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| Title: | The Economics of Misbehavior, Love, and Marriage Contract Enforcement |
| Authors: | Hull, Brooks B. |
| Keywords: | marriage
love |
| Issue Date: | Feb-1989 |
| Series/Report no.: | UM-Dearborn Economics Working Papers
59 |
| Abstract: | Individuals allocate time between production of goods shared by family members and goods consumed only by the individual. Individuals are inclined to misbehave by giving less time to production of shared goods than is preferred by the family. In some cultures, strict family control reduces misbehavior. Marriage for love is an innovation in marriage contract enforcement adopted by cultures with specific characteristics. Analysis of cultures in the Human Relations Area Files supports the theory. |
| Appears in Collections: | Social Sciences: Economics, Department of (UM-Dearborn)
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| Hull_B_1989_Working_Paper_59_Marriage_Contract_Enforcement.pdf | Working Paper | 1792Kb | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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