, the destruction of watersheds for the construction of roads, pipeline and power lines that all of this infrastructure development had caused.

"The disaster" happened, he stated, when the multinational companies left Trinidad in the late sixties to early 1970s. There was no money in the Treasury. The previous government left the Treasury dry and in 1986 the NAR government was forced to go to the IMF to seek financial assistance. The EMA was established as a condition to that IMF assistance because T&T at the time lacked the legal framework for environmental policy and protection but the agency was designed as " a toothless bull dog" that would be in a corner and unable to act with out the necessary changes to the T&T constitution. The UNC-led government at the time, repealed the Environmental Management Act of 1995 passed by a simple majority vote in Parliament, and then re-enacted it with the required 3/5th majority vote in both houses of Parliament which allowed for the subsequent creation of an Environmental Commission to adjudicate environmental claims. "They just put institutions in place to draw down the IMF loan, " he stated. The earlier Act "lacked the philosophical underpinnings for proper environmental management."[214] It was not until EM Act #3, passed in the year 2000 that we see the creation of an institutional framework for environmental policy - the National Environmental Policy or NEP. He cites additional to further strengthen T&T's institutional arrangements for environmental protection, such as the creation of a series of baseline studies - the essential

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[214] Confidential interview with author, July 21, 2011.

information needed for this type of enterprise, but he notes that the Prime Minister's and their advisors are not sufficiently environmentally minded and possibly ignorant of the necessary policy and legislative frameworks (and information) required for the effectiveness of such institutions.

Environment is therefore lumped together with other government ministry portfolios, and with gas prices moving from $9/barrel to $16/barrel during the tenure of the UNC government, the incentive structure was set up for rent seeking rather than the strengthening of policy frameworks that were seen as hinderances to acquiring those revenues. Environmental protection and management in T&T therefore remain unfinished works, and as he opined, "there is no political will for environment...just competition among elites for political power...but environment is beginning to affect voting behavior."[215]

Sentiments about environmental and social risk are strong among some members of this group and perhaps for valid reasons. As this respondent explained, from his perspective the PNM, with its largely Afro-Trinidadian base wins the majority of its seats in the north and they use O&G revenues to develop their own constituencies. The geography of his environmental narrative is defined by his personal and professional experiences and his social location and he therefore frames the PNM government's motives in that context. He tells me that the PNM's aim is the destruction of the Indian diaspora in T&T, citing as evidence the fact that despite the IMF's mandate that T&T restructure its sugar industry, the PNM led governments have neglected this task. The geographic boundaries that define the two groups in his view are characterized as, "urban versus rural, where urban areas are north of Caroni and rural areas are south of Caroni." He goes on to state that the wealth is generally in the south, but the welfare of the peoples of the south continue to be neglected - evidenced by poor infrastructure, roads, health

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[215] Confidential interview with author, July 21, 2011.

facilities, education, public utilities (electricity and water access) and food production. Instead, the south is characterized by disease states - what he terms lifestyle diseases that are associated with Indo-Trinidadians' relatively lower incomes, and illness such as diabetes, alcohol consumption, domestic violence. He states that the PNM governments do not ensure that water-ways are cleared in the south. Many rural folk still use pit latrines and when it rains and the rivers flood, this poses a threat to public health and welfare. He sees Caroni as both an environmental and an economic issue as discussed further below. His experience of local environmental issues however, stand in stark contrast to the stories that are published about the success of T&T's development agenda.

When continuing an approach to Trinidad over the Northern Range, one would most certainly envision the Gulf of Paria, a relatively, large, asymmetric bowl of semi-brackish water, influenced by the outflow of the grand Orinoco River, stands between Trinidad and Venezuela - an uneven bowl with its deeper end near Venezuela and just within the *bocas,* marked by their strong currents that are the passages ways to the convergence of the Caribbean Sea and Atlantic Ocean. The pass over might be quite swift as the jet makes a turn over the Gulf and heads back to the north east for a landing at Piarco International airport. The observer might perhaps miss the densely packed cluster of liquified natural gas, ammonia and methanol manufacturing plants, the cement and steel factories, with their dust plumes, and other industrial infrastructure along the central and southwestern coasts. These are the industries that drive T&T's economy; the result of the country's bold development by invitation strategy, the success stories of Ken Julien, and others. Accompanying this industrial cluster are the related networks of pipelines, flaring stacks, tankers and rigs that dot the central coast and the Gulf of Paria.

Development Environmentalism - Elite Industrial Voices - The Smell of Money

The development narrative described in Chapter II that involved the creation of the LNG industry in T&T and PLIPDECO are salient to this particular set of narratives about the environment. To illustrate, I draw upon the experience of a respondent who is a member of the local, industrial elite; born in Trinidad to an upper class family. He described growing up in an upscale neighborhood along the East-West corridor. Although he began his high school education at one of the elite boy's/men's colleges in Port of Spain, he was subsequently sent to boarding school in England and then sent to North America for his university education in engineering. For him, like other respondents with ties to the O&G sector, environmental issues represented an inconvenience that people simply accepted as a necessary byproduct of prosperity.

> "In university... my air pollution design professor, who [w]as really old school - I think he was there reluctantly. He was telling ... the class how there was a – I think it was in ... Ontario where there's an oil refinery, like Point a Pierre[216], and there was always a certain smell in the air. And the citizenry at the time justified it by saying that it was the smell of money, meaning it was something they were accepting to live with. I just used that as an analogy. So what he was inferring [to] is there should be or there was a tolerance for pollution in the old school days because it meant revenue. I never forgot that, and I said, "That's just not right. There has to be a way of balancing the two."[217]

Unfortunately, that balancing of the two - environment and development via risk based heavy industry remain elusive in T&T to the present day and constitutes an area of opportunity for further research and policy development. Public statements, made by then PNM Prime Minister, Patrick Manning, echo this sentiment about the environment as a resource to be utilized and

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[216] Point a Pierre is the location of T&T's oil refinery and its LNG facilities. Air pollution is monitored by the EMA further north at Pt. Lisas but there is no known government air quality monitoring at Point a Pierre.
[217] Confidential interview with author, May 25, 2011.

managed. At a meeting at Frisco Junction, Point Fortin, prior to the 2010 election, Prime Minister Manning told supporters, "You are going to be home to the first aluminum smelter in Trinidad and Tobago. And those who are against it will tell you that it is not that they are opposed to the smelter, but to the whole concept of industrialization on the whole." According to Prime Minister Manning's approach to development, "[a]s we industrialize it is not possible to industrialize without adversely affecting the environment, … there are international standards established to determine the levels of emission of one kind or the next that are acceptable which will allow human beings to coexist." In his view, this is what sustainable development means and he sees himself as committed to it as a matter of policy. He states that, "sustainable development is what we are all about and while we use the environment we must use it and ensure that we must not prejudice the environment for generations to come." It is notable that in his and virtually all of the public conversations on development, environmental issues are also at play and vice versa. In this sense, environment and development have become conjoined with other patriotic aims. During his Point Fortin speech, he tells the public that "…you all will live to see not only [an] aluminum smelter in La Brea and Point Fortin but LNG expansion and more industrial plants located in this part of the country and that is the policy of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago." The certainty, insistence and finality of Prime Minister Manning's way of speaking on the matter was also reflected in the speeches of other members of his Cabinet. The incumbent PNM Energy Minister, Conrad Enill sheds additional light on how his party viewed environment and development. In an address on the state of the energy industries, he says, " [w]e also intend to develop the aluminum smelter (referring to ALUTRINT), not only to sell our natural gas, but to develop a plastic industry to export these products to markets in the world…the decision we have made is to withstand the challenges of the world". The narrative

focus of this and other PNM and pro-smelter speech development tends to be focused on external

market risks and as many of them are engineers, geologists and otherwise, experts with

experience in the sector – that is, they possess both the technical know-how and social location

in the industry with which to understand the trends – they are not usually inclined to entertain

alternative points of view on this subject readily. Additionally, they would assert that they have

been correct in their assessments because the experiment worked – "they know what they are

doing" and they see it as a noble cause. Prime Minister Manning even invokes God when he

speaks about it as though it is a religious edict or moral obligation to develop. He has said, "if

Almighty God in his wisdom has endowed us with resources of oil and gas, it would be wrong if

these resources were forsaken in the process of national development." Notions of environment

as a mere administrative fix, categorical conformity to northern standards, or beautification, do

not antagonize but compliment this dominant understanding of the role of development led by

extractive, point source industry. Understandings of nature and environment that fall outside that

boundary are seen as unnecessarily antagonistic and potentially linked to a political agenda.

While in some cases, this situation may well hold, there seems to be little ability or institutional

mechanisms to enable distinguishing between the two sets of objectives. In such circumstances,

the tendencies of patrimonial, race and class-based bureaucracy and allegiances govern but as I

demonstrate below, these strategies can be misguided and not fully responsive to the underlying

problems.

A master narrative is one account that is so widespread that it constitutes the dominant

narrative. A master narrative defines the PNM elite's entitlement to resources such as land,

decision-making about the valuing and use of the nation's mineral resources, political power, and

the like. To better understand how the dominant narrative works in the context of the local

culture, social relations and hegemony, one would have to explore what Afro- or Indo-Trinidadians, French-creoles, Whites, Chinese and other Trinidadians and Tobagonians long told themselves about their origin stories and their trajectory for progress. There is on the one hand, a national picture seen repeatedly at Carnival and external representations of ourselves as a "calaloo" where "every creed and race has an equal place," but a potent alternative reality is evidenced by the Indo-Trinidadians who sought to migrate to Canada claiming refugee status from racial and religious persecution, and those who make claims of the underdevelopment and diasporic challenges of Indians as a people with the evidence being place specific, e.g., the PNM's neglect of the East and South - where the extraction of the resources of the nation's wealth is taking place.

PNM elites (including the upper classes who are Syrian, white and Indo-Trinidadian and benefit from their development policies) held the view that continuous industrialization via the down-streaming plan ensure the nation's ongoing and growing wealth. New data showing that the amount of available natural gas is rapidly depleting and the limited number of successful new finds put fetters on this master narrative. In addition, the reality of new market competitors, a globalized sense of concern about climate change, droughts, and shortages of water for industry, commerce and use in homes, large flash floods, and the like also call to question this master narrative.

The PNM's master narrative became widespread during the independence movement in 1956-1962 when a newly independent Trinidad and Tobago began to re-conceive itself as a self-created nation state, and community. In that process locals wove stories about themselves (new identity stories) to distance themselves as a nation from the Colonial past. The themes of these stories remain popular in local literature and arts and include narratives expressed as, "we are

superior to our colonial masters, we are more British than the British, we are better cricketers, we can be self-reliant in handling our own government affairs, "together we aspire, together we achieve". Oil and gas-based development became the technology used to enable this remaking of the national self, but what other stories and resources did locals forsake to re-shape a national identity? What was forgotten in the forgetting about a relationship to land, outside of its conception as a resource for wealth, and ownership? In his famous book on the subject, Eric William argued that slavery's purpose was purely economic and the racial abuses that developed were mere by-products thereof. In this way, the Trinbagonian peoples could re-humanize themselves by demonstrating their economic prowess based on cultivating the expertise to propel their own economic growth and change, spawning a generation of geologists, economists but most importantly, oil and gas engineers who became the power elite. Yet, there was the disillusionment that came with this strategy and the social costs of its success.

> "I was just 16 years old when this country gained independence. Before the big day, I had learned the national anthem "by heart", and sang it lustily. I used to whistle the tune as I rode my bicycle in the village. On Independence Day, I was a cadet in uniform, posted somewhere near the Red House on Abercromby Street with my colleagues from the Presentation (Chaguanas) Unit.
> Do you think it mattered to me that Dr Eric Williams was the Prime Minister, or that the PNM was in power? I couldn't care less—not about Eric or Bhadase Maharaj or Rudy Capildeo or any of the politicians. It was my country, and that is what was uppermost in my mind. I did not quite understand the ramifications of independence, but I saw it as a progressive step. Later, when I became a soldier, my patriotism ran deeper in my veins, so much so that when I felt my people's rights were under attack, I initiated drastic action that many people felt was decidedly unpatriotic.
> If only people would put country before party or leader, the disaster that befell Patrick Manning in his maniacal final years might never have happened. Instead, the sycophants vociferously defended his descent into the abyss. Today, no one even remembers their names, and Patrick is remembered only because of our human compassion for his infirmity.
> Today, too, we are witnessing another descent into hell. And once more, no one listens to voices in the wilderness crying out for the leaders to stop the madness. Like scoundrels, they take refuge behind the fig leaf of what passes for patriotism, confident that they would benefit from good fortune—a golden

jubilee, a gold medal, or even better, a huge discovery of black gold. Maybe they would enjoy luck. Eric Williams had resigned in 1973 when the price of oil spiked and he returned to enjoy another eight bountiful years as Prime Minister."[218]

Ideologically, the dominant development approach is undergirded by a modernist, patriarchal worldview that is not easily dislodged. Nonetheless, it has not been the exclusive policy terrain of the PNM. Until the most recent elections, the UNC's approach to development was also the same and they also promoted the down-streaming agenda. The key difference between the two major parties to date has been the question of who benefits from the oil and gas revenues generated in the south and this is not solely an Indo-Trinidadian matter. Nor are the issues of risk and lack of access to reachable livelihoods, reliable government services and basic infrastructure such as plumbing and health care somehow less important than the need to position T&T strategically in the global O&G political economy.

Additionally, there seems to be very little understanding among political decision-makers of the underlying social dynamics that have happened in the society and are still occurring as a result of the more recent 'success' of the oil and gas sector. A respondent of Afro-Trinidadian descent who grew up in the oil and gas sector in southern Trinidad described the creation of new, largely American-influenced and global middle class values and tastes. He also notes that while those values have become widespread, not everyone in the society has access to the wealth that is needed to support the conspicuous consumption that almost seems to be required in order to fit in.

"The agro sector has failed [due to the government's narrow focus on oil and gas]. [If] you want to eat, you have to import it, and when you have a bunch of fairly well-to-do society [folks] wanting sophisticated foods because that's what

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[218] Shah, Raffique. (2012, September 1). "Part-time Patriots." *Trinidad Express Newspaper*. Accessed January 28, 2013. http://www.trinidadexpress.com/commentaries/Part-time_patriots-168290896.html.

they're being fed on television, in the media, you can't -- you expect to have caviar when you go to a cocktail party now. You're not going to settle for rum and Coke. It's Scotch, not just Scotch, it's blue -- black label -- Johnny Walker Blue, green and purple even, not red, whatever colors they have now. So your tastes suddenly change because you have the means. But your food tastes change. You turn your television on and you're fed a whole set of stuff and you want to imitate that --because, after all, the Kardashians are eating that. Why not me? The new middle-class tastes however, apply only to some, and that's the problem. That's why I call them the underclass right now. That's another division that the [latest gas-sector-based economic] boom has created, or this so-called industrial development has created. This has created the underclass, and they survive, quite frankly, on their wits; drugs, essentially."[219]

He goes on to state that these social arrangements have created the conditions that enable the rampant, seemingly uncontrollable levels of crime that has plagued T&T over the recent decade. To be clear, the governance strategists and planners on all sides seem to have misunderstood the full set of consequences of 'progress' and the cash economy that it has created at all levels of social life. The alleged degree of financial corruption and scandal at the level of government and the local construction and financial sectors is seen by many as being just as potent as the violent crimes being perpetrated by gangs, kidnappers, and drug lords.

"The political, economic and social class, they are not rooted here. They are not rooted *in* their place. They do not sufficiently understand how they have arrived at this particular juncture and they do not *see* themselves as the agents of their own development. So for example, there was this governmental delegation coming back from India recently and the talk is only about how much investment India will pour into Trinidad and Tobago. Have we really critically examined what we want out of that? And, worst of all, apart from the strict economic part of it, we have not explored the cultural and social meaning of that."[220]

These circumstances have also produced a new, new middle class who - while themselves also involved in and produced by some of these social forces - present a growing set of critiques

[219] Confidential interview with author, July 14, 2011.

[220] Confidential interview with author, January 20, 2012.

and counter-narratives to the extant development agendas and political regimes. This may be so in part, because while they can utilize some aspects of their social status and location to access important sources of power and decision-making, they do not fit comfortably into the arrangements of the status quo.

Environmentalisms of the New Middle-class – Risk, Justice & Quality of Life

"I heard the word Trinidad in a dream and my heart pounded me awake like an alarm going off. I have a moment of absolute terror, in which I can't hear the rest of what the announcer has said. I imagine all manner of chaos has erupted in Trinidad. In the seconds it takes to go from sleep to wake I imagine all manner of horrors, major enough to come to the attention of BBC's World Service. And then the announcer says that thousands of Leatherback turtles had been killed on a beach far away in a place called Grande Riviere. I see it in my mind's eye, a halo of black in the sky, a circle of corbeaux coming closer and closer. Corbeaux with their grace and impressive wing span from a distance, come closer and land on the beach and lose all their distant beauty and become clumsy and awful gluttons feasting on the carcasses of tiny dead turtles and destroyed eggs. And vagrant dogs who have been spending the day combing the beach for a meal, their nostrils prick up and they smell the carnage on the breeze. The men just following orders and clearing a beach in nesting season in a country so blessed to be chosen as one of the few special sacred places on Earth where these giant, ancient creatures come to plant their futures. A small sacrifice of endangered animals. And I see in the approaching dawn the terrible sight of dogs crunching the tiny bodies of those turtles in teeth accustomed to garbage and the other discards of humans. The story is over before I open my eyes to the darkness. The reporter moves on to something else. Some Eurozone crisis. Some massacre in Syria. And some part of me is slightly relieved but also sort of disappointed. That we only make it to the news for murdering turtles. In my muddled in-between sleep I guess I was mixing up the other news stories. There was a report from elsewhere about people taking to the streets. And I guess part of me had hoped that Trinidadians had reached enough of a point of indignation about any of the various things that should make us incensed enough to send us out on the streets. The environmentalists are the only ones reported as being concerned about the dead turtles. In a country of wild-meat lovers, maybe a story of dead turtles will never prompt national outrage. In a country of yes people and complainers and passively

accepting masses, I'm not sure what will ever prompt us to take to the
streets. There's always some division we will find to keep us from
working together to put an end to whatever is causing offence. And surely
the destruction of thousands of turtles is a highly offensive thing. But there
are so many other examples of destruction that should have caused
national offence but didn't."[221]

Springer represents the still relatively silenced grassroots environmental community

voices that are aspiring to be heard in mainstream T&T culture. I provide an extended account of

her work here to enable the full context of her narrative, which is representative of a newer form

and understanding of environmental in T&T. As these voices are excluded or have limited access

to the mainstream national news media, the Internet age has provided a powerful and seemingly

effective, popular and trans-national alternative avenue for expressing these internally subaltern

ideas.

Her account, which includes the clearing of the Union Estate (in Figure 1.1), captures the

key features of a growing environmental narrative in T&T and it is this group from below that

comprises the near-invisible but increasingly vociferous public support for what I term, the new

risk-based environmental agenda. Hers, as many of these newer grassroots narratives, is not one

that is optimistic about the state of the environment. She specifically emphasizes the failure of

environmental protection, generally. She expresses the notion that the EMA and not other

regulatory authorities (such as the Wildlife Division), is responsible for the protection of wildlife

such as turtles and monkeys, and suggests that the authorities do not really care about the

environment, but rather are focused on "big money." Her narrative points to the role of money in

the society, led by a rentier state. Her story also suggests that what is of value is not the "low

paying" jobs that seem to be so prized and are offered as the great need and rationale for

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[221] Springer (2008).

entertaining foreign capital under the development by invitation model. This development approach implies that development is something that outsiders do for Trinbagonians, rather than an understanding that development is an arena in which Trinidadians and Tobagonians can exercise choice and must do for themselves. Springer's narrative posits an alternative way of making sense of environment and development, where the purpose of development is not merely about monetary gains but is rather about maintaining the "quality of life".

Springer also implies that the current development trajectory presents a form of progress that is not really progressive and her choice of metaphor intones a narrative of risk inequality, captured in the personification of "corbeaux wearing suits" - likely foreign investors, and the "turtles [being] the lives of us all", the latter at risk of being pushed aside by the former, and aided by the dogs with human faces - quite possibly, the locals who benefit from rentier profits, including the state. It is interesting to note that the turtles themselves seem to have no agency in her account. They are innocent and in need of protection. The fact that she awakens to learn the story on the BBC's radio program is also significant in that, news about environmental issues is sometimes suppressed in the local media, is highly politicized or may become important, only after it is picked up by the international press. A case in point is the series of attempts I made to reconstruct a story that I was told by at least twenty percent of the people with whom I interviewed during fieldwork. It was difficult to obtain any reliable record of news coverage of the Easter weekend clearing of the Union Estate to which Springer refers in her essay, and the event is important to the enterprise at hand, because it is an event that marks the beginning of the environmental story of the ALUTRINT project, though it also fits into a larger environmental narrative told by local environmentalists from the new, new middle class. Springer's narrative is

representative of the risk focus of the new environmental discourse that is perhaps beginning to demand changes of government and the approach to governance and citizenship in T&T.

From Anti-smelter to Environmental Capital

Ramesh Lawrence Maharaj, an attorney and a contender for the UNC party leadership], and former Prime Minister Basdeo Panday, who led the UNC government until the year 2000 became active in the marches and protest movements against the smelters. The current People's Partnership Prime Minister, then leader of the opposition, also spoke out against the PNM government's efforts to site the smelters. The PNM's rebuttal to the UNC opposition's support for the anti-smelter protests - led by a small group of professors and students from UWI and neighborhood and grassroots activists, and the media's - was to show that the UNC had also sought to build smelters when their party led the government. Still, as the respondent quoted below suggested, the perception of harm or risk of the public being poisoned by these projects was so great that people chose to ignore the political debates. In the end, Maharaj was instrumental in galvanizing anti-smelter support and joined a coalition of middle class and grassroots groups (voices from below) to mobilize the anti-smelter protest movement and to bring the lawsuits against ALTRUINT that lead to the overturn of its CEC approval. Whatever his motivations for bringing the lawsuit, Maharaj's success in the courts sent a strong signal to the public. The scientific uncertainty and dueling expert accounts of the environmental, health and safety merits of the ALTRUINT project were finally settled by a court of law - an entity that was viewed as impartial to either side or party.

Speaking of Maharaj, a respondent in one of my ethnographic interviews, put it as follows:

"He got a lot of kudos for it and so on and I suppose he deserve it too all but this is the point I'm making. Now, people like myself always said that from the beginning but I'm saying that ordinary, general population started saying that they were opportunists just riding there. Strangers that I [would] just meet up so and the conversation come. They would say that eh, - and especially the PNM-ites would say that. They would say, "Look, I don't know too much about the smelter issue. I'm hearing that it could be dangerous and could be poisonous and all this kind of thing and if that is so, then we shouldn't have it.

They [would] say, "But, you know, I don't trust the politicians, especially the ones from the UNC like Ramesh Maharaj and so on. They're just using this thing as the way they use everything else. And that would be my analysis as well. They [are] ruthless when it comes to exploiting a good cause. But they will make that distinction between say like Ramesh and even people in the PNM. And the fellas at the university. There was talk about people like Vine and Kublalsingh and so on and they would say, "Look. Maybe those fellas sincere, eh. Listen to them still. Maybe they're sincere and really this thing is poisonous...we don't really want it, but you see the politicians, I don't trust them." And by politicians they mean Maharaj and Panday. They saw the political opportunity and they took it with both hands." (Confidential interview January 16, 2012)

Another interview participant close to the negotiations stated that the UNC's motive for teaming with the COP was to bring the urban, educated, "knife and fork" Indians back into the UNC's fold, and the UNC party, therefore, softened their racial rhetoric. Noted political scholar, Selwyn Ryan, in a JCC poll conducted in 2008, showed that Trinbagonians of both large racial groups, Africans and Indians disapproved of the government's performance on crime, and the squandering of public funds. The poll indicated that 70% of the representative sample of respondents felt that they were worse off than five years before.[222] The discontent created by the events leading up to the 2010 elections then opened an opportunity for the UNC to build a coalition of communities that cut across different classes and races while also being pro-environment. The perception of unfairness and corruption was enough to shatter the symbolic boundaries that normally keep groups, such as - the Caroni and central Trinidad Indians, the

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[222] The survey results were reported in the newspapers and can be found at
http://jyoticommunication.blogspot.com/2008/11/ryan-poll-gives-pm-manning-failing.html. Accessed January 2013.

disgruntled "Grenadian" oil workers, Garveyite Black nationalists, and the new, new middle class in Trinidad (COP) and Tobago (TOP) polarized. The differences in Trinidad versus Tobago's historical heritages from that colonial past has been compounded by the fact that to date, most of the oil and gas development has was undertaken on- or off-shore from Trinidad rather than Tobago (though that may be changing). As a consequence, much of the policy formation processes surrounding the environmental debates that are examined in the dissertation are particular to Trinidad's development rather than to Tobago's. That is not to say that these Trinidad focused debates are irrelevant or without cache in Tobago because the oil and gas resources belong to the nation as a whole. As a result, many Tobago-based governments have emphasized the need for more equitable distribution of the revenue and government infrastructure investments and jobs. This more equitable arrangement was part of the TOP's platform during the 2010 national elections. Still, the most poignant environment and development debates that ensue have focused more directly upon industrial development, land tenure and distribution in the more industrialized island of Trinidad. For the sake of representativeness, most of the respondents in my ethnographic interviews were Trinidad-based, although other discussion of the voices that are silenced or missing in these narratives necessarily includes a Tobago perspective.

Given the landslide vote that brought the PP government into office, it is also very likely that they also garnered broad support from major parts of the East-West corridor with its Afro-Saxon, Muslim and Presbyterian middle and upper middle classes who sought to vote for a government that would integrate racial equality, transparency and fairness, and for whom protecting the environment mattered.

The physical or natural environment has become a new locus of political struggle that has shifted from the point of production to that of consumption (Appleyard 2007:144, Castells 1976). In this context, what becomes important for the political contestants is the ability to define meaning-making or sense-making of a particular set of phenomena. Specifically, the ability to define the boundaries of the environmental territory being invaded, attacked or put at risk, and to define the protagonists and antagonists, becomes key to defining both group identity in the context of the particular story, thereby gaining lexical and emotional control over messages, legitimacy and power. Environment therefore becomes a tool in this process when it is conceptualized as a cultural symbol that is intended to represent a particular charismatic leader or social group. It is thereby encoded with temporally and place-specific social meanings. In the case of the 2010 elections, the meaning of the protest phrase "no smelter" experienced a narrative change over the course of the political process. UWI lecturers such as Wayne Kublalsingh, the students, and others who joined with local community folk to oppose the rapid, third phase of the government's down streaming policy represented a risk-based movement for environmental justice, transparency and engagement in government's development policy. It should be noted that, this anti-smelter group itself is not a monolith and also possesses its own fault lines between community folk and boisterous outsiders, between those who are hard liners and against any form of new industrial development at all, and those who seek a more balanced, engaged approach, and also among racial, party and class lines.

The same is true within each of the political parties (and is especially apparent in media reportage on the issue debates and leadership fissures within the PNM, UNC and COP). The COP was in part formed as a break-away faction of the UNC led by former Prime Minister Basdeo Pandy. The COP's leader going into the 2010 election was Winston Dookeran, who was

seen in some circles as a far more popular leadership figure among both progressive and more traditional Indo-Trinidadian voters and Afro-Trnidadians, alike. Kamla Persad-Bissessar won the UNC party's leading position over Ramesh Lawrence Maharaj and former leader Basdeo Panday in the immediate pre-election period.[223] Mr. Panday had become mired in a scandal about accepting large money donations from a local financier and Mr. Maharaj was seen as a polarizing figure who is unpalatable to some portions of the electorate (both Indo and Afro-Trinidadian). Whether or not by coincidence, it was a strategic move for the UNC to have selected Mrs. Bissessar as its leader - the first woman to run for the heretofore, all male, elite post of prime minister. Additionally, because the UNC party leadership was seen as proactive and supportive of the anti-smelter effort, Mrs. Bissessar would likewise assume that mantle in the impending election.

Information Politics

During the period before a national election it has become the norm for each of the leading parties to hire pollsters to help predict how popular or unpopular the government or party is, and to canvass for the critical issues that drive voter opinion. As Ryan (1996, 2001a, 2001b, 2003, 2006) has shown, since 1995, T&T has experienced "deadlock" elections that essentially result in a tie because the leading political parties, the PNM and UNC have been successful at achieving racial polarization of Afro- and Indo-Trinidadians, respectively. This propensity to polarize elections based on race has consequences however, because it narrows the range of

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[223] See "The Changing Political Culture." *The Trinidad Guardian Newspaper*. Accessed January 29, 2013. http://m.guardian.co.tt/columnist/2012-12-16/changing-political-culture. For some media coverage on the political changes currently underway with T&T's major political parties.

discourse that politicians believe to be relevant in the lead up to an election. This was very likely the case in both the 2007 and 2010 national elections based on the responses observed in the WVS regarding both the environment and the development agenda.

Stories in Numbers

World Values Survey responses were analyzed using the R statistical package. Demographic variables such as race, religion, education, and class were compared to ensure that they were defined comparably in both the 2006 and 2010 WVS. These variables were then compared to a series of environmental and development indicator variables and analyzed by employing the summary function in R. These results were then plotted as shown in Figure 3.2 below. Where comparable data are not available for both years for key questions, the single year responses are reported. Assuming that these sample results are representative of the T&T population, the data show that public trust in environmental organizations increased between the two study years, although trust in these and other organizations remains low, overall. Local World Values Survey respondents also expressed low levels of confidence in government, labor unions, major companies, the press and political parties.

Table 3.2 Respondent Confidence in Environmental Organizations WVS 2006 and 2010.

Response Category	Year	
	2006 (in percentage)	2010 (in percentage)
A great deal	10.88	12.41
Quite a lot	29.24	34.53
Not very much	41.32	34.43
None at all	12.57	6.31
Don't know	5.99	12.31
Total	100	100

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Figure 3.2 provides an interesting set of results. In the 2006[224] version of the Survey, respondents were asked to rate the likelihood that Vision 2020, the government's policy to achieve developed nation status by the year 2020 would be achieved. These results were compared to their answers on the question of whether environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs or whether economic growth and the creation of jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent. It is notable that respondents overwhelmingly chose environmental protection over economic growth, even if it resulted in some job loss. Whether or not respondents believed Vision 2020 would be achieved, the respondents consistently selected environmental protection over economic growth.

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[224] The Vision 2020 question was not included on the 2010 WVS questionnaire.

Figure 3.2 Likelihood of Achieving Vision 2020 Goals by Environment versus Economy as the National Priority.

Views on the Likelihood of Achieving Vision 2020
Percent of Respondents by Category Based on WVS 2006

Additionally, the 2006 sample showed that across a wide range of demographics - in particular those that are durable in the complex stratification structures that persist in T&T, respondents expressed a strong preference for environmental protection over economic development as top national priorities. These results are presented in the series of bar charts at Appendix B. Protestants, followed by Hindus and Catholics reported the highest preferences among religious groups, for environmental protection over economic growth. Men tended to favor environment over economic growth in larger numbers than women, and the working class, followed by the lower- and upper-middle classes also prioritized environmental protection over economic growth. Indo-Trinidadian respondents were also more likely to select environment over development in the 2006 WVS. This survey was completed during the year when the ALCOA smelter protests were occurring. The issue received a great deal of media coverage and had already taken on the mantle of partisan politics with the UNC taking the position of opposing ALCOA's project proposal amidst growing public controversy.

Election reforms have been enacted to redress the racial and party deadlock problem via re-districting in key geographies. Still, as observed elsewhere, T&T elections are now determined by the independents and radicals along the East-West corridor - a racially mixed collection of groups. Since 1995 then, race has come to be a key focus in electoral campaigns, however, the polarization that it entails is also frowned upon by many independents. Table 2.4 in Chapter 2 shows the main social habitus communities by political party, except for the PNM, which is identified as the Afro-Trinidadian party with its base in the Garveyite Black Power community and among Afro-Saxons.

The UNC's base is primarily comprised of Indians from Caroni, Chaguanas and the central and south hinterlands that are now themselves becoming urban. Caroni, predominantly a

large green wetland, extends along Trinidad's western coastline from just south of Port of Spain and stops north of the Point Lisas. Caroni was, until very recently, the core of T&T's sugar belt, where laborers brought from India, under the indentureship program, worked the rich, verdant, grasslands and mangrove swampland of the Caroni plain. What remains of the Caroni wetland ecosystem directly abuts the Gulf of Paria, and provides a home for the national bird, the Scarlet Ibis, which gets its red color from its diet of shrimp and swamp-crab. Further inland, the lands that were cultivated for sugar remain under cultivation by small farmers after the PNM's closure of Caroni (1975) Limited, the state-owned sugar company, in the year 2003. Its closure left some 7,965 sugar workers without employment, many of them Indo-Trinidadians whose forebears had arrived to work these lands. The PNM government promised to distribute some seven thousand residential parcels of land and provide other renumeration via pensions and national insurance as a mitigation for the former sugar workers, but this promise never fully materialized. The proposed land distribution for former workers was planned as part of the government's Voluntary Separation of Employment Programme (VSEP). The land distribution efforts became mired in bureaucratic red tape and eventually partisan politics. Although the PNM government had also promised to re-engage Caroni workers in its efforts to promote much needed agricultural sector reform and expansion to better enable the nation to produce its own food, these efforts paled in comparison to their oil and gas industry infrastructure development initiatives.

Instead, an expansion of the Pt. Lisas industrial estate (PLIPDECO) and a new abutting industrial space was proposed for a majority of the Caroni sugar lands - the Point Lisas South and East Industrial Estate. The NEC, the same government corporation charged with clearing the Union Estate to site the Alutrint smelter plant and related facilities, is also responsible for

creating the new and expanded estate at an estimated cost of T&T$550 million. The NEC's efforts to obtain CEC approval for this estate and its related port facilities have become mired in technical complexity.

In the lead up to the 2010 election, the PNM was steadfast in its support for the Alutrint smelter project for reasons explored in Chapters I and II. Not only may their reasons have involved patronage, but they saw it as highly germane to the future success of the nation's ongoing efforts of national and regional economic independence - on the basis of their most recent successes. There were elements of the UNC party who were anti-smelter prior to the election, and had spoken out against it, but it was in the lead up to the 2010 national election that the COP party demanded that the UNC hold fast to the anti-smelter platform as a condition of the COP's participation in the coalition. Despite not winning any seats in 2007, by 2010 the COP had enough of a following to negotiate its position effectively.

Analyzing the Political Rhetorics in the Media

A review of the media messages and texts leading up to the election demonstrates that the messages were simple, most of them derived from the COP, the newer middle class-based, multi-racial party that had formed as an alternative to the fractious, deadlock racial politics of the PNM and UNC. The COP was also decidedly pro-environmental in the sense that they brought to the negotiating table the need for land reform, transparency, and greater control of development efforts that expose Trinbagonians to industrial risks. When the UNC successfully formed a coalition that included the COP and its agenda, the NJAC and its pro Afro-Trinidadian lower class agenda, and the MSJ's labour rights agenda, the symbolic act of creating the People's

Partnership transformed these issues so that they came to signify a single message - pro PP (UNC) and anti-PNM.

The meanings of the lexical signs were therefore transformed to secure the landslide result for the PP. The phrase "no-smelter" then, came to symbolize and to mean PP and implies that there should be some discernible lexical distance between the narratives of the pro- and anti-smelter political speeches or for that matter, that given the PP's coalition manifesto documents, there should be greater congruence or similarity between the lexical content and style of middle-class, pro-environment and pro-labor interview respondents. To explore these hypotheses, I employed DICTION 6.14, the computerized, lexical analysis software that was developed by Roderick P. Hart and his colleagues as part of the Campaign Mapping Project. Version 6.14 is a highly refined tool that has been used by other social scientists, including sociological (Huffaker and Calvert 2005) and political science scholars (Collier 2006; Lim 2008) due to its robust lexical analysis properties (primarily, its comprehensive dictionaries and master variables).

DICTION was originally designed for and continues to be used to evaluate political and campaign speech - though it is not limited to that genre. Additionally, DICTION permitted me to create word dictionaries for variables or scales that were relevant to this research and tailored for the local discursive and cultural contexts pertinent to T&T. Inherent to the lexical analysis process that is foundational to DICTION is a theoretical approach that presumes that the words that speakers choose in their formation of narratives are important to examine and when combined with other social variables can illuminate a great deal about the nature of narratives.[225] In his work, Hart and his collaborators have sought to explain the word choices of various

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[225] See Hart, Roderick P. 2001. "Redeveloping DICTION: Theoretical Considerations". In Mark. D. West, Theory, Method and Practice in Computer Content Analysis.

speakers or in particular texts. In so doing, they have made four assumptions, which I also apply

in this section of the analysis, namely,

1)   people usually have limited ability to monitor individual language decisions
2)   they have no consistent ability to monitor their patterns of language choice
3)   people, nevertheless think that they have considerable control over these choices and the ability to observe them, and
4)   these choices therefore warrant further analysis and are relevant to understanding social phenomena.

According to Hart, the words are not inherently important per se, but are important

because they illuminate information about speakers' feelings or tone and the situational contexts

for their narratives. Words are therefore shaped by cultural experiences and reflect these

experiences in speech or text narratives (Hart 2001: 44). The environmental understandings and

beliefs of pro-and anti-smelter proponents and a group of nineteen interviewee texts (together 71

texts) were first evaluated by narrative assessments of the ethnographic information from

interview respondents and also from an accompanying set of media based texts on environment,

development, the state of the nation and the state of the environment. Quantitative results from

DICTION were then computed, analyzed and plotted using the R package for statistical analysis.

Computation included descriptive statistics, standardization of sample statistics to enable

comparisons, and Pearson's chi-square tests. I used the following analytical framework (Table

3.3) to guide my choice of applicable variables in DICTION to evaluate my research questions. I

also used this framework and other empirical literature that has employed DICTION to inform

creation of my own variable scales for analysis.

Table 3.3 Conceptual Model for Narrative Analysis

Master Variables	Narrative Questions
Temporality (Historicity)	-What is the temporality or understanding of time and time frames implied by the narrative? *(Adichie 2009, Cronon 1992, Somers 1992)*

Power	-Declensionist or progressive plot? *(Cronon 1992)*
	-Do they show or imply sites of or outcomes of prior contests? *(Tilly 1998)*
	-Where are the silences? *(Zerubavel 2006, Ho 2000, bell hooks 1989, Hill-Collins 1991, Gocek 1994)*
	-Does it tell someone else's story and subordinate that group in the process *(Adichie 2009)*
	-By whom is the environment constructed? *(Bourdieu 1984, Somers 1992, Steinmetz 2011)*
	   · Frames (*Goffman* 1974)
	   · Boundaries (*Small, Harding & Lamont* 2010)
	   · Repertoires (tool kits) (*Swidler* 1986)
	-Why is it being created? *(Tilly 1998)*
	   • Intent
	   • Motivation
	-How is it used in transformation*? (Mohr 1998)*
	-What symbolic and material property/capital is created or reallocated? *(Swartz 2008)*
	-Are there a multiplicity of voices and stories*?(Adichie 2009)*
	-Is there a balance of stories? *(Achebe 2000)*
	-Are the narratives representative?
	- Do the actors insist on a single story?
	   • Singularity
	   • Negativity
	   • Stereotypical- flattening of lived experience?
	   • Incomplete stories?
	-How did the Election of the PP preserve or change existing structures? (
	-Who are the dominant story tellers vis a vis the 12 *habitus* categories?
	-Where are they socially located?

Conflict/ Contentiousness	-Are representations of nature and the environment used to legitimize or question institutional policies and development plans (Dekker, Linnros, 2001)
	- Why is the narrative being created? (Tilly 1998)
	
	   • Purpose for creating the narrative
	   • Contents of narrative
	   • Characteristics of the creators
	   • Conditions in which the narratives are being formulated
	   • Political contention
	   • Mutual claims making that bears significantly on the parties' interest
	   • Does the narrative make mutual and contradictory claims? If yes, it is contentious.
	   • Do the narratives activate visceral emotions?
	   • Operates within limits of historically formed conventions
	-What are the counter narratives?

Place Specificity/ Historicity	-Where is the location or effect of the conflict? *(Merchant 2003, Massy 2004, Harvey 1996)* - How is environment constructed ? *(Bourdieu 1984, Somers 1992, Steinmetz 2011)* -How is the given narrative linked to other social issues/structures/history, if at all? *(Somers 1992)*
Risk	-Does the given narrative show or imply sites or outcomes of prior contests? *(Beck 2006)*

DICTION's narrative analysis program when applied to a text provides scores for five master variables - certainty (Ober, Zhao, Davis, & Alexander 1999), optimism (Barber 1992), the measurement of meaning (Ansoff 1987), realism (Dewey 1954) and commonality (Etzioni 1993). The program also permits the user to run text analysis using customized word dictionaries relevant to the researcher's subject matter. It is also designed to perform word counts in the analyzed texts based on theory derived from social science research on linguistics, narrative assessment and content analysis. DICTION provides a group of calculated variables, including insistence, variety, which is a ratio of the number of different words in a given text over the total

words, embellishment - the ratio of adjectives to verbs (Boder 1940), and complexity - the

average number of characters per word in a given text.

In my review of this research and development of a hybrid model that applies

DICTION's master variables to my work, I created a set of new variables relevant to the central

questions of this research and based upon the conceptual model at Table 3.4.

Table 3.4 Lexical analysis variables by definition and source.

Variable	Definition/Source
Commonality	DICTION 6.14
Insistence	DICTION 6.14
Optimism	DICTION 6.14
Realism	DICTION 6.14
Urgency	Calculated ratio of the time and spatial terms dictionaries in DICTION 6.14
Hortatory Style	[patriotic terms+religious terms+voter references+certainty+embellishment]
Partisan Style	[leader references+politics] -[optimism+commonality]
Environment	Custom dictionary derived from ethnographic interviews
Development	Custom dictionary derived from ethnographic interviews
Patriotic Terms	Custom dictionary derived from ethnographic interviews
Voter References	Custom dictionary derived from ethnographic interviews
Religious Terms	Custom dictionary derived from ethnographic interviews
Politics	Custom dictionary derived from ethnographic interviews
Contentious Speech	[tenacity+insistence+numerical terms]
Self reference	DICTION 6.14

Analysis of Pro- and Anti-Smelter Interview Participants using DICTION

DICTION is a dictionary-based language analysis program that analyzes the characteristics and implied meaning of a text by searching it with the assistance of 40 dictionaries (Given 2008). DICTION allows for consistency in the rhetorical examination of text by subjecting the narratives of the different group of actors to the rigor of a set of computerized search routines. Other computer-based analysis software is available, it is specifically designed to evaluate political tone in language based on its large database (n=30,000) of texts that were previously analyzed (Hart and Lind 2010:357). The program consists of 40 separate and unique (largely independent) word dictionaries that amount to some 10,000 words. It is therefore fairly robust and produces the generic language norms for 35 sub-genre (Hart and Lind 2010: 357). The fifteen variables employed in this analysis include 1) commonality, 2) insistence, 3) optimism, and 4) realism which are derived directly from DICTION. The remaining variables were either created from a tailored arrangement of select DICTION sub-scales based upon their previous use in the relevant empirical literature, from data dictionaries designed exclusively for this work, or a combination of the two.

Variables of Interest

The urgency (time/space ratio - Hart and Lim 2004), hortatory style and partisan style variables were derived following Hart and Lind's formulation (2010:359). The urgency variable was designed as a proxy variable for place specificity. As Hart and Lim (2004) have demonstrated, high time to space ratios tend to be associated with a speaker's "disinclination to be grounded" - that is, a disassociation to place (see Hart and Lind 2010:359). The voter reference, and religious

and patriotic terms dictionaries were also guided by Hart and Lind's derivations (2010:358) but include terms that are appropriate to the local T&T context. One limitation with the key word dictionaries tailored to T&T is that they tend to be much smaller in size than that of the DICTION databases. This problem is largely addressed in the standardization process however, these questions warrant further refinement and analysis in subsequent research. The bivariate correlations among all variables, original and constructed were very small - (ranging between .1 and -.004). The partisan style variable measures the extent to which a speaker emphasizes political actors and parties and places less emphasis on universalist or uplifting visions of a given matter. I therefore constructed this scale on with a complete list of the key political actors and parties relevant to the 2010 national election in T&T. Hortatory style is defined by Hart and Lind (2010:358) as the propensity to emphasize core beliefs of politics, religion or community in a manner that is assured and dramatic (Id.). Theory, as well as the nature of the contention being examined (that the PP government coalition represented a new development agenda, compared to that of the PNM) would suggest that the pair-wise comparison on each of the key variable scales such as Environment, Development, should yield a significant and divergent relationship.

In order to execute this approach, I conducted hypothesis testing for each of the competing groups, by variable type, employing Welches' two-sample t-test at the 90% significance level. Table 3.5 summarizes my hypotheses for each group by variable of interest. These hypotheses are informed by the political claims that each of the groups made about their positions and motives, and how they were understood and characterized in political debates. For instance, the anti-smelter lobby, based their claims on patriotism, the desire to protect the country from unnecessary environmental and health risk and the need for transparent and fair government compared to the incumbent PNM party and its corruption. Likewise, the PNM

claimed that their efforts to 'run the third leg of the development by down streaming relay' were in the best long term interests of the nation. I therefore hypothesize that both the pro- and anti-smelter groups would score high on the patriotism variable. Hypotheses for these key variables were informed by theory but also the rhetorical and narrative claims being made by the contending political parties and the media during the election period. For instance, based on statements made by the candidates and the media, one would expect the anti-smelter groups and political party alliance to speak about both environment and development in very divergent ways from that of the incumbent government and pro-smelter supporters.

Table 3.5 Hypothesized pair-wise comparisons between pro and anti smelter proponents' narratives by variable of interest.

No.	Variable	Hypothesized Relationship between Pro- and Anti-smelter Proponents
1	Contentiousness	Similar
2	Voter reference	Similar
3	Declination	Divergent
4	Insistence	Similar
5	Development	Divergent (high for pro-, low for anti)
6	Environment	Divergent (high for pro-, low for anti)
7	Commonality	Divergent (high for anti-, low for pro)
8	Partisan Style	Divergent (high for pro-, low for anti)
9	Hortatory Style	Divergent (high for anti-, low for pro)
10	Optimism	Divergent
11	Patriotic	Similar (with higher scores for anti-smelter groups)
12	Realism	Divergent (high for anti-, low for pro)
13	Religious terms	Divergent (high for pro-, low for anti)
14	Urgency	Divergent (high for pro-, low for anti)
15	Politics	Similar (high for both groups)

Results

An initial review of the results of running the anti- and pro-smelter texts thorough

DICTION using its standard default setting shows that their rhetorical characteristics are very

similar, in that the shape of the distributions resulting from the analysis of both groups is largely

the same. The chart in Figure 3.3 provides a comparison of 40 characteristics of interview and mass media text narratives grouped by their position on the smelter issue. For each group, the highest absolute values of the weighted median scores are for DICTION's familiarity scale, which measures use of the most common words in the English language including prepositions and demonstrative and interrogative pronouns. This result is not surprising given the narrative context of political debate that applies to this case (C.K. Ogden 1968). The anti-smelter speakers demonstrated higher absolute values of familiarity compared to smelter advocates. Both groups also demonstrated high scores on all of DICTION's master variables - commonality (language that highlights agreed upon values), realism (language describing tangible and immediate matters - such as an election), certainty (resoluteness and inflexibility word choices that is expected of contentious speech), activity (words that suggest movement or change), and optimism (endorsement word choices - expected in political narratives).

Apart from the expected higher scores on the master variables, what is notable in this basic comparison are the high median scores on the insistence and tenacity scales. The pro-smelter advocates' narratives resulted in the highest insistence values demonstrating a tendency for word choices that suggest a preference for a limited, ordered world (Hart 2001). It is not surprising that the insistence variable is significantly higher for the pro-smelter group given its habitus community composition. That is, their narratives involved use of repeated words, indicating a "preference for a limited, ordered world" (Short and Palmer 2007:733). Pro-smelter respondents comprised the local technical elites who manage the oil and gas sector, many of them are engineers, geologists, or business professionals who are engaged in the sector internationally and have traditionally had strong ties to the PNM government. The DICTION scores capture the characteristics of this group fairly well. For instance, their use of language

signifies a focus on accomplishment, and is far higher than that of the anti-smelter group. Likewise, their propensity to use numerical and spatial terms is slightly greater than those who were against construction of the smelters. This latter group is relatively more heterogeneous in its composition, based upon observation and information gathered in a series of ethnographic interviews.

Tenacity measures the speakers' use of verbs that indicate totality and confidence. That both group's exhibit higher scores on these scales is consistent with the nature of contentious political speech. DICTION suggest that the anti-smelter lobby's narratives reflected higher degrees of power, based upon their significantly higher certainty and optimism scores. The pro-smelter group's relatively lower realism scores may be indicative of their higher average class status and their divergent values although viewed as a relatively homogenous group, when compared to anti-smelter activists. Not surprisingly, activity scores were high for both groups but higher for anti-smelter respondents. That both sets of narratives were contentious and imbued with power is clear. Figure 3.3 provides a graphical overview of the two groups' results on all of the DICTION software generated variables - anti-smelter respondents are represented in blue, pro-smelter respondents in red. This version of the analysis was derived by running the all cases or default norm for the relevant dictionaries.

Figure 3.3 Comparison of Pro- & Anti-Smelter Interviewees & Narratives Using DICTION 6.14

Median DICTION Score for Selected Scales

T-test results are presented in Table 3.6 for the fifteen variables of interest that were analyzed

based upon the narrative framework described in Table 3.3. Subsequent analyses were refined by

applying the public policy speeches norm and dictionaries within DICTION 6.14 to the narrative

texts.

**Table 3.6** T-test results for fifteen variables of interest.

Scale Label	p.value	sig	t	df	lwr	upr	alpha	group mean Anti-Smelter	group mean Pro-Smelter
Contentious Speech	0.34		-0.98	21	-312.99	112.37	0.05	251.28	351.60
Urgency	0.89		0.14	26	-0.57	0.66	0.05	1.05	1.01
Declination	0.28		1.11	18	-1.44	4.69	0.05	10.90	9.27
Insistence	0.35		-0.95	21	-310.37	116.2	0.05	216.62	313.71
Development	0.8		-0.26	14	-16.46	12.92	0.05	32.69	34.46
Environment	0.25		-1.2	21	-6.7	1.81	0.05	19.79	22.24
Politics	0.65		-0.46	23	-3.45	2.18	0.05	4.47	5.10
Realism	0.89		-0.14	24	-2.12	1.86	0.05	46.07	46.20
Optimism	0.72		-0.36	19	-1.38	0.98	0.05	49.05	49.25
Commonality	0.37		-0.92	16	-1.95	0.77	0.05	49.98	50.57
Religious terms	0.34		0.98	24	-0.07	0.21	0.05	0.11	0.05
Partisan Style	0.48		0.73	21	-1.99	4.13	0.05	-95.89	-96.96
Hortatory Style	0.24		-1.22	17	-17.12	4.56	0.05	117.03	123.31
Patriotic Terms	0.42		-0.83	20	-11.13	4.8	0.05	60.10	63.27
Voter references	0.04	*	2.12	26	0.02	1.11	0.05	0.78	0.21

*indicates a somewhat significant result

Points of Similarity & Divergence

The weighted mean values of pro- and anti-smelter proponents are compared for each variable of interest. The t-test compares the difference between the two groups' average scores to determine whether that difference is significantly different from zero. The null hypothesis is that there is no significant difference between the two groups' average scores and the alternate hypothesis is that a significant difference exists. Almost all fifteen variables of interest evaluated in the analysis of the pro-smelter and anti-smelter groups show no significant differences in their standardized mean values, except for voter references, which is only significant on the margin. That the two groups are similar in their degree of contentiousness, insistence and patriotism are congruent with the political nature of their narratives, denoting the conflict, strong positions, and appeals to the public's sense of what is ultimately best for the nation. The significant difference in voter references is unusual in this context as one would have expected this variable - comprised of word references to the electorate, to have been equally high for both groups. An evaluation of the box plot (Figure 3.4) for this variable demonstrates the minor significant differences between the two groups. The skewness created by the two outlier points (represented by the small dots) in the anti-smelter group would likely have influenced the average score for that group.

Figure 3.4 Box Plot for Voter References


Voter references

Voter Reference, Environment & Development

The overall similarity of results between the two groups is especially relevant to the

environment and development questions because the rhetorics espoused by both sides, and

especially the PP coalition proponents, were rhetorics of difference. The differences should then

be very significant (thereby rejecting of the null hypothesis) if these rhetorics hold true.

According to the results here, the lexical characteristics of the two groups are quite similar on

average for both environment and development. The box plots for the environment variable

below (Figure 3.5), provide a summary of how the anti and pro-smelter contestants compared to

each on their rhetorical features and word choices. Although the general tendencies do not differ

significantly, as one would expect, the anti-smelter narratives exhibited a greater range of environmental word usage suggesting greater heterogeneity in how they defined environment, and the bulk of the distribution sways to the right or top.

Figure 3.5 Box Plot for Environment

The distribution of environmental terms for pro-smelter advocates is comparatively narrower in range indicating greater homogeneity or agreement on environmental terms. The two groups are the opposite on development narratives, with the smelter supporters demonstrating a

wider ranging distribution of development word usage and thus greater heterogeneity in their

understandings of what development means. See Figure 3.6. This is an interesting result when

examined in the context in the narrowing and flattening narratives that the groups employed to

describe the other's agendas. For instance, the dominant narrative of anti-smelter groups was

simply that smelters were bad for T&T under any conditions and this narrative was extended to

any form of large industrial development proposed. The effect of this flattening of the narrative

range has had a lasting effect on local politics in the post election period to the point that the

government is wary about entertaining or moving forward with any new industrial projects at all.

The comparatively taller box and whisper plot of the anti-smelter group on environment and the

pro-smelter group on development are indicative of their differing opinions on these two

variables. The longer top whiskers on both the environment and development variables for the

anti-smelter group also suggests a great deal of within group positive variation in the upper

quartiles.

Figure 3.6 Box Plot for Development

Development

Lexical Style – Contention and Negativity

In terms of the tone and style of these narratives, both groups exhibited high degrees of contentiousness - though the anti-smelter group was less so, even accounting for the three outliers. Shown in Figure 3.7. Both groups of narratives were fairly negative in tone, demonstrating a high absolute degree of within group agreement on the nature of the declension in their word use based upon the narrow range of the two distributions.

Figure 3.7 Box Plot for Contentious Speech

Contentious Speech

Figure 3.8 Box Plot for Declination


Declination

Urgency & Place Specificity

Each group surprisingly demonstrated relatively low degrees of urgency, indicating a propensity for place-based speech. This result is unusual when compared to Hart and Lind's (2010) empirical findings for the US that political speech has become increasingly urgent and less place based. This result may be explained by the nature of the political debate which involves environmental problems which are either in fact or symbolically coded to a particular geography or set of geographies. In the instant case, the anti-smelter debate is associated with the Union Industrial Estate and LaBrea, very particular local geographies. The development debate is also associated with particular sets of geographies, including the south, Pt. Lisas, Caroni, and

the places where there are contests over how land should be used, how land, access and use

rights, the revenue should be distributed among T&T citizens, who should benefit both in terms

of access to jobs and profits from new industrial development, and when and how should T&T's

remaining reserves of oil and natural gas be used? Is there an obligation to leave reserves for

future generations of Trinbagonians?

Figure 3.9 Box Plot for Urgency

The hortatory styles, among both sets of actors exhibited a great deal of variety on their degree of embellishment, use of patriotic language, references to voters, the degree of certainty expressed and religious statements. Pro-and anti-smelter speakers showed a greater degree of heterogeneity on the positive or higher end of the respective distributions.

Figure 3.10 Box Plot for Hortatory Style

The within group partisan styles also varied, with anti-smelter advocates exhibiting a much

broader range, likely due to the fact that they represented a coalition of different political parties,

issue, and habitus communities. Relative to the point spread for the hortatory style, both groups

of narratives were more highly partisan, focused on political parties and figures, than patriotic or

focused on core beliefs and the national community in an assured way (Hart and Lind 2010:

359).

Figure 3.11 Box Plot for Partisan Style

Political Change Is Not Regime Change – Governance Challenges of the Post-Election Period

When the lexical data analysis is placed into the context of the WVS analysis results, the details of the narratives that are briefly illustrated above, and the discussion on T&T's status with regard to its rentier state propensities in the contemporary era, an interesting complementary analysis of passive environmental revolution becomes more tangible. Unlike many other late developers that rely upon point source, natural resource extraction and prioritize development and economic growth over environmental protection, thereby seeing the latter as a necessary cost of progress, T&T citizens made a different choice during the national election in 2010. The case for silent revolution is borne out in the T&T instance, as voices from below, local community groups, academics, and grassroots activists joined voices to send a resounding "no-smelter" message to those in government. The people resoundingly ousted the PNM administration, which, in response to the rising degree of challenges to its spending, development and environmental policies, called an election two and a half years earlier than was necessary. These grassroots voices from below and their message calling for a new path forward, one focused, as Attillah Springer stated, on the quality of life and not merely low paying jobs. As another respondent to my confidential interviews put it, these voices are calling for the "environmental and ecological deficit" that has accumulated to be redressed.[226] The new environmental movements are not only about deficits and risk, however, but about belonging and connectedness to place; creating a new place. As this same speaker pointed out T&T has not prioritized the creation of or restoration of very many new parks or forest preserves since the pre-colonial era,

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[226] Confidential interview with author, January 20, 2012.

with very few exceptions (such as the classification of the Nariva swamp as a Ramsar site, which is significant). He opines,

> "This is a place where you don't have, well, recreational facilities, particularly for the mass of the population. You here are fortunate to have this Queen's Park Savannah. But what have we done with this Queen's Park Savannah? How has that changed over the years? We are mutilating it all the time. The same is true of Skinner Park in San Fernando. And beyond that, what new space have we created? Could anybody imagine that -- I say Queen's Park Savannah was once forested. But I am certain -- and this is where, I suppose, in politics and in political power you'd simply be regarded as mad, because if I were in the -- if I had the authority to do it, I would explain to people why I'm creating -- recreating an original forest. But I wouldn't expect many people to understand."

That the preexisting political and social structure, mediated by complex race relations enabled the challenges from the grassroots to be coopted in the electoral process is salient to the party that wins the governance apparatus, yet the underlying passive revolution seems to have begun and is still underway. Here it is important to distinguish the political party from the regime. In the T&T case, the regime is the governance structure that enables the rentier state, low levels of public voice, weak environmental institutions, low levels of accountability and transparency in government decision making, and the like. As the CEPEP discussion in Chapter I demonstrates, this governance regime and the corruption it engenders appears to be fairly persistent despite which dominant party is in power. Therefore, it is not surprising that the DICTION analytical results show that they differed very little from the incumbent PNM on the substantive issues on which these debates turned, that is environment and development. Though environmental capital was formed and deployed by the winning political coalition, who coopted the anti-smelter issue to garner the requisite electoral seats, the WVS results reported in Appendix B, illustrate that public sentiment has shifted, with representative samples of Trinbagonians in 2006 and 2010, across race, religion, gender and class (with few exceptions),

choosing environmental protection, fewer jobs and slower economic growth over rapid economic development, even if it means slower job growth. Baptise and Nordenstam's (2010) analysis of the environmental attitudes of Trinidadians in rural, wetland areas provides a consistent result. That is, rural Trinbagonians who live and work in these areas impacted by the nation's oil and gas sector, show concern for appropriate environmental protections in these areas. That the politicians and governments, committed as most rentier, and risk based states are to the suppression of information, cannot see or fully comprehend the meaning of the shifts that are occurring does not negate that they exist. If anything, their inability to fully perceive the problem outside of the worldview of the rentier apparatus may well be the source of their governance problems and may explain why new challenges from below continue despite a change in the party/ies that currently administer government. As one political pundit, Sunity Maharaj of the Lloyd Best Institute aptly opines,

> "How ironic that at the centre of the politics, there was no politics, if we are to take politics to mean something more than horse-trading. As flawed as it was, however, no one with an interest in this country could deny the sense of relief at having stopped the Manning bullet train. But it was clearly not going to be enough.
> The transformation of what Best called "a pick-up-side" into a coherent political force was quickly aborted; the prime minister's cabinet took precedence over the political leadership of the alliance and with that one act, killed the possibility of graduating from bribery to something approximating representative politics with a reasonable prospect of tackling the core problems of the nation. Having dismissed the partnership and failed to institute a mechanism for rational policy-making based on shared and declared principles, the Persad-Bissessar administration has had no choice now but to govern by extempo."[227]

It is unclear that the disconnect between rhetoric aimed at winning the political battle and the underlying need for social forms have been meaningfully identified or addressed. Instead, the

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[227] "State of Emergency: Sunity Maharaj Breaks the TT Media Silence." *Blogosphere*. Accessed January 29, 2013. http://gerardbest.wordpress.com/2011/09/20/state-of-emergency-sunity-maharaj-breaks-the-tt-media-silence/.

same issues persist and have become the source of more discontent in the post 2010 election period as a charismatic leader of the anti-smelter movement, Wayne Kublalsingh hunger strikes against the government over a highway expansion project – infrastructure that will serve the O&G industry and will likely displace villagers. As mentioned before, a coalition party, the MSJ left the PP in May of 2012, and new scandals have cropped up with the PP government, most notably, the state of emergency, that many Trinbagonians was called without the proper requirements being met, and the Section 34 matter.[228] That is, the underlying national questions of how to develop in a manner that is responsive to new calls for transparency, accountable government, voice, awareness of environmental risk and more balanced development approach are not well understood or integrated in current governance structures and institutions, nor expressed as the de facto modus operandi of the new government whose coalition is itself at risk. Nor does the PNM opposition seem to have come to terms with the need for a new path forward, based upon media reportage. Therefore, both the winning political coalition (as well as the losing faction - the PNM) continue to struggle to redefine environment and development in the post silent revolution world where they must revisit how best to manufacture citizenship (true independence – though independence still implies a prior subordinate relationship to someone or something else), autonomy, an organic sense of place and development on their own terms - a post independence, post risk society.

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[228] For the Prime Minister's speech on the Section 34 issue, see http://www.news.gov.tt/index.php?news=11724. Accessed January 2013. "'Section 34' Brings a Halt to Piarco Enquiry." *Trinidad Express Newspaper*. Accessed January 29, 2013. http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/_Section_34__brings_a_halt_to_Piarco_enquiry-177052171.html. "Section 34 Flawed —Law Association." *The Trinidad Guardian Newspaper*. Accessed January 29, 2013. http://guardian.co.tt/news/2012-09-17/section-34-flawed-%E2%80%94law-association.

Relevance of the Findings to Theory

Contributions to the Literature

This work contributes to building the theoretical and empirical foundations of what remains a very limited literature on environmental sociology in the Caribbean, especially the Anglophone Caribbean, the literature on the ecological history of the Caribbean region, connecting the pre-, immediate post-colonial and more contemporary eras. In this dissertation I develop the concept of environmental capital as a place specific, temporally specific category that is derived from both individual and group experiences with nature and environmental claims. Represents a nascent body of work that attempts to apply Bourdieu's habitus, field and capital, together, as they were intended to be employed, to understand how and when nature and environment are cultural categories (both shaped by and shaping culture) and specifically, how definitions of environment can vary among competing groups in complex cultural milieu or in political contests. Environment is shown to be a cultural category in conditions of social conflict, and is mediated by the habitus, and power relations among various actors. The work also develops a typology of local T&T environmentalisms and links these to locally relevant social groups. Exploration of representative narratives from a selection of these social groupings or habitus categories, demonstrates that social phenomena help define how groups or individuals comes to understand the environment along a continuum of more instrumental to more relational environmentalisms.

The study findings also support arguments that demonstrate the validity of rentier state theory when applied to oil and gas-rich, or other point-source resource extractive late developing economies. It therefore supports the empirical findings of Beblawi and Luciani (1987) Auty

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(2007), Smith (2004), Abidin (2001) on the low growth trap, and others. It also supports the growing body of empirical work in development sociology that emphasize place specificity and temporality, along with other more traditional variables such as the impact of global natural resource commodity prices. While these macro-economic explanations do matter, studies that are more culturally embedded shed greater light on nuances that are not well operationalized in some of these macroeconomic models. For instance, studies that demonstrate that Trinidad and Tobago is less likely affected by the natural resource curse based upon macro level indicators of democracy and voice, such as whether or not democratic elections continued to occur, fail to capture issues associated with the quality of democracy, institutions and citizenship. The research results also support and demonstrate the value that can be derived from more contingent approaches to defining master narratives such as environment and development.

The findings by Cable, Shriver and Mix (2008) about the intervention of the state in risk societies to limit access and creation of information and thereby, the range of environmental discourse, also appears to be supported by the T&T case study, as described in Chapter I where the regulatory context for environmental protection and review were discussed. The fragmentation of the environmental review process, the limited autonomy, authority and availability of effective regulatory tools available to the EMA, and the preservation of systems of private information ownership of environmental information are fitting examples of what these authors describe as characteristic of risk societies. Additionally, the work demonstrates that even if it comes about for unintended reasons, on the part of the state, it is possible for environment to trump development in late developing, or Third World nations.

Limitations of the Study & a Research Agenda

My effort here is limited as a case study, the intent being to better understand, define and operationalize variables that are common place in both social and scientific theorizing but not always well understood in terms of how meanings may change in particular contexts. As it is an early foray and necessarily exploratory, further refinements to the work, with a larger, more representative sample size would be useful for refinements of the narrative-based environmental typologies that are at play in contemporary T&T. Narrative work is by its nature, not directed at assessing the relative importance of any one set of explanations for given phenomena compared to others. That is, it cannot assess whether or not global financial market performance and the depressed or bust-period economy are more important drivers of local social unrest and challenges than the public's changing perception of risk. What it can help us to better understand is the nature of how locals come to make sense of the conditions that inhere based upon where they are socially located and their experience. The power of narrative method, through its inherent relationality is to link those individual experience to social and political structures. It is therefore a powerful tool for properly defining variables and the conditions and mechanisms with which they operate. The study is also limited by its singular focus on T&T. Future comparative work that explores these questions in other natural resource based economies would be apropos for determining whether or not Trinidad and Tobago's experience was simply anomalous. Lastly, trend based analysis of the environment and development narratives of key party leaders over time would be useful for shedding light on how government leadership changes their views on these issues over time.

CHAPTER IV:

Conclusion

When Noble Struggles Collide

When the multiplicity of stories and plots are considered from varied vantage points, it becomes clear that many of the struggles over environment and development are in fact quite noble, the rentier arrangements aside. What is also clear is that the state matters critically in balancing these competing interests in charting the course/trajectory for development and is less capable to do so if it becomes increasingly embroiled in rentier dealings and cannot keep credible commitments to the interests competing for rent in exchange for political patronage. This includes the state's relationship to external capital and national trading partners. In Trinidad & Tobago, the post-colonial state sought to position itself for advancement in the neoliberal, globalizing economy. As Zhao (1994) has demonstrated, the relevant question for late developers is less so whether or not they are subject to the natural resource curse or Nigerian or Dutch Diseases, or even whether or not their governments are rentier states incapable of effective governance. In fact, the state does possess sufficient autonomy to act despite the imperatives of global capital and their most critical role then, becomes its ability to "lead its national society to controlled participation in global markets." To do so effectively, implies that the state is committed to creating a more complete citizenship in which its peoples have access and voice in decision-making, not simply via a democratic voting apparatus but via the maintenance of

strong, semi-autonomous and effective institutions. It must also maintain balance in order to be credible in keeping the commitments it invariably will make in the political processes of patronage. In the case of T&T, it must also be recognized that the creation of effective, modern institutions has become critical to not just environmental protection but development itself. It is ironic that it is perhaps only environmental reform and regulations that are clear and transparent that will signal to the world that T&T is indeed serious and truly open for business - however that gets defined in the future.

In T&T there are two pedagogical mismatches that emerge from the narratives of the pro- and anti-smelter (modernist versus risk focused development) groups that comprise this study. The post colonial Trinidad and Tobago state, dominated by the PNM and UNC with their racialized focus and rhetorics, has to date ensured its legitimacy by preying on the class and racial conflicts in the society. Meanwhile the governments, whether pro Indian or Pro Black/African have embraced a modernist development agenda, one that relies upon the belief that uneven development and environmental despoliation are necessary byproducts of participating (successfully) in global markets to achieve progress and the agenda of economic nationalism. Party politics in T&T continues therefore, to be based on narratives about racial and class inequality, which remain relevant but in this historical moment are perhaps secondary to the heightened awareness of and growing, often grassroots and middle-class movements focused on what Beck terms, risk inequality. That risk inequality is distributed unequally based upon preexisting structures of social inequality is no surprise, however, and so it becomes easy to confound racial or class inequality with what are essentially risk movements. Race and class are the focus when the key issues are risk inequality and environmental justice.

The proponents of the new risk movements, likewise, are opposed to modernist views of development and its spoils and oppose the global (even if not the local) modes of production that expose the nation to greater financial and ecological risk. They oppose the status quo but there is a vacuum of viable alternatives, especially, given that most middle class Trinidadians have adapted to lifestyles supported by the rentier economy's boom periods.

With regard to both points above, temporality matters in that increased awareness of risk inequality sets up arrangements where those habitus communities who do not typically speak to or interact with each other in the society are faced with the need to dialogue on these important issues. Sachs' (DATE) description of development today, as having delusion, disappointment, failures and crime as steady companions, and telling the common story that it did not work, seems appropriate for T&T today. This is likely more the view of the COP proponents and some factions of the UNC than for the PNM; it may be there in the PNM but very suppressed by internal party discipline. Like Sachs, I argue that for T&T, the historical conditions that have made development prominent as an idea have diminished, modernist development is outdated as a concept, and the hopes and desires that made it acceptable are now exhausted, development is thus, obsolete (Sachs , p.1). In T&T, perhaps for part of the power elite, the still nascent grassroots movements, and a growing segment of the populace, environmentalism and the language of environmentalism (environmental narratives or stories) have become the vessel for containing and carrying forward the mounting doubt and uneasiness that is widely felt.

Where Do We Go From Here?

Invoking a Post-Racial, Post-Colonial Society

Traditional modernist, and PNM and UNC party notions that development may be unjust but it is justified by its ability to "liberate" Trinbagonians as a nation from (that part of) their colonial roots from which they want to distinguish themselves as "good enough or even better", "more English than the English", "better scientists than those of the global North", (a Trinidadian exceptionalism) have begun to lose their social cache in light of growing awareness of globalized and local economic and environmental risks. Development as a means of healing the wounds of a historical assault and insult is no longer appropriate under these conditions and a new approach will be necessary to regain the social license that has been lost for the approval of new industrial mega projects in the oil and gas sector. Therein lies the greatest dilemma, because social issues are often not perceived as business investment or environmental permitting issues, yet it has become the critical component for moving forward with any form of new development in T&T. Likewise, the central task at hand for government in T&T is to shift from its focus on rentier-state based, business-as-usual, economic nationalism to something else, something more ecologically focused and inclusive, an approach that is sufficiently responsive to the growing perceptions of risk injustice based upon forms of democratic social engagement, and that imagine a multiplicity of perspectives and stories.

APPENDIX A: Comparison of WVS 2006 and 2010 Sample Distributions

Figure A.1 Probability Density Plot Comparison of WVS Sample Distributions by Respondent Age

A kernel density plot and QQ plot were created to evaluate the skew between the two age distributions. A t-test and a non-parametric (Mann-Whitney) test was performed for a difference in central location between the two distributions.

	mean	sd
2006	42.61477	17.32712
2010	45.86874	17.79353

Although the absolute values of both means and standard deviations are close, they are nevertheless statistically different, however, it should be noted that the density plots are not symmetrically distributed. More robust measures such as the trimmed mean or median and MAD depict the disparity between the age distributions of the two WVS population samples. The

means of the two age distributions are only three years apart while the median values are more

divergent. Due to the skewness in the distributions (especially in the 2006 sample), the mean is

not as robust a measure of central tendency as is the median. In terms of variation, also, the

standard deviations approximate each other but the median absolute deviation (MAD) represents

a more robust measure of variability and accordingly exhibits a larger difference than the

standard deviation.

Table A.1 Central Tendency Comparison of WVS 2006 and 2010 Sample Statistics

year	n	mean	sd	median	trim-med	mad	min	max	range	skew	kurtosis	se
2006	1002	42.61	17.32	40	41.46	20.7564	18	90	72	0.466238709	-0.70	0.54
2010	998	45.86	17.79	45	45.21	22.2239	18	94	76	0.248011571	-0.93	0.56

Based on this limited review, I conclude that the age distributions between the WVS 2006 and

2010 samples are likely to be incongruent. They are statistically different in age composition and

this difference may well explain the observed change in the expected pair-wise correlation

between class and religion. See also the age histograms for both WVS survey years included in

Figure 03.

**Figure A.2** QQ-Plot for WVS Age Distributions between 2006 and 2010

QQ-Plot for WVS Age Distributions between 2006 and 2010

Figure A.3 Age Histograms of the 2006 and 2010 WVS

2006

2010

APPENDIX B: WVS 2006 and 2010 Respondent Choice on Development versus Environment by Major Demographic Variables

Figure B.1 Percent of Respondents by Ethnic Group based on WVS 2006

Figure B.2 Percent of Respondents by Religious Affiliation Based on WVS 2006


Percent of Respondents by Religious Affiliation Based on WVS 2006

**Figure B.3** Percent of Respondents by Social Class Grouping Based on WVS 2006

Percent of Respondents by Social Class Grouping Based on WVS 2006

Figure B.4 Percent of Respondents by Racial Self-Identification Based on WVS 2010


Percent of Respondents by Racial Self-Identification Based on WVS 2010

Figure B.5 Percent of Respondents by Gender Based on WVS 2006

Percent of Respondents by Gender Based on WVS 2006

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