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Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities

dc.contributor.authorJehiel, Philippeen_US
dc.contributor.authorMoldovanu, Bennyen_US
dc.contributor.authorStacchetti, Ennioen_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-11-14T23:21:15Z
dc.date.available2013-11-14T23:21:15Z
dc.date.issued1994-05en_US
dc.identifier.otherMichU DeptE CenREST W94-03en_US
dc.identifier.otherD440en_US
dc.identifier.otherD820en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/100795
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the model of auctions with externalities, and while doing so develops techniques that we believe will be valuable in the understandign of other mechanisms design problems.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipCenter for Research on Economic and Social Theory, Department of Economics, University of Michiganen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Paperen_US
dc.subjectAuction Designen_US
dc.subject.otherAuctionsen_US
dc.subject.otherAsymmetric and Private Informationen_US
dc.titleMultidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalitiesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelEconomicsen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelSocial Sciencesen_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/100795/1/ECON256.pdf
dc.owningcollnameEconomics, Department of - Working Papers Series


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