Pacman Refutes the Coase Conjecture: Durable-Goods Monopoly with Discrete Demand
dc.contributor.author | Bagnoli, Mark | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Salant, Stephen W. | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Swierzbinski, Joseph E. | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-11-14T23:21:21Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-11-14T23:21:21Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1988-01 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | MichU DeptE CenREST W88-05 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | D420 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | L120 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/100809 | |
dc.description.abstract | We analyze a dynamic game between consumers with unit demands and the sole seller of a durable good. Unlike previous analyses, we assume there exists a finite collection of buyers rather than a continuum. We show that none of the main conclusions of the durable-goods literature survives this change in assumption. In particular, for any demand curve there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium such that for discount factors near one the monopolist's profit approaches the profit attainable under perfect price discrimination. This contradicts Coase's conjecture (1972)--proved formally for the continuum case by Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986)--that the monopolist's profit must always converge to zero. It also implies that renting or precommitting to a path of prices-which Bulow (1982) and Stokey (1979) have shown, respectively, must always increase profit with a continuum of buyers--may strictly reduce profits when the collection of buyers is finite. Hence, while in other contexts the assumption of a continuum of consumers has proved an innocuous and useful simplification, in the context of durable-goods monopoly it has proved misleading. | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | Center for Research on Economic and Social Theory, Department of Economics, University of Michigan | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | CREST Working Paper | en_US |
dc.subject | Durable Goods | en_US |
dc.subject | Consumption | en_US |
dc.subject | Market | en_US |
dc.subject | Profit | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Market Structure and Pricing: Monopoly | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Monopoly | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Monopolization Strategies | en_US |
dc.title | Pacman Refutes the Coase Conjecture: Durable-Goods Monopoly with Discrete Demand | en_US |
dc.type | Working Paper | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Economics | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel | Social Sciences | en_US |
dc.description.bitstreamurl | http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/100809/1/ECON026.pdf | |
dc.owningcollname | Economics, Department of - Working Papers Series |
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