

**Multi-Client Lobbying in the American States**

by

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# Abstract

Multi-client lobbyists are individuals authorized to represent two or more distinct interests during legislative sessions. Over the past three decades, interest groups in the United States have increasingly come to rely on these lobbyists for representation. In 1989, nearly 57 percent of the 26,998 interest groups in the U.S. states employed at least one multi-client lobbyist. By 2011, nearly 81 percent of the 54,320 clients hired at least one. Moreover, the average number of multi-client lobbyists hired per client increased from 1.26 to 2.56. There was a corresponding decrease in the hiring of single-client lobbyists as well.

I examine how lobby laws and legislative institutions affect multi-client lobbying in the American states. To date, no study has sought to measure multi-client lobbying directly, and no one has tested explanations for why interest groups hire different kinds of advocates in different states. I address both these gaps in our understanding of interest mobilization. I rely on an original data set compiled from all U.S. states and multiple decades to measure and explain how often groups hire multi-client lobbyists. My findings have implications for how lobby laws and legislative assemblies might be reformed to improve the representation of diverse interest groups. Related reforms have changed how interests get represented in the state capitols.

I approach multi-client lobbying from three different perspectives. I first argue that multi-client lobbying within U.S. states can be measured by comparing totals of unique lobbyist-client dyads to totals of unique lobbyists and clients. I then find that multi-client lobbying is more prevalent in states with more registration criteria, but that reporting re-

quirements dampen this positive correlation. Multi-client advocacy became more prevalent in legislatures that became more competitive along partisan lines and where members were provided more staff support over time. In addition, the imposition of term limits reduced overall numbers of lobbyists hired, but did not affect rates of multi-client lobbying.

In order to determine which kinds of groups are most likely to hire multi-client agents, I measure multi-client lobbying at the level of individual interest groups. I argue that public interest groups are less likely to hire multi-client lobbyists than private interests due to economic and membership-related reasons. Public interests advocate for the state provision of public goods. Unlike private interests such as business corporations, public interests seek to maintain a constant lobby presence. It is more efficient for them to hire in-house, single-client lobbyists on a salaried basis. Moreover, dues-paying members derive more purposive benefit from giving to such in-house lobby enterprises. I find that public interests prefer single-client advocates, even after controlling for total lobbyists hired, and an array of lobby laws and institutional variables.

I then examine sources of multi-client lobbying by exploring the backgrounds of lobbyists. States legislatures produce different numbers of former lawmakers who become revolving-door lobbyists. While legislative turnover produces more former lawmakers, it also reduces their value as lobbyists. As incumbent legislators are replaced by new ones, the existing relationships and knowledge that former lawmakers have lose value. As a result, proportionately fewer former lawmakers become lobbyists in states with high turnover. Cooling-off laws dampen totals of revolving-door lobbyists as well. Nevertheless, former legislators tend to represent multiple interest groups, thereby partly explaining rates of multi-client advocacy.

# Chapter One:

## Introduction

In the United States Congress, multi-client lobbying is increasingly prevalent. Information collected from both interviews and public records help to illustrate this trend. Of the 114 lobbyists whom he interviewed, Milbrath (1963, 40) found that only 31 of them were paid on a fee-basis (indicating that they were not full-time salaried employees of their clients). When interviewing several hundred group leaders in the early 1980s, Heinz et al. (1993, 64) found that a third of all the organizations interviewed regularly retained lobbyists, lawyers, or public relations consultants for representation. In the mid-1980s, interest groups consistently used both internal and external employees for legislative representation (Schlozman and Tierney 1986, 101). The enactment of the Lobby Disclosure Act (LDA) in 1995 has allowed scholars to measure multi-client lobbying more accurately. The LDA requires lobbyists to report their activities and the names of clients. According to these reports, it is increasingly common for congressional lobbyists to be members of firms. In 2007, there were more than 145 lobbyists associated with the firm Patton Boggs, LLP representing 398 clients (Drutman 2015, 156). Drutman (2015) found that the number of similar firms increased substantially in Washington between 1998 and 2012. LaPira, Thomas, and Baumgartner (2014) found that many lobbyists now represent clients with interests in many different issue areas.

There has been substantially less research on contract lobbying in the American states. The hiring of multi-client lobbying is no doubt also a frequent phenomenon in those capitols.

While interviewing 105 lobbyists across six states in 1990 and 1991, Rosenthal (1993, 21) noticed that plenty of them represented multiple clients on a contractual basis and that some even had prior legislative experience. Lobbyists were reportedly entering into group practice with other lobbyists more often. The benefits of this were said to include economies of scale (i.e., firms of lobbyists could better coordinate their lobbying efforts) and more comprehensive services being offered (such as having a political action committee be associated with the firm). More and more, legal firms appeared to be entering the lobbying practice (25). Gray and Lowery (1996a) examined lobby registration records in six states to identify who the top five contract lobbyists were (in terms of clientele sizes). Their 23 interviews revealed a highly competitive atmosphere of profiteering advocates. In using historical documents to explain the coordinated influence of the Tobacco Institute across U.S. state legislatures, Givel and Glantz (2001) found that the Institute frequently made use of high-fee contract lobbyists. In examining lists of registered lobbyists from all U.S. states published in 1994, Goldstein and Bearman (1996) found that there were 450 lobbyists registered to represent at least one tobacco-related organization. *All* of those lobbyists were multi-client advocates, with clientele sizes ranging between 2 and 42 clients (the average number of clients was 13).

If one examines lists of registered lobbyists from all the states for 1989 and 2011, the records reveal that interest groups hired multi-client lobbyists much more often in 2011 than in 1989, but that increases in multi-client lobbying varied across states. Table 1 presents nation-level descriptive statistics generated for both years under observation. Across the states, the number of interest groups that registered lobbyists more than doubled.<sup>1</sup> This reflects the findings of Lowery, Gray, and Cluverius (2015). Moreover, the average number of lobbyists (single- and multi-client combined) hired per group increased from 2.33 to 3.21. With increasing frequency, groups hired multi-client lobbyists. The percentage of groups

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<sup>1</sup>These figures are sums of how many unique groups registered in each state. If a group registered lobbyists in two different states, then it was counted twice (once for each state). These figures are also approximations due to some listing errors. On occasion, slight variations of the names of individual clients who hired multiple lobbyists would appear more than once. This likely is due to different lobbyists submitting slightly different versions of the client name when registering.

Table 1: The Emergence of Multi-Client Advocacy in the U.S. States


Variable	1989	2011	Change
Number of Groups	26,998	54,320	27,322
Mean Lobbyists per Group	2.33	3.21	0.88
Percent Hiring Single-Client Only	43.31	19.06	-24.26
Percent Hiring Mix	12.16	13.98	1.82
Percent Hiring Multi-Client Only	44.53	66.96	22.44
Mean Number of Single-Client Hired	1.06	0.65	-0.41
Mean Number of Multi-Client Hired	1.26	2.56	1.30

*Note:* Aggregated statistics based on client-level measurements.

relying only on single-client lobbyists decreased significantly whereas more groups had come to rely only on multi-client advocates. Whereas the balance of single- to multi-client lobbyists was nearly even in 1989, more than two thirds of groups hired only multi-client lobbyists by 2011. In general, the many new groups in the U.S. states relied mostly on multi-client advocates. These trends become nuanced when differences between states are examined. Figure 1 presents the logged average numbers of multi- and single-client lobbyists hired by groups in each U.S. state for 1989 and 2011.<sup>2</sup> Measured at the group level, the solid lines represent the rate of change in single-client lobbying and the dashed lines capture rates of change for multi-client lobbying. In 32 states, the average number of multi-client lobbyists hired per group increased while the average number of single-client lobbyists decreased. In some small states like North Dakota and West Virginia, there were only small across-time differences in multi- or single-client lobbying. In a few others, single-client lobbyists became *more* prevalent.

<sup>2</sup>Average lobbyist counts were logged to allow for easier comparisons between states (groups in some states hired a lot of lobbyists, thereby skewing the scale of comparison).

Figure 1: Single- and Multi-Client Lobbying Across U.S. States



# What Explains Multi-Client Advocacy?

I examine how lobby laws and legislative institutions affect multi-client lobbying in the American states. Multi-client lobbying occurs when a lobbyist is authorized to represent two or more distinct interests before legislators. To date, no study has sought to measure multi-client lobbying directly, and no one has tested explanations for why interest groups hire different kinds of advocates in different states. I address both these gaps in our understanding of interest mobilization. I rely on an original data set compiled from all U.S. states and multiple decades to measure and explain how often groups hire multi-client lobbyists. I find that differences in lobby laws and legislative institutions explain multi-client lobbying both across states and time, and that related reforms have affected how interests get represented in the state capitols. I also show that different kinds of groups hired multi-client lobbyists at different rates.

This dissertation provides a series of contributions to scholars' understanding of interest groups, lobbying, and political representation. I have quantified (for the first time) the increase in multi-client lobbying that occurred throughout the U.S. states in recent decades. Previous studies of lobbying in the state legislatures have not examined multi-client lobbying specifically, or they have focused exclusively on the mobilization of interest groups. Moreover, most major studies of lobbying in America have tended to focus on federal or congressional lobbying. Leading examples include Milbrath (1963), Bauer, Poole, and Dexter (1964), Scholzman and Tierney (1986), Walker (1991), Baumgartner et al. (2009), Schlozman, Verba, and Brady (2012), and Drutman (2015). These works made significant and unique contributions to our understanding of groups, and any scholar of groups should be familiar with their findings. In contrast to Congress, however, the U.S. states provide substantially more variation in lobby laws and institutions. Moreover, the states were the first regimes in the world to require lobbyists to register. These two aspects of the states allow scholars to answer a variety of new questions about group mobilization and influence. A recent study that utilizes variation in the states to explore interest influence is Hall (2015).



I propose a new measure for advocacy in chapter two. The measure is aggregated at the level of the state. State-level observations for multi-client lobbying are particularly useful for capturing the effects of institutional and legal reforms on the decisions of organized interests. I argue that the number of unique lobbyist-client dyads within a state can serve as an accurate proxy for how much multi-client lobbying is occurring, once one controls for totals of unique lobbyists and clients. This measure is used to test various hypotheses (proposed mostly by other scholars) of institutional and legal reforms.

In chapter three, I attempt to bridge two divergent bodies of research by proposing that public interest groups engage in a form of advocacy different from that of special interest groups. Public interest groups (e.g., Sierra Club, Common Cause) advocate for the state provision of collective or public goods. Such goods are non-rivalrous and non-excludable, and include a clean environment, civil rights and liberties, among others. In contrast, special interests advocate for particularistic or private benefits from governments. These benefits tend to focus on specific firms or economic sectors, and include tax and regulatory exemptions, and subsidies, among others. While a substantial body of research has focused on citizen activists and lobbyists who personally value the causes of their organizations (see Berry 1977 and Rothenberg 1992), another body of research examines mostly professional lobbyists and the influence of wealthy, private interests on policy outcomes (see Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Baumgartner et al. 2009; Drutman 2015). Surely, comparing the activities and influence of public interests to those of private interests has been a part of these prior studies, but no scholar has previously argued explicitly why these two types of groups engage in different kinds of advocacy. I argue that public interest groups prefer single-client lobbyists for efficiency and agency-related reasons. Special interests prefer multi-client lobbyists for efficiency as well. Upon finding robust evidence for my expectations, I unite two disparate fields of research on interest groups (see LaPira, Thomas, and Baumgartner 2014). This chapters show that the historical rise of multi-client lobbying can be attributed to the political mobilization of more businesses and other private interests than ever before.

In chapter four, I explain that the insider connections and political knowledge of former legislators expire or lose value more quickly with high legislative turnover. With high turnover, new people cycle in and out of a legislature more quickly, thereby disallowing former legislators from capitalizing on their relationships with and knowledge of incumbents. In other words, as a result of turnover, the valuable contacts that former legislators have move out of a legislature, thereby reducing their value as advocates. I measure the total numbers of former legislators registered to lobby in all U.S. states in 1989 and 2011. This is the first ever quantitative analysis of the revolving-door in state capitols. I show that smaller proportions of former legislators become lobbyists in states with high turnover, as theorized. This relationship is robust to the inclusion of a series of control variables, including post-governmental employment restrictions, legislative staff resources, totals of interest groups registered, and registration criteria. Since former members of Congress who become lobbyists tend to have many clients (see LaPira and Thomas 2017), these findings suggest that multi-client lobbying is partly a function of the production and value of legislative experience within a U.S. state.

While this dissertation does not examine how well multi-client lobbyists represent the interests of their clients, the rise of such lobbyists suggests that interest groups might have less control or agency over their representation than in the past. Interest groups who hire multi-client lobbyists may be accepting of agency loss (see Kersh 2000; Holyoke 2015). At the same time, client organizations can take steps to reduce the autonomy of their lobby agents. First, they may write their contracts with multi-client lobbyists so that the lobbyists instead act as political advisers (see Williamson 1981; Kersh 2002). Second, clients can attempt to monitor their lobbyists through inter-organizational networks (Heaney 2014; Heaney and Strickland 2017). Third, clients may use emerging digital technologies to help monitor the efforts of their lobbyists (Drutman and Mahoney 2017). These issues lie beyond the scope of this dissertation, but they present important directions for future research. Additionally, for determining the causes of multi-client lobbying, the U.S. states present unparalleled spatial

and temporal variation. Lobbyist registration records from the states indicate specifically which lobbyists were authorized to represent which clients.

## Historical Lobby Reforms in the States

The U.S. states were the first governments in the world to require lobbyists to register with state authorities (Opheim 1991). The states have produced lobbyist registration information for more than a century. In 1890, Massachusetts became the first political system in the world to adopt a method for registration. Whenever governments first required lobbyists to register, they typically required that lobbyists visit a particular official's office and fill out a form or sign a docket (notebook). Only in later decades did state governments adopt more elaborate sets of laws for requiring lobbyists to register.<sup>3</sup> The registration records reveal how numbers of lobbyists and clients have grown over time, and can be used to measure the historical emergence of multi-client lobbying.

In 1890, Massachusetts passed a lobby registration act that required individuals who solicited legislators directly (termed "legislative agents") and those who testified before committees (termed "legislative counsel") to register their names, addresses and occupations, the names of their clients, the duration of their employment, and the nature of their business in dockets maintained by the sergeant-at-arms. The bill was introduced in response to an investigation that found that Boston street railways had hired thirty-five lobbyists and spent more than \$33,000 to lobby for authorization to build an elevated line (Lane 1964). Those seeking to lobby the Massachusetts General Court (i.e., the legislature) accordingly began to register their names in dockets for the session of 1891. They were also required to

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<sup>3</sup>As opposed to lobbyist registration, several state governments outlawed all private acts of legislative solicitation. In 1873, Alabama's constitution was amended to ban "solicitation [of legislators] to influence their official action." An amendment to Georgia's constitution adopted in 1877 outlawed all "lobbying" (the first use of the term in a legal context). In 1879, California's constitution was amended to declare "lobbying... a felony." Prior to the implementation of disclosure, several other states either adopted constitutional amendments or approved laws that banned solicitations of state officials. These include Arizona, Montana, Texas, and Wyoming. Such bans were distinct from mere anti-bribery measures that were adopted nearly across all the states (see Lane 1964).

file expense statements within thirty days of the session's end. Along with the nation's first lobby disclosure law, the elevated railway bill was also enacted and approved. Wisconsin became the second state to enact lobby disclosure. In 1899, the state adopted a statute nearly identical to the one in Massachusetts, but with one exception: only individuals lobbying on bills that directly affected the pecuniary interests of their clients were required to register. Maryland then adopted a law like Massachusetts', but one that also gave its governor some enforcement authority. In New York, two investigations into the political activities of gas, electrical, and insurance companies revealed widespread corruption. As a result, a new law banning corporate contributions to political parties and disclosing lobbying activities was enacted and signed (Baker 2001). The New York law resembled earlier reforms passed in other states, but also imposed a penalty of \$100 per day for the filing of late expense statements.

In the following decades, numerous other states began to adopt measures requiring lobbyists to register. The means of passage and choice of governing authority varied. Table 2 lists the first year in which each U.S. state required the registration of lobbyists. The dates are listed based on information found in legislative journals and records, and from secondary sources compiled by state investigative committees and non-government research organizations such as the Council of State Governments. Whereas most states adopted legislation, on occasion a single chamber within a state would adopt a rule or resolution requiring registration of those lobbying its members. This first occurred in Illinois when its senate approved a resolution on March 17, 1915. Instead of adopting a law as sixteen other states and one territory had done before, California's Senate followed Illinois's example in 1925. Eventually, all states with single-chamber rules or resolutions adopted full laws requiring all lobbyists to register. A flurry of lobby reform concentrated mostly in the east occurred in the 1930s. Within three years of the adoption of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act in 1946, six more states required registration but most of these states adopted single-chamber rules. The 1960s and 1970s provided steady progress in disclosure as state legislatures further professionalized and national political scandals (e.g., Watergate) increased the salience

of special interest influence in the minds of voters (Squire and Hamm 2005; Ensign 1997). By 1975, all fifty states had adopted measures for registering lobbyists. Over time, the legislatures of the U.S. states also began to delegate lobbyist registration responsibilities to outside agencies. Whereas secretaries of state had historically been the usual source of lobby disclosure information, more states began to establish ethics commissions that enforced both lobby disclosure and campaign finance laws (see Rosenthal 1996 and Rosenson 2005). Among legislatures that had always had internal staff administer registration, Arkansas and West Virginia's were the last states to delegate such duties to outside agencies, in the late 1980s (Thomas 1998, Hall 1989). Figure 2 shows the increase in the number of states requiring lobbyists to register between 1890 and 1980.

As state governments reformed and improved their lobby laws over time, the volume of information provided and preserved about their lobbyists increased. With a few exceptions, laws that disclose and regulate the activities of lobbyists are rarely repealed or weakened. Newmark (2005) documents various increases in lobby law stringency that occurred in particular states between 1990 and 2003. States tended to change their lobby laws infrequently but always adopted more numerous registration criteria, reporting requirements, or ethics standards.<sup>4</sup> Not only did many U.S. states precede the national government in disclosing lobbying activities, most states continue to have the most detailed regulatory regimes for lobbyists in the world (Chari, Logan, and Murphy 2007). Many states have made additional efforts to improve or streamline compliance with registration and reporting requirements. In addition to these requirements, the states have also enacted a variety of ethics laws such as bans on contingent fee contracts, and revolving-door restrictions (see Rosenson 2005).


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<sup>4</sup>One exception occurred in Pennsylvania where in 2000, the Commonwealth Court decided in *Gmerek v. State Ethics Commission* that the state lobby law violated the state constitutional clause vesting regulation of the legal practice under the authority of the state's Superior Court. Following unsuccessful appeals, the state's lobby law was struck down and the Senate had to adopt a rule-based registration procedure. It was not until 2007 that individuals lobbying the Pennsylvania House had to register once again. See Chari, Logan, and Murphy (2010, 26 - 27) for a brief history of events in Pennsylvania.

Table 2: Passage Year of Lobbyist Registration

State	Year	Method of Passage	Delegated Authority
Massachusetts	1890	Legislation	Sergeant at Arms
Wisconsin	1899	Legislation	Secretary of State
Maryland	1900	Legislation	Secretary of State
New York	1906	Legislation	Secretary of State
Idaho	1907	Legislation	Secretary of State
Nebraska	1907	Legislation	Secretary of State
South Dakota	1907	Legislation	Secretary of State
Kansas	1909	Legislation	Secretary of State
New Hampshire	1909	Legislation	Secretary of State
Georgia	1911	Legislation	Secretary of State
Rhode Island	1912	Legislation	Secretary of State
Alaska	1913	Legislation	Secretary of the Territory
Ohio	1913	Legislation	Secretary of State
Illinois	1915	Senate Resolution	Secretary of State
Indiana	1915	Legislation	Secretary of State
Kentucky	1916	Legislation	Attorney General
Mississippi	1916	Legislation	Secretary of State
Maine	1919	Legislation	Secretary of State
California	1925	Chamber Rule	Senate Secretary
North Carolina	1933	Legislation	Secretary of State
South Carolina	1935	Legislation	Secretary of State
Connecticut	1936	Legislation	Secretary of State
Virginia	1938	Legislation	Secretary of State
Vermont	1939	Legislation	Secretary of State
North Dakota	1941	Legislation	Secretary of State
Colorado	1947	Chamber Rule	House Clerk
Florida	1947	Chamber Rule	House Clerk
Michigan	1947	Legislation	Secretary of State
Iowa	1949	Chamber Rule	House Clerk
Oklahoma	1949	Chamber Rule	Senate Secretary
Texas	1949	Chamber Rule	Committee on Representation
Montana	1959	Legislation	Secretary of State
Washington	1959	Chamber Rule	House Speaker
Pennsylvania	1961	Legislation	Secretary of State
Minnesota	1963	Legislation	House Clerk
New Jersey	1964	Legislation	Secretary of State
Missouri	1965	Legislation	Senate Secretary and House Clerk
Tennessee	1965	Legislation	Secretary of State
Oregon	1965	Legislation	Legislative Counsel
Arkansas	1967	Legislation	Senate Secretary and House Clerk
New Mexico	1967	Legislation	Secretary of State
Delaware	c.1970	Chamber Rule	House Clerk
Wyoming	1971	Legislation	Legislative Service Agency
Louisiana	1972	Legislation	Senate Secretary and House Clerk
Alabama	1973	Legislation	Ethics Commission
Nevada	1973	Legislation	Secretary of State
Arizona	1974	Legislation	Secretary of State
West Virginia	1974	Chamber Rule	Senate Clerk
Hawaii	1975	Legislation	Senate and House Clerks
Utah	1975	Legislation	Secretary of State

Figure 2: Total U.S. States with Required Lobbyist Registration



The varied histories of the U.S. states in regulating lobbyists has led to a variety of different legal environments in which lobbyists operate. These differences in lobby laws, as well as differences in legislature characteristics, allow for a comprehensive examination of the causes of multi-client lobbying, which is taken up in this dissertation.



# Chapter Two:

## Measuring and Explaining Lobbying

Across the United States over time, numbers of registered interest groups have continued to increase, but these populations mask the total amount of lobbying that is occurring within America's statehouses. Among registered interests, average numbers of hired lobbyists have increased markedly since the late 1980s. This chapter both quantifies this increase and identifies a set of causal variables. Previous studies have proposed a variety of short-term, political and long-term, institutional factors that govern rates of lobbying. Using a new data set spanning multiple decades, I find that changes in lobbying can largely be ascribed to institutional variables, including the implementation of term limits and regulations on lobbying. Lobby regulations, one-party dominance, and legislative expenditures also appear to play a role in determining rates of multi-client lobbying. Direct democracy and state spending do not affect the hiring of lobbyists by registered interest groups.<sup>5</sup>

Recent reforms to the federal tax code have renewed interest in the influence of lobbyists over national policy. According to reporters, the quick legislative pace of the proposal created a “frenzy” among thousands of registered lobbyists “desperate to preserve prized tax breaks” (Tankersley, Kaplan, and Vogel 2017). According to one analysis, more than 6,000 lobbyists had reported that they lobbied on tax-related issues during 2017, which was more than half of all lobbyists registered in the nation's capital that year (see Lincoln 2017). While lobbying

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<sup>5</sup>This chapter is based on Strickland (2019).

activity on tax issues might have spiked, this sort of frenzy is not unprecedented. There have been similar bursts of activity on prior tax bills at both the federal (Birnbaum and Murray 1987) and state levels (see Brasher, Lowery, and Gray 1999).

Such temporary bursts of lobbying activity present several challenges for scholars of interest representation. Scholars have yet to propose a method for measuring intensity of lobbying effort that is applicable to many different political systems, or develop a means for predicting when and where organized interests lobby more intensely. I seek to achieve both goals. I first argue that lobbying intensity, at an aggregated level, can be measured by the average number of lobbyists hired by each interest group. I then measure changes in lobbying intensity in all U.S. states over multiple decades. No other study has examined numbers of lobbyists to such an extent. I review what prior scholars have had to say about lobbying intensity, and I categorize these hypotheses into two competing camps: explanations oriented towards political factors that are focused more on bursts of lobbying activity, and institutional factors that help to explain long-term trends in lobbying. I then subject these different explanations to statistical analysis and find that institutional variables such as legislature expenditures, the implementation of term limits, and regulations on lobbying all affect how many lobbyists interest groups register. In additional tests, I find that two of these factors and one-party dominance also appear to change how often interest groups rely on multi-client lobbyists.

My findings have implications for those interested in representation, policy change, and transparency. Especially since the publication of Schattschneider's (1960) incisive critique of interest pluralism, scholars have been concerned about the influence of money on American politics and policymaking. Interest groups that are able and willing to spend lots of money can hire teams of lobbyists to target legislators in tandem, possibly affecting policy outcomes. At the same time, however, traditional membership groups that seek public goods can also call upon members to storm legislative offices and make their desires known. While groups with more resources do not always get their way and linking money spent on lobbying to

policy outcomes has proven elusive (see Baumgartner et al. 2009, 190 - 214), lobbying is always an ongoing effort. If registered interest groups consistently maintain many lobbyists to encourage or maintain state expenditures in some political systems, then this suggests that policy change might be more difficult to come by in those systems than in others (Olson 1982). Moreover, particular regulations of lobbying may not lead to more compliance on the part of lobbyists (see Thomas and LaPira 2017). The data set assembled for this project allows us to test some of these hypotheses.

## Measuring Advocacy

While many scholars have commented on or examined the influence of interest groups on policy outcomes, there has been a shortage of research on group agents or lobbyists (see Lowery and Marchetti 2012). Scholars have tended to assume that lobbyists successfully convey the interests of their clients without loss of specificity or “energy” (140). This assumption is problematic since lobbyists may not serve the interests of their clients faithfully or exclusively. It is difficult for interest groups either to observe the efforts of their agents or judge their advocacy success (see Schiff et al. 2015, 226 - 29), and shirking may especially be problematic for the clients of small lobby firms (Whitesell, Schiff, and Lowery 2018). Prior studies have conflated numbers of registered interests with the overall level of interest-group activity. This is also problematic since groups may choose to dedicate more resources to their mobilization effort by hiring multiple lobbyists (Rosenthal 1993, 57). After all, it is *lobbyists* who fulfill the crucial function of linking their clients with policymakers.

Prior studies of interest mobilization have conflated numbers and types of active interest groups with mobilizational intensity. For example, if groups perceive that policy is more likely to change, then more of them register to lobby (Lowery and Gray 1995, 12). Indeed, in states dominated by a single political party, there are fewer registered interests (see Strickland 2018a). Boehmke (2008) has also found that in U.S. states with direct democracy techniques,

more citizens' interests register. Residents of these states are also more likely to be members of such groups (Boehmke and Bowen 2010). Boehmke considered both these factors to be energizing issues for group mobilization (see Gray and Lowery 1996b, 71). Certainly while numbers of interests were shown to fluctuate in response to these factors, these studies missed the second decision facing a group once it chooses to lobby: how many lobbyists to hire. Brasher, Lowery, and Gray (1999) did examine lobbyist numbers across two decades in two states, but the authors were chiefly concerned with how many interest groups those lobbyists represented.

More recent studies have begun to explore the connections between lobbyists and their clients in more detail. Relying on a combination of interviews and lobby transparency data, Drutman (2015) argues that lobbyists are responsible for encouraging firms to support more lobbying efforts, leading to crowdedness and competition. LaPira, Thomas, and Baumgartner (2014) suggest that interest groups hire different kinds of lobbyists based on how much monitoring of an issue is needed. LaPira and Thomas (2017) have also examined the number of "revolving door" lobbyists active in Washington and how their activities differ based on their prior government experience. These studies are important steps in the development of our understanding of how lobbyists affect the actions of their clients, but they prioritize (as subjects of theory and observation) the actions and characteristics of the lobbyists over those of the clients.

The number of lobbyists a group hires should be interpreted as a function of how intensely the group seeks to engage in lobbying. Just as groups might pay lobbyists to spend additional time advocating for their positions, the number of lobbyists a group hires is also a result of how much lobbying the group seeks to support. For example, an interest group might choose to hire a "team" or firm of lobbyists, which is not uncommon in the U.S. states (see Rosenthal 1993, 57). This occurs often when legislatures consider controversial issues that pit teams of lobbyists against each other. Interest groups might also engage in "crowd lobbying" where groups of citizen-lobbyists register and storm legislative offices (see Lofland

1982). By contrast, a group may choose to hire a fraction of a lobbyist by retaining a multi-client professional on an hourly, fee basis as needed (see Drutman 2015, 155 - 67).

Being able to measure the number of lobbyists that interest groups hire allows scholars to capture how vigorously those groups are choosing to lobby, on average. If two political systems each contain roughly equal numbers of registered interest groups but with substantial differences in numbers of registered lobbyists, then this would suggest that groups chose to hire (and register) more agents in one system. Gray and Lowery (1996b, 255) have distinguished this temporary “intensity of lobbying effort” from the interest representation that they aimed to measure. To them, interest populations are different from the “gradations of engagement” that individual groups might employ depending on which issues become part of the “public policy agenda” (7). One might imagine that if legislators in a state were to consider a particularly controversial proposal, then relevant interest groups might seek influence by crowding the statehouse with advocates. Such an event occurred in Florida in 1990 when interest groups registered more than 5,000 lobbyists in response to a fractured budget battle (Brasher, Lowery and Gray 1999). In contrast to populations of interest groups, lobbyist-client pairings or dyads consist of the individual agreements that link groups with advocates (Hunter, Wilson, and Brunk 1991 referred to these dyads as contracts). For example, whereas there were more than 5,000 lobbyists registered in Florida in 1990, there might have been thousands more lobbyist-client dyads since many of those lobbyists might have been authorized to represent more than one client. Some clients might have also hired teams of lobbyists, thereby increasing numbers of lobbyist-client dyads even further.

Most U.S. states provide lobbyist registration data granular enough to make measuring average rates of lobbying a straightforward task. Historically, the states have provided lists of registered lobbyists that included the individual names of their clients. Totals of lobbyists, clients, and lobbyist-client dyads can be calculated based on these lists. To demonstrate how lobbyist-client dyadic data can be used to measure lobbying intensity, let us turn to a sample of registered lobbyists and clients from Alaska for the year 2000. Figure 3 lists the first


Figure 3: Alaska Registered Lobbyists in 2000 (excerpt)

<b>Lobbyist</b>	<b>Client</b>
Don Kubley	Global Seafoods North America, Inc.
Jerome Selby	Global Seafoods North America, Inc.
Linda Anderson	Alaska Visitors Association
Linda Anderson	Fairbanks Native Association
Linda Anderson	Fairbanks North Star Borough School District
Linda Anderson	Utility Services of Alaska
Linda Anderson	Fairbanks Memorial Hospital
Linda Anderson	Coalition of Alaskan Way of Life
Sharon Anderson	Alaska State Hospital and Nursing Home Association
Willie Anderson	NEA - Alaska
Timothy M. Armstrong	American Legion Department of Alaska
Rod Arno	Coalition of Alaskan Way of Life
Tuckerman Babcock	Matanuska Electric Association
Judy Bakeberg	City of Wrengell
John Baker	City of Wrengell
John A. Barnes	Marathon Oil Company
Marie Becker	Alaska Village Electric Cooperative
David G. Bedford	Southeast Alaska Seiners Association
Joel Bennett	Defenders of Wildlife
Nancy Bennett	American Cancer Society

twenty lobbyist-client dyads from Alaska’s lobbyist list. There are fifteen unique lobbyists and seventeen unique clients. On average, each interest group hired 1.18 lobbyists. If these same clients had decided to hire more lobbyists, then this quotient would have increased. Likewise, if the clients had hired fewer lobbyists, then the average number of lobbyists hired per client would have decreased. Complete lists of lobbyist-client dyads from the U.S. states are always much longer than the sample presented in Figure 3.

Figure 4 shows a box plot of interest group populations, lobbyist-group dyads, and dyads per 1,000 groups for nearly all U.S. states from 1989 and 2011. The box plot shows that there are differences between U.S. states not only in numbers of interest groups registered but also in how many lobbyists those groups hired. Whereas group populations have increased over time in the states, state-level totals of lobbyist-client dyads have increased even more.

Figure 4: Groups and Lobbyist-Group Dyads for Two Years



Importantly, the average number of lobbyists hired by groups has increased over time. The average number of lobbyists hired by each interest group is represented by the third and sixth boxes. It has been multiplied by 1,000. In 1989, across all U.S. states, interest groups hired an average of 1.8 total lobbyists. By 2011, across 47 states, interest groups hired an average of 2.1 total lobbyists. These statistics were calculated based on state-level averages.<sup>6</sup>

## Limitations of the Measure

While the average number of lobbyists hired by each interest group provides a measure of how intensely groups are lobbying within a state and year, there are other kinds of political mobilization that this measure does not capture. Many interest groups consist of dues-paying members. These groups might engage in inside lobbying infrequently, preferring instead to engage in outside, grassroots efforts. Such groups include public interest groups and labor unions, and such activities include coordinating protests or letter-writing campaigns (see Kollman 1998). My measure of lobbying mobilization does not reflect these outside activities since the measure relies only on lists of registered lobbyist-client dyads. Moreover, my measure does not consider any aspect of campaign finance activities. In the U.S. states, interest groups often (but not always) give to candidates via political action committees (Benz et al. 2011). Shifts in local policy agendas can sometimes spur more giving (Kirkland, Gray, and Lowery 2010). While my measure focuses exclusively on lobbying, grassroots efforts and campaign finance activities are forms of political mobilization separate from direct, inside lobbying. All these forms of mobilization should be interpreted as techniques that groups rely on more or less often depending on political circumstances. Having a more direct measure of *lobbying* mobilization can help to shed light on when groups prefer this tactic more often over outside efforts or campaign giving.

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<sup>6</sup>One outlier is excluded from the box plot. In 2011, there were 32,171 lobbyist-client dyads in New York. This state regularly contained more dyads than any other state. In 2010, New York had the longest lobbyist list in my sample at 43,760 dyads. Later on, I explain why New York's lists are significantly longer than those from other states, and I include a control for this state (and a few others) in my statistical models.



Moreover, the average number of lobbyists hired per group masks differences in relationships between lobbyists and clients. Some lobbyists work for individual clients as full-time, in-house counsel. Others work on retainer for multiple clients, but also work as lobbyists on a full-time basis. Still other lobbyists may not lobby on a full-time basis but instead have other jobs or fulfill other functions for their organizations. Indeed, Milbrath (1963, 117) found substantial differences in the activities that federal lobbyists focused on during each day. He also found that some lobbyists have more prominent roles in managing or leading their client organizations (145 - 61). In the U.S. states, contract lobbyists are quite different from in-house lobbyists in terms of hours spent lobbying and quantity of campaign donations given (see Gray and Lowery 1996a; Rosenthal 1993). My measure of overall lobby intensity is not intended to account for lobbyist-level differences in time spent lobbying. More granular data and measurements are needed to determine how often interest groups turn to different lobbyists, or even to other forms of political mobilization.

Despite its limitations, my measure of lobby mobilization is intended to serve more as a proxy for the overall demand for lobbying within a state (see Leech et al. 2005 and Dusso 2010), and it can be used to test existing proposals of how politics and institutions affect such demand. Prior studies of lobbying in the states have used imprecise measures. While the Energy-Stability-Area area of Gray and Lowery (1995) captures the dynamics of interest group populations, subsequent scholars have often conflated interest populations with overall lobbying activity. This is problematic given that the theoretically implied effects of political and institutional factors should mostly affect the lobbyists of groups. Groups are often credited with seeking access, for example, but it is individual lobbyists who must gain access and communicate with policymakers. In a political system where clients' single-client lobbyists cannot achieve access to incumbents as easily, groups might be more likely to retain multi-client contractors who act as de facto gatekeepers. Since groups are no longer hiring their own single-client advocates, my measure of overall lobby intensity would decrease and reflect the scarcity of access while interest populations would remain stable (provided that

groups do not exit politics altogether). Hence, it is important to test such theories with data that would most precisely reflect hypothesized implications.

Scholars of interest groups have proposed several hypotheses about the effects of political and institutional factors on the mobilization of interest groups. Political factors refer to short-term events or circumstances that might energize groups into lobbying more intensely, or dissuade them from lobbying. For example, if legislatures are more evenly split between competing parties, then the resulting policy uncertainty might spur groups to hire more lobbyists as a form of insurance (LaPira and Thomas 2017, 52 - 58). Institutional factors consist of more long-term features that might affect the expected returns from lobbying, or the cost of lobbying or political access. If a state's constitution allows for direct democracy techniques, then interest groups might change their tactics to focus more on efforts other than inside lobbying. Government spending, legislative staff capacity, legislator term limits, and formal regulations of lobbying have all also been proposed as possible catalysts or dampers of lobby activity.

## **Politics, Institutions, and Lobbying**

Reduced policy stability can energize groups into hiring more lobbyists. Such as in Florida in 1990, if organized interests perceive that policy is more likely to shift on issues that they care about, then not only will more clients register lobbyists but the average number of lobbyists hired per client should increase as well. If policy is perceived to be stable, however, then there is little added benefit to crowding a statehouse with advocates. Strickland (2018a) found that more interest groups register in states with legislatures that are more evenly divided between political parties. Likewise, there are fewer groups with registered lobbyists in states with legislatures dominated by single parties. To determine if partisan division affects lobby intensity, I incorporate a folded Ranney index into statistical models that predict lobby intensity (see Ranney 1976). The index ranges from 0 to 0.5, with

higher values indicating greater one-party dominance within the legislature over the prior six years.<sup>7</sup> If partisan competition encourages interest mobilization, then this variable ought to be negatively associated with the average number of lobbyists hired by each interest group.

If a state's constitution allows for direct democracy, then this can affect the strategies of registered interest groups. Boehmke (2002) found that there are roughly 17 percent more groups with registered lobbyists in states with direct democracy than in other states. The bulk of these additional groups tended to be citizen interests. On average, groups in these states were more likely to rely on outside lobbying tactics instead of on direct, inside lobbying (Boehmke 2005, 120). Following Boehmke's example, I include a dichotomous indicator within my models for whether a state allowed for direct democracy. It is possible that groups in these states rely less on direct lobbying and more on outside efforts such as coordinating protests and letter-writing campaigns (see Kollman 1998). Accordingly, I expect registered interest groups to engage in lobbying less frequently on average in states with direct democracy.

State spending may energize interest groups into lobbying more intensely. If interest groups lobby to protect particularized benefits enshrined in state budgets, then they have more to lose in case the status quo is disrupted. Multiple Virginia School (i.e., public choice) scholars of lobbying have offered similar hypotheses. Using data from 1970, Mueller and Murrell (1986) found that there were more mobilized interests in countries with larger public sectors. Coughlin, Mueller, and Murrell (1990) further illustrated the logic and comparative statics of interest-driven government. While these scholars expected interests to seek more state spending, Salisbury (1992, 85 - 86) instead expected public spending to attract more interest groups. Regardless of the causal direction, both theories suggest there will be more interest mobilization in states that spend more. Those registered groups might also lobby more intensely. Once a government allocates more resources towards constituencies in various

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<sup>7</sup>This measure does not capture polarization between parties. Gray et al. (2015) concluded that polarization within legislatures did not strengthen the relationship between partisan competition and numbers of registered interests.

sectors (perhaps public education, healthcare, or safety services), then groups representing those constituencies will have an added incentive to mobilize both to protect themselves against losses and to seek additional resources. Not only will the groups become active but they will also seek to secure their gains through sustained increased lobbying activity (see Leech et al. 2005 for an examination of how changes in policy activity across issue domains affect lobbying intensity). Recent evidence suggests that this might not be a linear correlation. Drutman (2015, 68) found that the lobbying of a set of companies “level[ed] off” after reaching a threshold. Moreover, when examining lobby activities and government contracts, Ridge, Ingram, and Hill (2017) found that such lobbying returned diminishing benefits. I suspect that lobbying efforts yield state expenditures at a declining marginal rate, or that (equivalently) public spending will generate more lobbying at a declining marginal rate. If spending encourages lobbying, or even if lobbying encourages spending, then logged spending should be positively correlated with numbers of lobbyist-client dyads. General spending statistics were provided by Klarner (2015) and exclude utility, liquor store, or social insurance trust expenditures.

Legislative institutions might also help predict lobbying intensity. Lobbyists often serve as sources of timely and relevant information for lawmakers (see Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963; Hall and Deardorff 2006). Berkman (2001) argues, however, that not all lobbying environments are similar in that some legislatures have permanent staff members who can also provide information to lawmakers. Such staff can substitute for lobbyists, thereby discouraging lobbying. Kattelman (2015) approached the relationship differently by expecting such staff to serve as additional access points for lobbyists, thereby increasing lobbying activity. Legislators in more professionalized assemblies would be able more effectively to “capitalize on the information supply that groups provide” (171). Even though both Berkman and Kattelman used Squire’s (2007) measure of legislative professionalism to test their theories, both of their theories hinge on the presence of staff persons in the legislature. Accordingly, I incorporate the total dollars spent on each state’s legislature into my models, in terms

of dollars per legislator. These figures were provided by Bowen and Greene (2014), who collected the data from the U.S. Census Bureau.

Limitations on how long individuals may serve as legislators has the effect of increasing legislative turnover and reducing institutional knowledge and policy competence among incumbents (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1998; Moncrief and Thompson 2001). As a result, term-limited legislators are perceived by lobbyists as having to rely more often on staff persons and outsiders (i.e., interest groups) for information. Mooney (2007) proposes that reductions in competence among legislators forces lobbyists to engage in educating incumbents more often. As a result following the implementation of term limits, lobbyist populations had grown more quickly in term-limited states than in other states. To determine if term limitations truly increase lobbying within a state, I include in my models a dichotomous variable for when such limits went into effect.

Formal regulations of lobbying might also affect the hiring of lobbyists. Strickland (2018a) showed that more interest groups were registered in U.S. states with more lobbyist registration criteria, but that this effect was moderated by additional campaign finance regulations that limited only the activities of registered groups and lobbyists. His study examined interest populations and did not explore how registration criteria, campaign finance limits, and reporting requirements affect the hiring of lobbyists. In this study, I adopt a similar model specification to test for whether criteria encourage groups to register more lobbyists, and if additional laws dampen this effect. When numbers of interest groups are held constant, the number of lobbyist-group dyads within a state should reflect the residual effect of these laws on lobbyist hiring rates.

I incorporate measures of different lobby laws into my models, as provided by Newmark (2005). As outlined in Table 3, Newmark's scale of lobby laws consists of three types of laws: lobbyist registration criteria, prohibitions on their gift-giving and campaign finance activities, and reporting requirements. Registration criteria range in number from zero to seven. States received an additional point for each criterion they had on the books. Prohibited activities

were numbered from zero to four, and reporting stringency was also measured as being between zero and seven. As with registration criteria, states received higher scores for each additional prohibition or reporting requirement. As Strickland (2018a) did, I use the three components of Newmark’s scale as separate independent variables. I expect criteria to be positively associated with lobbyist hiring rates (as least in terms of registered lobbyists), but prohibitions and reporting requirements should each dampen (interact with) this effect. Registered interest groups may prefer not to register additional lobbyists if doing so triggers prohibitions on their political activities, or required reporting of group and lobbyist activities. Table 4 provides summary statistics from each of my model covariates.

Table 3: Newmark’s Measure of Lobby Regulations

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***Definitions of lobbyists include:***

- Those seeking to lobby the legislature
- Those seeking to lobby administrative agencies
- Elected officials acting as lobbyists
- Public employees acting as lobbyists
- Compensation standards
- Expenditure standards
- Time standards

***Prohibited activities involving lobbyists include:***

- Making campaign contributions at any time
- Making campaign contributions during legislative sessions
- Making expenditures in excess of a certain dollar amount per official per year
- Solicitation by officials or employees for contributions or gifts

***Reporting requirements for lobbyists include:***

- Semi-annual or more frequent reporting for lobbyists or their employers
  - Name of targeted legislation or administrative action
  - Expenditures benefiting public officials or employees
  - Compensation received, broken down by employer(s) or employee(s)
  - Total compensation received
  - Categories of expenditures made
  - Total expenditure made
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Source: Newmark (2005)

Table 4: Summary Statistics for Model Covariates

Statistic	Minimum	25%	Median	75%	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.
Lobbyist-Client Dyads	147	729	1,301	2,428	43,760	2,431	3,858
Registered Clients	97	417	694	1,142	4,275	892	689
Registered Lobbyists	110	368	555	820	5,727	759	736
One-Party Dominance <i>Folded Ranney index.</i>	0.00	0.046	0.110	0.189	0.374	0.126	0.094
Initiative State	0	0	1	1	1	0.534	0.499
State Spending <i>In billions.</i>	1	5.4	12	24	230	19.9	26.6
Legislature Expenditures <i>In thousands.</i>	51	241	437	687	5,521	649	776
Term Limits	0	0	0	1	1	0.146	0.353
Lobby Definitions	0	2	4	5	7	3.668	1.683
Lobby Prohibitions	0	0	1	2	4	1.016	1.122
Reporting Requirements	0	3	5	7	7	4.666	1.970

## Controlling for Interest Populations

When measuring mobilization using the number of registered lobbyist-group dyads within a state, one should control for the number of interest groups registered. The number of registered groups in a state should be a leading predictor of how many lobbyist-group dyads there are. By holding the number of groups constant, one can isolate the effects of explanatory variables on the mobilizational intensity of the groups. Interest populations are typically correlated with the size of a state's economy (Gray and Lowery 1996b). While it is possible to estimate rates of lobbyist hiring while holding economic output constant, this unnecessarily introduces statistical noise into regression models. Since all registered clients must have at least one registered lobbyist, controlling for client totals most effectively isolates the effects of other variables on rates of lobbyist hiring. Controlling for group totals also results in more conservative estimates of effect sizes for other covariates. Since totals of registered interests have already been shown to fluctuate in response to political and institutional fac-

tors, controlling for their totals will already capture much of the effects of these factors. Any residual variance that my econometric models explain will therefore capture the effects of these political and institutional factors on numbers of lobbyist-group dyads.

Totals of lobbyists, clients, and lobbyist-client dyads were calculated based on more than 600 lists of registered lobbyists spanning all U.S. states between 1986 and 2013. The lists were generated by state authorities typically at the end of each legislative session. The lists were drawn from a variety of sources. These include state libraries and archives that the author visited in 29 U.S. states, online databases maintained by state authorities, a directory (i.e., Wilson 1990) consisting of state lobbyist lists from 1989, and from the National Institute on Money in State Politics (which provided most lists from after 2005). Once the lists of lobbyists-client dyads were located in archives or elsewhere, they were transcribed into spreadsheets by research assistants. The spreadsheets allow for the straightforward calculation of dyad totals, and totals of unique lobbyist and client names. There are missing observations in the sample as many lobbyists lists could not be found. Lists from nearly all states were found, however, for 1989 and years after 2005. For nearly all states in my sample, lobbyists alone were tasked with registering their names and the names of their clients. The lists resemble the lobbyist-client dyads presented in Figure 3, but are significantly longer.

The U.S. states were the first regimes in the world to require lobbyists to register and list client names (see Opheim 1991), and their political and institutional variation allows for statistical inference. Massachusetts was the first state to require lobbyists to register, beginning in 1891. Historically, lobbyists were responsible for registering their names and clients with state authorities. Such authorities included legislative clerks, secretaries of state, or ethics agencies. Lobbyists would typically be required to sign their names in legislative docket books, and record the names of the firms, organizations, or interests they represented. In some states, lobbyists would also be required to provide expense statements. By 1975, all U.S. states required lobbyists to register. By the late 1980s, West Virginia and Arkansas were the last states to delegate lobbyist registration to staff persons or agencies outside of



the legislature (Thomas 1998).

When working with lists of lobbyists from the states, one must control for idiosyncratic registration procedures in some states. For recent years, there are a few states where lobbyist lists do not clearly indicate which lobbyists were authorized to represent which clients. In these states, lobbyists were allowed to register as members of firms. Representatives of interest groups were also allowed to authorize firms to represent them. Hence, because these states provided only lobbyist-firm matches or client-firm matches, lobbyist-client dyads could be counted only if one assumed that all lobbyists of the firms were authorized to represent all clients associated with the firm. This was the case in California, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. As a result, lobbyist-client lists from these states provided by the Institute are particularly long and may contain some spurious lobbyist-client dyads. I include a dichotomous control for those four states within my econometric models. Also, beginning in Michigan in the early 1980s, lobbyists were no longer required to re-register for each legislative session. Michigan's lobbyist list from 1989 (provided in Wilson 1990) likely includes numerous lobbyist-client dyads that were active during prior sessions. I include a dichotomous indicator also for this observation. More recent lists from Michigan provided by the Institute are significantly shorter and do not appear to contain outdated dyads.

## **Estimation Method and Results**

My dependent variable is the total of lobbyist-client dyads registered within a U.S. state. Since this variable is a non-negative count of events, I estimated regression coefficients using the negative binomial variance function. This function helps to account for overdispersion where model-conditional variances exceed model-conditional means (see King 1988; Long 1997, 230 - 41). Moreover, since I am working with multiple observations within each state, my observations are clustered into different political systems. This violates the least squares assumption of independent errors. As a result, I estimated models with standard errors

clustered by state (see Primo, Jacobsmeier, and Milyo 2007). These models do not control for the different starting points of states or for national factors that might affect all states similarly. For eliminating the influence of those factors, I estimated a second set of models with fixed effects included for each state and year (but not with standard errors clustered by state). These models provide more conservative estimates of effect sizes because they rely only on within-state changes (see Allison 2009). Effect sizes in these models may be artificially small for institutional variables that change slowly over time (see Beck and Katz 2001). Models 2 and 4 exclude observations from Nebraska’s non-partisan Unicameral.

## Results

We can draw several conclusions based on the results presented in Table 5. The first is that the number of registered interest groups within a state is a leading predictor of how many lobbyist-client dyads there are. This result is robust to the inclusion of state and year fixed effects, which forces my models to rely only on variation that occurs within states but over time. This significant correlation is unsurprising given that all lobbyists must have at least one client. Instead, the other coefficients that partially explain the residual heterogeneity are more interesting. They tell a complex story.

When models are allowed to use both across-state and within-state variation to calculate effect (coefficient) sizes, one-party dominance is negatively correlated with numbers of lobbyist-client dyads. Partisan dominance has been found to discourage interest groups from registering, and there appears also to be some effect on the lobbying intensity of registered groups. In models with fixed effects, groups did not mobilize or de-mobilize in response to shifts in partisan dominance. Those models utilized only variation that occurs within states but over time. The absence of discernible findings within those models suggests that most heterogeneity in one-party dominance was found *between* states. The exclusion of client totals from my fixed-effects models does not alter this result. The differences across models also suggests that party dominance may be correlated with a time-invariant confounder that

Table 5: Explaining Lobbying in the U.S. States

	Model 1 Clustered SE	Model 2 Clustered SE	Model 3 Fixed Effects	Model 4 Fixed Effects
<u>Interest Groups</u> 1,000	0.826*** (0.108)	0.833*** (0.100)	0.769*** (0.038)	0.763*** (0.039)
One-Party Dominance	-	-0.627** (0.286)	-	-0.227 (0.137)
Initiative State	0.020 (0.075)	0.042 (0.076)	0.916*** (0.218)	0.877*** (0.220)
Logged State Spending (In \$1,000s.)	0.306*** (0.056)	0.300*** (0.055)	0.034 (0.119)	0.015 (0.120)
Legislature Expenditures	-0.184*** (0.057)	-0.200*** (0.056)	0.113 (0.065)	0.100 (0.065)
Term Limits	-0.010 (0.073)	-0.013 (0.077)	-0.142*** (0.046)	-0.120** (0.048)
Lobby Definitions	0.030 (0.046)	0.025 (0.045)	0.094*** (0.025)	0.087*** (0.026)
Lobby Prohibitions	0.158 (0.081)	0.132 (0.075)	0.078 (0.053)	0.067 (0.054)
Reporting Requirements	-0.007 (0.026)	-0.008 (0.027)	0.049** (0.020)	0.047** (0.020)
Definitions*Prohibitions	-0.032 (0.017)	-0.028 (0.016)	-0.021 (0.012)	-0.019 (0.012)
Definitions*Reporting	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.011 (0.005)	-0.010 (0.005)
Constant	1.563 (0.820)	1.757** (0.827)	5.236*** (1.856)	5.606*** (1.875)
$\ln(\alpha)$	-2.396 (0.163)	-2.421 (0.152)	-3.407 (0.058)	-3.399 (0.058)
<i>Observations</i>	630	620	630	620
<i>No. of States</i>	50	49	50	49
<i>Log Likelihood</i>	-4,734	-4,658	-4,418	-4,357
<i>AIC</i>	9,495	9,344	9,015	8,894

\*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01 on two-tailed tests. Standard errors are in parentheses.

is not included within the first two models. Models 3 and 4 also suggest that changing a state's initiative status led to more lobbying on the part of registered interest groups. However, this result is due to a single outlier within a state.<sup>8</sup> Re-estimating my models after excluding this outlier eliminates the statistical significance of initiative state status.

Similar explanations may be applied to logged state spending and legislature expenditures. These variables were also significant predictors of lobby intensity only in models with clustered standard errors. In models with fixed effects, results do not provide evidence that increases in U.S. state spending led to more lobbying within states. This is in contrast to the results of Mueller and Murrell (1986), who identified more interest groups in nations with more state spending. My results also do not suggest that increases in legislative expenditures lead to less lobbying, as Berkman (2001) suggested. This does not mean that these factors have no effects on interest populations. State spending and legislature expenditures might still affect the totals of registered interest groups. If one excludes group totals from my models, then state spending becomes a positive and significant predictor of lobbyist-client pairings. This suggests that most of government spending's effects on lobbying are through the entry or exit of additional groups, and not additional lobbyists. The exclusion of group totals from my models does not alter substantive results for legislature expenditures.

In contrast to the expectations of Mooney (2007), states in which term limits took effect saw a statistically significant drop in lobbyist hiring. This result persists even when group totals are excluded from my models with fixed effects. This result is likely not due to outliers since term limits went into effect in sixteen states throughout my sample.<sup>9</sup> This does not

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<sup>8</sup>Since models with fixed effects rely only on within-state changes to estimate effect sizes, the significance of initiative state status is the result of an outlier. Most states had adopted direct democracy prior to when my sample begins, in 1986. Throughout my sample, only two states (Kentucky and Mississippi) became initiative states. There are no observations from when Kentucky did not allow for direct democracy, and there is only one observation from Mississippi from before that state's change in initiative status. Mississippi became an initiative state in 1992. Mississippi's lobbyist list from 1989 is short compared to its lobbyist lists from after 1993 (when lists were published online). The significance of a state's initiative status change hinges entirely on the one observation from Mississippi.

<sup>9</sup>Term limitations were approved in five more states but never went into effect in some due to legal challenges. In Oregon, term limits were briefly in effect between 1998 and 2003. As of 2018, term limits apply to legislators in fifteen states.

suggest that Mooney’s analysis is flawed. Whereas Mooney explored how lobbyist totals changed over time in states with term limits and in states without limits, my analysis takes into account fluctuations in both client and lobbyist totals. According to my results, interest groups in states with limits hired roughly 12.3 percent fewer lobbyists than groups in states without limits, on average. What might explain this counterintuitive relationship? In models not reported here, term limits are found to be a negative predictor of client totals. Yet, even among registered interests, lobbyist hiring is depressed as well. These trends suggest that term limits might create an environment that discourages lobbying in general. At the same time, however, the effects of term limits are not the same in every U.S. state. States vary in the severity of their term-limits laws (see Sarbaugh-Thompson 2010), and there is substantial variation in legislator turnover even among states without limits (see Moncrief, Niemi, and Powell 2004). Further exploration is needed to help identify the causal mechanism linking term limits with lobbying.

My models also suggest that the implementation of some lobbyist laws affect rates of lobbyist hiring by interest groups. Strickland (2018a) found that more registration criteria get more interest groups to register, but that this relationship is moderated by prohibitions on lobbyists giving gifts and campaign donations. Since group totals are already affected by lobby regulations, it is notable that these laws also affect the hiring of lobbyists among the remaining groups who register. The effects of lobby laws on lobbyist registration are somewhat similar to their effects on interest populations. The addition of registration criteria within a state led to more lobbyists registering relative to group totals. The implementation of more reporting requirements also had a positive effect. It was expected that reporting requirements would dampen the influence of definitions in capturing more groups, but the negative interactive term between the two variables did not achieve traditional levels of statistical significance. Limits on gift-giving and campaign finance activities were not correlated with lobbyist-client dyads.

## Tests for Multi-Client Lobbying

While the initial set of regression models with fixed effects show that term limits and lobby laws are correlated with the hiring of lobbyists by interest groups, the measure of overall lobbying does not capture the popularity of multi-client advocates over single-client ones. Interest groups in some states rely more often on multi-client lobbyists than on single-client ones (see Strickland and Crosson 2016). These differences may prove problematic for measuring the overall level of lobbying. Dyad counts can be influenced by the share of clients hiring multi-client over single-client lobbyists, even when group counts are held constant. While dyad counts would decrease if interest groups shifted (on average) from single-client advocates to multi-client advocates, two states with similar numbers of groups could have similar dyad counts but with different numbers of lobbyists. This is possible so long as lobbyists in one state tend to represent one client each whereas those in the other state each represent multiple clients. Let us imagine two U.S. states with six clients each. In one state, there are ten lobbyists who represent one client each (some clients hired two single-client lobbyists). As a result, there are ten lobbyist-client dyads in all. In the second state, there are also six clients and ten lobbyist-client dyads, but only six lobbyists. That is because four of the six lobbyists represent two clients each. Even though the interest groups in the first state have each hired only single-client lobbyists (with some of those groups hiring two such lobbyists), the state has the same number of dyads and clients as in the second state, where four of the six clients hired multi-client lobbyists. Hence, the dyad count within a state can mask the popularity of multi-client advocates, even when client totals are held constant. This is problematic for my measure since I argue that any group that hires a single-client lobbyist is mobilizing more intensely than a group that shares a multi-client lobbyist with other clients.

In additional model specifications, I test for whether political and institutional variables are correlated with multi-client lobbying. When client *and* lobbyist counts are held constant, the number of lobbyist-client dyads in a state is a proxy for how much multi-client lobbying

is occurring. If client and lobbyist totals are the same in two states, then there is more multi-client lobbying in the state with the greater number of dyads. If a political or institutional variable is correlated with multi-client lobbying (i.e., it positively predicts dyads in models with both lobbyist and client totals), then it may not affect overall lobbying so much as it affects the balance of multi- versus single-client lobbyists among groups. On the other hand, if a political or institutional variable is not correlated with multi-client lobbying, then the results presented for it in Table 5 are indeed reliable estimates of its effect on rates of overall lobbying. Checking for whether explanatory variables are correlated with multi-client lobbying is a necessary robustness check for determining sources of overall lobbying. I present additional model specifications in Table 6. With the exception of the introduction of lobbyist counts, the model specifications in Table 6 are the same as those in Table 5.

The results presented in Table 6 provide insight into which political and institutional variables encourage multi-client lobbying. Both group and lobbyist populations are significant and positive predictors of lobbyist-client dyads. This is unsurprising given that dyads consist of lobbyist and client pairings. One-party dominance is correlated with less multi-client lobbying as groups active in more divided legislatures hire more multi-client lobbyists. This might be because multi-client firms often form ties with members of one party or another. Legislative expenditures is a significant predictor of multi-client lobbying, as well. This may be due to spending being correlated with another factor that might influence lobbying, such as legislative institutionalization (see Berry, Berkman, and Schneiderman 2000).<sup>10</sup> Importantly, the implementation of term limits in a state was not correlated with more or less multi-client lobbying. Term limits did not compell groups to change their choice of lobbyist types. This re-affirms the results originally presented in Table 5. As for lobby

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<sup>10</sup>In additional model specifications, I re-estimated my models using the raw count of permanent legislative staff persons in each state. These figures were provided by the National Conference of State Legislatures (2016). Such permanent staffers work for legislatures even when they are not in session. Unlike with legislature expenditures, raw staff counts were not significant predictors of dyads in any of the model specifications presented here. This suggests that expenditures (and certainly professionalism) measure much more than merely staff capacity. It also suggests that staff capacity has no effect on the lobbying strategies of registered interest groups.

laws, the interactive effect between registration criteria and reporting requirements achieves statistical significance in models with lobbyist counts. This suggests that the imposition of registration criteria and reporting requirements got existing groups to register more dyads with multi-client lobbyists in a state, but that reporting requirements dampened this trend somewhat. Figure 5 shows this dampening effect under two reporting conditions when all variables (except definitions) are held at their means. The predicted dyad counts are based on the results presented in Model 8.

In general, the results presented in Tables 5 and 6 suggest that the effects of political and institutional factors on lobbying are more complex than originally thought. Scholars of interest representation have proposed a variety of hypotheses for how these factors might influence lobbying. They have also used a variety of measurement scales for their explanatory variables. These variables, however, might affect any one of at least three aspects of lobbying: interest populations, lobbyist-client dyad counts, and the incidence of multi-client lobbying. Whereas term limits depresses lobbyist hiring and is not correlated with multi-client lobbying, the effects of lobby laws on overall lobbyist hiring may be an artifact of groups shifting to multi-client lobbyists in response to new laws.

## Discussion and Conclusion

This study was intended to improve our understanding of lobbying in the U.S. states. Prior studies of interest mobilization in the states have conflated interest populations with mobilization, or have explored variations in raw totals of lobbyists. To build on these studies, I proposed a simple measure for the average lobbying effort of interest groups in a state. At the group level, the number of lobbyists it hires can be interpreted as an indication of its intensity of lobbying effort. When aggregated to the level of states, the total number of lobbyist-client dyads is a good proxy for lobby intensity when client totals are held constant. This measure does not reflect other forms of political mobilization such as outside efforts




Table 6: Multi-Client Lobbying in the U.S. States

	Model 5 Clustered SE	Model 6 Clustered SE	Model 7 Fixed Effects	Model 8 Fixed Effects
<u>Interest Groups</u> 1,000	0.619*** (0.090)	0.635*** (0.085)	0.524*** (0.051)	0.502*** (0.052)
<u>Lobbyists</u> 1,000	0.237** (0.102)	0.224** (0.102)	0.294*** (0.042)	0.310*** (0.043)
One-Party Dominance	-	-0.418 (0.221)	-	-0.275** (0.131)
Initiative State	-0.010 (0.067)	0.006 (0.067)	0.953*** (0.211)	0.907*** (0.212)
Logged State Spending (In \$1,000s.)	0.298*** (0.056)	0.296*** (0.056)	0.072 (0.115)	0.048 (0.115)
Legislature Expenditures	-0.148*** (0.048)	-0.160*** (0.047)	0.227*** (0.066)	0.215*** (0.066)
Term Limits	-0.016 (0.063)	-0.015 (0.068)	-0.068 (0.045)	-0.033 (0.047)
Lobby Definitions	0.050 (0.037)	0.045 (0.037)	0.094*** (0.024)	0.084*** (0.025)
Lobby Prohibitions	0.186** (0.080)	0.166** (0.075)	0.083 (0.051)	0.066 (0.052)
Reporting Requirements	-0.002 (0.020)	-0.003 (0.021)	0.049*** (0.019)	0.049** (0.019)
Definitions*Prohibitions	-0.039** (0.016)	-0.035** (0.016)	-0.018 (0.011)	-0.014 (0.011)
Definitions*Reporting	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.013** (0.005)	-0.013** (0.005)
Constant	1.584 (0.805)	1.698** (0.821)	4.553*** (1.789)	4.931*** (1.801)
$\ln(\alpha)$	-2.550 (0.145)	-2.557 (0.143)	-3.487 (0.058)	-3.487 (0.059)
<i>Observations</i>	630	620	630	620
<i>No. of States</i>	50	49	50	49
<i>Log Likelihood</i>	-4,685	-4,615	-4,393	-4,331
<i>AIC</i>	9,398	9,261	8,967	8,843

\*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01 on two-tailed tests. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Figure 5: Predicted Dyads for Two Reporting Conditions



or campaign finance activities, and it also does not measure the balance of single- versus multi-client lobbyists, but it advances our understanding of lobbying by allowing scholars to test existing hypotheses with greater precision.

Do interest groups mobilize in response to short-term political factors, or are their rates of lobbying generally steady because of long-term institutional features? This study was conducted partly in response to prior studies of interest mobilization in the U.S. states. Others have found evidence that politics *and* institutions play some part in structuring interest representation. Gray and Lowery (1996b) found that partisan competition spurs more groups to register. In several studies, Boehmke (2002; 2005) found that there are more interest groups in states with direct democracy. Mueller and Murrell (1986) identified more groups in nations with more state spending. Lobbyist totals grew more quickly in states with term limits than in states without them (Mooney 2007). Berkman (2001) found there are fewer groups in states with more professional legislatures. Strickland (2018a) found that gift-giving and campaign finance restrictions push down registration totals for groups. All these studies have contributed to our understanding of the mobilization of interest groups, but they focused more on the entry or exit of groups instead of on how many lobbyists or what kinds of lobbyists the groups hired. Interest populations are substantively meaningful, but they mask the true amount of lobbying that occurs within America's crowded statehouses.

By focusing on numbers of lobbyist-client dyads, I found that it is mostly institutional factors that shape the hiring rates of lobbyists. In Models 3 and 4, term limits and lobby laws have the strongest discernible correlations with the hiring of lobbyists. The implementation of term limits in a state was associated with decreased rates of lobbyist hiring, while registration criteria and reporting requirements were associated with more dyads. Once I controlled for lobbyist totals in Models 7 and 8, term limits were no longer a significant predictor of dyad counts, and reporting requirements were found to interact with registration criteria. Moreover, one-party dominance (a short-term, political factor) and legislature expenditures became significant predictors of dyad counts. The differences in model results across tables

were ascribed as being due to shifts in the balance of single- versus multi-client lobbyists. If both client and lobbyist populations are held constant, then dyads increase in response to more multi-client lobbying.

These findings present several additional questions for scholars of interest representation. To understand better the effects of both political and institutional factors on lobbying, it would be beneficial to examine rates of lobbying by individual sectors or guilds of interests. Legislative activity in specific policy domains may spur more lobbying on behalf of only some sectors of interest groups (see Gray, Lowery, and Fellowes 2005; Dusso 2010). As state economies and interest populations grow, there may also be unequal, long-term growth between sectors in their political mobilization (see Lowery, Gray, and Fellowes 2005). If sectors of interest groups vary the strength of their lobbying efforts in response to policy agenda shifts, then variables such as legislative gridlock and the granting of economic rents may partly be results of differential lobbying efforts across sectors of interests. Exploring how state-level partisan competition influences totals of lobbyist-client dyads may also be too broad of a approach for truly capturing the short-term effects of politics on lobbying. Such an approach surely misses granular differences in mobilization across policy domains or sectors. It might also be the case that types of interest groups vary in how often they employ single- or multi-client lobbyists.

My measure of lobbying has limitations and might be most informative when used in conjunction with measures of other forms of political mobilization. Lobbying, as a form of mobilization, is distinct from outside grassroots efforts and campaign finance activities. For interest groups, lobbying should be seen as one tool in an arsenal of political tactics. Groups can vary their use of different tools for strategic purposes. Campaign donations may be used to bolster lobbying efforts (see Hall and Wayman 1990), or groups may shift towards outside lobbying tactics in response to a proposal's status in the legislative process (see Hall and Reynolds 2012). Moreover, groups may choose to pay their lobbyists for more hours of representation. These are metrics that are not directly captured by my measure.

Much work remains to be done on studying the political tactics of interest groups in the U.S. states, and the determinants of their lobbying activities. Linking group-level accounts of lobby intensity to system-level changes in politics and institutions is a challenging task that requires granular lobbyist data. Nevertheless, this chapter was intended to be a step forward in advancing our understanding of interest representation in the U.S. states.

# Chapter Three:

## Client-Level Determinants of Multi-Client Lobbying

Throughout the past three decades, interest groups active in Congress and the U.S. states have increasingly come to rely on these lobbyists for representation. To explain the rise of multi-client advocates, I argue that groups hire these lobbyists based on how central lobbying is to their core functions or missions. Advocacy is a core function for public interest groups but not for business firms. Public interest groups hire single-client advocates because of economic and agency-related reasons. Public interest groups maintain a constant lobby presence while business firms desiring part-time representation prefer hire multi-client lobbyists on an hourly retainer. Public interest groups also have to rely on the support of dues-paying members and donors. Members and donors derive more purposive benefit from giving directly to in-house lobby enterprises. Using an original data set consisting of more than 80,000 client-level observations that span all U.S. states and multiple decades, I find that public interest groups are indeed less likely to hire multi-client lobbyists than business interests. This finding is robust to the inclusion of total numbers of lobbyists hired per group, and an array of lobby laws and totals of revolving-door lobbyists. The rise of multi-client lobbyists can be attributed to the entry of more businesses and other private interests into political lobbying.

## Public Interest Groups and Lobbying

Lobbying is a core mission for organizations that advocate for public or collective goods. Such organizations are regularly referred to as public interest groups. These groups advocate for “collective good[s]” that do not “selectively and materially benefit the membership or activists of the organization” (Berry 1978, 385). In other words, such public goods are non-rivalrous: the consumption of a public good by one person does not hinder its consumption by another. They are also non-excludable: no one can prevent another person from benefiting. Examples of public goods include ethical government, due process, and a clean environment. It is not in the interests of individuals to pay for these goods since everyone (including free-riders) benefit from their eventual provision (see Olson 1965). Yet, public interest organizations such as Common Cause, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the Sierra Club all successfully attract and retain members who support (with their dues) advocacy for the state provision of public goods. In addition to having dues-paying members, organizations like these are often founded by motivated issue entrepreneurs (see Salisbury 1969; Berry 1978) and benefit from large contributions from individuals or institutions (Walker 1983).

There are two reasons why public interest groups hire multi-client lobbyists less often than other groups. The two explanations are related to each other and, admittedly, cannot be disentangled easily. The first explanation is more economic in nature (based in transaction cost economics) whereas the second is more sociological (based in agency theory). Others have melded such disparate approaches to corporate and organizational strategy before (see Kaufman, Englander, and Marcus 1993; and Jia 2018). The first approach: public interest groups rely on single-client lobbyists more often than other interests because of costs. Unlike for business firms, advocacy is a core organizational mission for public interest groups. These groups seek to maintain a constant presence within legislative affairs because public goods are under constant threat of being under-provided. Single-client lobbyists can provide constant advocacy on a more cost-efficient basis than hourly contractors, and they might also work at a

discounted rate because of loyalty to their employer's cause. The second reason why public interest groups hire single-client lobbyists is to preserve the legitimacy of their advocacy efforts. Public interest groups are often purposive organizations (see Clark and Wilson 1961, 146). Being represented by a single-client lobbyist helps to preserve the identity of the organization in the eyes of policy makers and dues-paying members. It also protects the integrity of the organization's advocacy by minimizing the potential for conflicts of interest.

## Advocacy as Organizational Mission

Political advocacy is a core function for organizations that advocate for public goods (see Thompson 1967, 10). The public goods that these groups seek are provided most effectively by governments since individuals have limited incentives to contribute to the provision of public goods voluntarily (Olson 1965). As a result, advocacy focusing on the activities of government (as opposed to private businesses) is a core mission of public interest organizations. As opposed to for-profit or business firms that produce private goods for sale in private markets, public interest groups must pursue their goals within the political arena. For businesses, political advocacy is merely of ancillary benefit. They might engage in advocacy only when necessary and perhaps even unwillingly. For public interest groups such as Common Cause, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), or Sierra Club, political advocacy is a core organizational function.<sup>11</sup>

Organizations for whom advocacy is a core function are interested in maintaining a constant political presence. Olson's (1965) logic of collective action implies that individuals have insufficient incentives to contribute to the provision of public goods, or to groups that advocate for their provision. The logic also implies that public goods are under constant threat of being underprovided because governments are lobbied mostly by private interests

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<sup>11</sup>These organizations may engage in multiple forms of advocacy. Direct lobbying is one such form. Other forms of advocacy include outside, grassroots-based efforts. These include sponsoring letter-writing campaigns, advertisements, or polls (see Kollman 1998). It is difficult to measure how often organizations rely on inside, direct lobbying *versus* outside efforts, but I attempt to control for differences in overall lobbying in my statistical analyses.



seeking particularistic goods. Examples of particularistic goods include tax and regulatory exemptions, or subsidies. Indeed, the entities that lobby government most often are institutional firms that face less steep challenges in overcoming collective action problems (see Lowery and Gray 1998).<sup>12</sup>

For providing a constant presence, it is more cost-effective to hire single-client, in-house advocates than multi-client contractors. Multi-client contractors are usually retained by clients on an hourly basis or work on commission. Many of them are legal professionals and charge high hourly rates. For groups wishing to lobby constantly, it is more cost-effective to internalize lobbying and pay an in-house employee a flat salary for lobbying services. Firms for whom advocacy is not a constant, organizational mission are attracted to multi-client contractors for the opposite reason: they offer clients flexibility. Hiring a multi-client contractor allows an organization more easily to ratchet up or tone down lobbying efforts as the government agenda affects its interests (see Drutman 2015, 134). These firms hire lobbyists only when government affects them (Leech et al. 2005; Dusso 2010). Contractors can be hired and disengaged more easily than in-house employees.

Public interest groups also pay less for full-time advocates than other organizations. Such groups attract members who are politically engaged and care about the missions of the organizations (see Berry 1977, 93 - 103; Rothenberg 1992, 63 - 95). As a result, public interest groups often can rely on individuals to serve as volunteers or to work at a discounted rate (Berry 1977, 102). By volunteering or working for public interest groups, individuals sacrifice some pay for the satisfaction of helping to fulfill political goals they care about. That is, whereas volunteers or employees may earn more money by working for business firms, they instead choose to work for the public interest because they derive non-monetary utility from such work (i.e., purposive benefits). They derive *conviction* from their work (Baumgartner et al. 2009, 184 - 85). As a result, full-time political advocacy is more

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<sup>12</sup>At the same time, there are benefits to maintaining a constant presence. Berry (1999) found that successful citizen groups developed reputations for issue-specific expertise. Maintaining a constant lobby presence on a core set of issues allowed those advocates to develop expertise.

affordable for organizations that aim to produce public goods than for organizations that produce private goods. Organizations such as Common Cause, the ACLU, or Sierra Club all benefit from this reduced-cost labor, which gives these organizations even more incentive to retain in-house, single-client lobbyists.

## Protecting Advocacy Legitimacy

Public interest groups also hire single-client lobbyists in order to preserve group identities. Many public interest groups rely on members and contributors for support (Walker 1991, 65). As examples, Common Cause, the ACLU, and Sierra Club all recruit dues-paying members who contribute to advocacy efforts. These members join for the sake of deriving purposive (expressive) benefits (Berry 1977, 36 - 43; Cook 1984; King and Walker 1992).<sup>13</sup> For continued support, public interest groups must preserve their identities in the eyes of members and contributors. These members and donors draw more purposive benefit from giving directly to an in-house lobby enterprise than from giving to a multi-client contractor (see Salisbury 1969). Hiring a single-client, in-house lobbyist allows an organization more able to claim credit for policy victories whereas hiring an independent, multi-client lobbyist entails a loss of group identity, in part (Holyoke 2009).<sup>14</sup>

Public interest groups also turn to single-client advocates in order to preserve the public legitimacy of their advocacy efforts. By hiring single-client agents, public interest groups are protecting their organizational missions from external risks (see Thompson 1967). For these groups, such risks include hiring lobbyists who shirk or have conflicts of interest. The best way to address such problems is to hire a lobbyist who already shares the interest of the client

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<sup>13</sup>See Rothenberg (1992, 67) for a survey of persons who joined Common Cause, a public interest group that advocates for government reform. More than 70 percent of surveyed members listed forms of purposive benefits as the “principal reason” for them joining the group.

<sup>14</sup>Multi-client lobbyists are often weakly committed to the interests of their clients (Milbrath 1963, 109). While they may deliver more access to policy makers in the short-run, the use of multi-client professionals does not bolster the standing of citizens’ groups in the eyes of legislators in the long-run (Rosenthal 1993, 56). Moreover, many public interest groups do not need to purchase political access from connected multi-client contractors because they can otherwise gain access to policymakers by showing grassroots support (as in Kollman 1998).

or public interest group. In other words, the group must hire an advocate who agrees with the mission of the organization, or who lobbies with conviction.<sup>15</sup> Such lobbyists are less likely to shirk because they personally share the interests of their clients. Given their strong interest in single issues, those lobbyists are (themselves) also less likely to be multi-client contractors with multiple interests. Public interest groups not only prefer lobbyists who share their interests, they avoid multi-client lobbyists because of increased risk of shirking. Hiring a lobbyist who shirks or who has conflicts of interest can be especially damaging for public interest groups. Wasting money on a bad lobbyist undermines the core function of the organization, and can harm membership recruitment and fundraising efforts. Hiring lobbyists who represent opposing interests can especially damage membership recruitment and fund-raising efforts. Members and donors would discontinue joining or contributing to organizations that pay the lobbyists of opposing interests.

## Using State-Level Lobby Data

To determine if public interest groups prefer to hire single-interest advocates over multi-client ones, I utilize a large sample of registered groups from the U.S. states. The states were the first governments in the world to register lobbyists on a consistent basis (see Opheim 1991; Strickland 2018a). I gathered lists of registered lobbyists and clients from all U.S. states for years 1989 and 2011. Lists from 1989 were found mostly in Wilson (1990), a compendium of state lobbyist lists. Most lists from 2011 were provided by the National Institute on Money in State Politics, hereafter labeled the Institute.<sup>16</sup> From the lists, I generated a data set

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<sup>15</sup>Interest group leaders can accomplish this goal partly by hiring individuals who reflect their tastes or preferences. Heinz et al. (1993, 59 - 83) found that there was substantial variation in the professional (such as occupations and income levels) and personal characteristics (including ethnicities, partisan and religious affiliations, and gender balances) of lobbyists depending on the types of clients they represented. For example, there tended to be many fewer Catholic representatives of agricultural groups, which the authors accredited to differing group constituencies. Even though advocates in every policy domain were mostly white or male, members of racial minorities were slightly more popular as representatives among labor-related groups. Female representatives were clustered in the healthcare domain.

<sup>16</sup>Some lists found in Wilson (1990) appeared short when compared to the 1990 interest populations published in Gray and Lowery (1996). For those states, I turned to original lobbyist lists found in state

consisting of more than 80,000 unique client-state-year observations. Each row consists of an interest group registered in a particular state and year, along with totals of single- and multi-client lobbyists hired by that group.<sup>17</sup> The resulting data set allows for the broadest glimpse of single- and multi-client lobbying ever conducted, especially by groups active in the U.S. states. A broad approach is appropriate given that the hiring of lobbyists, whether single- or multi-client ones, is an activity common to all kinds of interest groups. This approach differs from previous studies of single organizations (e.g., Rothenberg 1992) that allow for rich explorations of organizational features.

Using lobby registration data from the U.S. states presents both benefits and challenges. Among the benefits, the data allow researchers to measure the effects of group- and state-level covariates simultaneously. Differences between and within states (but over time) offer scholars opportunities for making inferences based on statistical analyses. Scholars working with federal data cannot test as many hypotheses given that such data are generated for only the U.S. Congress. Moreover, using cross-national lobby data proves challenging given the limited set of nations that require lobbyists to register, vast differences in their registration criteria, and the limited number of years of data available (see Chari, Hogan, and Murphy 2010). Another benefit of using lobby data from the U.S. states is that such data have been under-utilized for studying public interest groups. Previous large-scale studies of public interests relied on surveys of groups based in the nation's capital (see Berry 1977; Walker 1983; Berry 1999), although there are exceptions (e.g., Cook 1984). My data set allows for

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archives and libraries. Those states include Alaska, Maryland, and New Hampshire. Whereas the Institute gathered lobbyist lists directly from state authorities, some of their lists also appeared short when compared to 2007 interest populations published in Lowery, Gray, and Cluverius (2015). As a result, I gathered lobbyist lists directly from state authorities for Alaska, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming. New Jersey's lobbyist list is from the Institute but is from 2013.

<sup>17</sup>I examined the lobbyist hiring decisions of individual clients. I began with lists of unique lobbyist-client pairings transcribed from lobbyist registration records. Client totals were then calculated for each lobbyist. Single-client lobbyists were clustered together. Totals of single-client lobbyists were then calculated for each client before duplicate client names were removed. Multi-client lobbyists were also clustered together. Totals of multi-client lobbyists were then counted for each client, and duplicate client names were accordingly filtered out. This process was repeated for each U.S. state, and produced a large data set consisting of client-state-year observations, and the totals of single- and multi-client lobbyists each client hired. The data set consists of 81,318 client-state-year observations.

new insights into how the strength of public interest groups has waxed or waned over time in the states. Among the challenges presented by using state-based lobby registration data, however, are the effects of confounding variables, including the potential for unregistered lobbying, differences in the regulation of lobbying, and legislative characteristics. These confounding variables might explain not only the substantial cross-state differences in multi-client lobbying seen as early as 1989, but also the different rates of change seen across states. I control for these confounders in my statistical analyses, thereby informing previous studies of lobby laws and how legislative institutions affect lobbying.

## Lobby Laws

In determining what kinds of advocates interest groups most often hire, I control for different kinds of regulations on the lobbying process. First among these are the criteria that determine which advocates have to register as lobbyists. As mentioned previously, the U.S. states have a long history of registering lobbyists, particularly those targeting legislators. Using lobby registration data to study the actions of public interest groups, however, poses two risks. Lobby registration criteria may not capture all lobbying activities. Some states have broad, comprehensive criteria that define multiple facets of lobbying. Other states have few criteria. In states with few criteria, there likely are more unregistered, shadow lobbyists. Second, advocates for public interest groups might be less likely to register as lobbyists than full-time, multi-client advocates. These advocates may want to avoid the official status of “lobbyist” in order to preserve the legitimacy of advocacy efforts in the eyes of dues-paying members (who would prefer to think that their dues pay for more transparent forms of advocacy). In addition, some public interest groups might not register some lobbyists in order to preserve their non-profit tax exemptions (see Berry 1977, 48 - 55). Some public interests engage in political advocacy but have no registered lobbyists (see Berry 1977, 13; Baumgartner et al. 2009, 199).<sup>18</sup> In order to compare rates of single- and multi-client advocacy across

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<sup>18</sup>Non-profit organizations registered as tax-deductible 501(c)(3) units are forbidden by the Internal Revenue Service from engaging in substantial political advocacy, but this does not mean that public interest

interest groups and states, I control for the total number of lobbyist registration criteria adopted in each state. I expect more criteria to capture additional single-client lobbyists. Whereas full-time, multi-client advocates lobby often enough to trigger required registration, single-client advocates may not lobby as frequently or spend as much money, thereby avoiding registration in states with few criteria. I incorporate an additive index of criteria into my statistical models. The index consists of the first seven lobby laws in Newmark's (2005) general index of lobby laws, outlined in Table 3. The criteria counts were provided by Strickland (2018a).

Ethics laws restrict or place limits on the activities of lobbyists. These laws might affect state-level rates of multi-client advocacy. Lobbyists have been shown to cultivate personal relationships with lawmakers and their staff in order to maintain access to them. Giving gifts or campaign donations can help ensure access and also encourage lawmakers to change their behavior. Donations have been linked to access (Chin, Bond, and Geva 2000) and increased committee participation (Hall and Wayman 1990). There is evidence that lobbyists form symbiotic relationships with legislative offices, and this often involves giving campaign donations. Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi (2014) found that donations from the same lobbyists follow members of Congress even when they change committees. Indeed, firms of multi-client lobbyists in the U.S. states often have related political action committees that make donations to allies (Gray and Lowery 1996). None of this is surprising given that lobbyists have acted as "service bureaus" for their legislative allies for decades

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groups cannot lobby at all. Not all public interest groups are 501(c)(3) units. Among the groups Berry (1977, 51) studied, slightly fewer than half had 501(c)(3) designation. Roughly a third of the groups had no tax-deductible status, and a small number had formed into 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations with associated tax-deductible foundations. Even for tax-deductible non-profits, communication with legislators is permitted so long as they act in an educational capacity by providing technical assistance to legislators (Berry 1977, 47). These groups were found often to have existing relationships with legislators who granted them access (i.e., invited them to provide information). Merely discussing issues with legislators does not qualify as lobbying so long as there is no official legislative action pending on the topic of conversation, or as long as the non-profit organization does not advocate for a particular proposal. Moreover, lobbying is still permitted for 501(c)(3) organizations so long as it does not constitute a substantial part of the organization's overall activity (see Mehta 2009). Congress introduced rules in 1976 that allows non-profits to lobby in part. These rules are not expected to affect the kinds of lobbyists that non-profits hire since non-substantial lobbying may include single- or multi-client lobbyists.

(see Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1964, 353; Hall and Deardorff 2006). If lobbyists are disallowed from giving gifts or making donations, however, then this might harm their ability to act as exclusive door-keepers for powerful lawmakers. In turn, interest groups will not perceive a need to hire multi-client door-keepers if their in-house advocates get similar levels of access. I incorporate an additive scale of ethics laws into my statistical models. The laws limit the gifts and donations that lobbyists may give to lawmakers. I expect this variable to be a negative predictor of multi-client advocacy. The additive scale is based on Newmark's (2005) index of lobby laws outlined in Table 3.

Reporting requirements might present costs to interest groups and encourage them to consult with multi-client professionals. Throughout the past thirty years, the U.S. states have imposed new reporting requirements on registered lobbyists and their clients (see Newmark 2005; Strickland 2018a). Frequent and detailed reports impose two costs on lobbyists and clients: compliance and public scrutiny. If lobbyists are required to report who they meet with, the content of their lobby efforts, and compensation and expense details, then some interest groups might then prefer to outsource lobbying to a professional. Multi-client lobbyists report for multiple clients, thereby pooling the compliance (paperwork) cost and taking advantage of economies of scale. Some groups might also prefer to consult with multi-client professionals if they know how to shield their clients from public scrutiny (see Jia 2018). These lobbyists maintain client confidentiality and may be able to circumvent some reporting requirements. I incorporate an additive scale of reporting requirements into my statistical models. This scale is also based on Newmark's (2005) index of lobby laws. I expect multi-client lobbying to occur more frequently in states with more reporting requirements.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup>Reporting might also help clients monitor their agents, thereby helping to address risks associated with multi-client advocacy. For this to have any effect on the incidence of multi-client lobbying, however, reports must be easily accessed by clients, produced frequently, and contain accurate information about the timing of the lobbying effort, the targeted officials, and the substantive content of the lobbying efforts. Even these conditions may not prevent predatory lobbyists from abusing clients since reported information might be fabricated.

Inherent in any lobby contract is the potential for lobbyist shirking. While any lobbyist can shirk, those who represent multiple clients have more opportunities to shirk (and they can bill clients redundantly). Offering lobbyists contingent pay schemes or bonuses is one way to encourage them not to shirk. If lobbyists are offered bonus payments in return for lobbying success, then they are given more incentive to pursue the interests of their clients. With large enough bonuses, their personal interests come to reflect the interests of their clients. If clients are allowed to enter into contingent-pay agreements with lobbyists or offer them bonuses, then they have additional options for discouraging shirking. The use of contingent-pay agreements might make interest groups of all kinds more amenable to hiring multi-client lobbyists (but it remains to be seen if any lobbyists, including single-client ones, actually enter into such agreements). Most U.S. states, however, have banned clients from offering lobbyists pay contingent on policy outcomes or giving them bonuses. These bans were enacted to discourage unethical behavior on the part of lobbyists (see Capps 2005). In 1989, 37 states either banned or limited contingent pay arrangements. By 2011, that total had increased to 43 states.<sup>20</sup> I include a dichotomous indicator within my models for whether these kinds of payments were banned within a state. Bans on contingent fees were found using various surveys of ethics laws published by the Council of State Governments or Council on Governmental Ethics Laws, or found in State Capital Group (2012). If the indicator is negatively correlated with multi-client lobbying, then this would suggest that clients hire multi-client lobbyists more often in states where such payments are allowed.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>20</sup>These figures include Delaware's partial ban: in both 1989 and 2011, not more than 50 percent of a lobbyist's compensation from a single client could be paid on a contingent basis. For my regression analyses, this state was given a score of 0.5.

<sup>21</sup>Some caution is in order when interpreting the meaning of this coefficient. While there are anecdotal cases of clients and lobbyists violating such contingent-pay bans (see LeDuc 2002 for an example), the significance of this coefficient would not provide direct evidence that clients frequently offer lobbyists contingent pay or bonuses where legal. Moreover, multi-client lobbyists may not necessarily want immediate bonuses so much as they desire to retain clients on commission for future sessions (see Drutman 2015). Getting policy victories or at least emphasizing potential losses are other (legal) ways to retain clients and commissions.



## **Revolving-Door Lobbyists**

In many political systems, there typically exist insiders who can market their political connections and knowledge in order to attract clients and become lobbyists. Such insiders include former lawmakers and legislative staffers. Former legislators and staff persons become lobbyists in Congress and the U.S. states regularly (see LaPira and Thomas 2017). These revolving-door lobbyists have connections and familiarity with incumbent legislators. As a result, their clients win policy victories more often than clients who do not hire insiders or revolving-door lobbyists (see Baumgartner et al. 2009, 203; Makse 2017). If former legislators sell their access and expertise to interest groups, then they might be able to attract more clients than other lobbyists, including multi-client lobbyists without legislative experience. As a result, the addition of former legislators acting as lobbyists within a state would increase overall rates of multi-client advocacy. Former members of Congress have been found to have more clients than other lobbyists on the Hill (LaPira and Thomas 2017, 112). When compared to other interest groups, large businesses tend to hire these lobbyists most often (Baumgartner et al. 2009, 199; LaPira and Thomas 2017, 116). I incorporate a count of former legislators registered as lobbyists into my statistical models. If former legislators acting as lobbyists are successful at gaining more clients than other multi-client lobbyists, then this count should be a positive predictor of state-level rates of multi-client lobbying. The counts of former legislators acting as revolving-door lobbyists are from Strickland (2018b). Unfortunately, there are no existing estimates of how many former staffers register as lobbyists in the states.

## **Public Interests in the States**

To determine if public interest groups are less likely to hire multi-client lobbyists than other kinds of interest groups, I began coding public interests according to the collective goods they seek. Based on previous studies, I generated lists of terms and phrases that regularly appear in the names of public interest groups (Berry 1977; Schlozman, Verba, and

Brady 2012, 337; Lowery, Gray, and Cluverius 2015). I searched for these terms throughout my data set, and marked individual clients as public interest groups if they appeared to advocate for any kind of collective good. My lists of terms and phrases are included in an attached appendix. For example, since Berry (1977) considered the Sierra Club to be a public interest group engaged in advocating for environmental protections, all appearances of the club in the U.S. states (including local affiliates) were classified as public interests. My coding was not limited to groups mentioned in previous studies. State-based groups with common phrases in their names were also included; but web searches were sometimes needed to insure that groups truly were advocates of collective goods. To be classified as a public interest, groups did not necessarily have to be membership organizations (although I expect most or nearly all public interests to have members), but groups could not be for-profit firms of any kind. Groups classified as public interests also could not be coalitions of for-profit firms or occupational associations. I excluded all identified “astroturf” groups or those primarily sponsored by, or concerned with the interests of, for-profits (see Walker 2014, 8). In cases where I was uncertain whether a group qualified as a public interest, web searches helped to reveal more information about the group’s purpose, profit status, or sponsorship.

I disaggregated public interest groups into four different categories: environmental groups, government reform groups, women’s groups, and religious groups. While all these interests are expected to prefer single-client lobbyists, disaggregating allows for comparison across interest types. Within environmental groups, I included those advocating for pollution control, conservation of natural resources, provision of parks and green space, protection of animals, and recycling. I excluded from this category industry groups, including environmental consulting firms. Within governmental reform groups, I included those advocating for civil liberties or rights (including marriage and adoption rights), consumer protections, ethics reform, justice system reform, tax reform, electoral reform, drug policy reform, gun reform, and separations of church and state. For women’s groups, I included civic organiza-

tions such as the League of Women Voters, feminist organizations, abortion-related groups, groups advocating for equal pay, and groups advocating for reform of sexual offense laws.<sup>22</sup> For religious groups, I included the dioceses, conferences, and offices of religious denominations that had registered lobbyists. This category also included organizations on the religious right or left advocating for various social policies or reforms. I expect all public interests to prefer single-client over multi-client lobbyists, even if this preference might be stronger for some.

There are some notable exclusions from my coding of public interest groups. Government agencies and groups financed by governments do not need to recruit dues-paying members or raise funds. Advocacy is not a core function for these groups, which might be established on a temporary basis by legislatures. Berry (1977, 9) excluded from his analysis all groups that received more than 20 percent of their funds from government. My own data set does not include the percentage of group funds provided by government, but I excluded from my coding of public interests all clients that clearly were government agencies, including local governments and environmental districts.

Just as in Berry (1977, 10), and Schlozman, Verba, and Brady (2012), I also partition labor unions from my definition of public interests. Labor unions have some of the traits of public interest organizations: they recruit dues-paying members, and advocacy is an organizational mission. They sometimes advocate for collective goods such as higher wages, better working conditions, and worker-friendly legislation. Unions often advocate, however, for the provision of selective goods from employers (Olson 1965, 72 - 73), and their recruitment and fund-raising success might be contingent on there being closed-shop arrangements (see Olson 1965, 68 - 72). I exclude labor unions from my coding of public interest groups

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<sup>22</sup>Even though many women's organizations (such as the National Organization for Women) could also be classified as governmental reform groups advocating for civil liberties, I coded these groups separately since studies of women lobbyists in the U.S. states have found them more often than men to be single-client lobbyists (see Nownes and Freeman 1998; Lucas and Hyde 2012). This was attributed to women being new entrants into a traditionally male-dominated profession. Yet, women's interest groups might also prefer to hire women lobbyists if doing so preserves the legitimacy of their advocacy efforts in the eyes of dues-paying members and policy makers (and ensures that the lobbyist values the cause of the organization).

but nevertheless measure their lobby presence in the U.S. states. Labor unions may not need to maintain full-time lobbyists in the state legislatures, but they still have to preserve the legitimacy of advocacy efforts in the eyes of members. As a result, labor unions might rely more often on single- than multi-client lobbyists. This category includes national union offices, state branches, and local chapters with registered lobbyists. In contrast to trade associations, organizations that engaged in collective bargaining were coded as unions.

## Private Interests in the States

I also coded all *Fortune* 100 companies that appeared among the lobbyist registration records. These clients are the 100 top private companies in America ranked by total revenue (i.e., not profits). The rankings were produced by *Fortune* magazine and are based mostly on 10-K forms submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission. They do not include corporations headquartered outside of the U.S. Since my lobbyist records date from 1989 and 2011, I searched for the names of companies ranked in 1995 or 2011.<sup>23</sup> In 1995, all *Fortune* 100 firms brought in at least \$10.9 billion in revenue. By 2011, that amount had grown to \$25.2 billion. Political advocacy is not a core organizational function for these firms: they do not recruit members, and they lobby for collective goods infrequently and only as a “by-product” (Olson 1965, 132 - 35; Hansen, Mitchell and Drope 2005). Drutman (2015, 83 - 97) found that the largest private companies who engaged in lobbying spent the most (when compared to smaller firms), lobbied on more issues, *and* engaged more in-house lobbyists. While businesses generally preferred multi-client over single-client lobbyists (Drutman 2015, 135), the largest firms were found to employ a mix of lobbyist types. I include an indicator variable within my regression models for *Fortune* 100 companies. If the companies employ a mix of lobbyists, then the indicator should not be a predictor of multi-client lobbying.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>23</sup>Prior to 1995, the *Fortune* rankings did not include service companies. The introduction of service companies allowed for such large firms as Wal-Mart, McDonald's, and AT&T to appear among the rankings (see Groves 1995).

<sup>24</sup>Certainly, these large firms vary in degrees of political activity as those with the most government contracts are most politically active (see Boies 1989). Businesses are also subject to collective action problems,

Tables 7 illustrates changes in the totals of interest group types across all U.S. states in 1989 and 2011. Groups advocating for the environment and various reforms doubled in number. This shift reflects the national trend in Table 1: the total of all interest groups registered in the U.S. states doubled over this period as well. Women's and religious interests increased their numbers somewhat, but not nearly enough to keep up with the national trend. Totals of labor unions and associated chapters were generally flat. This reflects the federal-level findings of Schlozman, Verba, and Brady (2012, 352 - 57), and is indicative of the declining membership of unions throughout the period under observation. By contrast, *Fortune* 100 firms increased their presence in U.S. states capitals nearly by a factor of two. Table 8 lists the average lobbyist totals, as well as average totals for single- and multi-client lobbyists, for each of the interest types in both years under observation. All interest types increased their lobbyist totals (on average), but religious groups and *Fortune* firms either doubled or nearly doubled their totals. All group types increased their average totals of multi-client lobbyists. All groups except for the religious and *Fortune* firms transitioned away from single-client advocates, although these advocates accounted for an increasingly small share of agents hired by all groups types. These statistics provide evidence for the increasing popularity of multi-client advocates among interest groups in America, and for the increasing political presence of American businesses.

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particularly in less concentrated economic sectors (Lowery et al. 2004). My indicator averages over firm-level characteristics. On rare occasions, companies moved into or out of the *Fortune* 100 between 1995 and 2011.

Table 7: Totals of Interest Types

Interest Type	1989	2011	Change
Environmental Groups	332	822	490
Reform and Advocacy	622	1,272	650
Women's Groups	239	311	72
Religious Groups	124	151	27
Labor Unions and Chapters	712	721	9
<i>Fortune</i> 100 Firms	1,173	2,292	1,118

*Note:* Totals are aggregated across U.S. states.

Table 8: Lobbying Across Interest Types

Interest Type	Avg. Lobbyists 1989	Avg. Lobbyists 2011	Avg. Multi-Client 1989	Avg. Multi-Client 2011	Avg. Single-Client 1989	Avg. Single-Client 2011
Environmental Groups	2.02	2.53	0.72	1.30	1.29	1.23
Reform and Advocacy	2.28	2.78	0.62	1.36	1.65	1.47
Women's Groups	2.22	2.31	0.42	1.14	1.81	1.17
Religious Groups	1.40	2.84	0.30	1.45	1.10	1.39
Labor Unions and Chapters	2.44	2.79	0.43	1.49	2.01	1.29
<i>Fortune</i> 100 Firms	2.30	4.40	1.28	3.27	1.02	1.13

*Note:* Averages are aggregated across U.S. states.

## Lobbying for a Cause?

I use statistical regression to predict the number of multi-client lobbyists hired by each group in my dataset, after controlling for totals of lobbyists hired. Although not a perfect measure, the total number of lobbyists a group hires is indicative of how many resources it is investing into lobbying. This measure ought to reflect resource disparities between different groups (Baumgartner et al. 2009, 199). Totals spent on lobbying have been found to correlate with numbers of lobbyists, issues and bills lobbied on, and agencies targeted (Drutman 2015, 88 - 92). Totals of lobbyists should capture resource-based differences between groups. For example, public interest groups often make do with slim budgets (Berry 1977, 59 - 71). Some even struggle to pay their staff persons regularly. By predicting totals of multi-client advocates, but also controlling for total lobbyists, I capture the average propensity of each group type to hire multi- versus single-client lobbyists. In addition, I control for types of lobby laws and numbers of revolving-door lobbyists within each state.<sup>25</sup>

In my regression analysis, each unit of analysis is a client-state-year observation. My dependent variable is the total number of multi-client lobbyists each client hired in 1989 or 2011. This variable is a count of discrete events, and its model-conditional variance exceeds its model-conditional mean. To model this overdispersion, I employ the negative binomial variance function to generate regression coefficients (see Long 1997). I estimated a series of models. The first model in Table 9 estimates the average propensity of all group types to hire multi-client lobbyists. The second model controls only for total lobbyists hired. The

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<sup>25</sup>I also control for registration procedures that were idiosyncratic to several U.S. states. Michigan's lobbyist list from 1989 includes lobbyists who had registered in prior years but who had not submitted forms indicating that they no longer worked for their clients. Since lobbyist registration did not expire from one year to the next, this led to Michigan's list from 1989 being unusually long. I included a binary indicator for observations from that state and year. Most lists from 2011 were provided by the Institute. In California, New York, and New Jersey, lobbyists were allowed to register as members of firms, and clients could authorize firms to represent them. This effectively obscured which individual lobbyists were authorized to represent which clients, and the Institute attempted to correct this by listing all lobbyists affiliated with a firm as agents for every client associated with the firm. This had the effect of inflating multi-client contracts in those states for 2011, so I included another binary indicator to control for these three states in 2011. The coefficients for these controls are not reported.

third and fourth models introduce additional control variables and specifications.<sup>26</sup> Since my observations are all nested within states, the least squares assumption of independent errors is violated. While individual interest groups might vary in their hiring decisions, all of them are clustered into separate states. In response, I clustered my standard errors by state (see Primo, Jacobsmeier, and Milyo 2007).

Public interest groups prefer to hire single-client lobbyists over multi-client ones. The results presented in Table 9 show that public interest groups of all kinds are significantly less likely to hire multi-client lobbyists than other (uncoded) kinds of interests, even after controlling for a variety of potentially confounding variables. In Model 1, we see that all four kinds of public interests, as well as labor unions, hire significantly fewer multi-client lobbyists than all other interest groups. By contrast, and in accordance with the findings of Drutman (2015), *Fortune* 100 firms hired more multi-client lobbyists. In Model 2, which includes the total number of lobbyists hired by group, this last correlation does not achieve a traditional level of statistical significance. This suggests that large private firms hire more multi- *and* single-client lobbyists than other groups, thereby relying on a mix of lobbyist types. This is unsurprising based on the descriptive statistics presented earlier in Table 9. In all models, public interests and labor unions hired fewer multi-client lobbyists than all other interest groups. In Model 4, this effect was strongest for women’s and religious interest groups.

Other variables provide some insight into multi-client advocacy. I included lobby laws and totals of revolving-door lobbyists in Models 3 and 4. Since these are state-level covariates, their coefficients represent their average effect across all interest groups, public and private. Registration criteria, ethics laws, and bans on contingent pay arrangements were not correlated with numbers of multi-client lobbyists hired by interest groups. This suggests that the decision of which kind of lobbyist to hire is determined chiefly by internal, group characteristics. Reporting requirements and numbers of revolving-door lobbyists, however,

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<sup>26</sup>Totals of revolving-door lobbyists are not available for Vermont in 1989.



Table 9: Public Interest Groups and Multi-Client Advocacy

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Environmental Groups	-0.576*** (0.078)	-0.443*** (0.089)	-0.454*** (0.091)	-0.442*** (0.090)
Reform and Advocacy	-0.520*** (0.046)	-0.526*** (0.045)	-0.530*** (0.043)	-0.518*** (0.046)
Women's Groups	-0.824*** (0.097)	-0.777*** (0.074)	-0.761*** (0.074)	-0.737*** (0.073)
Religious Groups	-0.852*** (0.158)	-0.926*** (0.096)	-0.920*** (0.099)	-0.902*** (0.100)
Labor Unions and Chapters	-0.846*** (0.096)	-0.739*** (0.130)	-0.717*** (0.123)	-0.710*** (0.123)
<i>Fortune</i> 100 Firms	0.237*** (0.035)	0.025 (0.029)	0.031 (0.030)	0.054** (0.027)
Total Lobbyists Hired	-	0.145*** (0.024)	0.142*** (0.023)	0.137*** (0.022)
Registration Criteria	-	-	0.045 (0.031)	0.019 (0.031)
Ethics Laws	-	-	-0.054 (0.033)	-0.035 (0.029)
Reporting Requirements	-	-	0.032 (0.021)	0.046*** (0.017)
Contingent Fee Ban	-	-	0.162 (0.089)	0.171 (0.111)
Revolving-Door Lobbyists	-	-	-	0.008*** (0.002)
Constant	0.428*** (0.065)	-0.021 (0.070)	-0.426*** (0.113)	-0.609*** (0.123)
$\ln(\alpha)$	-0.246 (0.122)	-1.081 (0.162)	-1.120 (0.168)	-1.152 (0.167)
<i>Observations</i>	81,318	81,318	81,318	81,086
<i>No. of States</i>	50	50	50	50
<i>AIC</i>	297,688	261,768	260,394	259,030

Note: standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state.

\*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01 on two-tailed tests.

appeared to have some effect. As expected, reporting requirements were positively correlated with multi-client lobbying overall. Once revolver totals are included, Model 4 then detects reporting requirement effects, and *Fortune* 100 companies are shown to hire multi-client lobbyists more often than other groups (as expected). These results suggest that the presence of revolving-door lobbyists in U.S. states increases overall rates of multi-client lobbying. These lobbyists therefore appear to represent more clients than even other multi-client lobbyists. Moreover, the effects of the revolving-door on multi-client lobbying are confined mostly to how those private interests get represented. This might be unsurprising to some given that former government officials represent businesses and for-profit firms more often than public interests when lobbying Congress (see Baumgartner et al. 2003, 199; LaPira and Thomas 2017, 116).

## Discussion and Conclusion

In this chapter, I attempted to measure and explain in part the rise of multi-client advocacy in the U.S. states. I proposed two explanations for why public interest groups would be significantly less likely to hire multi-client lobbyists whenever communicating with elected officials. The first explanation is that such groups seek to maintain a constant political presence, and therefore choose to hire in-house advocates who can provide constant representation more efficiently. The second explanation was more sociological or agency-based in nature. It suggests that public interests hire single-client lobbyists in order to preserve the credibility of advocacy efforts in the eyes of dues-paying members and contributors, and to insulate their advocacy efforts from delegation problems. This chapter did not determine which of the two explanations most explain why public interest groups prefer single-client lobbyists, but it does contribute to our understanding of lobbying in several ways.

First, while more interest groups are becoming active in U.S. state politics than ever before, these groups are turning more often to multi-client lobbyists over single-client ones.

Between 1989 and 2011, the number of unique, registered clients of lobbyists in all U.S. states more than doubled (see Tables 7 and 8). Totals of only some types of public interest groups, however, doubled as well; and total labor unions and chapters remained stagnate over time. *Fortune* 100 firms have increased their lobby presence in the states significantly. Second, all these groups are hiring more lobbyists than ever before. Over time, the average number of lobbyists hired by all types of interests also increased (see Table 8). Religious groups doubled their average total of lobbyist hired. Third, public interest groups of all kinds, as well as labor unions, prefer single-client lobbyists over those with multiple clients. This correlation is statistically discernible across multiple model specifications that introduce control variables, including totals of lobbyists hired by each interest group.

Given these findings, what explains the rise of multi-client advocacy in the U.S. states? The entry of more private interests into lobbying explains this trend. Even though there are more environmental and governmental reform groups registered in the states, these groups were found to hire single-client advocates most often. Changes in numbers of women's, religious, and labor groups does not explain the rise of multi-client lobbying given that totals of these groups grew slowly and that the groups preferred single-client lobbyists. By contrast, *Fortune* firms have both increased in number and increased their lobby presence over time. When compared to public interests, other kinds of interests active in the states mostly rely on multi-client lobbyists. The entry of these interests, which are private interests such as smaller businesses and trade associations, into politics mostly explains the rise of multi-client advocacy. These findings likely reflect similar changes in federal lobbying and my proposed explanation for single-client lobbying can be applied to public interest groups active in Congress.

Further research is needed for measuring the substantive effects of multi-client advocacy on the influence of interest groups. Even though businesses hire multi-client lobbyists more often than public interests, this does not necessarily suggest that business interests are represented faithfully before lawmakers. Lobbyists with multiple clients may act as free

agents and poorly communicate the interests of their many clients to lawmakers. Monitoring their behavior remains a persistent issue for clients, and delegation problems may especially affect the representation of clients of smaller lobby firms (see Whitesell, Schiff, and Lowery 2018). Nevertheless, former members of Congress have been shown to represent multiple, business clients (see LaPira and Thomas 2017), and having more of these lobbyists leads to policy influence (Baumgartner et al. 2009, 208; Makse 2017). Perhaps an interest group's influence matters not so much on how many clients its lobbyist represents, but on the kind of experience and connections the lobbyist has.

## Appendix: Terms for Coding Interest Groups

### Environmental advocacy groups:

<i>1000 friends</i>	<i>conservat</i>	<i>green industry</i>
<i>alliance for clean energy</i>	<i>deer</i>	<i>ground water</i>
<i>alliance for renew</i>	<i>elk</i>	<i>groundwater</i>
<i>animal</i>	<i>energy coalition</i>	<i>habitat</i>
<i>arboriculture</i>	<i>enviro</i>	<i>heal</i>
<i>asbestos</i>	<i>environmental action</i>	<i>healthy river</i>
<i>audubon</i>	<i>environmental advocates</i>	<i>healthy rivers/lakes/streams</i>
<i>awareness</i>	<i>environmental alliance</i>	<i>heritage</i>
<i>bad lands</i>	<i>environmental coalition</i>	<i>humane</i>
<i>black hills</i>	<i>environmental council</i>	<i>hunters</i>
<i>brazos</i>	<i>environmental defense</i>	<i>izaak walton</i>
<i>campaign for the envir</i>	<i>environmental education</i>	<i>lake assoc</i>
<i>chattahoochie</i>	<i>environmental law</i>	<i>land trust</i>
<i>chesapeake</i>	<i>environmental professionals</i>	<i>menhaden</i>
<i>clean</i>	<i>environmental remedia</i>	<i>mercury</i>
<i>clean energy</i>	<i>environmental trust</i>	<i>migratory</i>
<i>clean power</i>	<i>environmnetal lobby</i>	<i>mountain</i>
<i>clean water</i>	<i>environmnetal monitor</i>	<i>nature</i>
<i>clean water network</i>	<i>ethanol</i>	<i>ocean</i>
<i>clear water</i>	<i>forests</i>	<i>open space</i>
<i>climate</i>	<i>forever</i>	<i>openlands</i>
<i>coastal</i>	<i>friends</i>	<i>outdoor</i>
<i>conserv</i>	<i>green</i>	<i>outdoors</i>
<i>conservancy</i>	<i>green building</i>	<i>ozone</i>

park  
park &  
park and rec  
park people  
parks &  
parks and rec  
people for  
plains ducks  
pollution  
population  
prairies  
preserv  
puget  
rc&d  
recycl

renewable  
river alliance  
river fields  
river keeper  
river network  
riverkeeper  
rivers council  
salmon  
sane  
save our  
scenic  
sierra club  
sound nuclear  
steward  
sustainable

tides  
tomorrow  
toxic  
trail  
trout  
water alliance  
water environmental  
watershed  
wetlands  
wilderness  
wildflower  
wildlife  
wind coalition  
yellowstone

## Governmental reform and advocacy groups:

aclu  
act!  
action network  
advoca  
african  
agribusiness acc  
alcohol  
american civil liberties union  
american security  
americans for  
arms con  
asian  
aviation con  
campaign finan  
capital pun  
center for au  
child  
children's found  
citizen action  
citizens committee  
citizens communi  
citizens first  
citizens of  
citizens united  
civil justice  
civil lib

clean  
common  
common cause  
common good  
community action  
conservative  
constitution  
consumer  
corrupt  
death pen  
decency  
defense inf  
democracy  
dignity  
disabilit  
draft  
drug  
easter  
election  
elwyn  
equal  
eye of the day  
fair  
fair share  
first amend  
forward

free express  
freedom  
gambling  
gay  
gray panthers  
gun  
human rights  
humanist  
immigration  
innocence  
innocence project  
justice  
kids  
law and social  
lesbian  
liberty  
liquor  
living dem  
mariju  
massvote  
military  
minuteman  
naacp  
nambla  
National association for the  
advancement

*national policy*  
*open*  
*peace*  
*people*  
*pirg*  
*porn*  
*pride*  
*prison*  
*prison reform*  
*privacy*  
*progres*  
*public citizen*

*public good*  
*public interest*  
*public interest research group*  
*reform*  
*repeal*  
*responsive law*  
*rifle*  
*right & just*  
*right to work*  
*rights*  
*safety council*  
*sane*

*science in the public*  
*second amend*  
*secular*  
*security council*  
*separation of church*  
*social conc*  
*southern poverty*  
*speak*  
*tax*  
*tea part*  
*transparen*  
*voters*

### **Religious groups:**

*adventis*  
*anabapt*  
*anglica*  
*baptist*  
*brethren*  
*buddh*  
*catholic*  
*christian*  
*christian reform*  
*christian sci*  
*church*  
*church of*

*churches*  
*clergy and*  
*episco*  
*hebrew*  
*hindi*  
*hindu*  
*islam*  
*jesuit*  
*jew*  
*latter*  
*luthera*  
*mennonite*

*methodi*  
*mormon*  
*muslim*  
*penteco*  
*pieti*  
*piety*  
*protestant*  
*quaker*  
*religious*  
*synag*  
*temple*  
*unitarian*

### **Women's groups:**

*abortion*  
*abuse*  
*domestic*  
*equality*  
*equity*  
*father*  
*femini*  
*for life*  
*league of women voters*

*men's rights*  
*naral*  
*national abortion*  
*national organization*  
*now*  
*planned parenthood*  
*prochoice*  
*pro-choice*  
*prolife*

*pro-life*  
*reproductive*  
*right to life*  
*sex*  
*spous*  
*trafficking*  
*women*

### **Labor unions and chapters:**

*#*  
*aaup*

*ACTWU afge*  
*AFL*

*afl-cio*  
*afm*

<i>afofm</i>	<i>iatse</i>	<i>postal wo</i>
<i>AFSCME</i>	<i>ibew</i>	<i>repeaterman</i>
<i>aft</i>	<i>ibpat</i>	<i>retail wholesale</i>
<i>air line</i>	<i>ilgwu</i>	<i>roofers</i>
<i>aiw</i>	<i>ilwu</i>	<i>RWDSU</i>
<i>allied indus</i>	<i>independent pilots</i>	<i>sanitat</i>
<i>amalgamated cloth</i>	<i>industrial workers</i>	<i>seiu</i>
<i>amalgamated trans</i>	<i>international association</i>	<i>service employee</i>
<i>American federation of labor</i>	<i>international brother</i>	<i>sheet metal</i>
<i>American federation of state</i>	<i>international ladi</i>	<i>signalmen</i>
<i>american federation of t</i>	<i>international union</i>	<i>stage emp</i>
<i>associated acto</i>	<i>ironworker</i>	<i>steamfitter</i>
<i>bakery</i>	<i>iuec</i>	<i>transport worker</i>
<i>bctgm</i>	<i>iuec</i>	<i>twa</i>
<i>blet</i>	<i>iuoe</i>	<i>u.e.</i>
<i>bmwed</i>	<i>iupat</i>	<i>uaw</i>
<i>boatmen</i>	<i>iww</i>	<i>ufcw</i>
<i>classified schools</i>	<i>knights of la</i>	<i>ufw</i>
<i>communication work</i>	<i>laborers</i>	<i>unap</i>
<i>communications work</i>	<i>letter car</i>	<i>uniformed</i>
<i>electrical workers</i>	<i>local</i>	<i>unite here</i>
<i>elevator con</i>	<i>local #</i>	<i>united auto</i>
<i>federation of mus</i>	<i>local nu</i>	<i>united brother</i>
<i>federation of state</i>	<i>locomotive</i>	<i>united electri</i>
<i>federation of tea</i>	<i>longshore</i>	<i>united farm</i>
<i>glass, mod</i>	<i>machinists</i>	<i>united food</i>
<i>gmp</i>	<i>maintenance of way</i>	<i>united mine</i>
<i>gppaw</i>	<i>nabtu</i>	<i>united nurses</i>
<i>handlers un</i>	<i>national educ</i>	<i>united stee</i>
<i>here</i>	<i>nea</i>	<i>united trans</i>
<i>hotel emplo</i>	<i>needle</i>	<i>university profes</i>
<i>i.a.f.f.</i>	<i>operating engi</i>	<i>upiu</i>
<i>i.b.e.w.</i>	<i>ortt</i>	<i>utility workers uwua</i>
<i>iaff</i>	<i>painters</i>	<i>writers guild</i>
<i>iamaw</i>	<i>paperworkers</i>	

### **Fortune 100 Firms:**

<i>3m</i>	<i>altria</i>	<i>american tele</i>
<i>abbott</i>	<i>amazon</i>	<i>amerisource</i>
<i>aetna</i>	<i>american air</i>	<i>ameritech</i>
<i>aig</i>	<i>american exp</i>	<i>amoco</i>
<i>albertson</i>	<i>american inter</i>	<i>amr</i>
<i>allstate</i>	<i>american stor</i>	<i>anheuser</i>

apple  
archer  
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atlantic rich  
bank of amer  
bankamer  
bellsou  
berkshire hat  
best buy  
boeing  
bristol  
cardinal heal  
caterpillar  
chase man  
chevron  
cisco  
citib  
citic  
citig  
coca-cola  
comcast  
compaq  
conagra  
conoco  
continental air  
continental cable  
costco  
cvs  
deere  
dell  
delta  
digital equi  
dow  
du pont  
eastman  
enterprise hold  
enterprise pro  
express scr  
exxon  
fannie  
fcstone  
Federal exp  
fedex  
fleming

ford mot  
freddie  
general dyn  
general elect  
general mot  
general tele  
georgia-pa  
goldman  
goodyear  
google  
gte  
hca  
hess  
hewlett  
home dep  
honeywell  
humana  
ibm  
ibp  
ingram  
intel  
international bus  
international paper  
intl  
iowa beef  
itt  
johnson &  
johnson con  
jpmor  
kmart  
kodak  
kraft  
kroger  
liberty mut  
lockheed  
loews  
lowes  
marathon  
may  
mcdonnell  
mci  
mckesson  
medco  
merck  
merrill

metlife  
microsoft  
mobil  
morgan s  
nabisco  
nationwide  
new york life  
news cor  
nextel  
northrop  
nynex  
oracle  
penney  
pepsi  
pfizer  
philip morris  
plains all  
procter  
proctor  
prudential  
rite aid  
rockwell  
safeway  
sara lee  
sbc  
schaller and  
sears  
sprint  
state far  
sunoco  
supervalu  
sysco  
target  
teachers insurance  
tenneco  
texaco  
ttaa  
time warn  
tyson  
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ual cor  
united contin  
united parcel  
united tech  
unitedhea



*valero*  
*verizon*  
*walgreen*  
*walmart*

*wal-mart*  
*walt dis*  
*wellpoint*  
*wells*

*winn dix*  
*xerox*

# Chapter Four:

## The Declining Value of Revolving-Door Lobbyists

“Revolving door” lobbyists are individuals who transition from governmental positions into lobbying for private entities. As new lobbyists, they have insider connections and political knowledge that afford their clients greater policy influence. While revolving from the public to the private sector delivers increased access and influence for some lobbyists, it raises questions related to political representation. For example, is there a premium on the lobbying services of former public officials? If so, are interest groups with greater financial resources more likely to hire them and enjoy greater access and influence? Moreover, do retiring legislators, staffers, and other state actors temper their governmental actions in anticipation of soon receiving cushy private-sector jobs? In addition to making campaign donations or commenting on proposed regulations, hiring a “revolver” is yet another means for attempting to influence public policy.<sup>27</sup>

While hiring a former government official might be an effective means for gaining influence (see Baumgartner et al. 2009, 208; Makse 2017), the value of insider connections and political knowledge is contingent on the continued presence of former colleagues within government. If an individual knows incumbent legislators well enough to gain access to or lobby them more

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<sup>27</sup>This chapter is based on Strickland (2018b).

effectively, then this individual might advertise his legislative experience in order to be paid to lobby. Persons with the connections and knowledge that legislative experience generates often receive a premium for their services over other lobbyists (see LaPira and Thomas 2017, 96 - 102). If a former legislator's colleagues have departed the assembly, however, then his insider connections and political knowledge are no longer as valuable to clients. The value of connections and knowledge should influence how many legislators are hired as revolving-door lobbyists.

The crux of my argument is that the representation of interests is affected by their institutional context. The revolving door can be modeled in terms of supply and demand. Each political system supplies a different number of legislators depending on legislative turnover and assembly size. The number of those individuals who become lobbyists, however, is contingent on the continued presence of colleagues in the assembly and their proportional influence over policy. As turnover or assembly size increase, lobbyist-legislator relationships, as well as the political knowledge former legislators have, expire and lose value. Under such conditions, there are diminished returns from hiring former legislators to lobby. Interest demand for revolvers is accordingly depressed. As a result, the political systems with the most former legislators have the fewest revolvers. Once I model this supply and demand, I control for the imposition of "cooling off" periods, the presence of substitutes like legislative staffers, numbers of interest groups, and registration criteria for lobbyists. I find strong and consistent support for the declining value of revolving-door lobbyists, but mixed results for these other confounders.

This chapter contributes to our understanding of the revolving door in several ways. I propose that characteristics of legislatures help to structure the representation of interests by changing the value of connections and knowledge. Based on my theory, I generate a model that predicts how many former legislators will register to lobby. To test the model empirically, I measure the presence of revolvers in all fifty U.S. states over two decades. No other study has examined the presence of state-level revolvers to such an extent. Interests

and institutions are found to interact in ways that substantively affect representation, and institutional reforms related to assembly characteristics can help to level the playing fields for groups with fewer material resources.

## Democratic Concerns Over Revolving

The possibility that policy makers might retire from public service and then represent private interests before their former colleagues has raised concerns over the political influence of interest groups. Individuals with government experience might be hired for representation services (such as lobbying, litigating, or submitting regulatory comments or amici briefs) because of either their relationships with incumbents, political knowledge, or policy expertise (see LaPira and Thomas 2014; 2017, 52 - 65). They might sell their services out to the highest bidders (organized interests) regardless of the bidders' goals. If hiring a revolver results in clients getting greater influence over policy, then the policy influence of clients who can afford revolvers (i.e., more resourceful groups) might be magnified. Such influence might even occur prior to an incumbent retiring and entering into representation services. The prospect of receiving cushy private-sector positions can induce soon-retiring incumbents to cater their actions to the wishes of future employers. Reformers in various political systems have attempted to address these concerns with various ethics laws.

There are substantial differences among organized interests in the material resources available to them for paying lobbyists (Walker 1991; Baumgartner et al. 2009, 199). Interest groups with more resources can more easily hire expensive lobbyists, particularly those with *legislative* experience. Lobbyists who formerly worked as legislators or staffers have been found to cost more money to hire. Blanes i Vidal, Fons-Rosen, and Draca (2012) found that when the U.S. Senator for whom a staffer used to work retired from Congress, the revolver's estimated revenue from lobbying fell drastically. Former staffers with more connections to current ones have also been found to earn more (McCrain 2018). Indeed, revolvers are

among Washington's most expensive lobbyists, with some earning contract-adjusted revenues in excess of \$2 million (LaPira and Thomas 2017, 89). Business interests have been found to hire revolvers more often than other types of interest groups (Baumgartner et al. 2009, 199; LaPira and Thomas 2017, 116).

While revolvers might be more expensive to hire, there is evidence that their clients get what they pay for. In examining a large sample of bills in Congress from the early 2000s, Baumgartner et al. (2009, 203) found that groups who had hired more revolvers enjoyed more policy success than groups who had hired fewer or no revolvers. In examining a sample of bills from the 2010s, Makse (2017) found that the number of former members of Congress lobbying on those bills had a noticeable impact on the chances of those bills being reported out of their respective committees, even after controlling for totals of other lobbyists. Universities and defence-related firms have specifically been shown to hire revolvers who deliver results (see Lazarus and McKay 2012; Luechinger and Moser 2014).

In addition to awarding influence to clients after retiring from political office, incumbent lawmakers can have conflicting interests due to the prospect of becoming a revolver (Barro 1973). If a legislator has chosen not to run for reelection and is looking for post-congressional work, lobbying can be an attractive choice due to the compensation and ability to remain involved in politics (Parker, Parker, and Dabros 2012). Becoming a lobbyist might also allow incumbents who were not reelected to continue living in the Beltway instead of returning to an unfriendly district. In order for lobbying to be a viable career choice, however, the lawmaker has to prove of value to potential clients. Last-term lawmakers are no longer beholden to their constituents. The appeal of gaining future employment can lead these lawmakers to make decisions they would not have otherwise made during their last terms in office. In some suggestive cases, lawmakers were noted to have become revolvers immediately after advocating for major pieces of legislation that were beneficial to the interests of their new employers (see Kusnetz 2013). While these correlations or historical patterns do not prove the existence of any quid pro quo agreements, numerous legislatures have enacted

“cooling off” periods to help prevent such conflicts of interest (see Rosenson 2005, 156 - 61).

Given that revolvers play influential roles within the legislative process by representing groups with more material resources than others, and given that they actually deliver results for their clients more often than non-revolvers, understanding the institutional circumstances surrounding their numbers is of crucial importance to reformers. If legislative characteristics or laws influence the number of revolvers within a democratic system, as well as the influence they achieve for their moneyed clients, then political reformers have valuable information for making the playing fields of political advocacy more even for interests with fewer financial resources. This chapter tests for whether such reforms as changing legislative turnover and assembly size, implementing cooling-off periods, hiring legislative staffers, and imposing lobby transparency each help to slow down the revolving door. If one accepts that the merits of policy positions are independent of the resources of their advocates, then such political reforms can help to eliminate or at least ameliorate the influence of money on politics and policy. Numbers of revolvers on the Hill have increased drastically since the 1970s (Lazarus, McKay and Herbel 2016). The effects of reforms should be of immediate interest to the public.

## **The Declining Value of Revolver Assets**

As compared to non-revolver lobbyists, revolvers offer their clients two kinds of assets: insider connections and political knowledge. When legislators work together within assemblies, they often form personal connections with each other. Such relationships can be formed over shared legislative priorities or personal interests. When legislators retire or are removed from their workplaces, they continue to be familiar with their former colleagues. Even though retirement or loss of reelection might entail no longer being able to cast roll-call votes, former legislators can still maintain social relationships with incumbents. While serving in office, legislators also acquire political knowledge. Such knowledge consists of familiarity with the

legislative priorities and ambitions of incumbents, how committees might be managed, and how to construct a winning coalition for a proposal. The interpersonal bonds that legislators form while in office, as well as the political knowledge they acquire, make former legislators attractive advocates for interest groups (see LaPira and Thomas 2017, 36).<sup>28</sup>

As revolving-door lobbyists, former legislators can achieve results for their clients due to increased access to incumbents. Interest groups seeking to influence policy need to lobby those who decide what policies are enacted. In a legislature, the targets of lobbying efforts consist of lawmakers who vote on the outcomes of proposals. A lobbyist's influence begins when a legislator bases his knowledge or decisions on what a lobbyist tells him (Wright 1996, 81). This is possible only if a lobbyist has access to the lawmaker (Truman 1951, 260 - 64), and having a relationship or being familiar with incumbent lawmakers reduces the cost of gaining access to them (McCrain 2018). Legislators might also perceive information from familiar colleagues as being more credible. Since former legislators cannot cast votes in the assembly, their influence is contingent on whether they have access to incumbents.

Accordingly, the value of revolvers' insider relationships and political knowledge is contingent on whether their prior colleagues continue to serve as incumbent legislators. As new members enter an assembly, former lawmakers' relationships and knowledge expire. New members are not familiar with former legislators, and may even be suspicious of lobbyists in general. Legislative turnover has the effect of reducing the access to incumbents that revolvers once enjoyed. The political knowledge of prior legislators also expires as new members enter the assembly. New legislators may have different legislative priorities or management styles. Not being familiar with incumbent priorities, or not understanding how committees are managed, are harmful to a revolvers' ability to build winning coalitions and usher

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<sup>28</sup>Political knowledge is different from policy expertise (see LaPira and Thomas 2017, 60 - 65). Whereas legislators may acquire knowledge of each others' priorities and ambitions while working together (and learning how to build winning coalitions), they have been assumed to be policy generalists (i.e., non-experts) who work on multiple issues and who need informational subsidies from lobbyists (see Hall and Deardorff 2006, 80; Ainsworth 1997; Denzau and Munger 1986, 91). Non-revolvers may acquire policy expertise and become lobbyists (see LaPira and Thomas 2017, 52 - 67), but only those working within the legislature have political knowledge of incumbent members.

proposals through the legislative process. As new legislators enter the chamber and join committees, the access and influence that revolver lobbyists previously enjoyed are reduced.

Factors such as legislative turnover and assembly size govern the value of revolvers' insider connections and political knowledge. Turnover can vary across political systems due to a variety of institutional and political reasons (see Moncrief, Niemi, and Powell 2004). Turnover presents two dilemmas to revolving-door lobbyists. Revolvers must maintain access to and knowledge of incumbent policy makers, despite turnover. Maintaining relationships and political knowledge is more difficult when there is more upheaval within the assembly. Building relationships and coalitions with new legislators can be time-consuming as freshmen are often suspicious of career lobbyists (see Mooney 2007). Secondly, the exit of incumbents from the legislature produces new, potentially competing revolvers. These more recent (former) legislators might even be more valuable as advocates since (from among all former legislators) their relationships and knowledge are the most up-to-date. A revolver's assets are more valuable to clients when his prior colleagues remain in the assembly.

A revolver's insider connections and political knowledge are also worth less in large assemblies. As assemblies increase in membership size, the proportional influence of each individual legislator over policy outcomes decreases and more votes are needed for policy victories (McCormick and Tollison 1981, 33). The smallest statehouse chamber in the U.S. is the Alaska Senate that consists of 20 members. The largest statehouse chamber is the 400-person New Hampshire House of Representatives. Each senator in Alaska has a lot more proportional influence over policy outcomes than each representative in New Hampshire. Across the two chambers, the average payoff from a revolver influencing each senator is greater than the payoff from influencing each representative (see Powell 2012, 44 - 45). While differences in such payoffs might not matter when legislators are unanimous in their roll-call voting, the differences can be salient whenever chambers are split. Tilting the majority outcomes in smaller chambers requires lobbyists to target fewer individuals than in larger assemblies. A revolver's assets are more valuable to clients when his former colleagues



have more proportional influence over policy.

While legislative turnover and size should both independently affect the value of a revolver's insider connections and political knowledge, these factors interact to influence the supply of former legislators who may become lobbyists. The supply of individuals with legislative experience can be increased by either high turnover or large assembly size, but both these factors work in tandem to increase supply even further. If there exists a large assembly with high turnover, then the total of former legislators should be quite large compared to the supply produced by smaller legislatures full of members who serve for decades. As a result, different kinds of legislatures supply different numbers of individuals with legislative experience who can become revolvers.

A naïve assumption would be that revolver totals increase linearly with the supply of former legislators, but this assumption fails to take into account the declining value of revolver assets. Despite increases in legislator supply, interest groups reduce their demand for revolvers in at least two ways. Groups across different political systems choose to hire more or fewer revolvers based on the immediate characteristics of their local legislature. There may be a limited supply of revolvers, or (even with a large supply) groups might not think that hiring revolvers is worthwhile given high turnover or a large assembly. If groups can assess the value of revolvers in such a prospective manner, then there should be significant differences across states in rates of revolving (after controlling for legislator supply). Groups might also adjust their hiring decisions over time in a retrospective manner. If turnover or assembly size change within a legislature, then the insider connections and political knowledge of revolvers expire more or less quickly. Over time, clients will update their expectations of how useful former legislators are (as lobbyists) given local changes in turnover or legislature size. If clients ascertain that their revolvers are no longer being granted as much access as before, then they will be (on average) less likely to hire revolvers than non-revolvers. If such updating occurs within states in response to institutional changes, then we should expect revolver totals to shift over time within individual states.

Demand for revolvers does not shift equally or immediately in response to shifts in the supply of former legislators because of informational asymmetries. Interest groups do not detect that slight differences in the supply of potential revolvers affect the value of insider relationships or political knowledge by much. LaPira and Thomas (2017, 56 - 57) portray groups as being on the “uncertain outside” and lobbyists as being hired informants who understand local politics. Groups are uninformed about the issues of greatest interest to incumbents and how to achieve the most favorable results. As agents, lobbyists can help to address these uncertainties, but they can also take advantage of principal-agent problems by exaggerating policy victories or potential losses (see Drutman 2015, 137 - 43). The uncertainty that groups suffer from when evaluating the performance of their advocates explains why demand for revolvers may not respond proportionally or immediately in response to differences in turnover or assembly size. Nevertheless, if there are any decreases in demand due to institutional differences, then there will be a curvilinear relationship between the supply of former legislators and total revolvers. In legislatures with low turnover or small chambers, there should be few revolvers because of limited supply. Legislatures that supply more former legislators will have more revolvers, but revolver totals will display diminishing marginal increases as clients begin to ascertain that their revolver lobbyists are not much different from non-revolver lobbyists (in terms of access and influence).

***H<sub>1</sub>***: There will be a positive relationship between former legislators and revolvers, but with diminishing marginal increases.

## Confounding Variables

While the number of former lawmakers should be a leading determinant of how many of them register as lobbyists (but with diminishing marginal increases), there are other factors that can influence how many former legislators become lobbyists. These confounders include restrictions on post-governmental employment, the presence of legislative staff persons,

across-state differences in totals of registered interest groups, and differences in registration criteria for lobbyists.

### **Post-Governmental Employment Restrictions**

Numerous states have imposed limits on how soon retired public officials may work for private entities in specific capacities after their work in government ends. Such restrictions are referred to as “cooling off” periods. Restrictions on post-government employment (PGE) are intended to curb conflicts of interest in which soon-retiring public officials may want to appease the interests of future employers. The laws are also intended to protect public trust in political institutions (National Conference of State Legislatures 2002). Different revolving-door laws are designed for preventing conflicts of interest among specific groups of officials, including legislators, their staff persons, and regulators, among others. Some laws work as intended. Cain and Drutman (2014) examined Legistorm data and found that the hiring of former congressional staffers was affected by the 2007 Honest Leadership and Open Government Act, which implemented a one-year cooling-off period for members and staffers.

In addition to turnover and assembly size, cooling-off periods might further reduce the demand for legislator revolvers and have negative wage effects. Former legislators in states with cooling-off periods lose the ability to gain lobbying experience immediately upon leaving office. In the intervening years, their connections and knowledge may atrophy somewhat. Moreover, former legislators might have to take on consultative positions that pay less than lobbying. Such roles may not require lobbyist registration and might be hidden from public view (see Lapira 2016). Other workplace sabbaticals have been shown to have similar wage effects. Mothers tend to be paid less money than their non-mother female counterparts. Explanations for this trend include the loss of job experience and mothers entering into jobs that are more accommodating to motherhood (see Budig and England 2001 for a test of competing explanations). Unfortunately for mothers, wage effects can last for decades (Kahn, García-Manglano, and Bianchi 2014). For reformers, however, depressed rates of

revolving might be a desirable outcome provided that cooling-off periods are not simply causing ex-legislators to avoid registering as lobbyists.

***H<sub>2</sub>***: Longer cooling-off periods will be negatively correlated with revolver totals on average, *ceteris paribus*.

### **Legislative Staff as Revolvers**

Former legislators are not the only individuals with insider connections and political knowledge who can become lobbyists. Legislative staffers might also retire from the public sector in order to take advantage of contacts and knowledge (see McCrain 2018). Such revolving is common at the federal level (see LaPira and Thomas 2017, 37; LaPira and Thomas 2014). Former congressional staffers represent the largest single group of revolvers on the Hill, and their services come at a premium (Blanes i Vidal, Fons-Rosen, and Draca 2012). In the U.S. states, staff members are typically subject to the same PGE restrictions that affect their former bosses (see Holman and Reddy 2011). In relation to ex-lawmakers, permanent staff persons might serve as substitutes. Both legislators and staff persons can have insider connections and knowledge. If there are many *former* staffers in a state, then interest groups might hire more of them instead of former legislators. This might have the effect of taking business from former legislators, thereby reducing their totals as lobbyists.

***H<sub>3</sub>***: Legislative staff will be negatively correlated with (legislator) revolver totals on average, *ceteris paribus*.

### **Number of Interest Groups**

As lobbyists, former legislators might find clients more easily in states with larger populations of interest groups, or when more groups decide to hire lobbyists. This would lead to there being more revolvers in states that house more groups. Gray and Lowery (1996) developed the Energy-Stability-Area model to explain differences in interest populations across states. More interest groups hire lobbyists when policy outcomes are less certain (Gray et

al. 2015). At some points in time, there might even be spikes in lobbying activity due to major policy battles (see Brasher, Lowery, and Gray 1999, for an example). Some political systems constantly house more interest groups because of their larger economies or area. Whereas some U.S. states contain several thousand clients, others contain only a few hundred. It should be easier for legislators in large states with many active groups to find work as lobbyists than legislators in small states with many fewer groups. In predicting numbers of revolvers, I hold interest populations constant.

***H<sub>4</sub>***: Interest populations will be positively correlated with revolver totals on average, *ceteris paribus*.

### **Lobbyist Registration Criteria**

The effects of registration criteria on totals of registered lobbyists has been subject to debate for some time but recent research suggests that the number of criteria within a state should be utilized as a statistical control whenever estimating totals of registered clients or lobbyists. Strickland (2018a) argues that more criteria give lobbyists less personal discretion over whether to register. I hold constant the number of lobbyist registration criteria within a state whenever predicting totals of registered revolvers. Registration criteria help to determine who all has to register as a lobbyist (see Newmark 2017). I employ Newmark's (2005) additive index of lobby definitions commonly found in the U.S. states. The index ranges in value from zero definitions to seven. This variable is expected to correlate positively with revolver totals. Such a finding would suggest that there are unregistered or "shadow" revolvers in U.S. states with few criteria (LaPira 2016). There likely are thousands of unregistered advocates in Washington, and some former officials might take advantage of registration loopholes (see Thomas and LaPira 2017).

***H<sub>5</sub>***: Lobbyist registration criteria will be positively correlated with revolver totals on average, *ceteris paribus*.

## Data and Measurement

Testing my hypotheses requires disclosure of which individuals are lobbyists. The data also need to be collected from a single regime but at multiple points in time, or from multiple regimes. There are roughly a dozen governments around the world that require lobbyists to register. In most of these countries, unfortunately, lobby transparency laws are recent developments and there are substantial differences in how information is reported (see Chari, Hogan and Murphy 2010; Crepaz 2017). As a result, drawing cross-national lobby data proves problematic for testing my hypotheses. While the U.S. has a relatively robust set of lobby transparency laws, these laws are also new. Even though the U.S. Congress enacted the Regulation of Lobbying Act in 1946, the Supreme Court struck down many provisions of the law in *United States v. Harriss* (1954). It was not until 1995 that the Congress passed the Lobbying Disclosure Act which filled many holes left in the original statute. Unfortunately as well, roughly 23 years of federal lobby data is insufficient for testing my hypotheses given that turnover among members of Congress has not changed much during that time (Glassman 2017), and that the last time either chamber changed membership size was in 1959.

Data from the U.S. states fulfill all of the criteria required for testing my hypotheses. The states have provided data over multiple decades and their different institutional and political characteristics allow for statistical inference. Massachusetts was the first democracy in the world to require lobbyists to register, starting in 1891 (Opheim 1991).<sup>29</sup> In the following decades, numerous other states began to adopt similar measures. By 1975, all fifty states had adopted laws or resolutions requiring lobbyists to register. Whereas secretaries of state had historically been the source of lobby information in most states, more states began to establish commissions for such purposes after the 1970s (see Rosenson 2005). Some legislatures had had internal staff members register lobbyists but these states, too, eventually delegated registration to outside agencies. Arkansas and West Virginia's legislatures were

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<sup>29</sup>While the U.S. House of Representatives first required lobbyists to register in 1876, the resolution did not require lobbyists to register during subsequent sessions. Only lobbyists active within the House during the 44<sup>th</sup> Congress (1875 - 1877) had to register (see Straus 2015, 5 - 6).

the last ones to delegate lobbyist registration to outside agencies, both in the late 1980s (Thomas 1998).

To determine if the supply of legislators affects numbers of revolving-door lobbyists at a curvilinear rate, I began with lists of legislators and lobbyists dating back multiple decades. Using data collected by Klarner et al. (2013), lists of legislators from each state were generated for years 1967 to 2010. These lists were then divided into two periods consisting of individuals who were elected between 1967 and 1986, and those elected between 1987 and 2008. States that held elections in odd years had slightly different cut-off points that are specified later. Lists of registered lobbyists were then gathered and transcribed from the fifty U.S. states for years 1989 and 2011. With some exceptions listed later, lists from 1989 were taken from Wilson (1990) and 2011 lists were provided by the National Institute on Money in State Politics (hereafter, the Institute).<sup>30</sup> Names of former legislators were found within these lists of lobbyists.

Since no single source indicates which state lobbyists have legislative experience, I turned to detecting revolvers by matching names across lists. This involved filtering duplicate names out of each list, isolating surnames, sorting them alphabetically, and then highlighting all surnames that appeared among both legislators and lobbyists within the same state. Individuals were then matched based on shared name combinations. Lobbyists were marked as revolvers only if they shared the same first and last names of a legislator. If a lobbyist's name contained a suffix such as "Jr." or "Sr.," then he must have also shared the suffix with a legislator. Lobbyists were also considered revolvers in cases with matching last names but different versions of the same given name. Lobbyists were not considered revolvers if their names did not match the spelling of any legislator names, including if middle initials or suffixes conflicted. This process was repeated for each state-year observation generated. Lobbyist names from 1989 were identified among legislators who had served or won election at some point between 1967 and 1986. For lobbyists from 2011, legislator names were drawn

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<sup>30</sup>Data from the Institute have been used in other studies cited in section five of the supplementary material, which also includes a discussion and tests of the reliability of the data.

from those who served or won election at some point between 1987 and 2008. I test the reliability of this name-matching in the first section of the supplementary material.<sup>31</sup>

## Explanatory Variables

The number of former legislators within a state is expected to be correlated with the total number of revolvers, but with diminishing marginal increases. In order to capture this relationship, I include two variables within my models: one for the total number of former legislators from either one of two historical phases, and another for the squared values of these totals. I expect the first coefficient to have a positive value, indicating initially increasing totals of revolvers. I expect the second coefficient to have a negative value, indicating the diminishing marginal increases in these totals. In other words, the number of former legislators “interacts” with itself to begin suppressing revolver totals (see Kam and Franzese 2007, 34 - 35).<sup>32</sup> Figures 6 and 7 show scatterplots of total revolvers and former legislators for the two historical periods in the fifty U.S. states. While the correlations in both figures are suggestive of diminishing returns, other factors might help to influence revolver totals.

To determine if PGE restrictions negatively affected revolver totals, I incorporate the length in months of a state’s cooling-off period into my statistical models. This information was collected from Rosenson (2005), but also verified using annual editions of the *Lobbying*,

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<sup>31</sup>The cut-offs for these two historical periods differed by a few years in states with elections in odd-numbered years or in states where elections were held only every four years. Since I was working with lists of election winners, at least two elections were allowed to have occurred in each state between the years that legislator names were drawn and when lobbyist registration lists were collected and transcribed. Since elections occur only every four years in Alabama and Maryland, legislator names were gathered from elections that occurred between 1990 and 2006 (for the second historical periods under review). In Mississippi, where elections occur only every four years but in odd-numbered years, legislator names for the second phase were drawn from those who won or held office between 1987 and 2007. In New Jersey and Virginia, where elections are held every two years but in odd-numbered years, second-phase listings of legislators were drawn from years 1988 to 2007. Legislator data from Vermont are missing for years 1967 to 1986.

<sup>32</sup>The total of former legislators is a function of both turnover and assembly size, but not a direct measure of either of those factors. It is difficult to measure the long-term effects of turnover. Turnover may fluctuate wildly from election to election (see Berry, Berkman, and Schneiderman 2000), can vary across chambers in bicameral legislatures (see Moncrief, Niemi, and Powell 2004, 61 - 65), and members might serve non-consecutive terms or cycle from lower to upper chambers in states with weak term-limits laws (see Sarbaugh-Thompson 2010). In section two of the supplementary material, I attempt to parse the long-term effects of turnover from those of legislature size. My findings are robust to the inclusion of legislature size in the statistical models, and the use of an alternative turnover measure.



*PACs, and Campaign Finance 50 State Handbooks*. Between 1989 and 2011, the number of U.S. states with waiting periods of some length increased from 12 to 33. Figure 8 shows the gradual increase in the number of states adopting cooling-off periods of any length between 1989 and 2016. The figure was constructed using data from Rosenson (2005), the *Handbooks*, as well as information from Public Citizen and the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL). The maximum waiting period within my data set was 24 months. I assigned a length of six months to states where legislators only had to wait until the end of the current legislative session to lobby.

Measuring the number of legislative staffers who became lobbyists presents a challenge since there is no existing directory of legislative staffers from the U.S. states that dates back multiple decades. Nevertheless, since former and current staffers might be substitutes, their presence may affect the number of legislators who revolve. I incorporate into my models the total of all permanent staff persons serving each state's legislature in 1988 or 2009. This measure does not include persons who work only during legislative sessions, which typically last only several months each year in non-professionalized legislatures. Totals of permanent staff were provided by the NCSL (2016). A count of staff persons is the most direct measure of how many of them might revolve, but I also control for alternative measures of staff resources (e.g., Squire 1988; Bowen and Greene 2014) in section three of the supplementary material.

To account for how easy it might be for former legislators to find clients, I include the number of registered interest groups within my models. These totals were counted from the same lists where revolver names were found. Lists from 1989 were collected mostly from Wilson (1990), although lists from Alaska, Maryland, and New Hampshire were gathered directly from state authorities. Lists from 2011 were collected mostly from the Institute, except for lists from Alaska, Pennsylvania, Wyoming. Lists from these states were also collected from state authorities. New Jersey's list was provided by the Institute but dates from 2013. The use of lists from alternate sources or years is due to discrepancies between

Figure 6: Total Former Legislators and Revolvers, 1989




Figure 7: Total Former Legislators and Revolvers, 2011





Figure 8: PGE Restrictions in the U.S. States



lists provided by Wilson (or the Institute) and either official registration statistics published by state authorities or predictions based on the Energy-Stability-Area model of Gray and Lowery (1996).<sup>33</sup>

Comparing totals of registered lobbyists across states requires holding registration criteria constant. Newmark (2005) demonstrates that substantial variation exists across U.S. states in the numbers of criteria adopted. His scale of lobby definitions ranges from a low score of zero to a high of seven, with one additional point being awarded to a state for each lobbyist definition its laws contain. The seven registration criteria for lobbyists include whether one is lobbying legislators, whether one is lobbying executive officials, whether current public officials or state employees must register, and registration thresholds related to compensation paid for, expenditures made while, and time spent lobbying. Data on registration criteria are from Strickland (2018a).

## Estimation Method and Results

My dependent variable of interest is the number of former legislators registered to lobby. This variable is a count that cannot assume negative values. I estimated negative binomial regression coefficients that account for overdispersion (see Long 1997, 230 - 41). I am working with two panels of observations from the U.S. states gathered from 1989 and 2011. Since each state (with the exception of Vermont) has two observations, there is clustering of my observations by state. Each state presents its own “contextual” confounders that influence the number of registered revolvers (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 219 - 20). This violates the least squares assumption of independent errors. To help account for this violation, models 1 and 2 include standard errors that have been clustered by state (see Primo, Jacobsmeier, and Milyo 2007). As opposed to including state-level fixed effects, clustering my standard errors allows me to maximize the amount of variation (both across states and across time)

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<sup>33</sup>In additional model specifications in section three of the supplementary material, I control for totals of registered lobbyists, and also for both lobbyist and client totals.

for estimating my coefficients. Such clustering does not, however, control for state-specific starting points or for nationwide trends over time. To control for these issues, I also estimate two other models with both state and year fixed effects included (but not with clustered errors). The inclusion of both sets of effects forces my models to utilize only change within states (from 1989 to 2011) when estimating coefficient sizes. While this approach provides more conservative estimates presented in models 3 and 4, it is necessary for eliminating the influence of state-specific, time-invariant confounders on my coefficients (see Allison 2009).<sup>34</sup> In all models, coefficients for legislator, staff, and client totals have been divided by 1,000 to reduce the number of zeros reported. This step does not affect the significance of any coefficients.<sup>35</sup>

## Results

The coefficients listed in Table 10 show strong support for the declining value of revolving-door lobbyists. As state legislatures produce more individuals with legislative experience, the number of revolving-door lobbyists increases at a declining marginal rate. All four models show evidence for my first hypothesis. The first and third models show that there is no linear correlation between revolvers and former legislators. Instead, revolvers are correlated with former legislators with diminishing marginal returns. The value of revolving-door lobbyists declines with turnover and assembly size. I perform several robustness checks in section two of the online supplementary materials.

With regard to PGE restrictions, results suggest that these laws do dampen rates of revolving among former legislators. In models with errors clustered by state and models with fixed effects, cooling-off periods have a discernible negative effect on revolving. The

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<sup>34</sup>While the inclusion of fixed effects in the negative binomial model might introduce incidental parameters bias, Allison and Waterman (2002) and Allison (2009, 61 - 69) show that such bias is negligible with both the application of the mean-dispersion variance function labeled NB2 by Cameron and Trivedi (1998) and the use of unconditional fixed effects. This is different from the constant-dispersion function used by Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984), which is implemented as part of Stata's `xtnbreg` command.

<sup>35</sup>In section three of the supplementary material, I provide alternative model specifications. These include estimating linear regression models, and also providing bootstrapped standard errors. The results remain substantively the same.

Table 10: The Declining Value of Revolving-Door Lobbyists

	Model 1 Clustered SE	Model 2 Clustered SE	Model 3 Fixed Effects	Model 4 Fixed Effects
<u>Former Legislators</u> 1,000	0.439 (0.249)	2.458*** (0.510)	0.334 (0.370)	3.080*** (1.045)
$(\frac{\text{Former Legislators}}{1,000})^2$	-	-1.221*** (0.260)	-	-1.579*** (0.565)
Cooling-off Months	-0.016*** (0.006)	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.016** (0.006)	-0.013** (0.006)
<u>Legislative Staffers</u> 1,000	0.013 (0.109)	-0.037 (0.098)	0.196 (0.189)	0.312 (0.194)
<u>Registered Interests</u> 1,000	0.491*** (0.096)	0.480*** (0.090)	0.151 (0.105)	0.179 (0.105)
Registration Criteria	0.027 (0.031)	0.009 (0.029)	0.092*** (0.028)	0.068** (0.030)
Constant	2.254*** (0.156)	1.727*** (0.178)	1.989*** (0.330)	1.190*** (0.435)
$\ln(\alpha)$	-2.030 (0.164)	-2.254 (0.195)	-27.414 -	-20.429 -
<i>Observations</i>	99	99	99	99
<i>No. of States</i>	50	50	50	50
<i>AIC</i>	687.586	675.116	650.716	644.713

Note: state and year fixed effects are included in models 3 and 4 but not reported.  
 \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01 on two-tailed tests. Standard errors are in parentheses.

coefficients suggest that, on average, each additional 12 months of waiting time results in about three fewer revolvers. These results do not prove, however, that former legislators truly shy away from lobbying in states with cooling-off periods. Former legislators may instead not register and become consultants for lobby firms. Indeed, former members of Congress have been found to avoid registering as lobbyists by becoming consultants (LaPira 2016). While it remains possible that cooling-off periods (as workplace sabbaticals) truly decrease the value of former legislators by forcing them not to lobby while their connections and experience atrophy somewhat, more research is needed to determine if legislators are not circumventing cooling-off periods simply by refusing to register.

The results presented in Table 10 provide no support for my third hypothesis that legislative staff serve as substitutes for legislator revolvers. None of the coefficients achieved levels of significance worth noting, therefore disconfirming my expectation. This might be because interest groups hire former staffers for their ties to current staffers (McCrain 2018), who may not experience the same turnover as legislators. If this is the case, then the supply and demand model for these revolvers may adhere to a different functional form.


My estimates provide some support for the fourth hypothesis that as interest populations increase, so do revolver totals. Models that utilize only within-state variation, however, did not find significant correlations. This suggests that, while interest populations are correlated with revolver totals, the introduction of more groups into a state (over the time period studied) did not correspond with the entry of more revolvers. This might be due to a number of explanations. Group totals might be correlated with other state-level covariates that encourage revolving. Standard errors that are clustered by state fail to account for time-invariant confounders. Once state-level fixed effects are included, any bias introduced by these confounders is eliminated. It might also be the case that existing revolvers within each state represented a growing share of clients, thereby making it more difficult for new potential revolvers to attract clients and become lobbyists.



All of the trends described above persist even when controlling for the registration criteria that might capture additional revolvers. Evidence for hypothesis five is also mixed. While the numbers of criteria between states were not correlated with revolver totals, enacting more criteria between 1989 and 2011 appeared to have at least a modest effect on revolver registration rates. These findings are inconclusive but nonetheless suggestive of shadow lobbying. Revolving-door lobbyists, as former legislators, are often some of the most adept advocates for hire. Former members of Congress know how to evade having to register as lobbyists (LaPira 2016). When U.S. state governments impose more registration criteria on lobbyists, they supposedly have less room to hide. While implementing new criteria might bring some revolvers out of the shadows, there might already be widespread non-compliance that helps to explain the lack of discernible findings in models with clustered errors.

To illustrate the declining value of revolvers, Figure 9 shows a line chart of predicted revolver totals based on the results presented in model 4. The solid line in the figure traces predicted revolver counts at various totals of former legislators when all other variables are held at their means, and the dashed lines represent 95-percent confidence intervals. When all other variables are held constant, we see a curvilinear relationship between revolver and legislator totals emerge. Interestingly, the predicted number of revolvers begins to decrease beyond a global maximum. This suggests that revolver assets become liabilities as clients shift towards non-revolvers. This might be the case if the many amateur members of legislatures with extreme turnover grant access to non-revolvers more often, and if clients accordingly prefer to hire non-revolvers in those states. Direct observations of access would be needed for testing such a proposition. Regardless, the value of revolver assets certainly diminishes as more individuals cycle through the legislature.

Figure 9: Predicted Revolvers and Former Legislators



## Implications

Numbers and types of politically active groups supposedly matter for political representation (Schattschneider 1960) and economic growth (see Olson 1982), but there are differences in the types, quality, and costs of advocates. Revolving-door lobbyists have been shown to exacerbate resource inequalities between interest groups. Given that revolving-door lobbyists often represent and get results for the wealthiest of clients, what reforms are needed to help lessen their influence and make the playing fields of political advocacy more even for groups of all resource levels? My findings suggest that only a few reforms might be effective.

Policy makers can use the findings of this study to estimate how quickly the revolving door is currently spinning within their respective capitals, and whether increasing turnover might have a desired effect on revolver totals. Increasing turnover or assembly size may initially increase the number of former legislators who become lobbyists but beyond a certain point, interest groups begin to hire fewer of them. According to my results, if a legislature has supplied fewer than 1,000 former members throughout the prior two decades, then moderate increases in turnover might increase revolver totals. If a legislature has supplied more than that, then increases in turnover likely would not lead to more revolvers but instead decrease their ranks over time. There are multiple ways to affect turnover. As of 2017, legislators in fifteen states were restricted by term limitations, but such laws do not explain turnover entirely. The effects of limitations on turnover vary since some states allow for unlimited but non-consecutive terms (Sarbaugh-Thompson 2010). There yet remains substantial variation in turnover even among legislatures without term limitations. These differences are attributed to legislative professionalization and alternative political opportunities, among other factors (see Moncrief, Niemi, and Powell 2004).

My findings have implications for the expected price of revolvers. Revolvers in states with fewer former legislators might be paid the greatest premium over the services of non-revolvers since there is limited supply of legislative experience in those states (see LaPira and Thomas 2017, 66 - 81). Even though there might be more revolvers in states with marginally

more legislators, the average revolver premium should decrease as more and more legislators are supplied, and certainly as interest demand for their services declines. Revolver prices might be measured directly in states that require reporting of compensation, or indirectly by examining the types and totals of clients they represent. If revolver prices are greatest under conditions of low legislator supply, then this would suggest that their deleterious effects on political representation are greatest in those legislatures. In this regard, efforts to professionalize legislatures or foster careerism among members might have unintended consequences.

While adjusting turnover or professionalizing a legislature can have counterintuitive effects on the representation of interests, other reforms sometimes have similarly unintended consequences. Gerber (1999) documents how direct democracy techniques that originated during the Progressive Era are today prone to being captured by wealthy interest groups. Hogan (2005) finds that the imposition of strict campaign giving limits in some states is correlated with interest groups relying more often on other forms of electioneering. Moreover, LaPira and Thomas (2017, 191 - 201) argue that numerous lobbyists likely de-registered in response to the 2007 Honest Leadership and Open Government Act and the Obama Administration's restrictions on hiring lobbyists. State-based reformers may benefit from considering numbers and clienteles of local revolvers prior to adjusting turnover or further professionalizing a legislature.

Some reforms appear to slow down the revolving door, but more research is needed. The implementation of cooling-off laws between 1989 and 2011 was shown to depress revolver totals somewhat. This might surprise critics of such laws (see Law and Long 2012), but it remains to be seen if cooling-off laws are achieving their intended objectives. If lawmakers retire from service only to accept positions as consultants (i.e., jobs that do not require lobby registration), then cooling-off periods may instead be pushing the revolving door underground. The substantive effect of such laws is small when compared to the effects of turnover or assembly size. I also did not find that increases in legislative staff resources

depress rates of revolving. This is despite there being some evidence that staff persons substitute for the roles of lobbyists (see Berkman 2001). Taken together, these findings suggest that if reformers truly want to slow the revolving door, then they should enact meaningful reforms that cycle people in and out of the legislature.

My findings also suggest that the number of revolvers within a state depends on various contextual factors. As evidenced by the differences in model fits in Table 10, the inclusion of state and year fixed effects significantly increased the predictive utility of my models. This is suggestive of several things. The different U.S. states had different starting points in terms of how many revolvers were registered in 1989 and subsequent years. The most powerful predictor of revolver totals in any state and year is likely the number of revolvers registered in the prior year. The inclusion of fixed effects by state helps to isolate and control for these different starting points, but additional data collection is needed for parsing components of variation that remains unexplained.

## **Appendix**

### **Reliability of Name Matching**

Matching names across lists of legislators and registered lobbyists is a form of record linkage. The benefit of using data collected by Klarner et al. (2013) is that legislator names are recorded accurately. Names from lists of registered lobbyists are also recorded with enough detail to allow matching across lists, but no lists provide enough detail (e.g., such as shared addresses or birth dates) to verify if the lobbyists were in fact former legislators. The matching criteria used for identifying revolvers included name and state-year matches. Given these constraints, it is possible at least to estimate an error rate for my name matches. Let us assume that former legislators are unlikely to register as lobbyists in states in which they did not get elected. This is a reasonable assumption given that such individuals, as lobbyists, market their connections within the chambers in which they served (Blanes i Vidal,

Table 11: Spurious Name Matches

Variable	Test One	Test Two	Test Three	Test Four	Test Five
Total Legislators	714	669	518	633	1,762
(Sample)	(ME 1967 - 1986)	(PA 1967 - 1986)	(SC 1967 - 1986)	(VT 1987 - 2008)	(NH 1967 - 1986)
Total Lobbyists	282	861	659	337	5,147
(Sample)	(HI 2011)	(OR 1989)	(GA 1989)	(NH 2011)	(NY 2011)
<b>Name Matches</b>	0	0	0	0	18

Fons-Rosen, and Draca 2012). Let us also assume that the probability of former legislators registering as lobbyists in other states decreases with geographic and temporal distance. For example, it would be most unlikely that a legislator who served in Maine in the 1970s would later register as a lobbyist in Hawaii, in 2011. If I adopt these assumptions, then I can estimate an error rate for comparing lists of legislators to lobbyists.

I match on five pairs of lists from different sets of states and years. I begin by matching former legislators from Maine who served between 1967 and 2008 to Hawaii's registered lobbyists in 2011. There should be no individuals appearing on both lists, so any name matches between the two are purely spurious matches. I then match names between states separated by distance but not time: legislators from Pennsylvania dating from 1967 to 1986 to Oregon's registered lobbyists in 1989. I then match names between states separated neither by time nor by distance: legislators in South Carolina dating from 1967 to 1986 with Georgia's 1989 lobbyists, and Vermont's legislators from 1987 to 2008 with New Hampshire's 2011 lobbyists. Since there is also the possibility that spurious name matches are more likely to occur whenever lists are longer (thereby increasing the potential for matches), I also matched names from the longest list of legislators in my sample to names in the longest list of lobbyists. The total matches from all these tests are listed in Table 11.


Based on the totals of spurious matches listed in Table 11, we can conclude that matching names between lists of legislators and lobbyists is a mostly reliable method for identifying revolvers. For the first four tests, no names matched across lists. This suggests that lists of limited size do not generally lead to spurious name matches. For the fifth test, how-

ever, eighteen names matched across lists. Since this test involved the two largest lists in the sample (which together total 6,909 names), the possibility for spurious matches was increased. While this suggests that there might more some spurious matches in states with either many lawmakers or many lobbyists, the occurrence of spurious matches is contingent on there being both many lawmaker and many lobbyist names (since a spurious match draws upon names from both types of individuals). For two reasons, this is not problematic for my findings. Firstly, as shown in Figure 10, most states tend to have many former lawmakers, many lobbyists, but not both. In fact, no single state had more than 1,000 former lawmakers and more than 1,000 lobbyists. The chances for spurious matches among all these states, as evidenced in the first four tests in Table 11, is much smaller than in Test 5. Secondly, if the occurrence of spurious matches increases in states with many lawmaker names to match from, then this should reduce the chances of me finding a curvilinear relationship between legislator and revolver totals. In states with many lawmakers, it is hypothesized that fewer of them will enter into lobbying as a profession. At the same time, however, the abundance of lawmaker names increases the chances for spurious matches. Hence, my tests are conservative estimates of the declining value of revolving-door lobbyists. The data set used for this study will be made available on the author's personal website.

## **Parsing Legislative Turnover and Assembly Size**

Both legislative turnover and assembly size contribute to the number of former legislators in a U.S. state, but each of those factors may diminish the value of insider connections and political knowledge. Whereas the connections and knowledge that former lawmakers have expires more quickly under conditions of high turnover, those assets are also worth less in large assemblies where each incumbent has proportionally less influence over policy. I attempt to parse the separate effects of turnover and assembly size on rates of revolving. There is a curvilinear relationship between totals of former lawmakers and revolver totals. I expect there to be a similar relationship between legislative turnover and revolver totals. While

Figure 10: Lobbyist and Legislator Totals





more turnover should initially supply more former legislators, there should be diminishing marginal returns as insider connections and knowledge expire, and interest groups hire fewer revolvers. I expect a negative relationship between assembly size and revolver totals. As assemblies increase in size, the proportional influence of each incumbent legislator decreases. The value of insider connections and process knowledge is expected to be worth less in large assemblies than in small ones.

Measuring the long-term effects of legislative turnover can be difficult for several reasons. Turnover may fluctuate wildly from election to election, especially in less institutionalized legislatures that are more vulnerable to national economic and political shocks (see Berry, Berkman, and Schneiderman 2000). Turnover rates can also vary across legislative chambers in bicameral assemblies, especially if those chambers are elected in different years or on staggered terms (see Moncrief, Niemi, and Powell 2004, 361 - 63). In addition, members may retire from a chamber only to return again at a later date, or they may rotate between the upper and lower houses. This is often the case in U.S. states with weak term-limits laws (see Sarbaugh-Thompson 2010). Legislatures within the U.S. states have changed sizes infrequently, but some changes were drastic.

The population of former legislators is a function of both long-term turnover and historical chamber sizes. I re-estimate the models presented in the main text but control for historical chamber sizes. Controlling for historical chamber size isolates the long-term effects of legislative turnover within my models. There are at least three benefits of utilizing former legislators as a measure for long-term turnover. It smooths out the volatility that occurs from election to election. The population of former legislators can be treated as a proxy for turnover for both unicameral and bicameral legislatures, and it is not affected by chambers being elected in different years. Also, members of legislatures may cycle between lower and upper chambers or serve non-consecutive terms. Whereas measures of turnover based on single-year observations would treat such individuals as completely new legislators, my approach takes such cycling into account.

The U.S. state legislatures have experienced numerous membership adjustments since the 1930s (see Squire and Hamm 2005, 44 - 49). Sometimes, adjustments were large: such as when the Massachusetts House decreased from 240 to 160 members in 1979, or when the Cutback Amendment reduced the total number of representatives in Illinois from 177 to 118, in 1983. To isolate the cumulative effects of turnover over periods when legislatures changed sizes, I control for the average historical size of a legislature. For example, there were 280 total legislative seats (including those in the senate) in Massachusetts prior to 1979. In that year, the total was reduced to 200. As a result, the yearly average number of seats for the period 1967 to 1986 is roughly 248. The Massachusetts legislature has not changed size since then, so the average number of seats from 1989 and 2011 is 200.

The regression models in Table 12 estimate numbers of revolvers while controlling for historical chamber sizes. As outlined before, I expect turnover to have a curvilinear relationship with totals of revolvers. Chamber size should have a negative relationship with revolver totals. All models were estimated using the negative binomial variance function (just as in the main text). The first two models in Table 12 feature standard errors that are clustered by state. The second two models in Table 12 include fixed effects for each state and year. The effects are not reported.

The results presented in Table 12 confirm most of the results presented in the main text. The number of former legislators in a state is correlated with revolvers, but with diminishing marginal increases. This result remained intact even after controlling for the historical size of each state's legislature, thereby suggesting that legislative turnover is the primary force driving down the value of revolving-door lobbyists. The historical size of a state's legislature appears to have no effect on the number of revolvers within a state. Cooling-off laws are negatively correlated with revolver totals (but not in models with fixed effects), and there are more revolvers in states with more interest groups. These trends remain in models with state-level random effects (not reported here). These trends also remain when I use contemporary legislature sizes instead of historical legislature sizes (those reported are also


not reported here). Figure 11 shows the predicted number of revolvers within a state under different turnover conditions. The predictions are based on the coefficients presented in model 4, in Table 12. When compared to Figure 9, there remains strong evidence for the declining value of revolvers (although the predicted counts in Figure 11 reach slightly higher values).

Table 12: Controlling for Legislature Size

	Model 1 Clustered SE	Model 2 Clustered SE	Model 3 Fixed Effects	Model 4 Fixed Effects
<u>Former Legislators</u> 1,000	0.294 (0.324)	2.389*** (0.529)	0.337 (0.373)	3.437*** (1.108)
$(\frac{\text{Former Legislators}}{1000})^2$	-	-1.216*** (0.251)	-	-1.755*** (0.594)
<u>Legislature Size</u> 1,000	0.797 (1.687)	0.317 (1.265)	-0.254 (3.946)	-4.046 (4.143)
Cooling-off Months	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.016** (0.006)	-0.012** (0.006)
<u>Legislative Staffers</u> 1,000	-0.003 (0.118)	-0.043 (0.102)	0.196 (0.189)	0.334 (0.195)
<u>Registered Interests</u> 1,000	0.494*** (0.095)	0.482*** (0.089)	0.151 (0.105)	0.188 (0.106)
Registration Criteria	0.026 (0.031)	0.009 (0.029)	0.092*** (0.028)	0.065** (0.030)
Constant	2.216*** (0.192)	1.715*** (0.192)	2.024*** (0.628)	1.646*** (0.640)
$\ln(\alpha)$	-2.034 (0.165)	-2.255 (0.197)	-28.645 -	-18.779 (269.331)
<i>Observations</i>	99	99	99	99
<i>No. of States</i>	50	50	50	50
<i>AIC</i>	689.285	677.061	652.712	647.753

Note: state and year fixed effects are included in models 3 and 4 but not reported.  
\*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01 on two-tailed tests. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Figure 11: Alternative Predicted Revolvers and Former Legislators



In Table 13, I re-estimate my models using an alternative measure of legislative turnover. In these models, turnover is measured as the number of former legislators divided by the historical average total of incumbents. This measure of turnover also smooths over the short-term effects of election cycles, differences in chamber re-election rates, and the possibility that members served non-consecutive terms or alternated between chambers. From among all of my observations, this measure ranged from 2.1 in Alabama in 2011, to 7.4 in Missouri in 1989. By contrast, there was limited change *within* states between 1989 and 2011. In only seven states did this variable change by more than one. Except for the alternative measure of turnover, the models presented in Table 13 are specified like those presented in Table 12.

The results presented in Table 13 continue to provide strong support for the declining value of revolving-door lobbyists, but with some caveats. Legislative turnover is a significant predictor of revolver totals in models with clustered standard errors, and in models that included state and year fixed effects. Such results are particularly strong given the limited heterogeneity of turnover between states. The coefficients in models with fixed effects are based only on over-time changes within states. If independent variables change slightly over time or not at all, then this forces regression equations to rely on limited heterogeneity for calculating coefficients. Such coefficients can be substantively misleading when there is limited variation across time (see Beck and Katz 2001 for an example). The number of former legislators per incumbent did not change by much between 1989 and 2011 in most states. In 43 states, this figure did not change by more than one. Also, between 1989 and 2011, legislatures in only five states – Idaho, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Wyoming – changed membership sizes (and those changes were all modest, ranging from one to 37 seats). Nevertheless, the results provide strong evidence for the declining value of revolving-door lobbyists, even if the bulk of explained heterogeneity occurred between states. In the main text, such cross-state variance was ascribed as being the result of interest groups prospectively evaluating the value of revolvers (as opposed to groups engaging in retrospective learning, which would explain within-state changes). Additional observations

are needed for measuring the effects of within-state institutional reforms on rates of revolving. Such observations could consist of repeated yearly measurements taken from a handful of states that experienced significant institutional reforms.

Table 13: Using an Alternative Measure of Turnover

	Model 1 Clustered SE	Model 2 Clustered SE	Model 3 Fixed Effects	Model 4 Fixed Effects
Legislative Turnover	0.098 (0.056)	0.609** (0.267)	0.111 (0.061)	0.618** (0.254)
Legislative Turnover <sup>2</sup>	-	-0.060** (0.028)	-	-0.054** (0.027)
<u>Legislature Size</u> 1,000	1.525 (1.186)	1.570 (1.345)	-13.368 (9.019)	-15.496 (9.070)
Cooling-off Months	-0.016*** (0.006)	-0.014** (0.006)	-0.015** (0.006)	-0.012** (0.006)
<u>Legislative Staffers</u> 1,000	0.010 (0.115)	0.056 (0.127)	0.267 (0.185)	0.373 (0.192)
<u>Registered Interests</u> 1,000	0.492*** (0.094)	0.463*** (0.099)	0.212** (0.101)	0.248** (0.102)
Registration Criteria	0.025 (0.031)	0.021 (0.031)	0.095*** (0.028)	0.075** (0.030)
Constant	1.927*** (0.258)	0.932 (0.621)	3.638*** (1.287)	2.978*** (1.325)
ln( $\alpha$ )	-2.049 (0.164)	-2.096 (0.165)	-18.309 (336.806)	-19.399 (306.087)
<i>Observations</i>	99	99	99	99
<i>No. of States</i>	50	50	50	50
<i>AIC</i>	688.371	687.174	650.420	648.156

Note: state and year fixed effects are included in models 3 and 4, but not reported.  
\*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01 on two-tailed tests. Standard errors are in parentheses.

## Alternative Model Specifications

The following models present my findings with alternative measures of legislative staff resources, or with additional variables. Table 14 presents my original model specification

but with Bowen and Greene's (2014) measure of legislative staff resources substituting for the count of permanent legislative staff persons. Bowen and Greene measure spending for legislative staff support as the number of dollars spent on a legislature divided by the total number of legislators within the assembly (and excluding dollars spent on legislator salaries). These statistics were collected from the U.S. Census Bureau and measured in real 2010 U.S. dollars. With the exception of four states, I used legislative spending data that preceded my lobbyist data by one year. For reporting regression coefficients, I further divided Bowen and Greene's measure by 1,000. Table 15 presents my original model specification but with Squire's (1988) measure of legislative professionalism. This measure captures how similar a state's legislature is to the U.S. Congress in terms of member salaries, staff resources, and session lengths, which are all weighted equally. Professionalism scores from 1986 were gathered from Squire (2007), and scores from 2009 were found in Squire (2012).<sup>36</sup>

In these alternative specifications, there are few substantive changes from the regression models presented in the main text of the study. Numbers of former legislators continue to be correlated with revolver totals in a curvilinear fashion. There continues to be inconsistent support for the hypotheses linking post-governmental employment restrictions and additional staff resources with depressed totals of legislator revolvers. Increases in registration criteria appear to capture more revolver registrations between 1989 and 2011, but criteria are not correlated in general with revolver totals (as evidenced by the results presented in Models 1 and 2). While numbers of registered interest groups are correlated with revolver totals, increases in these registrations from between 1989 and 2011 did not result in more revolvers

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<sup>36</sup>Based on the information provided by the National Conference of State Legislatures, it is not possible to ascertain what percentage of permanent staff persons fulfill roles that are strictly policy-relevant (as opposed to clerical or constituency-related). The NCSL (2006) has provided profiles of staff services in the 50 states. Whereas permanent staff might include legislative council or lawyers who draft legislation, committee staff who conduct research, and any personal staff of chamber leaders or members, there are others who work within the legislature only during sessions. The job titles of session-only staff vary but tend to include additional law clerks, security guards, secretaries, or even janitors. Some permanent staff persons who engage in policy-related research during the session might also engage in constituency work when the legislature is not in session. This further complicates delineating which staff persons might have valuable policy expertise. Nevertheless, other measures of staff resources (e.g., Bowen and Green 2014, or Squire 2007) also do not delineate policy staff from constituency staff, and all these staff measures are correlated.

registering as well. These results are unchanged from the main text of the study. Results from Table 15 largely mirror those found in Tables 10 and 14. Squire's (1988) measure of legislative professionalism captures more than just staff resources since it also includes measures for session length and legislator pay.

Table 16 includes estimates of my regression models that also estimate coefficients for the numbers of lobbyists within states. Controlling for lobbyist counts (in addition to client totals) might provide a more accurate measure of how much lobbying activity is occurring within a state, or how easily it is for former legislators to find work as lobbyists. Table 16 reports results that are substantively similar to the ones presented in the main text of the chapter. One exception, however, is for post-governmental employment restrictions or cooling-off months. Additional months of waiting time are shown to be correlated with fewer revolvers across all four model specifications. The total of registered clients within a state is no longer a reliable predictor of revolver totals, but this is likely due to the fact that these totals are collinear with totals of registered lobbyists. The primary lesson to learn from these coefficients is that lobbying intensity, whether measured as the totals of registered interests or both interests and lobbyists, helps to explain totals of former legislators who register as lobbyists.

Table 17 presents linear estimations of my regression coefficients. The model specifications are the same as in Table 10. The results all remain substantively similar except for the effects of interest populations. Table 17 presents some evidence that more interests might have contributed to revolver totals, but these specifications fail to take into account the overdispersed nature of the dependent variable.



Table 14: Using Bowen and Greene (2014) Measures of Staff Support

	Model 1 Clustered SE	Model 2 Clustered SE	Model 3 Fixed Effects	Model 4 Fixed Effects
<u>Former Legislators</u> 1,000	0.390 (0.245)	2.281*** (0.513)	0.102 (0.323)	2.327** (0.990)
$(\frac{\text{Former Legislators}}{1000})^2$	-	-1.144*** (0.257)	-	-1.337** (0.565)
Cooling-off Months	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.016*** (0.006)	-0.015** (0.006)
Staff Spending <i>(Bowen and Greene 2014)</i>	-0.127** (0.060)	-0.098 (0.055)	-0.154 (0.136)	-0.099 (0.138)
<u>Registered Clients</u> 1,000	0.580*** (0.089)	0.526*** (0.084)	0.129 (0.101)	0.129 (0.100)
Registration Criteria	0.026 (0.031)	0.010 (0.028)	0.087*** (0.028)	0.066** (0.029)
Constant	2.299*** (0.164)	1.789*** (0.193)	2.228*** (0.289)	1.620*** (0.385)
$\ln(\alpha)$	-2.085 (0.179)	-2.296 (0.207)	-18.202 (323.092)	-19.927 (290.269)
<i>Observations</i>	99	99	99	99
<i>No. of States</i>	50	50	50	50
<i>AIC</i>	684.115	672.842	652.515	648.784

Note: state and year fixed effects are included in models 3 and 4 but not reported.  
 \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01 on two-tailed tests. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table 15: Using Squire (2007) Measures of Professionalism

	Model 1 Clustered SE	Model 2 Clustered SE	Model 3 Fixed Effects	Model 4 Fixed Effects
<u>Former Legislators</u> 1,000	0.456 (0.237)	2.395*** (0.509)	0.138 (0.320)	2.469** (0.973)
$(\frac{\text{Former Legislators}}{1000})^2$	-	-1.181*** (0.267)	-	-1.406** (0.559)
Cooling-off Months	-0.017*** (0.006)	-0.017*** (0.005)	-0.017*** (0.006)	-0.015** (0.006)
Professionalism <i>(Squire 1988)</i>	0.385 (0.480)	0.292 (0.476)	-0.026 (0.628)	0.098 (0.628)
<u>Registered Interests</u> 1,000	0.473*** (0.081)	0.441*** (0.072)	0.118 (0.100)	0.124 (0.100)
Registration Criteria	0.027 (0.031)	0.010 (0.028)	0.089*** (0.028)	0.066** (0.030)
Constant	2.192*** (0.167)	1.700*** (0.185)	2.167*** (0.294)	1.535*** (0.385)
$\ln(\alpha)$	-2.047 (0.169)	-2.267 (0.196)	-16.982 (327.096)	-17.638 (285.986)
<i>Observations</i>	99	99	99	99
<i>No. of States</i>	50	50	50	50
<i>AIC</i>	686.472	674.552	653.792	649.277

Note: state and year fixed effects are included in models 3 and 4 but not reported.  
 \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01 on two-tailed tests. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table 16: Controlling for Lobbyist Counts

	Model 1 Clustered SE	Model 2 Clustered SE	Model 3 Fixed Effects	Model 4 Fixed Effects
<u>Former Legislators</u> 1,000	0.497** (0.236)	2.488*** (0.455)	0.532 (0.374)	4.122*** (1.079)
$(\frac{\text{Former Legislators}}{1000})^2$	-	-1.206*** (0.239)	-	-2.035*** (0.577)
Cooling-off Months	-0.018*** (0.005)	-0.018*** (0.004)	-0.018*** (0.006)	-0.016** (0.006)
<u>Legislative Staffers</u> 1,000	-0.004 (0.100)	-0.051 (0.095)	0.281 (0.193)	0.457** (0.201)
<u>Registered Clients</u> 1,000	0.296*** (0.110)	0.296*** (0.096)	0.030 (0.110)	0.043 (0.111)
<u>Registered Lobbyists</u> 1,000	0.230*** (0.0708)	0.221*** (0.059)	0.235*** (0.065)	0.277*** (0.066)
Registration Criteria	0.047 (0.031)	0.029 (0.028)	0.096*** (0.028)	0.066** (0.030)
Constant	2.143*** (0.156)	1.626*** (0.154)	1.839*** (0.333)	0.768 (0.450)
$\ln(\alpha)$	-2.207 (0.196)	-2.470 (0.229)	-18.654 (311.195)	-22.875 -
<i>Observations</i>	99	99	99	99
<i>No. of States</i>	50	50	50	50
<i>AIC</i>	678.295	664.274	641.456	628.628

Note: state and year fixed effects are included in models 3 and 4 but not reported.  
 \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01 on two-tailed tests. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table 17: The Declining Value of Revolving-Door Lobbyists (Linear Models)

	Model 1 Clustered SE	Model 2 Clustered SE	Model 3 Fixed Effects	Model 4 Fixed Effects
Former Legislators	7.544 (4.210)	42.273*** (9.266)	1.477 (8.511)	58.952** (22.063)
Former Legislators <sup>2</sup>	-	-20.849*** (4.663)	-	-33.920*** (12.155)
Cooling-off Months	-0.292** (0.119)	-0.293*** (0.106)	-0.335** (0.139)	-0.257 (0.133)
<u>Legislative Staffers</u> 1,000	0.387 (2.135)	-0.520 (1.937)	5.318 (4.801)	7.438 (4.526)
<u>Registered Interests</u> 1,000	10.518*** (2.230)	10.534*** (2.053)	4.942 (2.530)	5.271** (2.355)
Registration Criteria	0.466 (0.640)	0.128 (0.590)	1.532** (0.613)	1.066 (0.593)
Constant	6.601** (2.558)	-2.270 (2.920)	4.416 (6.873)	-12.369 (8.774)
<i>Observations</i>	99	99	99	99
<i>No. of States</i>	50	50	50	50
<i>R<sup>2</sup></i>	0.49	0.56	0.90	0.92

Note: state and year fixed effects are included in models 3 and 4 but not reported.  
 \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01 on two-tailed tests. Standard errors are in parentheses.

## Alternative Samples

Since I am working with only 99 observations, the statistical results presented in my models might be influenced by the presence of outliers. In Table 18, I estimate the same regression equations originally presented in Table 10, but exclude observations from New Hampshire's unusually large legislature. My results remain substantively unchanged.

Table 18: Excluding New Hampshire

	Model 1 Clustered SE	Model 2 Clustered SE	Model 3 Fixed Effects	Model 4 Fixed Effects
<u>Former Legislators</u> 1,000	0.788*** (0.302)	2.982*** (0.568)	0.346 (0.372)	3.123*** (1.062)
$(\frac{\text{Former Legislators}}{1000})^2$	-	-1.701*** (0.360)	-	-1.609*** (0.580)
Cooling-off Months	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.015** (0.006)	-0.013** (0.006)
<u>Legislative Staffers</u> 1,000	-0.016 (0.104)	-0.034 (0.100)	0.200 (0.189)	0.311 (0.194)
<u>Registered Clients</u> 1,000	0.494*** (0.093)	0.472*** (0.090)	0.156 (0.106)	0.176 (0.106)
Registration Criteria	0.020 (0.031)	0.007 (0.029)	0.092*** (0.028)	0.067** (0.030)
Constant	2.133*** (0.157)	1.612*** (0.185)	1.980*** (0.331)	1.238*** (0.441)
$\ln(\alpha)$	-2.082 (0.169)	-2.247 (0.196)	-16.699 (312.833)	-18.040 (412.236)
<i>Observations</i>	97	97	97	97
<i>No. of States</i>	49	49	49	49
<i>AIC</i>	668.402	662.830	641.552	635.641

Note: state and year fixed effects are included in models 3 and 4 but not reported.  
\*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01 on two-tailed tests. Standard errors are in parentheses.

In addition, there is some evidence that Michigan's list of registered lobbyists from 1989 included more names than just those who registered to lobby in that year. Beginning in the early 1980s, Michigan's Secretary of State began to publish a running list of lobbyists

and clients who had registered (i.e., lobbyists did not have to re-register every year). Names were not removed from the lists unless employers indicated that they had terminated their relationship with the lobbyist. The list of Michigan's lobbyists provided by Wilson (1990) might include names of lobbyists who registered years before but who were not lobbying in 1989. This has the potential to inflate the number of revolvers detected in that year. As a result, I re-estimated my models with a sample that excludes Michigan's observation from 1989. The results are substantively unchanged. Table 19 lists the regression results.

Table 19: Excluding Michigan in 1989

	Model 1 Clustered SE	Model 2 Clustered SE	Model 3 Fixed Effects	Model 4 Fixed Effects
<u>Former Legislators</u> 1,000	0.437 (0.249)	2.446*** (0.510)	0.359 (0.371)	3.540*** (1.078)
$(\frac{\text{Former Legislators}}{1000})^2$	-	-1.216*** (0.260)	-	-1.821** (0.583)
Cooling-off Months	-0.016*** (0.006)	-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.018** (0.006)	-0.016** (0.006)
<u>Legislative Staffers</u> 1,000	0.010 (0.108)	-0.039 (0.097)	0.147 (0.193)	0.251 (0.197)
<u>Registered Clients</u> 1,000	0.488*** (0.095)	0.478*** (0.089)	0.140 (0.105)	0.164 (0.106)
Registration Criteria	0.022 (0.031)	0.005 (0.028)	0.090*** (0.028)	0.061** (0.030)
Constant	2.266*** (0.156)	1.741*** (0.180)	2.019*** (0.330)	1.112** (0.439)
$\ln(\alpha)$	-2.030 (0.164)	-2.256 (0.196)	-160.529 -	-19.304 (485.164)
<i>Observations</i>	98	98	98	98
<i>No. of States</i>	50	50	50	50
<i>AIC</i>	679.299	666.946	643.903	637.856

Note: state and year fixed effects are included in models 3 and 4 but not reported.  
\*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01 on two-tailed tests. Standard errors are in parentheses.

I also estimated my models using bootstrapped standard errors. Bootstrapping involves drawing observations from my data set repeatedly and randomly (but with replacement) in order to gain more information about the population data-generating process (see Carsey and Harden 2014, 215 - 28). Since observations may not be normally distributed when working with data from the fifty U.S. states, bootstrapping can be useful for relaxing the normality assumption (see Keele 2008, 185). I generated bootstrapped errors based on 1,000 replications or drawings from my data set. The standard errors are clustered by state.

Table 20: The Declining Value of Revolving-Door Lobbyists (Bootstrapped Errors)

	Model 1 (Linear)	Model 2 (NB2)
<u>Former Legislators</u> 1,000	42.273*** (11.138)	2.458*** (0.657)
$(\frac{Former\ Legislators}{1000})^2$	-20.849*** (7.997)	-1.221** (0.479)
Cooling-off Months	-0.293*** (0.102)	-0.016*** (0.005)
<u>Legislative Staffers</u> 1,000	-0.520 (3.021)	-0.037 (0.132)
<u>Registered Interests</u> 1,000	10.534*** (2.149)	0.480*** (0.105)
Registration Criteria	0.128 (0.578)	0.009 (0.030)
Constant	-2.270 (3.188)	1.727 (0.204)***
$\ln(\alpha)$	-	-2.254 (0.228)
<i>Observations</i>	99	99
<i>No. of States</i>	50	50
<i>R<sup>2</sup></i>	0.555	-
<i>AIC</i>	-	675.116

Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.

\*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01 on two-tailed tests.

## Reliability of Lobbyist Registration Data

The lists of registered lobbyists and their clients were collected mostly from Wilson (1990) and the National Institute on Money in State Politics (hereafter, the Institute).<sup>37</sup> Whereas research assistants were tasked with transcribing printed lists from Wilson (1990) and the various state agencies into Excel spreadsheets, the Institute's lists were provided directly by its staff already in spreadsheet format. All spreadsheets that were transcribed or sent by the Institute consist of lobbyist-client pairings, or lists of each lobbyist-client connection (similar to the dyads in Figure 3). In accordance with lobbyist registration procedures in most states, the lists make the distinction between the individual persons acting as representatives, and the organizations, firms, or entities that they were authorized to represent. Since many lobbyists represent multiple interest groups, one has to count unique names in order to identify just how many persons are lobbyists. Since many clients hired multiple lobbyists as well, one has to count unique client names to identify the population of interests registered within the state.

When working with lists of registered lobbyists from the U.S. states, there arise several other issues that must to be resolved for measurement purposes. Sometimes, lobbyists or interest group leaders will register the names of their firms as the representatives. This would be the case, for example, if an interest group appeared to have a lobbyist named "Capitol Strategies." This can affect measurement in several ways. Since firms are not the persons who represent the clients but instead consist of multiple lobbyists, firms that are listed as lobbyists might conceal the identities of employees. This might conceal the total number of unique lobbyists (including revolvers) working in a state's legislature. There is no way to circumvent this issue by using lobby registration data, but it might be possible to address this issue in other ways. Using words and phrases that appear only within the names of lobby firms, I identified which lists of registered lobbyists included firms. The words and phrases include "strategies," "group," "consulting," "associates," "partners," "strategic," "solutions," and

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<sup>37</sup>See McGovern and Greenberg (2014, 5 - 14) for a history of the Institute.



“capitol,” among others. Lists that included lobby firms were marked dichotomously. The inclusion of this dichotomous indicator variable within the models did not affect my results. Instead, my models gained explanatory power, with the measure of post-governmental employment waiting periods now reaching traditional levels of significance. Table 21 presents regression results with the dichotomous control included. State and year fixed effects are included (but not reported) in model 2. Table 22 presents regression results with a measure of the number of firms registered as lobbyists included.<sup>38</sup>

There are other problems that might arise when working with lists specifically from the Institute. Benz et al. (2011, 445) reported, for example, that they had to “clean” the Institute’s data to count the number of PACs in the U.S. states. Lowery et al. (2009) also made note of errors within the Institute’s data. Nevertheless, McGovern and Greenberg (2014, 29) noted that the Institute’s data have proven sufficient for conducting research on state campaign finance and other topics (e.g., Brown 2013; Damore and Nicholson 2013; Hartney and Flavin 2011), and that the Institute’s data have additional uses provided that researchers adapt to limitations of the data. Direct examination reveals that in nearly all of the Institute’s lists of registered lobbyists and clients from 2011, lobbyists also registered their firms as clients. This can have the effect of inflating totals of registered interest groups slightly. The Institute has coded a large portion of interest groups registered in the U.S. states according to their interest type. In order to help isolate further the effects of legislator supply on rates of revolving, I re-estimated my models using only data from 2011 and controlling for the number of clients coded as “Lawyers and Lobbyists.” Since the data are collected from one cross-section of the U.S. states, there is no need to cluster the standard errors or employ fixed effects. I also controlled for whether any firms appeared among the names of lobbyists in the state.

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<sup>38</sup>In many states, members of firms also registered on an individual basis. Often, firm names would be followed by the names of their associates. Just because a firm showed up as a registered lobbyist for an interest group does not mean its individual members did not also register as lobbyists.

Table 21: First Test for Lobbyist Data Reliability

	Model 1 Clustered SE	Model 2 Fixed Effects
<u>Former Legislators</u> 1,000	2.634*** (0.488)	3.244*** (1.054)
$(\frac{\text{Former Legislators}}{1000})^2$	-1.290*** (0.249)	-1.659*** (0.568)
Cooling-off Months	-0.016*** (0.004)	-0.016** (0.007)
<u>Legislative Staffers</u> 1,000	-0.077 (0.092)	0.304 (0.194)
<u>Registered Interests</u> 1,000	0.0465*** (0.079)	0.137 (0.110)
Registration Criteria	0.008 (0.027)	0.069** (0.030)
Firms as Lobbyists? <i>(Binary indicator.)</i>	0.230** (0.106)	0.128 (0.102)
Constant	1.646*** (0.168)	1.110** (0.440)
$\ln(\alpha)$	-2.333 (0.192)	-22.762 -
<i>Observations</i>	99	99
<i>No. of States</i>	50	50
<i>AIC</i>	672.076	645.149

Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01 on two-tailed tests.

Table 22: Second Test for Lobbyist Data Reliability

	Model 1 Clustered SE	Model 2 Fixed Effects
<u>Former Legislators</u> 1,000	2.456*** (0.505)	2.978*** (1.053)
$(\frac{\text{Former Legislators}}{1000})^2$	-1.215*** (0.258)	-1.523*** (0.570)
Cooling-off Months	-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.014** (0.006)
<u>Legislative Staffers</u> 1,000	-0.037 (0.097)	0.286 (0.197)
<u>Registered Interests</u> 1,000	0.459*** (0.091)	0.179 (0.105)
Registration Criteria	0.011 (0.028)	0.068** (0.030)
Firms Registered as Lobbyists <i>(Count of firms.)</i>	0.003 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Constant	1.720*** (0.178)	1.232*** (0.439)
$\ln(\alpha)$	-2.284 (0.194)	-17.140 (277.990)
<i>Observations</i>	99	99
<i>No. of States</i>	50	50
<i>AIC</i>	675.656	648.126

Standard errors are in parentheses.

\*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01 on two-tailed tests.

Table 23: Third Test for Lobbyist Data Reliability

	Model 1
$\frac{\text{Former Legislators}}{1,000}$	3.174*** (0.817)
$(\frac{\text{Former Legislators}}{1000})^2$	-1.566*** (0.459)
Cooling-off Months	-0.018*** (0.007)
$\frac{\text{Legislative Staffers}}{1,000}$	0.043 (0.118)
$\frac{\text{Registered Interests}}{1,000}$	0.255** (0.115)
Registration Criteria	-0.018 (0.038)
Firms as Lobbyists? <i>(Binary indicator.)</i>	0.177 (0.131)
Lobbyists Registered as Clients <i>(Count of firms.)</i>	0.003 (0.004)
Constant	1.773*** (0.243)
$\ln(\alpha)$	-2.646 (0.342)
<i>Observations</i>	50
<i>No. of States</i>	50
<i>AIC</i>	349.649

Standard errors are in parentheses.

\*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01 on two-tailed tests.

Table 24: Fourth Test for Lobbyist Data Reliability

	Model 1
$\frac{\text{Former Legislators}}{1,000}$	3.005*** (0.824)
$(\frac{\text{Former Legislators}}{1000})^2$	-1.485*** (0.465)
Cooling-off Months	-0.016** (0.007)
$\frac{\text{Legislative Staffers}}{1,000}$	0.062 (0.123)
$\frac{\text{Registered Interests}}{1,000}$	0.259** (0.125)
Registration Criteria	-0.010 (0.040)
Firms Registered as Lobbyists <i>(Count of firms.)</i>	0.001 (0.003)
Lobbyists Registered as Clients <i>(Count of firms.)</i>	0.003 (0.005)
Constant	1.800*** (0.246)
$\ln(\alpha)$	-2.605 (0.338)
<i>Observations</i>	50
<i>No. of States</i>	50
<i>AIC</i>	351.138

Standard errors are in parentheses.

\*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01 on two-tailed tests.

# Chapter Five:

## Future Directions for Research

This dissertation presented an examination of multi-client advocacy and its causes. Using an original data set, I quantified the emergence of multi-client advocacy in the U.S. states. I proposed that interest groups hire multi-client lobbyists in response to legislative characteristics and lobby laws, the types of goods they seek from government, and the availability of former legislators. In brief, I found mixed evidence that legislative institutions and lobby laws affect the hiring of lobbyists. Instead, clients appear to trade-off agency for assets mostly depending on the kinds of goods they seek from government. Public interest groups that seek collective benefits from government prefer to hire single-client advocates. This was reasoned to be due to such organizations maximizing the use of their resources for full-time advocacy, and hiring advocates who both share their interests and serve as credible spokespersons. Different legislatures were shown to produce different numbers of former legislators who became lobbyists. Diminishing proportions of former legislators became lobbyists under conditions of high turnover. Results presented in chapter three suggested that the presence of former legislators acting as lobbyists increases the overall rate of multi-client lobbying within a state, suggesting that former state legislators tend to have multiple clients.

## Summary of Theory and Findings

In the first chapter, I attempted to complicate multi-client lobbying. When clients hire lobbyists to communicate with state officials, there is a risk that those lobbyists will not communicate client interests faithfully or as zealously as contracted. Like many other economic sectors, lobbying is rife with possible agency loss abuse. Unlike most other sectors, however, clients cannot monitor the actions of their agents effectively, and it can also be difficult for clients to judge the success of their agents. Even worse for clients: there are few credentialing associations for lobbyists, and even they cannot monitor or police their members adequately. I have argued that the best way for an interest group to overcome agency problems is to hire a sincere agent, or someone who shares its interest personally. Of course, while sincere lobbyists might help to guard against agency loss abuse, they cannot offer the same assets that professional, multi-client lobbyists have. As opposed to preserving agency, professionals can offer access and political knowledge. It is these assets that allow lobbyists to accrue multiple clients and become full-time, professional advocates. Granted, some lobbyists with access and knowledge might serve as single-client lobbyists for high-paying clients; and many multi-client lobbyists would claim to represent their clients faithfully. The trade-off between agency and assets is based on the assumptions that single-client lobbyists typically serve as better spokespersons while multi-client lobbyists typically offer other assets. In three empirical chapters, I then examined the circumstances under which groups are more or less likely to hire multi-client lobbyists.

The second chapter examined the hiring of lobbyists from an aggregated perspective. I proposed a new measure both for lobbying intensity in general and for multi-client lobbying specifically. Using dyadic lists of registered lobbyist-client dyads, I argued that the average number of lobbyists hired per group can be interpreted as a proxy for how intensely those groups lobbied. Of course, there are limitations to this measure. It is not intended to capture outside, grassroots efforts or campaign finance activities. Nevertheless, I found that interest groups in U.S. states with term limits hired fewer lobbyists, on average, and that limits did

not affect rates of multi- or single-client lobbying. Groups hired fewer multi-client lobbyists in legislatures that became more competitive over time. While there was generally less multi-client lobbying in states with less legislative expenditures, increases in expenditures over time had a positive effect. Also, lobby definitions captured more multi-client lobbying, but reporting requirements had a dampening effect on this trend. In general, these findings suggest that legislative institutions and lobby laws have some effect on the lobbyists groups hired. The tests presented in the second chapter used state-level observations, however, so it was impossible to determine just which groups were hiring multi-client lobbyists most often. I then turned to group-level measures of this phenomenon.

In the third chapter, I sought to measure rates of multi-client advocacy directly. I argued that public interest groups that advocate for collective benefits (e.g., environmental protections, government ethics, justice system reform) are significantly more likely to hire single-client, likely in-house advocates than business firms. These organizations seek to maintain a full-time lobby presence. As a result, they retain an advocate to fulfill this function on a full-time (perhaps salaried) basis. This is more cost-effective than contracting services out to a professional who is paid on an hourly basis. At the same time, political advocacy is a core function for public interest groups. These organizations seek to minimize agency loss abuse by hiring sincere agents who already share the interests of the clients. Having single-client advocates can also help to build credibility with dues-paying members and policy makers. To test these propositions, I generated lists of client-state-year observations using lists of registered lobbyist-client dyads from 1989 and 2011 (the years for which I had reliable lists from all U.S. states). The resulting dataset consisted of more than 80,000 observations, with each row containing the numbers of multi- and single-client lobbyists that each client hired. I then coded individual interest groups by searching for key terms and using a strict coding scheme. Regression analysis indicated that environmental, advocacy, women's, and religious groups were all significantly less likely to hire multi-client advocates than all other groups. Labor unions also preferred single-client advocates. This trend was



reversed for large, *Fortune* 100 firms, which are likely to hire multi-client, revolving-door lobbyists. This study presented the first nationwide examination of multi-client lobbying in the states, and it presented an original explanation for why different kinds of interest groups choose different lobbyists.

Revolving-door lobbyists consist of former government officials who become lobbyists. Due to having served in office, these lobbyists use their personal connections and political knowledge to gain access and influence. In Congress, these individuals represent multiple clients and are among Washington's best-paid lobbyists. Similar patterns might be found in the U.S. states, but I argued that the different turnover rates of the state legislatures should affect the value of revolving-door lobbyists. Under conditions of high turnover, former legislators lose their valuable connections in the assembly. Their exclusive political knowledge of how the legislature operates also expires. As a result, I expected interest groups to begin to fewer former legislators to lobby as turnover increased. Such a pattern could be the result either of groups retrospectively determining that their revolving-door lobbyists are no longer effective advocates, or of interest groups prospectively judging that former legislators with fewer years of legislative experience (due to high turnover) would not be effective advocates to begin with. Using lists of legislative election winners, I identified former legislators within lists of registered lobbyists for 1989 and 2011 for all U.S. states. I found strong support for my expectations: as the number of former legislators in a state increases (as a result of turnover), numbers of revolving-door lobbyists increase with declining marginal returns. After a global maximum, returns even become negative (suggesting that interest groups *reject* former legislators in some states with extreme turnover). The curvilinear relationship between legislator supply and revolver totals was robust to the inclusion of a host of possibly confounding variables, including government-mandated cooling-off periods, legislative staff resources, sizes of interest populations, and lobbyist registration criteria.

## Future Directions for Research

To an extent, this dissertation sought to re-orient scholars' views of lobbying in the American states. Over time across the United States, numbers of interest groups with registered lobbyists have increased significantly, but these populations mask the total amount of lobbying that is occurring within America's state capitols. Interest populations also mask the kinds of lobbyists that groups hire. For better or worse, most of the existing scholarship on lobbying in the American states has focused exclusively on active interests. I argued that lobbyists are the conduits of communication for interest groups. As such, scholars should begin to explore the different kinds of lobbyists that interest groups hire, and how successful they are in conveying client messages. Whereas previous scholarship has often focused on the mobilization of bias (as manifested in the kinds of groups that lobby or not), the emergence of multi-client lobbyists threatens the competitive representation of diverse groups and reinforces the influence of business and other institutional interests (Schattschneider 1960, Gray and Lowery 2004). While more and more interest groups have hired lobbyists to target state legislators, a class of multi-client, professional advocates has arisen to represent these interests. Such advocates, particularly those who are former legislators, enjoy more access to and influence over legislators. At the same time, multi-client advocates are less likely to represent public interest groups and labor unions. The kind of lobbyist that a group hires has substantive implications for its policy influence and success.

While multi-client lobbyists might get results for businesses and institutional interests, other kinds of groups may exercise influence through other political activities. When compared to other kinds of groups, business corporations, trade and professional associations spend the greatest amounts on lobbyists (Baumgartner et al. 2009, 199). The average amount that public interest groups spend on lobbyists pales in comparison, but this does not suggest that these groups have no influence. The representatives of these groups tend to be taken seriously by members of Congress because they, unlike businesses, can credibly claim to speak on behalf of thousands of dues-paying members. Such representatives often

testify before congressional committee hearings or are mentioned in popular press outlets (Berry 1999). These agents can successfully coordinate grassroots lobby campaigns in which group members contact state officials (Kollman 1998). Businesses cannot rely on dues-paying members for such support and must instead resort to such insider tactics as direct lobbying and campaign finance. This dissertation stopped short of testing for whether the clients of multi-client lobbyists more often get rewarded in state legislatures than those of single-client lobbyists, or if outside lobbying techniques are more effective at gaining influence. The differences between the two tactics and their effectiveness might prove to be a persistent theme in future research.

## **Gendered Lobbying**

My original data set and explanation of how clients choose lobbyists can contribute to the study of women lobbyists in the American states. To date, there has been limited examination of the gender diversity of lobbyists in the American states, but existing studies have produced some informative conclusions. Lobbyists in the states are mostly men but women are making substantial inroads into the profession (Nownes and Freeman 1998). Women lobbyists reported fewer years of experience and lower average salaries than their male counterparts (Lucas and Hyde 2012). They were less likely than men to be contract lobbyists (Nownes and Freeman 1998), less likely to have held political office prior to becoming lobbyists, less likely to represent business interests, and more likely to represent public interest groups and identify as politically liberal (Lucas and Hyde 2012). Most of these trends were also found among women lobbyists in Congress (Bath, Gayvert-Owen, and Nownes 2005). Lucas and Hyde (2012) also found that women lobbyists were more likely to engage in grassroots activities. All these studies relied on survey responses to estimate the percentage of state lobbyists who are women. Names and contact information for respondents were gathered from lists of registered lobbyists. While this technique is most useful for gathering more indepth information about how men and women lobbyists differ

in their characteristics and tactics, my own registration lists allow scholars to code just how many lobbyists had female names and the kinds of clients those agents represented. Such coding can provide a more complete picture of how lobbyist gender diversity varies across states and time.

Moreover, my explanation of how clients choose lobbyists can help to explain some of those earlier empirical findings. Interest groups often hire lobbyists who can serve as credible spokespersons. Public interest groups that consist of dues-paying members are particularly likely to seek lobbyists who can credibly claim to speak on behalf of group members. Members and other supporters of public groups are often motivated by purposive (or expressive) benefits (Clark and Wilson 1961, 135 - 37). Members of Common Cause and the American Civil Liberties Union, for example, desire reforms that ensure ethical conduct in government or the protection of civil liberties and due process, respectively (Rothenberg 1992; Cook 1984). When asked, members of those organizations indeed prioritized more highly the state provision of those public goods than receiving any material or solidary benefits from those organizations. Many public interest groups advocate for reform on women's issues. Such groups include the League of Women Voters and National Organization for Women, among many others. These organizations advocate for legislation to end workplace discrimination, protect reproductive rights, and end sexual violence. According to my explanation of how clients choose lobbyists, presented in chapter three, I expect women's interest groups to be more likely than other kinds of groups to hire women lobbyists. These groups desire to be represented by individuals who can credibly claim to speak for women (thereby shoring up membership and fundraising efforts, and building credibility with policymakers). If this is the case, then the findings presented in Nownes and Freeman (1998) and Lucan and Hyde (2012) should be of little surprise. Some of the differences between male and female lobbyists that those scholars measure can be explained in part by interest group motivations. Group motivations are not mentioned as potential causal factors in those prior studies, but similar narratives may be applied also to other identity-based groups and their lobbyists.

## Using Historical Lobby Data

Historical lobbyist records from the U.S. states provide numerous opportunities for additional research. Recall that the states were among the first regimes in the world to require lobbyists to register. The lobby disclosure measures adopted by the states led to the creation and preservation of numerous documents that capture how lobbying changed over time. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, for example, maintained all of the legislative dockets and expense statements that lobbyists signed and provided over the years. Lists of registered lobbyists and their clients can be constructed from such dockets and statements. Importantly, the dockets detail exactly who represented each client and in what capacity (i.e., as an agent who lobbied officials directly or as counsel who testified before committees). Unfortunately, these records have been underutilized for the study of interest groups. Not since Edgar Lane wrote a dissertation in political science at the University of Michigan in 1949 (and then published it as a book in 1964) has anyone rigorously examined these historical documents in detail. Lane explored only the numbers of lobbyists and groups that registered, and did not examine the substantive issue areas they represented. Gray and Lowery (1996) also examined group counts across multiple decades, but their data include observations from 1975 and later years. There are a few scattered studies that include older observations of lobbyist and group populations, but these studies mostly focus on individual states and are not comparative in nature. The lobbyist records maintained in state archives across the United States provide insight into how lobbying has changed, and the information contained in the records can allow researchers to answer new questions or explore existing questions more deeply.

Scholars have attempted to explore how public opinion, social movements, and activists influenced the ratification of U.S. constitutional amendments. The most commonly used method for amending the constitution has been for Congress to approve of a proposal and then send it to the states for ratification. Once three fourths of the states ratify the amendment, it becomes part of the constitution. All amendments to the constitution have been

ratified via legislative votes, with the exception of the Twenty-First Amendment repealing the prohibition of “intoxicating” beverages (which was ratified through state conventions). When amendments are sent to the states, battles over amendment may occur. Studies of the roles of opinion, movements, and activists in these battles have usually employed qualitative, historical methodologies (e.g., Kerr 1980, Pegram 1997). Studies that are more quantitative tend to use blunt instruments as proxies for public opinion, social movements, or the presence of activists in the legislature. Blunt instruments include mostly statistics provided by the U.S. Census (as in Baack and Ray 1985, Munger and Schaller 1997, among others). The use of these poor measurements can be blamed on a lack of sufficient data from years when amendments of interest were ratified. There is more sufficient data for examining the non-ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment, however (see Conover and Gray 1983, Soule and Olzak 2004).

The lobbyist records contained in the state archives are old enough to list lobbying efforts related to proposed constitutional amendments. The records can allow scholars to count exactly how many agents or activists registered to lobby or testified before committees on issues related to constitutional amendments. The docket pages include the signatures and goals of registrants. Representatives of the Anti-Saloon League, for example, registered lobbyists frequently across many states both before and after the national adoption of prohibition. Prior to the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment, numerous woman activists registered and lobbied on behalf of their local suffrage organizations. They preceded the emergence of various citizen interests in the 1960s (Walker 1991, 63). Lobby records have indeed already been used to examine mobilization regarding the Equal Rights Amendment (Conover and Gray 1983). Older records can illuminate lobbying on other proposed amendments, therefore allowing scholars both to explore new questions and measure historic mobilization more accurately.

Further still, a comparative analysis of how interest groups affect the development of constitutions remains elusive. The U.S. states have held numerous constitutional conventions

since 1789 (see Kogan 2010 for a list). Several conventions from the 1960s and 1970s required those seeking to lobby delegates to register their names. These records can also be found in state archives. While scholars have explored the influence of interests on the U.S. convention of 1789 (e.g., Dougherty and Heckelman 2008, Heckelman and Dougherty 2010, Pope and Triere 2015), comparing the interests that lobbied delegates across multiple conventions might allow scholars to identify circumstances that allow for special interest influence. It remains to be seen how the interests targeting convention delegates would differ (both in number and diversity of issues) from those targeting legislators during typical sessions.

## **Further Explorations of the Revolving-Door**

There remain other avenues for research particularly on revolving-door lobbyists in the U.S. states. Examining the count or quantity of revolving-door lobbyists ignores an important dimension of how institutions affect the representation of interests. Indeed, the *price* of such lobbyists should be of interest to those worried over the equal representation (or access) of diverse interest groups. If the value or price of former legislators truly changes in relation to institutional context, then we should expect these lobbyists to represent different numbers and kinds of clients in states with more turnover.

In Congress, former legislators exacerbate the influence of wealthy, special interest groups. Not all interest groups are alike or have equal influence. Groups vary in the material resources available to them for paying lobbyists. As a result, substantial differences exist between groups in the amounts they spend on lobbying and political action committees (PACs) (see Baumgartner et al. 2009, 199). In a large study of federal interests, business corporations, trade and professional associations were found spending significantly greater amounts on lobbying than labor unions and citizen groups, among others. Labor unions tended to concentrate their resources into sponsoring PACs, and citizen groups still spent significantly less on PACs than all other interests. Moreover, former members of Congress are among Washington's most expensive lobbyists. Some bring in more than \$2 million per year in

lobby contracts, and the overall median revenue of former members is more than \$450,000 per year, or more than five times what non-revolver lobbyists earn (LaPira and Thomas 2017, 93). Relatedly, former members rarely represent labor unions or citizen groups on the Hill (Baumgartner et al. 2009, 199); but they deliver results. Hiring former members of Congress or former staff persons is associated with more policy victories or getting bills advanced through committees (see Baumgartner et al. 2009, 203; Maske 2017; McCrain 2018).

At the same time, not all former legislators come from similar legislative assemblies; and their value changes in relation to legislative turnover. If former legislators are worth less as lobbyists in states with high turnover, then we should expect them to represent different numbers and kinds of clients across legislatures. In other words, high turnover should reduce the premium that former legislators can demand for their services over those of other (non-legislator) lobbyists. Whereas turnover in Washington has remained generally stable since the mid-1970s, the U.S. state legislatures vary drastically in the percentage of members who depart each year. The revolver premium itself cannot be directly measured in most states since most states do not require lobbyists to report their income. However, a shrinking premium should be one part of a broader pattern: in general, *all* the differences between revolving-door and non-revolving lobbyists should decrease with increasing turnover. There are two reasons why former legislators in high turnover assemblies might represent different kinds of clients than those in low-turnover assemblies.

In assemblies with high turnover, former legislators lose their valuable connections and political knowledge more quickly. As lobbyists, former legislators are more valuable and influential because they have friends and acquaintances still serving in government. Friends in the legislature leave with turnover, however, thereby reducing the value of a lobbyist's assets. As a result, interest groups hire fewer former legislators to lobby either because of reduced access and influence or because the groups are less interested in hiring former legislators with fewer years of government experience on average.



A second reason why former legislators in high-turnover states may represent fewer or different kinds of clients is that they were not fully socialized into the business of politics. In legislatures with high turnover, members serve less time in office, on average. By virtue of having served less time in office, they have been less socialized into the norms and elitism of officialdom. Individuals who served brief stints in office may continue to have anti-establishment or ideological values (i.e., the values that motivated them to run for office in the first place) (see Powell 2007, 138 - 39; Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000, 30 - 33, 60). They might remain suspicious of lobbyists after serving in office. After all, first-time lawmakers tend to be suspicious of lobbyists and it takes time for lobbyists to build relationships with new lawmakers (Mooney 2007; Rosenthal 1996, 109 - 11). In contrast, veteran lawmakers who are used to communicating with lobbyists of all stripes are more likely to view legislative politics as a usual business. They are no longer moored to personal, perhaps ideological principles since they developed over time a broad view of interests in government. They came to learn which policies can or cannot realistically be enacted given the institutions and entrenched interests (distributional coalitions, as in Olson 1982) of the state. In other words, the longer a “Mr. Smith” remains in Washington, the more he comes to resemble other members of the Washington establishment or community.

Not only do former legislators who served for brief stints in office lack strong connections with incumbents, they continue to have anti-establishment or ideological values and desire not to become professional lobbyists. Those who served in office briefly should be more likely to represent low-paying clients or causes that they personally value. Perhaps even in some cases, individuals who served several terms in office became disenchanted with legislative polarization, procedure, or gridlock and decided to retire (and become activists for reform). Regardless, they did not serve in office long enough to develop durable, lasting connections that would benefit any lobbyist. Given the effects of turnover on revolver assets and socialization, I expect former legislators generally to represent a smaller share of total interest groups in states with high turnover. Specifically, I expect them to represent fewer

well-paying firms or more less-paying firms as well. I examine the size and diversity of revolver clients across the U.S. states. I offer some descriptive statistics to illustrate who former legislators represent in the states, but I offer no additional analysis in this conclusion.

Studies of the clientele of former legislators have tended to focus exclusively on the American Congress. These observations are instructive for illustrating how revolving-door lobbyists reinforce the influence of wealthy interest groups. First, lobbyists with government experience attract more clients than lobbyists without such experience. After examining Lobby Disclosure Act records for more than 1,600 federal lobbyists, LaPira and Thomas (2017, 111) found that the lobbyists with the most prior jobs in government had the most clients. Former members of Congress were found to have more clients than former staff persons, who in turn had more clients than those who had worked in the White House (112). (Recall that the president of the United States is term-limited while members of Congress are not.)

I examine the clients of legislators-turned-lobbyists in all U.S. states for 1989 and 2011. These clients were identified within the lists of registered lobbyists used to identify revolving-door lobbyists in chapter five. Based on the lists, I measure both the numbers and types of clients former legislators represented. Figures 12 and 13 include scatterplots of the average numbers of clients for both former legislators and non-revolving lobbyists in each of the U.S. states, for 1989 and 2011. Each point represents a state. In nearly all states for both years, former legislators had more clients than other lobbyists. In both scatterplots, the regression line traces potential values where revolvers and non-revolvers would have equal clientele sizes. In states that lie above the line, revolving-door lobbyists had more clients than non-revolvers. The opposite is true for states that lie below the line. The farther away a state is from the regression line, the larger the difference in clientele sizes between revolvers and non-revolvers. In 1989, from among revolvers across all states, former legislators in Pennsylvania had the most clients. In 2011, revolvers in New Jersey had the most clients.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>39</sup>Former legislators registered in New Jersey in 2011 each had 81 clients on average. This outlier is excluded from Figure 13, and likely is due in part to idiosyncratic registration procedures. I attempt to

The two scatterplots demonstrate that former legislators tend to have more clients than other lobbyists, but the differences in clientele sizes certainly differ across states. Legislative experience seems to matter for attracting additional clients, but it remains to be seen if these clients differ substantively from those of non-revolver lobbyists, or whether they pay more for representation.

Revolving-door lobbyists in the states tend not to represent public interest groups but instead represent large firms. Table 25 compares populations of interest types across the states with the groups that were represented by former legislators in 1989 and 2011. The total number of interest groups registered in the states more than doubled between those two years. The total number of clients represented by former legislators also (nearly) doubled.<sup>40</sup> Whereas environmental advocacy groups composed 1.5 percent of all interests active in the states in 2011, less than 1 percent of revolver clients were environmental groups. Governmental reform and advocacy groups (e.g., American Civil Liberties Union, Common Cause) composed 2.3 percent of all interests active in the states; but only 1.2 percent of revolver clients. Similar patterns are seen for women's and religious groups, and for labor unions and their local chapters. The percentage of revolver clients that were *Fortune* 100 (large) firms reflects the percentage of such firms among all clients (4 versus 4.2 percent), in 2011.<sup>41</sup> Given that public interest groups hire single-client lobbyists more often than other groups and that former legislators have more clients than their non-revolver colleagues, it is unsurprising that former legislators represent so few public interests. The clients of state-level revolvers reflect those of former members of Congress (LaPira and Thomas 2017, 103 - 30).

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adjust for such procedures in my statistical analyses.

<sup>40</sup>All these totals are aggregated across states. For example, if Wal-Mart or any other organization hired lobbyists in more than one state, then it was counted once for each state.

<sup>41</sup>The totals for all clients include those represented by revolving-door lobbyists. Some clients hired both revolvers and non-revolvers; but the aggregated differences (across client types) between non-revolver and revolver clients would surely increase if clients represented only by revolving-door lobbyists were excluded.

Figure 12: Revolver vs. Non-Revolver Clientele in the U.S. States, 1989




Figure 13: Revolver vs. Non-Revolver Clientele in the U.S. States, 2011




Table 25: Totals of Interest Types: All Clients and Revolver Clients

Interest Type	All Groups			Revolver		
	1989	2011	Change	1989	2011	Change
All Group Types	26,998	54,320	27,322	3,110	6,017	2,907
Environmental Groups	332	822	490	13	60	47
Reform and Advocacy	622	1,272	650	32	70	38
Women's Groups	239	311	72	9	20	11
Religious Groups	124	151	27	1	6	5
Labor Unions and Chapters	712	721	9	25	52	27
<i>Fortune</i> 100 Firms	1,173	2,292	1,118	122	240	118

*Note:* Totals are aggregated across lobbyists and U.S. states.

## Parting Thoughts

What might the future of lobbying in the American states look like? In general, I expect numbers of interest groups and lobbyists to remain stable in the states, but such nationwide totals will mask growth and contraction in some areas. There are several possible sources of change. These include the enactment of institutional reforms and new lobby regulations, and increasing one-party dominance in legislatures. I do not foresee new waves of institutional reforms or lobby laws on the horizon. Demographic shifts will affect interest totals *within* individual states. National economic fluctuations may have predictable effects on local lobbying, but are themselves unpredictable. Certainly there will be changes in types of groups hiring lobbyists as disturbances occur. Disturbances can include economic fluctuations, political events, or international conflict (Truman 1951). As new technologies emerge, for example, new business firms emerge and become more profitable than old ones. These more profitable firms begin to challenge the political influence of outdated firms. The total number of clients does not increase, however, if new firms simply replace old ones. Multi-client lobbying is here to stay.

I doubt that U.S. states will further professionalize their legislatures in the immediate future. In the 1960s, many state legislatures were citizen legislatures that met biennially for part-time sessions. Beginning in that decade, more legislatures began to meet each year for full-time sessions (see Squire and Hamm 2005). Member turnover also began to decrease. With the term limits movement of the 1990s, however, trends towards professionalization slowed or were reversed in some states. Member turnover increased with term limits. Surely with the rise of the Tea Party and anti-establishment conservatism, efforts to improve legislator income and staff resources will be met with some resistance. Since turnover is correlated with legislative professionalism (which does not appear to be changing), I expect the total supply of potential revolving-door lobbyists to remain stable in most states.

Lobby laws tend to mirror legislative professionalization (Opheim 1991). The state governments enacted a flurry of new lobby laws in the 1970s and 1990s, but I do not foresee major reforms being enacted any time soon. Sources of reform have included national and state scandals, particularly in states with moralistic political subcultures, but the influence of organized interest groups tempered the effects of these reforms in some states (Ozymy 2013). On occasion, states will enact new laws. In 2018, voters in Florida amended the state's constitution to include a six-year waiting period for former officials wishing to lobby. When the waiting period takes effect at the end of 2022, it will be the longest in the nation. Such drastic reforms come few and far between, however, and most new laws tend to strengthen existing laws instead of creating entirely new agencies for policing conduct (see Newmark 2017).<sup>42</sup>

The relationship between parties and interest groups continues to evolve in the U.S. states. Fewer groups register to lobby in legislatures dominated by members of single parties

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<sup>42</sup>At present, presidential candidate Elizabeth Warren has expressed support for a lifetime ban on members of Congress becoming lobbyists (Warmbrodt 2018). I am doubtful that incumbent members would enact such a law given that it severely restricts their post-congressional employment opportunities. There are loopholes in the present, one-year ban as former members often accept consulting positions in lobby firms that do not require lobbying or registering (LaPira 2016). It would be quite an achievement for Congress to set aside its present agenda and amend that law, yet alone impose a lifetime ban on former members becoming lobbyists.

(Strickland 2018a). This trend has been attributed to unified chambers being less likely to change status quo policies (Gray and Lowery 1996). In addition, groups might pursue their agendas through partisan politics (giving campaign contributions or making endorsements) more often (and lobby less often) if the parties in power already represent their interests (as in Bawn et al. 2012). While state legislatures are becoming more polarized over time (Shor 2014), polarization itself has not been linked to more or less lobbying (see Gray et al. 2015). Instead, more or fewer groups register to lobby whenever parties control greater portions of legislatures (which may occur with or without polarization between parties). For better or worse, divided government might be on the decline in the states. Since 1990, the number of legislatures with split party control has declined precipitously (Masket 2018). After the 2018 elections, only one legislature (Minnesota) was divided between parties. The last time just one legislature was split was 1914. Masket (2018) blames this trend on the decline of split-ticket voting in the electorate. If voters continue to elect legislatures with one-party control, then this might dampen total lobbying over time. Distributional coalitions might become more entrenched, thereby discouraging groups with opposing interests from lobbying somewhat.

So what does the future of lobbying in the American states look like? I believe that multi-client lobbyists are here to stay. These lobbyists have emerged to represent thousands of new interest groups vested in political advocacy. The emergence of these groups occurred gradually over time and not in response to rapid shifts in legislative agendas, as was the case in Florida in 1990 (Brasher, Lowery, and Gray 1999). As a result, the groups are unlikely to demobilize anytime soon save for a deep economic recession or international conflict. These clients have developed enduring relationships with professional lobbyists. Lobbyists can take advantage of principal-agent problems to sustain contracts (Drutman 2015). Ultimately, hiring a multi-client lobbyist may present an opportunity for access and influence, but there is no guarantee that those agents faithfully articulate the interests of their clients to lawmakers.



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