http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/55208 Thu, 20 Jun 2013 05:43:44 GMT 2013-06-20T05:43:44Z http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/96847 Religion, Warrior Elites, and Property Rights Hull, Brooks B.; Bold, Frederick In 1119 C.E., King Baldwin II of Jerusalem granted nine French knights space in the Al Aqsa Mosque on the Temple Mount over the ruins of Solomon’s Temple to create the headquarters of a new monastic order: The Poor Fellow-Soldiers of Christ and of the Temple of Solomon (Pauperes commilitones Christi Templique Solomonici). The Knights Templar, or Templars, as they have become known, grew in wealth and power after that modest beginning to become an influential and pervasive organization throughout Western Europe until the years before their suppression by King Philip of France in 1307. The Templars were only one of a number of Christian holy orders of “warrior monks” founded after the First Crusade. The Knights Hospitaller (Order of Saint John) and the Teutonic Knights are the most well-known, but at least fourteen other orders were founded in Syria, in Central and Eastern Europe, and in the Iberian Peninsula. More importantly for this paper, the Templars are one example of what we label “warrior elites.” Our definition of warrior elites is not precise, but is intended to include pre-industrial full-time specialized soldiers that represent a relatively small part of a region’s military forces but possess disproportionate military strength. In addition, warrior elites often possess significant political and social power. This paper explores the extent to which warrior elites have two characteristics: they adopt a special religion, either different from the mainstream religion or a unique adaptation of the mainstream religion, and the special religion has doctrinal provisions which enforce property rights. To the extent warrior elites have these two characteristics, we hypothesize they are an example of a social institution that evolves as a low-cost alternative to government and to ordinary religion as a method of property rights enforcement. Our preliminary analysis yields mixed results. Certainly there are examples of warrior elites who have the two aforementioned characteristics: the Templars and at least some of the other post Crusades warrior monks being examples. By contrast, the loyalty to leaders by Japan's samurai the Ottoman Empire’s Janissaries likely eroded a well-defined system of property rights is not consistent with our hoped-for results. Mon, 11 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/96847 2013-03-11T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/78447 Free Riding, Market Structure, and Church Member Donations in South Carolina Hull, Brooks B.; Lipford, Judy The research on factors influencing member donations to churches is extensive. This paper uses unique data from South Carolina Baptists congregations to confirm much of the research, particularly including the potential for free-riding by members, but also extends that research by exploring the differential effect on donations of competition among Baptist congregations and competition between Baptist and non-Baptist congregations. The paper employs hierarchical linear modeling, rarely used in religious research but particularly well suited to the data, some of which is by congregation and some of which is by county. Previous empirical and theoretical work offers contradictory conclusions. We review the theory, clarifying some issues. Our results confirm that free riding increases as congregations grow larger, an effect mitigated by the increasing level of services offered as congregations grow. Importantly, competition between Baptist congregations reduces per member donations and competition with non-Baptist congregations increases per member donations. Copyright Religious Research Association, Inc. Archived with permission. Wed, 01 Dec 2010 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/78447 2010-12-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/61272 The Economics of Misbehavior, Love, and Marriage Contract Enforcement Hull, Brooks B. Individuals allocate time between production of goods shared by family members and goods consumed only by the individual. Individuals are inclined to misbehave by giving less time to production of shared goods than is preferred by the family. In some cultures, strict family control reduces misbehavior. Marriage for love is an innovation in marriage contract enforcement adopted by cultures with specific characteristics. Analysis of cultures in the Human Relations Area Files supports the theory. Wed, 01 Feb 1989 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/61272 1989-02-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/61271 An Economics Perspective Ten Years After the NAB Case Hull, Brooks B. The U.S. Justice Department brought suit against the National Association of Broadcasters in 1979, charging that the NAB Television Code restricted the supply of advertising. This paper examines implications of a collusive code, concluding that the code did not successfully serve this purpose. Television station sale prices were no higher in markets with a high proportion of code subscriber stations. Stations in single station markets were no less likely to subscribe to the code. Finally, rates of return on broadcast firm and network stocks did not change when the antitrust case was settled. Sun, 01 Jan 1989 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/61271 1989-01-01T00:00:00Z