http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/55208 Search the Channel search http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/simple-search http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/61272 Title: The Economics of Misbehavior, Love, and Marriage Contract Enforcement<br/><br/>Authors: Hull, Brooks B.<br/><br/>Abstract: Individuals allocate time between production of goods shared by family members and goods consumed only by the individual. Individuals are inclined to misbehave by giving less time to production of shared goods than is preferred by the family. In some cultures, strict family control reduces misbehavior. Marriage for love is an innovation in marriage contract enforcement adopted by cultures with specific characteristics. Analysis of cultures in the Human Relations Area Files supports the theory. http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/61271 Title: An Economics Perspective Ten Years After the NAB Case<br/><br/>Authors: Hull, Brooks B.<br/><br/>Abstract: The U.S. Justice Department brought suit against the National Association of Broadcasters in 1979, charging that the NAB Television Code restricted the supply of advertising. This paper examines implications of a collusive code, concluding that the code did not successfully serve this purpose. Television station sale prices were no higher in markets with a high proportion of code subscriber stations. Stations in single station markets were no less likely to subscribe to the code. Finally, rates of return on broadcast firm and network stocks did not change when the antitrust case was settled. http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/61270 Title: Has the Wedding Between Economics and Anthropology Been Cancelled? Economic Theory and Polygamy<br/><br/>Authors: Hull, Brooks B.<br/><br/>Abstract: This paper uses data from the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample of the Human Relations Area Files to test implications of family economic theory related to multiple marriage. As the theory predicts, actions which interfere with the marriage market make most participants worse off. In particular, in those cultures which forbid polygyny, the value of a wife falls. Polygyny disappears in more complex economies, economies in which the value of the quantity of children is relatively less important than the quality of children. http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/61269 Title: Rezoning the Afterlife: Religion and Property Rights in the Middle Ages<br/><br/>Authors: Hull, Brooks B.<br/><br/>Abstract: This paper reviews an economic theory of religion and uses the theory to explain changes in attitudes toward hell, heaven, and divine retribution in Western Europe during the Middle Ages. The hypothesis is straightforward. Religion serves a number of important functions, one of which is to provide an alternative to the state and to the local community in enforcing good social behavior in general and property rights in particular. As the nature of the state's power, of the influence of the local community, and of economic activity change, religious doctrine changes in a manner predictable by economic theory. Although applied to a particular period and culture, the theory is perfectly general and has implications for behavior in other cultures and other periods in history.