Emerging differentiation of folkbiology and folkpsychology: Similarity judgments and property attributions.

Abstract

Research suggests that for adults, folkbiology and folkpsychology represent two distinct conceptual domains for understanding the world of living things. However, it is not clear whether these represent distinct domains for young children; past work suggests the two conceptual systems are confused until around age 10. Contrary to this past work, it is argued that the presence of distinct similarity metrics for the two domains, and of distinct patterns of attributions for biological versus psychological properties, would indicate earlier conceptual differentiation. In Studies 1 and 2, subjects aged 4, 5, 7, 8, and adult were shown human-primate-nonprimate animal triads and asked to choose which two were "the same kind of thing" and which two "think the same way." As predicted, adults chose different pairs for the two questions; they paired the primate and the animal for the former, and the human and the primate for the latter. Counter to expectations, children paired the primate and the animal for both questions, although all age groups provided reliably different explanations for their responses to the two questions. In Study 3, subjects aged 6, 8, and adult were shown pictures of mammals, birds, reptiles, and fish (a large predator and small domestic member of each taxon), and asked whether each displayed a variety of biological (e.g. has blood, can sleep) and psychological (e.g. can think, can feel angry, can feel scared) properties. For all age groups, biological properties were equally attributed to predatory and domestic animals; psychological properties were differentially attributed to the two groups. Distinct patterns of attribution from Study 3 and distinct justifications for different similarity judgments from Studies 1 and 2 provide converging evidence that by kindergarten, children's notions of folkpsychology and folkbiology are sufficiently differentiated so as to constitute distinct and independent conceptual domains. Evidence also suggests that knowledge about living things continues to become more differentiated throughout the lifespan.