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    <title>Why Share in Peer-to-Peer Networks?</title>
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    <description>Title: Why Share in Peer-to-Peer Networks?
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Jian, Lian; MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K.
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Prior theory and empirical work emphasize the enormous free-riding problem facing peer-to-peer (P2P) sharing networks.  Nonetheless, many P2P networks thrive.  We explore two possible explanations that do not rely on altruism or explicit mechanisms imposed on the network: direct and indirect private incentives for the provision of public goods.  The direct incentive is a traffic redistribution effect that advantages the sharing peer.  We din this incentive is likely insufficient to motivate equilibrium content sharing in large networks.  We then approach P2P networks as a graph-theoretic problem and present sufficient conditions for sharing and free-riding to co-exist due to indirect incentives we call generalized reciprocity.</description>
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    <title>PEAK: Pricing Electronic Access to Knowledge</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/60423</link>
    <description>Title: PEAK: Pricing Electronic Access to Knowledge
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K.; Jankovich, Alexandra</description>
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    <title>Some Economics of Market-Based Distributed Scheduling</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/60422</link>
    <description>Title: Some Economics of Market-Based Distributed Scheduling
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K.; Walsh, William E.; Wellman, Michael P.; Wurman, Peter
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Market mechanisms solve distributed scheduling problems by allocating the scheduled resources according to market prices. We model distributed scheduling as a discrete resource allocation problem, and demonstrate the applicability of economic analysis to this framework. Drawing on results from the literature, we discuss the existence of equilibrium prices for some general classes of scheduling problems, and the quality of equilibrium solutions. We then present two protocols for implementing market solutions, and analyze their computational and economic properties.</description>
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    <title>'Bundling' y el Acceso Electronico a la Informacion Academica: El Projecto PEAK</title>
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    <description>Title: 'Bundling' y el Acceso Electronico a la Informacion Academica: El Projecto PEAK
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K.; Riveros, Juan F.</description>
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