Urban Fragmentation and Class Contention in Metro Manila

by

Marco Z. Garrido

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Sociology)
in the University of Michigan
2013

Doctoral Committee:

Professor Jeffery M. Paige, Chair
Dean Filomeno V. Aguilar, Jr., Ateneo de Manila University
Associate Professor Allen D. Hicken
Professor Howard A. Kimeldorf
Associate Professor Frederick F. Wherry, Columbia University
Associate Professor Gavin M. Shatkin, Northeastern University
To MMATCG
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I thank my informants in the slums and gated subdivisions of Metro Manila for taking the time to tell me about their lives. I have written this dissertation in honor of their experiences. They may disagree with my analysis, but I pray they accept the fidelity of my descriptions. I thank my committee—Jeff Paige, Howard Kimeldorf, Gavin Shatkin, Fred Wherry, Jun Aguilar, and Allen Hicken—for their help in navigating the dark woods of my dissertation. They served as guiding lights throughout. In gratitude, I vow to emulate their dedication to me with respect to my own students. I thank Nene, the Cayton family, and Tito Jun Santillana for their help with my fieldwork; Cynch Bautista for rounding up an academic audience to suffer through a presentation of my early ideas, Michael Pinches for his valuable comments on my prospectus, and Jing Karaos for allowing me to affiliate with the Institute on Church and Social Issues. I am in their debt. Thanks too to Austin Kozlowski, Sahana Rajan, and the Spatial and Numeric Data Library at the University of Michigan for helping me make my maps. There are many, many others who deserve my thanks, who made an effort to help me despite the bother it caused them: librarians, bureaucrats, community organizers, etc. Their kindness sustained me.

My research was supported by a Ford Foundation Dissertation Fellowship, a Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellowship, a Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship, and a Predoctoral Fellowship from the Rackham Graduate School at the University of Michigan. I also received small grants from units within the University of Michigan, including the Sociology Department, the Rackham Graduate School, the International Institute, and the Center for
Southeast Asian Studies. A Fulbright-Hays Group Projects Abroad Fellowship allowed me to participate in the Advanced Filipino Abroad Program in summer 2007, and the Sweetland Dissertation Writing Institute provided me with office space and a stipend in summer 2012.

Finally, I want to thank my wife, Mica. Her support—both in the field as my research assistant and throughout the protracted process of writing my dissertation—has been so constant that I have taken it for granted and confused her strength for my own.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEDICATION</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF APPENDICES</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Acts of Sincerity</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. The Sense of Place behind Segregating Practices</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. The Cognitive Economy of Class Contention</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Conclusion</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| APPENDICES | 139 |
| REFERENCES | 157 |
## LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II.1</td>
<td>The Mechanisms, Their Definitions, and the Evidence for Them</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.2</td>
<td>Class Relations: Logic and Count Data</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.3</td>
<td>Why the Urban Poor Supported Estrada: Logic and Count Data</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.4</td>
<td>Poverty Incidence and Income Inequality v. Slum Population and Number of Slum Areas in Metro Manila</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.1</td>
<td>Segregating Practices in Typical and Atypical Situations of Class Interaction</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.2</td>
<td>Desegregating Practices in Everyday Class Contention</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.1</td>
<td>Analytical Procedure</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.2</td>
<td>Recurring Views</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.3</td>
<td>Definition of Terms According to Informants’ Meanings</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.4a</td>
<td>How Villagers Justified their Interpretations of Edsa 3</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.4b</td>
<td>How Squatters Justified their Interpretations of Edsa 3</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.5</td>
<td>Villagers’ and Squatters’ Cognitive Logics</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.6a</td>
<td>Villagers’ Cognitive Construction of Edsa 3</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.6b</td>
<td>Squatters’ Cognitive Construction of Edsa 3</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURES

II.1 Fieldsites in Metro Manila 19
II.2 Quezon City “Interspersion” Map 27
II.3 Makati City 28
II.4 The de la Rama slum in BF Homes 29
II.5 San Roque and Phil-Am Homes 30
II.6 Don Antonio 31
II.7 Estrada’s Mugshot 46
III.1 A Tale of Two Guardposts (BF Homes) 68
III.2 Manila Memorial Cemetery 74
IV.1 Number of Articles Characterizing the Demonstrators as Manipulated or Destructive, or Concerned with the Coup Plot Attached to EDSA 3 as a Proportion of All Articles on EDSA 3 between April 26 and May 2, 2001 123
LIST OF APPENDICES

APPENDICES

A. Plan for Proposed Book 140
B. Informant Data 142
C. Ronald Lumbao on Estrada 143
D. A Brief History of Edsa 3 146
E. Edwin Nakpil on the “Poor People’s March” 152
F. Breakfast at Malacañang 155
ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores the relationship between urban fragmentation and political polarization in Metro Manila, in particular, the rise of a populism associated with celebrity representatives and urban poor support. It finds that these developments are not merely coincident but connected, with class segregation a crucial mechanism in the formation of the polar political dispositions of the urban rich (villagers) and poor (squatters). This insight is elaborated in three separate, self-contained chapters organized around distinct empirical questions. Chapter II argues that the urban poor responded to the populist appeals of Philippine President Joseph Estrada on the basis of knowledge shaped by their spatial relations with the urban elite. The consolidation in the 1990s of a spatial configuration marked by the virtual contiguity of slums and enclaves led to the rampant imposition of spatial boundaries on the urban poor. This made the stigma attached to their status as slum dwellers more salient. The urban poor’s heightened consciousness of stigma led them to support Estrada because of his apparent sincerity, as deduced from the absence of stigma in his conduct towards them. Chapter III accounts for the symbolic partitioning of Metro Manila by documenting squatters’ and villagers’ segregating practices. These practices reveal a well-developed sense of place on both sides, a commitment to the relative status positioning of the two groups as expressed through their separation in space. A sense of place explains why squatters and villagers engage in segregating practices. It also enables us to identify other spatial practices that conform to or challenge its logic. Chapter IV explains why squatters and villagers framed Edsa 3—a massive, week-long demonstration in support of Estrada—in antithetical ways.
by developing an analytical procedure derived from three cultural approaches to cognition and
grounded in the social psychological literature on social cognition. It employs this procedure to
show how squatters’ and villagers’ different class and state schemas predisposed their respective
interpretations of Edsa 3. These chapters establish that the spatial divide between squatters and
villagers is deeply implicated in their political divide. The different knowledge informing their
different interpretations of political figures and events is not just located in distinct spaces, slums
and enclaves, but constituted by the segregation of these spaces.
CHAPTER I

Introduction

Several years ago, while visiting the Philippines, my aunt took me to see family members in a provincial town half a day’s drive from Metro Manila. We drove through a stretch of road with nothing but vast farmland on either side. We had not eaten for hours. We passed several carinderias, cafeteria-style food stalls, but my aunt waved the driver onward. Finally, approaching another cluster of stalls, the driver asked my aunt for permission to stop and eat. She consented. I disembarked as well and, on my way out, asked her if she would join us. She demurred, saying that she was not hungry. As the driver and I ate, we noticed her slip out of the van and walk discreetly past our stall to another one farther down the road, where she ordered and ate. Her behavior puzzled me for a moment, and then I realized, indignantly, that she did not want to be seen eating with, or anywhere near, her driver. I asked him about it and he simply shrugged it off as something he had grown accustomed to.

My aunt’s behavior may have been extreme, but it was not inconsistent with the logic of class interaction in Metro Manila. I lived in Manila for much of the period between 2001 and 2004 doing research for a development organization and reporting on Philippine politics for an online newspaper. During this time I was struck by the acute sense of class regulating middle class interaction with the urban poor. This sense of class was often expressed as a sense of place, with the middle class asserting their difference from the poor by maintaining their distance, keeping to exclusive spaces and differentiating common or public spaces by class, even if all that
meant was refusing to share a table with one’s driver. A pair of events in early 2001 suggested that this class divide also cut politically. In January, a four-day demonstration led by the middle class culminated in the ouster of populist president Joseph Estrada. In April, another demonstration, this time largely comprising the urban poor, clamored unsuccessfully for Estrada’s restoration. The demonstrations came to be known, respectively, as Edsa 2 and Edsa 3. In both cases, the demonstrators had gathered around the shrine along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) where, in 1986, the demonstrations prompting the abdication of the dictator Ferdinand Marcos had taken place. I was in the country when Edsa 3 happened. The media downplayed its significance and discounted the demonstrators as manipulated. Among the middle class, a mood of complacency yielded to a moment of alarm only when the demonstration, exceeding Edsa 2 in size and duration, came to be associated with a coup plot. The moment passed with news that President Arroyo had persuaded the two religious organizations thought to have enlarged the demonstration to withdraw their members. With only the urban poor remaining, the newspapers declared the end of Edsa 3. The following morning I took the metrorail to watch a movie in an upscale mall along EDSA, emerging hours later to discover the avenue thick with demonstrators turned back from their march on the presidential palace. These impressions inspired my dissertation project.

I went into the field primarily interested in how everyday class contention between the urban poor and middle class informed their views on Estrada and Edsa 3. I investigated four cases of slums and gated subdivisions (known locally and hereafter as villages) in close proximity and drew on official data to map the location of these two types of spaces across much of Metro Manila. I found that their virtual contiguity was characteristic of the metropolis and that this “interspersion” had intensified over time. Accordingly, my qualitative data revealed an acute

2
spatial consciousness. The residents of slums and villages spoke of class in terms of the “squatters” and “villagers” next door. Relations with these neighbors were often contentious, involving, on one hand, the desire for greater security and exclusivity, and, on the other, the need for access to or through exclusive spaces. Finally, I found a near polar divide in their views on Estrada and Edsa 3. Generally, squatters and villagers made sense of politics differently and responded to different kinds of political appeals. Given these findings, I reframed my research in terms of two coincident developments during the post-Marcos period (since 1986): urban fragmentation and political polarization, in particular, the rise of a populism associated with celebrity representatives and lower class support. I wondered whether these two developments were somehow related, whether interspersion could be a mechanism in the formation of the polar political dispositions of squatters and villagers. The evidence on the ground suggested as much, but with regard to this particular question, the scholarly literature was unhelpful.

The literature on the fragmentation of cities in the developing world has focused on enclavization and, concomitantly, the spatial exclusion of the urban poor. It has neglected to ask how widespread experiences of spatial exclusion shape their political disposition. The literature on populism is attentive to the process of urbanization insofar as it has led to the concentration of the poor in cities; however, it has all but overlooked segregation as a factor in the urban poor’s support of populism. This literature also tends to take for granted or discount the knowledge of poor, which, along with the knowledge of the middle class, has been the focus of my research. Prevailing explanations emphasize the draw of populist leaders while simply assuming that the poor respond to them out of a discontent usually heightened by some kind of crisis. Likewise, explanations of populism in the Philippines tend to assume that the poor simply respond to
populist appeals given the sheer popularity of the candidates making them. This oversight presented an opportunity for me to contribute to the literature. But how?

Back from the field, I found myself faced with having to bring together two conceptual relationships, between class and space and class and politics, and their separate literatures as well as having to explain the different political dispositions of two social groups. Pulled in several directions by different analytical demands, my first draft ended up the way it began: muddled—aptly, because the process of writing it involved muddling through the data. The process, while unpleasant, was instructive. It forced me to devise an analytical strategy for managing the complexity of the task at hand. In my second attempt, I considered the two conceptual relationships individually, in separate, self-contained chapters complete with their own argument, literature review, data, and methods section. These two chapters engaged distinct empirical questions, namely, why do squatters and villagers employ segregating practices? (Chapter III) and why did they frame Edsa 3 in antithetical ways? (Chapter IV). Focusing on each relationship separately helped me understand how they might fit together in the same analytical framework. In a third chapter (Chapter II), I use this framework to explain why the urban poor responded to Estrada’s populist appeals. For now, I set aside the corresponding question of why the urban middle class rejected Estrada’s appeals in the name of reformism. These chapters, featured in reverse of the order in which I wrote them, present an argument elaborated in parts. Chapter II makes an argument connecting interspersion and populism. Chapters III and IV, having to do, respectively, with how squatters and villagers negotiate urban space and interpret Edsa 3, elaborate parts of this argument with respect to their particular topics.

In Chapter II, I argue that the urban poor responded to Estrada’s populist appeals on the basis of knowledge shaped by their spatial relations with the urban elite. This argument consists of
three claims: (1) The consolidation in the 1990s of a spatial configuration marked by the virtual contiguity of slums and enclaves led to the rampant imposition of spatial boundaries on the urban poor. (2) This made the stigma attached to their status as slum dwellers more salient. (3) The urban poor’s heightened consciousness of stigma led them to support Estrada because of his apparent sincerity, as deduced from the absence of stigma in his conduct towards them. In Chapter III, I account for the symbolic partitioning of Metro Manila by documenting squatters’ and villagers’ segregating practices. These practices reveal a well-developed sense of place on both sides, a commitment to the relative status positioning of the two groups as expressed through their separation in space. A sense of place explains why squatters and villagers engage in segregating practices. It also enables us to identify other spatial practices that conform to or challenge its logic. Integrating practices are largely consistent with a sense of place, while desegregating practices challenge it and may set up or advance contentious situations. By using this approach, we are better able to understand how class patterns of residential segregation are extended to encompass virtually all urban spaces where class interaction occurs. In Chapter IV, I explain why squatters and villagers framed Edsa 3 in radically different ways by developing an analytical procedure derived from three cultural approaches to cognition and grounded explicitly in the social psychological literature on social cognition. The procedure involves coding as schemas or frames recurring views leading to squatters’ and villagers’ interpretations of Edsa 3, identifying the cognitive logic linking each group’s schemas to its framing of Edsa 3 through sequence analysis, and illustrating the application of this logic in each group’s construction of Edsa 3 by comparing accounts drawn from qualitative and archival data. Employing this procedure, I show how squatters’ and villagers’ different class and state schemas predisposed their antithetical framing of Edsa 3.
These chapters derive from the same data, they have as their central concern the contentious relationship between the urban poor and middle class in Metro Manila, and, analytically, they emphasize the distinct class consciousness of each group as mediating their sociospatial and political positions. My analysis is informed by the work of Bourdieu and the literature in sociology and social psychology on cognition. The virtue of a cognitive approach is its linking of social structure and its spatial manifestations with cognitive structures or schemas, and cognitive structures with interpretation and action. Thus we are better able to explain macro outcomes such as segregation, populism, and protest in terms of the enacted knowledge of human actors.

I recognize that writing my dissertation as three articles entails certain constraints. This format favors analysis over historical narrative. My analytical framework, such as it is, is splintered rather than overarching, developed around different questions and in dialogue with different literatures. My qualitative data is used as evidence of analytical points instead of being featured as the substance of a story about the effects of class segregation on the social ties and political dispositions of Metro Manila’s poor and middle class residents. However, it is because of this format that now, having finished writing my dissertation, I am able to tell that story (Appendix A outlines my plan for a proposed book).
CHAPTER II
Acts of Sincerity

This chapter examines the effects of urban fragmentation on the poor’s support of populism. By urban fragmentation, scholars usually mean enclavization, the splintering of cities, particularly in the developing world, into privatized elite spaces: business and commercial districts, gated communities, exclusive recreational areas, etc. (Gugler 2004, Marcuse and van Kempen 2000, Sassen 2006, UN Habitat 2001). I also include in my consideration of urban fragmentation the growth of slums. This growth exceeds well-defined peripheries. It is spread across the city in a motley pattern, all around and even within elite spaces (UN Habitat 2003). I frame my research question in terms of the literature on populism and return to urban fragmentation as part of my answer. By populism, I mean a political style or strategy of mobilization by personalistic leaders employing anti-elite rhetoric (Ellner 2003, Jansen 2011, Roberts 1995, Weyland 2001). By itself, this definition is too broad for my purposes, including figures as dissimilar as Hugo Chávez and Sarah Palin. I specify populism further by placing it in developing country contexts marked by extreme social inequality and relatively weak forms of institutional representation. In this context, populism constitutes a mode of political incorporation of the poor (de la Torre 2010, Oxhorn 1998, Roberts 1998). This usage is consistent with most of the populism literature on Latin America, which happens to be most of the populism literature. In Latin America, as in the Philippines, the presence of socially subordinated but electorally significant populations has made populist appeals relatively common. Scholars have observed “a perpetual tendency”
towards populism in Latin American politics (Roberts 1995: 113); an ever-present “populist temptation” (de la Torre 2010: 125). Hence my question: Why do the poor respond to some populist appeals and not others? This question matters given populism’s power to mobilize the poor and given its resurgence as a mode of political mobilization in parts of Latin America and Asia. The question matters because the politics of the poor matter, not just because, in developing countries, they possess the numbers to decide elections, but because, despite their numbers, their political dispositions are often the object of scholarly presumption. To restate my question in terms of my case, I ask why Metro Manila’s urban poor responded so strongly to the populist appeals of Philippine President Joseph Estrada and not others.

Joseph Estrada was a movie star primarily in the 1960s and 1970s. He served as mayor of San Juan, a city in Metro Manila, for 19 years, went on to become a senator, vice president, and then, in 1998, was elected president of the Philippines. Just two and a half years into his term, Estrada was accused of receiving kickbacks from an illegal gambling game and impeached. His trial was aborted, and, in January 2001, a demonstration composed mainly of middle and upper class groups ousted Estrada from office. His vice-president, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, succeeded him. Three months after his ouster, a second, even larger demonstration took place in Metro Manila, this time attended mainly by the urban poor and aimed at reinstalling Estrada as president. The demonstration, known as Edsa 3, culminated in a march on the presidential palace that was violently repulsed by the military. With the failure of Edsa 3, Estrada remained under house arrest. In 2007, he was tried, convicted of plunder, and sentenced to life imprisonment, but pardoned by President Arroyo. In 2010, he ran once again for president and came in second behind Benigno Aquino III.
Notably, Estrada drew his support mainly from the lower classes. Indeed, Estrada’s election in 1998 marked the first time that class, more than geography, gender, or age, determined the presidential vote (Mangahas 1998). Not long after being elected, Estrada’s support among the middle and upper classes largely evaporated amid reports of cronyism, serial indiscretions, and extravagance. His support among the lower classes, however, remained relatively stable. Even during his impeachment trial, the lower classes exhibited a “pattern of disbelief” regarding the various corruption charges against him (Bautista 2001). According to the results of one survey conducted in Metro Manila, the difference between the percentage of the highest class and the percentage of the lowest class finding the charges against Estrada credible was an average of nearly 40 points during his trial and 30 points after his ouster (SWS 2001a). Following Estrada’s ouster, his trust ratings plummeted across the nation, declining particularly sharply in Metro Manila—except among the poor (Bautista 2001; SWS 2001a). Their trust in Estrada remained virtually unaffected. Even the more highly educated poor in Metro Manila (those with some college education) were more likely to disbelieve the charges against Estrada than their less educated counterparts nationwide (Bautista 2001:22-24). Overall, Metro Manila’s urban poor demonstrated higher levels of trust in Estrada than the poor nationwide and the urban poor outside the metropolis. This same finding from surveys by two different research organizations led one scholar to conclude that the urban poor in Metro Manila constituted Estrada’s “staunchest constituency” (Bautista 2001:25).

The urban poor’s support for Estrada is puzzling for the following reasons. First, Estrada was bad for the poor, at least in terms of their material interests. His poverty reduction program was severely limited in scope, targeting a mere 0.0008 percent of the nation’s poor (Choguill 2001:9). When it came to mass housing, he ended up prioritizing the interests of real estate developers
over the urban poor (Constantino-David 2001). Overall, the poor’s access to health, education, and other social services deteriorated during his presidency (Balisacan 2001). Gloria Arroyo issued 94 proclamations between 2001 and 2006 awarding land to nearly 200,000 urban poor families (Wehrmann and Antonio 2011)—a far higher accomplishment than Estrada’s. And yet in San Roque, one of the slums where I did research, Estrada is the one remembered for distributing groceries on Christmas and his birthday.

Second, Estrada had been ousted, imprisoned, and convicted of plunder, but he still came in second in the 2010 presidential race largely due to the support of the poor. The puzzling nature of this support is thrown into relief by the failed populist campaign of another candidate in 2010, Manny Villar. Villar, a real estate developer and senator, overcame humble origins to become one of the wealthiest persons in the Philippines. His campaign touted his poor background and portrayed him as someone who truly represented the poor. A prominent Villar ad featured slum children singing against squalid backdrops. They asked, “Have you ever swum in a sea of garbage?/ Spent Christmas on the street?/ That’s our question,/ Are you really one of us?,” described Villar as the one candidate who truly came from the poor and cared for them, and claimed that he would “end poverty.” Villar appeared on a popular noontime game show and gave away free houses to contestants, made extensive use of celebrity endorsers, and even put his frail, 86-year old mother on TV to plead his case. Despite leading early in the race, Villar ended up finishing third behind Estrada. He won only half as many poor votes as Estrada despite having outspent him nearly two to one (TV5-SWS 2010). Estrada’s lead was even larger in Metro Manila, where he won three times as many votes as Villar (Comelec 2010) and lost to Benigno Aquino III by a much smaller margin—700,000 votes versus four and a half million nationwide (Doronila 2010). Why did the poor support Estrada and not Villar? Why Estrada and
not Arroyo? These comparisons underscore the point that simply deploying populist tactics or adopting a populist narrative is not enough to win the support of the poor. The poor have to recognize a leader’s appeals as credible. Why they respond to some appeals and not others is an empirical question, and only by answering it can we account for the distinctiveness of populist leadership.

Explaining Populist Support

Scholars explain populist support mainly with reference to two factors: supporters’ availability and the draw of populist leaders especially in times of crisis. First, they emphasize the erosion of institutional forms of representation following Latin America’s dual transitions in the 1980s into a freer market and more democratic institutions. Neoliberal reforms weakened institutions that once represented workers and the urban poor generally: labor unions, mass-based political parties, and social movements (Portes and Hoffinan 2003; Roberts 2002, 2007, 2009). Meanwhile, democratization deepened the fragmentation of the popular sectors along territorial lines, partly by fostering an advocacy orientation and dependence on NGOs (Oxhorn 1994, 2012; Roberts and Portes 2006, Weyland 2004). Their resulting availability, that is, their lack of institutional ties and autonomous organization, predisposes their formation of vertical, largely unmediated ties with personalistic leaders propounding an anti-elite line (Oxhorn 1998; Roberts 1995, 1998, 2007). This predisposition is heightened by their weak civil rights: their discrimination on the basis of poverty, their helplessness before courts, their vulnerability to corruption, crime, and harassment, etc. (Holston and Caldeira 1998, Oxhorn 2003).
The second part of this argument emphasizes the draw of populist leaders. It attributes their allure to the symbolic power of a populist discourse and style and to their efficacy in providing for the material welfare of their supporters. James (1988), for example, attributes Peronism’s political appeal to a discourse that accorded workers moral superiority and political primacy. The clearest indication of the “heretical power” of Peronist discourse—its upending of social hierarchy—was the resignification within its context of words once used to disparage workers. Most notably, the word *descamisado* (shirtless one), formerly an indictment of workers’ deprivation, came to signify their status as Perón supporters. A populist style enacts this same inversion through symbolic practices, including rhetorical tactics; the use of biography and personal attributes, particularly class origins and ethnicity, to convey social similarity; physical expressiveness; the flouting of middle class conventions; and other, largely intimate gestures providing a basis for popular identification. Scholars have also attributed the draw of populist leaders to their ability to address the material needs of their supporters, whether through institutional reforms or, more commonly, clientelism. Panfichi (1997) argues that while people may initially support a populist leader for expressive reasons, their continued support is conditional on his delivering concrete improvements in their life conditions.

For all its explanatory power, this argument does not tell us much about why the popular sectors respond to the symbolic power of populist appeals. It simply assumes that they do given their marginality, particularly during times of crisis when their sense of deprivation or exclusion is sharpened. Even scholars who also look at populism from the bottom-up (de la Torre 2010, Oxhorn 1998) conceive the knowledge behind populist support as relatively invariant, essentially frustration, discontent, and humiliation. Taking the resentment of the popular sectors for granted makes the draw of populist leadership the key mechanism explaining the support given to some
populist figures and not others. But populism properly concerns the *relationship* between leaders and supporters. This understanding builds on Weber’s insight (1978[1922]: 1113-15) that a leader’s charisma depends on its being recognized as such by his followers. Focusing exclusively on what leaders say and do limits our capacity for explaining the distinctiveness of leadership. For example, the Venezuelan poor pinned their hopes on Hugo Chávez, versus other contenders for their support, out of “faith in his charisma” (Weyland 2003:843). It is not clear, however, what this charisma actually consists of. For Weyland, it has to do with “his personal characteristics, such as the attraction of his crude diction and belligerent rhetoric” (p. 844). Roberts (2003:70) cites “his modest upbringing, mixed racial features, blunt discourse, and penchant for playing baseball.” Sylvia and Danopolous (2003:67) include “his dark complexion and coarse hair [which] identify him racially with the vast majority of Venezuelans,” his invocation of the nationalist icon Simón Bolívar, and his use of media to communicate directly and regularly with the poor. Lopez-Maya and Lander (2000) bundle six or seven distinct qualities into the category of charisma, including Chávez’s rhetoric (as anti-elitist, nationalist, and culturally resonant), his outsider status, his working class roots, his use of symbols and rituals, his military background, the pedagogic character of many of his speeches, and his physical features. Clearly, charisma functions as a kind of catch-all for a number of appealing qualities. The analytical challenge is not reducing Chávez’s charisma to just one quality or weighing his several qualities in terms of their effectiveness but specifying how these qualities produce a populist bond. To do this, we need to know why his supporters responded to his leadership. That is, we need to establish the logic behind populist support.
Explaining the Support of Metro Manila’s Urban Poor for Joseph Estrada

The Philippine literature suggests three explanations, often invoked in combination, for the urban poor’s support of Estrada. One, the urban poor supported Estrada because he established a patronage relationship with them. He used his power as patron-in-chief to respond directly to the particularistic demands of urban poor groups, sometimes bypassing the relevant institutions in the process (Bautista 2001, Karaos 2006). Two, the urban poor supported Estrada because they identified with his screen persona as “defender of the oppressed” (Abinales and Amoroso 2005:270). Early in his film career, Estrada played the role of lower class hero—squatter, jeepney driver, tenant farmer, rebel—so often and so memorably that movies featuring the actor in that role became an identifiable genre: “Joseph Estrada proletarian potboilers” (Lacaba 1983[1970]). When these films debuted in the 1950s and 60s, Tagalog movies were just being discovered by the urban lower classes (Hedman 2001). Scholars contend that the urban poor recognized themselves in Estrada’s screen persona (Flores 1998, Hedman 2001, Tolentino 2010). Estrada himself deliberately blurred the line between his screen and political personae by invoking lines and situations from his most popular movies. Three, the urban poor supported Estrada because he identified with them, adopting a political persona based on the repudiation of polite society. He defined political contention in terms of an elite-masses divide and made his allegiance to the masa (the Filipino masses) an oratorical keynote. His campaign slogan unequivocally conveyed his positioning: Erap para sa masa (Erap is for the poor). (Erap, Estrada’s moniker, is the word pare—Filipino slang for “buddy”—spelled backwards.) His persona was conveyed most effectively, however, through his brusque demeanor and open indulgence in a number of vices, including drinking, womanizing, and gambling. Early into his presidential term, the media had already characterized him as “a boor” given to a “kanto
[streetcorner]-boy kind of vulgar wit and coarse behavior” (David 2001:155). “Whenever he speaks without a prepared speech, whether in English or Tagalog,” David observed,

he slides into a familiar grunt, a patented way of talking tough that immediately connects him with the masa, but which sharply alienates him from the intelligentsia and the middle classes, who expect more decorum from the highest official of the land.

Among the upper classes, Estrada’s persona became the subject of an entire class of “Erap jokes” having to do with his alleged dim-wittedness, his infidelities, and his inarticulacy, but it endeared him to the poor, who saw him as unaffected and approachable (Karaos 2006).

Later I will assess each of these arguments in light of my data. For now, what is important to note is that all three explanations reflect the general explanation of populist support in their exclusive focus on Estrada’s leadership. They cite who Estrada is or what he does without establishing empirically what the urban poor actually saw in him. Moreover, they imply a characterization of the urban poor as either politically shallow and thus easily manipulated or full of class resentment because of their exclusion. In the first explanation, a lack of institutional incorporation means a lack of political socialization—or “conscientization” (Bautista 2001:36)—leaving the urban poor susceptible to populist displays of patronage (de Dios and Hutchcroft 2003). In the second, their exclusion makes them susceptible to representations of themselves on screen (Hedman 2001). This argument strongly implies a lack of discernment in the urban poor’s reading of Estrada’s screen persona into his political persona—sometimes put more baldly as their inability to distinguish between movies and reality. Finally, the third explanation simply assumes that the poor automatically responded to Estrada’s pro-poor political persona given long-standing feelings of marginalization. These assumptions elide the actual knowledge of the
urban poor by suggesting that they act out of a deficient, rather than different, knowledge, and that we can simply take for granted a constant reserve of class resentment. I contend that without identifying the knowledge behind the urban poor’s support for Estrada, why this knowledge became salient, and how Estrada mobilized it, we cannot fully explain the distinctiveness of Estrada’s appeal.

Argument, Data, and Methods

My argument consists of the following claims.

(1) A spatial configuration marked by the virtual contiguity of slums and enclaves—what I call *interspersion*—led to the rampant imposition of boundaries on the urban poor.

(2) *Boundary imposition* on the urban poor heightened their consciousness of *territorial stigma*.

(3) The urban poor’s heightened consciousness of stigma led them to support Estrada because of his concrete *acts of sincerity*.

This argument includes the following mechanisms or causal elements (Table II.1): (a) Interspersion, as defined above, (b) boundary imposition, (c) territorial stigma or stigma based on residence in or association with symbolically degraded places such as ghettos, banlieues, favelas, and other types of slums (Anderson 2012, Wacquant 2008), and (d) acts of sincerity. This last element, in particular, requires some explication. By sincerity, I refer to both its
Table II.1. The Mechanisms, Their Definitions, and the Evidence for Them

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Interspersion</td>
<td>A spatial configuration marked by the virtual contiguity of slums and enclaves.</td>
<td>Archival data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Boundary imposition</td>
<td>“Authorities draw[ing] lines where they did not previously exist” (Tilly 2004:218).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Consciousness of territorial stigma</td>
<td>Stigma based on where someone lives or is deduced to live from their demeanor, dress, or other identifying characteristics.</td>
<td>Interviews and observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Acts of sincerity</td>
<td>A political practice negating stigma.</td>
<td></td>
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common definition as being free of dissimulation as well as a more specific definition as a political practice negating stigma. I will illustrate this meaning presently.

Like all mechanism-based explanations, my explanation is highly selective. It includes only those elements that are indispensable to yielding the outcome of interest. Its explanatory power comes from its explicitness with regard to the causal sequence leading to this outcome. This explicitness makes the explanation and its constituent parts eminently subject to empirical falsification. A second virtue is that mechanism-based explanations allow for both context-specificity and generalizability. While my explanation has been constructed with regard to post-Marcos Metro Manila, its constituent mechanisms describe general “switches” that can be decoupled and extrapolated across contexts (Hedstrom and Swedberg 1998, Hedstrom and Ylikoski 2010, Tilly 2001). Qualitative methods are especially appropriate for elaborating
mechanism-based explanations. Compared with historical and quantitative methods, they allow us to observe mechanisms directly rather than simply inferring them from the historical record or positing their existence given statistical associations (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2008). As Vaughan (2004) demonstrates, identifying mechanisms operating at the micro-level better enables us to trace social processes resulting in macro-level outcomes.

My qualitative data consists of 189 in-depth interviews with the residents of slums and gated communities in Metro Manila as well as ethnographic observation in both types of spaces. In this chapter, I draw mainly upon my research in slums. Given the prohibitive cost of land in the metropolis, virtually all the urban poor live in slums. By slums, I mean illegal or informal settlements and blighted areas (UN Habitat 2003). I also use the word villages, which is what gated communities are called locally. Interviews were conducted mainly in Filipino (Tagalog); the English translation of the quotations used in this chapter is mine. They took place on site in four different slums spread across the metropolis (Figure II.1). This research, conducted between September 2009 and August 2010, builds on a cumulative 30 months living and doing qualitative fieldwork in the Philippines since 2001.

To obtain interviews with slum dwellers, I went through the barangays in charge of them. A barangay is the smallest administrative division within cities and municipalities. It also refers to the administration at that level; essentially a kind of ward or neighborhood government. The barangays generally referred me to their deputies within an area. I began my fieldwork in each site by following up the barangay’s leads. Once I had become a relatively familiar presence within an area, I solicited interviews myself. Every week I entered the slum through a different entrance in order to interact with new groups of residents. I did this until I had obtained between 25 and 30 interviews per site. Towards the end of my research in a particular site, my informants
Figure II.1. Fieldsites in Metro Manila.
usually reflected the composition of slum areas in the daytime: mostly women, older people, and the unemployed. I tried to correct this imbalance by targeting men, younger people, and workers. Overall, the demographic characteristics of my informants are largely consistent with those of the urban poor population in Metro Manila (Appendix B).

I asked slum residents about their relationship with the villagers (residents of gated communities) “next door” and why they supported Estrada (if they did). I used this data to evaluate the three hypotheses reviewed in the preceding section. I looked for evidence that the urban poor’s support for Estrada had to do with his patronage, his screen persona, and his political persona. The evidence, however, pointed most consistently to the explanation that I develop here. To establish my argument, I draw upon interviews and observations to show that boundary imposition leads to consciousness of territorial stigma and that the urban poor responded to Estrada’s act of sincerity because of their stigma. My argument implies a historical trajectory involving two longitudinal developments: The proliferation and greater proximity of slums and enclaves over time (interspersion) and a concomitant increase in class resentment (stigma consciousness). I demonstrate interspersion using demographic and spatial data obtained through archival research. I cannot, however, show an increase in the urban poor’s consciousness of territorial stigma through historical sources. While sources exist showing that squatting was stigmatized as early as the 1960s, there is no documentation of class resentment within the slums themselves until the mid-1980s. It may be that class resentment among the urban poor was not very strong before then because the slum population had not yet reached a critical point, but I cannot assume this. So I proceed by logical inference: If boundary imposition leads to territorial stigma, then the increase in boundary imposition associated with interspersion leads to an increase in the urban poor’s consciousness of territorial stigma. I will now proceed to develop the
constituent parts of my argument. In the following section, I explain and document the virtual contiguity of slums and enclaves.

Interspersion

Enclaves and slums are not new to Metro Manila. Following World War II, Manila’s wealthier residents fled the city’s devastation for newly built residential enclaves in the suburbs. The corporate master-planned subdivisions built in Makati and Quezon City in the 1950s and 60s were the first of their kind in the country. They were built to insulate expatriates and the rich from the normal disorder of the public city and to provide them with a standard of development commensurate with their means (Garrido 2012). Meanwhile, droves of provincial migrants fleeing stagnation and insurgency in the countryside occupied the bombed-out, once exclusive central city as squatters. The number of squatters in Manila multiplied 33 times between 1948 and 1968 (Santiago 1992:41), eventually comprising one fifth of the city’s population by the 1960s (Stone 1973:71). Despite their number, squatters were concentrated in relatively few and well-defined slum areas (Karaos 1995:258). These areas could still be characterized as “zones of transition,” enabling migrants to save money for legal housing while providing them with community life and an education in Manila politics (Lacquian 1969). Although Laquian discounted the severity of Manila’s squatter problem in the 1960s, he predicted that it would become serious in the future (p. 6)—a conclusion Hollnsteiner (1969) also reached with regard to enclaves. Observing the proliferation of communities “with barrier gates and armed security guards,” she warned that “Metropolitan Manila’s course today threatens to transform her into a
city of enclaves, each focused on its own needs and oblivious to those of others” (pp. 168-69). By the late 1980s, Caoili (1999 [1988]:92) could already discern “the emergence of a dual society” in Metro Manila divided by housing quality, income, sanitation, services, and values.

Enclavization and slum growth accelerated in the 1990s. A surge in foreign direct investment following the institution of neoliberal reforms by the Ramos administration spurred construction booms in the mid-1990s and 2000s led by the private sector (Reyes 1998). This building responded mainly to demand by corporate interests and a growing urban middle class. It was characterized by exclusivity: gated communities, luxury condominiums and villas, upscale commercial centers, office buildings, and “cities within cities”—corporate megaprojects bundling services together with residential developments within exclusive spaces (van den Muijzenberg and van Naerssen 2005, Rimmer and Dick 2009, Shatkin 2008). This building has led to the runaway inflation of land values. Between 1987 and 1996, land prices in two of Metro Manila’s premier business districts—Makati and Ortigas—appreciated by 6,000 and 8,000 percent respectively (Shatkin 2004:2474). During this period, investing in real estate yielded higher returns than investing in the Philippine stock market (Strassmann and Blunt 1994:280). Thus speculation further constricted the supply of land and drove up prices. High land values made housing in Metro Manila more expensive than anywhere else in Asia, despite its having the lowest construction costs among neighboring cities (Magno-Ballesteros 2000:5). According to the World Bank, average housing prices in the metropolis appreciate by 32 percent annually (Ballesteros 2002:3). Even government-subsidized housing built in the suburbs ends up priced beyond the reach of the poor and purchased by the middle class (ADB 2006:17).
The high cost of housing is one of the main factors driving the residential patterns of different socioeconomic groups. Middle income groups tend to reside some distance away from Metro Manila’s multiple central business districts or in suburbs outside the metropolis altogether. They commute to work, unable to afford housing closer to the center. Conversely, high- and low-income groups tend to cluster around the metro’s various centers; the one group able to afford housing in the center and the other unable to afford either housing or the long commute and thus residing in the center illegally or in slum conditions (Reyes 1998:31). Enclavization and slum growth go hand in hand. The new development attracts workers to the metropolis but makes it impossible for them to reside legally within it (Berner 1997). Only about one-fifth of Metro Manila’s slum dwellers are poor based on the national poverty line (Ballesteros 2011:3); most of them simply cannot afford the cost of formal housing. While better housing in the metro fringe may be available to them, slum dwelling saves them both the cost of commuting (often a significant fraction of their daily income) and the time it takes to commute (usually several hours) (Shatkin 2009:23).

The Philippine state has been complicit in the growth and concentration of enclaves and slums within Metro Manila. It has largely deferred to the private sector with regard to urban development (van den Muijzenberg and van Naerssen 2005). The state has even subsidized infrastructure projects initiated by the private sector and reflecting corporate interests (Shatkin 2008), many of which involve transportation systems (metrorail and toll roads) connecting corporate land developments (Corpuz 2000). Second, the state’s shortcomings have compounded the high cost of housing. These include a lack of land market regulation, a Byzantine bureaucratic process prone to corruption, and the inadequate provision of low-cost housing

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1 Another factor is the relocation of industrial development to the metro fringe where land prices and taxes are lower (Kelly 2000).
(Magno-Ballesteros 2000, 2002). Finally, the political dynamics of electoral democracy have enabled slum growth. Following the ouster of the dictator Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, hundreds of thousands of provincial migrants settled illegally across Metro Manila, encouraged by the prospect that the new president, Corazon Aquino, would issue a general amnesty for squatters. An amnesty was never declared, but Aquino conceded the tenurial rights of squatters occupying over six square kilometers of land in two parts of the metropolis, setting a precedent for presidential patronage (Karaos 1995:194-5, Shatkin 2004:2478). Even more consequentially, her administration institutionalized the urban poor’s access to the government by establishing an agency tasked with representing them and a legal framework for them to make political claims. Consequently, squatters have become more organized and entrenched (Karaos 1995). Moreover, electoral considerations have prompted local politicians to take a pastoral approach toward the slum populations living within their administrative areas—except, as Shatkin (2007) points out, in cases where considerable revenue would be generated from having a slum area developed.

A number of indicators suggest the extent of spatial inequality in Metro Manila. “Open market” housing, or housing whose price is determined entirely by the market (versus government subsidized housing), comprised 91 percent of all residential construction in Metro Manila between 1992 and 2009. Given prevailing land prices, just being on the market makes such housing prohibitive for all but higher income groups. Meanwhile, the number of slum dwellers has grown considerably, constituting from 37 to over 50 percent of the metro population, with an annual growth rate—8.6 percent—four times the size of Metro Manila’s as a

\[ \text{This figure is based on the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board’s raw data on residential projects in the National Capital Region.} \]
Furthermore, the number of slum areas has risen sharply in the last two decades. Metro Manila had 415 slum or “depressed” areas by 1980 (Karaos 1987:13), 654 by 1990 (van Naerssen 1993:3), and over 2000 by 2008. These areas can be as vast as tracts of land occupied by tens of thousands of families, and as small as vacant lots crowded by half a dozen families. They cover all kinds of spaces that the poor, out of necessity, make habitable, including riverbanks, dumpsites, cemeteries, the margins of railroad tracks, the cover under bridges, and the islands separating the lanes of a road. The proliferation of enclaves and slums within the same extremely dense area has resulted in their proximity.

Metro Manila’s population density nearly doubled between 1980 and 2007 (Cariño and Corpuz 2009:6). In 2007, at 18,648 persons per square kilometer, it was 72 times higher than the national average. (In slums areas, density levels are ten times higher than even this figure. An urban poor family of six occupies, on average, 27 square meters of living space (ADB 2006:75).) Living proximately is also a functional arrangement. Gated communities provide squatters with numerous opportunities for domestic work serving as maids, cooks, nannies, laundrywomen, secretaries, drivers, gardeners, carpenters, plumbers, manicurists, seamstresses, and odd job “boys.” The juxtaposition of enclaves and slums is so common in fact that a neologism exists in Filipino describing the squatters living just outside the walls of villages: gilidgers, a combination

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3 The government has mainly collected data on informal settlers (those without legal tenure to the land on which they reside) rather than slum dwellers (those living in blighted conditions) as a whole. Officially, the proportion of informal settlers has remained between one-fifth and one-third of the metro population since the 1960s; 20 percent in 1967 (Stone 1973:71), 28 percent in 1985 (Karaos 1987:13), 34 percent in 2000 (NHA 2000), and 21 percent in 2007 (NHA 2009). These figures are based on local government surveys mostly compiled by the National Housing Authority. The National Statistics Office generates its own, usually lower figures based on census data on tenure status (Cruz 2010).

4 This number is based on my compilation of depressed areas identified by 12 of the 17 municipal governments comprising Metro Manila. In 2008, there were 2042 depressed areas in just these 12 cities (PCUP 2008, TFHR 2008). Quezon City alone had 878 (QC Gov 2008).
of *gilid*, meaning “on the edge,” and villagers. Mapping all the villages and slum areas in Quezon City, which comprises nearly a third of the metropolitan area, illustrates the virtual contiguity of slums and villages (Figure II.2). According to the Quezon City map, the median distance from a village to the nearest slum is less than 275 meters.\(^5\)

The spatial situations of the four sites where I did fieldwork illustrate what interspersion looks like on the ground. Each site represents a different configuration of proximity between village and slum. In Makati City, the slum areas where I interviewed surround a cluster of exclusive villages (Figure II.3). In Parañaque, the super-village BF Homes encompasses 82 villages, each one its own gated enclave, as well as four contiguous slum areas informally grouped together as the de la Rama settlement (Figure II.4). Part of de la Rama was supposed to have been developed into a village before being abandoned by the developer and overrun by squatters. In one of my two cases in Quezon City, the village, Phil-Am Homes, and slum, San Roque, are separated by a major highway (Figure II.5). In my other case, village and slum extend into each other. The southern perimeter of the village, Don Antonio, has become accessible to squatters and, consequently, been rendered an intermediate zone, with part of the perimeter street a slum and the rest in keeping with the village aesthetic; higher walls around property compensating for insufficient walls around the village (Figure II.6). In the following section, I show that the proliferation and proximity of sharply unequal spaces has led to the rampant imposition of spatial boundaries on the urban poor (my first claim).

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\(^5\) This figure was obtained using the Near tool on ArcGIS. It is almost certainly an underestimate for two reasons. One, I was only able to map 86 percent of all slum areas (756 out of 878 locations). The other points were too ambiguously defined to identify geographically. Two, the Near tool calculates the distance from one point to another without taking into account the actual area of the place indicated by the point.
Figure II.2. Quezon City “Interspersion” Map
Figure II.3. Makati City. New Makati—the “green mitten”—represents a cluster of six exclusive villages. Coryville, La Peral, McKinley Driver’s Association, P. Gomez St., and Tripa de Gallena are only a few of the slums surrounding it (and the sites where I did fieldwork). Source: Google Earth.
Figure II.4. The de la Rama slum is flanked by BF Homes and another exclusive residential estate, Manila Memorial Cemetery. Source: Google Earth.
Figure II.5. San Roque and Phil-Am Homes. Although half the size of Phil-Am, San Roque has ten times as many residents. Source: Google Earth.
Figure II.6. Don Antonio. I did fieldwork in the slum areas along Don Vicente, Samonte, and Zusuarregui Streets. *Source:* Google Earth.
Boundary imposition

Slum dwelling has been stigmatized at least since being identified as a social problem in the 1960s. “A day rarely passes,” Stone (1973:35) noted, “without a story in the Manila press labeling squatting as a vicious disease impeding city and national development and breeding crime and corruption.” The official line echoed editorial sentiments. A report issued by the Office of the President in 1968 associated slum dwelling with crime, fires, disease, low property values, and “a breakdown in morals and socially accepted behavior” (p. 94). A bill criminalizing squatting was passed in 1975 and remained in effect until 1997. Until the work of the anthropologist Michael Pinches in the 1980s, however, scholars either neglected to focus on or found little evidence of class resentment among the urban poor. Pinches (1984, 1985, 1987, 1991, 1992) found stories of insult and ill-treatment relatively common among slum dwellers in Tatalon, Quezon City. He rooted their resentment in their experience of wage labor as degrading and their general subordination by the burgis or urban rich. Acts of shaming by the rich—ignoring the poor or treating them with condescension or contempt—underlined their disvalued status and fueled a “quiet belligerence” (p. 88). I make the case that the urban poor’s consciousness of stigma has become even more salient and is now substantially shaped by experiences of spatial exclusion. As I will illustrate below, these experiences have become relatively common as a result of interspersion.

Enclavization in the 1990s entailed not just the building of new enclaves but the fortification of existing ones. Villagers linked high crime rates in the late 1980s with the urban poor and identified the slums nearby as particular sources of insecurity. Thus, gates were erected, tightened, and more heavily guarded. For the urban poor, greater enclosure meant the imposition
of boundaries excluding them, containing them, and otherwise keeping them apart. BF Homes, for example, is subdivided into a number of smaller villages, some of which are subdivided further into even smaller ones. BF’s perimeter and all of the 82 villages within it are gated. Depending on your destination within BF and where you enter the complex, you must stop at two or three different checkpoints. Residents are identified by the stickers on their cars. Visitors must state their destination and leave their driver’s license with the guard in exchange for an entry permit. Domestics and day laborers are detained at the gates while the guard calls their employer to verify their appointment. The de la Rama slum inside BF is bounded on one side by Tierra Maria village and on the other by Manila Memorial Park, a cemetery. On one hand, this location is opportune. De la Rama residents find work as tricycle drivers and domestics within BF and are hired to maintain the burial plots and mausoleums in the cemetery. On the other hand, residents find themselves locked in on both sides. The Tierra Maria village association closed its gate with a part of de la Rama called Target 1. The residents of Target 1 depended on the gate to enter and exit their area and had their water and housing materials delivered through it. They appealed vainly to the village association and then to the mayor, succeeding only in being allowed use of the gate in emergencies. On the other end of de la Rama, the cemetery is also gated and guarded in order to prevent the spread of squatting onto its pristine grounds. Residents are allowed to use the gate only between five and 10:15 a.m., mainly in order to dispatch their caretaking duties before visitors arrive. Although de la Rama is located inside BF Homes, a series of gatings effectively exclude the slum from the rest of the village. Residents regard their containment with frustration. “They banned us from BF and closed off Memorial,” Manuel complained, “How are we supposed to get out? It’s like we’re imprisoned here.”
In the case of Phil-Am Homes, exclusion is complicated by proximity. Santa Rita de Casia, the church within Phil-Am, serves both the village and San Roque, the slum across the street. Barangay Phil-Am, also located within the village, conducts outreach projects involving the residents of San Roque. Services conducted at the barangay—eye exams, dental cleanings, vocational workshops, etc.—necessitate these residents being allowed inside the village. To maintain their boundary with San Roque, villagers use gates to regulate the entry of its residents into Phil-Am; once inside the village, they use security personnel to circumscribe their movement. They allow them to enter only through a certain gate and only during certain hours. Meanwhile, the coordinated efforts of Phil-Am’s three separate security groups—barangay tanods (police), security guards hired by the village association, and the neighborhood watch—keep them on path to their given destination (usually the church or barangay), with the rest of the village effectively restricted to them. Consequently, San Roque residents cannot simply cross the street to attend mass but are made to pass through a farther gate about a kilometer away. To avail of the barangay’s services, they must obtain tickets from the coordinator hired to distribute them in San Roque, with the number of tickets limited by quota. When a fire broke out in San Roque in 2004, Phil-Am ended up taking in around 500 “refugees” from the burning settlement—just enough to fit inside the village’s covered basketball court. Although sheltered and fed for five days, the squatters were kept strictly contained inside the court. Ernesto, formerly in charge of security for the village association, recounted the precautions taken.

We had three shifts of security personnel, ten people each. And they [the squatters] were confined to just that area. They were not allowed to roam around. They were not allowed even to the skating rink or the playground [right beside the court]. We explained to them, ‘You have to stay right here.’ Some wanted to leave, and of course we couldn’t stop them, but they had to be escorted out.
In order to retain control of its gates—“to keep Phil-Am exclusive,” as Paolo put it—the village association has resisted calls for re-zoning parts of Phil-Am for semi-commercial use despite its prime location. It has refused to donate the village’s roads to the city despite the onerous cost of maintaining them.

Where gates prove insufficient, villagers impose boundaries in other ways. Gating effectively split Don Antonio into two parts. Holy Spirit Drive had once been the village’s access road; it now divided Don Antonio North from Don Antonio South, with each subdivision separately enclosed. Don Antonio North was completely secured. One of its residents boasted that it had “only one entrance, one exit, and no squatters.” Don Antonio South, however, had been “breached.” Hundreds of squatters occupied vacant lots within the subdivision. In many cases, the owners of these lots had left the country to live or work abroad and entrusted them to caretakers, who then rented them out to squatters. Half of Don Vicente, the southern perimeter street, is virtually indistinguishable from the slum area outside the village walls. Houses made of plywood and concrete hollow blocks crowd close together on either side. The houses on the other half of Don Vicente could hardly be seen for their high walls crowned with broken glass and arrow-tipped iron bars. The village association of Don Antonio South has taken several steps in the name of security, including gating “breaches” along the perimeter, restricting gate access, and imposing a 10 p.m. curfew within the village. It has also tried to wall out Don Vicente several times, but every time a new wall is erected, squatters destroy it. They have the right to do so; Don Antonio’s roads belong to the city, which maintains them, and thus cannot be barricaded by private citizens. Thus villagers have come to adopt more intensive forms of enclosure. Lucia and her neighbor agreed to buy up the empty lots adjacent to their properties and gate them. They make a ritual of patrolling their respective sides; “every night, flashlight here, flashlight there.”
Esmerelda and her neighbor simply took the liberty of gating the empty lot in between their houses. She even partitioned her own house by installing a gate in between floors. Nobody sleeps upstairs where she expects robbers would enter using the roof.

The siege mentality of villagers affects the squatters living within and just outside Don Antonio South in consequential ways. They resent the routine inconvenience posed by their restricted access to the village. “It’s just a few meters,” Eileen complained. “You go through the gate and you’re there. But they make you go all the way around [to the main gate] because they don’t want you to see where they live.” But it is extraordinary cases of boundary enforcement that incite class anger. Charito recounted that a seven year-old boy who had clambered up a guava tree to pick the fruit had been mistaken for a thief by one villager and shot in the back. It seems the villager had assumed that the boy was using the tree to scale the wall around his property. In a different case, another purported thief had been shot and killed, but what Charito found most offensive was the fact that the perpetrator took the trouble to dump the body in the slum outside the village gate, presumably where he thought it belonged.

The imposition of boundaries on the urban poor extends to public spaces. The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority routinely removes beggars, vendors, vagrants, and squatters from sidewalks, footbridges, and streets. Its “beautification” efforts have included destroying the wares of sidewalk vendors (Michel 2010:395) and forcibly detaining street children in shelters (Nugroho et al. 2008). Such harassment is not solely perpetrated by the state but occurs also at the level of everyday class interaction within public spaces. While selling eggplant along the sidewalk, a lawyer threatened to sue Marietta for “trespassing” after her dog tried to bite his son. At upscale malls, the urban poor commonly find themselves subject to surveillance and judgment (Connell 1999). Myrna complained of being followed by salesclerks and scrutinized by guards.
Territorial stigma

My second claim is that widespread spatial exclusion has made slum dwellers acutely conscious of the stigma attached to their territorial status. Riding the metro rail as it passed above San Roque, Elena overheard another passenger describe the slum—her home—as an “eyesore.” Although ashamed and indignant, she felt powerless to rebuke him given how thoroughly squatting is stigmatized. Even the word squatter is a pejorative, necessitating a politically correct term—informal settlers—for official use. “It really hurts,” she said, “to hear that you live in a slum, that you act like a squatter—a hoodlum, a killer, someone who snatches away people’s bags and holds them up in the street.” My count data indicates the extent of this consciousness. Asked about their relations with the villagers “next door,” 53 percent of the squatters I interviewed recounted stories of class discrimination and 84 percent complained of being discounted as squatters. A significant number (43 percent), however, cited instances of being treated fairly or well. These two opinions, which were largely held by the same people, were typically formulated in the following way: (a) Villagers look down on us (b) but not always (Table II.2). This formulation suggests the operation of a schema, or cognitive structure, organized around an expectation of discrimination. This schema comes across clearly in the qualitative evidence. Marivic, on staff at a barangay in Quezon City, described an incident at the birthday party of an administrator.
Table II.2. Class Relations: Logic and Count Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Logic&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>N=92</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>The rich look down on us…</td>
<td>77 (.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>but not always</td>
<td>40 (.43)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other
- Discussed experiences of class discrimination 55 (.60)

---

a. Informants asked about their relations with the villagers “next door.”

They were really rich. Of course, it’s his birthday; everyone’s invited. When we were introduced, he said to me, ‘Did you bring a plastic bag [for taking food home]?’ If he wasn’t beside Cap [the barangay captain]…! I wanted to spit on him and say ‘Even if we’re squatters, we know how to respect ourselves! We know where to bring a plastic bag!’ [Laughs] I left. I didn’t even eat.

Based on the given facts of Marivic’s story and keeping in mind that, in the Philippines, hosts traditionally distribute food from the party to their guests, it is possible to interpret the administrator’s question as innocent, a feckless attempt to be considerate rather than snide. But Marivic interprets his question as a deliberate slight because that is how she expects to be treated as a squatter in the house of a rich man. At the same time, Marivic can follow her discrimination story with a story about being treated kindly by a rich man. In this case, her use of qualifiers and repetition frame the story as exceptional.<sup>6</sup>

There’s one guy, my boss, Sir Popoy. When he sees me, ‘Hello! Marivic, come here!’ <i>He doesn’t make me feel uneasy at all. Even if he’s rich, he kisses me [in greeting]. I like it, that even if he’s rich he sees me that way [emphasis added].</i>

---

<sup>6</sup> Here I draw on Deborah Tannen’s work (1993) on linguistic markers of expectations.
She evaluates Sir Popoy’s behavior against an expectation of stigma: even if he is rich, he is nice to her. In other words, an expectation of discrimination on the basis of their territorial status informs how slum dwellers approach class interaction. This schema is relatively durable given its capacity to assimilate non-discriminatory behavior.

As some of the examples above reveal, territorial stigma is embodied in two distinct senses of the word. First, it is embodied in the sense intended by cognitive psychologists (Barsalou 2008, Damasio 2005, Niedenthal 2007); that is, it is experienced primarily through feelings (pain or shame) or introspective states (mental dispositions, such as a sense of inferiority). Pinches (1991) covered this ground by focusing on the role of shaming both in maintaining class subordination and stoking class resentment. My data validates his work. Nelly recounted her son’s first becoming aware of the stigma attached to their circumstance as squatters. “My son asked me, ‘Mama, are we squatters?’ His classmate said we are. I said, we were but we’re not anymore. That depressed me.” Out of shame, Nelly parried the label “squatter” by equivocating, referring her son to their formal condition as technically no longer squatters since they had recently acquired their land through a government-subsidized mortgage program. And yet she knows full well that her son’s classmate was pointing out their territorial status, something that has not changed despite the change in their legal status.

Second, territorial stigma is embodied in a sense consistent with Mary Douglas’ work (1966) on ritual uncleanness; which is to say, being a squatter is conceived as a bodily condition, like a disease, and associated with various taboos to prevent contamination. “You do this to the rich,” Myrna said, swiping my arm with her finger, “and they will say, ‘Yuck!’” Evelyn recounted an incident that occurred at a party for the lay workers of Santa Rita church. The party included both the residents of Phil-Am and San Roque.
Evelyn: You can’t brush against another person.

MG: Why not?

Evelyn: They rub themselves with alcohol.

MG: In front of you?!

Evelyn: Yes.

MG: You’re saying that someone rubbed himself with alcohol in front of you?

Evelyn: Yes!

As we will see in the following section, the urban poor’s embodiment of territorial stigma in this sense, as something communicated by their bodies, has made physical contact a particularly important indicator of sincerity. My final claim is that the urban poor’s heightened consciousness of stigma led them to support Estrada because of his concrete acts of sincerity.

Acts of Sincerity

To discover why my informants supported Estrada, I pursued the question to the point where reported responses, as reflected in my count data, yielded to stories requiring interpretation (Table II.3). Most of my informants support Estrada (84 percent), overwhelmingly because they think he is good for the poor (79 percent). This finding in itself is not surprising. The poor regularly cite helpfulness or being pro-poor as an important quality of a good leader (Pulse Asia 2009, SWS 2001b). Despite this perception, however, there is little evidence to show
Table II.3. Why the Urban Poor Supported Estrada: Logic and Count Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logic(^a)</th>
<th>N=107</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Informants support Estrada…</td>
<td>90 (.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) because he is good for the poor,</td>
<td>85 (.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) i.e., because he is a good person…</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—especially compared to other politicians—</td>
<td>49 (.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) as revealed by his conduct towards the poor.</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other
- Personally benefited or knew someone who benefited from Estrada’s patronage 12 (.11)
- Mentioned Estrada’s screen persona as one reason for supporting him 9 (.08)
- Reacted emotionally when shown Estrada’s mugshot 68 (.64)

\(^a\) Informants asked why they supported Estrada.

that Estrada actually provided the poor with much material help. For the most part, informants stated his helpfulness axiomatically. Some made reference to his “policies” (broadly put), his housing program, and, for the residents of San Roque, his promise to legalize their tenure. But only a few could actually point to concrete improvements in their material welfare under Estrada’s presidency. Only 12 informants personally benefited or knew someone who benefited from Estrada’s patronage. There is even less evidence that the urban poor supported Estrada because of his screen persona as defender of the oppressed. Only nine informants mentioned it as one reason for supporting him. While it may exert an indirect influence on the poor’s support, it
did not appear to be much of a direct factor. My data clearly supports the view that the poor found Estrada’s pro-poor persona credible. The question is why. What about Estrada’s persona were the poor responding to? His flouting of middle and upper class mores? His characteristically informal and even vulgar behavior? His indulgence in vices supposedly common among the poor?

As I pursued the question further, my informants shifted their emphasis from Estrada being good for the poor to Estrada being a good person, someone who really cared about the poor. He was commonly described as kind, compassionate, humble, approachable, and unaffected. “He doesn’t act superior,” Anita said. “He treats everyone equally.” More than just prioritizing the poor as a matter of policy, informants described Estrada as actively recognizing them. The Filipino expression *marunong tumingin*, literally, “he knows how to look [at us]”—in contrast to the rich who look down on the poor or pretend not to see them—recurred repeatedly during interviews. But again, why did informants see him in this light? Their explicit knowledge in the form of reported responses was not sufficient to answer this question, and so I turned to their stories describing Estrada’s interaction with them. Insofar as stories both encapsulate and constitute a commonsense (Polletta 2006, Somers 1997, Tilly 2002, White 1981), they convey knowledge that may be taken for granted by the narrator and thus represent a form of practical cognition. My informants’ stories are distinguished by a common theme: the absence or negation of stigma in Estrada’s conduct towards them. This quality—what I call sincerity—is evident less in what Estrada does for them than in how he treats them. For example, Erlinda described approaching Estrada for help. What stood out for her was not just the fact that he gave it but that in doing so “he didn’t embarrass us.”
We saw that he helped the poor a lot, and that he would help you if you really needed it. At the time my husband was sick, and we went to Erap’s house in Greenhills. I brought with me a handful of prescriptions. Thank God he didn’t embarrass us! He gave us medicine and even money to commute home. You can’t just approach other politicians like that because you feel uneasy, but with him you can speak freely and openly because he sees you as an equal.

Similarly, Dina explained:

They say Estrada is stupid and uneducated. Well, we say it’s not education that makes you sincere [totoong tao, literally, a real person]. It’s that a person has heart and loves his fellow man. Politicians focus on the rich. When it comes to the poor—nothing. It’s like they’re ashamed of you. When Erap was president, he often visited us. We saw that even if he were high up he would lower himself to reach down to the lowest person.

The poor’s discernment of sincerity is predicated on their awareness of the general insincerity of politicians, an awareness documented by the Institute of Philippine Culture (IPC 2005:107) and reflected in my data. Nearly half my informants explicitly distinguished Estrada from other politicians. “Other politicians just use us,” Beng said, “but Estrada’s different. He really cares about us.” Contrary to popular portrayals of the poor as easily duped, the notion of sincerity suggests that the poor are particularly savvy in distinguishing politicians who merely seek to use them from politicians truly acting on their behalf, and populist tactics from acts of sincerity. The stories of my informants suggest that this distinction is informed primarily by a politician’s conduct towards the poor. This interpretation is consistent with previous qualitative research on the political disposition of the poor. In Schaffer’s (2008) study of election reform, he observed that many of the urban poor he interviewed “judged candidates on their concrete acts of caring” (p. 137). He concluded that, for them, “bad politics is a politics of callousness and insult, while good politics is the politics of consideration and kindness” (p. 138). Similarly, the IPC
(2005:85, 107) finds that “personal behavior that accords the poor dignity and respect” is an important basis for their determining which politicians really have their welfare at heart.

As politicians periodically discover, sincerity defies simulation because it involves more than the sum of specific gestures, such as visiting a slum. It is a quality revealed by a manner of being at ease among squatters and treating them, essentially, as if the stigma reinforced by their everyday class interactions did not exist. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo visited San Roque probably more times than Estrada did and even built a schoolhouse there (it has since lapsed into disuse from lack of funding), and yet residents described her as “plastic [insincere]” and told stories of her uneasiness during visits. “Erap came here without a bodyguard,” Renato recalled, “but GMA [Arroyo] came with a whole battalion, and she was still scared to get on stage.” “When it burned here,” Benjielyn recounted, “Gloria came to visit but no one paid her any mind.” “We knew we had to move on,” Pilar said, “but our hearts remained with Erap.” Noting Arroyo’s strenuous wooing of the poor following Edsa 3, the writer Jun Cruz Reyes (2001) quipped, “Gloria’s put on a denim jacket. She’s wearing a t-shirt and eating with her hands in front of the media. If she doesn’t stop trying to be like Joseph Estrada, the day after tomorrow she’ll grow a mustache!”

I had the chance to witness Estrada’s sincerity myself. A few months before the presidential election in 2010, I accompanied Estrada’s entourage on a campaign sortie through the provinces just south of Metro Manila. Estrada spent the day giving speeches and greeting thousands of supporters from a trolley in procession through several small cities. In the following, I recount an incident recorded in my fieldnotes.

At the end of the day, we stopped for dinner at a fancy Chinese restaurant. After dinner, Estrada walked out of the restaurant to find that a man—by appearance, a street vendor—had been waiting outside to greet him. The man was thin and wearing a white tank top and shorts. Slung around his neck, he carried a tray filled
with candy, chewing gum, and cigarettes by the piece. When he saw Estrada, he started chanting, barely audibly, “Erap! Erap! Erap!” only to interrupt himself and exclaim, also quietly, “Idol!” The man was clearly nervous about meeting Estrada. Without hesitation, Estrada walked up to him, took his hand in greeting, and thanked him for his support. He then gestured to an aide, who went inside the campaign bus to retrieve paraphernalia—an Erap t-shirt and cap—which Estrada handed to the man before boarding the bus. What struck me was that he did all this without a hint of artifice. He did not pretend that he was not tired, a 73 year old man who had spent the last 14 hours campaigning, or act differently than he acted while dining among his friends. He probably did nothing that his presidential rivals, in similar circumstances, would not also do. What distinguished him was how naturally he carried himself.

The significance of this quality came into focus much later as I went through my data and found that Linda’s description of Estrada’s appeal spoke directly to what I had observed. She took his familiarity for acceptance: “Erap will accept you however dirty you are. Other politicians may shake your hand, but afterwards they will wash theirs with alcohol.”

Stories depicting acts of sincerity corroborate Estrada’s populist persona as conveyed by his rhetoric and public behavior. In a political landscape where appeals to the poor are electorally imperative and thus common, such stories distinguish Estrada as sincere and worthy of support.7 The bond the urban poor formed with Estrada was palpable during interviews. His mugshot, in particular, often triggered an outpouring of emotion among my informants (Figure II.7). Sixty-eight expressed feelings of pity, sadness, bitterness, and pain upon seeing it. Some reached out to take the photograph, some asked if they could keep it, some decried the way Estrada was publicly shamed by being made out a criminal, a handful wept, one woman broke out into

7 It might be asked whether Estrada is actually sincere. This question, apart from being impossible to answer definitively, is based on a flawed conception of being sincere as something that one either is or is not. A better question is why Estrada gives the impression of being sincere. I suspect that the answer may have less to do with his experience as an actor than with his long career as a local politician. This required him to interact with the poor regularly as well as to develop an effective way of relating to them, a manner that, over the course of his career, conceivably became second nature—part of his habitus, if you like.
goosebumps and insisted that I feel the ridges on her arms, and another remembered, with evident solicitude, that at the time of the photograph Estrada had been down with a cold.

By examining the practice of sincerity in other contexts, we can better appreciate it as a quality independent of Estrada. Generally, the urban poor describe as sincere social superiors whose conduct contradicts expectations of stigma in situations of class interaction. Consider, for example, how a group of women in San Roque described their mutual friend, Sister Che.
Teody: Can you believe it? When I got sick, [Sister Che] wanted to carry me. When you’re with her, you don’t feel uneasy at all.

Pilar: She’s a sincere person. You wouldn’t even think she’s rich. We’re even better dressed [than she is]! She just wears a white shirt and black pants, sometimes even jeans.

Josephine: But her friend, Trining? Ugh! When we hug [in greeting], you can see how disgusted she is. Who does she think she is?

Many of my informants from San Roque remembered Corazon Aquino, perhaps the only president more beloved by the poor than Estrada, for her sincerity. They attended mass with her at Santa Rita in Phil-Am. Evelyn recounted that “[Cory] would help to clear the plates” after a church reception and, during a full mass, “would be the one to make room for other people to sit [in her pew].” My informants from de la Rama could tell me which politicians had visited their settlement and, specifically, which ones had walked through by themselves. “The guy might as well be a squatter!” Carmela said, describing the son of Parañaque’s mayor. “When he sees you, he gives you a big hug. He gave me a hug,” she confided, obviously delighted, “and even slapped my butt!” Such gestures of familiarity—touching, hugging, kissing, visiting slums without bodyguards—bridge the social distance separating politicians from the poor by closing the physical distance between them. Squatters remember these actions so vividly because they negate the sense of stigma that class interactions normally reinforce.

Clarifying the Mechanisms at Work

To strengthen my claims beyond the evidence presented above, I clarify the mechanisms at work in three ways: by considering an alternative mechanism to the boundary imposition brought
about by interspersion, by situating sincerity among other political logics, and by decoupling sincerity from interspersion.

In the populism literature, the people’s heightened receptivity to populist appeals is usually attributed to crises; therefore it makes sense to ask whether the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 could have driven the urban poor to support Estrada. De Castro (2007) argues that the crisis gave Presidents Ramos, Estrada, and Arroyo the opportunity to implement populist or redistributive measures primarily intended to shore up their political support. He acknowledges that the effects of the crisis on the Philippines were relatively mild but suggests that a public already inclined towards populism was further drawn to support populist leaders as a result of deteriorating conditions. If the Asian Financial Crisis was indeed the cause of the urban poor’s support for Estrada, then we would expect to find evidence of its obvious mechanisms at work: greater immiseration and inequality. Instead, we find that, between 1997 and 2000, poverty incidence among families in Metro Manila increased by a single point (from 4.8 to 5.8 percent), while levels of income inequality decreased slightly (from .46 to .45) (NCSB 2012). In the context of the longer period between 1985 and 2009, poverty has declined substantially while levels of income inequality have remained largely the same. Contrasting these trends with the precipitous growth in both the slum population and the number of slum areas in Metro Manila suggests, as I have argued, that increased spatial inequality is the more viable mechanism of populist support (Table II.4).

Second, sincerity is only one among multiple political logics and, in most of the country, less important than traditionally dominant logics such as regionalism and clientelism. Most of the people outside Metro Manila that supported Estrada in 2010 did so for reasons other than his sincerity. The dominance of political families allied with Estrada probably explains why he
Table II.4. Poverty Incidence and Income Inequality v. Slum Population and Number of Slum Areas in Metro Manila
carried regions such as Palawan and Cagayan, where he was supported by the Sandovals and Enriles, respectively. Estrada’s prosecution of an “all-out war” against Islamic insurgents during his presidency probably accounts for his support in Mindanao among Christians (notably, the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao did not support Estrada in 2010 as it had in 1998). There was also some variation in how the urban poor in Metro Manila responded to Estrada. Those who withheld their support accepted that he was corrupt, remained unimpressed by his performance on the ground (seeing him as no different from other politicians), or lacked political opinions altogether, regarding politics as beyond their depth, as well as, perhaps, irrelevant to their daily struggle. But as my data shows, in Metro Manila, the poor’s perception of Estrada’s sincerity was clearly a significant—and underappreciated—factor in their support for him. This support has been discounted as irrational because scholars have failed to recognize the logic behind it. Sincerity as a political logic suggests the importance, even the predominance, of a politics of recognition in contexts of widespread social exclusion. In such contexts, a politics of recognition is not about the assertion of group differences, as Taylor (1994) and Fraser (1997) have discussed it, but about equality of status and respect (Lister 2004:125).

Finally, sincerity can be decoupled from interspersion and each mechanism put to analytical use individually. By definition, stigma is implicated in the notion of sincerity. This stigma need not be territorial, however. It can be attached to different kinds of status (e.g., indigeneity, regional identity, rural origin, religion, ethnicity, etc.) and made salient by conditions other than interspersion (e.g., economic crisis). Likewise, interspersion may not always result in populism. The claim inherent in my use of the concept is that interspersion leads to spatial exclusion and thus greater consciousness of territorial stigma among the urban poor. This development is politically fraught, resulting in a host of political outcomes, including increased conflict over
urban space (Sandhu and Sandhu 2003), the erosion of the public sphere (Caldeira 2000), and political polarization. Whether the polarizing effects of interspersion actually foster a populist constituency, however, depends on several factors, including the political regime, the strength of competing cleavages, and, of course, the character of leadership.

Conclusion

I have argued that the urban poor responded to Estrada’s populist appeals on the basis of knowledge shaped by their spatial relations with the urban elite. To make this argument, I established the consolidation of a distinct pattern of residential segregation in the 1990s. Rather than spatial polarization, a kind of “interspersion” prevailed, with slums and enclaves drawn increasingly closer together in space such that social inequality took the form of spatial exclusion. I then showed how this configuration resulted in the imposition of class boundaries on the urban poor, thus making the stigma attached to their status as squatters and slum dwellers more salient. The urban poor’s heightened consciousness of stigma led them to support Estrada not, as others have proposed, because of his patronage, his screen persona as defender of the oppressed, or his anti-elite posturing, but because of his apparent sincerity, as deduced from the absence of stigma in his conduct towards them. To the urban poor, Estrada’s concrete acts of sincerity—e.g., touching them without hesitation, responding to their requests for help immediately and unstintingly, and visiting slums without the least apprehension—verified his pro-poor political persona.
My study significantly improves our understanding of populism by highlighting an essential but neglected aspect of the phenomenon: the reception of populist appeals. Moreover, my findings speak beyond the Philippines and the study of populism, revealing mechanisms that illuminate dynamics of contention across the developing world. Acts of sincerity negating stigma represent a potent but understudied form of political practice in the developing world. They demonstrate to socially subordinated but electorally significant populations that a politician’s persona is deeply held and not simply staged for political effect and thus can be quite consequential in determining popular support. More broadly, the notion of sincerity calls attention to the performative nature of politics; to behavior and bodily comportment, to seemingly trivial and throwaway gestures that may carry greater weight in impressing upon people a politician’s “true self.”

Second, my study provides a model for examining the political effects of urban fragmentation. Interspersion has been widely observed in megacities across the developing world. It has been variously referred to as “class apartheid” (Portes 1989), “perverse integration” (cited in Portes, Dore-Cabral, and Landolt 1997), “proximity and walls” (Caldeira 2000), or simply spatial exclusion (Bosdorf, Hidalgo, and Sanchez 2007, UN Habitat 2010, Koonings and Krujit 2009, B. Roberts 2005, Sandhu and Sandhu 2003). However, scholars have yet to fully appreciate how widespread spatial exclusion has brought about a qualitative shift in class relations distinguished not only by greater class consciousness but the articulation of class primarily in terms of territory. In this chapter, I have shown how this shift can be politically consequential. Already a third of the urban population in developing regions live in slums, i.e., nearly a billion people (UN-Habitat 2010), with many of the rest living behind the walls of
enclaves. My study suggests that the growing spatial divide will continue to shape contentious politics in developing world cities for decades to come.
CHAPTER III

The Sense of Place behind Segregating Practices

Socially distanced people find nothing more intolerable than physical proximity (experienced as promiscuity).
- Bourdieu (2000:128)

The literature on cities in the developing world equates segregation with the proliferation of enclaves and slums and tends to overlook how the people associated with those places are further segregated in public spaces and enclaves (e.g., Gugler 2004, Habitat 2001, Marcuse and Van Kempen 2000). Malls, parks, sidewalks, and entire urban districts are stratified or identified with a particular class and thus avoided (e.g., Abaza 2001 on Cairo, Connell 1999 on Manila, Naik-Singru 2003 on Mumbai). Simply walking on the public streets of São Paulo is taken as a sign of class and hence “an activity that the elite is abandoning” (Caldeira 1999:125). Within enclaves the movement of domestics and other workers is spatially circumscribed. Residential spaces as small as apartments are outfitted with separate facilities for the help. Again in São Paulo, maids ride separate “service” elevators—usually right beside the “social” elevators used by residents—to reach the same floor (Caldeira 2000:270). Altay and Turkun (2003:275) have observed that Ankara has become so finely differentiated symbolically that walls, guards, and other security measures are hardly needed to inhibit class interaction. The same can be said of several other cities across the developing world, including Metro Manila.
In order to account for the intensiveness of segregation, we need to view it as more than simply the accretion of exclusive and stigmatized places but as the practice of keeping apart people recognized as categorically unequal. Everyday practices of exclusion, circumscription, and avoidance cumulatively effect the symbolic partitioning of cities into classed places, whether an elite megaproject several square kilometers in size or the service area adjacent to the kitchen in a middle class apartment. While segregating practices are not new, the growth and greater proximity of enclaves and slums have made them more important in regulating urban space (Veloso 2010). To make sense of these practices, we need to identify the cognitive structure they enact, i.e., the sense of place behind them.

The literature on spatial cognition in sociology tends to focus on the symbolic power of place to represent people (e.g., the ghetto degrading black people by association) rather than the power of a cognitive structure to predispose place-making practices. Conversely, urban ethnographies in segregated settings feature the use of symbolic boundaries as spatial practices without elaborating how distinct conceptions of place (cognitive maps) inform boundary making. Bourdieu connects place and practices through the notion of habitus. While his conceptualization of the relationship between social and spatial distance is instructive, habitus—properly denoting a cognitive system—is conceptualized too broadly to operationalize with respect to a single cognitive structure. For my purposes, the value of Herbert Blumer’s conceptualization of racial prejudice as a sense of group position lies in its identification of the cognitive structure mediating a particular social position (racial identity) and behavior (racial discrimination). I draw out the spatial applications of Blumer’s model by reconceiving a sense of group position as a sense of place, defined as a commitment to the relative status positioning of groups expressed through their separation in space. Essentially, certain types of places (enclaves or slums) or the
people associated with those places elicit certain introspective states (mental states, including affect and motivation), which, in turn, predispose certain segregating practices. A sense of place functions as the cognitive mechanism linking place and place-making practices. It explains why particular social groups engage in segregating practices. By identifying the sense of place behind these practices, we are better able to understand how class patterns of residential segregation are not only reproduced but extended to encompass virtually all urban spaces where class interaction occurs.

Drawing on extensive qualitative fieldwork in Metro Manila—one year of participant observation in two households within enclaves and 189 in-depth interviews with the residents of enclaves (villagers) and slums (squatters)—I examine the segregating practices of squatters and villagers in both typical and atypical situations of class interaction. Given that, respectively, they deploy the same sets of practices in both types of situations, I infer the sense of place predisposing their behavior. I then identify other spatial practices in terms of this sense of place. Integrating practices are largely consistent with it, while desegregating practices challenge it and thus may set up or advance contentious situations. Finally, I review the implications of this approach for both Metro Manila and the study of segregation.

Cognitive Maps in Sociology

Cognitive maps refer to mental representations of the environment and represent a form of spatial cognition (Hart and Moore 1973, Downs and Stea 1973). They have been used mainly by psychologists, geographers, architects, and urban planners to explain spatial behavior, in
particular, spatial decision-making (whether to go and where to go) and wayfinding (how to get there). Tolman (1948) first used the term to explain how rats run through a maze. He argued that rats did not just respond to stimuli but were able to recognize spatial patterns that helped them navigate the maze on repeated runs. He speculated that “something like a field map of the environment gets established in the rat’s brain” (p. 192). Lynch (1960) identified certain properties of the urban environment, notably legibility or the ease with which we are able to recognize places and imageability or the vividness of place, as clarifying our cognitive maps and thus enhancing our experience of cities.

Importantly, cognitive maps convey knowledge about spatial meaning as well as spatial position. The relatively limited sociological study of cognitive maps has largely underscored the social variability of this knowledge. Orleans (1967) demonstrated that cognitive maps were shaped by physical location and social position. He found that different racial and class groups from different parts of Los Angeles drew very different—“almost mutually exclusive” (p. 111)—maps of the city. Bardo (1994), Harding (2010), Krysan (2002), and Lee (1968) discussed various determinants in how people conceptualize their neighborhoods, including race, length of residence in an area, proximity of friends, and the threat of violence. Milgram (1984) showed that cognitive maps (social representations) even of commonly salient aspects of cities—national monuments in Paris and beautiful locations in New York—varied by social class. He argued that the knowledge cognitive maps conveyed about the meaning of places predisposed individuals towards behavior consistent with their social position. “It is not merely that the individual knows that Harlem is an undesirable neighborhood,” he observed; “he cannot choose to live in Harlem without jeopardizing his own social standing. He will be directed toward those neighborhoods that correspond to his own social position, or that reflect his social goals” (p. 309). The influence
of social position on spatial cognition, Hayden (1990) noted, fostered a politics of space, where different groups with cognitive maps representing different “territorial histories” vied unequally for recognition and commemoration.

More recently, sociologists have focused on the transferability of place-meanings onto the people associated with those places. Anderson (2012a, 2012b) writes about the “iconic ghetto,” popularly conceived as “a mysterious and unfathomable place that breeds drugs, crime, prostitution, unwed mothers, ignorance, and mental illness” (1990:167) and associated with black people. Consequently, black people must counteract the symbolic power of the ghetto by taking pains to distance themselves from ghetto stereotypes. Wacquant (2008) describes the territorial stigma of the American ghetto and the French banlieue as “a taint of place” on their residents. For banlieue residents especially, living in such a symbolically degraded place is “experienced as shame” (p. 172). Whereas the stigma attached to the ghetto’s inhabitants is both racial and residential, the stigma on banlieue residents is inherently territorial. “It suffices,” he writes, “for the residents of the Quatre mille…to hide their address [in order to] make this status disappear and ‘pass’ in the broader society—unless they get spotted by their ‘degaine’ (physical demeanor and dress) and speech patterns” (p. 181). The Brazilian favela is another “place of stigma” (Castañeda 2012). As Veloso (2010:258) observes, its residents suffer a “metonymic equivalence” with criminality. A survey conducted by the urban scholar Janice Perlman (2010:153-155) showed that living in a favela was the number one source of discrimination for Rio de Janeiro’s squatters (skin color being number two). This line of inquiry further traces the effects of place stigma on spatial inequality. Jones and Jackson (2012) build on Anderson’s conception of the iconic ghetto by showing that the portrayal of areas as “ghetto” through interpersonal talk and online reviews effectively redlines them as places to avoid and thus
reinforces their isolation. Wacquant (2008) contends that the stigma of living in a ghetto or banlieue leads residents to avoid each other, denigrate one another, and scapegoat their neighbors as the “problem” with the place. Social distancing and withdrawal from communal life result in the social disorganization of communities and the loss of a sense of place for its residents. These findings speak only partially to the question of this paper, that is, how place stigma (and status) lead to the partitioning of spaces into distinct places and thus extend, not simply reinforce, segregation.

Symbolic Boundary Making as Spatial Practice

Lamont and Molnar (2000:168) define symbolic boundaries as “conceptual distinctions made by social actors to categorize objects, people, practices, and even time and space.” Urban ethnographies in segregated settings document the drawing, observing, and disputation of symbolic boundaries as place-making practices. Hartigan (1999) finds that both black and white Detroiters invoke racial boundaries to define their place within the city. Some whites define their mixed-race neighborhood, Warrendale, as including only the white part. Some blacks in Warrendale see whites as out of place in “black” Detroit. Given Detroit’s situation as a predominantly black city surrounded by predominantly white suburbs, one informant wondered aloud whether integration was even possible or “just a transition point from being all white to all black” (p. 232). Anderson (1999) observes that people adjust their behavior in observance of the symbolic boundaries separating one part of the city from another. For his informants, simply walking down Germantown Avenue in Philadelphia activates a cognitive orientation of
“knowing what time it is” and “watching your back,” and the code of civility scrupulously observed in neighboring Chestnut Hill is implicitly understood by everyone to be suspended along Germantown. A woman can stop her car in the middle of the street for ten minutes to wait on her companion in the barbershop, and the people that must go around her know well enough not to complain (p. 23, 27). According to Kefalas (1998), the white working-class residents of the Beltway in Chicago emphasize the symbolic boundary separating their neighborhood from the ghetto “outside” by engaging in a set of practices: fastidiously maintaining their lawns and houses, decorating their yards, and organizing against graffiti. This boundary is not simply racial; it distinguishes the Beltway, as the “last garden,” from the disorder of the surrounding urban environment. Thus non-whites are accepted into the Beltway as long as they show themselves to be “good neighbors”—the kind of people who “‘mow the lawn and take care of the house’” (p. 99). Small (2004) accounts for the social isolation of the Villa Victoria housing complex from the wider, relatively affluent South End by arguing that a set of signs, mere physical features of the built environment—“cast-iron gates, carved front doors, manicured flower beds, and renovated brownstones versus tipped-over supermarket carts, plastic lawn chairs, moldy wall bases, and aluminum front doors” (p. 110)—are taken as symbols of heterogeneity, and, altogether, exaggerate the differences between the residents of the two areas to the point of mutual exclusivity. An “invisible fence,” erected cognitively, sufficiently regulates practice to produce the “near geometric spatial segregation of class” (p. 114). This is not just a matter of cognition organizing space, but, equally and inseparably, of space organizing cognition, as streets, ironically, come to be seen as boundaries, dividing races, crime, and even markets, with businesses catering exclusively to the clientele on their side of the fence, physical contiguity notwithstanding.
In all these cases, boundary making clearly depends on conceptions of urban space as partitioned by race or class; however, the link between spatial cognition and spatial practices is undertheorized. Specifically, it is not made clear how informants know to alter their behavior in or keep away from certain places.

Habitat and Habitus

Bourdieu (2000:123-29) connects place and practices through the notion of habitus, defined as a system of durable dispositions arising from similar social conditions and leading people to act in accordance with their social position. On one hand, habitat or the set of places comprising our lived environment shapes the habitus. On the other, the habitus helps structure the places we occupy. We acquire the dispositions constituting the habitus mainly by assimilating through observation and interaction regular patterns of association between persons, things, and persons and things that routinely take place in our habitat. The Kabyle house, for example, with its clear division into areas of light and darkness associated with male and female activity respectively, both reflects and conveys a deeper, transposable principle of hierarchy, one that is grasped in practice through the experience of regularly navigating the domestic space successfully, that is, in a way enacting the rule at stake (Bourdieu 1979). At the same time, the habitus predisposes practices that reproduce existing spatial configurations as well as transpose them to other settings. Following Bourdieu’s lead, the anthropologist Christina Toren (1999) shows that, in Fiji, a cloth is used at mealtime to orient an above/below axis connoting hierarchy; men
automatically sit above the cloth in order of rank while women and children sit below it. Even when outdoors, the cloth is laid out in such a way as to create a graded space.

In other words, the habitus confers a sense of place. A sense of place is commonly defined as “the attribution of meaning to a built form or natural spot” (Gieryn 2000:472) or, similarly, knowing a place by various sensory means (Tuan 1974). For Bourdieu, a sense of place is a sense of class, or, more precisely, a sense of one’s position in social space. It is enacted by “translating” social distance into spatial distance. “It is this sense of one’s place,” Bourdieu (1989:17) writes, “which, in interactions, leads people whom we call ‘common folks’ to keep to their common place, and the others to ‘keep their distance,’ ‘to maintain their rank,’ and to ‘not get familiar.’” While a sense of place mainly keeps socially distant groups apart, Bourdieu observes that dominant groups can use proximity strategically. By reducing the spatial distance between themselves and members of the subordinate group, members of the dominant group enhance their legitimacy. These “strategies of condescension” involve “a purely symbolic denegation of distance (‘she is unaffected,’ ‘he is not highbrow’ or ‘stand-offish,’ etc.)” ultimately premised on “a recognition of distances” (p. 16).

While habitus is useful in helping us conceptualize the relationship between social and spatial distance, the notion properly denotes a cognitive system. As such, it is conceived too broadly to operationalize with respect to a single cognitive structure. It is more accurately a metaconcept—“a powerful tool to steer social inquiry and trace out operant social mechanisms” (Wacquant 2009, p. 137)—requiring further specification if we are to actually trace the behavioral outcomes of a given social structure.
A Sense of Place

For my purposes, the value of Herbert Blumer’s (1958) sense of group position model lies in its identification of the cognitive structure mediating a particular social position (racial identity) and behavior (racial discrimination). Against traditional notions of prejudice as individual feelings of antipathy and intolerance towards subordinate racial groups, Blumer argued that prejudice inheres in a conception, not of a specific racial group, but of the *relationship* between the dominant and subordinate racial groups. What matters, to paraphrase Bobo and Zubrinsky (1996:887), is the degree of social distance one group has learned to expect and maintain relative to the other group. Whatever feelings individual members of the dominant racial group have towards members of the subordinate one, whether antipathy or sympathy, as a group they are invested in maintaining their relative status position. Consequently, they exercise their prerogatives as a matter of course and react defensively or anxiously at perceived encroachments on their social space. Bobo (1999), Bobo and Hutchins (1996), and Charles (2006) operationalize Blumer’s hypothesis by factoring certain indicators—perceptions of competitive threat, social distance (being hard to get along with), racial alienation, and inferiority—into a survey model.

But a sense of group position is essentially a hypothesis about how people will behave in situations of racial interaction, and thus can only be fully demonstrated by directly examining behaviors maintaining social distance.

Like habitus, a sense of group position is essentially embodied, functioning mainly as “a general kind of orientation,” “a general feeling without being reducible to specific feelings,” “a general understanding without being composed of any set of specific beliefs,” and “a sense of where the two racial groups *belong*” (1958:5). Blumer describes the dominant group’s sense of
position as consisting of four basic types of “feeling”; a feeling of group superiority, a feeling of intrinsic difference from subordinate groups, a feeling of proprietary claim over valued goods and resources, and a fear of subordinate groups encroaching upon their prerogatives (p. 4). As such, their sense of position functions by exerting normative pressure to maintain appropriate relations. Challenges to these relations—in the form of competition, opposition, or encroachment—arouse the feelings of apprehension and hostility characterizing prejudice. This account is consistent with the evidence from cognitive psychology showing that cognitive structures enact knowledge automatically in the form of sensorimotor reflexes and introspective states (Barsalou 2008, Damasio 2005, Niedenthal 2007).

While Blumer’s (1958) sense of group position hypothesis does not explicitly concern itself with physical space, it provides a model that is easily adapted into a conceptualization combining Bourdieu’s focus on social position with geography’s focus on physical place. In addition to respecifying the model in terms of a class relationship, I reconceive a sense of group position as a sense of place, a commitment to the relative status positioning of groups expressed through their separation in space. Specifically, I elaborate the model in two ways. First, a sense of group position is enacted spatially by drawing or observing symbolic boundaries partitioning space. Second, a sense of group position is activated spatially. Certain types of places (enclaves or slums) or the people associated with those places elicit a certain set of introspective states (the four types of feeling discussed by Blumer), which, in turn, predisposes a certain set of segregating practices (mainly exclusion, avoidance, and circumscription). Thus, the squatter avoids the upscale mall because it makes him feel self-consciousness, uncomfortable, and ashamed. Notably, the cognitive process underlying segregating practices may occur automatically. The environment-cognition link generally occurs unconsciously; the cognition-
behavior link may also bypass conscious mediation, such that we end up navigating our environment by way of “automatic guidance systems” (Bargh and Chartrand 1999:476). The value of this model lies in its specificity. It specifies the cognitive mechanism linking place and place-making practices and thus explains why particular social groups engage in segregating practices. Moreover, it allows us to identify other kinds of spatial practices. Integrating practices largely enact a sense of place, while desegregating practices challenge it.

Data and Methods

I examined the segregating practices of squatters and villagers in Metro Manila, Philippines. I use both terms here as they are used locally; squatters to denote all slum dwellers regardless of tenure status and villagers to denote the residents of gated communities. While each grouping is socioeconomically diverse—slum dwellers include both the subsistence poor and the lower middle class, while both the middle class and the very rich live in villages (although not usually the same ones)—a severe housing shortage resulting from extremely high land values in the metropolis has made legal access to urban land “the crucial dividing line in the city” (Berner 1997:26). Thus the distinction between squatters and villagers represents Metro Manila’s prototypical class division. These groups are obviously unequal across a number of measures and thus hierarchically connected mainly in the context of employment and ecological relationships. Moreover, as the data will make clear, both sides generally conceive their relationship in terms of categorical inequality and interact with respect to a class distinction.
I directly observed segregating practices through participant observation and documented them through interviews. My research consisted of two components: twelve months of participant observation in two households within villages and 189 in-depth interviews with squatters and villagers. I investigated four cases of slums and villages in close proximity—a spatial configuration typical of the metropolis—interviewing around 25 squatters per site (107 total) and around 15 villagers per site plus 20 from civic and professional organizations (82 total). I mainly asked them about their interactions with the squatters/villagers “next door.” In Appendix B, I present the demographic characteristics of my informants, including their age, gender, occupation, and education. This research builds on a cumulative 30 months living and doing qualitative fieldwork in Metro Manila since 2001.

To infer cognition from behavior, first, I identified a broad set of behaviors as segregating practices, defined as practices aimed at keeping apart people recognized as categorically unequal. By aggregating behaviors, I increased the reliability of the behavioral measure (Ajzen and Fishbein 2005:181). Second, I examined segregating practices in both typical and atypical situations of class interaction. (By interaction, I mean having reciprocal influence since segregating practices preempt much actual interaction.) By showing that squatters and villagers, respectively, deploy the same sets of practices in both types of situations, I provide a stronger basis for inferring the sense of place regulating their behavior. As Katz (2001:446) writes, causal inference in ethnography requires observing behavior at different times and places. Third, I employed “inconvenience sampling” (Duneier 2012:8) by deliberately looking for and asking informants about integrating practices. I did this in order to correct for possibly overemphasizing segregating practices at the expense of other kinds of spatial practices.

8 My interviews with squatters were conducted mainly in Filipino and my interviews with villagers in both Filipino and English. All translations are my own.
My cases represent different configurations of proximity between village and slum. In Makati City, exclusive villages are surrounded by relatively poor barangays with significant slum populations. (A barangay is an administrative division within cities and municipalities akin to a neighborhood. It can also refer to the government at that level or the building where that government convenes.) The super-village BF Homes in Parañaque City is subdivided into 82 separately gated villages. It also includes the de la Rama slum, a subdivision occupied by squatters before it could be developed (Figure III.1). In Quezon City, Phil-Am Homes is directly across the street from the San Roque slum. Also in Quezon City, Don Antonio Heights has been “invaded” by hundreds of squatters occupying a number of vacant lots within the village. As we will see, despite the virtual contiguity of slums and villages, interaction between squatters and villagers is carefully regulated by a sense of place.

Segregating Practices

Based on my data, I advance four analytical claims. (1) Villagers initiate segregating practices, while squatters mainly conform to them. (2) Villagers engage in three main types of segregating practices: exclusion, in which they keep squatters out of certain places (mainly their villages), circumscription, in which they keep squatters contained when they (squatters) are inside exclusive places, and avoidance, in which they avoid places associated with the urban poor or keep their distance from them when occupying common spaces. Squatters mainly engage in one type of segregating practice: avoidance. (3) Villagers’ sense of place appears to consist of four basic introspective states: a sense of superiority, a sense of intrinsic difference, a sense of
Figure III.1. A Tale of Two Guardposts (BF Homes). The empty guardpost on the left fronts an informal settlement, a remnant of erstwhile plans to develop the area into a village; the manned guardpost on the right fronts a gated subdivision. The two guardposts face each other across the street. Source: Author.
proprietary claim, and a fear of crime or encroachment. Squatters’ sense of place appears to consist of only one: a sense of inferiority manifesting as an acute self-consciousness of their disvalued status. (4) Villagers primarily identified squatters as such even in situations where other identities were available. Squatters, meanwhile, primarily reacted to places identified with the rich. I demonstrate these claims by documenting a number of segregating practices in various situations. Table III.1 presents a synoptic view of these practices as well as details the cognition underlying them.

Typical Situations of Class Interaction

Employment

Villagers and squatters typically interact in the context of an employment relationship. We see the class character of this relationship most clearly in the homes in villages, where domestic workers live alongside family members but inhabit a different social space. A number of such people are needed to service a single household—maids, cooks, nannies, laundrywomen, secretaries, drivers, gardeners, carpenters, plumbers, manicurists, seamstresses, and errand boys—many of whom live, or will end up living, in an informal settlement just outside the village. In fact, half the squatters I interviewed had worked at one point as domestics. Virtually all domestics are women (except for young boys tasked with odd jobs) and all drivers and day laborers men. This division of labor is spatialized. Women are allowed inside the house, while men, perceived as criminally and sexually threatening, are kept safely outdoors.
Table III.1. Segregating Practices in Typical and Atypical Situations of Class Interaction

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Situation(^1)</th>
<th>Sense of Place</th>
<th>Segregating practice</th>
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<td>Activation</td>
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<td>1. Domestic</td>
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<td>situations)</td>
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<td>2. Caretaking</td>
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<td>Fear of encroachment</td>
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<td>(BF)</td>
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<td>3. Attending</td>
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<td>mass in PA</td>
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<td>4. Attending</td>
<td>Territorial</td>
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<td>events in PA</td>
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<td>5. Barangay</td>
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<td>Day (Mak)</td>
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<td>6. Playing with</td>
<td>Territorial</td>
<td>Fear of crime</td>
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<td>squatters (DA)</td>
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<td>7. Using the</td>
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<td>footbridge (PA)</td>
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<td>1. Domestic</td>
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<td>2. Lining up</td>
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<td>for charity (PA)</td>
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<td>3. High-end</td>
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<td>4. Upscale</td>
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<td>5. Village (BF)</td>
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<td>Villagers</td>
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<td>1. Fire (PA)</td>
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<td>3. Engagement</td>
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<td>dinner</td>
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\(^1\) BF = BF Homes, PA = Phil-Am Homes, DA = Don Antonio, Mak = village in Makati.
The social divide between the family and the help is enacted by a set of practices establishing their separation in domestic space. Consider the various proscriptions on movement within the house. (Here I draw on participant observation in two households in villages in Metro Manila.) Typically, the help enters the house through the back door. Maids may pass through the front door when bearing grocery bags or accompanying small children, but otherwise they go around to the back or side door while the family enters through the front. With the exception of her quarters and the kitchen, the maid’s movement around the house must be justified by an appointed purpose (making the beds, sweeping the floors, collecting the laundry, etc.). This is especially the case as one ascends the higher floors where the family is at its most unguarded. The maid’s presence here must be warranted by a task, and when performing that task—say, replacing the sheets in the master bedroom—the door must be left open.

The maids do not sit around the dining room table or on any piece of the living room set. The only places I have seen them adopt a position of repose while in the main part of the house have been the kitchen and the stairs. Such circumscription is reproduced in their own practice. In one of the households I observed, I invited the maids to watch TV in my bedroom while I was away. Remarkably, despite there being three chairs and a bench, not to mention a bed, I found them sitting on the floor cupping their knees and standing reclined against the molding of the doorframe. Squatters with experience working as domestics consistently described their situation in terms of constraint. “Whatever the boss says you have to do,” complained Manuel, a family driver. “You just have to do it because he’s the boss. When he says, ‘Stay here,’ you can’t go there. When we go to a party and he says, ‘Don’t eat there,’ that’s what you do. ‘Don’t hang out with them. Stay here. Don’t go in the house. Don’t go in the garage.’”
A body of restrictions circumscribes even the day’s most mundane event: mealtime. The meal is made by the help, sometimes along with or under the supervision of the matron of the house. Generally, the family eats first, although on occasion of their running late, they may instruct their help to eat ahead. Such instruction is necessary, otherwise the help will not presume to do so just because the family is absent at the regular mealtime. When plans are diverted and the family decides on impulse to eat out, someone is always reminded to “call the help.” When the family eats, it is expected that the help remain present to serve. It seems typically the case that the help eat the same food as the family, although by definition, since they eat afterwards, leftovers. I have lived in a household, however, where the help prepare their own food separately and are even provided their own set of dining implements. The family and help generally do not share a table (except when eating out, when bringing the kids necessitates bringing the nanny). I often came late to dinner and would eat at an empty dining table, while directly across from me the help would be eating together around their small plastic table in the foyer on the other side of a screen door.

This logic extends beyond the house to the village. Within the village, maids are identifiable by their uniforms, normally a simple white shirt and a floral skirt. They need IDs to reenter the village on the evening of their day off. Without one, they will be held up at the gate until the guard can verify their status by calling their employer. Day laborers as well are screened, and all cars without the requisite sticker certifying residency must surrender their driver’s license for a card—essentially checking themselves in—before being allowed to enter the village. The maid’s movement around the village is also regulated. She goes to the dry goods store specifically to pick up an item for the family’s dinner, to the park to take the kids after school, or to a
neighbor’s house on an errand for the boss. When her movement appears unaccounted for—in other words, when she is out of place—the guards making rounds notify her “family.”

Squatters serve villagers in settings throughout the metropolis, as factory workers in relationships increasingly stripped down to the logic of simple exploitation, as taxi drivers beholden to the owners of the vehicles they drive, and as vendors plying traffic-paralyzed roads to sell motorists water, peanuts, and dust rags. In one of my cases, squatters served two villages, one inhabited by the living and one by the dead, since the De la Rama settlement is flanked on one side by a village (BF Homes) and on the other by a cemetery (Manila Memorial). If not working as domestic and day laborers in the one, they worked in the other as caretakers of internment plots several times the size of their own living space. Like the village, the cemetery is gated against the slum and guards allow caretakers entry only during certain hours of the day (Figure III.2).

Urban Ecology

Villagers and squatters typically interact in urban space. The segregating practices that characterize this interaction create classed patterns of urban community. Mainly, villagers preserve the exclusivity of their villages by securing the gates enclosing them. For the residents of Phil-Am Homes, the issue of gates is more complicated than usual because their village includes a church whose parish covers part of the San Roque slum directly across Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). On one hand, the village association has pushed to keep the gates closed mainly in order to deter crime, which is reflexively blamed on the squatters “next door.” With only around 600 households, Phil-Am Homes has three separate security groups: the barangay
Figure III.2. On the left, a squatter from the De la Rama slum works on a mausoleum in the Manila Memorial Cemetery (note the air-conditioning unit). On the right, the cemetery wall abuts the De la Rama slum. Source: Author.
According to the latter, criminal incidents—mainly break-ins and car thefts—occur once every two months within Phil-Am. On the other hand, the church in league with the barangay has lobbied to facilitate the entry of parishioners during mass time. Half the parishioners of Santa Rita de Casia come from outside the village (not just from San Roque but from areas all around Phil-Am), and its revenue dips when the gates are kept closed. When I visited in 2010, the contending parties had struck a compromise. The main gate on EDSA was set aside for villagers’ exclusive use, while parishioners had to use the side gate on West Avenue. In practice, the guards did not seem to discriminate between villagers and people driving cars. I drove through the main gate many times and was either waved through or momentarily detained as guards asked where I was headed. Closing the EDSA gate, however, posed a major inconvenience to the residents of San Roque, who were likely on foot, sometimes with children in tow. They were forced to walk over a kilometer out of their way just to attend mass.

Gates are not the only class boundary, only the most obvious one. Barangay Phil-Am is exceptional given the extent to which it includes the residents of San Roque as part of its constituency. Squatters are invited to attend barangay and church events within the village such as concerts, carnivals, and bazaars, and “adopted” as beneficiaries of social service programs. At the same time, their presence within the village is circumscribed. According to a past director of the village association, during such events, Phil-Am’s three security groups coordinate to monitor the movement of squatters from entry to egress. The number of squatters allowed inside the village is limited by quota, since the barangay hires someone to distribute tickets in San Roque prior to events. In some cases, the church or barangay hosts separate or segregated events for the different communities. For example, the church sponsored the philharmonic orchestra for
villagers and bingo for its parishioners from San Roque, in the words of one church organizer, “because they like gambling.” On Halloween, children from San Roque are allowed to trick-or-treat inside the village but only from 6 to 9 pm, after the village children have made their rounds. “You can see the difference,” said Gina, the barangay secretary. “The Phil-Am kids go around with their maids. Some are driven around. The San Roque kids go on foot. The Phil-Am kids have their own pumpkins. The San Roque kids have plastic bags.”

In “mixed” situations, segregation may occur automatically through mutual avoidance. Unlike Barangay Phil-Am, which is coextensive with Phil-Am village, the barangay of San Lorenzo, Makati, includes both villagers and squatters within its jurisdiction. San Lorenzo’s Barangay Day, held expressly to foster interaction among barangay residents, could hardly subordinate the distinction between squatters and villagers to their common status as barangay constituents. Bernie, a barangay councilor, described the scene.

We hold Barangay Day in the [village] park, so we have to herd these people from, you know [the slum], but they are so used to it already. The idea of Barangay Day is for people to mingle, to get to know one another, but what happens is that they group among themselves. And it’s quite easy to tell who’s who. Like, for example, we have the food spread out, you know. You see these people, they eat right away and rush, something like that. Otherwise I’ve noticed, when they are here, they try to behave. But you know, the kind of entertainment they prefer is different. Because they go for, like, gay standup comedians, as compared to the villagers who appreciate classical music. But these people, definitely, they want a Wowowee-type of entertainment. [Wowowee is a popular lowbrow game show.]

Knowing “these people” are squatters, Bernie can only see them as such. He evaluates their contradictory behavior—rushing to eat and not rushing (“behaving”)—in the same terms, as evidence of their intrinsic difference. A strong sense of intrinsic difference makes segregation
seem natural. For example, the twins Elmer and Emma recounted having once played with the squatters living just down the street from their family’s house in Don Antonio.

When we were kids, we used to play with them. Maybe we knew that they were poor but we weren’t aware that they were squatting. We were told, “Don’t play with them. You’ll pick up their bad habits.” Like being noisy and their way of speaking. […] I remember that this guy Ronald stole our snack. Looking back, we knew it was wrong even then, that it wasn’t something we would do. After that, we didn’t really want to play with them anymore.

The boy Ronald came to represent their knowledge of squatters as a class. Consequently, segregation appeared to them a natural arrangement given the intrinsic divide in civility between “classes.”

Broadly, villagers describe an experience of the public city as repellent and treacherous and report avoiding public spaces such as parks and pedestrian thoroughfares. These spaces are implicitly identified with the poor. Phil-Am residents, for example, avoid using the footbridge connecting their side of EDSA to the San Roque side because they fear being waylaid. To get to the Trinoma mall on the San Roque side, they end up driving two and a half kilometers (having to U-turn along EDSA and go around the mall) just to cross the street.

For their part, squatters experience the boundary drawn against them as painful. Myrna described attending one of Phil-Am’s charity events.

They give us a kilo of rice, a can of noodles, sardines, and you line up behind a long, long line, waiting half the day while they’re taking your picture. It hurts. It stings. That’s why we avoid the rich, because they see us as trash.

Because, like Myrna, most squatters were acutely aware of the stigma attached to their tenurial status (and because avoidance is hard to observe), it was easier to infer behavior from their
cognition of places identified with villagers. Being in such places, squatters reported an intense self-consciousness verging on shame, which led them to restrict their own movement upon pain of feeling out of place. This finding is consistent with Pinches’ (1991) description of acts of shaming inflicted from above and a sense of shame conceived from below effecting social—in this case, spatial—closure. “I used to go to Shangri-La [a five-star hotel] a lot because of my boss,” Manuel recalled. “When I would go, I would look at what other people were looking at, and it felt like they were all looking at me.” “It’s like we’re maids there,” Ella said of Trinoma, the upmarket mall nearby. “When I go there [BF Homes],” said Ruben, “they think I’m a thief.” Just like the maid needs a broom or new sheets to enter the master bedroom—some sign that her entry has been appointed and her presence there purely functional—squatters reported needing “a purpose” to venture inside a village.

George: When they need you, they’ll call for you. You can’t just enter or they’ll say, ‘Hey, you can’t just hang out here!’
MG: How do they know that you’re not supposed to be there?
George: That’s another thing. If you don’t appear decent, they’ll probably think you come from the slum with bad intentions. But maybe if they see you with a hammer or something, ‘Oh, that’s just a construction boy, we can let him in.’

Atypical Situations of Class Interaction

By demonstrating that segregating practices are not delimited to a set of typical situations of class interaction but also occur in contingent, extreme, and exceptional situations, we expand the basis for inferring the existence of a durable sense of place predisposing these practices. The outbreak of a particularly severe fire in San Roque one night in 2004 provides an example of a contingent situation where villagers automatically reconfigured space to maintain their social
distance from squatters. Seeing the fire, Phil-Am residents went to secure their main gate against looters, “but when we saw those people carrying months-old babies,” Ernesto recalled, “when you see pregnant women and kids in slippers [crossing EDSA]—.” The village association and barangay mobilized to allow inside a certain number of “refugees”—500 in total—but kept them carefully contained within the perimeter of the covered basketball court. The squatters were monitored around the clock by rotating shifts of security personnel. They were forbidden to stray beyond the court, even to the skating rink or playground right beside it. When some wanted to leave, they had to be escorted out. After five days, the barangay captain could no longer ignore “the clamor” for use of the basketball court, and the squatters were transferred to the care of the barangay actually responsible for them.

Don Antonio represents an extreme situation where squatters live inside a village. In this case too we see villagers respond to the presence of squatters by partitioning the village into class-distinct places. Squatters breached a part of Don Antonio that had never properly been walled in. One section of Don Vicente, the southern perimeter street, is virtually indistinguishable from the slum outside—with houses of plywood, aluminum, and concrete growing out of each other along a street crowded by cargo trucks and tricycles—while the rest of it, flanked by high walls crowned with arrow-tipped iron bars, remains in keeping with the village’s “aesthetic of security” (Caldeira 1999). Walls simply start where the row of open frontages stops; there is no boundary but the contrast. Villagers briefly succeeded in walling off Don Vicente, but the wall had to be dismantled upon orders from the Quezon City government. (Because Don Antonio depends on the city to maintain its roads, its roads are public domain and cannot be barricaded by private citizens.) Elsewhere within the village, squatters occupy lots abandoned to caretakers.
who have taken the initiative to sell the right to squat. This practice resulted in a situation Lena
found completely intolerable: her own maid living next door to her.

We had a big fight with our maid and let her go. It’s because she was so
hardheaded. Then one day she came to us and said, ‘Ate, ate [older sister], I now
have a house and lot in Don Antonio.’ We said, ‘This woman’s shameless! Where
did she end up? [Laughing] What, same street!’ Turned out that she was sold a
piece of land. So we asked, ‘Where did that land come from?’ Turned out that one
squatter, just a caretaker, sold her land without a title. Anyway, the owner found
out and got rid of them. But for a time, on our street, there were so many of them.
It wasn’t safe. And even our maid was there! [Laughing]

The vehemence of Lena’s reaction—indignation leavened by an appreciation of the humor in the
situation now that it has passed—suggests the extent to which her maid’s actions represented a
violation of the social order conveyed by her sense of place. For Esmerelda, the presence of
squatters inside the village warranted a state of alert. “There are 200 [villager] families in Don
Antonio,” she told me. “The lot next door is only 800 square meters but thirty [squatter] families
live there.” They tap her electricity and water and, most disconcertingly, represent a criminal
threat. Her house has already been broken into once and her maids hogtied, but the intruder was
frightened off when her husband brandished his gun. She has since partitioned her own house,
installing a gate in between floors, and has herself learned how to use a gun. Esmerelda and her
neighbors have themselves taken the initiative by walling or guarding the vacant lots and alleys
adjacent to their property (sometimes even without the consent of their owners, who can be hard
to locate, often having long absconded to the States). They regard each parcel as a space that
must be defended, as if engaged with squatters in a game of Go. Heightening the walls around
property, securing vacant lots, and, in Esmerelda’s case, dividing her house with a gate describe
a pattern of spatial involution consistent with a conception of squatters as best kept at a remove.
Finally, in an exceptional case, a large, garrulous squatter from de la Rama recounted breaking off his engagement with “a rich woman.” It is unclear from Antonio’s story whether the slight that undid his relationship was intended or simply imagined. What emerges clearly, however, is the power of a sense of place to undermine even non-hierarchical relationships. A simple question cut Antonio to the quick, unleashing all the self-doubt that comes with marrying outside one’s place.

Her mother said, and her sister, “Anton, why are you in such a hurry to get married?” What does that mean? We’re there for their support, right? We’re asking for their permission to get married. I wasn’t there to be interrogated or investigated, right? You know what that means? “What are you after? Fe’s inheritance? Her money or what? Her land, her work?” I said, “Ate, maybe Fe and I should talk about it some more. Maybe we’re not yet ready.” We’re old enough to be ready! […] Of course she was affected. “Fe, you’re old enough, why did you pick someone from the squatter area?” Imagine that. See? I was to be married. Our papers were done. […] That meant, “What are you after from our sister? Her this, or that, or that?!” No. We love each other, but I’m not fighting anymore because I know what will happen.

Integrating Practices

Integrating practices are practices that bring together people across class. For the most part, villagers use integrating practices in ways that are consistent with their sense of place (claim 5). Integrating practices limited by a sense of place represent an exceptional suspension of spatial boundaries and recall what Bourdieu (1989:16) termed “strategies of condescension.” In my data, integrating practices mainly took the form of invitations; in domestic settings, invitations extended to the help to partake in family events. Specifically, the help was granted access to parts of the house normally forbidden to them. These invitations were largely conditional. In one
household, the maids were allowed to use the TV room but only after dinner had been prepared and served and before the table had to be cleared. They were allowed to use the dining table on special occasions, on birthdays or feast days, but never at the same time as the family.

In the following example, an atypical situation, we see an integrating practice deployed strategically. In the wake of a massive protest by the urban poor (Edsa 3), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo not only pardoned some of the demonstrators that had been arrested but invited them to breakfast at Malacañang. Annie, a squatter from just outside Don Antonio, remembered the visit vividly; the dimensions of the palace, the luxurious carpeting, the gold utensils, and the Continental breakfast that left her hungry. Seated at the president’s breakfast table she was given a prepared speech and asked to read it as if it expressed her own sentiments. The speech had her apologize for making trouble and promise not to do so again. “It went against how I really felt,” she said.

I didn’t protest to cause trouble; I did it for my country. But I couldn’t say that and so I just read the speech. [Afterwards] I threw it away—even though I usually keep such things—because I didn’t want to think about it. I felt terrible.

In this case, an integrating practice—the invitation to Malacañang—was used to cow Annie and the other guests into complying with an orchestrated performance of reconciliation.

I have little evidence for integrating practices that actually negate class. A few informants described employment relationships apparently conducted without reference to a sense of place, but without in-depth information (the kind obtained through participant observation) I cannot validate this characterization. In any case, their descriptions suggest what truly integrating practices might look like. “I had a boss,” Carmen said, “who didn’t treat us like the help. He didn’t make us wear uniforms for helpers. Whatever the food was, we ate together. The glass he
used was our glass and his plate ours.” Similarly, Lydia described doing the laundry with her old boss. “She soaped, I rinsed. When I finished rinsing, she hung the clothes on the line. [Later] I ironed them while she folded. In the Philippines, this doesn’t happen often. They treat you like an animal.”

Desegregating Practices

Bayat (1997) on “quiet encroachment,” Benjamin (2008) on “occupancy urbanism,” and Holston (1999) on “insurgent citizenship” similarly suggest that the urban poor’s appropriation of urban space constitutes a *radical* claim insofar as it prioritizes human need over proprietary claims. Radical claims are made through desegregating practices, defined as the appropriation of urban spaces under private or public proprietary claim. Squatters’ desegregating practices contravene the dominant sense of place and thus may set up or advance situations of contention (claim 6). Squatters resort to these practices largely out of necessity, but also for strategic reasons (mainly in order to profit from them). Table III.2 presents a synoptic view of the desegregating practices I discuss below.

Facing the impending demolition of their community, the members of an organization in San Roque advocated land sharing instead of relocation. “Make room for us here,” Teody proposed, instead of “driving us away beyond our livelihoods.” “We just want to talk to [the land developers] and come to some agreement where both sides win…but they don’t take us seriously.” The Tierra Maria village association in BF Homes closed off their gate bordering part
### Table III.2. Desegregating Practices in Everyday Class Contention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situations</th>
<th>Squatters</th>
<th>Villagers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Desegregating practices</td>
<td>Cognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Appropriation)</td>
<td>(Radical sense of place)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The impending demolition of a slum</td>
<td>Squatters claim right to occupied land</td>
<td>Need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. A village closing its gate against a slum</td>
<td>Squatters claim use of the village gate in certain cases</td>
<td>Need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Vendor occupying the sidewalk</td>
<td>Vendor claims public space for the poor</td>
<td>Need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Carpark boys</td>
<td>Carpark boys claim parking spaces for their own dispensation</td>
<td>Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Guard rents out employer’s easement to squatters</td>
<td>Guard claims “idle” land in order to extort payment from owner</td>
<td>Strategy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

84
of the de la Rama slum. The squatters objected on the basis of need. “We wouldn’t have a way to pass,” Marissa complained. “Our water wouldn’t be delivered or construction materials for our homes.” They pressured the municipal government to broker a settlement allowing them use of the gate for approved deliveries and in case of emergencies (otherwise they use a farther entrance). The same dynamics of contention also manifest as competing claims on public space.

A lawyer walking along the sidewalk on which Marietta was selling eggplant threatened to sue her for “trespassing” after her dog tried to bite his son. “No,” she recounted telling him. “It’s you who’s trespassing!”

Squatters may advance a radical sense of place for strategic reasons by putting themselves in positions to take advantage of villagers’ discomfort, vexation, and bother. Carpark boys appropriate the parking spaces around an establishment in order to guide cars into them for a small fee (usually the change accumulated in the vehicle’s cup holder). I once objected to paying these boys on the grounds that I neither needed nor wanted their help parking. My companion, a lifelong Manileña, rolled down her window and paid them anyway. “You don’t know what they might do to the car,” she warned. It became clear to me that, from the villager’s perspective, you had to pay these boys not to damage the car. The assumption being that they would be given to doing so otherwise (such was their nature). The boys made their living capitalizing on this fear.

Similarly, professional squatters occupy land primarily in order to profit from it either by renting out plots or extorting payment from owners in exchange for vacating. Selene purchased a lot outside Don Antonio and paid to have the squatters removed from its easement (the area around a property, e.g., the frontage, to which the property owner has certain rights). She hired a guard to secure the property. He set up an outpost along the easement and then built an outhouse beside it. Before long, the guard started renting out plots to squatters. When Selene confronted him, he
agreed to clear the area for a price. She paid, ejected him, and put up stilts along the easement to
discourage squatting. Now her stilts are the object of routine complaints from squatters who want
to make use of the “idle” land.

Conclusion

The following six claims encapsulate my findings.

(1) Villagers initiate segregating practices, while squatters mainly conform to them.

(2) Villagers engage in three main types of segregating practices (exclusion, circumscription,
    and avoidance), while squatters mainly engage in one (avoidance).

(3) Villagers’ sense of place consists of four basic introspective states (a sense of superiority,
    a sense of intrinsic difference, a sense of proprietary claim, and a fear of crime or
    encroachment), while squatters’ sense of place consists of only one (a sense of inferiority).

(4) Villagers primarily identified squatters as such even in situations where other identities
    were available, while squatters primarily reacted to places identified with the rich.

(5) Villagers use integrating practices in ways that are consistent with their sense of place.

(6) Squatters’ desegregating practices contravene the dominant sense of place and thus may
    set up or advance situations of contention.

My findings speak to the dynamics of power in Metro Manila. We see that villagers’ initiative to
exclude is predicated on their control of certain “premium” spaces and the resources
encompassed within them (jobs, goods, and services). The intensity of their exclusion, however, suggests that they regard their control of these spaces as under threat given the extent of the metro’s "squatter problem"—i.e., the housing crisis and resulting disaccommodation of a significant percentage of urban residents. Thus villagers act out of insecurity, gating and guarding every bit of land they possess. We see also that these exclusive spaces ground, quite literally, villagers’ claims to categorical superiority. They are not simply better off but better because they live “in here” while others must live “out there.” “Breaches” that compromise their exclusivity and render them less able to maintain a sense of place effectively erode their class power. Meanwhile, the reactionary stance squatters adopt indicates their lack of symbolic power. In her study of how people manage the stigma of living in trailer parks, Kusenbach (2009:27) found that her informants deployed the degrading terms used against them to distinguish themselves from others in the same situation. Similarly, squatters are led to conform to the dominant sense of place by their own sense of inferiority. They regulate their own movement, avoiding places “above” their status. Dissension in the form of desegregating practices is not based on the rehabilitation of their status as squatters. Desegregating practices largely represent efforts to meet their basic needs. If these efforts collectively amount to an “insurgent citizenship,” as Holston (1999) contends, then it is an unintentional insurgency.

Secondly, my findings speak to the dynamics of class in Metro Manila. The salience of territorial identities among my informants indicates the articulation of class primarily in terms of territory. This development has been attributed to the acceleration of enclavization and slum growth in the 1990s (Berner 1997). It has resulted in class contention becoming increasingly spatial in nature, involving, as my data feature, both contention over urban space and contentious claim making through spatial practices, such as occupation, appropriation, and transgression.
A strong sense of place forecloses the possibility of what Anderson (2011) calls “cosmopolitan canopies,” public spaces where people from different racial and class backgrounds who otherwise interact in terms of difference can interact on the basis of equality. He argues that encountering others in such non-stratified settings encourages the practice of civility. In Metro Manila, the problem is not a lack of public spaces, but the power of a sense of place to regulate class interaction in all spaces. Segregating practices keep out people recognized as categorically unequal, keep them contained, and keep them apart. They partition urban space so intensively that interaction across class groups is effectively limited to class interaction, that is, interaction on the basis of inequality. Finally, my research has substantial implications for the study of segregation.

Racial segregation in the United States is mainly explained through a place stratification model where individual and institutional behaviors, specifically residential choice and discrimination, result in people being sorted into different neighborhoods by race. Scholars account for residential choice, however, by measuring survey respondents’ preferences for integration. Racial attitudes and stereotypes are shown to predict these preferences, and these preferences, in turn, are shown to predict the racial composition of respondents’ neighborhoods (Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996; Charles 2003, 2006; Krysan and Farley 2002). Residential choice is not directly observed and thus the causal connection between preferences and behavior is inferred rather than demonstrated. While scholars consider discriminatory practices by brokers and lenders (e.g., racial steering and redlining), they do so mainly with regard to its aggregate impact on patterns of residential segregation (Massey and Denton 1993, Yinger 1995). In short, both approaches define segregation in terms of residential patterns and neglect actual segregating behaviors as the point of analysis.
Approaching segregation as a practice rather than as simply an outcome improves the study of segregation in two ways. First, an ethnographic approach enables a focus on how segregation actually happens in concrete situations and can therefore provide a better account of the cognitive process underlying social segregation. We are better able to answer questions like: Why do people engage in segregating practices? Do they act reflexively or deliberately? (In other words, are their racial attitudes implicit or explicit?) And how do situational factors influence their behavior? Second, an ethnographic approach enables us to look beyond residential patterns at patterns of interaction and association in institutional settings and the urban environment. Focusing on the “micro-ecology” of segregation enables us to observe social differentiation on a “granular” scale (Tredoux and Dixon 2009). On this scale, we are able to appreciate the role of segregating practices in shaping our spatial routines within such settings and, consequently, our experiences of the social world. Thus, an ethnographic approach can serve to complement or correct demographic studies such as Glaeser and Vigdor’s (2012) showing declining rates of racial residential segregation across the United States. Do more integrated neighborhoods mean greater interracial association? To what extent do segregating practices limit substantive association in neighborhoods, schools, and workplaces? We can better address these questions by focusing on segregating practices and the sense of place behind them.
CHAPTER IV
A Cognitive Economy of Class Contention

The spectacle of Joseph Estrada being taken into police custody on April 25, 2001, instigated the massing along Epifanio de los Santos Highway (EDSA) of demonstrators heavily composed of the urban poor. Estrada, a populist figure in Philippine politics, had just been deposed from the presidency in January on grounds of corruption by a protest led by the middle class. On word of his impending arrest, supporters gathered outside his house in an exclusive subdivision in Metro Manila, blockading the gates with their bodies. Despite attacking the crowd with teargas and water cannons, it took two hundred policemen four hours to make their way through using riot shields and batons. With Estrada’s arrest and the publication of his mugshot in the newspapers, the number of people gathered at the landmark shrine along EDSA—where the demonstrations that toppled the dictator Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 (Edsa 1) and Estrada three months earlier (Edsa 2) had taken place—grew exponentially, probably exceeding one million people over the course of the seven-day demonstration. Ultimately, a contingent of 300,000 demonstrators marched on Malacañang, the presidential palace. Using dump trucks and the sheer force of their numbers, they breached five cement barricades along the ten kilometer stretch. Reaching the gates of Malacañang, they resumed their protest activities until being violently dispersed by combined police and military forces. The residents of Metro Manila’s slums and gated

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9 The Philippine Daily Inquirer estimated that the number of protestors reached 1.5 million (Pablo and Veridiano 2001, May 1:A1).
subdivisions, known locally as squatters and villagers (which is how I refer to them hereafter),
framed what came to be known as Edsa 3 in antithetical ways. Villagers saw Edsa 3 as
illegitimate, the result of the poor being manipulated by Estrada’s political allies and cronies.
Squatters saw the demonstration as a legitimate response to the injustice of Estrada’s ouster. To
explain why squatters and villagers framed Edsa 3 antithetically, we need to account for the
cognitive assumptions underlying their interpretations.

The sociological reflex would be to connect squatters’ and villagers’ different social
positions to their different framings of Edsa 3 through an instrumental account of class interests
or an expressive account of class identity. Neither approach, however, precludes studying
cognition. Indeed, both require it in order to achieve more complete explanations. First, class
interests are not immediately apparent. People from the same class may recognize different
interests. Furthermore, what people see as being in their interest may not actually be so. A
number of indicators suggest that, from the point of view of their material interests, Estrada was
actually bad for the poor (Balisacan 2001). This “fact,” however, did little to dim the urban
poor’s belief to the contrary. Interests are clearly mediated by cognition, a point that Weber
makes succinctly with his “switchman” metaphor (“world images” being the switchmen
determining the course of self-interested action). The proper question, therefore, is a cognitive
one, i.e., why people perceive their interests as such. This question requires us to identify the
beliefs that inform and motivate people’s behavior; to establish, in Boudon’s (2003) terms, their
cognitive rationality. Second, it is not clear that either squatters or villagers possess a strong
sense of class identity. The evidence suggests the opposite: fragmentation along territorial and
organizational lines (Karaos 1995, 1997). A cognitive view of identity as “widely shared ways of
seeing, thinking, parsing social experience, and interpreting the social world” allows us to focus
on social cognition or the cognitive structures commonly held by members of a social group (Brubaker 2006:79, Howard 2000). We can thus examine these structures without presuming that the people holding them identify themselves as a group. Finally, we need a cognitive approach simply to make sense of the disjunction between each side’s framing of Edsa 3. Squatters and villagers did not just interpret Edsa 3 differently; they constructed its reality differently by attending to different information, selectively or falsely recalling information, and making inferences where information was inconclusive. Explaining cognitive disjunction requires accounting for the processes whereby cognitive structures shape our sense of reality.

To proceed, I propose an innovative method for analyzing cognition, integrating insights from three cultural approaches to cognition and grounding them explicitly in the social psychological literature on social cognition. The procedure involves, first, coding as schemas or frames recurring views leading to squatters’ and villagers’ interpretations of Edsa 3; second, identifying the cognitive logic linking each group’s schemas to its framing of Edsa 3 through sequence analysis; and third, illustrating how each group constructed Edsa 3 according to its cognitive logic by comparing accounts drawn from qualitative and archival data. Employing this procedure, I show how squatters’ and villagers’ different class and state schemas conditioned the elaboration of distinct cognitive logics predisposing their antithetical framing of Edsa 3. By identifying the knowledge central to the political subjectivities of Metro Manila’s rich and poor, we clarify the grounds of their contention over Estrada. We are also better able to explain their positions on a larger set of issues, including political leadership, democracy, and citizenship. In short, a cognitive economy approach enables an empirical accounting of the civic divide posited by postcolonial theorists (e.g., Chatterjee 1993) without conceding to blunt conceptions of social
heterogeneity. It can be applied more generally to excavate the knowledge underlying social thought and action.

Approaches to Cognition in Cultural Sociology

I review three approaches to cognition in cultural sociology. My aim here is not to provide a comprehensive account of each literature but simply to underscore the distinctive features of each approach.

Cultural Reception

The literature on cultural reception points to the cognitive assumptions underlying interpretation. It links these assumptions to particular cultures and social positions. Griswold (1987) asks why West Indian, British, and American reviewers tend to emphasize different aspects of George Lamming’s novels; respectively, themes of national identity, their language and literary qualities, and racial themes. She argues that what they see as meaningful reflects their particular expectations and concerns. Meaning is “fabricated,” she writes, “when a cultural object engages at least some of the presuppositions of the person encountering it” (p. 1080). De Vault (1990) emphasizes the social character of interpretation. She contrasts her own “gendered reading” of a novel by Nadine Gordimer with the different way that novel is read “professionally” by critics. She concludes that readers arrive at interpretations by drawing upon “a particular stock of background knowledge shaped by experiences in different social locations” (p. 914). Shively (1992) found that both “Indians” and “Anglos” enjoyed watching a Western starring John Wayne
but for different reasons. For Indians, the film represented “a fantasy of being free” given its portrayal of the cowboy’s lifestyle and the Western landscape. Anglos saw the film as an authentic portrayal of their past—as a “primitive myth.” Again, the presuppositions of different groups lead to their different interpretations of a cultural object. Biesel (1993) shows that the same social group will interpret a cultural object differently if it comes to be associated with a disvalued social group. In the late nineteenth century, New York’s upper crust judged photographs of nude paintings to be artistic or obscene depending on the social class of people who bought them. If bought by the “uncultured masses,” then they were thought to inspire lust and were therefore regarded as obscene. Similarly, Binder (1993) examines the media rhetoric against heavy metal and rap music. Heavy metal is commonly framed as corrupting, while rap is commonly framed as being dangerous to society. The two kinds of framing, Binder argues, imply different “referent images.” Corruption frames have as their reference the journalist’s own children, while danger to society frames have as their reference young urban black males. She concludes that the difference in the media’s discourse on rap and heavy metal has much to do with racial perceptions of the groups associated with each type of music. In each case, the engagement of certain presuppositions or schemas, whether racial, class, gender, or national, determines the meaning people make of cultural objects.

Culture and Inequality

Recent conceptions of culture as fragmented and internally variable have led to the rejection of constructs like norms and values for their presumption of consensus within groups (Adams and Markus 2004, DiMaggio 1997). Cultural explanations of unequal or differential outcomes have become more precise, utilizing analytical tools such as schemas, frames, narratives, and symbolic
boundaries to parse “culture” into empirically verifiable patterns (Small, Harding, and Lamont 2010). This approach is distinctive for tracking the influence of cognitive structures on social thought and action. Steensland (2006) ascribes the fall of guaranteed annual income proposals in the 1970s to their identification as proposals for welfare. This schema framed the terms of debate over such proposals and effectively doomed their chances of being adopted as social policy. He also shows that different groups’ schemas of these proposals shaped how they defined their interests. Business groups supported or opposed them depending on whether they saw them as strengthening or weakening work incentives. Gerteis (2002) cites the Knights of Labor’s class schema to explain why, in the late 1880s, the class-based organization moved to include black workers while excluding other nonwhite workers. He argues that the Knights of Labor understood class principally in terms of civic virtue. Blacks were thus seen as potential class allies because they possessed the capacity for civic virtue. Chinese and Southeastern European immigrants, meanwhile, were thought incapable of civic virtue given their lack of republican socialization and thus seen as inimical to the organization’s class interests. Biernacki (1997) argues that British and German textile workers acquired different schemas of labor by engaging in different practices of production. In British mills, employers kept track of a worker’s output, paid workers for the length of fabric woven, and instilled time-discipline by bolting factory doors at the start of the workday. In German mills, employers kept track of a worker’s time, paid them according to an efficiency ratio (as measured by the number of shots of the shuttle), and instilled time-discipline by using punch clocks and fining them. As a result of these different practices, British workers recognized the value of their labor as embodied in finished products while German workers recognized their labor power as the commodity of value. These different
schemas led them to understand class struggle differently as well as to engage in different forms of collective action.

**Cognitive Sociology**

Cognitive sociology, finally, is distinguished by its foregrounding of the cognitive process. It has focused primarily on how mental acts such as perceiving, attending, classifying, interpreting, and remembering construct our experience of social reality. We learn to perform these acts according to the norms we are socialized into as members of particular “thought communities” (Zerubavel 1991, 1997). Thus cognitive sociology regards cognition as fundamentally social. This literature has increasingly drawn upon cognitive science to elaborate the kinds and qualities of cognition: cognition that is hot and cold, automatic and deliberate (Cerulo 2010); cognition as practical knowledge, as situated—contingent on the social and environmental contexts in which it operates—and as embodied in affective, introspective, and sensorimotor responses (Harvey 2009, Ignatow 2007, Lizardo and Strand 2009, Vaisey 2009). Compared to cognitive science, however, the advantage of a cognitive sociology is its study of cognition as a socially situated activity (Cerulo 2002). Scholars have produced insightful ethnographic and historical accounts of cognitive processes. Vaughan (1986) describes the “uncoupling” of long-term romantic relationships as a protracted process involving the assimilation of new knowledge. The initiator of the breakup must detach herself from the social patterns that have established the relationship through a series of practical moves, including displaying discontent, leaning emotionally on “transitional” people, flirting or actually cheating, and trying to mend the relationship as a “termination strategy.” These moves are not engaged in “with malice aforethought,” Vaughan writes, but rather reflect the initiator’s efforts to habituate a new understanding of herself as
“uncoupled” (p. 27). This cognition is enacted by these new practices. Her partner, meanwhile, continues to participate in the couple’s established routines and, as a result, fails to recognize these moves as signals. They get “drowned out” by the established meaning of these routines for the partner, i.e., that he remains coupled. Only by undergoing a similar transition—which Vaughan likens to a period of mourning—is he able to accept the new reality. Zerubavel’s (1992) account of America’s “discovery” involves a similar blindness requiring a mental shift to undo; in this case the process lasted almost 300 years. To be truly discovered, America had to be seen as a single and separate geographical entity fully detached from Asia—a cognition contingent on the accretion of geographical knowledge and subject to cartographic contestation. Its discovery presupposed an expanded view of the world that Columbus and his fifteenth century cohort simply lacked.

Social Cognition

These cultural approaches are broadly consistent with the literature on social cognition. I discuss this literature here in order to ground theoretically their distinctive elements. Social cognition is primarily concerned with the representation and use of social knowledge (Fiske and Taylor 1984; Howard 1990, 1995; Howard and Renfrow 2003; Markus and Zajonc 1985; Taylor 1998). It focuses mainly on the role of cognitive structures in mediating our experience of the social world. Most of this literature is about schemas, “cognitive structures that represent organized knowledge about a given concept or type of stimulus” (Fiske and Taylor 1984:140; also Casson 1983, D’Andrade 1995, Fiske and Linville 1980, Fiske and Morling 1996, Rumelhart 1980).
Schemas represent a top-down or theory-driven mode of information processing, as opposed to a bottom-up or data-driven mode in which we interact with the social world deliberately. Schemas simplify cognition in the interest of cognitive efficiency by leading us to recognize new information in light of general cases. Howard and Renfrow (2003) describe schemas as everyday theories; every schematic application posits a set of expectations about the nature of a given stimulus that help us make sense of, or recognize, it across various situations. In this sense, the schema functions as a “mental recognition device” (D’Andrade 1995:136), constantly processing information for its goodness-of-fit with preconceived mental models.

Schemas are implicated in cognitive processes such as attention, memory, and inference. Generally, they guide these processes toward information that is relevant and often consistent with their content. Brewer and Treyens (1981) asked participants to wait in a room described as an office. A moment later, they were taken into another room and examined on the contents of the “office.” Almost everyone recalled the desk and chair and almost no one the wine bottle and picnic basket (being schema-inconsistent items). Some even remembered books when there were no books in the room. In another study (Freeman, Romney, and Freeman 1987), participants in a seminar were asked to recall who attended a particular session. Informants forgot a number of participants, while some who were absent were falsely recalled. These errors were systematically biased toward the long-term or regular pattern of attendance. In other words, informants erred in ways that were consistent with their schema of the event. To be clear, schemas do not markedly distort available information. It is when information is lacking or ambiguous that they exert considerable influence in directing the inferences we make (Markus and Zajonc 1985:162). Duncan (1976) shows that white subjects were far more likely to label an ambiguous action (a shove) as violent when the perpetrator was black. When the perpetrator was white, they
interpreted the shove as playful or aggressive behavior. People not only interpret information in ways that are consistent with their schemas, they also act in ways that confirm their beliefs. For example, beliefs that physically attractive people are friendly and physically unattractive people shy predispose people to act in ways that bring out those very qualities in other people (Snyder 1984:251). This research highlights the active construction of reality as a fundamental premise of social cognition (Adams and Markus 2004, Fiske and Taylor 1984).

This idea has clear implications for sociological inquiry. It points to cognitive structures as key mechanisms in the construction of reality. It also suggests the need for a comparative study of cognition—a study of cognitive disjunction—as a means of counterbalancing the authority of any one account (especially the dominant one) and embedding cognition in particular social locations. This approach is particularly applicable in cases of contentious politics. To explain why two social groups experienced the same event in radically different ways, I develop an analytical procedure integrating the key elements of the cultural approaches reviewed above; namely, cultural reception’s distinction between levels of cognition, culture and inequality’s specification of the cognitive structures shaping social thought and action, and cognitive sociology’s emphasis on the power of cognitive processes to construct reality. First, I identify recurring views brought to bear on each group’s interpretation of the event as schemas or frames. Second, I identify the cognitive logic linking each group’s schemas to its framing of the event. Third, I illustrate the application of each group’s logic to its construction of the event (Table IV.1). We begin by clarifying the distinction between schemas and frames.
Table IV.1. Analytical Procedure¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultural Approach</th>
<th>Analytical Procedure</th>
<th>Method</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Reception: Two levels of cognition</td>
<td>1. Code recurring views brought to bear on each group’s interpretation of the event as schemas or frames</td>
<td>Coding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture and Inequality: Influence of cognitive structures on social action</td>
<td>2. Identify the cognitive logic linking each group’s schemas to its framing of the event</td>
<td>Sequence analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive Sociology: Power of cognitive processes to construct reality</td>
<td>3. Illustrate how each group constructed the event according to its cognitive logic</td>
<td>Comparative ethnography</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Developed to address the question of why two social groups experienced the same event differently

Distinguishing Frames from Schemas

Frames are a type of cognitive structure pertaining mainly to situations; in Howard’s (1994:251) words, a “situation-level analogue” to schemas. This view is consistent with Goffman’s (1974) definition of frames as essentially answering the question “What is going on here?” By defining a situation in a particular way, frames provide a context for interaction. Monkeys at play act as if they are fighting but they cue—or “key,” in Goffman’s terms—a play frame through various signals: exaggerated gestures, restrained blows, nipping and not actually biting each other (Bateson 1972). The naked body takes on an erotic meaning in the context of sex and an antiseptic one in the context of a medical examination (Snow 2007). Whether grievances are framed as resulting from misfortune or injustice dramatically alters how we feel about them and
what we do about it (Gamson 1992). As Snow and colleagues (1986) have pointed out for some time, framing focuses our attention toward particular aspects of a situation and articulates these aspects in ways consistent with their interpretation. That is to say, in establishing the meaning of a situation, frames construct its reality. In one experiment (Zadny and Gerard 1974), subjects were asked to view a video of two people exploring a room while handling a number of objects and discussing drug use, encounters with police, and theft. The situation was framed in one of three ways, as a burglary in progress, as friends removing drug paraphernalia in anticipation of a police raid, or as friends grown restless waiting for another friend to arrive. Subjects primed with the burglary frame were more likely to have noticed objects and dialogue related to theft.

Distinguishing frames from schemas is analytically useful because the two concepts do different kinds of cognitive work. Schemas, functioning as beliefs, expectations, or simply generic knowledge about the everyday world, facilitate our recognition of the social world, while frames supply the context guiding our interaction within it. Strauss and Quinn (1997:54) give the example of ordering a cup of coffee following a first date and ordering one once it has become part of a couple’s routine. The schema—ordering a cup of coffee—remains constant but its significance changes according to the context or frame (see also Tannen and Wallat 1997). Framing would also seem to require more cognitive work. While schematic processing occurs largely automatically, with perception basically no different from comprehension, as Casson (1983:430) put it, framing, particularly of new situations, entails at least some interpretive work (Snow 2007). Finally, the different kinds of work done by schemas and frames are causally related. Interpretation mobilizes prior expectations (schemas) to make sense of new situations (Sherman, Judd, and Park 1989). Consider Brent Staples’ well-known essay (1986) on walking the streets of New York at night. Simply being a young black man was enough to inspire
oncoming women to cross the street or run away. “They seem to have set their faces on neutral, and with their purse straps strung across their chests bandolier-style, they forge ahead as though bracing themselves against being tackled” (p. 20). These women have a schema of young black men as dangerous. Along with other aspects of the situation—a young black man + walking at night + along an empty street + in Brooklyn—it supplies the knowledge needed to answer the question “What is going on here?” thus activating a mugging frame. With the situation thus framed, these women are predisposed to recognize “facts” consistent with their frame. They notice Staples’ hands “shoved into the pockets of a bulky military jacket” (p. 19) and may conclude that he is armed. Staples discouraged this reaction by, for instance, whistling classical melodies. To the extent that this strategy worked, whistling Vivaldi would cue a differently associated schema, that of a well-educated young black man who, therefore, is not dangerous. Thus women’s “walking at night” frame would remain unperturbed, and if they notice Staples’ hands in his pockets at all, they might simply conclude that he is cold. Cultural sociologists have not sufficiently distinguished frames from schemas, using frames to represent knowledge about objects, concepts, and places when schemas are the more appropriate tool. Conflating the two kinds of cognitive work forecloses an analysis of the relationship between schemas and frames that improves explanation.

This distinction underlies my argument, which, to preview it here, runs as follows: Squatters’ and villagers’ different class and state schemas informed their divergent recognitions of deposed populist president Joseph Estrada. Their Estrada schemas predisposed their antithetical framing of Edsa 3, the failed demonstration aimed at restoring Estrada to power. Specifically, villagers saw politicians as corrupt but Estrada as flagrantly corrupt. They saw the poor as backward and the demonstrators, therefore, as manipulated, misled, and destructive. Indeed, a view of Estrada
as flagrantly corrupt made the poor’s support for him in Edsa 3 incomprehensible except in terms of their manipulation. Thus they discounted Edsa 3 as illegitimate. In contrast, squatters saw politicians as exploiting them but Estrada as good for them. They saw Estrada as targeted by the rich in the same way that the rich discriminated against them. Indeed, their view of Estrada as a good leader made his ouster incomprehensible except as an act of discrimination. Squatters thus regarded Edsa 3 as a legitimate reaction to the injustice of Estrada’s ouster.

Data and Methods

My data consists of 189 interviews with squatters and villagers in Metro Manila. I investigated four cases of slums and villages (gated subdivisions) in close proximity—a spatial configuration typical of the metropolis—interviewing around 25 squatters per site (107 total) and around 15 villagers per site plus 20 from civic and professional organizations (82 total). Interviews took place between September 2009 and August 2010 and build on a cumulative 30 months living and doing qualitative fieldwork in Metro Manila since 2001. I selected sites on the basis of their geographical spread across Metro Manila and obtained interviews by asking the barangay in slums and the homeowners association in villages for referrals. In villages, I would ask for a second round of referrals from the persons interviewed. In slums, I would solicit interviews myself once I had become a familiar presence within a site. I present the demographic characteristics of my informants in Appendix B. I also conducted archival research for this chapter, reading the country’s leading newspaper, the Philippine Daily Inquirer (Inquirer

10 A barangay is the smallest administrative division within cities and municipalities. It also refers to the administration at that level; essentially a kind of ward or neighborhood government.
hereafter), for its reporting on Edsa 3.\footnote{The *Inquirer* is the country’s most widely read broadsheet, with a circulation of 2.7 million and a market share of over 50 percent.} I use this research mainly to supplement villagers’ accounts of Edsa 3.

Identifying schemas through interviews would seem to present a methodological problem. Bloch and Vaisey argue that interviews cannot get at the largely tacit knowledge that schemas represent. Bloch (1998:16) cautions researchers to regard explicit knowledge as problematic; to ask “what peculiar knowledge is this which can take such an explicit form?” He advocates studying cognition in its natural environment through participant observation, staying in one site long enough to learn “how to live efficiently” with the subjects of one’s research (p. 17). Vaisey (2009:1689) advocates the opposite approach: forced-choice surveys. Choosing from a list of fixed responses, he reasons, is “akin to solving a practical problem” since respondents tend to choose items based on what feels or sounds right and hence draw on intuition more than deliberation. “If talking about our mental processes with an interviewer is like describing a criminal suspect to a sketch artist,” he writes, “then answering questions is like picking the suspect out of a lineup. The latter is much less cognitively demanding and potentially much more accurate, provided the right choices are in the lineup.” Getting the right lineup, of course, is the crux of the matter. Surveys detect schemas only when we already have a good idea of what these schemas are, and finding them out is not just a function of good theory, as Vaisey argues, but the result of empirical research. But how do we conduct such research in the first place?

Bloch’s argument for ethnography makes sense, but his and Vaisey’s conception of the interview is too shallow. A good interviewer does not simply attend to what his informants say but also to how they say it, what they do not say, and how they behave during the interview. In this sense, interviews are always partly ethnographic and sometimes primarily so. The
interviewer engages informants directly in order to observe how they make sense of given topics. This is the approach I take. I asked informants about several topics, one of which was Edsa 3. I pressed them to explain their views of Edsa 3 until their explanations took the form of “core beliefs.” To get at these core beliefs—knowledge taken as self-evident and thus often taken for granted—I employed a number of tactics. One, I paid attention to rhetorical forms communicating expectation and evaluation. As Tannen (1993) points out, schemas convey a structure of expectations that can be detected linguistically. She identifies 16 indices of expectations in linguistic expression, including inferences, generalizations, omissions, false starts, contrastive connectives (“but”), modals (“must have been”), etc. I draw on many of these, as well as some others: exceptions, examples, surprise, and, of course, distinctions. Two, I took certain recurring types of stories as evidence of schemas: crime stories, discrimination stories, corruption stories, stories about the poor’s benightedness, Estrada stories, etc. Insofar as stories both encapsulate and constitute a commonsense (Polleta 2006), they reveal a set of expectations that are not always explicitly recognized by the narrator herself and thus represent cognition in discursive action. Three, even while conducting interviews, a good deal of my data came from observing behavior, including informants’ emotional and bodily states and their conduct, particularly with respect to me. Since my interviews took place on site inside slums and villages, I was also able to observe informants interact with others in their natural environments.

To analyze this data, I identify recurring views (general cognitions) brought to bear on informants’ interpretations of Edsa 3. I code these views as class schemas, state schemas, Estrada schemas, and Edsa 3 frames. Class schemas pertain to informants’ beliefs about the relationship between squatters and villagers, state schemas to beliefs about their relationship with state agents (politicians mainly but including government workers in general), Estrada schemas to beliefs
about Estrada, and Edsa 3 frames to interpretations of Edsa 3. Secondly, I identify the cognitive logic linking squatters’ and villagers’ schemas to their respective framing of Edsa 3 by using sequence analysis. I reconstruct the sequence of meanings leading to their interpretations. By arranging elements in sequence, we represent their meaning in context, that is, as defined by their interconnections with other meanings (Abbott 1988, 1995). We are also better able to appreciate individual meanings as part of a larger pattern. Mapping out meaning structures facilitates cultural analysis by clarifying the core of complex narratives (Mohr 2000, Small 2011). Finally, I show that squatters and villagers constructed Edsa 3 according to distinct cognitive logics by comparing accounts of the event drawn from qualitative and archival data. Specifically, I catalog what stood out to informants and what they left out about Edsa 3. I also show that the Inquirer’s reporting and misreporting on Edsa 3 betrays a cognitive bias consistent with a framing of the demonstration as illegitimate.

Recurring Views

When pressed to explain their interpretations of Edsa 3, villagers and squatters regularly expressed distinct sets of views. Table IV.2 lists these views according to type (Edsa 3 frame, Estrada schema, class schema, and state schema) and gives the percent of informants indicating them. Table IV.3 defines the main term in each view according to informants’ meanings. (Views were coded according to these meanings.) I describe these views below and discuss the logic connecting them in the following section.
Table IV.2. Recurring Views

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Villagers (N=82)</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Squatters (N=107)</th>
<th>%</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Edsa 3 Frames</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Edsa 3 was manipulated .......... 88</td>
<td>- Edsa 3 was genuine ............. 80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- The Edsa 3 demonstrators were uncivil ...................... 75</td>
<td>- Estrada’s ouster was unjust ...... 83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Estrada’s ouster was just ........ 81</td>
<td>- The rich targeted Estrada ........ 58</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Estrada Schemas</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Estrada was flagrantly corrupt 87</td>
<td>- Estrada is good for the poor ..... 79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Class Schemas</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>An expectation of backwardness:</td>
<td>An expectation of discrimination:</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The poor are backward ............ 78</td>
<td>- The rich discriminate against us 84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- …but not always .................. 43</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State Schemas</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An expectation of corruption:</td>
<td>An expectation of exploitation:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Politicians are corrupt .......... 85</td>
<td>- Estrada is good for us ............ 79</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- …while most politicians simply exploit us .................. 46</td>
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</table>
Table IV.3. Definition of Terms According to Informants’ Meanings

**Villagers:**

- **Edsa 3 was manipulated ………...** Orchestrated by Estrada’s political allies and cronies
- The demonstrators were *uncivil* ……. Manipulated, misled, and destructive
- Estrada was flagrantly *corrupt* ….... Corrupt, immoral, and incompetent
- The poor are *backward* …………. Ignorant, vulgar, criminal, politically shallow, and our social responsibility
- Politicians are *corrupt* …………. Seek to enrich themselves through their office

**Squatters:**

- **Edsa 3 was *genuine* ………….** Spontaneous and volitional in response to valid grievances
- The rich *targeted* Estrada ………. Singled him out and mistreated him despite his having done nothing wrong
- Estrada is *good* for the poor ……. Helpful and devoted to the poor
- The rich *discriminate* against us … Look down on us because of our class cum territorial status
- Most politicians *exploit* us ………. Use us for electoral gain and neglect us otherwise
Edsa 3 Frames and Estrada Schemas

How informants viewed Estrada largely determined how they interpreted Edsa 3. Villagers framed Edsa 3 as illegitimate because they saw Estrada’s ouster as just. In their view, Estrada had been flagrantly “corrupt” during his brief term as president. I bundle in the term “corrupt” villagers’ objections to Estrada on grounds of his corruption (enrichment through his office), immorality, and incompetence. These meanings intertwined in villagers’ discussion of Estrada. They complained, for example, that Estrada lavished his several mistresses with mansions and held court over a “midnight cabinet”—drinking, gorging, and gambling sessions with cronies that carried on until the early morning and were thought to influence some of his policy decisions. Both issues highlight Estrada’s immorality and incompetence but also point to his corruption. As Rey’s story illustrates, however, it was not the scale of his corruption but its flagrance, its unabashed and even ostentatious display, that made villagers regard their antipathy toward him as actionable.

One time he was getting out of his car to attend some diplomatic event, no. As soon as he stepped out he threw up, no, because he was so drunk [laughing]. Yeah, he did. You see! Pardon my French, but what the fuck?! That’s the president of the Philippines!

Villagers rejected Edsa 3 for another reason. They saw the demonstrators as uncivil. Specifically, they regarded them as lacking political principles, participating in Edsa 3 for money or other inducements, as lacking political discernment, being easily misled by demagogues, and as generally lacking civility, airing their grievances by resorting to vulgarity, violence, and the destruction of property. The *Inquirer*’s editorials and op-eds reflect this view. They describe the Edsa 3 demonstrators as “rabid,” “unthinking,” and “blind fanatics”; as “hooligans,” “vandals,”
and “thugs” out for destruction. Consequently, Edsa 3 is discounted as “a parody and mockery of Edsa” (April 28, 2001:A8) and described as a mob, rally, riot, and throng.

Conversely, squatters framed Edsa 3 as legitimate because they saw Estrada’s ouster as unjust. They cited two beliefs in support of this view. One, Estrada was good for the poor. Squatters mentioned acts of patronage—his occasional distribution of groceries in the slums, for example—and pro-poor policies as evidence of his “helpfulness.” (Notably, only a small number of informants—12 (11 percent) to be exact—could say that they had actually benefited from Estrada’s patronage or policies.) Squatters also emphasized Estrada’s “love of the poor,” which they ascribed to a character distinguished by compassion and humility. Two, Estrada’s ouster resulted from his being targeted by the rich. Squatters generally maintained that Estrada did nothing wrong and that the charges precipitating his impeachment (receiving kickbacks from gambling lords) were fabricated or inconsequential. (This view is corroborated by a metro-wide survey administered shortly after Edsa 2 (SWS 2001).) Of all the presidents who have engaged in corrupt activities, they complained, Estrada was the one singled out for removal, through extrajudicial means at that. “Why did they have to kick him out?” Pogita wondered bitterly. “All of them [presidents] have had one kind of anomaly or another. Why didn’t they follow the law in Estrada’s case?” The view that Estrada was targeting also included the belief that he was humiliated. Specifically, squatters objected to his being treated “like a criminal.” They cite the publication of his mugshot in the newspapers, his being forced out the “backdoor” or rear exit of the presidential palace during Edsa 2, and his detention in a military facility during Edsa 3.
Class Schemas

Class schemas, beliefs about the relationship between squatters and villagers, were integral to informants’ interpretations of Edsa 3. Villagers viewed the poor with an expectation of backwardness. This expectation was conveyed mainly in how they talked about the poor. “You’d be surprised,” Minda told me. “Taxi drivers are very intelligent. Most of the time I talk to them, you know, they talk sense.” Rey described visiting the slum where his carpenter lived.

You know they had this small house, about a foot or so above ground, made of lumber but it wasn’t, it didn’t look—the guy was lacking in income, no? His wife came out of the room, and she was wearing high heels. And she was wearing pants, like the tight ones. Really dressed up, man, and made up. Make up, lipstick—and she was just walking. I think she was going to Phase 1 [the commercial center]. It’s like she quickly made the adjustment from looking like a frumpy old woman in a duster.

He had such a definite idea of what the carpenter’s wife should look like that he described her undergoing a transformation—from “a frumpy old woman in a duster” to the fashionably dressed woman he observed leaving the slum—that took place entirely in his mind. Villagers attributed qualities to the poor premised on their backwardness, including criminality and, of particular relevance here, a lack of political acumen. Selene gives her employees a short list of candidates to choose from “otherwise they’ll vote for celebrities.” She exhorted me to tell the squatters I interviewed whom to vote for president in the 2010 elections (months away at the time of fieldwork) “as long as it’s not Estrada.” Many villagers cited the ratio 80:20—80 them, 20 us—to convey the scale of the “problem,” the sheer demographic power of the masses in relation to their own “modern” sector. Flor concisely identified what villagers generally see as the limit to Philippine democracy: “The danger that the masses will win.” An expectation of backwardness was especially evident when villagers spoke of their “responsibility” toward the poor. Many
villagers described their relationship with their maids in parental terms. They saw it as their responsibility to teach them the “right” values by encouraging certain practices: planning ahead, saving, putting themselves first, etc. The sense of social responsibility many villagers feel toward the poor is significant and cannot be reduced to an exercise of noblesse oblige. Selene subsidizes the large-scale “livelihood purchases” of her workers (e.g., a passenger jeepney) and Flor put the son of his driver, a squatter living within his village, through school. Notably, however, this ethic of community service is premised on a view of the poor as backward.

Squatters viewed the rich with an expectation of discrimination. They were acutely aware of being seen as “criminals,” “animals,” “drug addicts,” and “eyesores” and approached class interaction on guard against the slights they have learned from experience to expect. They tell stories of discrimination, both mundane and extraordinary, on the basis of their territorial status; stories of being eyed at the mall, screened by village guards, accused of stealing and loafing, and even jailed without cause. Evelyn, from the San Roque slum, recounted that Phil-Am village restricted slum residents’ access through its gate because “all these things were being stolen. Their fruits, their gardens of the dawn, the aircon at church, the microphone, statues of saints. I said you have to investigate to see if those things are really lost or if someone from inside the village took them. But no, they said this [San Roque] is where all the thieves and drug addicts are.” An expectation of discrimination by the rich is so strong that it leads squatters to imagine slights where none was intended. I was in the de la Rama slum interviewing Randy when Mila, whom I had just interviewed, interrupted to offer me a plate of spaghetti. She was having a small party and saw us sitting on stools outside Randy’s house. I made the mistake of telling her that I had already eaten. She winced and said, “You just don’t want to eat it because I made it.” Unwilling to abort my interview with Randy, I asked her to bag it so I could take it home. “Don’t
just throw it away,” she implored. At the same time, squatters often cited exceptions, telling stories of class interaction where discrimination did not occur. While their class schema includes knowledge of both kinds of stories—discrimination and nondiscrimination—such that many squatters attest to a degree of variation among the rich, it remains structured by an expectation of discrimination. In the example below, Marivic’s account of being treated well by her boss is qualified linguistically as exceptional. In other words, she finds her boss remarkable because she expects otherwise.

There’s one guy, my boss, Sir Popoy. When he sees me, ‘Hello! Marivic, come here!’ He doesn’t make me feel uneasy at all. Even if he’s rich, he kisses me [in greeting]. I like it, that even if he’s rich he sees me that way [emphasis added].

These two kinds of stories provide squatters with parameters of knowledge about the rich that serve as the basis for evaluating their behavior.

State Schemas

State schemas, informants’ beliefs about their relationship with state agents, also figured in their interpretations of Edsa 3. Villagers viewed state agents with an expectation of corruption. They recounted stories of having experienced corruption personally. Rey worked for a government corporation that went out of business because its revenue was funneled into kickbacks. Miguel described needing 38 signatures from government officials for a construction permit; “20 required a bribe.” Ana recounted picking something up at Customs and being channeled through a number of offices; “in each one the official had his drawer open and you’re supposed to put something inside.” Villagers’ expectation of corruption is such that they behave accordingly. Several admitted underreporting their taxes in anticipation of being shaken down by tax officials.
“Even if you pay the right taxes,” Layla complained, “they want you to go under the table.” Rey keeps 200 pesos ready in the jacket of his driver’s license in case of being pulled over. Artie deals with venal traffic cops a different way. In return for consulting with the mayor of a major city in Metro Manila, he asked for the mayor’s business card with his signature on the back. “Now if I’m ever stopped [by traffic cops in that city] I show them the card and say, ‘Talk to him about it!’” In all, villagers shared a view of corruption as endemic to Philippine government.

Squatters viewed state agents with an expectation of exploitation. They recognize that politicians attend to them mainly in order to procure electoral support and not out of any deep commitment to their welfare. They see clearly the nature of the transaction defining their tie to state agents—“Politicians only approach you at election time,” Raul said, adding: “Us too, we approach them”—as well as the relative weakness of their own position. “Once they win, they don’t know us anymore,” Pilar averred. Only 46 percent of squatters expressed this view probably because it emerged indirectly, not as the main topic of conversation but as a way for squatters to make the contrast between Estrada and most politicians explicit. “Other politicians just use us,” Beng said, “but Estrada is different. He really cares about us.” It is reasonable to think, however, that this contrast is generally, if implicitly, understood and the expectation behind it, that politicians exploit the poor, widely held. This expectation is usually expressed as a statement of fact, a form reflective of common sense. It is consistent with the urban poor’s behavior, specifically, organizing parochially to strengthen their position relative to politicians. “Subsistence mobilizations” enhance their capacity to deliver votes and hold politicians accountable as constituents (Velasco 2006). Finally, there is evidence of this expectation in the literature on the political attitudes of the Philippine poor. A study by the Institute of Philippine Culture (IPC 2005) found that the poor expect politicians to dissimulate being pro-poor in order
to win votes. They find a politician’s claims sufficiently credible only when provided concrete demonstrations of these claims in the form of visibility in their area, assistance, and respectful behavior.

Structures of Justification

I reconstruct the sequences of views leading to informants’ interpretations of Edsa 3 in Table IV.4. These sequences represent how informants explained their interpretations of Edsa 3 in response to my probing. They reveal the cognitive logic linking their class and state schemas to the Estrada schemas predisposing their framing of Edsa 3. The numbers indicate the strength of association among views. Specifically, the numbers beside the arrows indicate how frequently informants expressing one view also expressed the other. For instance, 73 percent of villagers who viewed Edsa 3 as manipulated also saw the demonstrators as uncivil. Ninety percent of squatters who viewed Estrada’s ouster as unjust also saw him as good for the poor. The sequence numbers indicate how frequently all the views within a sequence were expressed. For instance, 70 percent of villagers viewed Edsa 3 as manipulated, the demonstrators as uncivil, and the poor as backward. Eighty three percent of squatters viewed Edsa 3 as genuine, Estrada’s ouster as unjust, and Estrada as good for the poor. If the sequence were widened to include the view that politicians exploit the poor—a view that, I argued, emerged indirectly and therefore was less likely to have been made explicit—its frequency decreases by half to 41 percent. The count data in Table IV.2 show that these views occur frequently. The count data in Table IV.4 show that they occur together. I establish the logic connecting these views using qualitative data. I put two
views in sequence if informants explained one view in terms of another. The sequences thus represent the series of justifications informants made to explain their framing of Edsa 3.

My reconstruction of their logic allowed for cases where views and connections were made implicitly. In some cases, views were not expressed but strongly implied. For example, a squatter might respond to my asking about Edsa 3 by talking about how the rich targeted Estrada and then about how Estrada was good for the poor. The view that Estrada’s ouster was unjust, while not expressed, can be reasonably inferred. Second, it was often the case that informants expressed views out of the “ideal” order depicted in Table IV.4 and yet in keeping with its logic. For example, asked about Edsa 3, a villager might respond by talking, in succession, about Estrada’s flagrant corruption, the corruption of politicians in general, the backwardness of the poor, the manipulation of Edsa 3, and the incivility of the demonstrators. The villager discusses one sequence in logical order (V1) and another (V2) out of order. The context makes clear, however, that one view implies another—the incivility of the demonstrators implies the backwardness of the poor—even if the two views were not expressed sequentially and explicitly connected. In short, the sequences depicted in Table IV.4 represent a logical order that does not necessarily correspond to the temporal order in which informants expressed their views. Finally, in one case, informants expressed views that I believed to be connected but which they neither explicitly nor implicitly connected themselves, perhaps because these views emerged in response to different lines of questioning. Squatters expressed the view that the rich targeted Estrada when asked about Edsa 3 and the view that the rich discriminate against them when asked about their relationship with the villagers living nearby. I indicate a connection between the two views but distinguish it with a dashed line.
Table IV.4a. How Villagers Justified their Interpretations of Edsa 3

```
Edsa 3 was manipulated
  \[\text{Estrada was flagrantly corrupt}, \text{Sequence V1 = .73}, \text{Sequence V2 = .70}\]
  \[Estrada was flagrantly corrupt, .86\]
  \[\text{The demonstrators were uncivil}, .73\]
  \[\text{Politicians are corrupt}, .85\]
  \[\text{The poor are backward}, .90\]
```

Table IV.4b. How Squatters Justified their Interpretations of Edsa 3

```
Edsa 3 was genuine
  \[S1 = .41, S1a = .83, Sequence S2 = .65\]
  \[\text{Estrada’s ouster was unjust}, .96\]
  \[\text{Estrada is good for us}, .90\]
  \[\text{Politicians exploit us}, .51\]
  \[\text{The rich targeted Estrada}, .69\]
  \[\text{The rich discriminate against us}, .80\]
```
Table IV.5. Villagers’ and Squatters’ Cognitive Logics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logic</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Villagers</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V1: Politicians are corrupt, but Estrada was flagrantly corrupt</td>
<td>Exception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V2: The poor are backward, therefore the demonstrators were uncivil</td>
<td>Inference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Squatters</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S1: Politicians exploit us, but Estrada was good for us</td>
<td>Exception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2: The rich targeted Estrada just like they discriminate against us</td>
<td>Analogy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The influence of informants’ class and state schemas on their evaluation of Estrada and the demonstrators is evident in the cognitive logics they employed to justify their interpretations of Edsa 3. Villagers reasoned that

V1. Politicians are corrupt, but Estrada was flagrantly corrupt, and

V2. The poor are backward, therefore the demonstrators were uncivil.

In the first rationale, their state schema informs their view of Estrada through a logic of exception; in the second, their class schema informs their view of the demonstrators through an inferential logic. Meanwhile, squatters reasoned that

S1. Politicians exploit us, but Estrada was good for us, and

S2. The rich targeted Estrada just like they discriminate against us.
In the first rationale, their state schema informs their view of Estrada through a logic of exception; in the second, their class schema informs their view of Estrada’s ouster through a logic of analogy (Table IV.5). In the following section, I illustrate these logics in action. I show how they guided squatters’ and villagers’ respective constructions of Edsa 3.

Cognitive Constructions of Edsa 3

Villagers

A view of Estrada as flagrantly corrupt made the poor’s support for him in Edsa 3 incomprehensible except in terms of their manipulation (Table IV.6a). Villagers discounted Edsa 3 as orchestrated by an Estrada faction attempting to retake power and enlarged by the participation of two religious organizations sympathetic to the deposed president. They discounted the demonstrators as political pawns bought and brought by politicians and supplied with food, alcohol, and drugs by cronies. The mere appearance of the demonstrators as visibly poor made their manipulation seem self-evident, something that could be seen simply by looking at them.

They were hooligans and people brought in and paid. You could see it!

The Edsa 3 crowd was really ugly. We saw it on TV and the newspapers. They were just being manipulated.

We saw them bussed in. We saw it! We were on the flyover and we saw, along Ortigas, bus upon bus upon bus. Along Edsa, bus upon bus upon bus.
Table IV.6a. Villagers’ Cognitive Construction of Edsa 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Edsa 3 Frame</th>
<th>Cognitive Logic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>What Stood Out (The Frame’s Constituent Elements):</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The manipulation of the demonstrators</td>
<td>( V_1 + V_2: ) Estrada was flagrantly corrupt (and his ouster just), hence Edsa 3 was the result of elite manipulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The desecration of the Edsa shrine ......</td>
<td>( V_2: ) The demonstrators were uncivil/dumb, destructive, and dirty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What Was Left Out (The Frame’s Limits):</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edsa 2’s own organization ..............</td>
<td>Edsa 3 frame: Edsa 3 as manipulated versus Edsa 2 as genuine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What Was Misreported (Instances of Cognitive Bias):</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The end of Edsa 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A cop’s heroism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The number of casualties</td>
<td>Edsa 3 frame: Edsa 3 as illegitimate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a result of this framing, villagers underscored the difference between Edsas 2 and 3 so absolutely that they failed to consider the similarities across demonstrations. Coalitions comprising hundreds of organizations had been campaigning for Estrada’s ouster for months. The movement had powerful allies in the leadership of the Catholic Church, the political establishment, and the corporate sector. Several private schools had canceled classes and transported students to Edsa 2 by bus. Many offices had emptied to swell the numbers at Edsa, often at the behest of bosses. And yet, despite the extensive organizational infrastructure
“pulling” people to participate, villagers celebrated an image of the Edsa 2 demonstrator as spontaneously moved by outrage. The same recognition was denied the demonstrators at Edsa 3.

The *Inquirer*’s reporting on Edsa 3 largely reflected villagers’ cognitive logic, particularly with respect to the incivility of the demonstrators. Widely circulated text messages deriding the demonstrators as dumb, destructive, dangerous, and dirty were printed approvingly as front page news (Caneday and Gallardo 2001, April 29:A1).

Let’s go to Edsa and protest. Please wear shorts, undershirt and slippers, bring a fan, knife, iron pipe, ice pick and rocks. Don’t bring money. There will be money.

Calling all the unwashed and ignorant, the toothless and unclothed, let’s prove we have no brains—go to Edsa.

You can now shop, carry lots of cash, drive alone even in dark areas, holduppers etc. are busy at Edsa.

The amount of trash that came out of Edsa 3 also made the front page; five truckloads before noon, one article noted (Rivera 2001, April 28:A1). The article went on to detail the “desecration” of the Edsa shrine.

Humans—and human waste—are scattered on the pavement. The air is vivid with the stench and spill of urine and phlegm. Mats and folding beds abound. Litter is everywhere. […] Passersby who checked out the protest action had to fight from throwing up at the sight of the trash and the human waste, which were already drying in the heat. Empty water bottles, banana peels, corncobs, barbecue sticks, plastic bags and other food refuse littered the area.

The destruction wrought by demonstrators was a major focus of the *Inquirer*’s coverage of Edsa 3, initially in the form of reporting on the vandalism and pollution of the Edsa shrine and later, after being temporary eclipsed by frantic reporting on the emerging coup plot, on the damage
done by the marchers on their warpath to Malacañang (Figure IV.1). The extent to which the “desecration” of the Edsa shrine primarily represented a symbolic pollution was highlighted by the element of ritual in its reclamation. Shortly after the demonstrators had been dispersed, the shrine was hosed down by firefighters, scrubbed by cleaning crews, disinfected with chlorine, and reconsecrated with a mass (Rivera and Esguerra 2001, May 2:A1). Some days later, a group of clergy and civil society members calling themselves the Mendiola Angels retraced the route taken by demonstrators in their march to Malacañang avowedly in order to “sanctify” it (Bordadora 2001, May 12:A2). These measures, suggesting an effort at purification, recall Zerubavel’s (1991:36) description of cleaning as “putting things back in their mental ‘place,’ where they ‘belong.’”

The dominant framing of Edsa 3 as manipulated and generally illegitimate led to the misreporting of certain information. When the religious organizations attending Edsa 3 were finally persuaded to withdraw, the expectation that the demonstration would subsequently dissipate was so strong that, the next day, at least six national dailies ran banner headlines declaring its end (e.g., the Inquirer’s headline on May 1, 2001: WHY THE POWER GRAB FAILED)—even as 300,000 demonstrators marched toward the presidential palace. In another case, television footage showed policeman Fausto Sabedia struck by rocks thrown by demonstrators. He staggered to the ground and drew his firearm but, according to the prevailing interpretation, “hesitated to fire even when dozens of demonstrators ganged up on him and almost clubbed and kicked him to death” (Soliven 2001, May 2). The media celebrated Sabedia as emblematic of the state’s restraint against the rabid demonstrators. A week later, however, an Inquirer columnist highlighted the ambiguity of the footage by suggesting that Sabedia did not shoot “apparently because he panicked and didn’t know what to do” (Tulfo 2001, May 8:A22).
Figure IV.1. Number of Articles Characterizing the Demonstrators as Manipulated or Destructive or Concerned with the Coup Plot Attached to Edsa 3 as a Proportion of All Articles on Edsa 3 between April 26 and May 2, 2001
Finally, the *Inquirer* reported that demonstrators had killed two cops during the march. It turned out that none had been killed and that one of the cops reported murdered had actually died the previous week in a different part of the city (*Philippine Star*, May 3, 2001). The *Inquirer* further reported that only four demonstrators had been killed at Edsa 3. According to the pro-Estrada group People’s Movement Against Poverty, the number of casualties reported to their organization alone was over 80. These instances of misreporting suggest a cognitive bias consistent with framing Edsa 3 as illegitimate.

*Squatters*

The view that Estrada’s ouster was unjust was central to squatters’ understanding of Edsa 3. Their view of Estrada as a good leader made his ouster incomprehensible except as an act of discrimination (Table IV.6b). They saw him as singled out and mistreated by the rich despite having done nothing wrong. A few squatters even misremembered his ouster in a way that was consistent with their belief in his goodness, recalling a statement he never made about stepping down to avoid bloodshed. This was cited as evidence of his “sacrifice.” “If you saw the TV footage of him stepping down,” Vilma averred, “I’ll step down. Just don’t hurt these people.’ He made this sacrifice out of his love for the people, so they wouldn’t be hurt. Just like Jesus.” Moreover, squatters took what they perceived as Estrada’s mistreatment personally, reacting with anger and empathy when recounting specific instances of “disrespect” toward him. (Suffice to say, these instances never came up in villagers’ accounts of Edsa 3.) These reactions suggest an emotional connection to their own experiences of class discrimination. Benito objected to Estrada’s arrest and imprisonment as humiliating.
Table IV.6b. Squatters’ Cognitive Construction of Edsa 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Edsa 3 Frame</th>
<th>Cognitive Logic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What Stood Out (The Frame’s Constituent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elements):</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estrada’s ouster was unjust ..................</td>
<td>S1 + S2: Estrada was a good leader, hence his ouster was the result of elite targeting</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edsa 3 as genuine .............................</td>
<td>Estrada’s ouster was unjust, hence Edsa 3 is legitimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What Was Left Out (The Frame’s Limits):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The allegations against Estrada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The coup plot</td>
<td>Edsa 3 frame: Edsa 3 as people power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The destruction caused by Edsa 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It was embarrassing that that would be done to the president of the Philippines, that he would be treated like a criminal. Actually, I cried when that happened. Why? Because they didn’t even show him respect. Even if he had done something wrong, show him respect. Then they broadcast [his mugshot] on TV. Why not just keep it private? The way he looked, broadcast not only in the Philippines but all over the world. How shameful, not just for him but for all of us.

Doreen and Beng complained that Estrada had to leave Malacañang through the rear, absconding by boat to his home in San Juan.

Doreen: They didn’t even let him exit through the front. He had to go through the back and ride a boat.
Beng: They made him go through the back, of course you feel sorry for him!
Doreen: We all saw what they did to him.
Beng: You really felt bad for him because they made him go through the back. You felt bad. I wanted to cry. Why did they do that to him?
Doreen: It’s as if he was a bad person.
The salience of these details—Estrada’s arrest, his backdoor exit—may have to do with their correspondence to the discrimination squatters encounter daily; specifically, their stereotypical portrayal as criminals and the prohibition against domestics and day laborers entering the house through the front door.

Squatters thus regarded Edsa 3 as a legitimate reaction to the injustice of Estrada’s ouster. Those informants who participated emphasized going to the Edsa shrine out of their own volition, even when responding to official calls for participation. As they tell it, they were not simply bought or brought; organizations and politicians allied with Estrada provided the means for something they wanted to do. Some participants took issue with the accusation that they were manipulated as overlooking the pains they took to attend the demonstration. “We pooled our money just so we could go,” Annie said, “so it really hurt me to hear them say that we were paid.” Some emphasized the risks they braved. They spoke of suffering tear gas and beatings and watching companions die from the police wantonly shooting into the crowd. Indeed, the way squatters spoke of their participation in Edsa 3 was remarkably similar to the way that villagers spoke of their participation in Edsa 2; that is, as an exercise of civic virtue. While villagers saw the stream of buses along Edsa and thought manipulation, squatters saw the buses and marveled at the show of support. While villagers took the distribution of styrofoam food boxes at Edsa 3 to indicate manipulation, squatters celebrated the outpouring of donations from local restaurants and the sharing of food among the crowd. The following two accounts of the same scene—the marchers gathered at the gates of the presidential palace—highlight the extent of cognitive disjunction. The first is by a veteran journalist with the Inquirer and the second by Edwin, a community organizer at the San Roque slum.
The attack on Malacañang...seemed well planned. The frontline, for instance, was composed mostly of women, who gave way to rows of tattooed thugs and shirtless men, some supplied with drugs and liquor, who battled the police and smashed barricades. [...] The pro-Estrada mob was able to breach the defense on Mendiola and came close to overrunning the gates of the palace. There were reports that the first wave of protestors who reached the main gate just stayed there for almost an hour, apparently waiting for reinforcement (Doronila 2001:239-240).

Edwin: We were in front of the gate of Malacañang. Imagine all the people, not quite a million but hundreds of thousands. Chest to chest, elbow to elbow. You can’t retreat. There’s just no space for it. So we had no choice. Some of the old people started crying: ‘We’re going to die here.’ ‘Let’s go home because I can’t breathe.’ ‘But where will we pass? And if we retreat now we may be more likely to die.’ And then I heard this woman say, ‘Fine. If we die, we die.’ [Laughs] Just like that. ‘If we die, we die.’

In the first account, the march is depicted as part of a strategic assault on the palace. The demonstrators are essentially cannon fodder in advance of some main force that never materialized. In the second, the marchers’ arrival at the gates is portrayed as unplanned and practically fortuitous and, at the same time, a crucible of their resolve. This framing of Edsa 3 as people power diverted squatters’ focus from any serious consideration of the allegations against Estrada or the coup plot attached to the demonstration. They discounted the destruction wrought by demonstrators as extraneous to the “real” protest, with some even claiming that hostile politicians had released prisoners into the crowd and the police had planted weapons on them.

Discussion

Variation
There was some evidence in the data of viewpoints contradicting the normal pattern of thinking about Estrada and Edsa 3. Taken together, these views suggest the possibility of alternative cognitive logics connecting different Estrada schemas to different Edsa 3 frames as follows:

\[ V_A: \text{Politicians are corrupt and Estrada was no different, therefore his ouster was unwarranted and Edsa 3 genuine.} \]

\[ S_A: \text{Politicians exploit us and so did Estrada, therefore his ouster was just and Edsa 3 illegitimate.} \]

In fact, however, only a small number of informants (four percent of squatters and five percent of villagers) actually articulated these views according to these logical sequences. Mainly, dissenting views were held discretely without concatenating into a distinct logic of interpretation. They were held by less than 10 percent of informants with two exceptions: villagers viewing Estrada’s ouster as unwarranted (13 percent) and squatters viewing Edsa 3 as illegitimate (10 percent). These views appeared to reflect the influence of knowledge not particularly taken into account by normal views. For example, the view expressed by some villagers that Estrada’s ouster was unwarranted was more likely held alongside views of Estrada as flagrantly corrupt and Edsa 3 as manipulated. In other words, it existed compatibly with, rather than redirected, the normal logical sequence. Similarly, many of the squatters who saw Estrada as not particularly good and even bad for the poor nevertheless objected to or remained agnostic about his ouster for the same reason that most squatters did, because he was seen as being unfairly targeted. Those who discounted Edsa 3 as illegitimate did so less because they saw it as manipulated than because it represented a disorderliness they dismissed as foolishness. In short, the variation in informants’ views on Estrada and Edsa 3 was small and did not tend to cohere into alternative cognitive logics.
Further Areas of Investigation

My focus has been on the cognitive logic linking schemas to frames. We can extend this focus, however, to include schema activation and acquisition. I showed how informants’ schemas predisposed their framing of a particular event. A different event, however, might activate different schemas. There was some evidence that squatters, in particular, held other class and state schemas than the ones discussed. Some squatters made distinctions reminiscent of the moral boundaries documented by Lamont (1992). They viewed the rich as morally inferior, denouncing them for their love of money and their lack of concern for people while upholding the poor as compassionate, patriotic, and God-fearing. This distinction was reflected in their contradictory use of the word *masa* or masses to connote both “the rabble” and “the people” in a nationalist sense. They used it both to disparage and elevate the poor. Generally, however, squatters were much more likely to conceive their tie with villagers primarily in terms of stigma and secondarily, if at all, in terms of moral distinction. They even deployed this schema against themselves—as being deficient in education and initiative, hence poor—as well as to indicate their social superiority relative to squatters who, in their view, were more deserving of the name. Recounting an incident when a neighborhood drunkard pelted his house with stones, Manuel ruefully observed, “The way people are here [in the slum], it’s like they’re really squatters.” The availability of different ways of thinking about the same relationship underscores the need to study cognition in context. People are inseparable from their social worlds, stress DiMaggio and Markus (2010:349); they should be analyzed as such. Future work along these lines could render a more precise accounting of the internal conditions (e.g., motivation, relative salience) and environmental cues activating certain schemas.
By specifying the context of cognitive disjunction, we move away from the conceit that squatters and villagers are absolutely heterogeneous and always disagree on matters of politics. A situation of cognitive conjunction occurs when a stimulus evokes schemas that are substantively similar across class. We must proceed carefully, however. A simple survey of views may show that squatters and villagers agree on an issue that they actually understand differently. For example, squatters, like villagers, regard politicians as corrupt, but they experience corruption somewhat differently. They associate it with voter fraud and media exposés of scandals involving politicians in collusion with the rich. In contrast, villagers associate corruption with the lower-level bureaucrats involved in their everyday extortion and the patronage dispensed by local politicians catering, as they see it, to the poor. Consequently, despite sharing a view of politicians as irremediably corrupt, squatters associate corruption mainly with the rich and villagers with the poor. An account of schema acquisition or learning is needed to clarify this difference. Beyond simply referring to the different social locations squatters and villagers occupy, we could demonstrate how their experience of a social tie yields a particular knowledge. Specifically, we could account for the practices constituting that tie. With regard to their class tie, I argued in Chapter III that squatters and villagers are connected hierarchically mainly in the context of an employment relationship; their social tie involving a set of practices establishing the control of one group over another and their separation in space. Consequently, both sides come to conceive their relationship in terms of categorical inequality and interact with respect to a class distinction. Future work along these lines could render a historically informed and ethnographically specific accounting of the practices characterizing squatters’ and villagers’ state ties. Altogether, these further areas of investigation allow for a more comprehensive account of political subjectivity.
A Cognitive Economy of Class Contention

A few days after Edsa 3 had ended, someone dropped leaflets from a private helicopter over slum communities reputed to have turned out for the protest (Pablo 2001, May 4:A3). The four-page leaflet, entitled “What the People Should Know,” was essentially didactic. It gave the reasons for Edsa 2 and Estrada’s ouster and depicted Edsa 3 as the product of elite manipulation. It included Estrada’s mugshot—a photograph that had galvanized the poor in his favor—to help make its case. The leaflet, although intended to turn the poor against Estrada, only underscored the depth of cognitive disjunction between urban rich and poor. It betrayed the assumption that if only the poor knew what the rich know, they would never have participated in Edsa 3. In other words, the poor were seen as lacking knowledge rather than possessing a different, equally valid knowledge. This conceit informs the historiography of Edsa 3, which, for the most part, has been limited to media accounts retread in the epilogues of books written about Edsa 2. It also informs certain scholarly perspectives on the politics of the poor in developing countries. Populism and elite democracy, insofar as they emphasize, respectively, political mobilization through charismatic leadership and the power of elites to persuade or dominate, retain an image of the poor as essentially pliant. Neither approach takes seriously the distinct knowledge of the poor and their mobilization on the basis of this knowledge.

E.P. Thompson (1964) focused on the experiences of the poor explicitly in order to rescue them from such condescension. The discursive traditions of the English working class, he argued, revealed a set of norms and values articulating a kind of moral economy. It was violations of these moral assumptions rather than actual deprivation that propelled them to engage in contentious action. While Thompson’s work has clearly inspired my approach, my focus on cognitive structures and processes allows for a more sophisticated and empirically
specific analysis of political subjectivity. My use of qualitative methods, meanwhile, partly negates the effects of social power on historical representation. If the history of Edsa 3 were to be written purely from archival sources, it would doubtless reflect the dominant framing. I use qualitative data to level dominant and subordinate accounts for comparative analysis. Finally, my focus on class and state schemas enables substantive claims beyond the present case. The same knowledge of class and state informs how squatters and villagers position themselves on a larger set of issues, including political leadership, democracy, and citizenship. Understanding that villagers see corruption as a byproduct of patronage politics—politicians shake down the rich in order to buy the poor’s clientage—helps explain why a significant number (34 percent) favored some form of limitation on Philippine democracy, from a franchise restricted to taxpayers (run the country like a corporation, some said, where only stockholders have a say) to an outright dictatorship. In short, a cognitive economy approach allows us to systematically elaborate the structure of meanings constituting political subjectivity and thus enables an empirical accounting of the civic divide posited by postcolonial theorists (e.g., Chatterjee 1993) without conceding to blunt conceptions of social heterogeneity.

A cognitive economy approach also makes substantial contributions to the sociological literature. It proposes an innovative method for analyzing cognition, integrating insights from cultural approaches and grounding them explicitly in the social psychological literature on social cognition. Second, it addresses the criticism many social psychologists have directed against their field—summed up in Schneider’s (1991:553) lament, “Where, oh where, is the social in social cognition?”—by situating cognition in social context and confronting issues of power and inequality that traditionally have been sidestepped (Hollander and Howard 2000; Oishi, Kesebir, and Snyder 2009). Finally, it redresses a key shortcoming in the social movements literature; its
neglect of the cognition of political actors beyond movement groups (McAdam and Boudet 2012, Walder 2009). In sum, a cognitive economy approach holds great promise for taking the study of political subjectivity in new and exciting directions.
CHAPTER V

Conclusion

In the wake of Edsa 3, less than two weeks ahead of a senatorial election, President Arroyo campaigned to win over the poor in traditionally clientelist fashion. Reports of the military raiding slum communities and rounding up truckloads of youth gave way to coverage of Arroyo distributing land titles in slums (*Inquirer* 2001, May 17:A8). She even commissioned another popular movie star turned politician, dubbed by the media “the masa tranquilizer,” for help in wooing the poor (Orejas 2001, May 12:A15). She never managed to win them over and eventually alienated her supporters among the middle class. Her administration, lasting from 2001 to 2010, was marred by a double-digit string of corruption scandals and repeated challenges to her legitimacy as president, including four impeachment complaints, two military mutinies, a coup attempt, and waves of protest. Her political survival attests to her adept use of presidential power to keep Congressional allies in line, military leaders in check, and civil unrest contained. It also points to civil society’s unwillingness to countenance populist alternatives. Chatterjee’s (2006:41) description of civil society in India, as “restricted to a small section of culturally equipped citizens represent[ing] the high ground of modernity,” applies equally well to civil society in the Philippines. It comprises nongovernmental, professional, and community organizations largely under a middle class leadership united by class-specific normative, hence political, commitments (Garrido 2008, Hedman 2006, Pinches 2010, Thompson 2011).
In 2001, Estrada’s wife and former police chief were elected senators. In 2004, a movie star and close friend of Estrada’s, Fernando Poe, Jr., nearly won the presidency. Arguably, he would have had Arroyo not cheated (Verzola 2004). In 2005, she was found to have all but asked an official responsible for tallying the final vote count to guarantee her win by at least a million votes—approximately the margin by which she won. When the recording of her call to the official was leaked to the media, civil society failed to mount a concerted effort to unseat her, having become disenchanted with people power as a political tactic and being reluctant to install another media celebrity, the vice president and news broadcaster Noli de Castro, as president. The logic of Arroyo being the “lesser evil” in the face of populist alternatives led civil society to close ranks around her in 2004 and, the following year, to fracture in demanding her ouster. In 2010, Estrada came in second in the presidential race while his running mate, the populist mayor of Makati City Jejomar Binay, won the vice-presidency. Even the elected president, Benigno Aquino III, although styled a reformer, was not without populist appeal. Not even running, he catapulted to the front of the presidential race following the public mourning of his mother, Corazon Aquino, who was known by the poor for her sincerity and seen by the middle class as the only “clean” president in recent memory. Surveying the results of electoral contests since Estrada’s election in 1998, Thompson (2010) notes the increased importance of populism relative to clientelism, traditionally the dominant explanation of Philippine politics. He writes that clientelism cannot tell us why presidential candidates with superior political machinery failed to win (Villar in 2010) or felt compelled to cheat (Arroyo in 2004) despite their chief opponents’ lack of funds and limited organizational base (p. 162). He identifies the clarification during this period of contending political narratives largely prevailing in distinct social locations; reformism among the middle class and populism among the poor.
I found evidence of this divide in my research on Metro Manila. Villagers and squatters tend to emphasize different but not exclusive political goals; on one hand, strong and impersonal institutions, mainly enforcing the rule of law and private property, and on the other, greater provisions addressing basic needs, mainly livelihood, shelter, and dignity. More significantly, I found the spatial divide between squatters and villagers deeply implicated in their political divide. My research showed that:

(1) Slums and enclaves have proliferated and grown increasingly closer together in space;
(2) Both squatters and villagers display an acute sense of class consciousness, particularly with respect to the stigma and status associated with slums and enclaves;
(3) The urban poor responded strongly to Estrada’s acts of sincerity;
(4) Slums and enclaves activate introspective states in squatters and villagers, impelling them to engage in segregating practices; and
(5) Squatters’ and villagers’ different class and state schemas predisposed their antithetical framing of Edsa 3.

The big idea linking these findings is that urban fragmentation and political polarization are not merely coincident but connected developments. Squatters and villagers make sense of politics differently to the extent that their interpretations engage their different knowledge of class and state ties. By focusing on their knowledge of the social ties linking them directly (class) and indirectly (state), I show this knowledge to be contemporaneous and connected. This claim contradicts the popular conceit that the knowledge possessed by the urban rich and poor is not coeval and therefore unequally valid. Squatters and villagers are not separated by time but by
space, and not in terms of physical but social distance. Their different knowledge is not just located in distinct spaces, slums and enclaves, but constituted by the segregation of these spaces. The growth and greater proximity of slums and enclaves has heightened the class consciousness of squatters and villagers. As a result of interspersion, they experience class increasingly as spatial exclusion or spatial prerogative and thus come to articulate it in terms of territory. Class consciousness as a sense of place reproduces and extends segregation, partitioning urban space so intensively that interaction across class groups is effectively limited to class interaction, that is, interaction on the basis of inequality. The lack of common ground undercuts the basis of a public sphere and exacerbates the political divide between urban rich and poor. My analysis suggests that this divide extends beyond Estrada. It shows in polarized reactions to the series of populist figures who have come after him and whom squatters and villagers assess by conflicting criteria.

Let me close with a point which I have not had the opportunity to develop. Contentious politics between squatters and villagers involves more than just disagreement over the substance of political claims. For the urban poor, it involves fighting for the right to make these claims and have them taken seriously, that is, as legitimate expressions of democratic will. As we saw in Edsa 3, this struggle is bound up in their fight for the right to use and appropriate urban spaces. The view of the demonstrators as squatters and therefore disqualified as political claimants was made explicit when the rector of the shrine emphasized their lack of legal right to be there. He pleaded with them to leave on the grounds that “This is private property. Check city hall and you’ll see this has a land title” (Rivera and Esguerra 2001, May 2:A1). By the same token, some demonstrators experienced their spatial transgressions as liberating. Edwin conveyed the
significance, and exhilaration, of crossing the bramble of barbed wire around the gates of Malacañang.

We broke the barbed wire. I won’t forget it. That was our “payment.” My friend and I shouted, ‘Long live the revolution of the small!’ That’s it, I’m paid up. It’s over. We did it. The revolution of the poor that no one had prepared for. Who knew that Erap would be the reason behind a revolution where we were able to take power? Even if all that meant was [breaking through] the barbed wire and entering an area that we couldn’t have entered before.

In this light, we see more clearly the deeper, durable grievance underlying Edsa 3, a grievance articulated through the figure of Estrada but expressed spatially, through a series of transgressions that recapitulated the itinerary of Edsa 2—demonstrations at the Edsa shrine culminating in a march to Malacañang—but for the opposite end. Such desegregating practices bespoke a demand for equal recognition even as they punctuated the question of why the poor, despite their numbers, counted for less in civil society.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A

Plan for Proposed Book

I plan to turn my dissertation into a book manuscript, and, in the process, address several areas that remain underdeveloped in the dissertation. Specifically,

(1) I will explain the reformist disposition of the middle class in Metro Manila.

(2) I will provide greater historical context on the following topics: the spatial fragmentation of Metro Manila, the development of the urban poor and middle class since the 1950s, political polarization in the post-Marcos period (since 1986), Estrada’s presidency, and Edsa 3.

(3) I will draw comparisons with cities (yet to be determined) in Asia and Latin America.

Overall, the book will provide a historically grounded explanation of political polarization in post-Marcos Metro Manila, particularly with regard to the role of class segregation in the formation of political dispositions.

See Proposed Table of Contents (next page).
# Proposed Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>Political polarization in the post-Marcos period. Overview of analytical framework (cognition)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Interspersion</td>
<td>The emerging spatial configuration of Metro Manila</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>A Sense of Place</td>
<td>Why squatters and villagers regulate their spatial interaction</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Acts of Sincerity</td>
<td>Why the urban poor responded to Estrada’s populist appeals</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>???</td>
<td>Why the urban middle class rejected Estrada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Cognitive Disjunction</td>
<td>Why squatters and villagers framed Edsa 3 antithetically</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Comparisons</td>
<td>Interspersion as a political mechanism in other cities across the developing world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>Synthesis and future prospects</td>
</tr>
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APPENDIX B
Informant Data

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<td>&lt; Elementary</td>
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<td>Participation in Edsa 3</td>
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\(^a\) Ragragio (2003:4) cites a survey finding unemployment in urban poor communities across Metro Manila to be 39.4 percent.

\(^b\) Shatkin (2007:68) finds the median education in urban poor communities across Metro Manila to be less than high school.
Ronald Lumbao is the president of People’s Movement Against Poverty (PMAP), an activist political organization with an extensive network in urban poor communities across Metro Manila. Lumbao claims that PMAP was instrumental in “triggering” EDSA 3. The group organized the first contingent of demonstrators—the poor from Tondo, a Manila slum—to gather around Estrada’s house in anticipation of his arrest. Following the arrest, Lumbao directed demonstrators to the military camp where Estrada was taken. The plan was to extract him with help from sympathetic elements within the camp. When this failed to happen, he diverted the demonstrators to the EDSA shrine. Lumbao and nine others, all senators, were charged with rebellion for instigating the march on Malacañang. He was the only one imprisoned, serving 15 months before being released on bail.

Lumbao grew up poor but managed to attend college, where he came to adopt a nationalist ideology. He became a student activist and, after college, continued to work as a professional organizer. He was involved in the coup attempt against Cory Aquino in 1989 and worked to mobilize the urban poor on Estrada’s behalf throughout the 1990s. A fellow activist praised Lumbao’s talent for “bombastic, dramatic, poetic agitation” but criticized him for having become another “ward leader for politicians” (Gloria 2001). Lumbao would undoubtedly object to this characterization. As the excerpts from my interview with him attest, he views his organizing efforts as advancing the cause of the poor.
On revolution through insurrection

RL: We were looking for the shortest route to achieve revolution. We didn’t want to just go around killing people. We believed in “a people’s uprising.” The problem is, not many people did. We were there in Edsa 1. We were there in ’89. It didn’t happen then. So with Erap it was another experiment for all those who believed in it. [...] We aren’t Bolsheviks, we aren’t Maoists, but we aren’t stupid either. Our theory is this: We don’t need an army to win a revolution. We need only convince the army not to kill us. To side with the revolutionaries.

MG: What is your agenda?

RL: Agenda? What agenda? Deliverance from poverty. Who wouldn’t want that? We can’t think straight like the intellectuals do as long as we’re lacking our daily vitamins. We see the elite drinking San Miguel beer everyday and that’s what we want to drink too so we can think like them!

On using Estrada to organize the poor

MG: Did Erap believe in your cause?

RL: We didn’t dare ask him about that. [Among ourselves,] we argued about how we could use him for the purpose of organizing, and, eventually, how we could turn him against himself if he wasn’t really sincere [in his commitment to the poor].

MG: You didn’t think Estrada was sincere?

RL: At the time, we didn’t care. What was important was what he stood for. We believed it and the masses believed it, so we organized around it. [...] When we campaigned for him to be vice-president, we just asked for Lucky Me [noodles] and 555 [brand] Sardines. Nothing more. If he wins, then we won’t bother him. We just asked that we be allowed to organize. We organized people that believed in Erap para sa Mahirap [Erap for the Poor, Estrada’s campaign slogan]. That’s what they gave us but didn’t know they gave us. I didn’t ask for a position. None of us did. But they let us organize and we used his name for our cause. We believed that he could live up [to his image] and that we could push him if he didn’t. Who he was in real life was beside the point.

Explaining Estrada’s appeal to the poor

It’s like this, you’re Joseph Estrada. What do we think of you? You’re higher than Mao Zedong! Higher then Lenin! Higher then anyone! You know why? Everyday
we see you being beaten up. You should be dead but you’re not dead. [Laughs] Because you’re a symbol of hope. When we see you, we know there’s still hope. It’s quite simple. All this talk of theories, Marxism, whatever. There’s only one Erapism and you see it in his movies. Everything in Marx is in an Erap movie. And the poor have been exposed to them for decades.

[...] If we had a Little Red Book, it was his movies. There was only one story. I’m the goon and you’re Erap. I beat you up, you survive, and the next time we meet, you beat me up. You’re the hero. Again and again. [People who dismiss Estrada] see him as just an actor. They don’t see how real he is on the screen. [...]

When do [the poor] feel what it’s like to be a squatter? When Erap Estrada is put in jail, not when their shanties are being demolished. They feel what it’s like to be a squatter when they see that their president can be jailed just like that! They realize, fuck! that’s why they treat us like nothing, because we’re nothing to them.
APPENDIX D

A Brief History of Edsa 3

Not long after being elected in 1998 by 40 percent of the vote—a plurality of more than twice the votes obtained by his nearest rival—Joseph Estrada’s popularity declined precipitously among the middle and upper class segments of his constituency with reports of his cronyism, serial indiscretions, and extravagance. Discontent with Estrada came to a head when provincial governor and disgruntled Erap crony, Luis “Chavit” Singson, publicly accused him of receiving kickbacks from jueteng, an illegal gambling game. Organizing for Estrada’s ouster was galvanized by Chavit’s revelations, and the following month Estrada was impeached. The impeachment trial was aborted on January 16, 2001, when Estrada’s allies in the Senate blocked a key piece of evidence, an envelope allegedly containing information on bank accounts for which Estrada had signed under an alias (Jose Velarde, for “very large deposits”). In response, the prosecution staged a walkout. Text messages circulated furiously—200 million between January 16 and 20 (Bautista 2001b:189)—expressing outrage and calling people to gather at the shrine on Epifanio de los Santos Avenue. Soon a crowd of several hundred thousand mainly young, mainly middle class demonstrators had assembled around the shrine. Merely three days later, on January 19, the military defected and the mood of the crowd, never particularly solemn to begin with, turned positively festive. On the fifth day of what was already being touted as Edsa 2, the presidential oath was administered to vice president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo at the Edsa shrine. Subsequently, 50,000 demonstrators marched from EDSA to Mendiola, ostensibly
to rout Estrada from Malacañang, the presidential palace. Estrada, meanwhile, had absconded by boat through the Pasig River at the rear of the palace and taken refuge in his home in San Juan. Estrada’s supporters seemed to accept the development until the Arroyo government moved to arrest Estrada three months later.

On word of his impending arrest, supporters began to gather outside his house in an exclusive village of North Greenhills. People’s Movement Against Poverty (PMAP), a political organization with an extensive network in several urban poor communities, had organized their core. At the time, politicians allied with Estrada had been hyping the idea of an “Edsa 3.” One senator vowed to jump out of a plane without a parachute if Estrada was arrested. The mobilization of such a large number of people would not have been possible, however, had the government’s move to arrest Estrada not galvanized a deep feeling of injustice among the urban poor over his ouster and subsequent treatment. On the day of Estrada’s arrest, April 25, 2001, 10,000 supporters blockaded the gates of his house with their bodies. Despite attacking the crowd with teargas and water cannons, it took 200 policemen four hours to make their way through using riot shields and batons. They rappelled over his walls and let themselves in. Estrada went with them “meek as a lamb” (Alquitran, Clapano, and Laude 2001, April 26:A1) while his supporters all but ran riot. “Women wailed, men screamed curses, choppers thundered overhead, and battle-ready police formed a wall of flesh outside the high brown gate of No. 1 Polk Street in North Greenhills, San Juan” (Contreras, Rivera, and Donato 2001a, April 26:A1). At one point, the demonstrators hijacked a water tanker to use as a barricade against riot police, and a few proceeded to wash themselves with water from it. As they did so, they cried out in response to a newspaper article deriding them as “bathless and toothless”: “Who says we’re ‘bathless and toothless’? Now we’ve got two water tankers here and are taking a bath!” (Soliven
2001, April 26). The *Inquirer* hailed Estrada’s arrest as a sign of political maturity and possibly a turning point “in our historical struggle to create a working democracy” (Jimenez-David 2001a, April 26:A7). The urban poor, however, reacted fiercely to the publication of his mugshot in the front pages of all the dailies. The image of Estrada looking like a common thief proved incendiary.12

Estrada’s supporters marched to the military camp where he was being held and then diverted to the Edsa shrine, where, according to one description, they took down “the flag of the Holy See [and replaced it with a pro-Estrada banner], clambered up the bronze statue of the Virgin Mary, spray-painted the walls, and dumped trash on a marker for People Power II” (Esguerra et al. 2001, April 27:A1). Many of the demonstrators remained around the shrine throughout the duration of Edsa 3. The media and the Catholic Church denounced their occupation of the shrine as a “desecration,” citing the amount of trash that had accumulated—“trash” included all evidence of occupation—as well as the bellicose, destructive, and vulgar nature of the demonstrators.13 In contrast, participants in Edsa 3 consistently depicted the demonstration as orderly and imbued with communal spirit.

12 “Later, I would learn from talking to people that one detail in particular stuck out with [the Edsa 3 demonstrators]. It was not the phalanx of shielded police that came to escort Erap, it was not the women that shed tears of grief for their idol, it was not even the bloodied faces of the men that fought off the truncheon-wielding anti-riot squads. It was the sight of Erap being photographed left, right, and front like a common thief” (de Quiros 2001, May 1:A8).

13 “My first impression of the scene was that it was no longer the shrine but a smaller version of Smokey Mountain [an infamous dumpsite and slum area]. […] There was evidence that some families had taken to living on the roof of the shrine throughout the five days that the pro-Erap forces ‘occupied’ it. There were makeshift tents and folding beds, as well as soggy lengths of cardboard that had apparently been used as mattresses. And what did they use as bathrooms? Noli found a shabby lean-to, fashioned from cartons set against the fiberglass roof, and beneath it human waste. The folks had literally been shitting at Our Lady’s feet” (Jiminez-David 2001b, May 3:A8).
People automatically organized themselves. The leaders of the groups would order, ‘Give that out, call your friends, help out, give some to the people over there.’ One person would get food and then the next. […] But what they showed on TV was people fighting each other for food. Sure, that happened too. You can’t control that. But that’s the only thing they filmed, the beggars sleeping on Edsa. That’s what they took pictures of, not the normal people.

As the numbers massing at the shrine grew exponentially, a “rally” that, by one police chief’s account, “did not appear to have any organizers” (Contreras et al. 2001b, April 27:A1), acquired “representatives.” Politicians who had aligned with Estrada during the trial now grafted themselves on to the crowd, reportedly supplying them with food and money out of a kitty established by Erap cronies (Doronila 2001:225). They advanced disparate demands, from snap elections to Estrada’s restoration, in line with their own self-interested political maneuverings weeks before a senatorial election. Politicians worked the crowd by exploiting the class divide between Edsa 2 and Edsa 3. One senatorial candidate “known for his penchant for designer suits and impeccable grooming” rallied the crowd by chanting, “Long live the smelly! Long live the stinky!” and went on to denounce those who say “that we smell” (my emphasis; Pazzibugan 2001, May 1:A1). One of Estrada’s sons exhorted the demonstrators to “take over” the financial center of Metro Manila. JV Ejercito led a contingent of about 2,000 demonstrators into the downtown area of Makati City, where they set up a stage in front of the Philippine Stock Exchange. “If you run into mestizos,” he told them, “flick them on the nose!”—in order to flatten them and thus efface one symbol of their class cum racial power, i.e., their high-bridged noses (Papa 2001, May 1:A25).
The size of Edsa 3 likely exceeded that of Edsa 2.\textsuperscript{14} Although comprised mainly of the urban poor, the demonstration was significantly enhanced by the addition of members from two religious organizations that supported Estrada, the Filipinized Christian church Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) and the Catholic charismatic sect El Shaddai. Despite its size, the major TV stations initially ignored the demonstration, ostensibly because of safety concerns—media representatives cried harassment—although the international press managed to cover the event. The demonstration was broadcast on the INC channel, which, until that point, had featured mainly religious programming. When Arroyo finally persuaded the INC to withdraw (capitulating to their demand to have Estrada put under house arrest), the expectation that the demonstration would subsequently dissipate was so strong that, on May 1, nearly all the major dailies ran banner headlines declaring the end of Edsa 3.

On May 1, at around two in the morning, a contingent of 300,000 demonstrators marched to the presidential palace. Using dump trucks and the sheer force of their numbers, they breached five cement barricades along the ten kilometer stretch from the Edsa shrine to Malacañang. “They were like cardboard boxes,” one participant said of the barricades. “They just gave way as we marched through them.” The demonstrators torched news trucks, police cars, and ambulances. They “divested [construction sites] of lead pipes, hollow blocks, wooden planks, stones—anything that could be used as a weapon” (Aning, Nocum, and Verdiano 2001, May 2:A19). Riot police, caught off guard and greatly outnumbered, simply stood aside and watched. Some were disarmed, and some invited to join the march. The marchers proceeded down Mendiola, the avenue leading to Malacañang, dividing into three groups approaching the palace

\textsuperscript{14} Doronila’s account (2001:236) is the most conservative: 300,000 at its height on April 29. At one point, the \textit{Inquirer} estimated that the number of demonstrators had reached 1.5 million (Pablo and Veridiano 2001, May 1:A1); Abinales and Amoroso (2005:277) estimated three million. In contrast, it is unlikely that the size of Edsa 2 reached one million.
from different directions. In the face of their advance, Edsa 2 forces that had gathered along Mendiola in order to defend the palace retreated behind the walls of a nearby college. The crowd had to be restrained by its leaders from pursuing them.\textsuperscript{15} The marchers reached the gates of the palace compound and resumed their protest activities. Television footage shows demonstrators chanting “Gloria step down,” “Erap return,” and “Edsa Tres”; men clustered around a dead comrade painting their hands with his blood; and others singing the national anthem and mugging for the cameras now circulating among them. A man with a megaphone was desperately pleading with the thin line of policemen that had interposed themselves between the demonstrators and Malacañang’s Gate 7. Over time, the line thickened with military troops. Five hours later, combined police and military forces moved to drive away the demonstrators, literally pushing them back with shields and truncheons. The demonstrators scampered away some distance then turned around to hurl stones. The cameras, now behind the troops, show them firing overhead and shooting teargas canisters into the crowd. The stalemate had devolved into a street battle waged block-by-block and lasting well into the afternoon before its remaining vestiges were finally dispersed.

\textsuperscript{15} According to PMAP officer Marlon Uson, “We blocked the gates [of San Beda College] so they wouldn’t kill Chito Gascon [an Edsa 2 leader]. So if you talk to Chito Gascon, tell him to thank PMAP—and Marlon in particular. We formed a human chain to keep [the Edsa 2 group] from being killed.”
APPENDIX E

Edwin Nakpil on the “Poor People’s March”

Edwin Nakpil has been a community organizer in the San Roque slum since the 1990s. He led the group from San Roque during Edsa 3. He gives an account of the demonstrators’ march to Malacañang on May 1, 2001.

Some groups didn’t want to march to Malacañang. I said to my group, if we don’t go to Malacañang, if we don’t make ourselves heard, then this demonstration won’t amount to anything. Maybe they didn’t hear us at the shrine because we were an assorted lot; organized groups, unorganized people who only cared about Estrada, politicians who came to make speeches. We have to assault Malacañang in order to make ourselves heard! This opportunity may never come again. When people heard about the march, people who lived in the slums along our route, from San Juan all the way to Manila, came out to see us. They just wanted to see what was going on. They came out of curiosity and became believers. It wasn’t just about Erap anymore but about something deeper, social problems and patriotism. There were so many of us, we overturned this huge construction vehicle, a grader or was it a bulldozer? We burned it and turned it over.

When we crossed the Chino Roces [Mendiola] Bridge, people went in different directions. Some continued along Chino Roces, some took another route to Malacañang, some took yet another. If you had an aerial view, if you were to look down on us from above, it looked like we were coming at Malacañang from all sides. We had no leader. There were a lot of leaders but no one wanted to speak up for all of us. We were all too scared! There were snipers on the buildings along either side [of Mendiola]. We knew they were snipers because we saw their guns had lasers. It was dark. All the streetlights had been turned off. They had set up barricades along the road—those iron rail fences used in construction—and had even electrified them! We broke through these barriers while the soldiers and the police just stood aside and watched. They just watched and did nothing. There were a lot of police and a lot of soldiers. Some of them, out of fear, left their guns, and, out of fear, people took them. Others were unwilling to harm their fellow poor—because they were related. Or they knew them. And if they didn’t know them, they could identify with them. “Would you kill your neighbor?” “Oh, this is too much.”

Groups that had been a part of Edsa 2 were gathered along Chino Roces [in an attempt to defend the presidential palace]. People sent in advance of the crowd told them to leave lest they be injured or killed. But they had nowhere to escape to and people were coming in from all sides,
so they ducked into a school [San Beda College]. People saw them go into the building and wanted to get them. We stopped them. We said, “Let’s not bother with them. They’re not our enemy. We came here to make ourselves heard.” [Those Edsa 2 groups] should thank us. The people were really angry and some of them just wanted to go crazy.

Along the way, we saw [Senator] Angara’s truck. There was one of his men announcing through a loudspeaker, “Let’s leave! We might die here!” The leaders got mad at him and said, “Get out of there! You’re already dying of fear. Go home!” Then we commandeered his truck. Now we had a sound system!

We used pliers and wooden planks to break through the barbed wire around the gate of Malacañang. I won’t forget it. That was our “payment.” My friend and I shouted, ‘Long live the revolution of the small!’ That’s it, I’m paid up. It’s over. We did it. The revolution of the poor that no one had prepared for. Who knew that Erap would be the reason behind a revolution where we were able to take power? Even if all that meant was [breaking through] the barbed wire and entering an area that we couldn’t have entered before. When we got there we put away all our sticks—barbecue sticks, deadly weapons if need be. We took them away just to prove that our message was pure. We left behind a mountain of sticks there for the police to see. Dawn broke and we saw that we were literally at the gate of Malacañang. One step away. Just a road between us. It’s like, here we were, there’s the gate, a road in between, what? six steps? There was the gate. Just go in. “What do we do now, Mang Edwin?” My God! I couldn’t be speechless at a time like this. What if they charge? There were the snipers, ready to fire! Imagine all the people, not quite a million but hundreds of thousands. Chest to chest, elbow to elbow. You can’t retreat. There’s just no space for it. So we had no choice. Some of the old people started crying: “We’re going to die here.” “Let’s go home because I can’t breathe.” “But where will we pass? And if we retreat now we may be more likely to die.” Then I heard this woman say, “Fine. If we die, we die.” [Laughs] Just like that. “If we die, we die.”

We started to pray. After praying, we planned to sing the national anthem, then stage a program. We were bluffing for time. When we could move forward, we would. We were so scared. While we were praying, even before we had finished, it began to rain tear gas. A lot of tear gas. Then they started shooting. Pak! Pak! Pak! Pak! Pak! Rubber bullets, but it still hurt. It’s like you’ve been shot with a slingshot. It’s like, ah, it hurt! It’s like you’ve been hit hard with the end of an iron rod. But the tear gas was worse. They wanted us to disperse but how could we fall back? It’s like we were ants trying to back into a whale. When the tear gas fell, you would just hear this “shhhhh,” crash. It made the hair on your skin stand on end. Then a sound you won’t forget your whole life, this howl. The cry of thousands of people roaring, “Huuuuu!” When I turned to look, I was teargassed myself. I saw people waving like the sea. A lot of screaming and crying. Other people got mad and wanted to fight back. A little later the helicopter came. It had a missile. A missile! It was about this long, right there on the side of the helicopter. It was just like a movie. The helicopter went like this [makes a swooping motion followed by a shrieking sound], “Eeeeee!”

We looked for what we could find. Water, even sewer water. A lot of people were hurt. A little boy got caught inside the barbed wire and died there. He was trampled while stuck. Finally, things quieted down. The Red Cross showed up. They didn’t know what to do with all the injured. [The media said] “Their eyes are red, they’re drug addicts!” As if you’re eyes wouldn’t be red too if you were just tear-gassed! “Why are you naked?” We took off our clothes to wet them and to have something to cover our eyes. The discos and nightclubs gave us water;
customers and even the GROs [hostesses] helped out. They brought us water and some even joined us!

Around 10 o’clock, I got word that someone from the media wanted to interview me and that I should go to him. I was holding up the flag of our party-list and my companion was holding up the Philippine flag. I left my flag with him and went over to where I was supposed to go, but the guy who had asked me to come over wasn’t there. I saw the guy who was supposed to interview me, and it didn’t look like he wanted to interview me. I thought I had been fooled. When I got back to my group, the guy I had left my flag with was dead. Shot in the head. Someone said it was because he turned the Philippine flag upside down and raised it. Isn’t that a signal to attack? So they shot him, pak! Other people said that it was me they wanted to shoot. The guy who had told me about the interview had found out and led me away so I wouldn’t get killed. Or maybe it was all just a coincidence.

By noon, things looked bleak. Our chance to take Malacañang had gone. People were on their knees praying, screaming, huddled together in groups. I said to myself, this is desperation. It’s suicide. I couldn’t take it and went home. I watched the rest of it on TV. I got mad because this wasn’t what we wanted. People were burning and destroying things. They had been hurt and needed to do these things.

That’s my version of the story. Now many years have passed. After it happened, we tried to bring together all the forces that made up Edsa 3. But they were so disparate, we couldn’t do it. And now, instead of…now I’m portrayed as the villain. That’s my version. There are other versions and you should seek them out. They differ in details and in the overall sense they make of Edsa 3. Other groups may see things differently, but we have our own name for the march. The Poor People’s March. May 1 was the Poor People’s March. Will it happen again? Again and again.
APPENDIX F

Breakfast at Malacañang

Annie and her family participated in Edsa 3 on their own. They even pooled money among themselves—around 3000 pesos (US$60 at the time)—to buy enough food to distribute to other demonstrators. On the day of the march, the police seized their truck and accused them of distributing weapons. The men and women were held in separate government facilities for a week. As part of her effort to woo the poor in the days following Edsa 3, Arroyo freed the demonstrators that had been arrested and even invited them to the presidential palace for breakfast. Annie recounts the event.

They told us to dress up so that it wouldn’t be so obvious that we were squatters. I made sure to look good that day. I took a long time in the bathroom and really washed up well. I used makeup and even bought perfume that I couldn’t afford. When I left the house, I could have been mistaken for a teacher. Our escorts came wearing uniforms. We traveled by convoy with a military escort. The cars didn’t even stop at the stop sign. They went straight ahead. I never imagined that the time would come when I could simply blow past a stop sign. Who can do that? And we went so fast.

Shit, the palace was gorgeous! It felt like I was dreaming going up the stairs because the carpet was so soft. It was so nice to step on. I can die now that I’ve been to Malacañang. The tables were beautiful. They were carved and covered with nice things. And it was cold. You didn’t have to fan yourself. You could eat and eat and not begin to sweat. No wonder Gloria won’t resign even though everyone wants her to. Her life here is really nice. She has so many servants. They probably even bathe her.

They had invited hundreds of people. It was like everyone who attended Edsa 3 was there. At least everyone they jailed. Although most people dressed up, some people didn’t really comb their hair. There were some people who looked like they hadn’t bathed. Some people brought their kids even though we were told not to bring kids.

They liked me because I talked a lot. They gave me a paper and asked me to read it in front of everyone. “Oh no,” I said, “I’m not used to public speaking.” “Don’t worry,” they said. “The media won’t be there.” The paper said that I promise never to cause trouble like that [Edsa 3] again. But that’s not how I really felt! I didn’t protest to cause trouble; I did it for my country. But I couldn’t say that and so I just read the speech. Before I knew it, it was over. People were clapping. I read it but I didn’t mean it. I wanted to tell the truth. Later I threw the paper away—even though I usually keep such things—because I didn’t want to think about it. I felt terrible.
We were seated at President Arroyo’s table, along with the head of DSWD and [General] Aglipay. After I spoke, [Aglipay] was clapping loudly for me. He said, “Missis, do you often attend these kinds of gatherings?” “No sir,” I said, “this is my first time.” “Well, you were very impressive.” Then President Arroyo said—in Tagalog, not English—“let’s eat!” I didn’t eat at first because I didn’t know how. Our spoon and fork were gold, how were we supposed to eat? Gold! I looked at the president to see how she ate. I see, you take the tissue [napkin]. You take the bread with your fork and slice it with your gold knife. I had to see how they ate, of course, because they were better than us. We used to be squatters (not anymore, though). She took her fork and put some ham on her bread, and then she put her fork down on the tissue and ate. Well, that’s what I did too so I wouldn’t look like an idiot. Us, we just use our hands to eat bread. We even dip it in our coffee. If they saw us doing that they might say, “What’s this? Where are these people from?” So I just did what they did.

Breakfast was a piece of bread, fruit salad, ham, and a cup of hot coffee. I thought, “One piece of bread? That’s not enough.” It was a big piece of bread, but I could have eaten four of them. They said we could have more, but I was too embarrassed to ask. They might call me greedy. Other guests arrived that were more important than we were and so I said, “Madam, I’ll move over to the other table.” “No,” she said. “Stay here.” There was a lot of small talk at our table but I just stayed quiet. I was embarrassed. They might just say, “Who does she think she is?”

They gave my mother-in-law PhilHealth [insurance]. They gave a four-year scholarship to everyone who hadn’t finished school. My son cried when he found out because now he could finish school. I was proud, and I won’t forget, that of all the presidents of the Philippines, President Arroyo is the only one I’ve shaken hands with. She hugged me and I took her hand. She said that I was her guest of honor. I was excited at the time, but I don’t feel that way anymore. She was good to me and she took care of us, but to tell you the truth, I can’t bring myself to like her. I don’t know what she wanted from us. What bothers me is having read that paper. I wouldn’t do it again. They didn’t tell me that I would have to give a speech. They only told me once I got there. If I had known, I would make them listen to how I really felt. Then I wouldn’t feel so bad about it now.

I don’t even want to vote anymore. My vote’s wasted. I voted for Estrada and they brought him down. You know, my eyes were so swollen when that happened. I was glued to the TV. I didn’t even eat. When he waved goodbye, I cried and cried. Even if he didn’t say anything, just the picture of him looking like he didn’t really want to leave…. I’m poor, that’s why I love him. When my sons were locked up in Crame [the military camp], he was the one who sent them food. Briefs for the men; panties and dusters [house dresses] for the women; and a lot of food.
REFERENCES


