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Title: Why Share in Peer-to-Peer Networks?
Authors: Jian, Lian
MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K.
Issue Date: 2008
Citation: International Conference on Electronic Commerce (ICEC’08), Innsbruck, Austria, 19-22 August 2008 <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/60443>
Abstract: Prior theory and empirical work emphasize the enormous free-riding problem facing peer-to-peer (P2P) sharing networks. Nonetheless, many P2P networks thrive. We explore two possible explanations that do not rely on altruism or explicit mechanisms imposed on the network: direct and indirect private incentives for the provision of public goods. The direct incentive is a traffic redistribution effect that advantages the sharing peer. We din this incentive is likely insufficient to motivate equilibrium content sharing in large networks. We then approach P2P networks as a graph-theoretic problem and present sufficient conditions for sharing and free-riding to co-exist due to indirect incentives we call generalized reciprocity.
Appears in Collections:Information, School of (SI)
Public Policy, Gerald R. Ford School of

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