<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:taxo="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/taxonomy/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Deep Blue Collection: William Davidson Institute (WDI) - Working Papers</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/39392</link>
    <description />
    
    <textInput>
      <title>The Collection's search engine</title>
      <description>Search the Channel</description>
      <name>search</name>
      <link>http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/simple-search</link>
    </textInput>
    <item>
      <title>National Culture and Financial Systems</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/57264</link>
      <description>Title: National Culture and Financial Systems
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Author(s): Tadesse, Solomon; Kwok, Chuck
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Countries differ in the way their financial activities are organized. In Anglo-Saxon countries such as the U.S. and the U.K., financial systems are dominated by stock markets whereas in Continental Europe and Japan, banks play a predominant role. Why do countries differ in the configuration of their financial systems? We argue that national culture plays a significant role. We find that countries characterized by higher uncertainty avoidance, as an attribute of their national culture, are more likely to have a bank-based system.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 28 Feb 2005 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Stock Markets Liquidity, Corporate Governance and Small Firms</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/57263</link>
      <description>Title: Stock Markets Liquidity, Corporate Governance and Small Firms
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Author(s): Tadesse, Solomon
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: While the importance of equity markets as a vehicle for capital formation is well recognized, their role in providing economically valuable governance services, particularly to small and medium enterprises (SME), has not received much attention. The paper examines the role of public policy in promoting the governance role of secondary equity markets for the benefit of SMEs. The paper first outlines the mechanisms through which equity markets could promote good governance in small firms, showing that equity markets serve as a monitoring and control conduit for outsiders to enforce good governance at the firm. It then establishes that the ability of equity markets to deliver good governance is closely related to those markets’ liquidity, presenting further international evidence that firms supported by liquid equity markets realize improved economic performance. Thus, the governance services of secondary equity markets have real economic value to the firms. The paper then argues that public policy can have a positive impact on the effectiveness of equity markets in delivering governance services through enhancing market liquidity. It examines the impact on market liquidity of two significant U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulatory reforms applied to The Nasdaq Stock Market: SEC’s ‘trade reporting’ rules of 1992, and SEC’s “order handling” reforms of 1997. The paper concludes that public policies that increase market transparency and efficiency -- such as “trade reporting” requirements and better “order handling” rules -- promote the effectiveness of the secondary equity markets in delivering corporate governance through increased market liquidity.</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 31 May 2005 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The MNC as an Agent of Change for Host-Country Institutions: FDI and Corruption</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/57262</link>
      <description>Title: The MNC as an Agent of Change for Host-Country Institutions: FDI and Corruption
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Author(s): Tadesse, Solomon; Kwok, Chuck
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Most empirical research examines how the institutional environment of corruption shapes the behavior of MNCs. In this study, we would like to highlight the other side of the picture: how the presence of MNC may shape the institutional environment of corruption over time. We propose three avenues through which the MNC may have an impact on its host institutions: the regulatory pressure effect, the demonstration effect, and the professionalization effect. Based on extensive data on FDI and corruption for a large sample of countries over the last 30 years, the empirical results are consistent with our general hypothesis that foreign direct investment generates positive spillover effects on the institutional environment of host countries. Such findings provide a glimmer of hope for the future of the host country where corruption is most prevalent.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 31 Aug 2006 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Allocation and Monitoring Role of Capital Markets: Theory and International Evidence</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/57261</link>
      <description>Title: The Allocation and Monitoring Role of Capital Markets: Theory and International Evidence
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Author(s): Tadesse, Solomon
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Capital markets perform two distinct functions: provision of capital and facilitation of good governance through information production and monitoring. I argue that the governance function has more impact on the efficiency with which resources are utilized within the firm. Based on industry level data across thirty-eight countries, I present evidence suggesting a positive relation between market-based governance and improvements in industry efficiency. The measures of governance are also positively correlated with productivity improvements and growth in real output. Furthermore, while governance affects efficiency, the capital provision services induce technological change. The evidence underscores the role of capital markets as a conduit of socially valuable governance services as distinct from capital provision</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 28 Feb 2003 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>

