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    <title>Deep Blue Collection: International Policy Center (IPC) - Working Paper Series</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/21609</link>
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      <url>http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/retrieve/98492</url>
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      <title>Effects of Privatization and Ownership in Transition Economies</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/64238</link>
      <description>Title: Effects of Privatization and Ownership in Transition Economies&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Estrin, Saul; Hanousek, Jan; Kocenda, Evzen; Svejnar, Jan</description>
      <enclosure url="http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/64238/1/ipc-30-estrin,hanousek,kocenda,svejnar,effects-privatization-ownership-transition-economies.pdf" />
      <pubDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2009 17:58:31 GMT</pubDate>
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      <title>Economic Effects of “Leveling the Playing Field” in International Trade</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/64024</link>
      <description>Title: Economic Effects of “Leveling the Playing Field” in International Trade&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Deardorff, Alan&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This paper uses simple economic theory to examine the effects of various policies that are intended to level the playing field in international trade. That is, when foreign producers are given advantages over domestic producers by government subsidies or other interventions that lower their costs, domestic firms may argue that their own governments should either provide comparable assistance or should protect them from competing with the foreign firms on grounds of fairness. Economic analysis easily shows that granting these requests is usually harmful for the domestic economy as a whole, but that may not prevent such policies from being implemented. Therefore this paper examines what the further effects of such policies may be. The main conclusion that emerges is that policies to level the playing field most often overcompensate those who request them, making them better off than if the playing field had not be tilted against them in the first place.</description>
      <enclosure url="http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/64024/1/ipc-87-deardorff-economic-effects-leveling-playing-field-international-trade.pdf" />
      <pubDate>Thu, 10 Sep 2009 18:18:25 GMT</pubDate>
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      <title>Self-Employment in Household Enterprises and Access to Credit: Gender Differences during India’s Rural Banking Reform</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/64023</link>
      <description>Title: Self-Employment in Household Enterprises and Access to Credit: Gender Differences during India’s Rural Banking Reform&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Meulen Rodgers, Yana van der; Menon, Nidhiya&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This study uses use four cross sections of household survey data collected by India’s National Sample Survey Organization between 1983 and 2000 to examine the role of credit in encouraging small-scale entrepreneurship among men and women in rural labor households. Results from two-stage probit least squares estimations indicate that land ownership, a key means of providing collateral, serves one of the strongest predictors of men’s and women’s self-employment. However, women’s self-employment exhibits a substantially stronger and more positive response to having a loan compared to men. Results also point to interesting class differences within the lowest tier of India’s social class system: self-employment is less likely for members of scheduled castes (who may be pressured by upper castes to remain employed by others), but higher for members of scheduled tribes (who tend to rely on their own skills to make a living).</description>
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      <pubDate>Thu, 10 Sep 2009 18:02:57 GMT</pubDate>
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      <title>The Distributive Impact of Reforms in Credit Enforcement: Evidence from Indian Debt Recovery Tribunals</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/64022</link>
      <description>Title: The Distributive Impact of Reforms in Credit Enforcement: Evidence from Indian Debt Recovery Tribunals&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Lilienfeld-Toal, Ulf von; Mookherjee, Dilip; Visaria, Sujata&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: It is generally presumed that strengthening legal enforcement of lender rights increases credit access for all borrowers, by expanding the set of incentive compatible loan contracts. This is based on an implicitassumption of infinitely elastic supply of loans. With inelastic supply, strengthening enforcement generates general equilibrium effects which reduce credit access for small borrowers while expanding it for wealthyborrowers. We find evidence from a firm-level panel data set of such adverse distributional impacts of an Indian judicial reform which increased banks’ ability to recover non-performing loans in the 1990s.</description>
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      <pubDate>Thu, 10 Sep 2009 17:50:42 GMT</pubDate>
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