A Comment on Peter Kilby: Industrial Relations and Wage Determination

by

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Recently in this journal, Peter Kilby demonstrated the absence of the institutional prerequisites for the operation of the "Anglo-Saxon model" of industrial relations and wage determination for Nigeria.[1] One can hardly take issue with this general point, made by numerous writers on the subject in other contexts.[2] But Mr. Kilby goes beyond this to reject the "Anglo-Saxon model" as a "failure." Such an assertion has two aspects: (1) definition of the "Anglo-Saxon model" and (2) the sense in which it has failed.

Presumably, the "Anglo-Saxon model" is the tradition of voluntary trade union associations and the freedom of such associations to bargain collectively for wages and conditions of service. "Failure" of this system is a more elusive concept. Clearly, the absence of the institutional prerequisites does not imply failure. Failure implies that the system has worked to the detriment of the general good of society. This seems to be Mr.

[1]Peter Kilby, "Industrial Relations and Wage Determination: Failure of the Anglo-Saxon Model," *Journal of Developing Areas,* I (July 1967), 489-519. All future references will be to "Kilby" with the appropriate page(s).

[2]Kilby himself cites Walter Galenson (ed.), *Labour and Economic Development* (New York: John Wiley, 1959) and *Labor in Developing Economies* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1962), and others. H. A. Turner, *Wage Trends, Wage Policies, and Collective Bargaining: The Problems for Developing Countries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965) is also relevant.

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Kilby's view. In his article, his argument is that the Anglo-Saxon model has been perverted through trade unions relying on political rather than economic weapons, with the consequence that "there is little doubt that trade unions [in Nigeria] have raised wages in the organized labor market higher than they otherwise would have been."[3] The detrimental effects of this have been two, it is argued: (1) depression of the wage in the unorganized sector and (2) creation of a rural-urban income differential which has aggravated urban overpopulation. Mr. Kilby concludes his article by offering certain policy recommendations both to reduce union power to influence wages and reduce the flood of migration.

The purpose of this note is to demonstrate, first, that the alleged union power to raise wages is illusory; and second, that even if this were not the case, several of the policy recommendations are ill-conceived. Section I considers the mechanism by which Mr. Kilby thinks unions have affected wages in Nigeria. Section II sets forth some of the evidence of the political role of Nigerian trade unions, and rejects the hypothesis of union political strength. Section III analyzes the historical development of the Nigerian trade union movement and, in light of this development, offers an alternative interpretation of wage determination. Section IV deals with Mr. Kilby's specific policy recommendations.

I

In order to argue that trade unions in Nigeria have had significant success in raising the level of real wages above "what they would otherwise have been," one must come to grips with the fact that the trade union movement, by any objective measure, is weak and precariously grafted onto the Nigerian system of industrial relations. Kilby correctly recognizes this problem.

> The constituent elements of this pattern [common to the majority of underdeveloped countries] include a preponderance of many small weak unions, apathetic, non-dues paying membership, vociferous but inept outside union leadership in dealing with foreign employers, maladministration and theft of union funds, a primary focus on wage claims, inability to sustain strikes, and realized gains won by politically-interested government intervention.[4]

In face of such overwhelming considerations leading to the conclusion that unions should have virtually no impact on wages, how is it that Kilby can conclude the opposite? He clearly sets out the mechanism by which he thinks unions are able to influence wages in spite of these weaknesses.

> In place of voluntary collective bargaining, wage rates in the unionized sector of the labor market have been determined by means of independent commissions in which neither workers nor employers have been represented. Prior to 1954 these commissions were set up in response to pressure from government employees suffering from an erosion of their real wage; since 1954 the "pull" of electoral politics has reinforced the "push" of rising prices to bring about wage tribunals and wage awards.

[3]Kilby, p. 501. His contention is essentially the same as W. M. Warren's, "the Nigerian trade union movement has been able substantially to counteract . . . debilitating effects by mobilizing political sources of strength which have enabled it to raise the real wages of its membership and of urban wage employees generally," in his "Urban Real Wages and the Nigerian Trade Union Movement, 1939-60," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, XV (October 1966), 21.

[4]Kilby, p. 514.

Trade unions have played an important role in mobilizing, magnifying, and channeling the discontent of government employees who have suffered a gradual erosion of their money wage [*sic*]; these union activities have resulted in more frequent wage tribunals and in larger awards than would otherwise have been the case.[5]

Mr. Kilby postulates a system in which unions, unable to organize and sustain economic pressures on employers with techniques such as strikes and slowdowns, are nonetheless capable of exerting sufficient political power on government to force commissioning of wage reviews, and to sustain the pressure sufficiently to force wage awards higher than they would be in the absence of unions. This trade union pressure is viewed as activated by a rising price level which erodes real wages, and spearheaded by government employees.

Before dealing with the alleged "pull" of electoral politics, these two key variables, the price level and the role of government workers, deserve comment. The erosion of the real wage by rising prices, in fact, has been very gradual in Nigeria. Prices have been remarkably stable, except during the last three years due to political troubles (that is, after the last wage award).

The role of government workers as the vanguard of the pressure to raise wages is open to even more serious question. Far from being militant and aggressive, the evidence indicates that Nigerian government employees, except for the 1940's, have tended to strike less than any other industry group in the economy, save services. Table 1 provides a breakdown of strikes by industry for various periods. After the general strike of 1945, state employees (general government, teachers, railroad, and water and electric workers) have shown little propensity to strike.

TABLE 1
MAN-DAYS LOST PER WORKER BY INDUSTRY FOR SELECTED PERIODS, NIGERIA, 1943-67*

Industry	*1943-50*	*1951-55*	*1956-59*	*1960-67*
Agriculture	19.1	1.0	1.7	. . .
Construction	1.4	0.6	1.6	0.8
Government	13.9	0.1	0.2	0.9
Logging	6.4	0.3	. . .	3.6
Manufacturing	0.6	nil	0.3	2.5
Mining	2.5	0.1	12.2	1.6
Railroads	32.1	nil	0.2	nil
Stevedore	5.1	1.0	2.2	6.3
Services	nil	nil	nil	0.9
Trade	15.5	nil	0.3	1.0

*Sources and method in Appendix.

Thus, the evidence on strike propensities does not support the position that government workers have played a militant role in bringing about wage increases. The evidence does not categorically exclude the possibility that government workers have played a militant role in bringing about wage increases; but in face of objective, quantitative evidence to the contrary, persuasive qualitative or quantitative evidence must be forthcoming to confirm Mr. Kilby's hypothesis.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 496, 500.

Having dealt with these issues, we can return to Kilby's central analytical problem: to explain how the trade union movement can be both too weak to organize and sustain a strike, yet sufficiently powerful to force a reluctant government to commission a wage review leading to higher wage rates. Mr. Kilby's "'pull' of electoral politics" seeks to explain this phenomenon. He implies that the various Nigerian governments have sought to woo the votes of the wage earner class through higher wages. The role of unions in this process is to "transmit" the rank-and-file pressure to the government. To quote Mr. Kilby, "Unions have played an important role in transmitting these pressures to the government, and have made clear to the contending political parties the electoral benefits of pre-election wage awards."[6]

II

There have been six major wage awards in Nigeria since 1940, but Mr. Kilby provides no evidence as to how and whether in fact trade unions made this "transmission," except for a chronological description of the development of the 1964 Morgan award. It is clear that proof of specific trade union action is necessary, for the postulated process, government wooing of wage earners, is consistent with the total absence of a trade union movement. The fact that the government in power seeks to woo wage earners by raising wages does not by itself imply that trade unions are powerful. The mere existence of an urban wage-earning proletariat, unorganized and amorphous, may be sufficient to induce government to sustain real wages out of real or imaginary fears of the violent potential of this group. In order for unions to play a strategic role, they must be capable, or thought to be capable by politicians, of commanding and delivering blocks of votes or gathering masses for politically embarrassing demonstrations. In this role the trade union leadership "sells" rank-and-file support to political parties, acting as middlemen.

There is little or no evidence that Nigerian trade unions have performed such a role.[7] Nigerian trade union leaders have been unable to forge their membership into strong political machines for the same reasons they have been unable to sustain economic strikes—a fragmented union movement, multiple unionism, membership existing in the main only on paper, and financial insolvency. Not only is the trade union movement incapable of rallying masses to the polls to repay political favors, the size of the trade union movement is such as to make the impact of such a delivery questionable. In 1964, 540 trade unions claimed

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 496.

[7] The following discussion of the political role of trade unions in Nigeria will deal only superficially with the relationship between unions and political parties. This issue has been set out exhaustively by Elliot Berg in a comment on the Warren article to be published ("Urban Real Wages and the Nigerian Trade Union Movement, 1939-60: A Comment"). Berg's major points are: (1) the difficult methodological problems involved in ascertaining political influence of unions, (2) lack of labor unrest or labor influence on the competing political parties during the early and middle 1950's (Gorsuch commission, 1954; Hanbury award, 1955), (3) government wages were not raised between 1946 and 1950, when trade union activity was strongest, and (4) at no time have a significant number of trade unionists either held leadership in the major political parties or been members of the Federal House of Representatives. (Though not yet published, Berg's note can be obtained from the Center for Research on Economic Development, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104.)

367,200 members. In the federal election of the same year, 5.6 million votes were cast.[8] Thus taking the extreme assumption that the entire membership was mobilized, it would have accounted for about 6-7 percent of the vote.

In light of the internal weakness and small size of the trade union movement, it is not surprising that most analysts of the Nigerian political scene have considered it of little political importance. Mackintosh, for example, passes the judgment that "on the whole there is little political capital to be made out of labor questions . . . ."[9]

Similarly, there is little evidence that "union activities have resulted in more frequent wage tribunals and in larger awards than would otherwise have been the case." Rather than pursue the political role of unions, I shall consider whether this "what-might-have-been" judgment is consistent with the historical development of the Nigerian trade union movement.

III

Analysis of work-stoppage data strongly supports the view that Nigerian trade unions have become progressively less militant and aggressive over time. It sustains the judgment of a Nigerian trade unionist, "Politically, Nigeria reached her climax of struggles in the forties. Our trade union activities were also at their peak within this period."[10]

Given certain environmental conditions, one can speculate as to the reaction of a trade union movement characterized by internal weakness. Since the Second World War, when a policy of forced labor was necessary to recruit adequate manpower, the Nigerian labor market has been characterized by growing urban unemployment and underemployment. While wage employment has increased, the increase has been much less than the rate of urban migration. Faced with this, one can postulate certain behavior by trade unions. Defining "offensive strikes" as strikes by unions to force an improvement over the status quo (higher wages, shorter hours, better working conditions) and "defensive strikes" as those to maintain or reestablish the status quo (redundancy, wage cuts, longer hours, wage arrears), one's predictions can be tested empirically. The hypothesis is that trade unions faced with growing unemployment, unfavorable external economic conditions,[11] and internal weakness would react in an increasingly defensive manner. Consistent with this prediction, Nigerian trade unions should have over the years become less aggressive on wage increases and increasingly struck over redundancy, wage arrears, etc. This is precisely the trend we observe. Table 2 provides data on man-days lost due to defensive strike action as a percentage of total man-days lost.

[8] J. P. Mackintosh, *Nigerian Government and Politics* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 596-603.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 82. Also see Richard Sklar, *Nigerian Political Parties* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 80 ff., 270 ff. Sklar emphasizes the political weakness of the trade union movement.

[10] Eyo Okon Akak, *Our Labour Movement* (Lagos: Nooremac Press, 1963), p. 5.

[11] The Nigerian GDP data, as in all economies dominated by peasant agriculture, are of questionable reliability. It is worth noting, however, that after the export-boom years of 1950-54, economic conditions worsened, improving again after 1960. (Average annual rates of growth: 1950-55, 10.1 percent; 1955-60, 2.2 percent; and 1960-64, 7.45 percent.)

TABLE 2
DEFENSIVE MAN-DAYS LOST AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL MDL NIGERIA, 1943-67[12]

Period	*Percentage*
1943-50	5
1951-59	17
1960-67	33

This evidence is consistent with our view of trade unions as weak and precariously grafted to the industrial relations system. In light of the overwhelming qualitative evidence indicating union impotence, the opposite result would have been surprising. While not providing conclusive proof that unions have had no impact on wages (which is virtually impossible if the debate over the same issue in the United States is any indicator), it does place the heavy burden of proof on those defending the contrary view.

The institutional evidence suggests union impotence. If unions have forced the creation of wage reviews and, subsequently, higher wages than "otherwise," one would predict a crescendo of strike action prior to the government's commissioning of the review body. The opposite has been the case. Warren, though arguing for a strong union impact, observes that "the Nigerian strike pattern has the unusual characteristic of showing a rise in the number of strikes *following a major government award instead of preceding it* . . . ."[13]

In light of our interpretation of the Nigerian trade union movement, such a pattern is not "unusual," but would be expected. One can build a "model" of wage determination in the Nigerian context which is consistent with union weakness and this strike pattern. For humanitarian, institutional, and ideological reasons the government commissions a major wage review about every five years.[14] In the absence of such government action, unions are incapable of mustering sufficient pressure to raise wages in the private or public sectors.[15] The announcement of the wage review significantly changes the union's environment. With

[12]See Appendix for definitions and sources.

[13]Warren, "Urban Real Wages and the Nigerian Trade Union Movement, 1939-60," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* (October 1966), p. 23, italics added.

[14]Major wage reviews were held in 1942, 1949, 1955, 1960, and 1964. Berg in his comment on the Warren article finds no evidence of trade union pressure for the period of the forties and was told by high Labor Department officials in Lagos in 1958 that the government had been ready for months to raise wages, but the trade union representatives had been unable or unwilling to present wage demands to the government because of internal political differences. Presumably these would be the officials pressured by the "pull" of electoral politics. Warren concedes that the 1954-55 wage increases were not due to union pressure, but resulted from "independent reasons" and "initiative from above by the regional governments" (*ibid.*, pp. 23, 30). The timing and motivational factors leading to the wage awards was the topic of Weeks's doctoral thesis, "Wage Policy and Rural-Urban Income Trends in Nigeria" (University of Michigan, 1968).

[15]An inspection of the seven issues of *Earnings and Employment Survey* published by the Nigerian Ministry of Labor (1956-62) and the surveys by the Nigerian Employers Consultative Association (1957-66) strongly suggests wage stability among firms between the major awards.

the public disclosure of the recommended wage levels for government employees, the trade unions are provided with powerful leverage on the private sector, for the government has given its blessing to the new wage structure as both fair and equitable. The moral force supporting the wage structure is further strengthened if, as in the case of the 1964 Morgan award, the increases are based on a concept of a living wage.

> There are many ways of approaching the question of a minimum wage. The most generally accepted standards are those usually referred to as the Poverty Datum Line and the principle of a Living Wage . . . .
>
> Our society has not changed in outlook since the Bridges' Committee [1942, using PDL] made its recommendations. Even if a man is not "his brother's keeper," insofar as his extended family is concerned, he is very much the provider for his family . . . . [T]he fact that a man has no education or special training to enable him to undertake employment other than at the bottom of the ladder does not and should not debar him [because of low income] from getting married and raising a family.[16]

Such a justification of wage increases clearly moves out of the realm of economics into ethics. The trade union movement can point out that if government workers deserve a living wage, so do private employees. This "key bargain" not only creates artificial trade union strength and solidarity through an "orbit of coercive comparison," but also places the government in an awkward position. The government will find it difficult not to support, at least tacitly, union demands for extension into the private sector of a wage structure which the state has justified on allegedly objective grounds for its own employees.

This system is one of passive union weakness, with unions able to rally rank-and-file support only after independent government action—"a sort of manna from Heaven."[17]

While the evidence strongly suggests that unions have had little to do with the frequency or awards of wage commissions, it still might be argued that unions have affected the wage level. If private firms in the absence of union pressure would not meet the level of government wages, then unions increase the wage level by "spreading" the government rate through the private sector. Private sector strikes and subsequent wage increases to match the government level do not by themselves support this, however. It is possible that the large private employers would follow the government's lead in the absence of unions, and the wage award system thus slows down the increase of money wage rates by postponing private increases until after public sector action.

The only way to test this alternative hypothesis would be to compare government wage increases in the absence of unions to increases in the presence of unions. While there were government wage increases in 1934 and 1937, before unions were legalized in 1938, there is no reliable information on wages in the private sector before or after.[18] However, there was a government wage increase in December 1941, and a survey

[16] Federal Republic of Nigeria, *Report of the Commission on the Review of Wages, Salary and Conditions of Service of the Junior Employees of the Governments of the Federation and in Private Establishments, 1963-64* (Lagos: Ministry of Information, 1964), pp. 11-12.

[17] Akak, *Our Labour Movement*, p. 24.

[18] "Rates of Pay for Employees and Labour in Lagos and District" (Lagos: Memorandum of Chief Secretary's Office, 20 September 1934). "Rates of Pay for Employees and Labour in Lagos and District" (Lagos: Memorandum of C.S.O., 5 July 1937).

of wages paid by private firms two months later.[19] By February 1942, 88 percent of the unskilled workers employed by the private firms surveyed in Lagos were paid the government minimum or above.[20] Yet trade union membership at the end of 1941 was still small, and concentrated in the public sector.[21] Thus, private emulation of the government cannot be explained in terms of union strength.

In summary, while "proof" of trade union impact or lack of impact on wages is elusive, because of the "what-might-have-been" nature of the argument, the preponderance of evidence is inconsistent with Mr. Kilby's hypothesis that the impact has been significant. To repeat the major points:

1. The Nigerian trade union movement is internally split and financially weak.
2. The data on strikes do not support the idea that government employees have taken the lead in exerting pressure on the government to raise wages.
3. There is no evidence that the Nigerian political parties actively courted trade union support or included unionists in positions of party power.
4. Nigerian trade unions have developed in an unfavorable economic environment.
5. Strike data indicate that the trade union movement has developed a progressively less militant posture.
6. The strike pattern is characterized by major work stoppage *after* the wage awards.

IV

The evidence that unions have not had any significant impact on the wage level throws profound doubt on the necessity for policy measures to check union strength. Nevertheless, three of Mr. Kilby's policy recommendations arising out of this argument invite comment. Information pertinent to those recommendations dealing with the rural-urban "imbalance" can be found elsewhere;[22] in any case, the topic involves issues beyond the scope of this note.

It is suggested that "Most, if not all of the political leverage of the Nigerian trade union movement could be neutralized by two simple measures."[23] The first is that wage determination should be tied to the cost of living and "removed from the domain of tribunals." While

[19] Circular No. 27/1944, M.P. No. 38731/S.1, "Cost of Living Bonus for Government Labour in Lagos" (Lagos: 8 December 1941).

[20] Government of Nigeria, A.F.B. Bridges (Chairman), *Report of the Cost of Living Committee, Lagos, Nigeria, 1942* (London: Crown Agent for the Colonies, 1942). Survey covered approximately 4,000 employees.

[21] T. M. Yesufu, *An Introduction to Industrial Relations in Nigeria* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 39-41. Trade union membership was 17,521 (41 unions).

[22] Berg, "Major Issues of Wage Policy in Africa," in *Industrial Relations and Economic Development*, ed. Arthur Ross (London: MacMillan, 1966); Charles R. Frank, Jr., "Industrialization and Employment Generation in Nigeria," *Nigerian Journal of Social and Economic Research*, IX (November 1967); *Minimum Wage Fixing and Related Problems with Special Reference to Developing Countries* (Geneva: International Labor Organization, 1964), pp. 77 ff.

[23] Kilby, p. 517.

agreeing that wage tribunals are far from ideal, one must wonder if this recommendation would not create more problems than it would solve. Tying government wages to the cost of living requires the government to grant the largest increases when it is least able to afford them. First, when prices are rising fastest, a country is most likely to encounter balance of payments pressures. An automatic wage increase would lead to increased imports which, while small relatively, would be significant at the margin. Second, inflation raises the cost of government goods and services, placing a strain on recurrent and capital budgets. In face of this, government would have mandated itself to increase the pressure through wage increases. This is clearly a vicious cycle—the higher are prices, the higher is the cost of government goods and services, and the higher must be the wage increase, further raising the cost of government goods and services. Such a policy is the road to recurrent budget deficits, further inflation, and further wage increases. There is little evidence of a wage-price spiral in any black African country, but this is clearly the way to produce one.

Mr. Kilby's second "simple" recommendation is that acceptance of funds from foreign labor organizations (AFL-CIO, WFTU) by Nigerian unions be made illegal. He feels this measure "cuts off . . . [the] *de facto* means of sustenance" of trade union political activity.[24] While perhaps a sound idea on other grounds, it is questionable whether it would have any impact on the political activity of Nigerian unions. The aid from foreign organizations seems to have had little observable impact. Berg concurs with this view of external aid.

> This foreign trade union activity in Africa has had three related goals: the winning of ideological allies . . . ; the transmission of ideas on the model of trade unionism most suitable for the defense of wage-earner interests; and the creation of strong self-sufficient trade union organizations. Measured by any of these criteria, results have been meager.
>
> Not only has outside trade union interest in much of Africa been brief, but the commitment in terms of money and manpower has been limited.[25]

With regard to the rural-urban "imbalance," Mr. Kilby recommends a "per capita 'unemployment tax' which would be levied on heads of households for every unemployed male dependent aged fifteen to forty,"[26] presumably designed to counter the matrix of obligations associated with an extended family system. The operational implementation of this suggestion requires a workable definition of unemployment, and no such definition exists. As W. A. Lewis has pointed out, unemployment is a phenomenon of a wage-economy.[27] In spite of attempts by the Nigerian government to measure unemployment in urban areas,[28] the concept is elusive and nonoperational. Nigerian cities are filled with workers who linger about markets, expatriate-catering stores, wholesale businesses,

[24] *Ibid.*

[25] Berg, "The External Impact on Trade Unions in Developing Countries: The Record in Africa," in *Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Meeting* (Madison, Wis.: Industrial Relations Research Association, 1963), pp. 1, 2.

[26] Kilby, p. 518.

[27] "Unemployment in Developing Countries," lecture to Mid-West Research Conference, October 1964.

[28] National Manpower Board, *Urban Unemployment Survey, 1963* (Lagos: 1964).

and truck terminals, working perhaps a few hours some days, not at all on others. At most major markets laborers congregate early in the morning to be hired by local contractors. Those who are not hired disperse to various vocations for which it is virtually impossible to draw a line between "employed" and "unemployed."[29] Unemployment in the statistical sense is a concept that has meaning only in an economy dominated by wage employment; then the definition is reasonably clear—if a person is not receiving regular wage payments and is looking for work, he is unemployed.

* * *

In summary, if by "failure" one means that the "Anglo-Saxon model" has resulted in generating detrimental economic forces in the form of wages rising faster than in the absence of it, the system has not failed in Nigeria.

But a more serious issue is at hand. By judging the system to be a failure, it is clearly implied that it should be eliminated. If tying wages to prices and eliminating foreign financing could well create a worse situation (in the case of the first) or be ineffective (in the case of the second), more drastic alternatives are called for. I would suggest that the only effective way of eliminating union strength, when and if it becomes serious in Nigeria, is to prohibit free association for members of the labor force. Authoritarian regimes at both ends of the political spectrum have found this an effective restraint on the demands of workers. Compared to this, "failure" of the "Anglo-Saxon model" may not seem so serious.

APPENDIX

Methodology

Table 1. The number of man-days lost for each industry over the period selected was divided by a figure taken to be representative of employment for that period in the industry.

Table 2. The general framework used for categorizing strikes as offensive or defensive is that devised by Elliot Berg (in "African Labor Movements," unpublished manuscript). Strikes were divided into three categories, offensive, defensive, and other, defined as follows:

1. Offensive, strikes in favor of:
   a. Wage increases, cost of living increases, retroactivity of such increases, piece rate increases.
   b. Bonuses and increases in all types of supplementary payments.
   c. Shorter hours, uniforms, size of work gangs, medical care, annual or other leave, tool allowances.
   d. Implementing or altering existing contracts, where not covered above.
   e. Union recognition.

[29] The author surveyed one of these congregating places for daily construction labor in April and May of 1967, located across the street from a native market on the Lagos Road in Ibadan. Over half of the 150 workers interviewed stated they were hired less than half the days they came (this ratio was supported by the author's observation over the period). When asked what they did when not hired, the informants replied that they would work on the family farm in or near town, report to artisans for whom they were unpaid apprentices, go to one of the large stores where they would act as porters, or hawk merchandise supplied by a friend or relative who was a trader.

2. Defensive, strikes against:
   a. Wage cuts, cost of living cuts, piece rate cuts.
   b. Longer hours, increased piece rate quotas, overtime without pay, overtime with regular rate schedule.
   c. Supervisor action such as abusive language, arbitrary punishment, but not involving disciplinary action.
   d. Laying off of workers, laying off without notice, laying off without following seniority, removal without cause.
   e. Demotion, firing, wage cuts, physical punishment for disciplinary reasons.
   f. Firing, arrest, or discrimination against workers for union affiliation, or refusal to allow union meeting.
   g. Method of calculating or payment of wages, new work rules, refusal to pay for work improperly done.
   h. Failure to pay or late payment of wages, bonuses, cost of living, or other allowances, or unannounced deductions from wages.
3. Other strikes:
   a. Sympathy strikes.
   b. Rival unionism.
   c. Jurisdictional strikes.
   d. Political strikes.

Sources

The data on "work stoppages" for both tables is from two sources: 1943-57, *Quarterly Report of the Department of Labor;* and 1958-67, copied directly from the official *Registry of Trade Disputes,* Ministry of Labor.

The denominator for the figures in Table 1, "employment by industry" is from the following sources:

1. 1943-50, *Department of Labor Annual Report, 1950-51,* pp. 43-45. December 1950 figures used. While 1950 is the end of the period, the ranking is not different if data is used from Orde Browne, *Labour Conditions in West Africa* (Command Paper 6277 [London: H.M.S.O., 1941]).
2. 1951-55, *Department of Labor Annual Report, 1953-54,* pp. 43-54. Average of June and December 1953 figures used.
3. 1956-59, Department of Labor, *Earnings and Employment Survey, 1958.*
4. 1960-67, Department of Labor, *Earnings and Employment Survey, 1962.* For stevedoring and railroads, additional sources are *Federal Digest of Statistics* for 1956 and 1964, and *Annual Report of the Ministry of Labor, 1964.*

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