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Coase, Competition, and Compensation

dc.contributor.authorVarian, Hal R.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-11-14T23:22:38Z
dc.date.available2013-11-14T23:22:38Z
dc.date.issued1993-05en_US
dc.identifier.otherMichU DeptE CenREST W93-15en_US
dc.identifier.otherD620en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/101021
dc.description.abstractI show that the Pigovian solution to a simple externalities problem and a particular Coasian solution can be viewed as competitive equilibria from different initial endowments. I also describe the "compensation mechanism," a mechanism that implements either the Coasian or Pigovian solution as the outcome of an economically natural bargaining game.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipCenter for Research on Economic and Social Theory, Department of Economics, University of Michiganen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Paperen_US
dc.subjectCoaseen_US
dc.subjectPigouen_US
dc.subjectExternalitiesen_US
dc.subjectBargainingen_US
dc.subjectCompetitive Equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.otherExternalitiesen_US
dc.titleCoase, Competition, and Compensationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelEconomicsen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelSocial Sciencesen_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/101021/1/ECON459.pdf
dc.owningcollnameEconomics, Department of - Working Papers Series


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