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| Title: | The Distributive Impact of Reforms in Credit Enforcement: Evidence from Indian Debt Recovery Tribunals |
| Authors: | Lilienfeld-Toal, Ulf von
Mookherjee, Dilip
Visaria, Sujata |
| Keywords: | Indian Debt Recovery Tribunals
Distributive Impact
Reforms in Credit Enforcement |
| Issue Date: | 10-Sep-2009 |
| Series/Report no.: | 85 |
| Abstract: | It is generally presumed that strengthening legal enforcement of lender rights increases credit access for all borrowers, by expanding the set of incentive compatible loan contracts. This is based on an implicit
assumption of infinitely elastic supply of loans. With inelastic supply, strengthening enforcement generates general equilibrium effects which reduce credit access for small borrowers while expanding it for wealthy
borrowers. We find evidence from a firm-level panel data set of such adverse distributional impacts of an Indian judicial reform which increased banks’ ability to recover non-performing loans in the 1990s. |
| Appears in Collections: | International Policy Center (IPC) - Working Paper Series
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| ipc-85-toal,mookherjee,visaria-distributive-impact-reforms-credit-enforcement-evidence-indian-debt-recovery-tribunals.pdf | Working Paper | 739Kb | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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