http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/35324 http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/retrieve/187574 http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/35324 Search the Channel search http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/simple-search http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/60961 Title: Equilibria in a Hotelling Model: First-Mover Advantage? <br/> <br/>Authors: Rajan, Uday <br/> <br/>Abstract: We study a generalized Hotelling duopoly in which a consumer's net utility from a product depends on the location of product and consumer in product attribute space, a random utility term that captures idiosyncratic preferences, and the price of the product. Our model allows us to vary the relative impact of product attribute preferences (i.e., location) and idiosyncratic preferences on consumer utility. Since the model is analytically intractable, we computationally study equilibria under both simultaneous location and sequential location by the two .rms, with prices decided simultaneously after locations have been chosen. In our numerical analysis, the simultaneous game admits only symmetric equilibria. If product attribute preferences are weak (i.e., distance costs are unimportant) and idiosyncratic preferences are also weak, both .rms locate in the interior of the feasible location space. With strong product attribute preferences and weak idiosyncratic preferences, price competition is at its most intense, leading to maximal di.erentiation. As idiosyncratic preferences become more important, price competition is mitigated, leading to both .rms locating at the market center. In the sequential game, we .nd that when product attribute preferences are strong and idiosyncratic preferences are weak, the follower has a strong desire to avoid price competition and the leader experiences a .rst-mover advantage. However, if idiosyncratic preferences are also strong, price competition is somewhat weaker, and the leader cedes a location and pro.t advantage to the follower. If product attribute preferences and idiosyncratic preferences are both weak, maximal di.erentiation results, and entry order is irrelevant. Finally, when idiosyncratic preferences dominate, price competition is a non-issue, and both players locate at the market center. Once again, the order of entry does not matter. Sat, 28 Jun 2008 22:58:59 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/60425 Title: The Three Pillars of Corporate Social Reporting as New Governance Regulation: Disclosure, Dialogue and Development <br/> <br/>Authors: Hess, David <br/> <br/>Abstract: In this article I examine corporate social reporting as a form of New Governance regulation termed “democratic experimentalism.” Due to the challenges of regulating the behavior of corporations on issues related to sustainable economic development, New Governance regulation—which has a focus on decentralized, participatory, problem-solving-based approaches to regulation—is presented as an option to traditional command-and-control regulation. By examining the role of social reporting under a New Governance approach, I set out three necessary requirements for social reporting to be effective: disclosure, dialogue with stakeholders, and the moral development of the corporation. I then assess current social reporting practices against these requirements and find significant problems. In response, I propose one option for solving those problems, and encourage future researchers to consider the demands of these three requirements and the possible trade-offs between them when attempting to find ways to improve social reporting practices. Sat, 28 Jun 2008 22:58:59 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/60210 Title: Costly external equity: Implications for asset pricing anomalies <br/> <br/>Authors: Li, Erica, X. N. <br/> <br/>Abstract: We document new evidence that the magnitude of the investment anomaly, the asset growth anomaly, the value premium, and the net stock issues puzzle is higher in financially more constrained firms than that in financially less constrained firms. We interpret the evidence using an investment-based asset pricing model augmented with costly external finance. Intuitively, financial frictions make marginal costs of investment more sensitive to investment in more constrained firms, giving rise to a stronger negative relation between investment and the discount rate. Mon, 29 May 2006 22:58:59 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/58723 Title: Firm R&D Behavior and Evolving Technology in Established Industries <br/> <br/>Authors: Posen, Hart E. <br/> <br/>Abstract: One of the key mechanisms of firms' strategic renewal is R&D, and a key driver of the intensity of R&D is industry context. A number of theories develop propositions linking industry factors to firm R&D behavior, but these theories lack consensus. To date empirical tests have been unable to resolve the competing predictions due to lack of time-varying measures of technology. We create new measures for technology then conduct a test of the competing theories. Our results indicate that the data best match a model of innovative behavior in which firms invest in R&D principally to regain eroded advantage rather than to pursue the new frontier. Sun, 29 Jul 2007 22:58:59 GMT