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But Is It Myopia? Risk Aversion and the Efficiency of Stock-Based Managerial Incentives

dc.contributor.authorCarmel, Jonathan Paul.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-01T22:29:14Z
dc.date.available2010-06-01T22:29:14Z
dc.date.issued2008-06en_US
dc.identifier.citationCarmel , Jonathan (2008). " But Is It Myopia? Risk Aversion and the Efficiency of Stock-Based Managerial Incentives ." Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 17(2): 541-579. <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/75475>en_US
dc.identifier.issn1058-6407en_US
dc.identifier.issn1530-9134en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/75475
dc.format.extent234243 bytes
dc.format.extent3109 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.format.mimetypetext/plain
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing Incen_US
dc.rights©Journal Compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishingen_US
dc.titleBut Is It Myopia? Risk Aversion and the Efficiency of Stock-Based Managerial Incentivesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelEconomicsen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelBusinessen_US
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Revieweden_US
dc.contributor.affiliationumRoss School of Business University of Michigan 701 Tappan Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1234 and The Interdisciplinary Center, Herzlia jpcarmel@umich.eduen_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/75475/1/j.1530-9134.2008.00186.x.pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1530-9134.2008.00186.xen_US
dc.identifier.sourceJournal of Economics & Management Strategyen_US
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dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


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