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Working Paper

Developing Evidence-based Expertise in Emotion Management: Strategically Displaying and Responding to Emotions in Negotiations

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Running Head: Emotion Management Expertise in Negotiations

Developing Evidence-based Expertise in Emotion Management: Strategically Displaying and

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Abstract

Adopting a theoretical model of expertise, this paper integrates the nascent literature on emotion in negotiation with the learning sciences literature to suggest how emotion management expertise can be developed. Emotion management expertise requires a negotiator to develop heightened sensitivities to emotional cues and the ability, not only to accurately identify the relevance of emotional dynamics to the negotiation, but also the ability to strategically display one's own emotions and respond to emotions displayed by others. The paper delineates approaches for developing such expertise in the classroom, and identifies directions for future empirical research on emotions in negotiations.

Although a growing body of research is discovering the extent to which emotions influence negotiations (for a review see Barry, Fulmer, & Goates, 2006; Li & Roloff, 2006), little is known about how to manage the effects of emotions (for an exception see Kopelman, Gewurz, & Sacharin, 2007), and less still on how to teach emotion management. One would expect that an expert negotiator would effectively manage emotions and leverage their effects toward desired outcomes. To learn to manage emotions, students need to experience them in the context of negotiations. Rather than focus solely on how to charge classroom negotiations with more emotion, we propose a principled, theory-driven, and evidence-based approach to developing emotion management expertise. By framing the negotiation task in terms of emotion management expertise we draw on a number of literatures to systematically break down what should be taught and how. We begin with a brief overview of what characterizes expertise itself before suggesting what emotion management expertise in negotiations would entail. Building on the learning sciences literature we then propose a variety of approaches to teach emotion management in the context of a negotiation course, and delineate directions for future research that will improve the understanding of emotion management in negotiations.

Characteristics of an Expert

According to a widely accepted definition of expertise (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993), an expert negotiator would be one who consistently achieves superior negotiation outcomes. The extensive research on financial and relational factors that influence negotiation processes and outcomes (for a review see Bazerman et al., 2000; Thompson, 2005) assumes that expert negotiators use the strategies that have been found to be associated with desired outcomes. However, little research has directly addressed what expert negotiators actually do (for exceptions see Black & Diaz, 1996; Northcraft & Neale, 1987; Van Hasselt et al., 2005), or how

negotiation expertise can be developed (for exceptions see Lowenstein & Thompson, 2000; Van

Hasselt et al., 2006).

It takes roughly 10,000 hours, or 10 years, of deliberate practice (i.e., pushing one's

limits) to develop into an expert in a complex domain (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer,

1993). Over this time, an individual's cognitions about that domain become increasingly

sophisticated. The result is that, compared to novices, experts have richer, more integrated

mental models (i.e., networks of associative and causal beliefs) of their domains. For example,

de Groot (1965) demonstrated that chess experts were able to better remember legal chess board

configurations than those arranged in impossible configurations, which gave rise to the theory

that experts think in terms of meaningful patterns of information called *chunks*. For chess

masters the chunks are game positions, and it is estimated that they have a "vocabulary" of some

50,000 positions they recognize quickly (Simon & Gilmartin, 1973). An expert's chunks,

however, are not a collection of isolated patterns of information, but rather part of a richly

integrated network that results in understanding. Hmelo-Silver and Pfeffer (2004), for example,

found that expert knowledge representation of a complex system exists at the levels of (or can be

meaningfully characterized in terms of) *structures*, *behaviors*, and *functions* (SBF). They

interviewed novices and experts about aquarium structures (e.g., "what is in a fish tank?"),

behavioral mechanism (e.g., "what do fish do in an aquarium?"), and contextual functions (e.g.,

"what happens when a filter breaks"), and posed system perturbing "what-if" problems. Experts

were found to know significantly more about aquarium behaviors and functions than did novices,

and expert responses were more elaborate and integrated across SBF levels. Another way to

characterize expert understanding is in terms of "situation awareness" (SA). SA involves

perceiving when there is a problem to solve, comprehending what that problem is about, and anticipating how it might unfold (Endsley, 1995, 2006).

In addition to having more elaborate and richly integrated knowledge, experts also are able to recognize what is essential about a given problem because they see its deep structure and relational features and ignore the irrelevant surface features that often distract novices (Chase & Simon, 1973; Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981; Larkin, McDermott, Simon, & Simon, 1980; Schoenfeld & Herrmann, 1982). In solving problems, then, experts do not necessarily consider more information, just more *relevant* information. Being able to discern what is relevant also accounts for why experts can learn from a problem, and transfer and adapt that solution to other problems that appear different on the surface, but are fundamentally the same.

Given the hours necessary to become an expert, no negotiation course can realistically claim to produce experts. Moreover, instructors and students cannot rely on real-world expert negotiators to serve as role models because of the dearth of empirical research on what expert negotiators are actually doing to achieve consistently superior outcomes. Although we acknowledge that expert negotiators exist, of course, we frame the problem in terms of teaching negotiation expertise—or the disposition to achieve superior negotiation performance. Finally, to help ensure that students' negotiation expertise continues to develop following the course when students engage in real-world negotiations, a negotiation course would need to instill the disposition to learn independently from negotiation experiences.

The extent of one's negotiation expertise is directly related to the amount and quality of one's deliberate practice, which helps build elaborate and integrated knowledge of negotiation. This knowledge, in turn, serves as the foundation for the disposition to negotiate in ways that consistently yield superior outcomes. According to Perkins, Jay, and Tishman (1993), a

disposition is a tendency to engage in effective practices, and consists of three elements: sensitivity, ability, and inclination. *Sensitivity* is a relatively automatic, perception-like pattern recognition that cues a given beneficial practice (e.g., noticing differences in priorities as an opportunity to leverage a trade-off that creates value). *Ability* involves being able to execute a given practice (e.g., completely conceding on a low-priority issue in a trade-off), and *inclination* is the tendency to consistently execute a practice (e.g., completely conceding on a low-priority issue in a trade-off in multiple settings and across time). If all three elements are built into a negotiation course, students are less likely to leave with inert knowledge, and more likely to change their negotiation practice to bridge what Pfeffer and Sutton (2000) call the "knowing-doing gap." The upshot is that the extent to which a course incorporates a learning process that accelerates the development of negotiation dispositions, it accelerates the development of negotiation expertise. Negotiation expertise is comprised of discrete disposition such as expertise in creating value, claiming value, and building long-term relationships. We focus on expertise in emotion management.

<p style="text-align:center">Expertise in Emotion Management</p>

Emotion management expertise is an invaluable component of negotiation expertise because emotions influence the negotiation process and outcome, and are financially and relationally either advantageous or counter-productive (for a review see Barry, Fulmer, & Goates, 2006; Li & Roloff, 2006). Emotion management consists of both strategic display of emotion (Frank, 1988; Barry, 1999; Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006) and strategic response to emotion (Kopelman, Gewurz, & Sacharin, 2007). Theoretically, a negotiator can leverage her own or others' emotions because they serve as sources of strategic information (e.g.,

Forgas, 2001; Van Kleef et al., 2004a) and a behavioral persuasion tactic (e.g., Forgas, 2001; Barry, 1999; Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006). While research has only recently begun to illuminate when it is advantageous versus counterproductive to display or respond to positive and negative emotion, in contrast to attempting to engage in an emotionally neutral social interaction, a negotiator with expertise in emotion management would benefit from a set of sensitivities, abilities, and inclinations to guide her course of action.

By framing emotion management as a domain of expertise, we are making the fundamental assumption that emotion management is learned and, in principle, teachable. Emotion management differs from models of Emotional Intelligence that are trait-based (EI) (Petrides & Furnham, 2001) or have trait components (Goleman, 1995) but resonates with Emotional Intelligence that are ability based (Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Salovey & Mayer, 1990; see Petrides & Furnham, 2000 for more on the distinction). Ability based EI posits four abilities: perceiving, using, understanding, and managing emotions. Criticism of EI is that it is too broad and vague a concept to be meaningful (Locke, 2005), that it measures knowledge of emotion, not actual performance (Brody, 2004), and that it may simply indicate conformity to one cultural standard. Research suggests that EI is related to negotiation in that it leads to greater integrative performance, but lower distributive performance (Foo et al., 2004), which may suggest that it is tapping into cooperation rather than strategic leverage of emotional intelligence toward desired outcomes. While expertise in emotion management in negotiations may be a manifestation of EI, emotion management as we define it in this paper is domain-specific and action-oriented expertise. We adopt the expertise model to delineate what it would entail to develop emotion management sensitivities and abilities in the classroom and stress how important the inclination is to apply, as well as continue, learning outside the classroom.

Emotion Management Sensitivities

Sensitivities to emotional dynamics serve as cues for the strategic use of emotion management abilities. Key emotion management sensitivities include, but are not limited to: (a) awareness that emotions are present; (b) identification of discrete emotions; and (c) gauging the intensity of a felt or displayed emotion. Research suggests that people across cultures experience, display, and recognize six basic emotions: anger, disgust, fear, sadness, surprise, and happiness (Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972), and that, whether positive or negative, emotions vary in intensity (Feldman & Russell, 1998; Larsen & Diener, 1992). In contrast to enduring mood, which is considered a diffuse psychological state, emotion is defined as a short-lived differentiated affective response to a specific situation (e.g., Barry, 1999; Schwarz & Clore, 1996). Emotions are either triggered by an identifiable event or brought on as a means to achieving an aspired end. According to appraisal theories (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), emotions result from immediate evaluations of a given situation.

Identifying one's own emotions may come naturally to some negotiators, whereas others may need to develop this sensitivity. Identifying emotions actually felt by the other party is usually more challenging because the other negotiator may attempt to conceal these emotions. Furthermore, one's own emotional state can influence the perception of others' emotions. For example, sad negotiators will identify sadness-congruent words faster and will perceive arguments with a sad tone as more persuasive than arguments with an angry tone, because sad emotions are congruent with their current personal reality (Niedenthal, Halberstadt, & Setterlund, 1997). Thus, identification of discrete emotions would benefit from an additional sensitivity to

the influence of one's own emotions on one's perception of the other parties' emotions, as well as awareness of situational factors that may fuel these emotions. Likewise a negotiator it would benefit from a sensitivity to anticipate how the other party may interpret her own emotional display.

A negotiator would benefit from being aware of emotions, identifying his own and others' emotions, and gauging the intensity of these emotions because emotions convey important social information (Van Kleef et al., 2004b). These sensitivities build the foundation of emotion management; without these emotion management sensitivities there would be no cues to guide the use of emotional management abilities.

Emotion Management Abilities

Attribution of recognized emotions. The emotion as social information model (EASI; Van Kleef et al., 2004b) suggests that emotions serve an important role in negotiations because they communicate information about strategic elements of the deal. Furthermore, emotions also convey important information about how a negotiator thinks. Emotions can be differentiated along several appraisal dimensions, such as responsibility, control, and urgency. For example, anger and happiness differ with regard to whom the emotional negotiator holds responsible for the situation, how much personal control they feel, and whether they experience a sense of urgency to act (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003), which have consequences for strategic choices in negotiations. It is also important to appraise whether the emotion felt or expressed during the negotiating process is *integral* to the given negotiation task or *incidental*; emotions may be carried over from an unrelated event to the current negotiation situation (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). If anger is incidental to the negotiation, it would not necessarily communicate information

about a negotiator's satisfaction with the level of concessions on price, though it would reflect

relevant relational information about the state of mind of the angry party.

Research provides insights about how emotions tend to influence negotiators, as well as

the negotiation process if left unmanaged. For example, angry negotiators have a tendency to

blame others (Quigley & Tedeschi, 1996) and are likely to attribute higher responsibility to other

parties when situations are ambiguous and open to interpretation (Keltner, Ellsworth, &

Edwards, 1993). Furthermore, they are likely to have a strong desire to take action against others

(Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000), which may lead them to take punitive actions against those

who may not be the source of their anger (Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock, 1999; Lerner, Goldberg,

& Tetlock, 1998).

In contrast to an angry negotiator, a happy negotiator feels relatively certain about the

course of events during the negotiation process, feels in control, and may feel personal

responsibility for the outcome (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). Thus, with respect to appraisals of

control and to some extent certainty, happiness is similar to anger. It differs, however, with

respect to the tendency to take action in that a happy negotiator would not attribute responsibility

of the situation to others and may therefore sense little urgency for change. A happy negotiator

also is less likely to take high risks (Isen & Patrick, 1983), whereas angry negotiators are more

likely to engage in risk-seeking choices (Lerner & Keltner, 2001) and have a tendency to behave

optimistically about the likelihood of future positive events, and perceive less risk of future

negative events (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003; Lerner & Keltner, 2000). Finally,

although a happy negotiator will experience less urgency to act, a happy negotiator may be likely

to engage in prosocial helping behavior (Batson, 1990; Batson, Coke, Chard, Smith, &

Taliaferro, 1979). This may lead happy negotiators to be perceived as more trustworthy. Indeed,

others view angry negotiators as less trustworthy than those who are happy or sad (Dunn &

Schweitzer, 2005).

Although some of the above attributions of emotions occur automatically, negotiators are

not necessarily aware of them. To effectively manage emotions in negotiations would therefore

require a better understanding of what attributions and tendencies are likely to occur if emotional

dynamics are allowed to play out. Active intervention may be necessary to leverage these

attributions strategically. For example, "I realize that I'm angry and have an urgency to act

immediately, but I will hold myself back and wait until tomorrow to make a decision." At the

very least, a negotiator will benefit from being aware of the dynamics that take place. For

example, "I realize that I'm angry and have an urgency to act, and therefore I'm making the

decision now."

Strategic Display of Emotion. Mindful display of one's own emotion is a critical emotion

management ability. Both integral and incidental emotions (Lerner & Keltner, 2000) inevitably

arise in a negotiation and are often displayed mindlessly. Strategic display of emotion involves a

conscious decision about whether and how to express a genuinely felt emotion, or feign (i.e.

recreate) a desired emotion. For example, toward the end of the negotiation, a negotiator pleased

with the outcome is likely to feel happy. Expressing this genuine happiness can be beneficial or

damaging. If a negotiator's happiness is attributed by her counterpart to the successful joint

effort to create value in the current negotiation, it may set the stage for a productive future

business relationship (Kopelman et al., 2006). However, if the other party interprets this

expression of happiness through a distributive mindset, it may signal that he made too many

concessions (i.e., if she is happy, she got the better deal and I lost). Furthermore, if interpreted as

gloating, it may damage the long-term relationship (Thompson, Valley, & Kramer, 1995). Thus,

it is a strategic choice whether and how to display genuinely felt emotions of happiness at the end of the negotiation. Likewise, it may be a strategic choice to feign an emotion, that is convincingly recreate and display an emotion that would not have otherwise been felt at that moment. For example, even if a negotiator is not happy at the onset of a negotiation, it may be strategically effective to feign happiness. To elicit a convincing display of happiness, a negotiator could focus on an intrinsic or extrinsic idea that leads her to feel genuinely happy at that moment, and express this happiness with regards to the opportunity to work together and explore joint gains.

Thus, a mark of emotion management expertise is the ability of a negotiator to consciously adjust her emotional display to serve her objectives. One way to do this is by amplifying or suppressing an authentically experienced emotion. Another way is to feign a desired emotion (Hochschild, 1983; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1991). Although feigning emotions has ethical implications, it may benefit a negotiator to feign negative or positive emotions. Whether authentic or feigned, strategically displayed emotions can function as behavioral persuasion tactics that lead to desired outcomes. For example, anger can be financially advantageous to a negotiator with high power, since others are likely to concede to his or her demands (Van Kleef et al., 2004a; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006). Although in some situations displaying discontent and anger (e.g., pounding one's fist on the table) leads the other party to make concessions during the negotiating process (e.g., Rafaeli & Sutton, 1991; Sinaceur & Neale, 2005; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a), it also can boomerang. Under certain conditions, anger may lead to a conflict spiral. Emotional contagion (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1992) would likely lead the other party to also feel and display anger, and angry negotiators are more likely to use competitive strategies (Forgas, 1998) and are likely to over-retaliate (Allred, 1999; Daly, 1991).

Displaying anger in cultures such as the U.S. and East Asia reduces the likelihood that one's

offer will be accepted by increasing the likelihood of a spiteful response by the other party (e.g.,

Kopelman & Rosette, 2008; Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006; Pillutla & Murnighan,

1996), and thus may lead to a negotiation impasse (Friedman, et al., 2004).

In contrast, strategic display of positive emotion, such as happiness, facilitates the

development of reciprocal long-term relationships in potentially integrative settings (Kopelman,

Rosette, & Thompson, 2006), and in East Asian cultures tends to increase the likelihood of

closing a favorable deal in distributive settings (Kopelman & Rosette, 2008). In general, happy

negotiators are more likely to share information and have an increased preference for and

adoption of cooperative negotiation strategies (Baron, 1990; Forgas, 1998) that lead to value

creation and better joint outcomes (Carnevale & Isen, 1986).

Strategic Response to Displayed Emotion. Controlling one's own response to the

emotions displayed by the other party is a crucial emotion management ability. When

considering the emotions of the other party, a negotiator may begin by assessing whether or not

they are authentic. Emotions are considered authentic when internally experienced and externally

displayed emotions align (Côté, 2005).

Despite the fact that there has been relatively little empirical testing, experienced

mediators and skilled negotiators have found some strategic responses to be useful for managing

emotionally charged negotiations (Kopelman, Gewurz, & Sacharin, 2007). Strategic responses

such as venting (e.g., Lewicki, Saunders, & Minton, 1999) and cooling-off periods (e.g., Ury,

1993; Ury, Brett, & Goldberg, 1993), as well as addressing the core concerns of the emotional

party (Fisher & Shapiro, 2005) often overcome negative emotion to achieve more collaborative

and successful win-win negotiated outcomes, and direct positive emotion toward constructive

information exchange and mutually beneficial outcomes. The basic assumption in the non-empirical negotiation literature is that only negative emotion is problematic and serves as an obstacle to successful negotiations (Kopelman, Gewurz, & Sacharin, 2007). The literature indirectly suggests that positive emotion would always signal that the underlying concerns of the other party have been addressed. For example, of the elements addressed by Fisher and Shapiro (2005), it would seem that affiliation has been properly established, autonomy respected, status acknowledged, and a fulfilling role has been chosen. And therefore beneficial agreements are likely to follow. However, empirical research on decision making in negotiation settings suggests that in some situations where these core concerns are met, such as when negotiating in the context of close relationships (McGinn, 2006), negotiators may be less focused on expanding the pie because they are focused more on dividing resources equally (Messick, 1993; Thompson & DeHarpport, 1998). Their need to avoid relationship conflict (Jehn, 1995) may lead them to make a priori concessions and miss opportunities to discover task-level differences in priorities that could be leveraged to expand the pie. Thus, it is important to note that positive emotions can present obstacles for optimal economic outcomes.

An expert at emotion management would therefore need to distinguish between situations where positive and negative emotions displayed by the other party are productive versus counterproductive, so that his strategic response would harness and perhaps amplify the other party's emotion or, in contrast, attempt to dispel and overcome the obstacles it presents. Once a negotiator assesses whether a strategic response would harness or dispel the other party's emotions, an appropriate behavioral response (e.g., allowing the other party to vent) can be adopted.

The ability to strategically respond to emotions displayed by the other party may actually

include not only an array of behavioral tactics (what a negotiator does), but also the ability to control one's internal state of being (who the negotiator is) during the negotiation. According to Kopelman, Gewurz, & Sacharin (2007), the recommendations in the prescriptive negotiation literature overemphasize strategic tactics themselves and underemphasize the person employing those tactics. They argue that success or failure of a strategic response to displayed emotions during the negotiating process may pivot on the responding negotiator's ability to balance strategic tactics with his or her authentic presence. Authentic presence is assumed to result from (i.e., is a by-product of) the ability to hold and live two or more seemingly contradictory mindsets simultaneously (Kopelman, Gewurz, & Sacharin, 2007). It is the state of being beyond the doing (i.e., beyond behavioral tactics) that creates a safe space for managing emotions from becoming obstacles to a negotiated solution, and leverages emotions toward optimal economic and relational outcomes. Future research needs to test whether behavioral strategies recommended in the literature are in fact effective responses to displayed emotions, and whether the state of being of a negotiator and the environment it creates, above and beyond the tactics she employs, influence emotion management.

Teaching Emotion Management in Negotiations

Helping students of negotiation develop their expertise in emotion management rests on the fundamental assumption that, at the very least, emotion management sensitivities and abilities can be improved, and that the inclination to use them takes root within the timeframe of a course. Ideally, however, students also leave a course with the disposition to continue learning from negotiations. This second disposition is the key to keeping emotion management inclinations labile enough so that, through deliberative practice, students can continue to adjust

and refine their emotion management sensitivities and abilities following the negotiation course. This is especially important since managers are increasingly changing jobs, as well as being asked to negotiate in multi-cultural contexts where the sensitivities and abilities that are functional in one's own culture may be dysfunctional in another. The display of negative emotion, for example, is less socially sanctioned in East Asian than it is in Israeli culture, and leads to higher rejection rates of offers in the former (Kopelman & Rosette, 2008). The disposition to continually learn also garners negotiators a competitive advantage if they are inclined to keep abreast of the fast-growing body of negotiation and negotiation-relevant research. If negotiation is fundamental to effective management, then it is one area where the call for evidence-based practice in management (Rousseau, 2006; Rousseau & McCarthy, 2007) can most easily be answered.

Our approach to teaching negotiations and emotion management is based on a system that integrates key principles of current educational theory to make learning more effective. Effective emotion management learning results in 1) heightened and more contextually discriminating sensitivities, 2) consistently superior execution of emotion management abilities, and 3) the inclination (i.e., the habit) of executing these abilities in practice. The core of the approach is a deliberately cyclical learning structure (see Bransford, Brown, & Cocking, 1999; Potworowski, Vath, & Shah, 2006), in contrast to the traditionally linear approaches to learning that can have incidental cyclical components, and even then rarely (See Nadler, Thompson, & van Boven, 2003). Our cyclical learning structure (see Fig.1) follows five steps: 1) Introduction of the problem, 2) Activation of prior knowledge, 3) Broadening of perspective, 4) Organizing knowledge for use, and 5) Assessing learning performance.

Insert Fig.1 about here

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The focal sensitivities and abilities introduced and practiced in one cycle are systematically

developed, refined, and combined with others in subsequent cycles. In principle, with each cycle

students' knowledge becomes richer and more integrated, their sensitivities become more

refined, their abilities develop, and their inclination to manage emotions is further reinforced (see

fig. 2). The opportunities to experience, practice, reflect on, and develop sensitivities and

abilities are most beneficial when they arise in varied and increasingly challenging contexts.

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Insert Fig.2 about here

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To better ensure the successful development and refinement of students' disposition to

emotion management, we incorporate into the cycle three instructional principles core to the

learning sciences: contrasting cases, scaffolding, and communities of practice. Evidence suggests

that negotiators are more likely to spontaneously apply (i.e., transfer) what they've learned to

novel contexts when they reason analogically (Loewenstein, Thompson, & Genter, 1999, 2003).

This *high road transfer* (Solomon & Perkins, 1989) requires students, like experts, to see the

deep structure in negotiation contexts. By contrasting cases (or examples) that are similar on one

level, but different on another, students learn to distinguish surface features from deep structures.

The studies by Loewenstein, Thompson, and Genter (1999, 2003) use contrasting cases that

appear different, but are fundamentally similar. To help discourage the novice tendency of being

misled by superficial features, one also can use cases that look similar, but are different, and to

maximize the effectiveness of contrasting cases, it also might be useful to occasionally contrast

cases that look similar and are similar (or look different and are different), so that students do not exploit the structure of the exercise.

Instructional scaffolding consists of providing students a developmentally optimal amount of support and structure to maximize their learning. One example of scaffolding is decomposing a complex activity (e.g., second language conversation) into component sensitivities or abilities (e.g., grammatical structures and vocabulary), and having students develop some competency in those components before attempting the complex activity. Generally, the components are taught in short, structured, and narrowly focused exercises that gradually become longer, less structured, and more authentic activities. Essentially, the idea is to keep students challenged by keeping them at the edge of their competence, which is an *assisted* form of the deliberate practice engaged in by experts.

Finally, by creating a safe and dynamic community of learners (or community of practice; Brown & Duguid, 1991; Lave & Wenger, 1991) in the classroom, one effectively increases the experiential and learning resources available to each student. Because negotiation courses often include participants with diverse cultural and professional experience, the participants themselves constitute a rich source of natural variance in emotional display and dynamics. By actively encouraging students to express the range of perspectives on the same exercises, they should quickly realize how contextual their emotion management sensitivities and abilities need to become.

To begin the emotion management learning cycle, emotional sensitivities can be highlighted as soon as the introductory session of a negotiation course. Negotiation courses taught at business schools in the U.S. often focus initially on deal making (highlighting integrative and distributive negotiation strategies in buyer/seller transactions) and progress to

more complex negotiation settings such as conflict resolution. It is a common assumption that conflict resolution is by definition a more emotional negotiation context because parties come to the table due to a perceived problem. Deal making may or may not be emotional, whereas in conflict resolution a negotiator would anticipate that at the very least emotions will be felt by the disputing parties, if not intentionally or unintentionally displayed during the negotiation process. Thus, the focus on emotion management can be intensified as the negotiation course progresses from deal making to dispute resolution.

In the context of deal making, highlighting emotion sensitivities alongside the core teaching of negotiation strategy will attune students to the role emotions can play in negotiations. Following a negotiation simulation, students can be prompted in a class discussion or in an individual write-up to assess whether they felt any emotions during the negotiation, and if so what emotions they felt at what stage of the negotiation. Furthermore, they can explore why they felt that particular emotion, whether they believe the other party was aware that they felt it, and therefore how did this emotion influence the negotiation process. Alertness to how one feels upon completing a negotiation is also important. In evaluating the financial and relational negotiation outcomes a student may discover that emotions felt immediately after the deal (i.e., a negotiator may be disappointed and sad because he believes he did not do well) change when he compares his outcomes to those of others' who simulated the same role (he discovers he did better than everyone in the classroom, so suddenly he is happy), and once again his feeling about the outcome may change when the student benchmarks his outcomes to the theoretically ideal simulation outcomes debriefed by the professor (he may once again realize he could have done better and not feel as happy). Thus, students practice noticing whether they felt, for example, frustrated, angry, anxious, happy, or satisfied before, during, and/or after the negotiation.

Emotion management can be integrated into teaching of basic distributive strategies such as anchoring, and thus a course can capitalize on the emotional dimensions of existing negotiation simulations. Recent research suggests that negotiators do not reap the financial benefits associated with anchoring due to anxiety about making the first offer (Rosette & Kopelman, 2007). While teaching the effectiveness of anchoring, the course also can highlight that emotions such as anxiety may present an obstacle to attaining desired outcomes. Noting that anxiety about making the first offer led her to lose money in that negotiation simulation may serve as compelling experiential justification for the systematic monitoring of how emotions influence negotiations. Students can then begin a habit of tracking an emotion, trying to see how it might be keeping them from advantageous behavior (e.g., anchoring) or in other circumstances lead to advantageous behavior (e.g., anxiety about an upcoming negotiation may lead to increased preparation). Once students begin to understand what makes them feel a certain way in a negotiation, why, and what can be done, students may be ready for a more emotionally rich take on perspective-taking and in so doing become increasingly sensitive to what makes their counterpart feel anxious in negotiations (e.g., how they can anticipate or behaviorally identify the other party's anxiety, understand why counterparts are anxious, and what can be done). The same is true, of course, for any other emotion. It may even be worthwhile to get students to keep an inventory of own felt and displayed emotions, assessment of other's felt and displayed emotions, potential causes, assessment tactics, and actions.

To more explicitly address both emotion management sensitivities and abilities, as well as provide an opportunity to integrate these components of emotion management expertise in a dynamic setting, a negotiation course might include a simulation (whether a deal making or dispute) in which students are coached to intentionally display emotions. Such a simulation

would allow students to see their own and each others' (naïve) beliefs, and how

(under)developed their sensitivities and abilities might be. Research suggests that negotiators can

express a desired emotion and that the behavioral display of the emotion, like other strategies in

their negotiation tool kit, may serve as a means to attain a desired outcome (Kopelman, Rosette,

& Thompson, 2006). Deliberate regulation of emotion may involve different levels of acting

(Coté, 2005; Grandey, 2000; Gross, 1998; Hochschild, 1983). In deep acting, internally

experienced and externally displayed emotions are aligned and therefore considered authentic. At

other times, however, the negotiator's emotional strategy may be at odds with how he or she

feels at that moment. This type of emotional regulation is called surface acting; and because it

influences only the display of emotion, not the internal experience of emotion, it is considered to

be inauthentic (Coté, 2005). Whether the strategic behavioral display of emotion represents

emotions psychologically experienced at that moment (i.e., the negotiator strategically

"harnesses felt emotions," perhaps exaggerating them as he displays them) or whether it

represents deliberately feigned emotion (i.e., the negotiator "wears an emotional mask" hiding

her current feelings), some negotiators can intentionally adjust their emotional display in a

desired direction by either amplifying or suppressing their own experienced emotion

(Hochschild, 1983; Levenson, 1994).

Adopting a coaching manipulation which consisted of a page of expert advice why it

would be advantageous to display a particular emotion throughout the negation, Kopelman et al.

(2006) confirmed that it is possible for novice negotiators (e.g., MBA students) to convincingly

display positive and negative, in contrast to neutral, emotion in a socially interactive face-to-face

negotiation simulation. This coaching technique was replicated and extended to anger by

Sinaceur and Tiedens (2006) and thus offers a viable strategy for producing emotional

interactions in classroom settings. This research suggests that the strategic display of positive or negative emotions by one negotiator led to the emergence of positive or negative emotional contagion. Interestingly, whether the displayed emotion was accurately judged by the other party was contingent on the emotion displayed. When negotiators displayed positive emotion, the opposing party accurately judged the emotional display as positive–that is, there was congruence between what the target negotiator believed she displayed and what the focal negotiator judged; however, when negotiators displayed generally negative emotion the negotiator believed she was more negative than judged by the opposing party (Kopelman et al., 2006). This pattern suggests that when negotiators choose to strategically display negative emotion they may be likely to overestimate the extent to which their displayed emotion is detectable by others. Alternatively, they may have been overconfident in their ability to display negative emotion, perhaps experiencing more emotion than they actually displayed, which would be consistent with research that showed that experienced negative emotions were related to expression only for people with dispositionally high expressivity (Gross, John, & Richards, 2000) and suggests that negative emotion may be relatively difficult to feign.

Thus, negotiators who are low on emotional expressivity might need to be professionally trained if they wish to have the ability to elicit and convincingly display negative emotion in a manner that is perceived by the other party. To this end, short experiential exercises can be interlaced with negotiation simulations. The point of mixing a full negotiation simulation with a shorter, more focused experiential learning exercise is that it allows one to focus on developing specific sensitivities and abilities "offline." Because novices have not developed relevant chunks (e.g., grammar and vocabulary are a chunk of fluency in a foreign language), they usually have difficulty identifying and tracking all the relevant information and cues in a full negotiation.

Breaking down complex negotiations into parts to help train emotion management sensitivities and abilities is therefore one approach for building emotion management expertise. For example, a part of the simulation could be practiced discretely. Students can be asked to deliver their opening statement once while displaying positive emotion and once again displaying negative emotion. Alternatively, students can be given a scenario that includes display of anger and asking a pair of students to simulate it in front of the class in a fish-bowl environment (i.e., the rest of the class observes their simulation). Thus, the class as a whole can compare and contrast different negotiators' ability and style of communicating a discrete emotion.

Another approach is to include short personally experiential exercises, for example, request students to recall an emotional event in their work life. If students are asked to recall a situation in which they were extremely angry they may then be instructed to spend several minutes telling a fellow student about that situation, while explicitly trying to display anger. Both the student expressing anger and the student listening can then take notes about this interaction, switch roles, and finally provide one another with feedback. For example, they can compare how intense the anger was as felt by the student displaying the emotion, in contrast to how it appeared to the student listening. They can discuss whether at the time of the event they believed others were aware that they were angry and how it may have influenced the progression and resolution of that situation. In debriefing this exercise, empirically pre-tested photos that delineate the differences between facial expressions of discrete emotions (Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972) can be compared and contrasted. Students might even try to mimic these facial expressions in front of a small mirror or with their partner.

The above examples also could be leveraged to teach strategic response to emotional display. An additional exercise to teach emotions is to provide an explicit model. For example,

one could show a clip from a relatively short video of a negotiation (e.g., a dispute resolution) in which the negotiators display subtle, but potentially consequential, emotions. One could then ask the class an open-ended question about what they noticed in this exchange. Recall that experts know what to look for and have their sensitivities attuned to what is most salient (i.e., scaffolding this from earlier in the course). After eliciting from students a large list of things they noticed, one could ask what an expert should be looking for, noticing, and why. This would give the instructor both a sense of what her students believe they should be noticing in a negotiation and consequently an idea of where to steer the discussion and lesson so students' beliefs are made more accurate. One can then open up a discussion by asking specific questions about the emotional states of the negotiators, including, for example, cues that indicated specific emotions. The exercise can be taken a step further by running the next segment of the video and stopping just before one of the parties uses an emotion management response tactic. One can then ask students a "what now?" question to start a discussion about how and why they would respond to the emotions in a particular way. Finally, in the spirit of Hmelo-Silver and Pfeffer (2004), one could ask the equivalent of system-perturbing "what if" questions to explore consequences of proposed actions or slightly different scenarios.

Alternatively, one could hand out roles that mirror those in the video and have students role-play the next step in the negotiation. This type of exercise can serve several functions. First, it can highlight some of one's own emotion management strengths and weaknesses, as well as those of one's peers. This is not only valuable information to help one individualize the course, but also identifies who in the classroom can help one improve specific sensitivities and abilities (community of practice). Second, in a diverse classroom, the different sensitivities and proposed strategic responses to emotions can highlight individual, gender, and cultural variations. Finally,

it can be leveraged by the instructor as the first in a number of experiences that illustrate the importance of being able to understand who your counterpart is and adapt to her. This involves a conceptual change from thinking of oneself as (desiring to be) a specific and narrow kind of negotiator (e.g., hard and uncompromising), to thinking of oneself as a flexible negotiator who is sensitive to a counterpart's emotions and capable of accommodating her to one's advantage.

Research suggests that similar appraisals occur whether emotional displays are experimentally manipulated or naturally expressed (Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993), which suggests that feigned emotional display can lead to similar appraisals as authentic emotional display (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004b). However, future research is needed to clarify how perception of authenticity of an emotion displayed by the other party influences the negotiation process and outcomes. It may be that different modes of communicating emotions, in face-to-face versus in writing, may have different implications for assessment of authenticity. If a negotiator verbally communicates happiness, while displaying a smiling facial expression that is congruent, it may boost perceptions of authenticity. Finally, to avoid misattribution of her emotional display (or written communication), a negotiator may chose to explain the underlying reasons for that emotion (e.g., "I'm happy because we were able to solve our differences today" (happiness is integral to the negotiation) in contrast to "I'm happy because I just received a bonus" (happiness is incidental to the negotiation). One could imagine that an explicit explanation, while motivated by transparency and honesty, actually may lead to suspicion by the other party. Thus, it is an empirical question whether clarity versus ambiguity about felt emotions is constructive, and whether there are emotions or contexts in which it is better to provide or not to provide such information. For example, given that research suggests that anger leads to a narrow focus of attention (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990); if a negotiator feels

anger and is worried about displaying and narrowing his own and the other party's ability to explore creative options, it may be advantageous to add an intervention process such as suggesting to take a break and resume the negotiation at a later time. Future research could examine whether it is better, or not, to acknowledge that the reason for the suggested negotiation behavior (e.g., process intervention) was emotional.

Conclusion

To summarize, encouraging students to engage in emotion management sensitivities and abilities will enable students to experiment with emotional dynamics in a safe learning environment. It can lead to an evidence-based discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of emotions, and to better understanding one's personal strengths and weaknesses in emotion management. There are ethical implications to training managers to display emotion, which seem more challenging when negative rather than positive emotions are concerned. Ethical considerations would apply to both organizations that engage in regulation of emotional display of employees and customers (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1991; Sutton & Rafaeli, 1988; Van Maanen & Kunda, 1989), as well as to individual negotiators. But the reality is that emotional dynamics arise in real-world negotiation, and a manager will benefit from learning how to effectively manage his own and other's felt and displayed emotion toward beneficial joint and individual negotiation outcomes.

Figure 1.
*The Five Steps in a Learning Cycle*

Figure 2.
The Gains Across Learning Cycles

• Problem Complexity
• Knowledge Integration
• Sensitivities
• Abilities
• Inclination

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