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| Title: | Self-Confirming Price Prediction for Bidding in Simultaneous Ascending Auctions |
| Authors: | Anna, Osepayshvili
Wellman, Michael P.
Reeves, Daniel M.
MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K. |
| Issue Date: | Jul-2005 |
| Citation: | Proceedings of the 21st Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI 2005), (July 2005). <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/49509> |
| Abstract: | Simultaneous ascending auctions present agents
with the exposure problem: bidding to acquire a
bundle risks the possibility of obtaining an undesired
subset of the goods. Auction theory provides
little guidance for dealing with this problem.
We present a new family of decisiontheoretic
bidding strategies that use probabilistic
predictions of final prices. We focus on selfconfirming
price distribution predictions, which
by definition turn out to be correct when all
agents bid decision-theoretically based on them.
Bidding based on these is provably not optimal in
general, but our experimental evidence indicates
the strategy can be quite effective compared to
other known methods. |
| Appears in Collections: | Information, School of (SI)
Economics, Department of
Public Policy, Gerald R. Ford School of
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| ppsaa.pdf | | 88Kb | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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