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THE PEOPLE OF JUNE, 1848

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THE PEOPLE OF JUNE, 1848

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Citizens!

On the February barricades, the men we had installed as members of the provisional government promised us a democratic and social republic. They made us pledges, and, trusting their words, we abandoned our barricades. In four months, what have they done? They have violated their oaths, for they have not kept their promises. We, the citizens at the post of the Eighth mairie demand:

a democratic and social republic;
the free association of labor aided by the state;
indictment of the representatives and ministers;
immediate arrest of the Executive Commission;

We demand the immediate removal of the army from Paris.

Citizens, believe that you are sovereign.

Remember our motto: Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. 1

As this poster and others like it went up on the walls of Paris in June of 1848, the authors supported their commitment to the "democratic and social republic" from behind their barricades. They fought in the name of justice for the fulfillment of promises which had, they believed, been made to them during the February revolution. But other citizens viewed the claims of the street-fighters rather differently. Many saw in the bloody struggles of June, 1848, not an attempt to redeem the Second Republic, but a demonic assault upon it. The Prefect of Police, for

example, was convinced that the men behind the barricades planned "the overthrow of our entire society" by means of arson, massacre and pillage. Alexis de Tocqueville and many of his republican colleagues saw in the conflict a threat to the existing social structure and division of property. They were implacably opposed: "... the insurrection was of such a nature that any understanding with it became impossible immediately, and from the first it left us no alternative but to defeat it or to be destroyed ourselves."

Tocqueville seemed to echo Marx's judgment that the insurrection was the moment when "the first great battle was joined between the two classes that split modern society." In fact, observers holding a variety of political positions saw in the street battles of June an elemental form of social conflict, pitting the "haves" against the "have nots"; by the depth of that division they explained (and sometimes justified) the carnage of the brief civil war and the repression which followed it.² Since then, the June Days have continued to occupy a special place among the many Parisian insurrections of the nineteenth century, because of their violence, and because of their symbolic significance for historians of the Left.

Nevertheless, the origins of the June uprising are far from clear. Some historians have found in the insurgents' hunger, or their desire for work, both the motive and the justification of the movement. Others have traced the claims of the street-fighters to socialist theories, or to greed aroused by demagogues.³ None of these formulations is

adequate. The people on the barricades -- their identities, their motives, and the world in which they lived -- have gotten lost in the ideological quarrels of academia.

Recently, the work of Peter Amann and of Rémi Gossez on political clubs, newspapers, and workers' organizations has added much necessary detail to our picture of Paris during the Second Republic.⁴ Yet many questions about the June Days remain unanswered. Why did a large body of Parisians try in June to overthrow a republic that many of them had helped to establish only four months before? Massive unemployment, combined with the closing of the National Workshops, led to active discontent, as most historians have asserted; but can these economic pressures account for the rebellion itself? Is it legitimate, moreover, to argue that the June Days were a rising of the workers against their masters? To what extent did the events of June continue the pattern of urban insurrection which appeared in 1789 and endured into the nineteenth century? Although an analysis of the June Days alone cannot "explain" French political behavior, a study of participation in revolutionary activity reveals much about the nature of revolution; that much George Rudé and Albert Soboul have demonstrated admirably.⁵ An examination of the people involved in the June Days will deepen our understanding of the processes producing conflict in France during the middle years of the nineteenth century.

To be more precise, the close study of the June Days' participants is likely to help answer three sets of general questions:

- 1) To what degree, how directly, and how did this rebellious movement (and do rebellions in general) result from economic crisis?
- 2) Do the June Days represent a typical or crucial phase of a standard revolutionary process?
- 3) To what degree do the participants in this rebellion (and in rebellions in general) consist of people at the margins of orderly social life?

All three questions are controversial, although recent work on European rebellions has set important limits to the controversy. The idea of a standard revolutionary situation in which an economic catastrophe raises the desperate and rootless poor against their betters, for example, has probably disappeared forever.

In our view, economic crises are only likely to stimulate rebellion under very special circumstances: when they place the powerful in the position of withholding or extracting resources from organized groups of persons who have established claims on those resources. Shortage without an apparent culprit does not incite rebellion. Crisis does not bring collective action from the unorganized masses; on the contrary, it depresses their capacity to act. But in some circumstances organization and opposition come together. The traditional food riot illustrates on the small scale the sort of process we have in mind: it did not tend to occur where people were hungriest, but where merchants, officials and wealthy individuals appeared to be diverting supplies on which the local community had a prior claim.⁶

The food riot, however, remains one of the most localized forms of political conflict precisely because of its tie to the rights of particular communities over their supplies of food. Even in 1789, about the strongest case that can be made for the direct effect of the subsistence crisis is that it preoccupied the Parisian crowd and that it facilitated the overturning of a great many municipalities which failed to meet their local responsibilities. To push the analogy of 1848 with 1789 in this regard, as C.E. Labrousse has done, one would have to establish that some such connection also appeared in 1878.⁷ We doubt it. If the subsistence crisis of 1846-47 had something to do with the revolution of 1848, it was most likely not through any direct effect on Parisian hunger, and certainly not through the fall of provincial municipalities. Instead, the strongest possibility is some delayed effect on the demand for the products of Parisian industry. That remains to be proven.

If we put aside the idea of a direct link between the agricultural crisis of 1846-47 and the revolution of 1848, however, Labrousse's more general contention that 1789, 1830 and 1848 also saw the convergence of political and economic crises still holds up for 1848. The two crises continued to play a fundamental part in the shaping of working-class political action up to the June Days. The appropriate metaphor for the way they came together is not the two sharp blows that break a rock. It is the funnel and the stream of milk -- the one channeling the other. The revolutionary regime helped create the organization of the unemployed, notably by forming the National Workshops to absorb the unemployed, but

also by temporarily promoting the organization of the associations which became the foci of political action among the poorer workers. (We must clearly distinguish between the manifestly political clubs of 1848, with their relatively middle-class constituencies, and the workers' mutual aid societies and similar organizations, which eventually became important vehicles of political action. It is the latter which added the extraordinary element to the organizational scene before the June Days.)

As for the process of revolution, we do not see any standard sequence of events or stages which must somehow play itself out in each transfer of power, except those which are inherent in the definition of revolution itself: the breaking of an existing political system into at least two parts, a struggle (long or short) between the parts, reestablishment of a single system. Reflection on revolution as a struggle among contenders for control over an existing governmental apparatus, however, leads us to several interesting hypotheses about the revolutionary process: 1) the level of conflict is likely to be much higher after the first major actions of the revolution than before, because the emergence of "dual sovereignty" (in Trotsky's phrase) challenges the position of every contender, and thus generalizes the struggle; 2) the contest between the fragments is likely to activate an exceptional proportion of the population on one side or another, as compared with involvement in politics outside the revolution; 3) the successful revolutionary coalition is likely to generate important resistance as it attempts to reassert routine central control over the whole population after seizing the governmental apparatus; this is likely to show up as a shift in the locus of conflict from the

center to the periphery as the revolution proceeds; 4) the initial revolutionary coalition is likely to dwindle, because the initial seizure of control requires a larger coalition than does the maintenance of control, because the divergence of the longer-run objectives of the various contenders is likely to become more obvious and pressing once the work of dislodging the enemy from power is finished and because those contenders which mobilized rapidly in response to short-run crises but remained relatively underorganized are also likely to demobilize more rapidly than other contenders, and therefore lose ground in the next round of political maneuvering.

Some readers will find these hypotheses pretty obvious. To us, they are. Yet they also contradict some widely-held notions: revolution as the quick release of tension built up over a long time, revolution as the work of a single class or an entire nation in opposition to an old elite, revolution as the consequence of weakening elite control over the masses.

Obvious or not, these generalizations hold rather well for the French revolution of 1848. There we witness a tremendous widening of political organization, involvement, action and conflict after the revolutionary seizure of power; the conflicts divide into two different categories: 1) struggles among groups within the revolutionary coalition, especially pitting portions of the bourgeoisie against organized segments of the working class in Paris and other major cities; 2) provincial resistance (most notably in the opposition to the 45-centime surtax) to new demands from the center.

Although the process of revolution draws people into political consciousness, the process is not irreversible. From 1849 through 1851,

we witness the gradual, deliberate demobilization of most groups within the initial revolutionary coalition; the repression of the great insurrection of 1851 completed that demobilization. And in the June Days themselves we see the most acute phase of the separation of the organized Parisian working class from the revolutionary coalition. The establishment of the National Workshops having sealed the membership of the organized working class in the coalition, the dissolution of the Workshops and the termination of the payroll then broke that seal. The conflict at this point was particularly fierce because the workers had not yet lost their coherence. Instead, the workers of Paris actually continued to mobilize within their own associations, within the Workshops and within the National Guard during the months following the fall of the July Monarchy.

This analysis has some clear implications for the personnel of the February and June Days, not to mention the several important journées in between. In no case should we expect Louis Chevalier's "dangerous classes" to have played an important part. Nevertheless, if both the widespread mobilization and the fragmentation of the revolutionary coalition we have described were actually occurring, there should have been some important differences between the participants in February and June. First, the participants in the initial seizure of power should have resembled the organized activists of earlier rebellions: a sprinkling of intellectuals, journalists, lawyers and other professionals, a contingent of shopkeepers, a large number of craftsmen from the older organized

trades. In June we should discover a more exclusively working-class population, a broader participation among workers in the newer industries, a decline in the role of the shopkeeper. Second, we should find the activists of February standing on a base (an underground base, to be sure) of liberal and republican organizations, while in June we should see the strong influence of the workers' societies, the National Guard and the Workshops -- not the clubs. It will take more close study of the participants in February, 1848 and of the day-to-day political participation of the workers thereafter to confirm or deny these hypotheses definitely. We will offer some evidence that they are correct.

Let us look more closely at the city in which the process played itself out. Louis Chevalier's picture of Paris at the time is grim. He describes a milieu of poverty, overcrowding and rapid migration, within which workers had to function as best they could. Death rates were high. About a third of all births were illegitimate. Crime, prostitution and disease flourished.¹⁰ Nevertheless, these conditions were rife in many European industrial cities; some of those cities were politically active, and others quiescent. Moreover, the rapid migration which intensified these problems was not a purely negative phenomenon. The movement of people into the capital -- a net flow of 230,000 between 1831 and 1846 -- was also a sign of vitality and expansion. The attraction of higher wages and varied employments remained strong, despite the appalling hardship of life for many urban workers. The needs of a large, wealthy market

of consumers created jobs for people of all skills and talents.

Indeed, several Parisian industries were thriving during the early and mid-1840's, in the atmosphere of an expanding national economy. The skill of the labor force and the availability of financing provided a solid base in Paris for many luxury crafts, the building trades, and metal-working industries. At the same time, economic changes triggered by industrialization were forcing the local labor force to adapt to new conditions that signalled the relative economic decline of the central city. Trades that were expanding their production for a mass market found it more profitable to leave Paris for the suburbs or the provinces, where wages and rents were lower. The exodus of textile and chemical firms was particularly marked. Operations that required highly skilled labor could still flourish in the high-wage Parisian economy, but more and more workshops decentralized their production, allowing the routine stages of work to be done outside the city, and leaving only the difficult tasks to Parisian artisans.

Thriving industries and thriving workers, therefore, can be two different matters. Even the skilled elite were hit hard by the realities of Parisian economic life. Many were employed in crafts closely tied to the fluctuating demands of the Paris Market. Not only were they affected by the periods of morte-saison that stopped work in a large variety of industries between three and four months annually, but some of these workers found that migration from the provinces and from abroad brought in competitors willing to work for lower wages. By 1847, for instance, foreign workers made up 40 percent of the labor force in tailoring;

links were close between a) "dilution" of the trade by outsiders, women or children and b) sweated labor for declining piecework rates. Sections of the clothing, textile and furniture trades were particularly affected. The structure of Parisian industry in 1848, then, was a mixture of the old and the new: on the one side, large factories, shops and construction companies employing dozens of people; on the other, the fabrique de Paris with its tiny workshops having fewer than ten workers, or perhaps just a single artisan, working in his own room, who contracted for individual jobs or sold completed articles directly to retailers.¹²

Against this background arrived the events of depression and revolution. The agricultural crisis of 1846 and 1847 brought in its wake sharp (but not uniform) declines in business activity. The depression gathered momentum in Paris after the events of February, which had a cataclysmic effect on the economy. The wheels of commerce slowed; during the spring they seemed about to stop. Comparing the year 1848 with 1847, the Paris Chamber of Commerce reported an average decline in business revenues of 54 percent, and an equal decline in industrial employment. Moreover, the highest rates of unemployment and contraction (all over 58 percent) were recorded for the furniture, building, and metal industries -- which were, as we shall see, the sectors most over-represented among the insurgents.¹³

In Paris, by the time of the June Days, there were at least 150,000 unemployed, even if we do not take into account the small masters working alone whose businesses had collapsed. The National Workshops offered only a partial refuge for these people. From March to May 12, when enroll-

ments were stopped, the number of men included rose from 14,000 to about 113,000; over 100,000 continued to receive support until early July.

Yet if no men from outside Paris were admitted to the workshops -- an unrealistic assumption -- at least 40,000 unemployed workers and their families were not receiving the government dole.

Moreover, the workshops scarcely protected those within from the depression: the wage of eight francs weekly was inadequate to support even an unmarried worker, and the state provided the men with no more activity than a day or two of digging per week. Interrogations of the June Days prisoners show that they used the workshops as stopgap support, regularly looking for other work and collecting their pay when there was none to be found. Participation in the brigades was apparently rather casual, an occupation of last resort. While day laborers, who made up some 13 percent of the workshop members, might adapt to this life, it was both difficult and unrewarding for the rest. The final prospect of being deported to the Sologne or drafted into the army in exchange for token support and employment must have been the final indignity for many artisans who rightly considered themselves to the elite of French labor.¹⁴

The pressures upon such men, which drew many into the June Days, were far more complex than the economic hardship of a subsistence crisis.

Although the events of Paris were crucial to the shifts of power which made up the French revolution of 1848, they formed part of a much larger series of struggles. As compared with the years before and after, the period from 1848 to 1851 enveloped much of France in political conflict. In the course of a study covering the years from 1830 to 1960, we have attempted to count the number of people in France taking part in violent incidents (that is, events in which someone seized or damaged persons or property over resistance) in which at least one of the groups involved had fifty or more persons.¹⁵ Our estimates for the years from 1845 to 1854 run as follows:

<u>Year</u>	<u>number of incidents</u>	<u>number of participants (thousands)</u>
1845	4	1
1846	27	41
1847	33	11
1848	126	271
1849	27	49
1850	15	5
1851	93	97
1852	2	0.3
1853	0	0
1854	3	5

The food riots of December 1846 and January 1847 supplied the bulk of the incidents in those two years. Even including those food riots in the comparison, it is clear that the revolution brought a greatly increased scale of violence -- not a gradual buildup followed by a sudden decline. The average of approximately 3,000 participants per violent event in 1848 is particularly impressive, as compared with anything that came before or after. Another remarkable fact brought out by the figures is the high level of collective violence in 1851, at the end of the Republic. Finally, we notice the great decline in open conflict in 1852, once the apparatus of Napoleonic repression was working well.

Figure 1 traces the number of incidents in finer detail. We separate the Seine from the remainder of France, and we observe each quarter-year. The subsistence crisis of 1846-47 is clearly visible: much more emphatically outside of Paris than in the city. In Paris, the disturbances in that series began in September of 1846 with three days of sporadic violence in the Faubourg St. Antoine; there, a crowd threw stones at shops when bread prices were raised. But after January, 1847 both France and Paris calmed for quite a while. The next Parisian troubles came in September, around the Palais Royal, when a minor dispute between a shoemaker and his master generalized into ragged street demonstrations and window-breaking by local workers.¹⁶

There was, however, no accumulation of collective violence even then. In Paris, the next violent conflicts of this scale to occur opened the revolution itself. Our graph shows the surging of conflict during the first two quarters of 1848, in both the Seine and the rest of France. We

see a broadly parallel movement between the Seine and the rest of France, with the provinces appearing to magnify the fluctuations which occurred in Paris. We also observe the generally downward drift of collective violence from the suppression of the June Days to 1851 -- despite some significant interruptions to the trend outside of Paris. Most notably, the graph shows the resurgence of provincial conflicts (especially tax rebellions) in 1849 and the great, violent resistance to the coup d'etat of December, 1851. And then all is silent. By that time, the revolution was over, and defeated.

As Peter Amann has suggested, when one ruler -- attacked but generally accepted as legitimate -- is replaced, his successor has the immediate and difficult task of building a new government which most of the population will again accept. ¹⁷ In the case at hand, the revolution was far from over when the revolutionaries dismantled the barricades of February. One could make a case for the persistence, or recurrence, of "dual sovereignty" over France as a whole into 1849, or perhaps to the coup d'état itself. Immediately after the days of February, the stage was set for conflict both inside and outside the provisional government. Not only did the men of the Executive Commission disagree among themselves about specific policies, but no amount of republican fervor could gloss over the difference between the bourgeois conception of a classic liberal regime guaranteeing civil rights and the existing distribution of property, on the one hand, and the idea of a state intervening actively in social and economic affairs for the benefit of the workers.

Since choices had to be made, conflicts over the nature of the choices were inevitable. The inclusion of men with socialist ideas (such as Louis Blanc and Albert) in the provisional government beside other men (such as Marie and Marrast) intensely suspicious of government's concession of the "right to work" brought the disputes of the press and the political clubs into the very center of the new regime. Then the decision to hold April elections forced the public to choose the ideological complexion of its leaders. The conflict was, therefore, considerably widened. The continuing contest was no longer limited to the republicans of February. It became a national conflict whose culminating point was the rising of June.

One major element of the contest in the Parisian region was the great increase in violent activity after the installation of the new regime. Beginning with the revolutionary days, Paris and its hinterland experienced repeated cases of arson, major attacks on the railroads, clashes between groups of workers, others between workers and employers, and numerous political demonstrations, some of which turned into violent struggles with the police or with political rivals.

With increasing frequency, casual assemblies grew into political crowds that marched on public buildings shouting slogans: "Vive Barbès", "Vive Bonaparte". In the heady atmosphere of republican freedom, quiet resentment regularly flared into open resistance. Local residents stormed a police station in La Villette; men in the railway crews at Choisy tried to eject German workers; a crowd of hat-makers attempting to enforce a

common wage and price scale attacked uncooperative workshops. Bonapartists, Legitimists, and Socialist-Republicans were rounded up by the police for demonstrating on Parisian streets. This crescendo of activity mounted during early June reaching its penultimate resolution on the barricades.¹⁸ Behind these public scenes lay a newly mobilized population responding to a changed political climate which for the first time in decades permitted men to write, to assemble, and, more important of all, to organize with complete freedom. Political clubs, newspapers, and workers' organizations appeared and multiplied with fantastic rapidity. Moreover, citizens of all ranks and talents were drawn into the new order. The capital was transformed:

The walls were covered with posters of every color on which verse and prose competed for the attention of passers by. Most often, there were dithyrambs in honor of the revolution and the French people, appeals to fraternity... These were naive, confused, excited expressions in an incoherent often grotesque language of the most honorable sentiments and the best of thoughts. At any moment, one could see long processions of men, women, and children, flag furred, drums at their head, marching hand in hand, faces radiant with joy and pride, carrying to the city hall a voluntary tribute in baskets of ribbons and flowers, the conscious homage of a people who believed that they had become free.¹⁹

The political life that Orleanists had tried so hard to limit to the "juste milieu" was now extended to the entire population. Over 259

deputations of citizens, clubs, and unions called on the government in March and April. The press multiplied overnight: 171 newspapers appeared in the capital between the revolution and mid-June, and the number of copies printed monthly reached a peak in late May of almost 400,000. In addition, there were political groups for all to join. By late March, the government counted 147 in Paris and its suburbs. While some of these were undoubtedly small and shortlived, others drew several hundred at a minimum to their meetings. These clubs and popular societies played an important role in helping to develop and define members' political commitments. Blanqui's group considered that its duty was to prod the government to maintain its "revolutionary course", and a stream of suggestions on specific policies and social reforms resulted from its tumultuous debates. Moreover, the impact of such associations extended far beyond the bourgeoisie. Artisans not only belonged to many of these groups but also held offices and directed some of the predominantly working-class ones. 20

Workers also had their own organizations, many of which predated the revolution. Compagnonnages, mutual societies, and corporate bodies having specific privileges and functions provided both occasions and structures for working class activity that easily passed from the economic to the political realm. Even before 1848, there had been a distinct revival of militancy among Parisian workers. In 1840, the tailors, joined by sections of the building trades, attempted a general strike and mounted large demonstrations. Printers, masons, and carpenters formed associations and pressed claims on wages and hours. Not only did strikes continue after

the revolution; but new clubs, committees, and corporate organizations sprang up on all sides in the congenial climate of the republic. The masons and painters each formed a club and a Fraternal Association; other parts of the building trades had their own groups or at least a strike committee. The need to elect delegates for the "workers' parliament", the Luxembourg commission, and then to enforce its decisions brought artisans together and stimulated a sense of corporate identity and common purpose. At the same time, the wish for government contracts and plans for the revival of trade and employment usually implied the creation of a central organization that would hire men and contract for work.²¹

This flurry of activity put artisans on the offensive. Fledgling trade unions sometimes disguised as mutual societies or clubs led a series of strikes in 1848 for higher wages, le tarif, shorter hours, and the abolition of marchandage.²² To be sure, this mobilization of the Parisian working class was widely diffused, but it seems to have been most intense in several specific sectors, most of which played an important part in the June Days. Again we find the mechanics, the railroad workers, and men from the building and metal trades leading the ranks of both the corporations and the insurgents.

Direct links from the barricades to specific railway crews, construction gangs, and the employees of the large engineering firms can be established. M. Cave, director of several engineering workshops in the Faubourg St. Denis, testified before the official inquiry that a number of his men had joined the fighting, led by about ten militants who forced the others to follow. In the affairs of his workshop we begin to see some of the connections between political action and workers' organizations during the Second Republic. Not only had Blanqui visited Cave's firm in

March to speak to the workers, but some of Cave's men had participated in the demonstration of May 15. A group of his employees had organized a union under the guise of a friendly society (une Société de secours mutuel), and apparently almost all of the others had joined, although Cave claimed that many were coerced into belonging. Some of the militant workers had attended unnamed political clubs; moreover, the leaders of the fledgling union were in contact with similar workers' organizations elsewhere. A demand that the working day be shortened appears to have been made, and other issues may also have been in dispute. Clearly, the men in his ateliers had begun to organize and had plunged into the radical political activities of 1848.²³ In the same way, militant printers, jewellers, tailors, shoe, hat, and cabinetmakers were both active in their own trades before June and in the insurrection. Conversely, workers who belonged to more poorly organized trades that sometimes relied on government privileges and regulation -- domestic servants, bakers and other sections of the food industries, some categories of transport workers -- were underrepresented in the rising.²⁴

Workers moved naturally from economic to political militancy because of the intimate links between the two spheres. The major issues that concerned working-class Paris between February and June partook of this dual character just as the closing of the National Workshops was an act with both political and economic implications. The Luxembourg commission, to which belonged about 700 delegates from Paris trades, debated the length of the working day and hiring procedures, clearly economic issues, but

attempts to enforce these decisions led the delegates to endorse candidates for the elections and to increase their demands for governmental intervention in the structure of Parisian economic life.

Then the desire to go a step beyond debate produced the demonstration of April 16, when several clubs and workers' societies, linked through their delegates, organized a massive march on the Hôtel de Ville to force the government to adjourn the upcoming election.²⁵ On the following day officers of the delegates attempted to defend themselves against hostile accusations. Their aim had been, they said, "to prove that the ideas of the organization of labor and of association, so courageously supported by the men who are devoted to our cause, are the ideas of the people, and that in accordance with this, the February revolution will be aborted if it should not have as an effect the ending of exploitation of one man by another." Their interest in electoral procedure, therefore, was part and parcel of a wider commitment to specific social policies, and they identified the integrity of the revolution with the adoption of these policies.²⁶

Their demand for "the organization of labor" was not merely an economic one; it necessitated governmental action of a wide-sweeping sort. In fact, it required that the bourgeois republic turn itself into something resembling a social-democratic state. Perhaps it was the intensity of the depression or perhaps their faith in a republican government, but many workers turned after February to the state for a solution to their economic problems. A mechanic from the Sixth and the Eighth arrondissements,

who identified himself only as "Alexis," asked the provisional government to back a large issue of new bank notes, to order 100 warships for possible piracy against the English, and to see that all canal and railway construction was completed. His ideal was the "organization of labor, building yards, and national workshops everywhere, even in the forests, today or tomorrow if possible."²⁷

These demands for state-organized workshops to employ artisans were widespread in Paris as unemployment mounted. Although not often explicitly defined, the phrase, "l'organisation du travail," appears again and again in election posters, both for workers' candidates and for others trying to win workers' votes. Several delegates and brigade leaders from the National Workshops asked the assembly in mid-May to organize work so that "each of us taking up his special tools again will no longer be obliged to beg...with pick in hand." And most important of all, the corporations' delegates to the Luxembourg commission, who organized themselves into the Comité central des ouvriers du département de la Seine in order to unify electoral and other activities, defined as one of their four aims "to prepare for the organization of labor, notably by the detailed study of each trade's techniques."

The right to work, promised by the government in February, led many workers to demand organized work or the creation by the state of firms that would employ craftsmen in their own specialties. But the workers' candidates lost the April election decisively and the government's treatment of the National Workshops made it clear that the new day of republican

full employment was not about to dawn. Moreover, by May it was obvious that the voice of France speaking through the ballot box had not produced the hoped-for advent of the democratic and social republic. To the contrary, concessions that had been made by the provisional government in February threatened to be whittled away by the more conservative assembly. 28

What then could be the response of militant Parisian workers?

Acceptance, of course, or some kind of renewed effort to change government policy, or a new insurrection, "the most sacred of duties". The government and the assembly would obviously have preferred the first choice, but they did little to assuage growing alienation from the regime. After the arrest of 130 men for the part in the demonstration of May 15, police began regularly to round up members of the ever more frequent crowds chanting political slogans that loitered in the squares. These crowds formed daily, fed by the worships which brought thousands of artisans out onto the streets to collect their pay and to grumble about their situations.

Evening assemblies at the Porte St. Denis, one of the pay stations for the workshops, produced a flurry of police reports and National Guard expeditions to disperse them. Each day the crowds were said to become "more considerable and tumultuous." Poems of loyalty to the republic were replaced by mutterings against aristocrats, the bourgeoisie, the National Guard. Most commonly, the police heard cries of "Vive Barbès" in support of a man who had been jailed after the 15th on charges of attempting to overthrow the regime. By June 22, almost 1300 people had been arrested in these evening sorties. While some were linked to the parties of Louis Napoleon, Henri V or Barbès, over 1000 were identified simply as members of

the street corner crowds which were predominantly working-class in composition. The government finally restricted the right of crowds to assemble. 29

In another significant change of policy, ministers authorized the calling into Paris of large numbers of troops because the garrison had been reduced to only 5000 men during the short period of postrevolutionary harmony. By June 1, the number had risen to 20,000 with increases concentrated in the weeks following the demonstrations of April 16 and May 15. As a further sign of official premonitions, Cavaignac successively replaced all regiments that had been disarmed in February. Authorities were clearly clamping down on some of the political forces engendered by the February revolution. 30

But at the same time, the opposition was becoming increasingly articulate and unified and was escaping from the regime's control. Delegates of the corporations to the Luxembourg commission stated their position quite clearly; they refused to hide the growing chasm between the government and the ranks of militant, politically conscious workers. The typographers refused to participate in the government-sponsored Fête de la Concorde because, they said, too much of the working class was without bread or work and because "our representatives have received in an almost mocking manner the proposals made to them for the Organization of Labor". The Comité radical des travailleurs du Nord condemned the idea of a fraternal banquet in support of newly elected representatives, for, they pointed out, the proposal had declared the assembly inviolable.

This would compromise the principle of popular sovereignty which they were determined to defend. Their aim as good republicans and that of "le peuple" should be the foundation of a new social order. Therefore, they "reserved the right of control and surveillance over the actions of those républicains du jour or du lendemain who profess to know more of the institutions that fit a republic than those [of us] brought up and nourished at republican springs." The insurrection was still "le plus saint des devoirs."³¹

Such ideas were dangerous for the government, particularly at a time when the few moderates who had retained the respect of many workers and could influence them had been removed from their official positions.

Louis Blanc, who had chaired the Luxembourg Commission and had used his job as a forum for his own schemes of peaceful social reconstruction, attempting regularly to dampen delegates' zeal for immediate changes, found that his forum ceased to exist after May 15. Then late in May, the government also dismissed and spirited out of Paris Emile Thomas, who had been respected by men in the National Workshops and had tried valiantly to keep his men out of the big demonstrations. Caussidière was replaced as Prefect of Police, and his special constables were dissolved. These three men had supported the regime for the most part; without their countervailing voices, workers mobilized in the corporations, workshop brigades, and National Guard battalions could be much more easily influenced by the militants among them.

Thus Paris polarized, with organized, insurrectionary groups of workers increasingly opposed to the self-proclaimed executors of the revolution.

The polarization reached its extreme in June, and ended in the near-destruction of the insurrectionary side. The events of the June Days themselves are well known. Our brief review will simply recall the terms of the conflict.

The trigger for the whole affair was the government's decision to rid itself of the National Workshops by sending those enrolled either into the army or into the provinces, where numerous workshops resembling those of Paris had formed to absorb the unemployed. The government's move, announced on June 21, produced an immediate, hostile reaction throughout eastern Paris. On the 22nd, a morning demonstration of several hundred workers led straight to the Luxembourg palace. There Marie, the Minister of Public Works, made it clear that the government would enforce its edict. The men led by Louis Pujol, lieutenant in the National Workshops and member of Blanqui's club, the société républicaine sociale, then rejoined the assembled crowd. They angrily reported the bad news. Soon large bands of hostile, shouting men carrying National Workshop banners were marching down the streets. "Down with Lamartine!" "Down with Marie!" "Down with Thiers!" "We won't go!"

The marchers spread news of an evening meeting at the Pantheon. By 7:00 p.m. the police reported that a "tumultuous" crowd of 5,000 had assembled. The number grew through evening parades through the Eighth and Twelfth arrondissements and around the Hotel de Ville. A group of

8,000 to 10,000 crossed the Faubourg St. Antoine: "Down with traitors!" "Down with the National Guard!" "Bread or bullets!" "Work! Work! Bread!" "Bread!" Finally all reconverged on the Pantheon. There, in the torch-light, Pujol shouted his defiance of the government, and demanded vengeance. The next morning another meeting was to produce decisive action. Meanwhile the guardians of peace and order did little to forestall the approaching confrontation. Only a few battalions were ordered to guard the Luxembourg and the Hôtel de Ville. The National Guard was not called. 32

On the 23rd, men began to pour into the Pantheon area shortly after 7:00a.m. Shouts of "To the barricades!" were heard by the police who, with good reason, feared the "very bad intentions" of the crowd. By 8:15, they estimated that 3,000 had assembled. Again flags from the National Workshops, as well as a few uniforms of the garde mobile and the garde républicaine, were recognized. The demonstration then spilled out into the other parts of Paris. Over 1,000 men went to the Place de la Bastille, marched around the column, and listened to speeches urging the overthrow of the government. Another band, said to be 1,500 to 2,000 men from the workshops, paraded along the Boulevard St. Martin. Soon an immense crowd along the Rue du Faubourg St. Denis was building barricades from overturned carriages and carts. A gunshop near the river was raided, and cries of "To arms! To the barricades!" echoed through the streets. By late morning a rash of barricades in the Cite, in the Eleventh and Twelfth arrondissements on the left bank and in the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth north of the river signaled the beginning of the insurrection. 33

When the National Guard was finally called up during the late morning and early afternoon, the rappel produced willing soldiers from the western quarters. Few men responded in the east, where men in National Guard uniforms joined, or even commanded, men behind the barricades. In many areas guards were "slow to appear" and showed little enthusiasm for shooting at their neighbors. But local responses to the uprising were ambiguous; fear of the insurgents soon began to affect the residents of some barricaded sections. The quarter of the Marais was reported to be "in a panic", and rumors of pillage circulated in the area east and south of the Sorbonne.³⁴

Scattered fighting between guardsmen and insurgents broke out shortly after 1:00 p.m. on the 23rd. It was followed quickly by more systematic attacks on the barricades by the army and the garde mobile. General Cavaignac, the Minister of War, received command of the troops in Paris; he proceeded to direct a three-pronged assault on entrenched positions along the boulevards, near the Pantheon, and around the Hotel de Ville. Yet little was done to stop the rising elsewhere, Cavaignac and the other generals preferring to mass their own strength and then to force their way through the twisted streets of Paris, using artillery where necessary. Military strategy thus set the seal on what was to become a miniature civil war.³⁵

Early on the 24th, the insurrection continued to spread. Barricades were reported in the Seventh arrondissement, while the Fourth was invaded by men looking for arms and supplies. Fighting also broke out in the suburbs in the north and east, beyond the octroi wall. Meanwhile the

National Guard, usually understrength, patrolled in its own quarters and handled local skirmishes, leaving the army and the garde mobile to follow generals Damesne, Duvivier, and Lamoricière in attacks upon the major rebel strongholds. Only Damesne reported a success: the clearing of the Pantheon area. By this time, the Assembly, although thoroughly alarmed by the collapse of civilian authority in Paris, ratified the effective transfer of power to the military by proclaiming a state of siege and giving Cavaignac sole authority. 36

But insurgents had already begun to lose the test of strength. The army and the garde mobile demolished their citadels of resistance -- slowly at first, then more rapidly. Many parts of Paris were quiet by the morning of the 25th; opposition began to "melt away", men from the barricades retreating into houses and back streets. By that time, the work of tidying up after the holocaust had already begun: guardsmen patrolled cleared areas and went to search lodging houses in the ^AHotel de Ville and St. Martin-des-Champs for caches of weapons. Suspected suppliers of arms were arrested before the fighting had even stopped. By nightfall the rebels had been beaten in the Fifth arrondissement; a gloomy calm had settled over the Twelfth. Finally, on the 26th, the hopelessness of continuing became apparent. The last centers of resistance, in the Temple and the Faubourg St. Antoine, gave up. 37

A very large number of people participated in the June Days in one way or another. Over 25,000 troops were stationed in or near Paris when the rising broke out; the battalions of the garde mobile brought the total force available immediately to about 37,000 men. Then two more regiments,

with additional squadrons of artillery and cavalry, came in by rail on the 23rd and the 24th.

The number of National Guardsmen who fought with the regular troops is less clear. The official size of the legions had increased to 237,000 men since the Guard opened its ranks to workers. But the vast majority of its members did not answer the rappel, either from political conviction, from fear or from a desire to guard their own property. The mayor of the Twelfth arrondissement reported, for instance, that only a few hundred had assembled out of a group normally 15,000 strong. The commissioner of police in the Marais counted only 1,500 of 24,000 in the Eighth Legion. Possibly 6,000 men were available in dispersed groups from the companies of the east, while an estimated 12,000 guardsmen came out initially from the western arrondissements.

Most of this force was available for use only in the home territory of its members. Nevertheless, the number of guardsmen who appeared grew steadily as the insurgents were beaten. The deficiencies of the capital's militia, moreover, were made up by men from the provinces, who flocked to Paris after being notified of the rising. Beginning on the 24th, a steady stream of volunteers came into the city. Although most arrived too late to do anything but patrol and then return home, over 120,000 rushed to defend law and order from the Parisian threat. The February republic was therefore able to raise a considerable force in a very short time. 38

Devotion to the "democratic and social republic" is much more difficult to measure. Here most of the evidence is conjecture. The informal groups of streetfighters can never be counted with precision; participation rates rose and fell with the time of day and the proximity of the

troops. Because the fighting took place in residential areas, men could easily move from their homes to the barricades and back again. The line between insurgents, sympathizers, and onlookers would have been hard to draw even for an eye-witness. Moreover, it probably changed from hour to hour: the casual, intermittent nature of much participation is evident from interrogations of the prisoners. There is simply no way of determining exactly how many people joined in the rising, because participation was informal and could mean so many things. Thousands of National Guardsmen materially aided the rising by not answering the rappel; few of them were prosecuted for doing so. How do we tally passive sympathy, or passive resistance? At this point, the historian trying to count his subjects throws away his pen in despair.

Yet we can be somewhat more specific. Both Trouvé-Chauvel, the Prefect of Police, and General Cavaignac estimated the number of insurgents at between 40,000 and 50,000 men. Ignorance in such matters usually produces exaggeration, however, so their tally should be accepted only as a maximum. At least 15,000 people (and possibly several thousand more) were picked up during the fighting, many to be released soon after. Arrest records were kept for 11,722 people. But of these only 4,500 were either transported or jailed for participation in the rising (see Table 1). A figure of 50,000 insurgents therefore seems much too high. A more realistic estimate would begin with the 4,500 convicted, then add another 1,500 for those who were killed. Very zealous investigations implicated no more than another 5,000 to 9,000 people, most of whom were

innocent. While many who were involved undoubtedly escaped the authorities, there is no reason to assume that their number exceeded the figure for those who were held and released. A range of 10,000 to 15,000 participants is, therefore, a reasonable guess. 39

The violent four-day battle with these thousands of insurgents produced enormous losses. The numbers of casualties in the revolutions of July, 1830 and February, 1848 had been small, reflecting the ease with which the governments fell. Not so during the June Days; the Prefect reported 1,400 dead, a figure that should be regarded as a minimum measure of the carnage. The number of wounded taken into the hospitals within a day or two of the fighting passed 1,700. Since many others were cared for at home to escape detection, this figure is again incomplete. Casualties in the army (708 killed and wounded) and the garde mobile (114 killed and 475 wounded) are probably accurate, but the full extent of the violence done to the insurgents cannot be reckoned. For a few days, eastern Paris was an occupied territory. The generalized feeling that all were guilty until proven innocent gave the forces of order free rein. Renan reported that the garde mobile, "drunk with blood", was responsible for a series of atrocities which reminded him of the wars of religion. Two or three days after the fighting stopped he heard "incessant shooting" from the Luxembourg, where prisoners had been taken. Although dwarfed by the Commune, the June Days took a toll of at least 4,000 casualties from among the 70,000 to 100,000 participants on both sides. 40

So far we have scrutinized the exterior of the June Days, but have not probed beneath the skin. The June Days left a well-preserved skeleton which will also reward careful study. In addition to a lengthy official inquiry, there are police and prefects' reports, arrest and judicial records, and even detailed interrogations of most of the 11,000-odd persons charged with taking part in the insurrection. The documentation is comparable to the vast residues left by the repression of the insurrection of 1851 and the Commune; that makes the June Days one of the best documented rebellions to occur anywhere,

We have not exhausted the material, by any means. But we have surveyed the chief collections of relevant documents at the Archives Nationales, the Archives Historiques de L'Armée, the Archives Départementales de la Seine and the Archives de la Préfecture de Police. We have taken an especially close look at some sources permitting a description of the mass of the insurgents: the individual dossiers of the persons charged with participating in the June Days, and the summary registers prepared to keep track of those dossiers. The largest part of our effort went into coding into machine-readable form each of the 11,722 descriptions of individuals in the Liste générale en ordre alphabétique des inculpés de juin 1848 and into a statistical study of their characteristics. We also devoted considerable attention to the close examination of approximately one percent (every fifth dossier in every twentieth carton, for a total of 123 persons) of the individual dossiers in the Archives Historiques de l'Armée at Vincennes.⁴¹ We shall present the results of those analyses in order of increasing specificity:

general characteristics of those arrested, distribution by industry and occupation, place of origin, residence in Paris.

To be sure, the employment of judicial records as the basis for this sort of description makes us adopt the perspective of the authorities, in ways we cannot always control. Because those who escaped the authorities also escape the historian, we can only examine those who were arrested. The records bear the imprint of official assumptions and prejudices; they reflect the procedures used to locate suspects. It is clear from the dossiers of the prisoners that overzealous guardsmen dragged off to jail many people who had no connection whatsoever with the rising: bystanders, workmen without alibis, or men mistakenly identified by supporters of the regime.

The majority of those arrested were picked up on the streets or in adjoining houses as the government forces cleared insurgent areas.

While most of those rounded up casually were eventually released, those unlucky enough to have been caught with powder-stained hands or bullet-filled pockets stood little chance of escaping prosecution. The rest of the 11,722 were ferreted out by watchful administrators, energetic guardsmen or police who were sent from house to house interrogating residents. Louis Jacques Voisambert, a shoemaker in his late 50's, one day found that his stall had been raided. Police had learned of his political leanings, and they found enough radical literature in his

possession to arouse suspicion. After local witnesses linked him to the rising, he was arrested. Eventually the court sentenced him to 20 years at hard labor. After July 7, over 4,000 people were located in this way. Moreover, the net of suspicion was spread all over France. Police stopped anyone without papers, and questioned anyone absent during June who returned home.

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Table 1 About Here

Despite these variations in the proportions of the persons picked up in the initial sweeps of the city who were eventually convicted, the overall characteristics of those arrested and of those convicted were quite similar; the same industries, the same parts of the city, the same age groups predominated. Either the authorities maintained their initial biases throughout the entire repression, or they had a pretty good idea who had taken part in the insurrection from the beginning. Given the nature of the repressive process and the sheer numbers involved, we believe that both the arrests and the convictions give a good gross picture of the participants in the rebellion. Our analyses sometimes use the total population of arrests, sometimes only those who were convicted, depending mainly on the convenience of one base or the other. In the analyses that follow, we shall occasionally report separate results for the arrested and the convicted; we shall in every case indicate which population is under examination.

For Georges Duveau, the typical insurgents were the cabinetmakers from the Faubourg St. Antoine and the mechanic from la Chapelle. Both had become increasingly disillusioned with the new regime after its installation in February and had gradually turned back to the support of more radical schemes of social reconstruction, to the utopian plans of Cabet or to the conspiratorial blueprints for change of Buonarotti and Blanqui; their commitment to change was, therefore, ideological. By late June, in Duveau's account, vague dissatisfactions had crystallized into militant opposition, and both were provoked into joining the rising immediately.⁴⁵ But how real were Duveau's personifications? Why did mechanics and cabinetmakers become so involved in the political struggles of 1848?

Let us look at two actual participants in the fighting. Raymond Capdegelle, ouvrier mecanicien, was born in Bordeaux and had come to Paris several years before the revolution, moving at some point into the Sixth arrondissement in St. Martin des Champs. He was twenty-eight and married, but also had a three year old daughter by another woman, then dead. Capdegelle worked as a locksmith for a contractor of carpentry located in the Faubourg Poissonniere. Although his employer complained that Capdegelle was too interested in politics, he was well enough satisfied with his services to have employed him for several years. Like many of his compatriots, Capdegelle had ambiguous political loyalties in the period before the revolution. He had joined the National Guard after the ranks were opened to workingmen, but he continued to

to attend the clubs even though his concierge claimed that he disapproved of the "extravagant" things said at the meetings.

One extra ingredient must be noted; by the spring of 1848, our mechanic, like so many others, was unemployed, and he enrolled in the National Workshops. There is no record of his response to the demonstrations of April and May, but with his dual commitment to the guard and the workshops Capdegelle was drawn inevitably into the events of June. When his company was called out on the 24th, he announced that he was going out to fight with the guard. Yet after he and two or three hundred of his company met at the March St. Martin, they determined to march on the National Assembly with the intention of "forcing an end to the shedding of blood." After this point, Capdegelle's part in the rising becomes less clear. He later claimed to have left his company when he saw barricades being erected and then to have been disarmed by the rebels. After wandering around for hours, he was arrested and transported several months later.⁴⁶

The complicity of the cabinetmaker is even more obscure. Charles Mayer of Rouen had come to Paris some time between 1844 and 1846 after finishing his term as apprentice in his home city, and then working there as a compagnon. Twenty-three, and probably single, he had then settled in Paris, living for two years on the rue St. Nicholas in the Faubourg St. Antoine. Mayer, too, was a member of both the National Guard and the National Workshops. In fact, his position in the workshops -- that of brigade leader -- gave him the extra responsibility of continuing to pay his men during the fighting.

Like Capdegelle, Mayer answered the rappel on the 24th. But when he tried to go to the local city hall to assemble, he found that it had been taken over by insurgents. Later that day, he claimed to have been disarmed at a barricade near the Marche St. Jean; after that, by his report, he fled to a local wineshop, only to be arrested there on the 25th when a National Guard unit entered. Mayer was also transported, despite the small evidence that he participated actively in the rising.⁴⁷

Others arrested for fighting in the June Days were quite similar to these men. Table 2 provides a preliminary description of all 11,722 persons arrested, and Figure 2 offers more detail on their age distribution. (For more exact comparability with the base population, later tables will deal only with the 8,928 persons known to have lived in the city of Paris in 1848, excluding the 1,995 suburbanites, the 375 from other departments, the 13 living in barracks and the 433 for which we have no certain address; the totals will therefore be smaller than in Table 2.) There were only 277 women in this vast number of suspects. The typical insurgent was a male worker employed in the metal, building or clothing trades. Between the ages of twenty and forty, he had a wife and children. He lived in eastern Paris, yet he probably had not been born there. In addition, he was very likely to be a member of either the National Guard or the National Workshops.

Table 2 About here

Figure 1 about here

In Table 2, the ratio between an industry's share of the total arrests and its share of the 1856 labor force provides a rough indication of its propensity to contribute to the insurrection. A ratio above 1.0 indicates that there were more arrests in that category than a purely proportional representation would lead us to expect. (We shall use a somewhat more refined method of calculation in later tables.) The really low propensities appear in textiles, clothing, the luxury trades, the food industries and the composite category including liberal professions, rentiers, students and financiers. Ordinary metals, leather, construction and transport, on the other hand, show up with at least twice as many arrests as chance would have led us to expect.

The specific occupational titles one encounters most frequently in the dossiers of the June Days are the 575 maçons (masons), 485 menuisiers (cabinetmakers), 216 terrassiers (ditch-diggers), 319 ébénistes (woodworkers), 299 tailleurs (tailors), 447 cordonniers (shoemakers), 269 mécaniciens (mechanics, in the old sense of the term), 263 serruriers (locksmiths), 699 journaliers (day-laborers) and 450 marchands (merchants and vendors). The largest categories include quite a few unskilled workers but that is partly due to the fact that there were many ditch-diggers and day-laborers in the city as a whole.

In order to get some sense of the relative rebelliousness of the construction workers or the mechanics, we ought to relate their numbers to the size of their categories in the labor force. The ratios comparing shares of arrests with shares of the labor force only do that job in a rather rough way, because the labor force figures refer to the city alone, while the arrests include several thousand men who worked and lived outside the city. We can get a more accurate picture by limiting both figures to Paris alone, and calculating rates of participation by industry.

Tables 3 and 4 do that job. They compare the number of persons in each of a number of occupational-industrial categories who were arrested, and the number who were convicted, in June, 1848 with the corresponding numbers of workers enumerated in two different surveys -- the Chamber of Commerce survey of Paris in 1848 and the census of 1856 -- via rates per 10,000 workers in the category. Both of the sources have significant disadvantages. The Chamber of Commerce survey ignored the whole range of service industries and neglected solitary workers who did not run their own shops: itinerants, peddlers, part-time craftsmen and the like. Those exclusions, for example, probably inflated the rates for the food industries. The 1856 census (the first one to provide relatively detailed and reliable enumerations of the labor force) has the serious disadvantage of coming eight years after the insurrection. It is unlikely, nevertheless, that the two bases erred in the same direction from the "true" 1848 labor force, however we might define it. Where both comparisons point in the same direction, we have grounds for believing the data.

Comparison of the arrests with the base population (table 3) diminishes the roles of the textile, clothing and furniture industries, which had a large share of the total Parisian labor force, and not such a large share of the arrests. It also produces low rates for the various specialty industries of Paris. In general, the low-rate industries are those characterized by small-scale, sweatshop conditions, many women and children among the workers. The comparison also brings out the extraordinary involvement of workers from construction, metal-working, leather and the graphic arts. The results for the food industries are ambiguous, for the reasons we have already mentioned. The comparisons also leave us uncertain about chemical workers and such fine-metal crafts as goldsmithing. Among the industries not covered in the 1848 survey but enumerated in 1856, transport and retail trade appear to have had more than their shares of insurgents.

When it comes to convictions (table 4), construction, leather, metal-working and graphic arts again stand out. The furniture-making industries, in which a high proportion of all those arrested were convicted, show up more strongly than they did among the arrests. Within the industries for which we have no 1848 labor force data, transport and retail trade again have high rates. From these comparisons and from the finer breakdown by individual craft, it appears that cabinetmakers and printers (and perhaps shoemakers and shopkeepers) held their own, but men from many of the old crafts had virtually abandoned the politics of violent

protest. In contrast, rates of participation in the metal, building and transport industries were several times as high as those of the older sectors of craft production. Although only 13 percent of all workers had jobs in these three sectors in 1856, 35 percent of the persons convicted in 1848 came from these industries; they were the ones with the largest firms; they had moved farthest away from the older workshop form of organization.⁴⁸

Anyone who has followed Rémi Gossez' description of working-class organization in the Paris of 1848 will already recognize some of the pattern. There were, in fact, important ties between the workers' societies documented by Gossez, brigades of the National Workshops and battalions of the National Guard. In our detailed examination of one individual dossier out of a hundred (123 persons), we find that three-fifths of the persons charged belonged either to the National Guard or to the Workshops. (43 percent had joined the Workshops and 34 percent the Guard; 16 percent of those arrested had dual membership.) It is clear, furthermore, that substantially more of the convicted than of the freed were members of either the Guard or the Workshops (in our sample: 76 percent of the convicted, 58 percent of the freed). The police and the judiciary must have thought that these institutions were implicated in the rising; for a man's chances of being released were greatly lessened if he was identified as a member of either group. And woe to him who had joined both: in our small sample, 14 of the 20 persons with dual membership (70 percent) were transported, while over 75 percent of those who belonged to neither were freed.

Although membership in mutual aid societies and similar working-class organizations was only infrequently discussed in the interrogations

For prisoners, Rémi Gossez has located many insurgents who also belonged to workers' groups. In contrast, we found very few men who were linked to the clubs. The tie between the June Days and the workers' societies seems to have been much closer than the link between the clubs and the insurrection. Simple arithmetic, to be sure, is enough to prove that most of the men in the Guard, Workshops and workers' societies did not fight on the barricades. But it is clear that those who did join the revolt bear a major share of responsibility for the June Days. In addition, many thousands of other materially aided the rising by refusing to take their places in the Guard. 49

Gossez has also pointed out the prevalence among the insurgents of workers who had come up from the provinces and settled themselves in the city. As was true of the population of Paris as a whole, the majority of the insurgents were migrants to the city (tables 5 and 6).

About a quarter of those convicted were born in the Seine, but the remainder came from elsewhere. A sizeable contingent (about 9 percent of the arrested and of the convicted) had moved into Paris from neighboring departments: Seine-et-Oise, Seine-et-Marne, Oise. An additional 5 percent had been born abroad. The rest had migrated to Paris from the provinces, particularly from departments north of a line running from Mt. St. Michel southeast through Burgundy to the Jura (see Figure 3). The other region contributing a large number of insurgents was the Massif Central; for generations, young men had come from there to Paris seasonally or permanently, usually to work on construction jobs or to

become petty traders. The mason from the Creuse (of whom about 150 were arrested) is typical. This pattern of migration among the arrested and the convicted was similar to that of the Parisian population as a whole. The capital also drew people most heavily from a circle of nearby departments stretching north and east. The south and central regions, again with the exception of the Massif Central, sent far fewer people to the Seine.⁵⁰

Table 5 and 6 about here

There were seemingly far fewer native Parisians among the insurgents than among the population as a whole, but that conclusion is clouded with several doubts. As compared with either the birthplaces of persons who died in Paris in 1833 or the entire Parisian population of 1861 -- the only two estimates we have found for this large period -- the group charged with involvement in the June Days had high proportions of outsiders (see Table 5).⁵¹ Because of the high level of migration, the percentage of Parisians actually born in the city was probably decreasing throughout the period. The comparison with 1861 therefore suggests that the 68 percent of those convicted in 1848 who had been born outside Paris were an exceptionally high proportion. The uncertainties in such a comparison are manifold: whether the death-based figures for 1833 represent the city as a whole depends on the life-cycles of migrants, on earlier fluctuations in migration and on prevailing patterns of fertility

and mortality. The figures for 1861 and 1866 include the entire population -- women, children, the aged, and so on. The appropriate base for such a comparison, as the age-distribution of the insurgents suggests, would be the male population of working age. So the question remains unresolved: many migrants, but perhaps no more than was true of the working population of the city as a whole.

One other factor must be taken into account: length of residence in the Seine. There is no evidence to indicate (and much to disprove) that men newly arrived in Paris formed the backbone of the rising. Migration into Paris had been going on at a high level for decades. But it had declined sharply by the end of 1846. Most migrants living in the capital in June 1848 would therefore have been there for a minimum of a year and a half, very probably for a much longer time. Balzac has shown through his portraits of Cesar Birotteau and Celestin Crevel how deeply provincials could become integrated into the economic and social life of the city. On a different level of the society, more and more formerly seasonal migrants by 1840 were remaining permanently in Paris or staying for several years at a time. Regional differences among workers had already become less noticeable, and assimilation, as revealed in mixed housing and occupational patterns was far advanced by the middle years of the Second Empire.⁵² Case histories of those convicted after the June Days substantiate this picture of stable residence in the Seine.

Most of the insurgents were well-settled in Paris; they had joined local institutions and were raising their families in the capital. Moreover, they worked in a wide variety of trades, not merely the badly paying ones in which recent migrants are usually concentrated. The contribution of men such as these to the political struggles of the Second Republic is a sign of the increasing integration of the Parisian working class, rather than proof of a threat to public order coming from disoriented outsiders.

Wherever they came from originally, most of the insurgents in the June Days were recruited locally. About 75 percent of those convicted lived in Paris within the octroi walls. Another 17 percent came from other parts of the Seine, predominantly from communes adjoining the city to the north and east, where fighting had also taken place. Although a few people without settled addresses or with homes in nearby departments fought in the uprising, their contribution was dwarfed by that of resident Parisians.

Figures 4 and 5 about here

The insurrection drew men from all parts of the city into the barricaded areas, but the largest contingents were drawn from within the scenes of combat. Two thirds of the convicted men lived in the five arrondissements of heavy fighting. The Eighth arrondissement contributed over 1,000, and the Twelfth over 500 to the total of those jailed or transported. When the size of local populations is taken into account, the unequal distribution of both arrests and convictions emerges clearly.

Several areas in the east stand out for their high rates of involvement: especially Popincourt, Quinze Vingts, Hotel de Ville, Faubourg St. Antoine and Faubourg St. Jacques; all were familiar neighborhoods for nineteenth-century rebellions.

For lack of labor force data at the level of the quarter, Figures 4 and 5 lay out the arrest and conviction rates by arrondissement. Calculated in terms of the resident labor force, the rate of convictions for the Ninth and Twelfth rises very high, over 300 per 10,000 workers -- one worker out of fifteen arrested, one worker out of thirty convicted. Rates for western Paris remained at fifty or less. Thus there was a close correspondence between areas of heavy fighting and those of high participation -- or, at least of high rates of arrest and conviction.

The map of the insurrection traced by these statistics is, of course, a familiar one. It is the traditional topography of Parisian rebellions. Yet we may reasonably ask what else went with an area's high or low propensity to rebellion. In order to get at that question, we have accumulated a certain amount of information about the arrondissements and quarters of Paris, and then carried on a series of statistical analyses correlating the characteristics of the areas with each other, and with their frequencies of arrests in 1848.⁵³ Tables 7 and 8 sum up the results.

Table 7 about here

Table 7 shows the correlations at the level of the arrondissement, after allowance (via the computation of partial correlations) for vari-

ations in total population. Since there are only twelve observation points-- one for each arrondissement -- the exact values of the coefficients should be taken with a grain of salt. With that proviso, the relationships form an interesting pattern. The number of migrants into the arrondissement between 1841 and 1846, for example, shows a strong positive relationship to the number of violent incidents occurring there in 1848, considerable negative relationships to the number of fabricants (a rough indication of the concentration of the population in crafts), to the level of unemployment and of business activity, but no relationship at all to the frequency of arrests in 1848. Unemployment, on the other hand, turns out to be closely related to the number of fabricants, the number of workers per fabricant (an indication of the scale of local enterprises), the level of business activity, and the number of workers' societies; there is, furthermore, a substantial tendency for arrests to be more frequent where unemployment is high. The number of clubs is not strongly connected to any of these variables, but is negatively correlated with the number of arrests. By contrast, the number of workers' societies enumerated in the area by Rémi Gossez shows positive relationships to the number of fabricants, the unemployment level, business activity, workers per fabricant and -- most important -- the number of arrests. Arrests themselves tend to be high where fabricants are numerous, unemployment high, clubs absent, workers' societies abundant and prior violent conflicts plentiful. All in all the results give the impression of an important division between the arenas and effects of the clubs and the workers' societies. The clubs are tied to non-industrial activity; they either discourage the local population from the insurrection or shield


them from its repression. The workers' societies flourish where unemployed industrial workers, especially those in larger shops, abound. Their presence forecasts high rates of arrest in June, 1848.

Table 8 about here

Although we have fewer items of information about each of the 48 quarters of Paris, the larger number of units and the smaller scale of the individual unit permit us to pay more attention to the levels of correlation we do find. This time we rely on the number of rooming houses (garnis) in the quarter as a measure of the concentration of dependent workers in the area. Following the lead of Louis Chevalier, we take the death rate from cholera in 1849 as a measure of the extent of genuine poverty. The correlations run lower than in the analysis of arrondissements, but they are consistent. We again see an association between clubs and a relatively prosperous, non-industrial population, and some tendency for arrests to be rare where clubs were frequent. Conversely, the covariation of rooming houses, cholera, workers' societies and arrests in 1848 appears again. Leaving aside the correlation of the arrest rate with the absolute number of arrests, the strongest relationships in the table tie arrests to the world of furnished rooms.

It may be helpful to recast the strongest relationships among characteristics of quarters in the form of a causal model. The numbers in the diagram are standardized partial regression coefficients. They indicate, loosely speaking, how much change in the variable at the end of the arrow is associated with a unit of change in the variable at the

arrow's origin. (The starred coefficients are at least twice their standard error, which is a conventional level below which similar results could easily be produced by chance.) Here is the diagram:



This model does not have overwhelming explanatory power; the coefficient of determination (R^2) for number of arrests is .352. Nevertheless, it brings out some relationships which lie hidden in the correlation matrix. To the extent that cholera does stand for poverty, it confirms the association of the clubs with relative wealth, and with none of the other variables in the set. Now we see the apparent association between rooming houses and rebellion dissolve into two components: relative poverty and the organization of popular societies. The geography of the rebellion corresponded, in a general way, to the geography of poverty and the geography of working-class political and economic organi-

zation.

Part of the variation from quarter to quarter is undoubtedly due to the neighborhood concentration of the more rebellious and organized segments of the working class. Our tabulations reveal, for example, a remarkable concentration of the ébénistes who were arrested in the Faubourg St. Antoine, of masons in the Hotel de Ville, of mechanics in la Chapelle, and so on. Unfortunately, occupational information on the Parisian labor force of 1848 does not come in fine enough chunks to permit a direct examination of quarter-to-quarter variation within each industry. At the level of the arrondissement, one more analysis is possible, using the Chamber of Commerce survey as a base. Table 9 presents the rates of conviction by industry and arrondissement for the categories covered by the survey. (The rates differ somewhat from earlier tables and maps because they treat only the resident members of categories covered in the Chamber of Commerce survey; the overall patterns, however, are the same.)

Table 9 about here

The table makes it clear that the differences among industries and the differences among areas we detected earlier were partly independent of each other. Construction, for instance, had higher-than-average rates of participation in almost every arrondissement. Textiles, clothing and the Parisian luxury trades stand below the average in almost every case. Yet there are also characteristic differences among the arrondissements which their industrial mixes do not explain: every industry in the First arrondissement but fine metals had a participation rate below the

city-wide average for that industry. Every industry in the Ninth for which we can make the comparison ran above the rest of the city. The differences among arrondissements are larger and more consistent than the differences among industries, but neither reduces to the other.

The table brings out some interesting interactions between industry and locality: the tendency of workers in fine metals to have higher-than-average involvement in the insurrection in the calm bourgeois areas where they were concentrated, despite their low standing relative to all other workers in the city; the exceptional role of shoemakers and other leatherworkers in the Second, Fourth and Seventh, and so on. The major role played by the metal-working industries shows up clearly in the figures for the Ninth and Twelfth arrondissements. Although the building trades were definitely underrepresented in the cadres of the insurrection from these two districts, their predominant position in the city can be seen in the rates for all the other sections of eastern Paris. We are dealing with interwoven effects of local organization, craft tradition and new forms of militancy based on occupation. The mason, the carpenter and the mechanic assumed central roles in the fighting, as men from several of the other traditionally militant crafts, descendants of the sans-culottes, abandoned their commitment to collective action outside of ordinary politics.

The intersection of local and occupational influences nevertheless left some areas and some industries the real foci of the insurrection: the Ninth and Twelfth arrondissements with overall conviction rates ten times those of the First, Second and Third, the workers in construction

and, especially, non-precious metals with their rates of convictions five to ten times those of textile workers or persons employed in the Parisian luxury trades. Balance against the high involvement of some kinds of manufacturing workers that of white collar workers, professionals and merchants. Very few joined the insurrection. The political alliances between wage-earners and the petty bourgeoisie which had been operative since the 1790's had collapsed. To be sure, a few people of distinctly bourgeois status were convicted for their parts in the June Days -- students, intellectuals, as well as men like M. Dupont, professor at the Lycée Corneille, or M. Grenon-Meunier, an architect and entrepreneur in the building trades, who owned a house worth 200,000 francs, but who also had joined the National Workshops when his business collapsed in the depression of 1847-1848. These men were exceptions. 54

Other kinds of men carried the torch of militancy. Consider, for example, Auguste Lanskin, a mechanic employed by the Chemin de Fer du Centre, who delayed the entry of troops into Paris. With a band of fifteen men he stole two locomotives and steamed out to Choisy-le-Roi to convince the stationmaster "in the name of the democratic and social republic" that troop convoys should not be permitted to go into the city. Seeing that soldiers were nearby and ready to depart, he and his men started up their engines and went back as far as the line of forts. There they cut the bridges and blockaded the tracks. 55 This is the world of the Third Republic, rather than that of the First. Industrialization had already produced changes in the labor force which were in their turn affecting the political struggles of the period.

The variables our analyses of arrondissements and quartiers isolate describe the world of the organized artisan, the journeyman living in furnished rooms, and the workshop member living in areas that had been hosts to earlier collective protests. All of these elements tended to draw local men into the June Days. Where other factors were dominant, however, they inhibited participation. In the areas where the number of migrants who arrived during the 1840's was comparatively high (predominantly the less crowded areas of western Paris) or where the number of master craftsmen and entrepreneurs was relatively large, the propensity to revolt was lower. The presence of clubs also inhibited men from joining the uprising. In this case, differences in Parisian social and economic milieux led to different forms of political action. While the clubs were certainly militant in many ways, their militancy was closer to the existing structure of power, their alliances with the bourgeoisie much stronger, than in the case of the popular societies. Their contribution to the June Days was small. Too many of them recruited their members from levels of society above the one which produced the June Days: intellectuals, professionals, shopkeepers, students, all groups which were underrepresented among the insurgents. Only 4 percent of the suspects whose dossiers we examined were identified as club members. While every social class was represented to some degree on both sides of the barricades, the vast majority of the men opposing the government came from a specific social and economic milieu, and were members of specifically working-class organizations. The "haves" and the "have-nots"

were not all out on the streets locked in hand-to-hand combat, certainly. But the opposing forces represented substantially different social groups. Even if many artisans and journeymen fought for the government with the National Guard, the central cadres of the pre-March legions came from higher social ranks -- from property owners, professionals, shopkeepers, and their employees.

Some workers stayed out of the action. Georges Duvéaux shows us his hosier, a supporter of the February revolution, dissociating himself from more militant workers and remaining a supporter of the existing regime.⁵⁶ Many workers from traditional crafts had retired from the field of rebellion. By June of 1848, many of them were willing to tolerate the government's newly imposed restrictions on the freedom to organize and to assemble; they were even willing to abandon their formerly militant demands for public surveillance and control of the regime. Although they had been drawn into active political life through their opposition to the monarchy, they soon accepted the legitimacy of the Republic, and were moderately content with the rule of the Assembly and the Executive Commission.

Despite the passivity of the majority, a determined minority, drawn disproportionately from the newer factory-based and semi-skilled trades, remained mobilized, outside the governing coalitions, willing to reassert -- by violence if necessary -- its right to oversee public policy and to share public goods. Much of the credit for this survival of political impulses belongs to the organizations which provided a forum for articulate workers and a focus for their energies. At the same time, these groups helped to define and to exalt the claim for a democratic and social

republic. That claim brought together the varied commitments to guaranteed employment, altered labor relationships, and political influence that animated Parisian workers in 1848. The June Days resulted from this collective commitment, and more directly from the government's violent denial of the claims and rights that commitment asserted.

Table 1. Results of the Judicial Proceedings for the June Days

<u>Decision</u>	<u>Number of persons</u>	<u>percent of total</u>
freed	6,658	56.9
transported	4,283	36.5
jailed	28	0.2
died before sentencing	36	0.3
trial before the <u>Conseil de Guerre</u>	212	1.8
pardoned	3	0.0
no further action	358	3.1
no information	144	1.2
total charged	11,722	100.0

Table 2. Characteristics of persons arrested for participation in the June Days by industry

<u>Industrial category</u>	<u>Number of persons</u>	<u>Percent of total**</u>	<u>Percent of 1856 labor force</u>	<u>Ratio</u>	<u>Percent Married**</u>	<u>Median age</u>
Textiles	344	3.1	4.9	.63	75.0	36
Clothing	1,044	9.3	17.2	.54	56.5	33
Luxury trades	212	1.9	3.5	.54	84.2	32
Printing, paper	444	3.9	3.0	1.30	55.6	31
Ordinary metals	1,325	11.8	2.9	4.07	57.3	31
fine metals	239	2.1	1.9	1.11	72.7	29
food	463	4.1	6.7	.61	51.3	32
furniture, wood	678	6.0	4.0	1.50	62.7	31
leather	168	1.5	0.6	2.50	56.8	32
carriage making	195	1.7	1.0	1.70	58.0	32
chemicals	148	1.3	0.9	1.44	54.5	34
basketry	136	1.2	1.2	1.00	67.6	31
construction	2,075	18.4	6.6	2.79	58.7	32
transport	529	4.7	2.1	2.23	58.2	34
retail trade	789	7.0	4.7	1.49	67.8	34
professions						
finance						
students	326	2.9	13.6	.21	57.3	34
military	501	4.4	4.5	.98	60.3	31
services & other	1,640	14.6	20.6	.71	57.6	35
not reported	456	--	--	--	66.7	33
TOTAL	11,722	99.9	99.9	1.0	59.6	33

* percent of total with occupations reported = 11,266

** percent of total with marital status reported = 2,982

Table 3: Arrests per 10,000 workers by industry (Paris only)

<u>Industry</u>	<u>Number of arrests</u>	<u>1848 survey as base</u>	<u>1856 census as base</u>
food	3337	323	61
construction	1528	367	280
furniture	578	160	176
clothing	863	96	61
textiles	274	75	68
leather	138	302	283
carriage making	131	95	153
chemical industries	110	113	150
ordinary metals	1022	410	426
fine metals	198	118	123
basketry	91	168	93
Parisian specialties	169	47	58
printing and paper	378	226	154
transport	342	?	198
services	362	?	30
military	249	?	67
retail trade	630	?	164
liberal professions, etc.	244	?	22
others	735	?	147
unknown	279	-	-
Total	8658	170	105

Table 4: Convictions per 10,000 workers by industry (Paris only)

<u>Industry</u>	<u>number of convictions</u>	<u>1848 survey as base</u>	<u>1856 census as base</u>
food	126	121	23
construction	541	130	99
furniture	258	71	79
clothing	309	34	22
textiles	107	29	27
leather	49	107	100
carriage making	45	33	52
chemical industries	47	48	64
ordinary metals	439	176	183
fine metals	66	39	41
basketry	34	63	35
Parisian specialties	61	17	21
printing & paper	151	90	62
transport	116	?	67
services	143	?	12
military	113	?	31
retail trade	227	?	59
liberal professions, etc.	77	?	7
others	175	?	35
unknown	81	-	-
TOTAL	3165	65	38

Table 5: Percent distributions of Paris population, 1833-1866, and of Parisian residents among insurgents, June Days, 1848.

<u>Birthplace</u>	<u>Total Paris Population</u>			<u>Arrested 1848</u>	<u>Convicted 1848</u>
	<u>1833</u>	<u>1861</u>	<u>1866</u>		
Paris		36	33	27	26
Other Seine		59	61		70
Other France				67	70
Abroad		5	6	7	5
Total		100	100	101	100
Number of Parisian residents with known birthplaces				6927	3047

Table 6: Birthplaces of individuals convicted for participation in the June Days

Birthplace	Convicted Living in Paris	Convicted Living Elsewhere	Total Convicted	Percent*
Moselle	106	44	150	3.6
Nord	86	28	114	2.7
Seine	776	290	1,066	25.4
Seine-et-Marne	90	46	136	3.2
Other France	1,731	612	2,343	55.9
Belgium	61	16	77	1.8
Other foreign	78	23	101	2.4
Unknown	227	104	331	--
TOTAL	3,274	1,249	4,523	99.9

*Based on persons with known birthplace

Table 7: Correlations among characteristics of arrondissements, partialled for total population

	Migration	Fabricants	Unemployed	Clubs	Workers' Societies	Number Charged	Business	Workers/ Fabricant	Incidents
Net Migration									
1841-46	+1.00								
number of fabricants 1848	-.66	+1.00							
number unemployed 1848	-.46	+.86	+1.00						
Number of clubs 1848	+.30	-.39	-.18	+1.00					
Number of workers' societies	-.34	+.41	-.63	-.16	+1.00				
Number charged	-.09	+.38	+.47	-.43	+.57	+1.00			
business activity 1848	-.51	+.86	+.93	-.16	+.45	+.18	+1.00		
Workers per fabricant 1848	-.23	+.33	+.70	+.14	+.56	+.02	+.73	+1.00	
Number of violent incidents 1848	+.61	+.11	+.27	+.20	+.14	+.42	+.13	+.03	+1.00

Table 8: Correlations among characteristics of quarters, partialled for total population

	charged.	charged/ 1000	rooming houses	cholera/ 1000	clubs	workers' societies
number charged	+1.00					
charged / 1000 population	+ .95	+1.00				
number of rooming hous- es Jan. 48	+ .44	+ .54	+1.00			
cholera deaths per 1000 1849	+ .35	+ .44	+ .42	+1.00		
number of clubs	- .18	- .16	- .31	- .32	+1.00	
number of workers' societies	+ .32	+ .24	- .23	+ .08	- .14	+1.00

Table 9: June Days: Convictions/ 10,000 workers

* Fewer than 100 workers in category

Industry	Arrondissements												Total	Convictions
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12		
Alimentation	18	49	55	128	135	115	84	401	289	21	58	266	121	126
Batiment	22	26	30	85	85	110	295	194	528	22	93	418	130	541
Amenblement	22	34	40	50	47	42	37	88	209	58	143	299	71	258
Vetement	12	8	13	32	17	23	43	155	58	15	23	108	34	309
Tissus	0	0	0	9	23	23	6	200	32	22	21	91	29	107
Cuirs	*	142	28	222	17	53	210	389	*	*	*	105	107	49
Carrosserie	3	19	0	0	24	22	55	206	*	12	0	162	33	45
Chimie	0	22	0	0	31	32	60	114	116	0	77	114	48	47
Metaux ordinaires	102	67	61	182	88	121	193	299	368	62	152	441	176	439
Metaux Precieux	49	37	35	23	9	28	23	216	250	194	50	*	39	66
Boissellerie	46	31	34	0	15	35	51	106	201	0	221	221	63	34
Paris	0	8	8	0	12	10	24	92	67	22	0	192	17	61
Imprimerie	53	17	8	42	81	60	88	891	677	21	15	208	90	151
TOTAL	22	19	16	37	38	41	59	165	203	24	52	199	65	
Convictions	46	64	45	62	173	238	210	717	209	38	83	348		2,233

FIGURE 1

NUMBER OF VIOLENT INCIDENTS PER QUARTER 1846-1852




FIGURE 2
NUMBER OF PERSONS ARRESTED FOR
PARTICIPATION IN THE JUNE DAYS, BY AGE




FIGURE 3: June Days arrests per 10,000 population in department of birth







FIGURE 4




- 1-149 ARRESTS/10,000 WORKERS
- ▤ 150-299 ARRESTS/10,000 WORKERS
- ▥ 300-449 ARRESTS/10,000 WORKERS
- ▧ 450-599 ARRESTS/10,000 WORKERS
- ▨ 600 and up.

PARIS: 1848

JUNE DAYS ARREST RATES

NUMBER OF ARRESTS PER
10,000 WORKERS IN ARRONDISSEMENT

FIGURE 5




PARIS: 1848

JUNE DAYS CONVICTION RATES

NUMBER OF ARRESTS PER

10,000 WORKERS IN ARRONDISSEMENT



FOOTNOTES

1. Rapport de la commission d'enquête sur l'insurrection qui a éclaté dans la journée du 23 juin et sur les événements du 15 mai (Paris: Imprimerie de l'Assemblée Nationale, 1848), II, 290.
2. Ibid., I, 358; Alexis de Tocqueville, Recollections of Alexis de Tocqueville, J. P. Mayer, ed. (New York: Meridian, 1959), 150, 159; Karl Marx, The Class Struggles in France, 1848-1850 (New York: International Publishers, 1935), p. 56.
3. The explanations of the June Days that have been offered differ markedly according to the political persuasion of the historian offering them. In general, historians on the left stress the elements of class conflict and the economic pressures of hunger and unemployment. [Georges Renard, La République de 1848, Histoire Socialiste (1789-1900), t. ix, Jean Jaurès, ed. (Paris: J. Rouff et Cie. 1906); Jean Dautry, 1848 et la IIe République, (Paris: Ed. sociales, 1957).] or the effect of socialist theories and organizations, [Georges Duveau, 1848: The Making of a Revolution (New York: Pantheon, 1967)]. Conservative historians have concentrated more exclusively on a description of the events themselves, explaining them by a combination of ideological and political factors [Pierre de la Gorce, Histoire de la Second République française, I (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1925); Charles Seignobos, La Révolution de 1848 - Le second empire, Histoire de France contemporaine, E. Lavisse, ed., t. vi (Paris: Hachette, 1900-1911)]. See also Charles Schmidt, Les journées de juin (Paris: Hachette, 1926); George Rudé, Debate on Europe, 1815-1850 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1972), 213-227.

4. See particularly, Peter Amann, "A Journée in the making: May 15, 1848," Journal of Modern History, 42, #1 (March, 1970), 42-69; Rémi Gossez, Les Ouvriers de Paris, I: l'organization, 1848-1851 Bibliothèque de la révolution de 1848, t. XXIV (La Roche-sur-Yon: Imprimerie Centrale de l'ouest, 1967); Rémi Gossez, La Presse Parisienne à destination des ouvriers, 1848-1851, La Presse ouvrière, 1819-1850, Jacques Godechot, ed., Bibliothèque de la révolution de 1848, t. XXIII (La Roche-sur-Yon: Imprimerie Centrale de l'Ouest, 1966), 123-190.
5. Albert Soboul, Les sans-culottes parisiens en l'an II (Paris: Librairie Clavreuil, 1958); George Rudé, The Crowd in the French Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon, 1959); George Rudé, The Crowd in History (New York: Wiley, 1964).
6. See Louise A. Tilly, "The Grain Riot as a Form of Political Conflict in France," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 2 (1971), 23-57; French version forthcoming in Annales; Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations.
7. C. E. Labrousse, "1848-1830-1789: Comment naissent les révolutions," Actes du Congrès historique de centenaire de la Révolution de 1848 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948), pp. 1-20; "Panoramas de la crise," in C. E. Labrousse, ed., Aspects de la crise et de la dépression de l'économie française au milieu du XIXe siècle (La Roche-sur-Yon: Imprimerie Centrale de l'Ouest, 1956; Bibliothèque de la Révolution de 1848, tome XIX).
8. Rémi Gossez, Les ouvriers de Paris, op. cit.

9. More extensive statements of this reasoning (and some evidence to support it) appear in James Rùle and Charles Tilly, "1830 and the Unnatural History of Revolution," Journal of Social Issues, forthcoming and Charles Tilly, "Revolutions and Collective Violence," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, forthcoming).
10. Louis Chevalier, Classes laborieuses et classes dangereuses à Paris pendant la première moitié du XIXe siècle (Paris: Plon, 1958).
11. Maurice Lévy-Leboyer, Les Banques européennes et l'industrialisation internationale dans la première moitié du XIXe siècle (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964), 116-8, 345-8.
12. Chambre de Commerce de Paris, Statistique de l'industrie à Paris résultant de l'enquête faite par la Chambre de Commerce pour les années 1847-1848 (Paris: Guillaumin et Cie., 1851), 48-51, 63-7, 76-8, 114-7, 130-5, 158-60; Chevalier, Formation, 91, 114-8.
13. Chambre de Commerce, 38-41; See also Ernest Labrousse, "Panoramas de la crise," Etudes: Aspects de la crise et de la dépression de l'économie française au milieu du XIXe siècle, 1846-51, Bibliothèque de la Revolution de 1848, t. XIX (La Roche-sur-Yon: Imprimerie Centrale de l'Ouest, 1956), iii-xiv.
14. Donald Cope McKay, The National Workshops: A Study in the French Revolution of 1848 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1965), 26-9, 159; Stein, III, 351-3.

15. For more detailed information on our procedures, see Charles Tilly, "Methods for the Study of Collective Violence," in Molly Apple Levin and Ralph M. Conant, eds., Problems in the Study of Community Violence (New York: Praeger, 1969). Recent reports of this work include Charles Tilly, "The Changing Place in Collective Violence", in Melvin Richter, ed., Essays in Social and Political History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970); Charles Tilly, "How Protest Modernized in France, 1845 to 1855," in Robert Fogel, ed., The Dimensions of Quantitative Research in History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming); Edward Shorter and Charles Tilly, "Le déclin de la greve violente en France de 1890 a 1935," Le mouvement social, 79 (July-September, 1971), 95-118; "Les vagues de grèves en France, 1890-1968," forthcoming in Annales; Economies, Societes, Civilisations.
16. Sources for Parisian incidents: Le Moniteur universel 2 October 1846, 3 October 1846, 16 September 1847, Le Droit, 2 October 1846, 3 October 1846, 5 October 1846, 5 October 1846, 30 October 1846, 31 October 1846, 3 September 1847, 5 September 1847, 8 September 1847, 14 September 1847, 16 September 1847, 17 September 1847, 30 September 1847.
17. Peter Amann, "Revolution: A Redefinition," Political Science Quarterly, LXXVII (1962) 36-52.
18. General sample incidents, #405, 425, 446, 491; see also Archives Nationales, BB¹⁸ 1461, 1468, 5265 BB³⁰ 363.
19. Stern, II, 174-5.

20. Ibid., II, 419-429; Rémi Gossez, "La presse parisienne à destination des ouvriers, 1848-1851," La presse ouvrière 1848-1851, Jacques Godechot, ed., Bibliothèque de la révolution de 1848, t. XXIII (La Roche-sur-Yon: Imprimerie Centrale d l'Ouest, 1966), 183-5; rapport d'enquête, II, 99-102; Suzanne Wassermann, Les clubs de Barbès et de Blanqui en 1848 (Paris, 1913), 25-6, 31-9, 51-9; Charles Boutin, ed., 1848: avril, mai, juin (Paris: E. Picard, 1869), 193-5.
21. Henri Sée, La vie économique de la France sous la monarchie censitaire, 1815-1848 (Paris: F. Alcan, 1927), 122, 126-31; see also Jean-Pierre Aguet, Les grèves sous la monarchie de juillet, 1830-47 (Geneva: E. Droz, 1954); Pierre Quentin-Bauchart, La crise sociale de 1848: les origines de la révolution de février (Paris: Hachette, 1920), 274-5; Gossez, Ouvriers, 127-9.
22. Marchandage was the system of subcontracting whereby an employer did not hire men individually but engaged and paid a leader or foreman who supplied the rest of the labor needed. Since workers were paid indirectly and often did not know the amount paid the foreman, they could easily be cheated. The tarif was a fixed schedule of wage rates that would apply equally to all the men in a firm; workers often wanted to apply it to all workshops in the industry. Thus, support for it became a demand for the equalization of wages.
23. rapport d'enquête, I, 258-9.

24. For a detailed description of workers' organizations in Paris during the Second Republic, see Gossez, Ouvriers, particularly 112-120, 136-145, 160-220.
25. Gossez, Ouvriers, 90-94, 100-103; Louis Blanc, La révolution de février au Luxembourg (Paris: Michel Levy, 1849); Louis Blanc, La révolution de 1848 (Paris: La crois, Verboeckhoven et Cie, 1870) II, 12-13; de la Gorce, I, 188-195; Emile Thomas, Histoire des ateliers nationaux, reprinted in J. A. R. Marriott, ed., The French Revolution of 1848 in its Economic Aspects (Oxford: Clarendon, 1913), 195-203.
26. Boutin, 208.
27. Charles Richomme, Journées de l'insurrection de juin, 1848: journal de la rue (Paris: Vve L. Janet, 1848), 46.
28. A. Delvau, ed. Les murailles révolutionnaires (Paris: C. Joubert, 1851), 362, 476-9, 563-5; see also Boutin, 183, 211; Richomme, 166-7; rapport d'enquête, II,
29. Archives Nationales, C. 934, #2692, "Etat des principales arrestations politiques du 15 mai au 22 juin, 1848"; rapport d'enquête, II, 193-5, 199-200.
30. rapport d'enquête, II, 49-54.
31. Richomme, 138-9, 148-9.

32. Archives Nationales, C. 933, #2427-8, #2452, "rapports sur la journée de 22 juin"; Le Siecle, 23 juin 1848; Moniteur, 2 decembre 1848; Daniel Stern [Marie C.S. de F. comtesse d'Agoult], Histoire de la révolution de 1848 (Paris: G. Sandre, 1853), III, 153-156; Rapport d'enquête, II, 212-214; Maxime du Camp, Souvenirs de l'année 1848 (Paris: Hachette, 1876), 238-9.
33. Archives Nationales C. 933, #2447-2451, "rapports sur la journée de 22 juin", #2454-2472, "rapports sur la 23 juin"; Stern, III, 157.
34. Archives Nationales, C. 933, #2454-2497, "rapports sur la journée de 23 juin."
35. Archives Nationales, C. 933, #2554-2591, "rapports sur les journées de 23 et 24 juin"; Moniteur, 2 decembre 1848. See also de la Gorce, 331-368.
36. Archives Nationales, C. 933, #2556-2574, "rapports sur la journée de 23 juin"; #2965, "rapport sur la journée de 24 juin"; Moniteur, 2 aout 1848.
37. Archives Nationales, C. 933, #2968, 2975, 2980, "rapports sur les journées de 25 et 26 juin"; rapport d'enquête, II, 248-50.
38. Moniteur, 25 juin - 21 juillet, 1848; 3 - 4 decembre 1848; rapport d'enquête, II, 53-4; Archives Nationales, C. 933, #2428, 2484, 2497, "rapports sur les journées de 22 et 23 juin"; Louis Girard, La garde nationale, 1814-1871 (Paris: Plon, 1964), 294, 313-4; Jean Vidalenc, "La province et les journées de juin." Etudes d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, II (1948), 102-3.

39, rapport d'enquête, I, 298, 358; Stern, III, 270-1; Archives Nationales, F.⁷ 2585-6, "Liste générale en ordre alphabétique des inculpés de juin," 1848; Archives de l'armée, "justice militaire, 1848; non poursuivis": Seignobos, 105.

40. Moniteur, 22 juillet, 2 & 8 août, 1848; rapport d'enquête, I, 363; P. Chalmin, "Une institution militaire de la seconde république la garde nationale mobile," Etudes d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, II (1948), 68; Ernest Renan et Henriette Renan, Nouvelles lettres intimes, 1846-50 (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1923), 209-10; de la Gorce, I, 393; Archives Nationales, C. 933 #2730, "Le nombre des morts et blessés."

41. There are several versions of the list, in Archives Nationales F⁷ 2585, F⁷ 2586 and Archives Historiques de l'Armée AA, A. There are small discrepancies among the three huge registers, but all three contain about 11,700 names. The register in F⁷ 2585 ends with number 11,671 while F⁷ 2586 ends with 11,693, for an apparent difference of 22 persons. However, our detailed reworking of F⁷ 2586 revealed a considerable range of numbering errors; our final total is 11,722 persons -- 50 persons (or 0.4 percent) more than the apparent total.

Since we have not made a person-by-person comparison of the registers, it is still possible that the lists are identical. We employed F⁷ 2586 because it contains more items of information concerning each inculpé than F⁷ 2585, and because it was more convenient to have it microfilmed than the copy at Vincennes. We coded each entry onto perforated cards, retaining the birthplace (but not, unfortunately, the name of

the person -- that was a mistake) in alphabetical form as well as in a numerical code. We performed the verifications, tabulations and computations with a tape version of the 11,722-card deck.

Priscilla Cheever, Muhammad Fiaz, Freddi Greenberg, Judy Kammins, Virginia Perkins, Sue Richardson and Cyrus Stewart gave us indispensable help in carrying out the analyses; we thank them warmly.

The Canada Council and the National Science Foundation provided the essential financial support. George Rudé, Rémi Gossez and most likely Georges Duveau have all used these sources before, but no one else seems to have carried out an analysis of them on the scale of our own.

42. Moniteur, 16 October 1848; 26 March, 7 and 10 April, 1849; A.N.

C 933, ##2961, 2980, 2985, "rapports sur la journée de 26 juin 1848," #2701, "Etat et répartition des prisonniers," See also Archives Historiques de l'Armée, A 1-125, "Justice Militaire, 1848".

43. R. C. Cobb, The Police and the People, French Popular Protest, 1789-1820 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 27, 29.

44. These and subsequent general remarks about the composition of the insurgents summarize tabulations of the liste générale ... which we have not presented in detail here.

45. Georges Duveau, 1848: The Making of a Revolution (New York: Pantheon, 1968), pp. 18, 79, 83, 84, 132, 136.

46. AHA, A 65, #4834, Capdegelle.

47. AHA, A 105, #7929, Mayer.

48. The description applies to the males charged with involvement in the insurrection, but not to the females. The occupational profile of the tiny group of women who were jailed was markedly different: about a third worked in either the clothing industry or in service jobs. Another large portion were either merchants or petty traders.

49. See especially AHA a 1-125, "Justice Militaire, 1848."

50. Louis Chevalier, La Formation de la population parisienne au XIXe siècle (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950), pp. 165, 207, 208, 217, 218, 285.

51. Ibid., 46, 57, 58. The account of nativity in Paris in 1833 was done by Dr. Bertillon, who based his findings on current death records -- an unreliable base for such an estimate, at best. See Récherches statistiques sur la ville de Paris et le département de la Seine, M. le comte de Rambuteau, prefect. (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1844), V, table 118.

52. Honore de Balzac, César Birotteau, La Cousine Bette. (See Chevalier's discussion in Classes laborieuses, op. cit., pp. 220, 238-410.

53. The variables in the tables, and our sources of information, run as follows:

1. net migration to the arrondissement, 1841-1846: calculated by the residual method from Charles H. Pouthas, La population française pendant la première moitié du XIXe siècle, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1956), p. 157.

2. number of fabricants, 1848: Chambre de Commerce de Paris, op.cit,
Tableau General #1.

3. number unemployed, 1848: Ibid.

4. number of clubs, March 30, 1848: rapport d'enqu[^]te, II, 99-103.

5. number of popular societies: transcription of the map presented
by Rémi Gossez, Les ouvriers de Paris, op. cit., p. 42.

6. number charged for participation in the insurrection: our
compilation from the list générale ...

7. business activity: Chambre de Commerce de Paris, op. cit.,
Tableau generale, #1.

8. workers per fabricant: our calculation from Chambre de Commerce
de Paris, op.cit., Tableau general #1.

9. number of violent incidents January 1847 to June 1848: our
compilation.

10. number of rooming houses (garnis), January 1848: Chambre de
Commerce de Paris, op. cit., p. 952.

11. Cholera deaths per thousand population, Recherches statistiques
sur la ville de Paris et le département de la Seine. M. Le baron

11. continued. G. E. Haussmann, prefect. VI (Paris, 1860)

"Cholera morbus en 1849", pp. 442-3.

54. Moniteur, 7 and 20 September, 13 October 1848.

55. Moniteur, 11 March 1849.

56. Duveau, op.cit., pp. 82, 134. See also Remi Gossez, "Diversité
des antagonismes sociaux vers le milieu du XIXe siècle," Revue
économique, (May, 1956), 439-457.

FIGURE 2
NUMBER OF PERSONS ARRESTED FOR
PARTICIPATION IN THE JUNE DAYS, BY AGE




FIGURE 3: JUNE DAYS ARRESTS PER 10,000 POPULATION IN DEPARTMENT OF BIRTH







FIGURE 40




- 1-149 ARRESTS / 10,000 WORKERS
- ◉ 150-299 ARRESTS / 10,000 WORKERS
- ▨ 300-449 ARRESTS / 10,000 WORKERS
- ▩ 450-599 ARRESTS / 10,000 WORKERS
- 600 and up.

PARIS: 1848

JUNE DAYS ARREST RATES

NUMBER OF ARRESTS PER
10,000 WORKERS IN ARRONDISSEMENT

FIGURE 5



NUMBER OF ARRESTS PER
10,000 WORKERS IN ARRONDISSEMENT

