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Resources or Power?
Implications of Social Networks on Compensation and Firm Performance

dc.contributor.authorHorton, Joanneen_US
dc.contributor.authorMillo, Yuvalen_US
dc.contributor.authorSerafeim, Georgeen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-21T15:48:13Z
dc.date.available2013-06-11T19:15:51Zen_US
dc.date.issued2012-04en_US
dc.identifier.citationHorton, Joanne; Millo, Yuval; Serafeim, George (2012). "Resources or Power?
Implications of Social Networks on Compensation and Firm Performance." Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 39(3‐4). <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/91155>en_US
dc.identifier.issn0306-686Xen_US
dc.identifier.issn1468-5957en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/91155
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing Ltden_US
dc.publisherWiley Periodicals, Inc.en_US
dc.subject.otherCorporate Performanceen_US
dc.subject.otherBoard of Directorsen_US
dc.subject.otherCorporate Governanceen_US
dc.subject.otherCompensationen_US
dc.subject.otherSocial Networksen_US
dc.titleResources or Power?
Implications of Social Networks on Compensation and Firm Performanceen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.rights.robotsIndexNoFollowen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelFinanceen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelBusinessen_US
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Revieweden_US
dc.contributor.affiliationumThe authors are respectively from University of Exeter Business School; London School of Economics; and Harvard Business School. They are grateful to Vasiliki Athanasakou, Daniel Ferreira, Fabrizio Ferri, Maria Loumioti, Yao Lu, Mark Mizruchi, Peter Pope, Andy Stark and seminar participants at University of Haifa, University of Michigan, University of Essex, the Corporate Governance symposium of European Financial Management Association and the JBFA Capital Markets Conference for their insightful comments. The authors appreciate the valuable comments provided by Martin Walker (editor) and an anonymous referee. The authors are solely responsible for any errors.en_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/91155/1/j.1468-5957.2011.02276.x.pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1468-5957.2011.02276.xen_US
dc.identifier.sourceJournal of Business Finance & Accountingen_US
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dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


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