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Formula Pricing and Profit Sharing in Inter‐Firm Contracts

dc.contributor.authorBlair, Roger D.en_US
dc.contributor.authorLafontaine, Francineen_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-01-07T15:23:42Z
dc.date.available2016-03-02T19:36:56Zen
dc.date.issued2015-01en_US
dc.identifier.citationBlair, Roger D.; Lafontaine, Francine (2015). "Formula Pricing and Profit Sharing in Inter‐Firm Contracts ." Managerial and Decision Economics 36(1): 33-43.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0143-6570en_US
dc.identifier.issn1099-1468en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/109908
dc.publisherCambridge U. Pressen_US
dc.publisherWiley Periodicals, Inc.en_US
dc.titleFormula Pricing and Profit Sharing in Inter‐Firm Contractsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.rights.robotsIndexNoFollowen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelManagementen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelBusiness and Economicsen_US
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Revieweden_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/109908/1/mde2704.pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.1002/mde.2704en_US
dc.identifier.sourceManagerial and Decision Economicsen_US
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dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


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