

**Police, Paramilitaries, Nationalists and Gangsters:
The Processes of State Building in Korea**

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS¹

ACHR	Asian Coalition for Housing Rights
CMPJ	Catholic Priests' Association for Justice
CIC	(United States) Counter-Intelligence Corps
CCEJ	Citizen's Coalition for Economic Justice
CPKI	Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence
CPKIYSC	Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence Youth Security Corps
CMPD	Council of Movement for People and Democracy
CPC	Criminal Procedure Code
EPB	Economic Planning Board
FKTU	Federation of Korean Trade Unions
GAJY*	General Alliance of Joeson Youth
GAYMKAI**	General Alliance of Young Men for Korean Association of Independence
HIC	Habitat International Coalition
IRA	Irish Republican Army
JRP	Joint Redevelopment Program
JCP	Joeson Communist Party
KDYA**	Korea Democratic Young Men's Assoc.
KEF	Korea Employers Federations
KCIA	Korean Central Intelligence Agency
KCSM	Korean Church Social Ministry
KCLW	Korean Council for Labor Welfare
KDP	Korean Democratic Party

¹ * Indicates Leftist Korean paramilitary group

** Indicates Rightist Korean paramilitary group

KICJP	Korean Institute for Criminal Justice Policy
KMWU	Korean Metal Workers Union
KNP	Korean National Police
KNPA	Korean National Police Agency
KNYC**	Korean National/Racial Youth Corps
KPR	Korean People's Republic
KPG	Korean Provisional Government
NCDR	National Congress for Democracy and Unification
NIS	National Intelligence Service
NPB	National Police Board
KNDP	National Korean Democratic Party
NWYC**	North West Youth Corp
PMCDR	People's Movement Coalition for Democracy and Unification
PMR	Public Management Redevelopment
PSC	Private Security Company
ROK	Republic of Korea
SMCM	Seoul Metropolitan Community Mission
SMG	Seoul Metropolitan Government
SKLP	Seoul Korean Labor Party
TRR	(South Korean) Truth and Reconciliation
SCNR	Supreme Council for National Reconstruction
UDA	Ulster Defense Association
UP	Unification Party
USAMGIK	United States Army Military Government in Korea
UIM	Urban Industrial Mission
YCDM	Youth Coalition for Democracy Movement

GLOSSARY OF NON-ENGLISH TERMS²

<i>Amakukari</i>	‘Decent from Heaven’ (Japanese)
<i>Chojik-p’ok-yök (p’a)</i> (조직 폭력) (배)	Organized violence (member/person)
<i>Chongch’i-kkang p’ae</i> (정치깡패)	Political gangster
<i>Göntal</i> (건달)	Organized crime elite (literally ‘good for nothing’)
<i>Haengtong-daechang</i> (행동대장)	Captain (literally ‘conduct leaders’)
<i>Han’guk ma p’ia</i> (한국 마피아)	Korean Mafia
<i>Kkang’pae</i> (깡패)	‘Gang member’ (typically derogatory)
<i>ko mun</i> (고문)	Adviser
<i>Kusadae</i> (구사대)	“save the company” employee forces
<i>Maghu-saeyök-ch’a</i> (막후세력자)	Power behind curtain
<i>P’anjach’on</i> (판자촌)	‘Plank’ villages
<i>Paekkol-tan</i> (백골단)	White Skeleton Squad
<i>Pinal-chip</i> (빈알집/하우스)	Vinyl House (type of ‘shanty house’)
<i>Pinwal</i> (빈활) (빈민현장활동)	Urban Poor Activities
<i>Pu-tumok</i> (부두목)	Under-boss
<i>Puposang</i> (부보상)	Peddlers
<i>Sae-ma ũ- untong</i> (새마을 운동)	New Community Movement
<i>Samch’öng-kyoyuktae</i> (삼청교육대)	Purification/education camps
<i>San-tongnae</i> (산동네)	Mountain village (type of shantytown)

² Unless otherwise noted the terms are Korean

<i>Tal-tongnae</i> (달동네)	Moon village (type of shantytown)
<i>Tekiya</i>	Peddlers (Japanese)
<i>Tumok</i> (두목)	Boss (organized crime)
<i>Tumok-haengsa</i> (두목 행사)	Boss meetings/events
<i>Vory y zakone</i>	Thieves in law (Russian)
<i>Yangach'i</i> (양아치)	Bully/hoodlum (derogatory)
<i>Yongyök-hoesa</i> (용역회사)	'Service' companies/ construction thugs

NOTE ON ROMANIZATION

All Korean words have been Romanized according to the guidelines outlined by the McCune-Reischauer system. Exceptions were made for well-known historical figures, including but not limited to Park Chung Hee, Chun Doo Hwan, and Kim Dae-jung, or for published authors for which I have utilized their preferred spelling. Korean names furthermore, have been listed according to the Korean standard of listing the surname name first, and the given names subsequent to that.

ABSTRACT

Police, Paramilitaries, Nationalists and Gangsters: The Processes of State Building in Korea

by

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This dissertation seeks to understand why developed democracies with high state capacity tolerate, and in some cases cooperate with criminal organizations such as paramilitaries, mafia organizations, and vigilantes. The symbiotic relationship between these groups is surprisingly common, but it blurs the lines between legitimate and illegitimate use of violence and allows political actors to circumvent democratic checks on state authority. While previous research has linked illicit violence to weak or failing states, my study is unique in its empirical and theoretical focus on both economically and politically developed governments.

It is argued that state monopoly over the use of violence purposefully varies. Political actors must continually exercise their authority in the face of both resource and politically driven constraints in the complex processes of state building, and state

maintaining. In the face of resource constraints, political actors sub-contract violence in order to extend their reach and expand their forces. Sub-contracting as a result of principally politically driven constraints however, serves two goals beyond an expansion of forces. First, it allows political actors to distance themselves from police actions deemed illiberal—and hence unpopular—by society. Second, because criminal groups are extra-legal organizations, subcontracting allows the state to avoid transparency and accountability constraints. The choice to subcontract is thus conditioned not only by the end goal, but also by social pressures regarding appropriate means to bring about preferred outcomes. Importantly, the political payoffs from subcontracting are high in states with high levels of operational capacity, as they can best manage the potential risk that criminal groups metastasize and challenge state authority directly.

Unbiased, quantifiable data on the linkage between state actors and illicit organizations are—largely by design—impossible to obtain. My primary analysis is based on a year of fieldwork in South Korea, utilizing evidence gleaned from interviews with the police, prosecutors, journalists, mafia members, and victims.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1

At 2pm on what seemed to be a normal day in Insadong, a historic tourist destination located in central Seoul, South Korea (henceforth, Korea), what seemed to be hundreds of police clad in riot gear suddenly appeared and quickly lined up into formation on either side of the street and in the back alley ways of the district. Ambulances were additionally positioned on opposite ends of the roughly 700 meter long road. 76 Street vendors as well were stationed next to their pushcarts, wearing red protest bands across their foreheads. Not long after the police were in position, did a group of 150 young thugs, both male and female, wearing yellow vests, start marching down the street, going from one vendor stall to the next, destroying them and beating any vendor who challenged them. Guiding the yellow clad thugs were a few intimidating men who seemed to be in their early to mid 40s, screaming their well-followed orders. The process took about one hour—the thugs having moved from one end of the street to the other and back again. The street vendors were selling their wares illegally and were labeled as public nuisances—they didn't pay taxes to the state—they didn't pay rent—and they often sold the same goods as the businesses in the area which had to pay highly to be there. The violence committed against the street vendors however, was also a criminal act, and the services of the thugs were directly and formally contracted out by the *Jongno-gu*

district office. This event did not occur in pre-1987 authoritarian Korea. It occurred on May 24th, 2011 in a country which is often characterized and hailed as being a prosperous and consolidated democracy.

The events which transpired on May 24th are not isolated to either that day or to street vendors alone. Rather, the practice as described above is part of a larger phenomenon in which the state either directly contracts the services of private security firms, or tolerates their use in limited, highly controlled areas. Questions raised in my mind that day are the questions that motivate this study. If the vendors are breaking the law, why can't the police simply arrest or otherwise sanction them in to compliance? How come Korean society, a society that has a well-documented history of being both contentiousness and in favor of civilian controlled rule, not be able, or more accurately, willing, to hold its elected leaders and the police accountable for allowing such acts to occur? Why would the state collaborate with groups to carry out *criminal violence* against its own citizens—in broad daylight and in a democracy no less? This phenomenon directly contradicts the notion of the legitimacy of the state on the one hand, and on the other, the illegitimacy of the groups which engage in criminal violence. This dissertation is an attempt to understand this complex phenomenon.

That states collaborate with non-state specialists in violence is not surprising and in fact has a long and well-documented history. Indeed, in the early processes of state development, state seekers and state actors alike have utilized a range of methods which at times have included collaborating with pirates, mercenaries, paramilitaries and gangsters as the occasions present themselves. That such collaboration has or continues to occur in weak and/or transitioning societies in turn, is not theoretically puzzling. What is

less understood however, are the conditions under which state actors in high capacity, democratic states would collude with private actors in carrying out extra legal violence within their own territorial boundaries, and against their own citizens whom they have been charged with protecting.

1.2: Methodology

This study focuses on explaining the causal mechanisms involved in the choice to sub-contract violence to non-state actors, and does so with an emphasis on hypothesis-building. Although a study like this would have benefited greatly from being able to test the causal relationships, quantifiable, unbiased data on this type of phenomenon is difficult to come by at best—this is largely by design. The central question of this dissertation, as it should be, drove the decision to employ a qualitative, historical analysis/narrative and process tracing approach.

The first part of this task entailed utilizing both secondary and primary source materials, such as scholarly and journalistic publications, and government documents, some of which were recently declassified. This included going beyond the bounds of political science research, including studies from the disciplines of history, sociology, economics, criminology, law, anthropology, urban studies, urban planning and others. The data obtained was then linked together to form a map of the evolution of Korea's state development and state-non-state relationships over time. As will be shown later, there is a tremendous amount of cross-temporal, cross-regional and cross-issue variation with respect to the use of state or non-state sources of coercion. The analysis was an attempt to both illuminate and explain the variation.

The second phase of this research included interviews and observations—this was the most difficult, time-consuming, and admittedly precarious part of the research for this dissertation. It is also the part which distinguishes this study from the vast majority of scholarship on the subject which more often than not (and for understandable reasons), rely on less direct sources of information and first hand observations.³ The collaboration between state and non-state sources of coercion in the area of criminal violence, works, as it will be argued, predominately when it is not brought to light. The first generalizable argument that this dissertation brings forth is that state-actors collaborate with non-state actors in order to enhance their capacity. This type of phenomenon, in domestic settings, typically occurs in weak and/or failed state environments and has a tremendous amount of scholarship. The second argument however, that state actors utilize non-state actors in order to avoid transparency and accountability measures, which is inexorably linked to democratization, works to the extent that state actors are able to plausibly deny their involvement in such illegal activities. It follows then that in equilibrium, there is little to no systematic data. In order to overcome the difficulties of having very little data with which to work with, I decided that the best approach to use would be to conduct extensive field work in Korea, over the course of one year with which a Fulbright award made possible—funding without which this study would not have been able to take place.

One of the first questions I am often asked regarding my research is why I choose Korea? To begin with, the phenomenon in Korea meets the standard methodological requirements; there exists substantial variance over time, space and issue area with respect to the dependent variable, with clear critical junctures, all of which collectively facilitates the analysis. This dissertation however is not a story about Korea per se, but

³ Notable exceptions include Arias (2006), Stark (1981), Varese (2001) and Volkov (2002).

rather the larger phenomenon of state-non-state collaboration in violence. This phenomenon is unfortunately ubiquitous and research could have just as easily been justified in my former backyard of Detroit as it was in Seoul. The problem however is that although I do speak English (it is in fact my native language), I do not have the necessary connections required to conduct such a study in Detroit. I do however have those connections in Korea.

Although I fashion myself as first and foremost, a comparative political scientist rather than a “Koreanist” or even an “East Asianist,” it would be dishonest to deny that I have a keen interest and fascination of the history and culture of Korea and her surrounding neighbors—perhaps because first and foremost they are so foreign to my own native culture. Without those interests, I would not have studied Korean in the first place (and Japanese to unfortunately a much lesser degree), and two; I would not have spent so much time in the region.

Over the course of a number of years living and studying in Korea, beginning first in 2004, I was able to develop a unique set of contacts with Korean actors from both the formal and informal political, economic and social sectors, which allowed such a study to take place. The fact that I am a conspicuously non-Korean from the San Francisco, Bay Area, who could speak slightly understandable Korean no doubt afforded me opportunities and certain protections that an everyday Korean might not enjoy so easily. Still, a random sample of interviewees willing to provide me information on both past and on-going illegal activities and collusion, at the risk of both legal and extra-legal punishment, was not possible. Thus, a snowball sampling technique was employed in which initial contacts were utilized to provide access and introductions to later contacts.

The implementation of a snowball approach proved to be quite effective owing to the ways in which networks work in Korea. Korea's four most important networks include family ties, regional ties, school ties and military ties. Such networks tightly link a tremendously diverse range of people from various social, economic and regional backgrounds. In Korea it seemed that much of the citizens were only two degrees of separation apart from anyone else. In the US, it is highly unlikely that an elementary school teacher for instance, would be in any way connected to a gangster or a national level prosecutor or politician. In Korea, through such networks, such seemingly unlikely relationships are surprisingly common. I was thus able to utilize those networks in order to gain access an ever-increasing span of actors that would normally have never given me even the time of day.

Although the vast majority of contacts were obtained in the course of my on-the-ground fieldwork in Korea, prior to my arrival I had secured a number of contacts in order to facilitate my start. One of those included a tie to the former Minister of Justice Kim Jung Gil who I had met and extensively interacted with during his one year visiting scholarship at the University of Michigan. Minister Kim, a member of the former President Kim, Dae-jung's regional network and powerful faction then, introduced me to other members of his network within the Ministry of Justice. Again owing to a unique characteristic of Korean culture, one that is hyper-hierarchical in nature, members of Minister Kim's network, even though Minister Kim was no longer in formal power, were obliged to assist me.

In addition to gaining access to the powerful Ministry of Justice network, I had reached out to a number of scholars in Korea who had worked on similar issues. One of

which was a researcher at a social research institute, who in turn introduced me to the former high-ranking police officer in charge of organized crime in Korea. These meetings facilitated my being introduced to the then current head of the violent crime division (of which the organized crime division is subordinate to) of the Korean National Police Agency. These connections in turn led to connections down the chain of command. Again, because of the hierarchical nature of Korean culture (although obviously not a characteristic exclusive to Korea), all connections were made in a top-down manner—I would first meet the highest-level person I could, and then request introductions to actors of the same rank or lower.

In addition to this not being a story solely about Korea, it is also not a study about organized crime, or Korean organized crime to be more exact. This study is concerned with state-non-state collaboration in the area of criminal violence. As such, it matters little whether or not those non-state actors are paramilitary groups, legally franchised private security firms, or mafias. That being said, the vast majority of non-state actors actually committing or at the very least, organizing the criminal violence in Korea are in fact members either directly or indirectly linked to Korean mafia-type firms (defined briefly here as economically motivated firms which specialize in extra-legal violence). So how does one go about meeting such figures and gaining their trust? The answer for me was two-pronged.

The first method was again a function of network ties—this time through a sports network. Having been involved in Korean sports for over 25 years, I had come into contact with a number of high-level organizers and administrators of various sporting organizations in Korea long before the decision to under take this type of research was

formed. In Korea, just like elsewhere, the sporting world (especially combative sports), are often closely connected to both public and private sources of coercion where both sides of the spectrum often recruit. Such connections led to my initial contacts with those either directly or indirectly related to organized, private coercion. Of these connections, two individuals were willing to speak candidly about the phenomenon. Although a substantial amount of information was obtained from these two sources, I was unable to convince them to introduce me to other actors.

The second method was almost purely by accident. Having already been begun my research in Korea, I had joined a local gym in my neighborhood. After a few months had gone by, the owner of the gym informed another member that I was a political scientist, which increased his interest given that he fashioned himself as a local level political power broker. In the course of a number of conversations, I informed him of the nature of my study of which we discussed in detail. After a number of subsequent weeks of meetings he offered to introduce to me his local organized crime contacts—an offer which I gratefully accepted.

That chance meeting at the gym led to my introduction to the local bosses in the area, of which I was invited to visit them either every week or everyday in their office. I was in fact somewhat viewed by them as a novelty, a fact which was perfectly fine by me. Most of the meetings involved drinking coffee and sitting around either talking directly to them or simply listening to their discussions. Over 70% of my interactions with such figures it should be pointed out, included my simply sitting quietly and observing who was coming in and out of the meetings, their mannerisms, and listening to their (more often than not, benign and inconsequential) conversations. The overwhelming majority of

interactions were informal in nature—such actors did not enjoy, nor feel at all comfortable with being interrogated for obvious reasons. I would mostly sit quietly and observe something, after which I would ask a question related to that observation. On that note, much of my early time with these actors was spent learning not only which questions to ask, but *how*, and importantly *when*, to ask them. For example, in a meeting which had occurred shortly after I was introduced to the boss of one group, I had mentioned that in Taiwan, it is well known that there were, and continue to be close relationships between politicians, police and gangsters, and if that was the case in Korea.⁴ Their answer was emphatically no, and that it was a feature of the past in Korea. This answer however was refuted by a number of sources in other areas but if I had challenged their initial answer it would not have put me in good standing with them. A few months later however, at a gathering at a nightclub, two district-level politicians showed up and acted subservient to the boss as he harangued them, and in one instance, kicked one of them, the reason of which I gathered, was due to their prolonging a public works project of some sort. Two days later (I required a day of recovery from the previous night) I asked the boss about the previous nights instance and he stated “of course we have to have relationships with politicians, we’re business people!” He was in fact quite pleased that I had seen how much “power he had.” He then went on to boast about how all the politicians throughout the country were afraid of him. Although I did not directly see this or other bosses’ direct interactions with high level politicians, the fact that I did see some of the political elite, or at least their representatives attend the events of these groups (most of the time weddings) in part confirmed the existence of at least minimal

⁴ See for example, Chin, Ko-lin’s (2003) excellent study on the expansive criminal-political connections in Taiwan.

connections. In one meeting with a national level politician I found out that his driver (and assumedly his bodyguard) was a retired, though still relatively young, former captain of one of the organized crime groups in the politician's area. The former organized crime member however maintained connections with his former group which in turn facilitated an indirect criminal-political nexus. These types of connections will be further discussed in chapter 3.

In addition to visiting their office on a near daily basis, they welcomed me to their various nightclubs, restaurants, legal and illegal gambling halls, and on numerous occasions, along with them on their excursions outside of Seoul to events in places such as Inch'ŏn, Pusan, Pohang, Chŏnju, and Suwŏn, among other locations.

Because of the boss's high level status, a range of actors tended to visit the same office, which in kind led to me being introduced to a number of other similar type of actors of varying levels and backgrounds—be the bosses themselves, advisers, mid-level gangsters, police, local level politicians, etc. Through these connections I was further introduced to other local and national level bosses at various events and gatherings, the importance of which will be discussed in the following chapter. Everyone I met knew explicitly what type of research I was conducting. If I was in fact allowed to interact with them and ask questions, I provided them with a statement of my research intent and assurances of guaranteed anonymity according to the IRB requirements. Furthermore, the gangsters knew I was meeting with police mostly during the early afternoons, and the police knew I was meeting gangsters often in evenings—usually on the same days. In one instance I had a meeting with the police in charge of organized crime in one station just

outside of Seoul, after which I was picked up by one mid-ranked gangster who lived in the area and driven back.

Additionally, through the intensive use of networks I was able to obtain the necessary introductions for a range of actors involved in both the public and private sources of coercion. In addition to academics, politicians, prosecutors, police and gangsters; connections with entrepreneurs, journalists and victims were made. Connections with journalists and victims it should be noted were overwhelmingly made through my directly contacting them either through e-mail or phone. Once those connections were made I would again utilize their connections to meet others.

The empirical evidence obtained from each of the actors was then continuously triangulated and verified for accuracy and reliability. Again, following the IRB's strict guidelines, the names of respondents and any identifying information, except for a few public actors (with their permission), were, and remain to be kept strictly confidential.

The choice to study this phenomenon in one country setting (albeit with multiple observations across time, space and issue area) and the methodological approach adopted, admittedly limits the ability to both 'test' the hypotheses derived and evaluate the generalizability of those explanations. Some of the findings are to be sure, unique to Korea. Most importantly, Korea's long history of brutal repression under various forms of colonialism and authoritarianism affects the ways in which the police and military (and by extension, the state), are able to operate in the present context. Indeed, the ways in which Koreans view violence by specific state actors (e.g. the police or military) is conditioned by years of living under such a set of consecutively repressive regimes of not

too distant a past. Violence by the state in turn has significant symbolic valence and its use threatens to break the carefully constructed image of Korea's new democratic era.⁵

Over the course of 42 years, from the end of colonialism to the move towards direct presidential elections, Korea grew to become both a strong state while simultaneously having a powerful, contentious society.⁶ In the late 1980s the once fragmented forces of students, labor, the intelligentsia, religious organizations, and importantly, the middle-class, galvanized into a single force with a common interest in the removal of authoritarian rule. What they got was political liberalization. This largely placated the middle class which de-mobilized, leaving the more radical elements to battle for reform on their own. Since that time and the time this study was conducted, the state has attempted to keep the middle class on the side-lines. Violence by specifically state actors however, threatens to awake and unite those forces. One of the observable implications of Korea's history then, is collaboration between state and non-state specialists in violence in the market for forced evictions and labor suppression. Why forced evictions and labor suppression? The answer to this is that both are related with the socio-economic well-being of the middle class. Forced evictions are first and foremost part of large redevelopment and beautification projects which not only increase the housing stock, but additionally improve other areas of infrastructure which are important in maintaining a strong, growing economy. Labor unrest in turn threatens the economic vitality of the state. State actions of violence in such projects however, act as a politicizing agent. In the instances where the state has been forced to intervene, the middle class has mobilized. In the vast majority of projects however, the state has been

⁵ Kwon, J.B. (2011) uses this argument to explain Korea's changed police tactics in the wake of democratization.

⁶ Koo, H.C. (1993) 231-249.

able to stay out of the mix, acting as a manager of violence as opposed to the ones which actually carry it out. In such cases, the middle class has remained conspicuously silent.

The practice of collaboration between state and non-state actors in the market for force however, is again not unique to Korea. It is my intention to not only contribute to the study and understanding of Korean politics but also to additionally utilize the findings obtained from Korea as a prism with which to understand the broader phenomena of state-criminal collaboration, state development, and the democratic control and use of violence. Those findings with the potential for generalizability are at the same time the main argument I put forth in this study. They are the following: there are conditions where sub-contracting force to non-state groups which specialize in coercion is not only rational but politically advantageous. Similar to sub-contracting in other environments, state actors utilize this “market” solution under logic of capacity and a normative framework.⁷ States sub-contract coercion to expand and enhance their existing forces and hence their enforcement capability. Normatively, they do so in order to distance themselves from actions deemed illiberal by society and thus politically risky. The strategic decision to sub-contract force is further conditioned by concerns over the end goals and means with which those goals are brought about. Finally, states that are coherent with high levels of capacity are the best able to manage the potential risks of this type of sub-contracting.

⁷ This is not the first study to utilize the ‘logic of capacity’ and ‘normative logic’ framework to understand sub-contracting force. Dunigan’s (2009) study titled “In the Company of Soldiers: Private Security Companies’ Impact on Military Effectiveness and the Democratic Advantage,” for instance, employed this logic in her study on contracting the services of transnational private military companies. To the best of my knowledge, this framework has not been utilized to understand the conditions with which state actors would collaborate with various forms of private security within domestic settings.

1.3: Organization of Dissertation

This study is organized into eight chapters. Chapter 1 includes this introduction. Chapter 2 presents this study's theoretical considerations and does so through the discussion of a range of interdisciplinary studies. Chapter three is descriptive in nature, and presents an outline and discussion of the evolution of Korea's market for both public and private force. Because the private actors in the market who are involved in the present day forced evictions and labor suppression are largely controlled and staffed by members of Korea's gangster elite, special attention to these groups will be carried out. To my understanding, this section presents one of the few explanations of the history, structure, and present day situation of such illegal groups, in either English or Korean, based primarily on *primary* sources such as interviews and participatory observations.

Chapter four is the first empirical chapter, and outlines and analyzes early state development in Korea from the end of 1945 to 1960. Early state development processes in general are often quite tumultuous. Korea's history is not different. During this period, state-seekers and state actors recruited gangsters and violent youth which made up paramilitary factions. This practice continued throughout the end of the Korean War and the end of Rhee Syngman's forced capitulation. State-non-state collaboration during this period, as it will be argued, largely occurred under logic of capacity.

Chapter five is where things get puzzling. This chapter starts off with a brief discussion of the political and economic dynamics following Park Chung Hee's 1961 coup d'état. Subsequently a description and analysis of the evolution and role of civil society in Korea will be covered. Both the discussion of the political dynamics and role of civil society in turn will serve to anchor the analysis of the two main, empirically

based case studies on forced evictions and labor repression which are covered in chapter six and seven. Sub-contracting criminal violence under a normative framework during Korea's move towards democratization is explained as being a function of an increasingly contentious society, rather than some form of a neo-liberal push towards massive privatization. If this study was talking merely about licensing private security for shopping malls the neo-liberal explanation might hold weight. The dependent variable however is *criminal* violence which puts it in a separate theoretical category.

Chapter eight concludes this study by drawing out the theoretical implications of the study. In addition, other areas in which the theory developed in this dissertation may hold explanatory power will be briefly discussed. These areas include the practice of lynching by vigilantes and criminal groups, which ostensibly collaborated with local level enforcement agencies in the U.S. South, as well as the case of criminal-state collaboration in Japanese state development.

CHAPTER 2

Theoretical Considerations

2.1: Introduction

Although there exist a variety of definitions and variations for the concept of what a “state” is, the common unifying theme rests on the commodity of protection—protection from both external and internal conflict.⁸ Authors such as North (1981), Tilly (1985, 1990) and Olson (2000) among others focused on what they view as the necessity of state-controlled violence in order to move out of states of anarchy and uncertainty and into predictable environments where productivity and economies of scales can take place. As summed up by Bates, Greif and Singh (2002) “state based political order arises in a context of (a) the enforcement of private property rights, (b) the pacification of civil society, and (c) the payment of taxes”—all three tasks of which depend on the ability of a single entity to evolve into the ultimate arbiter of coercion.⁹ Tilly (1985) further argues that state development is a process by which the state must endeavor to make clear the lines between legitimate violence (violence under the strict realm and control of the state) and illegitimate violence as clearly defined as possible.

While ideal-type definitions of states characterize such entities as those which hold a “monopoly” over violence, in reality few states (if any at all) have ever been able to claim such a position. Indeed, more realistic definitions, such as those provided by

⁸ See for example: Hobbes, T. (1968), Weber, M. (1946), North, D.C. (1981), Levi, M. (1989), Olson, M. (2000)

⁹ Bates, R., Greif, A., & Singh, S (2002). 61

Tilly (1985) and North (1981) drop the use of the word “monopoly” all together and instead focus on the state-based comparative advantage in the control of violence relative to non-state sources. This fact in turn challenges simplistic assumptions that development will ever reach a completed stage. Rather, as aptly highlighted by Ryter (2002), the state must continually produce and re-produce its authority and provide rationale for its continued existence in a dynamic political, economic and social environment.¹⁰

State builders have utilized a myriad of ways in which to establish their authority including the implementation of mixed strategies of buying, subjecting, or outrightly eliminating private powers.¹¹ It is the “buying” aspect that this which the study is interested in. The utilization of bandits, pirates, mercenaries and other specialists in violence by states and aspiring state seekers in Europe, Asia, Latin American and elsewhere is historically well documented. For instance, in Europe large-scale private armies dominated the market by force during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, hired mercenaries and other privateers then became the norm for state development during the seventeenth and eighteenth century. Such institutional practices however, were not unproblematic. Thomson (1994) for example explains that privateers generated organized piracy, mercenaries threatened to drag their governments into war, and mercantile firms were not unknown for turning their own guns on their home states.¹² Still, while European governments greatly reduced their reliance on private sources of coercion following the French Revolution, Tilly (1985) points out that the institutional practices mentioned above continued “as the occasions presented themselves.”¹³

¹⁰ Ryter, L. (2002)

¹¹ Tilly, C. (1986) 175

¹² Thomson, J.E. (1994)

¹³ Tilly, C. (1986) p. 175

Similar to the European experience, government officials beginning as early as the Tokugawa period (1603-1887) in Japan began to utilize organized ‘ruffians’ for maintaining order in areas where the state’s reach was weakest or most ambiguous. Sineware (2008) explains that a policy of cooperation and toleration for their use of violence and other nefarious activities was maintained as long as they did not challenge the state. Such groups continued to play similar roles throughout subsequent periods of Japan’s tumultuous history, including the transition to democracy.¹⁴

Studies of violence throughout Latin America as well illuminate patterns of cooperation between state actors and private forces. Beginning in 1950s Columbia for example, Mazzei’s (2009) study explains how state actors mobilized both paramilitary groups as well as private citizens into defense against leftist insurgents. Similar institutional arrangements are furthermore well documented in Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, Mexico and Peru.¹⁵

Finally, though non-exhaustively, collusion between loyalist paramilitary groups (mainly the Ulster Defense Association (UDA), the Ulster Volunteer Forces (UVF)) and the police and military forces in Northern Ireland is well accounted for—with the latter routinely having provided intelligence information (e.g. the names of confirmed or suspected Irish Republican Army (IRA) members or supporters) and other material support to the former.¹⁶

Although the use of non-state groups in developed contexts has declined relative to their use in the past, states continue to utilize sub-contracting coercion—though the

¹⁴ Sineware, E.M. (2008)

¹⁵ See for example: Campbell, B., & Brenner, A. D. (2000); Arias, E. D. (2006), Auyero, J. (2007) and Mazzei, J. (2009), among others.

¹⁶ See for example: McDonald, H., & Cusack, J. (2004); O'Brien, J. (2005)

trend has moved predominately towards sub-contracting groups firmly within the state's legally provided framework.¹⁷ Still, cooperation and collusion between states and non-state groups which engage in criminal violence continues in varying levels in most states—yet the literature on modern state development largely obscures or outright ignores the multiplicity of roles these groups play in modern, developed polities. Indeed, recognizing such institutional arrangements necessarily complicates notions of strict dichotomously ordered boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate sources of violence and those that order both their licit and illicit services. Furthermore, recognizing that cases exist in polities which are both strong and democratic challenges the hypothesis that the phenomenon is merely relegated to weak or failed states. As explained by Campbell (2002), “Modern states have a habit of subcontracting and in certain situations, this subcontracting can occur even at the risk of diminishing the state's legitimacy by violating the law, or by compromising its monopoly on the use of violence”.¹⁸

2.2: Empirical Framework

The following diagram and subsequent explanation will help to graphically depict the central focus of this dissertation:

¹⁷ For example, in the domestic, legal environment, private actors in the market for force can be found in the enforcement of contracts, torts and property law, where the role of the state is limited to essentially providing a court system. Other instances include the use of paid informers, private security for public spaces and bounty hunters. Internationally, the use of mercenaries and other illicit privateers has predominately given way to the utilization of legally sanctioned professional private military companies.

¹⁸ Campbell, B. (2000), 17

Diagram 1: The Market for Public and Private Force¹⁹




Diagram 1 shows the range of violence wielding organizations across both their levels of legitimacy and organizational relationship to states. Public institutions of enforcement in developed states are traditionally in the upper left hand zone—both high in levels of legitimacy (defined by their level of coercive supremacy) and subordinate, vertically organized relationship to civilian control (in democracies). Such organizations include professional militaries, police forces, prosecutors and judges. Next are non-state actors such as legally sanctioned security guard companies, private military firms and bounty hunters who occupy the upper right hand zone. Legitimacy to such groups is given through the state and are thus within its direct jurisdiction.²⁰ Finally, groups, which engage in principally illicit violence, occupy the lower, right hand corner of the diagram. Actors within this category include for instance mafias, illegal paramilitaries and

¹⁹ A similar chart was used by Ahram, A.I., (2011) (p.10). I borrowed the chart's framework and augmented it to fit the scope of this study.

²⁰ Yet a further complication is that often time's states or state actors sub-contract force to licit groups who then utilize illicit means to bring about the goals they have been tasked with.

mercenaries, vigilantes and others who operate predominately outside the state's legally defined jurisdiction and are often characterized as being in competition with it. They are thus by definition, illegitimate. It is specifically this ambiguous theoretical and empirical intersection between licit and illicit groupings and their relationship to the state which is of interest here. It is what Auyero (2007) identifies as the 'grey zone of state power,' an area "where the activities of those perpetrating the violence and those who presumably seek to control them coalesce."²¹

To sum up the discussion, state development, far from being a one-shot game, is an on-going process whereby the state seeks to gain supremacy, and thereby legitimacy over the means and use of coercion. States have utilized a range of methods with which to obtain such control vis-à-vis their competitors— of which one method includes the sub-contracting of force to private purveyors of violence.

2.3: The Market for Criminal Violence

Going back to diagram 1, we can see that both the licit and illicit markets for private force intersect. In other words, there are numerous instances in which licit firms engage in illicit behavior and other instances where illicit firms sell protection to legal markets. Said differently, both licit and illicit firms exist on a continuum of economic activity between the poles of licit and illicit acts.²² This fact in turn creates ambiguity when it comes to categorizing and labeling different types of organizations. Take for instance pirates and privateers. Thomson (1994) notes that "the distinction

²¹ Auyero, J. (2007), 32

²² Smith, D.C. (1980), 335-336

between a privateer and a pirate is that the former acts under the authority of the state that accepts or is charged with the responsibility of his acts, while the latter acts on his own interests and authority.”²³ The problem there is that a pirate could exist with little difficulty, as both a pirate and privateer. The distinctions between mercenaries, paramilitaries and private security companies as well can be confusing. Avant (2005) explains that “The term “mercenary” has been used to describe everything from individuals killing for hire, to troops raised by one country working for another, to private security companies (PSC’s) providing military services to their own country.”²⁴ The case of paramilitaries, militias and gangsters as well can cause confusion. In the period of early state development in Korea for example (as will be explained in detail in the following chapters), both state seekers and state actors were more than willing to collaborate with gangsters, effectively turning them into the coercive forces of ‘patriots’ and ‘nationalists.’ Furthermore, in contemporary Korea, one of the main income earning activities for mafia groups from a category of the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office has designated as “Hired Thugs.” Mafiosi in Korea will register their ‘companies’ as legal, private security firms. Such firms then engage in both legal and extra-legal protection.

Because of the issues explained above, this study concentrates less on the categorization of such groups, and instead focuses on the observable outcome of criminal violence—regardless of whether or not it comes from a legally registered private security firm, or a criminal, mafia type organization. That being said, it is important to note that the scope of this study is focused on explaining state-non-state collaboration in the market for *domestic* force. Thus, groups which operate on a transnational scale are not

²³ Thomson, J.E. (1994), 22

²⁴ Avant, D.D. (2005), 22

included in this study. Furthermore, religiously based groups and/or those that seek to either overthrow their own or other governments are outside the scope of this study as well.

Placing the issue of categorization aside however, to reiterate, this study is concerned with explaining state-non-state collaboration where criminal violence is the end result. Regardless of whether a firm is legally registered or not, the fact that they have engaged in illicit behavior makes them by definition, criminal and thus places them, at least theoretically, in a jurisdictional conflict with the state.

Criminal groups which operate in the market with extra-force are often referred to generically as mafia-type organizations. As explained by Gambetta (1996): “Mafiosi are first and foremost entrepreneurs in one particular commodity—protection—and this is what brings the difference and other simple criminals, simple entrepreneurs, or criminal entrepreneurs.”²⁵ Gambetta’s argument originates from his research into the Italian and Sicilian mafias where he contends that the phenomenon was an evolutionary product of the end of feudalism and the subsequent strife and violent conflict which characterized the era. He continues that such instability and distrust greatly increases the demand for protection—often in the form of contract enforcement, dispute settlement, and property rights among others.²⁶ In addition to acting as a substitute for trust, Gambetta argues that lack of effective state intervention in such areas is an additional key explanatory variable which accounted for the spread of such groups who had a comparative advantage in the effective use of violence.²⁷

²⁵ Gambetta, D. (1993), 19

²⁶ Ibid (79-80)

²⁷ Ibid

With respect to Russia, Volkov (2002) suggests that demand for private protection and “mediators” stemmed from insufficient protection of private businesses by state police in the wake of the Soviet collapse and the subsequent rapid transition to a market economy. He adds that additional factors, which produced demand for “enforcement partnership,” was a high entrepreneurial risk caused by frequent non-payment of debts and failure to observe contracts, in addition to the spread of swindling and theft. Such outcomes were as a result of legitimate state institutions being incapable of reducing such risks due to poor definition of property rights, the inefficiency of the state courts of justice in resolving disputes, and their incapacity to enforce decisions.²⁸

Milhaupt and West (2000), in their analysis of organized crime in Japan add to this concept by arguing that the true origins of mafia-type groups can be found in dramatic increases in formal property rights and the weakness of legitimate enforcement mechanisms—as was the case in post-feudal Japan. In other words, they argue that inefficiencies in state property right structures and a shortage of state-sanctioned rights-enforcement agents are the key causal variables for both the emergence and continuance of such groups.²⁹

With respect to American mafia-type groups, Varese (2001) notes that such groups can trace their origins to the Sicilian Mafia that flourished during the prohibition era of the 1920s and 30s. And, although there had in fact been criminal organizations running illegal prostitution and gambling markets before this period, the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution in combination with the Volstead Act,³⁰ resulted to a

²⁸ Volkov, V. (2002),741-754

²⁹ Mihaupt, C.J. & West (2000), 41-98

³⁰ The National Prohibition Act of 1919 (the 18th amendment of the US Constitution) prohibited the sale and position of alcohol.

massive jump in the demand for, scale, sophistication, violence, and wealth of the groups protecting illegal markets.³¹

In addition to the above arguments, the issue of corrupt ties between criminals and public and private actors at large is a paramount explanation for their origins and relative levels of success or failure.³² The general argument is this: a basic necessity for organized crime groups to operate is police and political protection. They also require the means with which to launder their earnings and bring them into the legal economic system. Such basic requirements then lead criminal groups to attempt to infiltrate and corrupt (through the payment of bribes or other services) both public and private organizations (at varying levels) so as to obtain the needed complicity and/or tolerance in order to engage in their activities.³³ Indeed, the ways in which criminal groups link themselves (and extent to which they are able to do so) into the broader political, economic and social environments can profoundly condition their ability to successfully operate, avoid prosecution and otherwise buy and sell their influence and services—ultimately affecting (and structuring) the quality of institutions such as the rule of law and the capacity for its enforcement.³⁴

Holding the discussion on the origins and existence of such groups aside, we can see that mafia type groups in particular engage in activities quite similar to licit sources of protection—mainly: (a) contract enforcement; (b) dispute settlement, and; (c) protection of property rights—in other words, policing—a commodity which is traditionally viewed as being within the strict realm of the states. Given this, Varese argues that mafias, through their actions, directly impede on the state’s jurisdiction—essentially putting them

³¹ Varese, F. (2001), 17-55

³² See for example: Baily, J.J. & Godson, R. (2000), Buscaglia, E. and J.van Dijk (2003), Van Dijk, J. (2007)

³³ Curzio, L. (2000) 84

³⁴ Arias. E.D. (2006)

in competition with public sources of protection—with relationships characterized predominately as antagonistic. For example, Palermo’s chief prosecutor, Giancarlo Caselli, describes the mafia...as a state within a state, ‘with its own territory, population and laws’...the mafia’s determination to establish itself as a state within the state is what makes it unique”³⁵ Furthermore, Falcone (1993) writes “The mafia does not have to be combated because of its core values, which may seem warranted in a disintegrating society, but because of its very essence: there cannot be two systems of government in one society.”³⁶ Strict models of competition between states and mafias however are often based on the erroneous assumption of dichotomously ordered boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate sources of violence. In reality, as has already been argued, the distinctions are much more ambiguous in nature.

Examples of cooperative/symbiotic criminal-political nexuses are not difficult to find. For instance, Hill (2003), in his study on organized crime in Japan provides evidence to suggest a symbiotic relationship between the organized criminal groups and police, in which such groups were utilized to “police” their own territories in addition to numerous instances of them being deputized as semi-official suppressors of various anti-government movements.³⁷ With respect to pre-revolutionary China, Booth (1999) explains that the Kuomintang government utilized various mafia-type groups in order to suppress communist uprisings such as the infamous White Terror uprising of 1927 in which thousands of people were slaughtered throughout Shanghai.³⁸ Similar accounts and evidence of cooperative criminal-state arrangements can be found in Bloc’s (1974)

³⁵ The Economist, April 24, 1993, reprinted from Fiorintini, G. & S. Peltzman, et. al (1995)

³⁶ Falcone (1993) Quoted from Hess, H. (1998)

³⁷ Hill, P.B.E. (2003), 251

³⁸ Booth, M. (2000), 252

influential study of mafia-state relations in Sicily in which he argues that state actors in effect harnessed mafia organizations in the suppression of banditry and other types of dissent.³⁹

What then accounts for such cooperative relationships? The conventional answer would be that cooperation between state actors and violent, non-state groups, as well as the not merely the toleration but at times promotion of their activities is largely a function of corruption. However, while corruption may in part be driving such symbiotic relationships, it is not a necessary nor sufficient explanation. To be sure, while corruption may in fact determine which actors are awarded contracts by the state, explanations based on corruption alone fail to account for the strategic logic determined by variance in levels of state capacity. For example, beyond models of strict competition and relationships conditioned by corruption, a number of theoretical arguments by authors such as Schelling (1967) have posited that cooperation and regulation of mafia-type organizations is a rational response to deficiencies in enforcement capacity.⁴⁰ Schelling proposes, through his analysis of black markets that while crime in itself can be considered a “public bad,” mafias can be effective in providing public goods both to the upper and under world. Mafias, he argues, can internalize much of the costs (e.g. regulation of conflict) that fall on the underworld but go unnoticed if crime is centralized. In other words, eradication of mafias—who have a collective incentive in restricting violence (so as to avoid punishment)—would have the same backward effect as removing third party regulators operating in licit markets—from civil society to anarchy. Implicit in his model is the assumption that crime can never be fully eradicated—and if the alternative to

³⁹ Bloc, A. (1974)

⁴⁰ Schelling, T.C. (1984)

organized crime is disorganized crime, the benefits of the former may outweigh the later.⁴¹ Thus, Schelling argues for a more practical approach to enforcement, with one method including the option for compromise and quasi-cooperation with mafia-type groups.⁴²

Much of my fieldwork findings fit well into Schelling's regulatory framework. In short, police collaborated with gangsters, and continues to do so, because they have to. Because of reasons related to budget constraints, asymmetric information, the nature of different types of crimes, diminishing returns to enforcement, and in the post-democratization period, institutional constraints on the amount of acceptable force, police often engage in cooperative arrangements with members of Korea's organized crime. Of course, there is variance in the types of actors, instances and rationale for cooperation. Not all police cooperate with gangsters, just like not all gangsters cooperate with police. Although such cooperative arrangements and relationships will be briefly covered in

⁴¹ Becker (1968) argues that the issue of enforcement of laws and budget constraints goes deeper than simply recent government cut backs and an expansion of private property. The author argues that enforcement of laws becomes incrementally more costly and less efficient the more successful it is. The logic hinges on two variables: public enforcement budgets and damage of crimes to society (in monetary terms). Successful detection and enforcement require increasing investment in personnel and technology—the higher the investment, the higher the probability of success. The more successful detection and enforcement becomes, the lower the total damage from crimes to society (though not essentially the individual or business), up to the point where budgetary costs overtake the damage to society as a whole. In other words, successful enforcement is subject to diminishing returns. If enforcement then is subject to diminishing returns, and budgets are constrained, state actors are forced into the question as to what the optimal level of enforcement should be. The strategic answer to this question obviously depends on the nature of the crimes themselves—for example, choosing between predatory and non-predatory types of crime and their effective levels of enforcement.

⁴² Building off of Schelling's analysis, Celentani, M., M. Marrelli, et. al (1995) (to be referred to as CMM) propose a game theoretic framework for how such models of cooperation might work. The authors argue that state actors can devise strategies aimed at reducing the potential rents (and assumedly negative externalities) of criminal organizations through selective enforcement as opposed to policies of strict suppression. State actors can threaten (and carry out) intervention for deviations from the state's interest. They can do so by either intervening directly with the offending group, or working with a competing organization, or both. In sum, the game the authors propose is an implicit sub-contracting model of collusion and intervention through repeated iterations. It is furthermore a framework of cooperative/complementary relationships between public and private sources of force.

chapter two, the regulation of illegal goods and service markets and the politics behind it are beyond the scope of this present study.⁴³

Cooperation between state actors and mafia type organizations however, extends beyond their involvement in black markets—for example, in their suppression of banditry and anti-government dissent. Such phenomena as well cannot be simply explained away as being a function merely of corruption. Rather, in order to understand the phenomenon, one must consider the institutional constraints—constraints shaped by political, economic and/or social dynamics—which can alter the strategic decisions of state actors. The following sections discuss such constraints and the subsequent sets of logic for state-non-state cooperation in the market for force.

2.4: Organization of Control: Vertical versus Horizontal Integration

The question still remains as to why states, assumed to, in the words of Ahram (2011) “jealously guard” their hold over the means and use of violence would sub-contract coercion to potentially less reliable sources.⁴⁴ While not specifically related to the sub-contracting of violence, Donahue (1989) extends perhaps the most concise and logical framework for understanding this question in the most general sense and thus provides a sound starting point. Donahue argues first and foremost that the *nature of the task* determines whether private or public actors will be most effective—with ‘effectiveness’ depending upon the range of intended goals. Furthermore, the case for sub-contracting public services becomes incrementally stronger if the state actors (a) know ex ante exactly what they want (so they can more accurately specify the terms of the contract); (b) have the capacity with which to penalize or otherwise replace

⁴³ This is an area of research I will be expanding upon in later studies.

⁴⁴ Ahram, A.I. (2011), 11

contractors who either deviate from the agreement or otherwise prove disappointing, and; (c) are concerned more about the end goals relative to the means with which those goals are brought about.⁴⁵ As it will be shown, the phenomenon of sub-contracting public services to private actors in the market for force is largely consistent with Donahue’s argument. In order to fully appreciate this parsimonious model however, a number of theoretical steps will be discussed below.

To begin with, transaction cost economists such as Coase (1937) and others for instance would argue that there is an overwhelming preference for single “firms” to trade internally at set prices rather than utilizing market prices which may be more costly.⁴⁶ Others such as Williamson (1975), building off of Coase’s theory of the firm, explains that vertically integrated organizations (defined as a supply chain with multiple units with a common owner) can alleviate many of the factors which lead to market-based failures (e.g. “getting the prices wrong”), including overcoming issues of asymmetric information, opportunism, and uncertainty.⁴⁷ In a later piece (Public and Private Bureaucracies, 1999), Williamson extends the logic and argues that for the same rationale, there are circumstances where state controlled bureaucracies are preferable to private firms. This is especially in the case of tasks surrounding *sovereignty*, in which he notes that sovereign transactions—such as the use of violence—are particularly susceptible to the concerns of loyalty and integrity—issues which Thomson (1994) argued were major factors contributing to European shift away from the use of risky privateers.

⁴⁵ Donahue, J.D. (1989), 79-80.

⁴⁶ Coase, R.H. (1937)

⁴⁷ Williamson, O.E. (1975), 257

While Williamson provides a strong theoretical argument for why state actors should have at least a preference for not sub-contracting sovereign tasks, others such as Cooley and Spruyt (2009) argue that there are a range of alternative institutional arrangements between the poles of vertical and horizontal integration—including quasi-vertical integration (through the use of incomplete contracting).⁴⁸ Such alternatives, they argue, can help overcome the contractual hazards which Williamson posited. Secondly, and especially important to this discussion, they argue that Williamson ignores issues of relative power and vulnerability between the contracting parties (whether they be private or public). Indeed, as argued by Avant (2005), and key to this dissertation’s position, strong states that are coherent with high levels of capacity are the best able to manage the potential risks of privatization and “harness” private forces to produce preferable outcomes.⁴⁹ Furthermore, while under ‘ideal’ conditions we might expect state actors to prefer to maintain direct control of all public services and tasks within a single supply chain, realities on the ground are often the case that such “best-practices” are simply not available options or are otherwise less attractive. Simply stated, state strength affects the range of institutional options, preferences, and subsequent practices of state actors.

2.5: State Strength and the Logic of Sub-Contracting:

This study argues that sub-contracting coercion is broadly a function of state strength. What is state strength? State strength in this study is defined as a function of both capacity and a polities’ relative level of autonomy from societal forces. This study follows in part the notion of capacity as defined by Migdal (1988) as follows: “the ability

⁴⁸ Cooley, A. & H. Spruyt (2009) note that “the incomplete contract approach assumes that in long-term relationships, the imperfections of the marketplace will force the parties to renegotiate many aspects of the initial contract” (26). Such renegotiations, they argue, can help to overcome issues of uncertainty and unpredictable changes.

⁴⁹ Avant, D. D. (2005), 22

of the state to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriately use resources in determined ways.”⁵⁰ A state’s level of autonomy then is defined as its ability to operate independently of societal forces. States which sub-contract violence due to deficiencies in capacity are explained in this study as sub-contracting under a logic of capacity. In other words, they do so in order to both boost their forces and extend their reach. Instances of sub-contracting in order to avoid punishment or sanction by societal forces then, is explained as sub-contracting under a normative framework.⁵¹

When looking at the phenomenon of sub-contracting force in general, whether for domestic or international purposes, scholarship largely points to weak capacity as the main driving force. The argument in short is that states sub-contract coercion to boost existing or otherwise deficient forces. Furthermore, and specifically with respect to domestic settings, the literature points to the phenomenon as largely being relegated to weak and/or transitioning states which utilize the option to gain internal supremacy. This argument in part underpins studies of early state development in Europe and more contemporary investigations which look at sub-contracting to paramilitaries and other non-state specialists in violence in different parts of the world including Middle East and Latin America. As state capacity increases, *ceteris paribus*, we should expect that the probability of sub-contracting coercion will correspondingly decrease.⁵²

⁵⁰ Migdal, J.S. (1988). 4

⁵¹ This study follows the theoretical framework for sub-contracting force as laid out by Dunigan (2009) who utilized the ‘logic of capacity’ and ‘normative logic’ for explaining state-private military company collaboration in international settings.

⁵² If we remember, the same ‘weak-state’ argument is often utilized to explain the existence of such groups. Thus, the reasons for the inability of the state to eradicate such groups, according to the weak-state hypothesis as is often presented, is interestingly the same theoretical reason why states may need to collaborate with such groups.

Although the capacity argument holds explanatory power for a significant portion of the type of state-non-state collaboration we see, and indeed explains much of the early collaboration in Korea as will be shown in chapter 3, this argument alone is not sufficient to explain such collaboration in developed settings. Indeed, in order to understand sub-contracting in states which exhibit high levels of capacity, this study argues that one must take into account the levels of autonomy a state has from its societal forces. In his argument as to why democracies fail in certain military conflicts, Merom (2003) argues that we must account for a variable he terms as the “normative difference”, defined as the distance between the position of the state’s preference and that of the society concerning the legitimacy and toleration for violence, in conjunction with the degree of influence societal forces (attributed to groups) have over policy choices and their outcomes. Both can have significant effects on the ability of states to wage war. He argues that when the normative gap is wide and societal forces against such conflict are strong, a state’s capacity and success in engaging in war is significantly diminished.⁵³ While his argument was made utilizing international conflicts as the units of analysis, we can easily apply this to domestic conflicts. The US’s “war on drugs” is an example. In this case, let’s assume a shared goal of “winning” the war, with a normative gap between state actors’ beliefs in the amount of coercion and resources deemed necessary to win (e.g. they differ on the means with which to bring out the shared goal) and the level of violence tolerated/accepted by the liberal forces of society. State actors (in this example, the policy makers) may be constrained due to their fear of being punished by society—either in the form of electoral outcomes, reputation, or other negative ramifications. The

⁵³ Merom, G. (2003)

following table marries both capacity and autonomy to come up with four categorizations of state strength:

Table 1: State Strength⁵⁴

	Low Autonomy	High Autonomy
Low Capacity	<p>QI.</p> <p>- State actors' ability to enter in to a society, to ensure that all relationships in the society are regulated; get all the important resources in these societies; and appropriate or use resources in determined ways is limited and they are not able to wield power independently of societal forces.</p> <p>-Note: typically characteristic of failed states or enclaves.</p>	<p>QII.</p> <p>- State actors' ability able to enter in to a society easily; ensure that all relationships in the society are regulated; get all the important resources in these societies; and appropriate or use resources in determined ways is limited, though state actors operate with high degree of independence from societal actors.</p> <p>-Note: typically characteristic of weak states or enclaves.</p>
High Capacity	<p>QIII.</p> <p>- State actors are able to enter in to a society easily; to ensure that all relationships in the society are regulated; get all the important resources in these societies; and appropriate or use them in determined ways, though they are not able to wield power independently of societal forces.</p> <p>-Note: typically characteristic of stable liberal democracies/enclaves</p>	<p>QIV.</p> <p>-State actors are able to enter in to a society easily; ensure that all relationships in the society are regulated; get all the important resources in these societies; and use them appropriately in determining ways with high levels of independence from societal forces.</p> <p>-Note: typically characteristic of strong authoritarian or illiberal democracies/enclaves.</p>

⁵⁴ I borrowed and modified a similar table which was utilized by O'Neil, P.H. (2003) 40.

Although such a parsimonious model cannot capture all of the complexity involved (e.g. it would be naïve to assume that states either have high capacity or not, or low autonomy or not), what is important about the table above is that it can, when speaking about state strength, help us to better understand what state actors are and are not able to do, and why. Furthermore, and quite importantly, variance in such indicators of state strength, whether cross-regionally, cross-temporally or cross-issue area, affect state actors' decision over whether or not to sub-contract the services of, or otherwise collaborate with private actors in the market for force. The following table thus presents this study's observable predictions:

Table 2: Observable Predictions

	Low Autonomy	High Autonomy
Low Capacity	<p>QI.</p> <p>- Probability of sub-contracting coercion under both the logic of capacity and normative framework high.</p>	<p>QII.</p> <p>- Probability of sub-contracting coercion under the logic of capacity high, low under a normative framework.</p>
High Capacity	<p>QIII.</p> <p>- Probability of sub-contracting coercion under the logic of capacity low, high under a normative framework.</p>	<p>QIV.</p> <p>- Probability of sub-contracting coercion under both the logic of capacity and normative framework low.</p>

While sub-contracting is only one among many potential institutional arrangements which state actors have at their disposal, it is quite clear that this option has and continues to be a widespread response to institutional deficiencies.

2.6: Conclusion

Although ideal type definitions characterize states as holding a monopoly over the means and use of violence, empirically such control is variant. In the face of such variant control, states and state seekers alike are faced with the challenge as to how they can and should assert or re-assert their authority. Sub-contracting of force in the face of weak state strength, again, as a function of weak capacity and/or low levels of autonomy, is one institutional arrangement which is far more ubiquitous than what the established literature acknowledges. The phenomenon of sub-contracting violence to illicit groups furthermore presents an inconvenient challenge to the notions of clear boundaries and distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate sources of coercion. And, despite its prevalence, this ‘grey zone’ of state power is not readily studied, nor well understood—especially in the context of domestic, democratic settings. I argue that the logic presented in this chapter will assist us in our understanding of this phenomenon.

Chapter 3

Korea's Market for Force

3.1: Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the market for both public and private force in Korea. Although almost entirely descriptive in nature, this chapter is key to understanding the subsequent empirical chapters focused on Korea. To reiterate the argument, this study posits that sub-contracting of force and/or state collaboration with non-state specialists in violence, *ceteris paribus*, is a function of capacity and/or normative concerns. This chapter thus lays out the institutional capacity of the state and its evolution from 'rule-by-law' norms to 'rule-of-law' beginning first in the late 1980s. Special attention will furthermore be paid to the origin and survival of the various state actors charged with enforcement.

Public actors and institutions are however not the only players in the market for force. Private entrepreneurs of coercion as well co-exist, either peacefully or competitively with public ones and thus require special attention. The principle non-state actors this study is concerned with, in regard to Korea, are those which operate predominately outside of the state's legally sanctioned jurisdiction. Few reliable studies exist on the topic of Korean organized crime, or more specifically, the subset of

organized criminals in the market for force (i.e. the Korean '*mafia*'), thus, this section relies substantially upon this author's interviews and first hand observations. As with the section on public sources of protection, special attention will be given to these groups' origins and incentives.

3.2: Evolution of Public Sources of Protection

The history of the Korean justice system, composed of the Judicial Branch, the Ministry of Justice and the Korean National Police, has been one in which the neutrality from successive governments, most authoritarian in nature, was virtually non-existent. Lacking legitimacy and public support through free and fair elections the military regimes under Park Chung-hee, Chun Do-hwan, and to a certain extent, Rho Tae-woo utilized the justice system in much the same manner as it had been used during the Japanese colonial period and subsequent US Military and Rhee Syngman interludes. The police and paramilitary units, backed by the court system and prosecutors, were routinely mobilized to suppress demonstrations to control or otherwise neutralize 'disloyal' citizens and political opposition alike.⁵⁵ Indeed, from the earliest phases of the republic through the 1990s the justice system was used less for public security and more for securing the dominance of political powers with the police forces having a well-earned reputation for human rights violations and other 'gangster-like' activities, all under the twin legitimizing banners of state development and preservation of a polity which was, and remains to be technically at war with its northern neighbor. With the move towards democratic elections in 1987, calls for reform of the justice system became politically more salient and costly to ignore. This section describes the roles and methods of

⁵⁵ In addition to the Korean Police the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) was formed in 1961 and was given virtually unchecked police power.

operation of the respective actors within the Korean justice system and how they have changed over the course of democratic reforms.

3.2.1: Judicial Branch

The Judicial Branch, separate from the Executive, controls the courts and is comprised of the Supreme Court, the High Courts, the District Courts and their Branch Courts, in addition to a number of specialized courts, all of which are empowered to adjudicate administrative, civil and criminal cases, and others which are stipulated by legal statute. Moreover, the Constitutional Court, established in 1988, is charged with, upon request of a court, adjudicating the constitutionality of statutes and issues related to impeachment or the dissolution of political parties.⁵⁶

Judicial administration is controlled “de facto” by the Chief Justice, a presidentially appointed position, who in turn nominates Supreme Court Justices and exercises administrative control over the judiciary. Judges other than the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court are appointed by the Chief Justice with the consent of the Conference of Supreme Court Justices. The Chief Justice, who serves a 6-year single term, can, in the words of Ginsburg (2004) “either be a channel of political influence or a wall of insulation from such influence.”⁵⁷

3.2.2: Ministry of Justice and Supreme Prosecutors Office

The Ministry of Justice, a system within the executive branch, is charged with investigating crimes, indicting suspects, and supervising the execution of criminal judgments. The Minister of Justice, the highest prosecutor, is appointed by the president.

⁵⁶ Choi, C. (2005). 250

⁵⁷ Ginsburg, T. (2004). 10

Next in line is the Prosecutor-General, also presidentially appointed, who supervises all lower-level prosecutors through the “principle of uniformity of prosecutors,” which stipulates that lower-level prosecutors shall obey higher prosecutors. This principle in part has been subject to much criticism, especially in cases involving powerful politicians, high ranking bureaucrats or influential members of society, where prosecutors in charge have had to unwillingly quit their investigations due to pressure from the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office or from the ruling political party.⁵⁸ In conjunction with the principle of uniformity, the prosecutors have discretionary power over whether or not to prosecute, giving them wide discretion. Because of this prosecutors have often been criticized for their reluctance or outright refusal or otherwise biased investigations of crimes related to influential people.⁵⁹ As a result of pressures in the aftermath of the 1987 transition to democracy, a number of measures have been instituted to address the issue of undue influence, including the creation of the special investigation unit, a branch within the Prosecutor’s Office but not directly under the command of the Prosecutor General, and one which was established for the investigation of corruption cases involving high-ranking bureaucrats, politicians and private-sector elites.⁶⁰ This reform along with others will be discussed in a later section of this chapter.

Despite the prominent role that police have played in the development of the Korean republic they are, by Korean law, in a subordinate position to the more powerful prosecutor’s office. In fact, while the vast majority of criminal cases are dealt with by the police, a police officer in reality has no legal right to carry out criminal investigations or the majority of arrests without prosecutorial approval. With minor exceptions, for

⁵⁸ Ginsburg, T. (2004). 11

⁵⁹ Cho, K. (2002). 386

⁶⁰ IBID. 386

example, if the alleged crime carries a potential penalty of more than 3 years, police are required to apply for an arrest warrant with the prosecutor.⁶¹ In the cases where an application is made, the prosecutor in charge examines the request and decides upon whether or not to seek the issuance of a warrant from a judge. The same procedures are required for a warrant for inspections, searches or seizures. As noted by Kim (2002), “the relationship between the prosecutor and the judicial police officer is not one of cooperation, but one of order-obedience. Accordingly, the prosecutor directs and supervises the judicial police officers in conjunction with criminal investigation and the police should obey the prosecutor’s official order.”⁶²

3.2.3: Korean National Police

Owing much of its current structure to the modernization of the forces during Japanese occupation, the Korean National Police, despite a number of recent reforms, has remained a highly centralized national system, separate from the military and organized into provincial police bureaus, police stations and sub-stations. With the end of the colonial period, the US Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) officially established the Korean Police in 1946 and at least on paper, abolished the practice of summary punishment and limited the police duties to the controlling of crime, preservation of peace and social order, in addition to the collection of intelligence on communist activities.⁶³ In reality, as will be highlighted in the following chapters, the police played a prominent and brutal role in both the periods prior to and following the

⁶¹ Prosecutors or police may arrest a suspect without an arrest warrant in cases where there is a reasonable belief that the suspect has committed an offense that would be punishable by life imprisonment, death, or punishable for more than three years. Additionally, warrantless arrests are allowed if there is belief that the suspect may destroy evidence or escape, or under conditions in which it is impossible to obtain a warrant from a judge due to urgency. Kim, Y.C. (2001). 81

⁶² Kim, Y.C. (2001). 80

⁶³ Moon, B. and Morash, M. (2009). 105

Korean War. By the year 2011, the number of police officers stood at 101,239, which translates into 1 officer for every 510 people, dispersed across the country in 428 offices and 1,517 substations.⁶⁴

In addition to the regular civilian force is a combat police section that includes both military combat and auxiliary police units. The combat police system was established in 1967, made up of military conscripts, tasked with the role of combating against North Korean spies and armies. The auxiliary police system, created in 1982 is made up of volunteers of people as an alternative to traditional military service. Despite the premise upon which they were created, both units have been routinely employed for suppressions of demonstrations and other anti-government activities. Similar to the regular police, both units had a penchant for aggressive tactics, with numerous accounts of violent confrontations with Korean society.⁶⁵

As noted by Pyo (2001 b.), politicization of the police starts with the appointment of ranking positions and the short life of commanding officers—with high-ranking officers seeking the patronage of powerful politicians.⁶⁶ The Police Commissioner's position for example is politically appointed and typically lasts for one to two years—leading them to rationally seek not only political benefactors in order to obtain the position but often private sector support as well for their post commissioner positions leading to a form of Korean *amakudari* (descent from heaven).⁶⁷ In addition to the political influence wielded through appointment, the KNP was within the direct auspices

⁶⁴ Statistics obtained from the Korean National Police Agency website: <http://www.police.go.kr>

⁶⁵ Moon, B. and Morash, M. (2009). 109-112

⁶⁶ Pyo, Changwon (2001 b.). 27

⁶⁷ *Amakudari* refers to a Japanese practice whereby retired bureaucrats “descend from heaven” into lucrative private sector jobs. The practice is largely criticized for increasing the probability of corrupt linkages between high ranking bureaucrats and private interests seeking to influence policy outcomes.

of the Ministry of Home Affairs—the same ministry which controlled elections—effectively making electoral manipulation by the respective regimes more efficient.

3.2.4: KCIA/NIS

Two months following Park Chung Hee's coup d'état in June of 1961, under the guidance of future prime minister and long-time political survivor Kim Jong Pil, the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) was established as Korea's main intelligence gathering organization.⁶⁸ Originally established to supervise both domestic and international intelligence operations, as well as high profile criminal investigations, the KCIA quickly became the most powerful repressive and coercive force in Korean political and economic environments.⁶⁹ Numerous high profile cases including the 1973 kidnapping and near murder of Kim Dae Jung, as well as frequent detainments and subsequent torture and other human rights abuses, the KCIA rapidly gained a reputation as being the most despised and feared institution during the successive authoritarian regimes, with such actions being justified as necessary under the on-going North Korean and Communist threats.⁷⁰

The KCIA operated under secretive and vague parameters, predominately outside of any formal control and being accountable only to Park.⁷¹ Of the KCIA, Henderson (1968) commented:

“The CIA replaced ancient vagueness with modern secrecy and added investigation, arrest, terror, censorship, massive files, and thousands of agents, stool pigeons, and spies both at home and abroad to its council powers...In

⁶⁸Oh, J.K. (1999). 52-53

⁶⁹Ibid. 52-53

⁷⁰Chang, P.Y. (2008) 119-120

⁷¹Henderson, G. (1968) 264. Also cited in Cumings, B.(1997) 356

history's most sensational expansion of council formation, it broadly advised and inspected the government, did much of its planning, generated most of its legal ideas and a large section of the study on which they were based, recruited for government agencies, encouraged relations with Japan, sponsored business companies, shook down millionaires, watched over and organized students, netted over \$40 million by manipulating the Korean stock market through cover brokers, and supported theaters, dance groups, an orchestra, and a great tourist center."⁷²

If the KCIA was at all restrained during the 1960s due to the façade of democratic rule, all restraints were lifted following Park's institution of formalized authoritarianism in 1972.⁷³ The KCIA would furthermore go onto play a major role in labor control and suppression as will be discussed in chapter four.

3.2.5: Reforms of the system: post-1987 Democratic Elections

The move towards democratization in the late 1980s brought about a number of changes in the Korean criminal law and procedure. Criminal law had been a symbol of authoritarian rule in Korea and the successive authoritarian regimes made use of it to suppress dissidents and control the populace. One of the major tasks of the National Assembly, post-democratization, was to revise criminal procedure laws. The institution of the 1987 Constitution brought a change in the practice of Criminal Procedure Code (CPC), with the explicit stipulation for due process for suspects being a core value. Furthermore, the Bill of Rights included requirements for the right to counsel, right to fair and speedy trials, measures against torture, and other stipulations to protect human rights. The 1988 and subsequent 1995 amendments further strengthened suspect's rights, with

⁷²Ibid. 264

⁷³Cumings, B. (1997) 357

the creation of the aforementioned Constitutional Court as the judicial oversight organization.⁷⁴

Prosecutors retained their full authority for both investigations and subsequent prosecutions, but as mentioned previously, the Central Investigation Department was created, against the opposition of the prosecutors, in order to investigate corruption cases involving politicians, high-ranking bureaucrats and influential citizens.⁷⁵ Despite reforms, criticisms against the prosecutors remain centered around their close ties and proximity to presidential power leading to the real or perceived public perception of high levels of corruption with the Office.⁷⁶

Among the different organizations within the justice system, the KNP was the one where most reforms were carried out. That the police were the main domestic strong arm of whichever regime was in power was not lost on the opposition. Calls for reform were frequent, with several formal proposals for increased police neutrality and structural autonomy coming in 1955, 1960, 1972, 1980, 1985 and 1989.⁷⁷ Following the 1987 launch of democratic reforms, protests in favor of reform increasingly grew more salient, again from opposition parties and citizens, in conjunction this time with demands from graduates and students from the National Police College (now referred to as the National Police University) which culminated into the Police Act of 1991.⁷⁸ The act created the Korean National Police Agency (KNPA) which removed the police out of the direct control of the Ministry of Home Affairs and additionally brought in civilian oversight

⁷⁴ Cho, K. (2002), 377-380

⁷⁵ IBID 386

⁷⁶ Ginsburg, T. (2004), p. 11, see also Johnson, D.T. (2004). 12

⁷⁷ Moon, B. and Morash, M. (2009). 111

⁷⁸ Pyo (2001 b) p. 7

through the creation of the National Police Board, made up of citizens who advise the politically appointed Police Commissioner on issues related to budgets, equipment, allegations of human rights abuses and personnel matters.⁷⁹ Further reforms were carried out in 1999 under newly appointed Commissioner Lee, Moo-young, selected by then President Kim Dae-Jung, who characterized the old police as “a totalitarian former USSR style police system.”⁸⁰ Most important of the reforms included increased measures for civilian collaboration and oversight.

In addition to the increased oversight and accountability measures discussed above, the issue of widespread corruption among the police has been addressed. Common place were instances of police officers receiving or demanding bribes from suspects in return for releasing them without further investigation and/or manipulation in favor of suspects. In response, police salaries were incrementally increased across the board and harsh penalties including but not limited to dismissal and criminal charges for both officers and citizens involved in bribery or other cases of abuse were instituted as policy. As part of increased oversight, the police established a separate unit at every station in order to receive and investigate citizen complaints of corruption, brutality or other forms of malpractice. Furthermore, in 2004, a police corruption financial award was created, with citizens who report instances of bribery receiving up to an equivalent of \$10,000.⁸¹

In addition to the revisions above, following Kim Young Sam’s election as Korea’s first civilian president since Rhee Syngman in 1993, as well as following purges of potentially subversive elements from the military, the National Assembly passed a

⁷⁹ Moon, B. and Morash, M. (2009) 108-10

⁸⁰ Quoted in Pyo (2001 b), p. 7

⁸¹ Moon, B. and Morash, M. (2009). 113

number of revisions on laws regarding the major intelligence agencies.⁸² The revised laws placed the KCIA's successor, the Agency for National Security Planning, and the Military Security Command under congressional oversight which in turn had control over their budgets and personnel management, as well as their methods of operation. The laws furthermore forced them back to their original mandates and required them to disengage from politics.⁸³

3.2.6: Summary

Korea's modern justice system and coercive elements, since the colonial period through 1987 was largely a force charged with predominately maintaining regime survival. The history of brutal practices, summary sentences and vast occurrences of human rights abuses, all in the name of state building and national security is clear. While this study is not one which searches for the causal linkages of democratization, it is unambiguous that factors such as economic development, the rise of an increasingly emboldened middle class, as well as international factors all played a part in the move towards democratic reforms. Democratic pressure in turn, through the function of continued elections and increased citizen participation of other forms (e.g. through civic organizations) has made the brutal and repressive methods once utilized by the past regimes for state preservation and expansion of control increasingly politically costly.

3.3: Evolution of Private Sources of Coercion

Korea's history with non-state actors in the market for force is an interesting one. Although accounts of state-non-state cooperation in the area of policing goes back as far

⁸²Im, H.G. (2004). 183

⁸³Ibid. 183

as the Ko-ryo Dynasty (A.D. 918-1392), the regularized practice of collaboration has its origins during the last century of the Joseon Period (1392 -1910). Similar to the *tekiya*, in part the predecessors to the Yakuza, itinerant peddlers in Korea, referred as ‘*pubosang*,’ banded together in close knit communities for mutual aid.⁸⁴ Peddlers were the lowest among the social classes and were looked down upon by the larger Korean society as “low-born, homeless outcasts,” and were very much treated as such. Peddlers, especially itinerant peddlers, were often vulnerable to predation by higher classes. As explained by Pak (1965) “During the closing years of the Wang Dynasty in Koryo, in order to guard against the extortion of the local officials and the attacks the mountain robbers, the Peddlers who had scattered all over the country gathered in large groups and organized merchant guilds to protect their own interests under a united front.”⁸⁵ In other words, demand for private protection stemmed from insufficient publically provided enforcement of the Peddler’s property rights and safety.

In the nineteenth century, the peddlers formed an important relationship with the Joseon Government with the state calling upon them as semi-official tax collectors (collection of sales taxes from the markets), spies, information gathers and scouts, as well as recruiting them as auxiliary forces in times of armed conflict. Their close relationship and multiple roles made them one of the most important and powerful non-governmental organizations.

In return for their loyalty to the state, the government provided them with monopoly control of commodities and other commercial rights as supervisors of such markets.⁸⁶

⁸⁴Pak, W.S.C. (1965). 1

⁸⁵ IBID

⁸⁶ IBID

Henderson (1968) noted that: “Korean guilds are an interesting example of the widely known function of organization as the weapon of the low and the despised, increasing the social connotation of “lowless” that already accrued to the organization function within Korean society. Thus guilds, which in Europe served to limit central tyranny, in Korea, served as its extension and arm.”⁸⁷ With Japanese annexation of the Peninsula in 1910, the Peddlers’ association and privileged status was removed and they faced violent suppression and near eradication as an organized group.⁸⁸

Although the practice of sub-contracting violence is one which goes back to antiquity, the historical origins of modern day criminal, violence wielding groups is virtually indistinguishable from the history of paramilitary ‘youth groups’ which dominated the political and economic scene in the post-liberation period. Much of their history will be described in the following chapter, but suffice to say, such gangs did the ‘dirty work’ and loyally carried out the autocratic demands of their political bosses and power brokers all the while running protection and extortion rackets along the way. Moreover, connections between these groups and the society at large, were, and remain to be necessarily extensive and far reaching. For instance, following the arrest and killing of one gang leader, Ko Hui-du, General “Snake” Kim Ch’ang-yong of the a report by the US Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) wrote:

Ko Hui-du was the Chairman of the Wonnam-dong Association, the Chairman of the Tondaemun Branch of the Civil Defense Corps, the Chairman of the Supporting Society for the Tongdaemun Police Station and the Chairman of the Judicial Protection Committee. Such were the titles he had on his name card. Jo was the representative of the stall keepings operating along the bank of the Ch’onggyech’on streamlet under the

⁸⁷ Henderson, G. (1968) 52

⁸⁸ Pak, W.S.C. (1965) 1

jurisdiction of the Tongdaemun Police Station. He was the virtual leader of thousands of young men. In some respects, the man who holds the control of Tongdaemun and Ch'onggyech'on can be regarded as the practical dominator of Seoul.⁸⁹

Through such extensive networks, non-state criminal groups played a tremendously influential role in the development of the state prior to the 1961 military coup d'état by Park Chung Hee. Through a number of campaigns carried out between 1961 and 1963 however, the police under Park Chung Hee arrested over 13,000 members of criminal groups. The official reason for such campaigns was to rid society from the groups blamed for social disorder.⁹⁰ The South Korean Truth and Reconciliation Report (2004) (hereinafter 'TRR') further notes on the rationale that in general such campaigns often prove successful in winning citizen approval.⁹¹ Public support would undoubtedly be useful, if not necessary in Park's subsequent presidential bids in 1963, 67 and 71.⁹² It also didn't hurt that such criminal organizations often formed the bases of Park's opposition.⁹³

Following the assassination of Park Chung Hee in 1979, Chun Doo Hwan came to power on the heels of the brutal suppression of the Kwangju Democracy Movement which had garnered the public's outrage and 'spontaneous resistance.'⁹⁴ In response to such outrage, the TRR noted that "...in consolidating their power, the new military group

⁸⁹ Published in the *Kyonghyang Sinmun* (Seoul), 1956-1957. Quoted in Henderson, G. (1968) 234

⁹⁰ Lee, S. (2006). 65

⁹¹ TRR (2004). 219

⁹² To be sure, despite the semblance of democracy which Park Chung Hee's administration claimed, South Korea was by all accounts a highly illiberal polity between 1961 and 1971, and a fully fledged authoritarian state following the passage of Park's Yushin Constitution in 1972. Paul Chang for instance notes that although various democratic institutions such as separate and independent executive, legislative and judicial branches did exist, as well as elections, with Park's third re-election in 1971, the façade of democratic rule effectively ended (Chang, P.Y. (2008) 28)

⁹³ Of the early campaigns, one respondent noted that Park was attempting to both legitimize his military coup-d'état by instilling order, something which previous administrations had largely failed to do, while at the time undermining potential threats to his position (P1).

⁹⁴ Cumings, B. (1997). 338

used the dual tactic of striking terror into the hearts of the citizens, while at the same time currying public favor.”⁹⁵ It was thus under the slogan of ‘realization of a just society,’ in which Chun’s administration attempted to legitimize his own military take-over. As part of this program, first under Martial Law #13 and then by the 1980 Social Security Act, criminals and dissidents alike were rounded up under the ‘social purging’ program. The police and military, working under region-wide arrest quotas, detained, without the need for warrants, as many as 67,055 citizens under the program, with 40,000 of those being sent to the infamous, military run ‘*Samch’ōng kyoyuktae*’ (purification/education) camps. Among those arrested and detained, reportedly 52 had died in the camps, 397 died following their release of causes attributed to the brutal treatment they had received while being ‘reeducated,’ 4 were missing, and 2,763 were left with physical disabilities.⁹⁶

In addition to the ‘purification camps,’ in 1980 Chun’s government instituted the ‘Social Protection Law.’ This law made it possible for the Ministry of Justice to sentence those deemed likely to repeat crimes again, to imprisonment in concentration camps, in addition to the sentences handed down from the courts. 7,500 of those convicted between 1980 and 1987 were sentenced to an additional two years of imprisonment following their original sentences.⁹⁷

What such ‘social purging’ and various ‘crack-down’ programs did, in addition to signaling to society that the governments (first under Park then under Chun) were in control, was to provide forums and avenues with which police and crime figures alike

⁹⁵ TRR (2004). 219

⁹⁶ TRR (2004) p. 219-223. See also, Lee, N. (2007). 46-47

⁹⁷ TRR. P. 221-222.

increasingly became familiar with each other.⁹⁸ Furthermore, with few checks on power, the police had extremely wide discretion over how to deal with any one individual.⁹⁹ Either extending leniency or sending them to labor camps was up to the prerogative of the police. Such powers thus became a major way in which the authorities gained leverage over criminals which further served as opportunities for police patronage of organized crime.¹⁰⁰

Despite the hardline measures outlined above, the 1970s and 80s brought about easing social controls and a society with an increasing capacity for consumption and new opportunities for both licit and illicit profits to be earned. For example, ostensibly in response to the well documented 1980 Kwangju Rebellion, referred to by Cumings (1997) as Korea's "Tiananmen nightmare,"¹⁰¹ Chun Do Hwan sought to placate public unrest and discontent by instituting his '3 S' (sex, sports, screen).¹⁰² This policy included gradually removing restrictions on entertainment, censorship of lewd cinema and promotion of sports. As part of this policy was the removal of the midnight to 4 am curfew which had been in place for some 36 years. While various entertainment districts existed before this in some form or other, the removal of the curfew was key to expansion of the industry. Although it is unclear whether or not Chun's '3 S' policy benefited his regime in the way it was intended, the policy undoubtedly led to an explosion of nightlife

⁹⁸Mobrand, E. (2006) 128

⁹⁹IBID 128

¹⁰⁰ With respect to the Samch'ong reeducation program for instance, the police and military were in charge of classifying arrestees into four different groups. Those designated in Group A were arrested and imprisoned. Those within Group B were sent to the purification camps for one month, with compulsory labor for several more months. Group C were sent to the purification camps without the requirement of compulsory labor following their 'reeducation.' Finally, those designated as Group D were simply dismissed with caution. Needless to say, this provided the police with significant 'influence' over those they wished to target. IBID. 220-221.

¹⁰¹ Cumings, B. (1997). 338

¹⁰² Davis, L.K. (2007). 27

and the entertainment industry that fed it, leading to windfall profits for organized crime groups. The entertainment industry then, as it remains to today is the number one source of income for organized crime groups.¹⁰³

The growth of the entertainment industry as well led to an expansion of entertainment districts where such businesses remain to be concentrated in. The growth of such districts and implicitly tolerated illegal activities by the government in turn led to increased opportunities for police-organized crime collaboration in policing and maintaining order in such areas.

In addition to the expansion of the entertainment industry, in 1981 the bids for the 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Summer Olympics were awarded to Korea which in turn led to a massive boom to the construction, redevelopment and private security industries which organized crime groups were effectively able to infiltrate into and contract out their violent services to both state and business interests.¹⁰⁴

Notorious organizations which dominated the market for criminal violence within Seoul during the 1980s and 90s—considered to be the ‘heyday’ of organized crime, included the *Shin Sangsa Pa* and the three groups which once comprised the larger *Ho-nam*¹⁰⁵ faction—the *Sŏ Pang P’a*, the *OB Dong Chae P’a* and the *Yang Un Yi P’a*, groups which still exist in some form or other today.¹⁰⁶ The leader of the *Sŏ Pang P’a*,

¹⁰³While not all profits are obtained from illicit activities, a 2002 Korean Institute for Criminal Justice Policy (KICJP) report found that 79% of Korea’s entertainment industry provided illegal sex services. Cited in Kim, J. (2007). 498

¹⁰⁴While more on this specific subject will be discussed in the following case study chapters the boom of the sanctioned private security industry, formally legalized by Security Service Business Act in 1976, provided a natural legal market for illicit groups to fill.

¹⁰⁵‘Ho-nam’ refers to the south-west region of the ROK, composed of Kwangju, North Jeolla and South Jeolla. Additionally, ‘Pa’ simply refers to ‘group.’

¹⁰⁶Lee, S. (2006) 65-66. See also: Jung, Y.S. (1997) 91

Kim, Tae-chon, was made famous in part by popularizing the use of sashimi knives in violent altercations beginning in the 1970s.¹⁰⁷ I was able to see his legacy firsthand through the numerous stabbing and slashing scars I saw displayed proudly by many of those who participated in the study. In addition to long knives, Korean gangsters typically employ iron rods, baseball bats, axes, swords and fire extinguishers as their weapons of choice, arguably the result of some of the strictest gun controls in the developed world.¹⁰⁸

3.3.1: Numbers and activities

Although estimates on the number of groups and members vary widely, according to an internal Supreme Prosecutor's study in 2006, there was an estimated 383 crime groups operating throughout Korea, with 47, 251 active numbers evenly spread out throughout the peninsula—a figure which translates into roughly 1 out of every 1000 Korean citizens in the same year.¹⁰⁹ According to the same prosecutor's study, the main activities and sources of income of these groups are the following, listed from highest to lowest:

¹⁰⁷ Kang, J.-k. (2013-01-07). Korea Joong Ang Daily

¹⁰⁸ In one interesting occurrence for example, I was invited to one of the gangster's apartments (not his primary residence) in the Kangnam area of Seoul to see the final work completed on his full body tattoo. In the laundry room of his residence were two large buckets of short swords. It was explained to me that such stockpiles of weapons were often in the residences and offices of low to midlevel gangsters throughout their territory. Although violence between and amongst rival factions greatly decreased from the 1960s, 70s, 80s, and 90s, gangsters still required convenient access to such tools in case it was deemed necessary.

¹⁰⁹ *Chochik p'oklyŏk pŏmchae ūi sirtae e kwanhan chosa yŏnsa*. 2006. 10 (p. 121)

Table 3: Main Sources of OC Income¹¹⁰

Activity	Number of groups	% of total
1. Entertainment Industry	192	52.2%
2. <i>Hired Thugs</i>	121	32.9%
3. Illegal Speculation	101	27.4%
4. Operation of Lewd Businesses	63	17.1%
5. Illegal Sex Trade ¹¹¹	37	10.1%
6. Public Auction manipulation	26	7.1%
7. Evasion of taxes	23	6.3%
8. Narcotics production and distribution	19	5.2%
9. Human trafficking	12	3.3%
10. Real estate speculation	8	2.2%
11. Others	22	6.0%

Source: IBID (p. 173)

It is on the second of these—that being “hired thugs” which this dissertation focuses on. However, it is important to note that the other activities for the most part either directly or indirectly depend on the threat and/or use of violence, in the same way in which legal markets depend on public sources of enforcement.

In addition to the operation of illegal activities organized crime groups engage in a number of legal businesses as well. A part from the usual suspects (for example operation of legal bars, karaoke establishments, restaurants, etc.) the growth of the private security industry has provided a niche market for those with specialties in coercion. Legalized in 1976 through the legislation of the Security Service Contract Act, the private security industry experienced rapid growth following the state’s move in the mid 1980s towards privatization of tasks such as forced evictions—once under the purview of public

¹¹⁰ See also Shin, E.K. (2004) and Park, K. & Son, S.C. (2006.22.07)

¹¹¹ A good overview of issues related to prostitution can be found in Kim, J. (2007)

sources of coercion.¹¹² Such groups which focus on the specific use of coercion (as opposed to those which focus primarily on site protection or escort security) are referred to as ‘*yongyeok-hwaesa*,’ literally ‘service companies,’ more but more widely translated as ‘construction thugs.’ While the companies utilized for the most part are officially registered and as such claim legal legitimacy, the tactics utilized are often criminal in nature. As recently noted by one journalist:

In South Korea, they’re known as “errand men”: hired street muscle who play often-violent mercenary roles in property disputes that law enforcement agencies refuse to handle. Their ranks are filled by physically fit young men who, critics allege, lurk in the gray area of the law, using violence and fear to uphold the will of people like landlords, businessmen and even the government.”¹¹³

In addition to forced evictions, ‘*Yongyök-hoesa*’ are heavily involved in strike breaking and labor issues. As will be explained in chapter four, the emergence of *Yongyök-hoesa* and their expanded involvement in both forced evictions and strike breaking corresponded to South Korea’s increasingly contentious society and democracy movements during the early 1980s.

3.3.2: Structure of Criminal Groups

When speaking with police or prosecutors, most denied that Korea had anything resembling an Italian or American style, nation-wide ‘mafia’ or yakuza type organization. The problem with that answer however is that the Italian, American and Japanese ‘mafia’ type organizations themselves do not resemble anything close to the myth of a monolithic, nation-wide organization. Korean mafia type groups are in fact quite similar to their more

¹¹² See for example: Lee, C.M. (1990, 2004) and Nalla, M.K., & Hwang, E.-G (2006)

¹¹³ Glionna, J. M. (2001-06-26). S. Korean errand men operate in shadows. Los Angeles Times.

famous criminal cousins in that they tend to be small in size, with their power stemming from a number of fragmented and sprawling horizontal linkages. In the case of Korean groups, this organizational formation is in particular the result of strict laws which prohibit the formation of groups and severe penalties for those that join. For instance, Article 4 of the Act on Punishment of Violence stipulates that: (a) the bosses of criminal groups shall be punished by death, imprisoned for life or ten or more years; (b) Its principle members shall be punished by imprisonment for life or seven or more years, and; (c) other members than the aforementioned shall be punished by imprisonment for a definite term of two or more years.¹¹⁴

Further complicating the investigation of these groups is their ephemeral nature, with groups forming, splitting, disbanding, and coming together again as opportunities arise. As is the tradition of Korean political parties, the names of the groups frequently change which often signify leadership shifts.

Although Korean gangsters themselves frequently reference the term ‘Korean Mafia’ or ‘hanguk mapia,’ what they are referring to are those groups which sit at the top of the criminal hierarchy in Korea. The ‘Korean Mafia’ then is made up of members who refer to themselves as ‘*gǒntal*,’ which translates into something along the lines of “good for nothing.” *Gǒntal* then refer to low-level thugs by derogatory terms such as ‘*kkanpae*’ (equivalent of gang member) or ‘*yangach’i*’ (bully/hoodlum). While this subject will be discussed in more detail in the following section, one of the reasons why *Gǒntal* are able to control younger thugs is in part due to not only their capacity for violence, but most

¹¹⁴Korean laws were accessed from the Korea Legislation Research Institute (한국법제연구원) website: <http://elaw.klri.re.kr>

importantly due to the fact that young delinquents often want to eventually be recruited into the ranks of the *Gǒntal* elite.

The organizational structure of individual Korean criminal groups resembles quite closely that of other criminal organizations such as the Japanese *Yakuza* or Russian *Vory v zakone* (“thieves-in-law”). At the top of each organization sits the boss, or “*tumok*.” While there are exceptions, money in Korean criminal organizations typically flow from top to bottom—with bosses providing money making opportunities to lower ranked members.¹¹⁵ The more money-making opportunities the boss has at his disposal, the more members he can recruit. The more members within his ranks, the more power he has to influence both political and economic markets in his favor. Often times the names of the true bosses themselves are unknown to even the captains and lower ranking members—and especially important—unknown to public authorities unless otherwise associated. The prosecutor’s office refers to them as ‘*maghu-saeyök-ch’a*,’ literally translated as a “power behind the curtain.” They can be considered as a sponsor of sorts and although many have risen through the socio-economic ranks through early criminal behavior, typically engage in purely legitimate businesses—though with the backing of their criminal ties.¹¹⁶ Bosses and sponsors alike in turn often hold legitimate positions of influence, either as businessmen, politicians, or those within other government or non-governmental organizations, a favorite being as leaders of various national athletic associations from which they recruit new members from. Sitting next to the boss are a number of advisers, or councilors, referred to as ‘*ko-mun*.’ Such advisers are often trusted

¹¹⁵ One exception it was told to me was the Chil Sung Pa (Seven-Star Group, composed of 4 connected gangs throughout the Pusan area), which more closely resembled their Japanese counter-parts with whom they conduct a substantial amount of business with.

¹¹⁶ In other words, they rarely *directly* engage in criminal activities themselves which thus insulates themselves from the consequences thereof.

business people, political actors or otherwise members of the private elite. While not being officially part of the organization, they can hold significant influence over the group's functioning.

The case of President Chun Doo Hwan's younger brother, Chun Kyung Hwan (referred to as "Little Chun") for instance, illustrates the complexity of locating the predominate power behind certain criminal organizations. Little Chun had graduated from the Seoul Judo School, the army adjunct school and the Commerce College of Yonnam University, eventually going on to earn an MA in physical education teaching in the US.¹¹⁷ Upon returning to Korea, Little Chun worked as a bodyguard for Samsung Company and then within the palace security force during the Park Chung Hee regime. Following the power ascension of his brother, Little Chun rapidly became the man to see regarding issues such as receiving favorable tax decisions or breaks, or obtaining import licenses and government contracts. He was furthermore appointed the head of the scandal ridden rural works project '*Sae-maül-untong*,' a program with an annual \$115 million dollar budget and one which had been charged with shaking down rural citizens for 'contributions.' As part of the program, Little Chun had reportedly awarded a land reclamation contract to a company headed by Chong Yu Sop, the *tumok* of the Mokpo Pa. After a bloody nightclub incident in which four rival gang members were killed in Seoul, newspapers reported that it had been carried out by Chong's politically connected gang. After a list of suspects came to light it was found out that one of the leaders of the hit squad was the former body guard of Little Chun. Some of the other suspects as well had ties to Little Chung—having both graduated from the Seoul Judo School as well as

¹¹⁷ In Korea, many of the police and gangsters a like earn degrees in physical education with special concentrations in the martial arts.

attending overseas events with him as part of his entourage.¹¹⁸ As this example illustrates, Little Chun could just as easily be considered a boss of sorts as he could be referred to as a *maghu-saeyŏk-ch'a* or *ko-mun*.⁷ Regardless of the title however, those at the top echelons of such groups are first and foremost power brokers and it is through such extensive networks in which both legal and extra-legal protection and influence is brokered.

Below the *tumok* sits the underbosses, or '*pu-tumok*.' The underbosses are often mistaken for being the actual boss, which is convenient for the true leader of the group. Underbosses typically direct and delegate the day-to-day operations with two or more captains under their leadership. Captains—referred to as "*haengdong daechang*" or "conduct leaders," as their name implies, are in charge of discipline, training, recruitment, and on the ground activities. Below each individual captain sit the soldiers which can number typically anywhere from between 10 to 30 members. Members typically are recruited from junior high or high schools, athletic organizations, or the unemployed, often starting out as errand boys. To be sure, there is a high supply of potential recruits given Korea's notoriously competitive society with few second chances for those that fail to succeed either in their academic or athletic pursuits.

Upward mobility amongst Korean gangsters is largely based on merit and one's ability to earn profits. As with the organization's leadership, the more money one can earn, the more people they can employ under them. As they increase their earning potential they can be promoted to captain, underboss, and eventually to head their own

¹¹⁸ Harrison, S. S. (1987-01-25). Is South Korea Going to be the next Philippines? . The Washington Post Sunday.

crew/organization which typically will remain loyal to their original group. Similar to the *Yakuza*, retirement, either forced or voluntary is common.

3.3.3: Intergroup relations

During the 1970s through the 1980s and early 1990s, relationships between violence wielding organized groups were both competitive and violent. It is also during this time period when a number of anti-organized crime “wars” were carried out by the Korean government, with subsequent arrests, prosecutions and prison sentences for the majority of influential players. Importantly, it was during these sequential waves of arrests and subsequent detentions in which the various crime players became increasingly familiar with each other—having the shared experiences of long and brutal incarcerations. Such shared experiences formed the catalyst with which loose-knit cooperative fraternities, or ‘brother-hoods’ were formed. These fraternities—protection racket in of themselves—were organized in order to facilitate cooperation, collaboration, and importantly, to reduce inter-group conflict.

Official meetings between elite bosses are referred to as ‘*dumok haengsa*’ (Boss Events). Such meetings occur frequently, typically taking place one to two times a month or more when needed. These meetings occur in various luxury hotel banquet halls for roughly two to three hours at a time. While other meetings occur at weddings, special anniversaries or similar type events, ‘*tumok haengsa*’ are devoted strictly to the syndicate’s business.¹¹⁹ Of the three events I attended, the first hour was devoted to

¹¹⁹ Where *tumok* are closed, other events such as weddings and other commemoration events bring together a tremendously diverse set of actors. For instance, I was invited to one wedding in Chŏnju where members of big business and industry, clergy, politicians, police and prosecutors and organized crime figures as well

handing out event invitations and engaging in other, typically non-business related pleasantries. It was explained to me that both the invitations and events were critically important to the functioning of the organization. For one, if you're provided with an invitation, you're considered part of the group. Second, according to custom, when one attends the event, the member is expected to pay an honorarium—these fees are essentially the syndicate dues. The higher amount one pays, the more respect is shown. When I asked one of the bosses how much on average he spends on such events, he explained that it was roughly the equivalent of US \$4,000 to \$5,000 per month. He also explained that if he did not attend the events, he would be considered outside of the syndicate—and thus in conflict with it. Less frequent high-level meetings occur with bosses in other regions.

The second halves of the meetings were devoted to settling disputes and/or organizing/coordinating activities. For instance, in one such meeting (the only one where I was allowed to stay during the second half), a member of one group had engaged in gambling and loan sharking activities in an area which was in another group's territory, and did so without prior approval. The dispute was resolved by both a formal apology from the offending member and his boss, and the paying of a significant monetary fine.

In addition to the settling of disputes, the bosses discussed their plans to begin collectively assisting different districts throughout Seoul, following the example of *Yakuza* groups who had helped during the then recent Fukushima disaster as well as other instances. The plans included providing scholarships, rent assistance, or other financially related activities. I was informed that this plan was in part intended to better relations and

as members of other extended networks all interacted. Such events make contact between members of society who would normally have very few chances to come into contact with each other in other cultural settings quite easy in Korea.

thus garner support from the community, and most importantly, from the local police, and politicians.¹²⁰


Similar to the *tumok* cooperative, each rank below maintain their own close networks with members of other groups. As hierarchy along both rank and age are strictly enforced, individual members of groups typically spend the majority of their time with either members of their own groups with the same rank and age, or with members of other groups in the same category. This cultural attribute greatly facilitated the expansion of my research contacts.

3.3.4: State-Business-Criminal Nexus

The following diagram, based off of and cross-checked by multiple sources maps out the basic relationship structure between politicians, business, gangsters, and police/prosecutors. It is important to reiterate that there is no single, monolithic organization referred to as the ‘Korean mafia.’ Similarly, the state and society at large is made up of multiple actors with varying interests and motivations. As such, there is variance with respect to the general relationship diagram and explanation presented below. Not all business people have relationships with gangsters, just as not all gangsters have close ties to police, prosecutors or politicians. The diagram is simply a depiction of how each are generally connected, when connections do in fact exist:

¹²⁰ I was never able to confirm from different whether or not such social assistance programs were ever actually carried out.

Diagram 2: State-Business-Criminal Nexus



The first relationship in diagram 2 depicts the *direct* linkages between politicians and violent entrepreneurs. As highlighted in chapter 2, such direct linkages were not only common but necessary for any political boss of consequence in the period preceding the rise of the military government under Park Chung Hee. Under such relations politicians provided money making opportunities, judicial protection and favoritism to such organizations. In turn, illicit groups provided protection, campaign finance, votes and other forms of support to which they proved quite proficient at. While this direct relationship between violent entrepreneurs and politicians has weakened overtime—especially in the wake of increased transparency and accountability measures since the 1990s, it still exists in limited areas, especially outside of Seoul, and/or among local, low level politicians and/or bureaucrats where relationships are predominately first developed. The dotted line simply indicates that this relationship has weakened substantially over time.

The second relationship focuses on the political-business linkage. In general, similar to other political-business nexuses, businesses of all types seek to associate with politicians in order to better their interests and seek to win favor through campaign contributions and/or other actions beneficial to politicians. Politicians in turn can provide

legal and/or extra legal support, for example, favoritism in government project bids. Many of these business themselves are, on the face of them, legally enfranchised but run by criminal elements. With respect to violent entrepreneurs, such actors are often found as previously mentioned, in the forced evictions industry. Similarly, relationship 3 depicts the tripartite political-business-criminal nexus. In general, businesses will provide money-making opportunities (both legal and illegal in nature) to criminal groups. When politicians seek out the services of violent entrepreneurs, it is done predominately indirectly, through the use of business intermediaries. For example, in times of elections, politicians will contact their business connections who in turn mobilize their criminal contacts. Activities include intimidation of voters and political competition, protection of campaign events, and the organization of grassroots campaigns. Businesses not directly run by gangsters themselves can find relationships with illicit organizations beneficial for their organizations. Businesses with such relationships can for example utilize them for protection, mediation, competition suppression and labor-related issues. In similar ways, businesses often seek relationships directly with public sources of protection. Similar to extra-legal protection provided to businesses from politicians, protection can be provided through this route as well.

Among the various relationships, the criminal-police/prosecutorial linkage is perhaps the most resilient, in part because the police and prosecutors are charged with representing the state in fighting criminal activities, and thus are often in close contact with criminal elements—though more so the police and the prosecutors.¹²¹ Police naturally seek out relationships with gangsters and the like in order to obtain more

¹²¹ Because police often have daily contact with underworld figures their relationships tend to be much closer than the criminal-prosecutorial relationship.

information and better control. Police will often tolerate certain types of activities in return for regulation of predatory and/or non-organized crime. Much of the variance simply depends on the type of demand for such non-predatory type crime. Criminals gravitate towards areas where there is both demand and where they have police connections.

The final relationship exists between politicians and the police/prosecutors. In return for advancement and/or other opportunities police and prosecutors will often provide protection to politicians or their business/criminal network. Of course criminals themselves seek strong relationships to police and prosecutors for the same rationale as to why they would seek out political relationships. In kind, politicians seek strong relationships with police and prosecutors. This is often the way in which extra-legal protection is provided to both gangsters and businesses within the respective politician's overall network.¹²² Police and prosecutors in turn seek out the association with political leaders due to their origin, survival and advancement in part being dependent upon such relationships.

3.4: Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to describe the evolution of criminal groups in Korea, with a focus predominately on the period after the 1961 coup-d'état by Park

¹²² It is more often than not quite difficult to explicitly see the influence. For example, two gangsters I had come into contact had committed virtually the same crime under the same circumstances—the ordered murder of an underboss, both of which had in some manner, significantly displeased one of the higher ranking members or affiliates. Both gangsters were in fact successfully prosecuted. However, one of gangsters received 5 years, while the other had received 15 years in prison. The one that received 5 years, it was stated, had the backing of his organization's powerful judicial support. Because of so many mitigating factors, it would be quite easy for the prosecutor to simply deny undue influence in his or her decision. Murder it should be noted is quite an infrequent occurrence, but it can and does happen as the occasions present themselves.

Chung Hee. As will be explained in greater detail in the following chapter, the criminal groups operating prior to 1961 were overwhelmingly ideological in nature, and if not ideological, were utilized for such purposes. It was the era of the ‘political gangster.’ Once Park Chung Hee came to power through the military led coup-d’état in 1961, he quickly went about with the task of eradicating potential competitors, whose power bases were often violent, criminal groups. Although complete eradication of such groups is impossible, and indeed, many of the groups continued to collaborate in one form or another with state actors and those representing the state, Park was in fact successful in that he reduced any significant type of national level political influence such groups might have in the past.

Following the assassination of Park in 1979, Chun Doo-Hwan ascended to power, and similar to his predecessor, carried out a number of social purges, of which numerous criminal elements and dissidents alike were caught in the waves of. However, hard line measures and continued repression were met with increasing calls for social, political and economic change—especially in the wake of the Kwangju Uprising in 1980. Chun Doo Hwan was forced to find ways in which to placate the forces calling for reform. One way Chun attempted to reduce the building pressure, was to relax certain restrictions on nightlife and promote entertainment. This policy inevitably led to more opportunities for those willing to engage in illicit market behavior.

In addition to the expansion of the market for traditional illicit activities, the market for private coercion was opened up during the run up to the 1986 and 1988 Asian Games which produced a massive move towards redevelopment and beautification of Seoul, in addition to the on-going need to boost the housing supply in Seoul’s growing metropolis. The twin goals of minimizing social pressure for political change while

providing public goods in the form of development, a process often associated with its own social upheavals and politically costly backlash, led to a natural niche for state-criminal collaboration. By privatizing the process the state was able to enjoy development, while at the same time avoiding being directly implicated in the violence that was carried out in the process.

Chapter 4

State Seekers, Nationalists, and Paramilitaries

4.1: Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to explicitly highlight the cross-temporal variance with respect to state-non-state collaboration in the market for force during the period of state development within the southern half of the Korean peninsula. In many respects this chapter and story line that follows fits well within existent explanations of state-non-state collaboration in coercion. Namely, state seekers and state actors alike utilized non-state specialists in violence in order to expand their forces and/or to extend their reach in order to gain internal supremacy. Once state capacity was greatly enhanced and supremacy obtained, state actors in turn attempted to either fully disband or enlist their non-state forces under their formal state sanctioned umbrella, which in turn fits within the traditionally held wisdom which posits that state actors overwhelmingly prefer public as opposed to private sources of coercion.

Although highlighting the cross-temporal variance with respect to the dependent variable is the main point of this chapter, special attention is necessarily paid to the history of state-non-state relations during the early phases of state development within Korea, and how this history continues to affect the range of decisions available to modern day state actors.

4.2: Early Korean State Development

State development, especially in its embryonic phases, is often disturbingly violent. The history of state development within the Korean Peninsula is certainly no exception. With the abrupt end of Japanese colonialism following the conclusion of WWII, the peninsula was thrown into a stateless period—increasingly chaotic, rife with crime, unemployment, inflation, and corruption.¹²³ With surrender came an end to both Korea's main export market, Japan, and the war time industries which had supported the economy, as well as the exodus of Korea's administrative and technical know-how in the hundreds of thousands of Japanese who had managed the peninsula's political, economic and social systems. In addition to the collapse of the economy and administrative systems, the volatile situation was exacerbated by massive influxes of refugees—either those returning from abroad or streaming down from the North with which the existing institutions hardly had the capacity to absorb.¹²⁴ Henderson (1968) writes “Refugees and repatriates without jobs and without the social constraints of their home communities joined gangs that stole, black-marketed, or pimped in Seoul and Pusan's alleys and marketplaces.”¹²⁵ In addition, gangs which had origins in organized crime and violence during the colonial period were harnessed by competing political powers. Most famous were the gangs led by Kim Du-hwan and Chung Chin-yung—both of whom had been made famous for their anti-Japanese activities but were then hired by the Japanese to organize and run the Police Assistance Association—effectively making them legal

¹²³ McCune, G.M. (1950) notes that By January of 1946, only 5 months following the American occupation in the South, only 60 Japanese administrative officials of the 70,000 Japanese administrative officials remained (48).

¹²⁴ Kim, B.J. (2003) cites a Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense report which estimates that between 1945 and 1948, 803,000 refugees flooded down from North Korea. 293

¹²⁵ Henderson, G. (1968) 139

terrorists.¹²⁶ With the end of the colonial period in 1945, both Kim and Chung hired out their services to political parties and power brokers—Kim taking his group to the Rightists and Chung working for the leftist South Korean Labor Party (SKLP). As will be explained in the following section, the two would eventually clash.¹²⁷ In a similar fashion, politically oriented youth and student groups, not immune to the revolutionary atmosphere, quickly formed and became ubiquitous—tying themselves (as had Kim Du-hwan and Chung Chin-yung) to power brokers and political factions which afforded them the opportunity to not only earn rents but perhaps as importantly if not more, to do so while taking an active role in shaping the direction of the peninsula. Indeed, these groups played a critical role in political socialization and the recruitment of political and military leadership—with many future leaders rising from their ranks. Such groups would then eventually form the basis of power for each political boss and factionalist grouping—to the point where a US Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) report noted that “Violence and terrorism on the part of political groups was an accepted technique for getting things done. Any political party which lacked a strong-arm youth group, fiercely loyal to the cause, to do its dirty work really could not be expected to worry any other political organization.”¹²⁸ In addition to ‘dirty work’ in the form of violent political activities, such groups, largely dependent upon illegal funds, relied upon forced or ‘voluntary

¹²⁶The 1990 film titled “General’s Son” or “장군의 아들” presents a romanticized version of Kim Du Han as a protector of Korean merchants. The film however conveniently leaves out his collaboration with the Japanese colonial government.

¹²⁷CIC p. 93. Of the “urban gang” Henderson (1968) comments that: “Young men, spirited by unemployed, put themselves under bosses demanding instant obedience and loyalty. In back-handed tribute to these un-Korean organizational qualities and to the lowness of the calling, these leaders are often referred to by Japanese names, like Aomatsu.” Each has top confidants, under them lesser ones in a strict hierarchical loyalty fitted for sudden action. The boss may connect with the world of political protection and assassination (like assemblyman Kim Tu-han), with former police bosses (like No Tok-sul), or with certain market groups. Experts in squeeze and blackmail, their intimate knowledge of market or neighborhood, become the indispensable tools of autocracy.” 233

¹²⁸ CIC P. 76

contributions’—contributions which surprisingly amounted to roughly half of national revenues in 1949. Leftists initially dominated the scene which in turn led to the formation of Rightists groups with their own state seeking ambitions.¹²⁹

To be sure the Leftist-Rightist divide in the peninsula was principally the consequence of the colonial period in which the Rightists (made up of elitists with land, other forms of capital, and education) were the clear minority, having at least partially collaborated with the colonial power in order to enjoy their privileged status.¹³⁰ That the elites, the basis for the Rightists (both during and following colonialism) were the minority and suffered from legitimacy concerns—both in terms of public support and initially, coercive capability—is somewhat of an understatement. The vast majority of Koreans were naturally left- leaning (politically that is), being poor, rural, and uneducated—having 95% of employed men and 99% of employed women working as laborers as late as 1944 and as little as 11.5% living in urban settings.¹³¹ Similar to the privileged class, the police force (staffed by and managed largely by those who had been trained by, served under, prospered and otherwise cooperated with the Japanese) was overwhelmingly viewed as illegitimate.¹³² Indeed, police power had infiltrated and permeated throughout the lives of everyday Koreans during the colonial period and the utilization of brutal tactics, torture, and summary punishments, on the spot executions included, proved immeasurable to Japan’s successful rule of more than 30 years.¹³³ General distrust and animosity of homegrown Rightists was so much that in order to obtain at least some semblance of legitimacy they had to look outside of Korea—

¹²⁹ Henderson, G. (1968): 139-142

¹³⁰ IBID: p. 202. Of course, there were divisions within each of larger Leftist-Rightist divides—for example, within the Rightist camp divisions existed between patriots and collaborators (Cumings, B. 198).

¹³¹ Henderson, G. (1968) 75

¹³² Roughly 85% of those that served under the Japanese were retained in the force (IBID, 143).

¹³³ Meade, E.G. (1951) 119

choosing exiled nationalists and staunch anti-communists such as Rhee Syngman and Kim Ku to lead their cause.

In the wake of such turmoil, a number of both formal and informal protective institutions emerged—many of which were organized prior to and in preparation for the arrival of the Americans in the South. The most conspicuous was established by the politically inclusive Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI)—headed by moderate Yo Un Hyung and anchored by left leaning People’s Committees.¹³⁴ The CPKI (later changing its name to the Korean People’s Republic)—formed the first de-facto government in the post-colonial era and had done so with surprising success. Paramount on the to-do list was restoring order. Untrusting of the then existing police the Committee harnessed existing youth groups (and recruited more from the vast supply of the unemployed) for security purposes, with the intended policy of utilizing the Corps as the main enforcement agency and the police as adjuncts.¹³⁵ By August 25th, 1945, (just two weeks after the day of liberation), some 2,000 youths had been organized in Seoul, with over 140 branches in areas outside the capital—exercising de-facto sovereignty over the peninsula.¹³⁶ Despite the organization’s effort to obtain official recognition, US officials openly opposed the Korean People’s Republic and opted instead to cooperate with the conservative and unpopular Korean Democratic Party (KDP)—a group which was led by exiled nationalists and conservatives and one which was aligned with the

¹³⁴ Also cited as Lyuh Woon Hyun. Yo, a left leaning political moderate who had survived 9 previous attempts on his life would eventually be assassinated in July of 1947, presumably due to his being one of the only political powers strong enough to challenge Rhee Syngman and the Rightists. Of the assassination, Cumings notes that the location was but a short distance from a police box, but that the police made no effort to apprehend the assassin. In an interview which took place in 1987, Yo’s daughter informed Cumings that the head of the Seoul Police Force, Kim T’aek-sang, had ordered the murder. Cumings, B. (1997) 209

¹³⁵ Meade, E.G. (1951), 55

¹³⁶ Kim, B.J. (2003) 291-292

tainted Korean National Police (KNP).¹³⁷ Whatever order had been obtained by the CPKI was lost with the US Military's refusal of recognition—a move which in no small part exacerbated the already tense relations between the Rightists and Leftists.¹³⁸

Presumably bolstered by the presence and support of American forces, the Rightists began to mobilize and consolidate their own paramilitary youth wings in order to compete with the more numerous and better organized Leftist groups. *Compete* is the key word there. Up to that point there were no real state *actors*, rather, a plethora of state seekers all vying for supremacy. Although the Rightists had the police at their disposal, they were significantly outnumbered. The Leftists in turn, without a ready-made police force at hand, had to recruit anyone ready and willing to join. By December of 1945, the umbrella organization referred to as the General Alliance of Young Men for Korean Association of Independence (GAYMKAI), comprised of 43 linked factions was formed. This was a group which posed a direct challenge to the Leftist's own consolidated General Alliance of Joeseon Youth (GAJY)—with staunch anti-communist, Rhee Syngman, and nationalist Kim Ku (leader of the Korean Provisional Government), as the president and vice president respectively.¹³⁹ By 1947, 34 young men's associations—of Leftist and Rightist political orientations—had officially registered before the Joint Commission.¹⁴⁰ While officially registered, the violent activities these groups engaged

¹³⁷ General Hodge, the military governor of Korea from 1945 to 1948 went as far as officially stating “I feel it necessary to the public understanding to announce that, regardless of what it calls itself, the Korean People's Republic is not in any sense a ‘government.’ ...I have today directed my occupation forces and the Military Government of Korea that the activities of any political organization in any attempted operations as a government are to be treated as unlawful activities (Chunghan Digest, No. 11, December 29, 1945, quoted in McCune, G.M. (1950) 49-50).

¹³⁸ Cumings, B. (1997) 190, 192

¹³⁹ Kim, B.J. (2003) 293-294

¹⁴⁰ Henderson, G. (1968) p. 141

in—both protective and offensive—remained unofficially sanctioned (albeit not inconspicuously) by their respective political leaders.

Under the US military occupation of the South, the buildup of Rightist paramilitary forces went hand in hand with the buildup of the Korean National Police and other forces tasked with the responsibility of bolstering the anti-Communist agenda. While the exact numbers are unclear, accounts have the police force prior to the Japanese surrender at 23,000—with 40% having been staffed by predominately low ranking Koreans. Japanese personnel were eventually replaced by Koreans and by mid 1946 the overall numbers had increased to 25,000. By the change of guard to Korean control in 1948, the KNP numbered an estimated 34,000.¹⁴¹ While the KNP were the main official elements of coercion the violent youth groups, supported and recruited by various Rightist factions (and at times directly by the USAMGIK), were far from insignificant. To suggest that the recruitment of militant youth groups was merely a function of a weak (but politically partisan police force) would however be incorrect. Based on his research on the American occupation in Cholla Nam Do (South Cholla Province), an area known for having especially strong Leftist support, Meade (1951) notes that the two Rightist political parties—the Democrats and the Unification Party—pooled their efforts with the paramilitary youths adopting the Unification label, so as to be able to continue their terrorist activities with the “odium falling upon only one of the rightist groups.”¹⁴² Such strategic games were employed throughout the peninsula. Although there were numerous youth organizations of varying sizes and political orientations arguably the most notorious factions were the Korea Democratic Young Men’s Association (KDYA)—led

¹⁴¹ IBID. 142-143.

¹⁴² Meade, E.G. (1951) 163

by future assemblyman and well known and aforementioned political gangster Kim Du-hwan, the Northwest Youth Corps (NWYC) and the USAMGIK funded Korean National/Racial Youth Corps.¹⁴³

Rightist youth bands were largely free to utilize brutal tactics against the leftists and suspected communists. For example, the gangster turned nationalist, Kim Du-Han, unleashed his youth faction on April of 1947 and captured, beat and tortured 13 leftists who had been distributing anti-Rhee Syngman literature (working on behalf of the South Korean Labor Party (SKLP) and under the direction of Chung Chin Yung). With one member eventually escaping and notifying the Seoul District Offices, officials soon arrived in order to investigate—finding two leftists dead—with Kim Du-Hwan and his followers readily admitting the murder. So great was the public outcry that the police were forced to act and arrest those deemed responsible. However, despite Kim Du-Hwan’s own confession as well as the accounts of the surviving victims, the Seoul District Court found insufficient evidence for a murder conviction, and instead fined Kim Du-Hwan 200,000 yen—the equivalent of two cartons of cigarettes on the black market.¹⁴⁴ Although Kim was eventually re-tried by the US Military Government and handed out a death sentence in March of 1948 (commuted to life in prison), by August of 1948, after the end of the US occupation, Kim was given amnesty by the newly elected President Rhee.¹⁴⁵ Following the Korean War, Kim would eventually go on to serve as

¹⁴³ Henderson, G. (1968) 140-141

¹⁴⁴ CIC reported however that a lesser member of KDYA, Kim Young Tai confessed to the murder and received a seven year sentence (CIC, 95).

¹⁴⁵ The CIC noted “In this instance, CIC took great pains to secure the punishment of men who had committed a crime while fighting an enemy that also was the American’s rival, Communism” (p. 93)

the Chief of the Investigation Section of the Korean Youth Corps, Rhee's personal body guard and as a member of the National Assembly in the 1960s.¹⁴⁶

Of course, the same lenient treatment did not extend to the leftists who were handed out hard sentences for crimes much less brutal than Kim Du-Han's. Leftists for example were often handed out multiple year sentences, some accompanied with hard labor for attending rallies, giving unauthorized speeches, or in other instances, being suspected of going against the provisional government.¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, Meade (1951) reiterates that "Leftist terrorism was punished by fines and imprisonment, while rightist goon squads were gently chided and warned not to repeat their offenses."¹⁴⁸

To suggest that the USAGMIK and other state actors (the KNP included) merely afforded Rightist youth bands preferential treatment, or otherwise couldn't control them because of they lacked capacity, would be incorrect. Rather, such 'paramilitary' youth groups acted largely as auxiliary forces to state forces—with many of the groups having their headquarters either adjacent to, or directly inside police stations.¹⁴⁹ For instance, according to Henderson (1968), "gang and boss were less dominators compared to their role as the instruments of domination in government's confrontation with the masses."¹⁵⁰ In a similar fashion, CIA reports stated that: "The enforced alliance of the police with the

¹⁴⁶ IBID: 92-96

¹⁴⁷ IBID. 157. Henderson further adds that "brutal treatment was reserved generally for suspected Communists and left-wing agitators. It was true that in some cases extreme rightists were arrested, but rarely were they held in confinement for long."

¹⁴⁸ Meade, E.G. (1951) 165

¹⁴⁹ Kuzmarov, J. (2012)

¹⁵⁰ Henderson, G. (1968). 234; Also quoted in Cumings, B. (1997) 208.

Right has been reflected in the cooperation of the police with Rightist youth groups for the purpose of completely suppressing the Leftist activity”¹⁵¹.

Cases that illustrate the collaborative relationships between the Rightists paramilitary youth squads, the KNP, and the USAMGIK are numerous. This was especially so following the 1946 Fall Riots in which, initially, railway laborers (voicing opposition to the daily wage system), followed by electric, printing, postal, and those working in other industries, went on strike. Students as well as a number of government workers soon joined the protests that occurred throughout the South. In response, the Military Government (initially believing the riots to have been agitated by Leftists and Communists groups) ordered the suppression of the strike by force—in which members of the KNP and Rightist paramilitary squads worked side by side. For instance, in Yongsan Railway Station in Seoul, 3,000 armed policemen and 1,000 members of youth squads were deployed to suppress the activities of the strikers and protect right-wing union members returning to work—ultimately arresting 2,000 strikers while injuring 60 through the use of gunfire, clubs, and rocks. For example, Robinson (1960) noted that *Yongsan* and the surrounding areas had the appearance of a battlefield—with armed gangs of hired thugs (operating with the complicity of the KNP) roaming the streets and industrial areas with the “announced purpose of breaking up any Leftist agitation”¹⁵². Among the hired thugs was Kim Du-hwan’s KDYA group, with rifles and hand grenades supplied by the KNP. Besides suppressing strikers, they led attacks against various Leftist organizations—such as ransacking the headquarters of the Joseon Communist Party, the

¹⁵¹ National Records Center, CIA, “The Current Situation in Korea,” ORE 15-48, March 18 1948. Reprinted from Cumings, B. (1997). 202.

¹⁵² Robinson, R.D. (1960) 162. CIC reported that the presence of right wing youth groups at the scene aiding the police placed the strike on political grounds (76).

executive offices of the Central People's Committee, and the Jayu Shinmun (Free News) building, while beating the staff and destroying (as well as confiscating) property and documents along the way. Moreover, 3,000 KDYA members, again supplied with weapons and other materials by the KNP and the US Army, were dispatched to locations outside of Seoul—helping to recapture and suppress further riots in areas such as Goryeong, Seognju, Waegon, Yecheon and Yeongcheon.¹⁵³

Arguably the most violent, or at least most notorious of paramilitary youth groups was the anticommunist Northwest Young Men's Association (NWyMA)—a group established officially (though with earlier roots) in November of 1946 and one which the CIC established liaison with (among other established rightist organizations) in order to capitalize on their unique comparative advantages. Indeed, the links between the US Military and the NWyMA are quite clear, with the CIC going so far as stating:

“The CIC could not perform its counterespionage mission alone, for reasons attributed in part to language hurdles and absence of professional agents. Of particular value to CIC were members of the North West Young Men's Association, NWyMA, a youth organization composed of men who had fled from North Korea. All members had had to have suffered personally at the hands of the Communists. Unfortunately this organization was heavily inclined towards brutality in its attempts to even the score with its enemies; but the members knew enough about the top North Korean Reds to make it imperative that they be utilized in counterespionage operations under strict CIC supervision.”¹⁵⁴

Both independently and under the auspices of the CIC, the NWyMA—an organization which the CIC themselves labeled as a top terrorist organization—conducted a range of anticommunist activities including counterespionage missions throughout the peninsula,

¹⁵³ Kim, B.J. (2003) 302-303; Robinson, R.D. (1960) 162

¹⁵⁴ CIC report. 25

censoring refugees from North Korea, arranging for jobs for refugees, broadcasting anticommunist messages to the North, and jointly policing areas with the KNP.¹⁵⁵ In one instance which highlights the types of activities carried out under the auspices of the Military Government, the CIC reported that:

“When WOJG Browning was in charge of the Special Squad, an informant came to him with the news that he could pick up some SKLP (South Korean Labor Party) documents if Browning was interested. The Korean was given enthusiastic approval and went on his way. A few hours later he backed up a truck to CIC offices and deposited two safes, still locked and full of documents. The Korean had rounded up an untold number of strong-arm specialists from the North West Young Men’s Association and barged into the SKLP Headquarters to seize the documents. Of course, the SKLP had much to say about American police tactics, but the documents and the safes were never returned.”¹⁵⁶

Perhaps the most egregious pre-war actions taken by the NWYA occurred both prior and during the Cheju Insurgency. Cheju-do, an island roughly 60 miles (100 km) southwest of South Cholla province, of which it was once administratively part of until 1947—was controlled from 1945 until early 1948 by the left leaning People’s Committees—having consolidated power on the island through armed clashes with Rightists groups in the aftermath of liberation. If the Rightists had legitimacy concerns on the mainland, with roughly 80% of the island population supporting or at least sympathizing with the Leftists and Communists—they had a full-blown legitimacy crisis

¹⁵⁵Kim , B.J. (2003) 309-314. With respect to policing, CIC reported that “CIC District offices were ordered to divide their cities into sections and assign trusted members of the NWYMA, other rightist youth groups or local police to patrol the areas. As these men became acquainted with the activities of almost every individual in their areas, they soon were able to spot strange persons. In this manner, CIC maintained an informal check on travel within South Korea. In addition, CIC had informants in different refugee organizations to look out for suspicious persons” (CIC report. 25).

¹⁵⁶ CIC report. 113

on their hands on Cheju-do.¹⁵⁷ Furthermore, the island had a long history of insurrection and rebellions against mainland rule.

Initially peaceful between 1945 and 1947, sporadic violence soon ensued, precipitated by a number of factors including: a poor economy with increased tax burdens, a once cooperative US occupation forces whose attitude towards the leftists hardened in the wake of insurgencies throughout the peninsula, and quite significantly the arrival of a newly appointed ultra-rightist military governor, Yu Hae-jin, who was un-sympathetic to the committee, dictatorial, and ruthless.¹⁵⁸ Indeed, Governor Yu—a staunch supporter of Rhee Syngman, staffed the already unpopular KNP with mainlanders and unleashed the NWYA, a group which operated according to Merrill (1980) “without even the minimal constraints that, in theory, limited the police.”¹⁵⁹ Further exacerbating the tense powder keg-like situation were low police salaries and a “volunteer” rightist terrorist group whose livelihood was dependent upon shakedowns, blackmail, protection rackets, and other “gangster-like” activities which put the KNP, the NWYA, the locally-recruited constabulary, and the islanders in an on-going cycle of terror and counter-terror.¹⁶⁰

With conditions apt for rebellion, full-scale insurgency was ignited shortly following the March 1st, 1948 announcement of unpopular separate elections in the South and subsequent rightist crackdowns on demonstrations. Violence on the part of both the Rightists and Leftists was extreme. For instance, Cumings (2010) notes that “In Hagui village, for example, right-wing youths captured Mun, a pregnant woman aged twenty

¹⁵⁷ Merrill, J. (1989) notes that membership within the South Korean Labor Party (SKLP) was roughly at 20% of the island, with American and South Korean sources indicating that the Communists could “count on the sympathy or active support of nearly 80% of the population” (157). Note: WOJG stands for “Warrant Officer Junior Grade.”

¹⁵⁸ Cumings, J. (2010) 121-122; Merrill, J. (1980) 152

¹⁵⁹ Merrill, J. (1980) 154.

¹⁶⁰ IBID.154

one and who faced allegations of being married to an insurgent, took her away from her house where they stabbed her severally, an act that made her lose her pregnancy in the end. She was left to die with her baby half-delivered. Other women were serially raped, often in front of villagers, and then blown up with a grenade in the vagina.”¹⁶¹ In one instance, four American advisers witnessed the execution of seventy-six villagers—among them five women and numerous children—by the NWYA and supervised by the police.¹⁶² The guerrillas perpetrated their own anomic retribution through the raiding of villages and the capturing and killing (at times by hanging or beheading) of Rightist youth members, police and suspected collaborators.¹⁶³

Insurgent forces alone were estimated to be anywhere between 3,000 to 4,000 members in strength, and were more so bolstered by popular support. Government forces, at the outset ineffective, consisting of roughly 450 KNP, hundreds of Rightist youth members, and an ‘understrength’ of sporadically unreliable constabulary. Reinforcements from all southern provinces were quickly mobilized and sent to bolster the weak government forces—with as many as 1,700 police and 800 constabulary troops being sent.¹⁶⁴ As the insurrection ensued, the recruitment of mainland forces for the counterinsurgency proved in part disastrous—with the well-documented Yosu Rebellion being sparked by the violent refusal of the elements of the 6th and 14th Regiments to participate in the suppression campaign—a rebellion which quickly spread throughout the South.¹⁶⁵ By April 1949, resistance forces were curtailed and order essentially restored—with estimated casualties across the island being anywhere between 30,000 to 80,000

¹⁶¹ Cumings, B. (2010) 124

¹⁶² Merrill, J.(1980) 186

¹⁶³ IBID 81

¹⁶⁴ IBID. 167-168; Cumings, B. (1997) 220

¹⁶⁵ Cumings, B. (2010) 132

people—substantial by any measure but especially so when you consider the total population to have been as low as 300,000 in the late 1940s.¹⁶⁶

Where the US Military capitalized on the pre-existence of the NWYA and other Rightist paramilitary groups, the Korean National Youth Corps (later the Racial Youth Corps) presents a case in which the USAMGIK specifically (though secretly) sponsored, financed and supplied a non-state paramilitary youth group—modeled after Chiang Kai-shek’s “Blue Shirts” and one which was loyal and directly accountable to the Military Government.¹⁶⁷ The Military Government in 1946 selected Yi Pöm-sök as the head of the organization—a former commander within the Korean Restoration Army in China and one who had worked closely with American Intelligence and the Kuomintang forces. As head of the training facilities Dr. An Ho-sang, a German educated admirer of Hitler’s paramilitary Youth (*Jugend*) was chosen. Based on the fact that it was ostensibly created in order to have an anti-Communist force in place in the event the negotiations with the Russians failed, Henderson (1968) notes that secrecy and the youth association title were employed to avoid protests.¹⁶⁸ Along with other Rightists youth associations (and the KNP) they were active in terrorism, strike breaking, suppression of uprisings and other anti-Communist activities throughout the southern peninsula.¹⁶⁹

Having established himself as the uncontested leader of the Rightists, Rhee Syngman assumed the pinnacle of formal power after the May 10th separate elections—elections that took place under significant security measures. One measure was the

¹⁶⁶ IBID.121; Deane, H. (1999) 37

¹⁶⁷ IBID. 124

¹⁶⁸ Henderson, G. (1968) 141

¹⁶⁹ Deane, H. (1999) 38; Cumings, B. (2010) 124

creation of Community Protection Associations—police auxiliary forces composed of Rightist youth members tasked with maintaining order:

Armed with clubs and axes, they patrolled the villages, proud of the government's "favor" to them and anxious to display their new status by interfering in the lives of ordinary citizens. Cases of police or youth groups beating, threatening, robbing, blackmailing, and removing the ration cards of those who would not register were reported to UNTOK.¹⁷⁰

In addition to bringing about a transfer of power from the USAMGIK to Rhee Syngman (through a nearly unanimous National Assembly vote), Communism was officially outlawed under the National Security Law, which provided the KNP and their auxiliary forces virtually unlimited power to root out opposition.¹⁷¹ According to Henderson (1968), the bill was "...so vague as to encourage utilization of the judiciary by the executive to eliminate political enemies. The judiciary as an instrument of executive predominance, not defender of rights or instrument of balance of powers forthwith became even more active than under colonial rule."¹⁷² The arbitrarily employed Security Law and domination of the Judiciary by the executive (through intimidation) proved especially valuable to Rhee given that factionalism and competing loyalties was and continues to be resilient characteristic of Korean politics. Through it, Rhee was able to effectively purge or otherwise threaten into compliance a number of National Assembly members with divided loyalties and thus dominate the legislature. Furthermore, Rhee attempted to consolidate his power by absorbing all Rightist youth associations into a single national group termed the Korean Youth Association (KYA)—a group which was

¹⁷⁰ Henderson, G. (1968). 156; also quoted in Merrill, J.(1989). 78

¹⁷¹ Kim, C.N. (2007). 52.

¹⁷² Henderson, G. (1968). 162-163

accorded official government status and public funds.¹⁷³ When the National Youth Corps, a group characterized as ‘clearly loyal’ to and under then Prime Minister Yi Pŏm-sŏk (who was simultaneously made the minister of defense), delayed in joining the KYA, Rhee asked Yi to either dissolve the organization or resign from power. Yi chose the former option, with the KNYA formally disbanding in 1949.¹⁷⁴ In the same year, the recalcitrant Kim Ku, (then in opposition to Rhee) was assassinated by an army lieutenant who was initially convicted of the murder but was shortly thereafter pardoned and promoted to lieutenant colonel by Rhee Syngman.¹⁷⁵ Despite Rhee’s moves, in addition to the expansion of forces, control was tentative at best; with on-going guerrilla actions, eventual fraternal war erupted in June of 1950.

4.3: Consolidation of Power and Rise of a Contentious Society: 1952-1960

Having been re-elected in 1952 Rhee Syngman survived the war politically intact as the republic’s first president and continued to rule in an increasingly difficult and competitive environment. In 1951, Rhee called upon Yi Pŏm-sŏk to set up the Liberal Party (Chayu-dang)—a party which penetrated deeply into Korean society through its various core social organizations, one of which was the KNP which remained key to Rhee’s machine. Their loyalty being ensured through the Liberal Party’s having control over police personnel’s origin and survival.¹⁷⁶ In order to further consolidate Rhee’s power, he ‘rewarded’ Yi and his followers by purging them through various methods

¹⁷³IBID, pg. 52; Kim, B.J. (2003). 319.

¹⁷⁴Han, S.n-j (1974) 21.

¹⁷⁵Henderson, G. (1968). 166, 257.

¹⁷⁶ For example, Han, S.n-j (1974) writes “The police chief in whose district the Liberal Party received proportionately less votes than in other districts was either fired or transferred to positions regarded as undesirable. It is significant that the political power of the Liberal Party did not result from their personal popularity with the voters or their leadership ability, but from their ability to serve Syngman Rhee well” (25).

between 1952 and 1953. Furthermore he formally dissolved all officially sanctioned youth groups on September 10th, 1953—effectively ending them as significant independent political players. Rhee additionally instructed the Liberal Party to ensure that no former member of the National Youth Corps, a group still loyal to Yi Pŏm-sŏk, would ever gain office in the assembly.¹⁷⁷ Through such measures and the façade of democratic rule, Rhee was able to dominate the political scene from his initial election triumph in 1948 through 1955—with virtually no social institution effectively being able operate without providing him and his Liberal Party unconditional support.¹⁷⁸

With little room for doubt however, Rhee continued to utilize his autocratic and at times, brutal style of governance, and increasingly so, given a number of factors which ratcheted up the competitiveness of South Korean politics following the war. To begin with there was a gradual process of urbanization coupled with increases in mass education. In 1952 roughly 17.2% of the population lived in cities of 50,000 or more. In 1955 this increased to 24.5 % and by 1960, the year in which Rhee and the Liberal Party collapsed, urban residents accounted for a significant 28% (7 million) of the population.¹⁷⁹ With respect to education, from 1948 to 1960 Korea's university level institutions rose from 31 to 62 with enrollment increasing from 24,000 to 97,819. Secondary schools expanded as well, with 97 institutions in 1945 soaring to 357 in 1960. Furthermore, feeding the increasingly anti-government populace was a massive expansion in communications and mass media, with 600 newspapers and periodicals

¹⁷⁷Kongboch'ŏ (Korean Government Office of Public Information), p. 130, cited in Henderson (1968), p. 452. With respect to the youth groups, while they were officially disbanded in reality groups still tied to Rhee's Liberal Party continued to operate in unofficial capacities as is evident in their on-going involvement in elections and intimidation of anti-government elements.

¹⁷⁸Han, S.n-j (1974). 21

¹⁷⁹IBID (27)

being registered by 1960, and up to 1,444 by 1961—staffed by roughly 100,000 reporters.¹⁸⁰

As if growth in urbanization, education and expansions in communications were not enough, further pressure was put on Rhee's political machine through the development of a stronger, more united and coherent 'grand coalition' of opposition under the Democratic Party (*Minju-dang*) banner in 1955 which offered the population a clear choice of who or who not to vote for and thus exacerbating the polarization of Korean politics. That the urban populace favored the opposition was clear given both Rhee's and the Liberal Party's poor electoral results—despite widespread intimidation and electoral manipulation. In the executive election of 1956 for example, Rhee Syngman received only 33.8% of the Seoul vote compared to 56% in the nation. In the 1958 National Assembly elections, only 13 out of 126 seats gained by the Liberal Party came from cities of 50,000 or more, while the Democrats received 43 out of 79 seats from the same cities.¹⁸¹

On the heels of political gains over the course of a number of elections, Assembly opposition members and budget conscious economic-aid authorities were able to reduce the inflated police force—having reached a peak of 75,000 during the war—down to 40,000 in July of 1955, and despite continued Liberal Party objections, down to 39,000 in 1958. While the KNP was reduced, the state's war-expanded military became the

¹⁸⁰Henderson, G. (1968). 170-172

¹⁸¹Han, S.n-j. (1974) 27

preeminent public source of force. This was a key development given that the military was able to maintain semi-independence from the central government.¹⁸²

As in the pre-war election, the KNP and now unofficial (though Rhee sanctioned) Rightist youth groups were mobilized and present in voting booths during the 1960 Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections (with two separate voting tickets) ensuring that voters cast their ballots for Rhee and members of his Liberal Party. In addition to outright intimidation and coercion, ballot counts were manipulated or openly fabricated, which was made easier due to the election centers being located within provincial headquarters.¹⁸³ Of the election, the Korea Report noted:

Democratic rallies were prohibited throughout the nation. Specific instructions were sent by the Home Ministry to police chiefs throughout the nation specifying the exact plurality by which Dr. Rhee and Mr. Lee were to be elected. Hundreds of thousands of pre-marked ballots accompanied these instructions, and these were dutifully stuffed into the ballot boxes on election day. Hoodlums smashed up Democratic Party offices and beat up Democratic election workers and sympathizers. In the country areas, voters were compelled by the police to go to the ballots in groups of three, one of whom was an arm-banded “Supervisor” whose duty was to check supposedly secret ballots before they were cast.¹⁸⁴

The results of the election were unsurprising with Rhee receiving 88.7% of the votes¹⁸⁵ while Yi Ki-bung—the Liberal Party’s Vice-Presidential candidate received 8,225,000 votes compared to the Democratic Party’s Chang Myŏn receiving 1,850,000.¹⁸⁶ That the election was manipulated was not lost on the vast majority of Koreans. Viewing

¹⁸²Henderson, G. (1968) 169

¹⁸³Han, S.n-j (1974). 28

¹⁸⁴ Korea Report 1 (October 1961), quoted in Kim, E. C. I. and K.-S. Kim (1964)

¹⁸⁵ In reality Rhee had run uncontested given that the Democrat’s candidate—Cho Pyŏn-ok—had died of natural causes a month before the elections.

¹⁸⁶ Henderson, G. (1968). 174

the results as illegitimate, citizens began demonstrating against the illegal elections in mass, especially so following the killing of eight protesters by the KNP in Masan on election day and the subsequent discovery of a 16 year old victim with a police tear-gas shell lodged in his skull floating in Masan Harbor the following day. Both acts sparked three days of virtually uncontrollable rioting and, yet again, leading to more casualties in the same city.¹⁸⁷ Newspapers—the vast majority of which condemned the killing of students and other protestors—quickly spread information on numerous cases of electoral violations. Other demonstrations occurred, many of which targeted police officers and their stations, as well as the burning of the offices of government propaganda agencies, Rightist youth organizations and other government-aligned organizations such as the Seoul *Sinmun* (Seoul Newspaper).¹⁸⁸

In one significant instance (among many similar type actions) the *Ich'on Pa*—a police-protected organized crime group which operated the lucrative Dongdaemun (East Gate) market in Seoul was mobilized to attack protesting Korea University students on April 18th.¹⁸⁹ The following day, the date from which the uprising derives its name, “*Sa-Il Gu*” (April, 19), some 200 demonstrators were killed by government aligned forces thus precipitating further demonstrations with which the Rhee and the Liberal Party, having exhausted their coercive forces, were unable to contain. Despite having called for martial law the military (under United Nations Command) stood by, merely protecting against

¹⁸⁷ Kim, Q.Y. (1983) “The Fall of the Syngman Rhee,” p. 5

¹⁸⁸ Kim (1983) pp. 5-6

¹⁸⁹ Henderson, G. (1968). 234. Of the *Ich'on* gang, Henderson notes that the group operated with the backing of the Liberal party, and “it collected rents, by terrorist tactics if necessary, for a major private tract of land in the market place, gave a large portion to the Liberal party, kept more, and turned the remainder over to the “owner,” the Kwangjang Company, which at least felt itself then protected from further exactions. Its funds were apparently rated as one of the biggest sources of revenues for the Liberal party.” 234.

destruction of property and further bloodshed. On April 21st, in response to the continued chaos, Rhee's Cabinet resigned. It only took five days from that point for Rhee to capitulate—handing over power to an interim government under Hô Chông, followed by a short but tumultuous flirtation with democracy under Prime Minister Chang Myôn's parliamentary government, who was in turn overthrown in the 1961 coup d'état led by Park Chong-hee.¹⁹⁰

4.4: Conclusion

In August of 1945 Japan's 35-year colonial rule of the peninsula abruptly ended, sending Korea into what can be largely described as a stateless period. State seekers, including the USAMGIK, supplemented their weak forces through the recruitment and training of private citizens able and willing to utilize violence means. Although Rhee Syngman had attempted to consolidate all groups into one large institution loyal and subservient to his cause, state capacity at that time, coupled with an increasingly powerful society in favor of change, limited his ability to do so. The era of collaboration between political gangsters, nationalists, paramilitaries and state actors to varying extents would thus continue through the post-Rhee period, though to a much less degree. As the following chapter will explain, although Park Chung-hee was able to largely enhance, and thus dominate the market for force through his public sources of coercion, he was nonetheless forced to operate under at least the promise of democracy during the first half of his tenure, lest he ignite the societal forces which played a significant role in bringing about the end of Rhee Syngman's regime. The logic driving collaboration between 1961 and 1970 is argued thus to be a function of normative concerns given the state's high

¹⁹⁰ Han, S. n-j. (1974), 29-30.

level of capacity yet low level of autonomy. Once formal authoritarianism was instituted by Park Chung-hee however, state-strength in Korea shifted to one which was both high in capacity and autonomy. In short, the state no longer needed such collaborative relationships to the extent they had in previous periods of Korean history—such relationships were thus severed until they were re-connected in the mid-1980s by Park's successor, Chun Doo-hwan.

Chapter 5

State Expansion, the rise of Civil Society, and a Change in Tactics

5.1: Introduction

As elucidated in the previous chapter, between 1945 and 1960, collusion between state seekers, state actors, and non-state specialists in violence alike occurred largely under the logic of capacity. In short, that tumultuous period was the big push towards the development of what is today the Republic of Korea. Similar to the myriad of European and Latin American cases, aspiring state seekers in Korea utilized a number of mixed strategies which included buying, subjecting and outright eliminating private powers. That period, although not theoretically puzzling, paved the way for continued (though not linear in time) state-criminal collaboration.

It is the intent of this discussion is to anchor the following two chapters, which focus on two of the main areas were state-non-state collaboration in the market for force occurs in the present, Korean context. This chapter first includes a brief but important description of the political dynamics during the two military dictatorship periods of Park (1961-1979) and Chun (1979-1987), with careful attention being paid to the issues of state-capacity and state-civil society relationships that evolved over the course of their sequential tenures. Subsequently, three significant water-shed moments, or ‘critical

junctures' in Korea's move towards democracy will be discussed. Such junctures it will be argued, have significantly shaped the then, and currently decision-making options and choices of Korea's political elite, and thus warrant careful inclusion into the explanation for the state's turn towards the market for private coercion.

As will be explained, once Park Chung-hee ascended to power following his successful coup d'état in 1961, he went about quickly consolidating his power through a number of campaigns aimed at his opposition. Such campaigns included massive police raids on the once powerful organized crime and paramilitary groups which had helped to secure the previous regime. Although the Park regime continued to utilize non-state sources of violence as his power expanded, following the implementation of formal authoritarianism in 1971, the systematic use of such groups largely ceased to exist, as the theory put forth in this study would predict. In other words, wary of the same societal forces that forced the capitulation of Rhee Syngman, and under the façade of democratic rule, Park Chung-hee relied on non-state forces under both a normative framework, and to a less degree, under a logic of capacity.

Once both high levels of capacity and autonomy had been achieved in 1971, Park Chung-hee effectively broke the state-non-state collaborative relationship. The relationship remained in large part severed until the practice was renewed by Chun Doo Hwan in the areas of labor protest suppression and forced evictions. Chun Doo Hwan's revitalization of the collaborative practice, despite inheriting a state which boasted a highly developed coercive capacity, as will be argued, was the result of the state's rapidly declining autonomy. Most critically, Korea's population had rapidly transformed from a predominately agrarian, rural one, to a largely urban and educated populace both willing

and able to impart significant pressure when deemed necessary. In short, although Korea's move towards free and fair democratic elections would have to wait until 1987, the forces in favor democracy had already begun to shape the decisions of the political elite. The move back towards state-non-state collaborative relationships in the market for force then, reflects the state's need to specifically provide public goods in the form of cheap labor and redevelopment (goods which the growing middle class demanded), while at the same time conveniently avoiding punishment from Korea's societal forces (and international condemnation) for the use of coercion needed to provide those very goods that were demanded.

5.2: The Park Chung-Hee Regime: 1961-1979

Despite having dominated much of the political scene since 1948, Rhee Syngman's regime (1948-1960) faced growing social pressures due in no small part to an increasingly urbanized, educated and contentious populace and relatedly, the growth of a more powerful opposition party (Minju-dang). In the face of expanding protests and having lost the support of the police and military, Rhee was forced to step down from power on April 21st, 1960. Rhee's regime was followed by a short interim government period under Hō Chōng which saw the transfer of power to Prime Minister Chang Myōn. In 1961 Park Chong-Hee carried out a successful coup d'état and led the country between then up and until his assassination in 1979.¹⁹¹

¹⁹¹ As a window to the mind of Park Chung Hee, Oberdorfer, D. (1997) notes that in 1974, while giving a speech commemorating the 29th anniversary of Korea's liberation from Japan, an assassin, ostensibly with links to North Korea, attempted to shoot Park, and although having missed, Park's wife was shot, as well as a 16 year old. Within minutes order was restored and while Park's wife was being taken to the hospital (where she would later die), the dictator continued to read his speech. Following the speech, he sat while the members of a high school chorus, minus the 16 year-old, who had been killed, sang the scheduled music. (47-48)

Park Chung Hee effectively took control and established an emergency government, and in doing so, promised to rid Korea of corruption, spur economic growth and instill national pride.¹⁹² In June of 1961 the military regime declaring itself the ‘Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR), proclaimed the ‘Law Regarding Extraordinary Measures for National Reconstruction’. The proclamation included the following six pledges: (1) “oppose communism”; (2) “support the United States”; (3) “reunify the country”; (4) “eliminate corruption and eradicate other social evils”; (5) create a “self-sustaining economy”, and; (6) “return to our proper military duties.”¹⁹³ In other words, Park promised to instill order and answer society’s demands for democratic rule, their preference for such rule having been vociferously demonstrated in the process of forcing Rhee to step down from power in 1960.

In carrying out the first and third pledges, within days following the coup the police arrested the ‘highest profile’ gangsters and leaders of criminal groups, 167 of which were paraded down Seoul’s main avenues under military escort, wearing nametags and carrying signs stating “I am a gangster, I will accept the people’s judgment.”¹⁹⁴ Within weeks nearly 14,000 gangsters and other types of criminals were arrested. The official reasons given for the campaigns were to rid society from groups blamed of social disorder.¹⁹⁵ The South Korean Truth and Reconciliation Report (2004) (hereinafter ‘TRR’) notes in general that such anti-criminal campaigns have often proven successful in winning citizen approval.¹⁹⁶ Public support would undoubtedly be useful, if not necessary in Park’s subsequent presidential bids in 1963, 67 and 71 given the façade of democratic

¹⁹² Kim, C.N. (2007), 94.

¹⁹³ Lie, J. (1998). 49.

¹⁹⁴ Mobrand, E. (2006). 124-125

¹⁹⁵ Lee, S. (2006) 65

¹⁹⁶ TRR. (2004). 219

rule during that time period. Furthermore, although Rhee had been ousted, his Liberal Party cronies were still around, and given that they had widely utilized such criminal groups to maintain their grip on the state, going after their power bases was not a bad way to undermine potential competition to Park's regime.¹⁹⁷

Over the course of successive campaigns carried out by the military junta the once notorious "political gangsters" (*chongch'i kkangp'ae*) which had once played such a prominent role in Korean politics; they were largely removed from holding any significant national level influence. And, although there are various accounts of state-gangster collaboration during election times prior to 1972 (when authoritarianism was officially promulgated); such accounts remain few and far between.¹⁹⁸

Among the 'criminals' were elite businessmen charged with illegal profiteering. Woo (1991) notes that essentially anyone who had profited during the Rhee regime could be considered as "illicit profiteers," which were defined as the following: those who had (1) "Illicitly earned profits totaling more than 100 million by either purchasing or renting publically owned properties"; (2) "Obtained loans or purchases of more than \$100,000 worth of government or bank owned foreign exchange"; (3) "Provided political funds of more than 50 million in return for bank loans"; (4) "Earned profits of more than 200 million in the process of contracting or bidding for public works or commodity trade in an illegal way"; (5) "Earned profits of more than 200 million by monopolizing the

¹⁹⁷ Moberand, E. (2006). 124

¹⁹⁸ Ibid. (150)

purchase or allocation of foreign exchange”; (6) “Avoided taxes of more than 200 million,” and; (7) “Illegally transferred their wealth abroad.”¹⁹⁹

On the rationale for such business leader targeting, Woo explains that Park had summoned the 10 major business elites and struck a ‘historic compromise.’ In lieu of criminal prosecution, the business leaders would be obliged to set up industrial firms with which a portion of the profits would be ‘donated’ to the government. Thus, according to Woo, the ‘compromise’ occasioned the creation of ‘Korea Inc,’ where the state and big businesses would “share the same destiny; prosper or perish.”²⁰⁰

Although ‘criminals’ and business leaders alike took a hard hit, the target was not only them. By proclaiming “anti-communism” as the state’s main priority, roughly 3,300 pro-Communists were additionally arrested. The following year the Political Purification Law was promulgated, under which 4,367 persons were barred from political activity for six years unless they underwent further screening—of which only seventy-four were cleared.²⁰¹ The bureaucracy was furthermore affected, with roughly 35,000 of the 240,000 civil servants being dismissed.²⁰² Similar purges affected the police and military as well.²⁰³

In further consolidating the military junta’s power, the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) was formed under the leadership of future Prime Minister Kim Jong-Pil. Beginning with a corps of 3,000 officers, by the late 1960s, their numbers

¹⁹⁹ Woo, M. (1991), 83

²⁰⁰ IBID. (84)

²⁰¹ Kim, C.N. (2007). 100

²⁰² Lie, J. (1998). 53

²⁰³ Kim, C. N. (2007). 100

would reach 370,000 employees.²⁰⁴ Along with the military, the KCIA would go on to play a tremendously influential role in the Korean social, political and economic arenas throughout the 1960s, 70s and 80s.

In 1963, owing in part due to the pressure of the US, the SCNR under Park's leadership was disbanded. Lie (1989) argues that given the large amount of aid flowing from the U.S., the military government could not afford to jeopardize its relationship with its chief benefactor (which tied aid to the holding of elections) and thus bowed to the U.S. demands for an electoral democracy.²⁰⁵ Although South Korea was hardly a liberal democracy following the 1963 elections, Chang (2008) notes that there was at least the 'semblance' of civilian rule with the establishment of democratic institutions, including separate and independent three main arms of government; executive, legislative, and judicial.²⁰⁶

Notwithstanding the accounts of Park and his supporters having manipulated both the 1963 and 1967 elections in his favor (and presumably the 1971 elections as well),²⁰⁷ in addition to having a tremendous advantage over his opposition, the margins of victory for Park were slim.²⁰⁸ In other words, despite Park's tremendous amount of coercive power under his fingertips, repression, having been justified as being necessary due to North Korea's on-going threat, was not enough to ensure victory. Thus, according to Lie (1998), economic growth and anticommunism became the "twin ideological pillars"

²⁰⁴ Lie, J. (1998). 53

²⁰⁵ IBID. (53). See also: Cumings, B. (1997). 354

²⁰⁶ Chang, P. Y. (2008). 28

²⁰⁷ Kim, S.H. (2000) notes that Park reneged on his initial promise to return to his military duty and transfer power over to a civilian government. Instead, Park donned civilian clothes and ran in the 1963, 1967 and 1971 presidential elections. (51).

²⁰⁸ See also, Chang, P. Y. (2008). 28

with which Park's power and thus, legitimacy, depended upon.²⁰⁹ As will be discussed in further depth in the following case studies, such economic growth in large part depended upon maintaining low wages and massive investments in infrastructure improvements. Through a series of 5-year economic plans, South Korea averaged 7.8 percent gains in GNP between 1962 and 1966. By the end of 1971, GNP growth reached 10.5 percent.²¹⁰

Between 1963 and 1971, Korea did in fact operate under the façade of democratic rule. This changed however, with Park's move towards full-fledged authoritarianism with the passing of the Yushin Constitution in 1972. The new constitution provided Park (who had already amended presidential term limits in 1971) with the power to appoint one-third of the National Assembly as well as central and local judges, not to mention his cabinet and prime minister. Although formal laws were arguably a mere formality, the National Security and anticommunist statutes were still in effect and were utilized to deal with any form of dissent. Emergency decrees were furthermore a favorite tool. Significant to this study, an emergency decree in 1973 made all work strikes illegal. Declaration no. 9 furthermore made any criticism to the government a national security violation.²¹¹

The obvious question stemming out of the discussion above is why would Park return toward autocratic rule? In the wake of economic decline, Park's political competition had been gaining ground (Kim Dae Jung nearly won the 1971 election) and labor disputes were up to 1,656 in 1971.²¹² In addition to the rising protests not only by labor but also by students as well, there existed intra-party factions 'centered around four

²⁰⁹ Lie, J. (1998). 54

²¹⁰ Chang, P. Y. (2008). 1

²¹¹ Cumings, B. (1997). 358

²¹² Ibid. (363)

“bosses,” of which some were in favor of pushing power over the Kim, Jong Pil. Furthermore, in the summer of 1971, there was a mutiny of twenty green berets who demanded an end to Park’s talks with North Korea. The situation was described by Woo as being “a crisis from below and incoherence at the top,” which in turn created doubt over whether or not the bureaucratic authoritarian system could continue as it stood.²¹³ Woo further notes that “In that confusing moment, business was the pivotal force that finally tipped the balance in favor of a full-fledged authoritarian system.” The turn, then, stemmed the inability of a liberal political regime to respond to the demands of business which were seeking to be bailed out while shifting the financial burden elsewhere.²¹⁴ Park gave in to business and in August 1971, he announced the bailout by proclaiming an immediate moratorium on all payments of corporate debt owed to the private domestic market—of which the moratorium was to last for three years. The result was that Korean business was “resuscitated overnight.”²¹⁵ As noted by Cumings (1997), “It was a short move from August 3rd, 1971, to the garrison decree of October and to the Yushin system that evolved over the next year.”²¹⁶

The decades long transition then, from the military junta (1961-1963) to quasi-democratic rule (1963-1971), and back to full-fledged authoritarianism in 1972 resulted in, again according to Woo (1991), a “state that was iron-fisted at home and, therefore, capable of restructuring domestic economy and supporting sustained growth.”²¹⁷ Between 1971 and 1978 (the year preceding Park’s assassination), the regime maintained an

²¹³ Woo, M. (1991). 112

²¹⁴ Ibid. (112-113)

²¹⁵ Ibid. (114)

²¹⁶ Cumings, B. (1997). (364)

²¹⁷ IBID (116)

impressive average of 9.8 percent GNP growth rates. Over the same time period, GNP per capita furthermore rose from US \$288 to US \$1392.²¹⁸

In addition to the economic gains, mass education was positively affected as well. From 1960 to 1980 for instance, the middle and high school student enrollments increased from 802,000 to 4,169,000. College level enrollment as well expanded from 101,000 to 602,000 over the same period. 10 years later the number of college students would surpass one million.²¹⁹ This is quite imperative given that students had played a major leading role in the movement which in no small part helped to topple the Rhee Syngman regime in 1960.²²⁰ Furthermore, according to Chang (2008), students were the most salient group in the democracy movement during the 1970s, having accounted for 32% of all protests during that time period (followed by laborers/workers at 17%).²²¹

Although the move towards democratic reform would have to wait until 1987, the pro-democracy movement didn't just appear miraculously in the late 1980s. Indeed, Chang (2008) argues that while there were pro-democracy cycles during the 1960s, the 1970s democracy movement became increasingly powerful with the entrance of a range of new and expanding social groups, one of which was a progressively politicized and enlarged middle class. And although each group had their own issues and grievances, much of the dissent focused on Park's constitutional amendment which removed his term limits, the subsequent promulgation of the Yushin Constitution (which formally instituted

²¹⁸ GNP growth and per capita rates were compiled from the Bank of Korea and listed in Oh, J.K. (1999). 62

²¹⁹ Oh, J. K. (1999). 66

²²⁰ Chang, P. Y. (2008). 33

²²¹ IBID. (33, 46)

authoritarianism) and continued repression.²²² As argued by Shin and Chang (2011), the ‘seeds of democracy’ were planted in the repressive context of the Park regime, seeds which would eventually grow and work to galvanize social groups from a variety of sectors in their collective push towards democracy.²²³

Arguably, the most significant event prior to the assassination of Park Chung Hee occurred as a result of the brutal suppression of female workers of Y.H. Trading Company, a garment manufacturer in Seoul. The workers began protesting against their sweatshop conditions and in response the government promptly sent in the police to suppress the demonstration, of which 200 workers were brutally beaten. 190 of the workers then fled the factory to the headquarters of the opposition National Democratic Party; the party led by future president Kim Young Sam, and held a hunger strike. Three days later, the state responded predictably again by sending in 1,000 riot police in the middle of the night, killing one worker and injuring 100 others.²²⁴

As a result of the criticism waged by Kim Young Sam against the Park regime in response to the strike suppression, the government, on October 4th, 1979, stripped Kim off his Assembly seat which in turn prompted the resignation of the 69 opposition Assemblymen in support of Kim Young Sam nine days later. The significance of this event was exacerbated given that it ignited further protests throughout the peninsula, beginning first in Pusan (in Kim Young Sam’s legislative district) then spreading to Masan, Seoul, Taegu and Chongju following the government’s “garrison decree.”²²⁵ Twenty-two days after stripping Kim Young Sam off his assembly seat, in a meeting

²²² IBID. (31)

²²³ Shin, G.W. and P. Y. Chang (2011). 5

²²⁴ Oh, J. K. (1999). 71-72

²²⁵ IBID. (72-73)

intended to discuss ways in which to handle the riots, Park Chung Hee was assassinated by Kim Jae Kyu, head of the KCIA. Kim had later claimed that he had orchestrated the assassination in order to “save the nation from a blood bath that Pak intended to rain down upon Masan and Pusan.”²²⁶ Regardless of the motives (which are still debated), the one shot on Kim Jae Kyu ended the eighteen-year rule of one of South Korea’s most controversial leaders.²²⁷

5.3: Post-Park Chung Hee and the Ascension of Chun Doo Hwan

Although Kim Jae-Kyu had violently ended the tenure of Park Chung Hee, he additionally paved the way for yet another brutal period of dictatorship, this time under Chun Doo-hwan. After Park had been killed, power formally transferred to Prime Minister Ch’oe Kyu Ha who became acting president of the transitional government which in turn declared martial law. Despite instituting martial law however, in November of 1970 Ch’oe declared that the constitution would be amended in order to ‘promote democracy.’ In the process of doing so, many of the rights which had been stripped off several hundred citizens, including professors, journalists, students and other political actors (one of which included future president Kim Dae Jung) were reinstated.

Ch’oe’s administration did not last long however, with General Chun Doo-hwan, head of the Defense Security Command, seizing power on December 12, 1979. Chun quickly went about suppressing ‘fierce’ demonstrations by students and political leaders who demanded the fulfilling of the democratic promises which had been made by the government just a few months earlier. By May 1980, Ogle (1990) notes that

²²⁶ Ogle, G. E. (1990). 92

²²⁷ IBID. (92).

demonstrations quickly spread across the country, including 200,000 students, 50,000 of which were in Seoul.²²⁸ Students, as discussed in chapter 3, were largely responsible for the ouster of Rhee Syngman in 1960. This fact could not have been far from the minds of Chun and his military backers.

In consolidating his power, Chun appointed himself Acting Director of the KCIA on April 14th, and led a military coup d'état a month later, on May 18th. This move by Chun in turn led to further demonstrations, many of which began in Kwangju, located in southwest Korea. Initially consisting of 500 people 'taking to the streets,' violent repression by 'elite paratroopers' spurred a widening of those willing to risk their lives in protest. Three days later, hundreds of thousands of locals had effectively pushed the soldiers from the city. On May 27th, the soldiers again responded with indiscriminate violence.²²⁹ Although the officially reported casualties, of what is now referred to as the "Kwangju Democratic Movement" are 161 deaths, 2,948 injuries with 64 missing, Cumings (1997) notes that there were 2,600 more deaths in that month of May than Kwangju's monthly average of 2,300 deaths per month.²³⁰ About the uprising, the Presidential Truth Commission Report noted:

"The citizens sacrificed themselves in an effort to end the Yushin regime and block the takeover by the new military group, with the aim of establishing a government based on democracy. And indeed, the Kwangju Democratic Movement became a turning point in the Korean democratization movement, manifested in the confrontation between people who tried to publicize the movement to restore democracy, and the authorities who sought to repress such efforts. The Kwangju Democratic Movement, recollected by the movements that followed it, became a great source of energy for the Korean

²²⁸ Ogle, G. E. (1990). 96

²²⁹ Cumings, B. (1997). 376-377

²³⁰ IBID. (378). The first figures are from TRR (210-211)

people as they struggled against the new military regime in the 1980s, and eventually led to the Great Civil Resistance of June 1987.”²³¹

According to Woo (1991), repression under Chun was greater than that during the Park regime (1961-1979).²³² Of course, the initial conditions that Chun faced were significantly different from what Park had to address at the beginning of his tenure in 1961. Park had effectively moved to Korea from a poor agrarian society to a largely urbanized, educated and increasingly contentious one in favor of democracy in just eighteen years. And, although Park had died at the hands of the KCIA director he himself appointed, his success at engineering the ‘economic miracle’ was at the same time his undoing. In the course of his tenure, Park moved to Korea from a weak capacity low autonomy state to one which had a tremendous amount of coercive capacity at its fingertips. The state’s coercive forces however had to be employed at an ever-increasing rate in order to suppress society’s forces in favor of democratic concessions. In other words, the balance of power was incrementally tilting towards those in favor of reform. Such was the state that Chun Doo-hwan ‘inherited.’

As evidenced by the discussion of the Kwangju Democratic Movement, as well as the subsequent crackdowns on protests and dissidents (e.g. the “*Samch’ong kyoyuktae*” program), Chun was not afraid to unleash violence in order to maintain his grip on power. As will be discussed on the following section, civil society activities between 1980 and 1983, as well as dissent by various subsets of society, although not completely eradicated, was largely suppressed through the implementation of Chun’s Machiavellian-style of

²³¹ TRR. 211

²³² Woo, M. (1991). 181

governance. Once order was restored however, the Chun government began a process of incremental liberalization, which in turn led to a resurgence of anti-regime activities.²³³

Beginning in late 1983, Chun's repressive measures began to be lifted, starting first with allowing anti-regime professors to return to their faculty posts, the permission for over 1,000 students to return to university, and again focusing on academia, removed the military police from all campuses. Liberalization furthermore saw the release of roughly 300 political prisoners, and in 1984, the regime removed the ban on just over 200 politicians who had been removed from power.²³⁴ Within this same time period, Chun lifted the 36 year long curfew, which, as discussed in chapter two, led to an explosion in night-life.

This line of events begs the question as to why the regime, which had been so successful at the suppression of dissent over the course of three years, would make moves towards liberalization. Kim (2000) argues that the rationale can be boiled down to a misperception of the regime regarding the state of affairs at that time, as well as due to a number of external factors.²³⁵ To begin with, Kim suggests that the regime had overestimated its ability to control societal dissent through its existent institutional power. Oberdorfer (1997) further notes that it was Chun's intention to eventually step down. For what it's worth, Chun had noted to the U.S. ambassador at the time, prior to his ascension to power, that: "If I were to become president, I would like the history books to say that I was the first one in Korea to turn over power in a legitimate and constitutional

²³³ Kim, S.H. (2000). 80-86

²³⁴ Ibid. (80)

²³⁵ Ibid. (81)

manner.”²³⁶ With the upcoming legislative elections in 1985, Chun very well could have been attempting to increase the popularity of his party and thereby improve his power base’s electability.²³⁷ In addition, the Asian Games were coming up in 1986, to be followed by the 1988 Summer Olympics, which meant increased international scrutiny.²³⁸

Whatever Chun’s motivations were, someone should have told the emperor he had no clothes. Chun’s relaxation of the draconian political tools with which he utilized to suppress anti-regime sentiment ultimately backfired and paved the way for yet another resurrection of boisterous calls for political reform.

With the kindling already set, the spark that set off Chun’s collapse was the ‘torture death’ by police of a Seoul National University Student, Pak Chong-ch’ol, in January of 1987. In response, demonstrators, fueled by demands for democratization, reform, and human rights battled for months with riot police.²³⁹ On June 10th, Chun partially capitulated with the announcement of his handpicked successor, General Rho Tae-woo, to be elected by the Electoral College, which Chun controlled. Chun’s announcement spurred yet more protests that led to Chun mobilizing the military to suppress the rioters. Chun’s lieutenants however warned against this, for fear of military insubordination as had happened during the waning period of the Rhee regime in 1960. In addition to domestic forces, through Gaston Sigur, a special envoy and assistant secretary

²³⁶ Oberdorfer, D. (1997). (162)

²³⁷ Kim, S.H. (2000). (81)

²³⁸ Ibid. (82)

²³⁹ Oh, J.K. (1999). 90-91

of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, the U.S. government applied diplomatic pressure and warned Chun against the use of the military for political purposes.²⁴⁰

As Chun's appointed successor, Rho announced on June 29th the "Declaration for Democratization" which entailed constitutional amendments allowing the first direct presidential election by the full electorate.²⁴¹ Avoiding political fallout and defusing further significant violence, elections took place in December the same year, with Rho surviving the contested election, garnering 36.6% of the popular vote, having won out in large part due to a split between the opposition's two main liberal candidates, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae-jung—both of whom would eventually have their turns at wielding presidential power over Korea.

While the introduction of an electoral democracy, again, did not automatically bring about a liberal, consolidated democracy to South Korea (as we should expect),²⁴² it did introduce a set of formalized mechanisms with which society could utilize in order to hold their elected leaders increasingly accountable and in the process of doing so, incrementally consolidate democracy.

5.4: Post-Chun Doo Hwan

That Roh's regime had benefited from the previous authoritarian governments is without question. As evidenced by the regime's lack of initial involvement and reluctance to mobilize the police in the labor riots of July and August 1987 (as will be discussed in a following section), Roh was well aware that he did not enjoy the same level of autonomy

²⁴⁰ IBID. (93)

²⁴¹ Diamond, L. J. and T. Shin (2000). 89-90

²⁴² The same point was made by Shin, D.C. (2003). 47

that Park and Chun had. The period following Chun's capitulation and direct, democratic elections then is one in which the subsequent governments increasingly sought to distance themselves for Korea's authoritarian past by introducing various reforms of the legal and political system. According to Kim, SH (2000 b.) the most serious attempts to break away from past came with the installation of Korea's first civilian president under Kim Young Sam.²⁴³

Following Kim's inauguration, as had occurred in previous new administrations, he began to purge the government (non-elected officials), bureaucracy, police and military off those who had been involved in coup by Chun Doo Hwan or corruption. Kim furthermore declared the December 12th take-over as "a coup-like event" and pledged further investigations into both the power-grab as well as the Kwangju Uprising.²⁴⁴ Following a year of investigation in October of 1994, the government announced that both Chun and Roh had engineered the military take-over, but prosecuting them for such crimes had the potential for damaging national unity. In July the following year, the government, citing statute of limitations, made its final decision to not prosecute Chun and Roh.²⁴⁵

The government's announcement of non-action in the case of Chun and Roh instigated a round of significant mass protests, which included professors, students, workers, and middle-class citizens throughout October and November. The protests in the wake of the announced decision included more protestors than had participated during the

²⁴³ Kim, S.H (2000 b.). 285-286

²⁴⁴ Ibid. (286)

²⁴⁵ Ibid. (286)

June 1987 uprising, and ultimately culminated into a national crisis.²⁴⁶ The government in response yielded to the social pressures generated by civil society, and in November 1995, promulgated a special law to retroactively punish those who had been involved in the 1980 Kwangju Massacre. As a result of the law, eleven former generals, including Chun and Roh were arrested on charges of various charges including bribery, treason, and insurrection.²⁴⁷ Additionally, the Kwangju Uprising Special Law decriminalized activist leaders, and prompted the creation of a number of memorials to the victims, including the Mangwol-dong Cemetery, the burial site for the victims of the uprising, which was in turn designated as a national cemetery.²⁴⁸

Although Chun and Roh were eventually provided with amnesty in 1997, the prosecutions of the former generals provided a clear demarcation between the authoritarian past, and the period in which democracy ruled the day.²⁴⁹ Both Kim Young Sam and subsequently, Kim Dae Jung (1998-2003), in the words of Kwon (2011) “actively pursued policies and projects to build a “new Korea” and distance their governments from the authoritarian past.”²⁵⁰

5.5: Growth of Civil Society

The core argument this dissertation makes is that state-non-state collaboration in the market force, in the period following the end of the Rhee Syngman administration, is largely explained as being a function of the relative levels of state autonomy from societal forces. In Koo’s (1993) widely cited “Strong State and Contentious Society,” the

²⁴⁶ Ibid. (286-287)

²⁴⁷ Ibid. (289)

²⁴⁸ Kwon, J.B. (2011). 60

²⁴⁹ Kim, S.H. (2000 b). 290

²⁵⁰ Kwon, J.B. (2011). 60

author argues that at the core of the historical process towards Korean modernity and industrialization has been the state-societal relationship. Koo notes that:

“Although the state has played a critical role in setting the dominant direction and framework of social transformation in Korea, concrete processes of social and political change have been intimately shaped by the specific ways in which individuals, groups, or social classes have reacted to state actions and to their experiences of social change.”²⁵¹

Further, Koo explains that civil society in Korea has had a short history, and has had ‘relatively underdeveloped institutional features,’ it has always contained characteristics of being both vehemently resistant to state power, and subject to ‘violent eruptions.’²⁵² As summed up by Shin, Chang, Lee and Kim (2011), “the simultaneous presence of a strong state and a contentious society set the stage for anti-government mobilization and state repression of dissident movements.”²⁵³

From Korea’s short contemporary history, we can easily see patterns of state-civil society relationships which are both expansionary and reactionary. In explaining Korea’s incremental move towards democracy, Kim SH (2000) identifies three main periods, or ‘critical junctures’ which have occurred since 1948: 1956-1961, 1973-1980, and 1984-1987.²⁵⁴ In explaining the role of civil society, I will follow the critical juncture timeline set up by Kim.

²⁵¹ Koo, H. (1993). 231

²⁵² IBID, (232).

²⁵³ Shin, G., and P. Y. Chang, et al. (2011). 21

²⁵⁴ Kim, S.H. (2000 a.). 19

5.6: First Democratic Juncture: 1956-1961

The first juncture saw the overthrow of Rhee Syngman's autocratic regime (1948-1960) as a result of a number of predominately student led protests, referred to as the April Uprising.²⁵⁵ Choi (1993) argues that the main issues leading to mass protests were pervasive government corruption and ineffectiveness, with the spark being Rhee's announced scheme to continue his rule through 'rigged elections'.²⁵⁶ Although the protests proved successful in that Rhee was forced into exile, radical students tried to both continue the movement, and expand its scope by including the issue of North-South reunification, in part by inviting North Korean students to join their movement. The anti-communist response, as noted by Choi, came in the form of Park Chung Hee's May 16th military coup.²⁵⁷

5.7: Second Democratic Juncture: 1973-1980

The second juncture saw the institution of Park's Yushin Constitution, which effectively legalized authoritarianism, the assassination of Park in 1979, a brief period of democratic hope, and the ascension of yet another military dictator in Chun Doo-Hwan. Where students had led the way in the toppling of the Rhee regime, the 1970s saw an expanded set of actors which while still encompassing students, also witnessed the introduction of, and cooperation between urban laborers, intellectuals and religious organizations and journalists which was in turn fed by a growing, class conscious middle class.²⁵⁸ Cooperation between the different groups often focused on labor issues.

²⁵⁵ IBID. (17).

²⁵⁶ Choi, J.J. (1993). 25

²⁵⁷ IBID. (26).

²⁵⁸ IBID. (26)

For instance, during what Koo (2002) identifies as South Korea's export-oriented, authoritarian industrialization period (1960s to 1987), church organizations and students viewed laborers as helpless 'victims of exploitation and repression,' and thus targeted them for assistance.²⁵⁹ Of the religious-labor linkage, Shin, Chang, Lee and Kim (2011) note that progressive religious organizations such as the Catholic JOC (Jeunesse Ouvrières Catholiques, or Young Catholic Workers) and the Methodist Urban Industrial Mission offered night schools and counseling sessions, as well as assisting them with the development of labor unions.²⁶⁰ Koo (2002) notes that through such activities, both union and 'class-consciousness' was first born.²⁶¹

Beyond assisting industrial workers, religious organizations acted as brokers and bridge builders between the various social groups and advocated for human rights through protests and other advocacy activities.²⁶² Chang (2008) notes that between 1975 and 1978, Christians in particular, staged more protests than any other group following the decline of students protests in the face of state repression.²⁶³

Although the 'church' played a prominent role during the 1970s, college students began to take their place in the late 70s through the 80s. During this time, factory workers as a whole had grown to roughly three million, constituting the largest workforce group in Korea.²⁶⁴ The first to recognize their potential as a tool for social change most clearly, according to Koo (2002) were student activists.²⁶⁵ In the 1980s, thousands of students dropped out of school and worked in factories, motivated by the

²⁵⁹ Koo, H. (2002). 110-111

²⁶⁰ Shin, G., and P. Y. Chang, et al. (2011). 25

²⁶¹ Koo. (2002). 111.

²⁶² Chang, P. Y. (2008). 38

²⁶³ Ibid. (38)

²⁶⁴ Koo. (2002). 113

²⁶⁵ Ibid. (113)

chance to bring labor to the frontlines of the pro-democracy movement.²⁶⁶ Inside the factories, they proselytized the tenets of worker organization and class struggle in making a democratic society.²⁶⁷ Through such activities, industrial labor would eventually be organized to play a major role in the democratic move in the late 1980s.

The 1970s ushered in an era in which various networks of dissidents composed of the groups discussed above, developed and expanded in depth, culminating into a powerful political alliance in opposition to authoritarianism and class-based issues. Towards the end of the decade, Korea's loose alliance of dissident civil society groups would eventually connect to political society, through the joining of the main opposition party—then called the New Democratic Party, under the shared leadership of Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung.²⁶⁸

With the conditions ripe for uprising, the YH factory labor dispute incident of 1979 and subsequent repression (discussed in the previous section), proved to be the spark which set off yet another round of mass protests in favor of political transition. Where civil society in the previous juncture (1956-1961) led to the forced exile of Rhee Syngman, mass protests in 1979 would lead to the assassination of Park by his former ally, Kim Chae Kyu.²⁶⁹ The brief authoritarian breakdown following Park's death however, did not lead to a reduction in protests, but rather intensification thereof. In response, the interim government under Choe Kyu Ha removed certain elements of the Yushin Constitution, released various dissidents from prison or their house arrests (e.g. former President and anti-Yushin activist Yun Po Son), and revoked the emergency

²⁶⁶ Shin, G.-W., P. Y. Chang, et al. (2011) p. 25; Koo, H. (2002), 111; Ogle, G.E. (1990), 108

²⁶⁷ Ogle, G.E. (1990). 108

²⁶⁸ Choi, J.J. (1993). 34

²⁶⁹ Kim, S.H. (2000). 63

decree No. 9 which had criminalized criticism of the Yushin Constitution. This brief period of reform however, changed with the introduction of military hardliners, led by Chun Doo Hwan.²⁷⁰

In response to increased protests throughout the Peninsula with significant levels in Seoul, many of which was led by students and labor groups, martial law was extended to include the whole country. Rather than quelling unrest, this move by the military hardliners ultimately led to the aforementioned Kwangju Uprising, beginning on May, 18th, 1980, a day following the announcement of extended martial law. The Kwangju Uprising was eventually suppressed, along with the vast majority of significant civil society activity between then and 1983. Korea would enter yet another period of iron-fisted rule under another military junta.

5.8: Third Democratic Juncture: 1984-1987

In terms of the scope of this study, this final period prior to the move towards an electoral democracy is particularly important. Prior to 1983, with respect to forced evictions, the state had played the main role in virtually every aspect of the redevelopment process. This changed with the privatization of the process in the midst of mass protests during the Mokdong redevelopment project. Further, with respect to labor suppression, the move towards allowing private security firms and other non-state actors (e.g. *kusadae* or “save the company” militant forces) began in 1987 during the period referred to as the Great Labor Movement (1987-1989). Through severe and unforgiving repression, civil society was effectively suppressed, though not eliminated, between 1980

²⁷⁰ Ibid. (64-65)

and 1983.²⁷¹ Starting in 1984 however, as previously discussed, civil society would emerge yet again following a miscalculated relaxation of civil society controls which proved to backfire against the military regime.²⁷² In particular, Kim (2000) notes that underground networks of pro-democracy students, workers and churches would yet again emerge. Organizations such as the Youth Coalition for Democracy Movement (YCDM), the Korean Council for Labor Welfare (KCLW) and the Catholic Priests' Association for Justice (CPAJ) would not only expand in scope, but additionally lead to the formation of national associations acting as umbrella organization which formed alliances among the various groups. In 1984 for instance, the Council of Movement for People and Democracy (CMPD) was created in 1984 (made up of 'sectoral movement groups'), to be followed by the National Congress for Democracy and Reunification (NCDR) (composed of religious leaders and intellectuals).²⁷³ Both the CMPD and the NCDR would later merge in 1985 to form the People's Movement Coalition for Democracy and Reunification (PMCDR) which was made up of 24 individual groups, consisting of urban labor, intellectuals, writers, journalists, religious activists, and others.²⁷⁴ The period of authoritarian relaxation furthermore paved the way for the strengthening of genuine political opposition, in the form of the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP), led by Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young Sam which would garner 29.25% of the legislative seats in the 1985 National Assembly elections.²⁷⁵

²⁷¹ For instance, the aforementioned involvement of students in labor issues was still occurring. Koo, H.C. (2002) cites Ogle's (1990) estimate of roughly "3,000 or more student-turned-workers" through the mid-1980s, (113-114)

²⁷² Kim, S.H. (2000 a.). 78-79

²⁷³ Ibid. (80-83)

²⁷⁴ Ibid. (83-84, 86). Although the PMCDR would not last long it set the precedence for national-level cooperation between diverse civil society groups.

²⁷⁵ Ibid. (85)

As previously noted, the torture death of SNU student Pak Chong-ch'ol in January of 1987 ignited civil society once again, which ultimately led to the turning of power over to Rho, Tae-woo and further ushering a move towards an electoral democracy. Choi (1993) explains that Rho's June 29th declaration of constitutional reform largely demobilized the urban middle class, which in turn reduced the power of other, more radical populist forces from reaching their goal of 'maximalist reform' of complete democracy and just-redistribution.²⁷⁶ In other words, by providing the middle-class hope for some modicum of democracy in the form of direct presidential elections, allowed the then ruling party, now under Rho, to remain relatively intact and unscathed from the crisis. The socioeconomic conditions of labor however, remained unchanged, which brought them to the forefront of political protest once again, albeit this time, without the support of Korea's middle-income strata.²⁷⁷

The schism between the middle-class and more radical, contentious elements of Korean society is evidenced by protests in the wake of economic decline beginning in 1989. As a result of increasing international competition (partly due to rising wage prices in the domestic market) and productivity drops, Rho's government was hit with, what Oh (1999) terms as a "double-whammy" of both economic and political crises. In 1991, students began to demonstrate yet again after a fellow student had been killed by plain-clothed police officers. Roh responded quickly by sacking his Minister of the Interior who assumed responsibility, but the protests ensued, with estimates of roughly 200,000 students and workers in eighty-seven cities demonstrating. The middle-class however, as

²⁷⁶ Choi, J.J. (1993). 37-38

²⁷⁷ Ibid. (38)

reported in both domestic and international news sources, were conspicuously absent.²⁷⁸ One report by the New York Times noted that “the middle classes appear fed up with unyielding attitudes of students and militant workers.”²⁷⁹ A number of the students, well cognizant of their need to bring in the middle class into their cause, went so far as to douse themselves with paint thinner and immolate themselves in order to shock the middle class into action. The students died, the middle class did not react.²⁸⁰

Prior to 1987, the alliance between the middle class and various sectors of civil society, labor included, had the shared goal of removing authoritarianism as the method of governance. After the political side of the equation had been solved, the middle class de-mobilized—viewing the more radical elements of labor and students as potentially being detrimental to both the state and, importantly, to their status. This schism in turn has proven to be one of the key factors allowing the successive governments, most often though not exclusively through private proxies, the ability to promote economic development and maintain order. In short, as will be shown, the government utilizes proxies so as to avoid the middle-classes’ reemergence and alliance with other less powerful sub-sets of Korean society.

5.9: Conclusion

As will be illustrated in the following two chapters, in the face of increasing social pressures, the state during the mid 1980s leading up to democratization, began to employ different strategies to avoid political backlash while still maintaining order and meeting the demands of Korea’s increasing middle class. One of those strategies was to

²⁷⁸ Oh, J. K. (1999). (113-115)

²⁷⁹ New York Times, and in the Washington Post, 05/12/1991. Cited in Oh (1999). (115)

²⁸⁰ Ibid. (115)

collaborate with non-state specialists in violence—private security firms, which, although often legal in nature, employ criminal violence as part of their normal operations. To be sure, the police, and by extension, the state, never retreated. Instances of the police working hand in hand with private security thugs in forced evictions and strike suppression are still not uncommon as is evidenced in a number of cases. What has changed then? The answer to that is that private security firms have taken *point* in such actions, with the police only intervening when violence escalates to a point where they are forced to mobilize, for fear of losing legitimacy in terms of their ability to maintain order.

That the state has not ‘retreated’ entirely however does not detract from this study’s hypothesis. Why? Although the state has shown a willingness to intervene, and thus risk the political backlash that it has and continues to entail, the state’s involvement has been minimized to a point where state intervention lasts for typically only a few days, which is what society in general has tended to focus on, as is evidenced by the 2009 Yongsan Redevelopment tragedy (to be discussed in detail in the following sections). What is generally not covered however, are at least not to the same extent as when the state is involved, are the months of violent clashes between private thugs and whichever group they are charged with suppressing, removing, or intimidating to compliance.

Chapter 7

The Politics and Processes of Forced Evictions

6.1: Introduction

Over the course of 20 years, from roughly 1960 to 1980, Korea transformed from a largely rural, agrarian society to one that was predominantly urban and educated. Rapid growth of the metropolis's population in turn brought demand for cheap housing and redevelopment. If private security firms (more specifically, those specialized in forced evictions), otherwise termed *yongyŏk-hoesa*, had always taken care of forced evictions, locating the rationale for such state-non-state collaboration in this niche market would be made undeniably more difficult. There is however variance across time and space with respect to this phenomenon, with state forces initially taking point in coercive action in the early 1950s through the 1980s. The point of this discussion is to explain the changed tactics, from state to non-state sourced coercion. The case of forced evictions thus presents us with a situation in which the state is faced with the difficult task of providing public goods in the form of redevelopment, yet challenged by being punished for the means in which those goods are brought about. The move towards the private market for force it will be argued was the state's response to that direct challenge.

6.2: Rural to Urban Migration: the issue of shantytowns

Many poor migrants made their first step into the city by moving into the cheapest illegal housing, finding homes on predominantly government, but occasionally privately owned land, amongst other squatters in the so called *p'anjach'on* which literally means 'plank villages,' named after the materials used in their make-shift homes. Other descriptive names included '*pinal-chip*' (vinyl house), '*tal-tongnae*' (moon village) and '*san-tongnae*' (mountain village)—the latter two names referencing their proximity to hillsides, the first being that vinyl was yet another popular material used for the houses. They were also often located next to riverbeds and other unutilized property.²⁸¹

Shantytowns dotted the metropolis's landscape and more often than not, they were without electricity, running water or mechanisms for removing garbage and human waste. Such conditions in turn exacerbated the spread of infectious disease.²⁸² The fact that the shantytowns were located next to hillsides and riverbeds did not help their situation given that they were subject to mudslides and annual flooding during monsoon season and fires during the dry periods. Regardless of the conditions and varying government opinions however, such settlements provided cheap and relatively convenient housing options to Korea's poor.

Not only were shantytowns prone to various hazards, they were ascetically unpleasing and presented a challenge to the government's drive towards modernization and at the least the perception of a prosperous state. They were furthermore illegal and

²⁸¹ Ha, S. n.-g (1987) 92-94

²⁸² IBID. (92-94)

posed an affront to the government's ability to control social forces. From its inception in 1961, the regime under Park Chung Hee viewed unlicensed housing as a problem for social order and sought to limit if not outrightly eliminating the squatter settlements. While Seoul's City Hall, under the direction of the presidentially appointed mayor took the lead in formulating and implementing housing policies the central government played a heavy handed role, often providing resources to city projects.²⁸³

The standard procedure for clearing shantytowns in the early 1960s was to demolish them and if need be, forcefully remove the residents to locations outside the city. In response evictees would build the same or other forms of substandard housing, or simply return to the city to rebuild. The same removal policies occurred as a result of frequent natural disasters, to which, as mentioned above, such shantytowns were particularly susceptible to. The government then attempted to rectify the problem by providing low income housing, but with over 50,000 illegal shacks throughout the city in 1964, simply demolishing the slums and building new subsidized apartments was viewed as increasingly unrealistic—especially so given that public housing was still too costly for many of the squatter residents. By July of 1969, 407 so called “Citizens’ Apartments” with 16,000 units were completed which had been designated for evictees, more were to be completed throughout the year. Only the most economically successful shack dwellers were able to afford the deposit and rent. The remainder of the units was often occupied by Seoul's urban middle-class who had illegally bought the rights to the apartments. Widespread plans for public housing by the Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG) were

²⁸³ Mobrand, E. (2008). 372

subsequently dropped, instead opting to demolish the slums and deal with the residents in different ways.²⁸⁴

In addition to simply re-building in the same or different locations, residents responded to evictions by protesting City Hall and bribing officials in return for not destroying their homes. In May 1968, 44 city officials and police were fired for taking bribes from over 300 households so that their homes would not be targeted.²⁸⁵ More common was outright physical resistance. Police and district administrators were charged with the work of carrying out the demolitions and forced evictions. Scenes of bulldozers, water cannons and tear gas utilized by police against residents, reminiscent of the civil rights era in the US South, were common. Kim Hyon-ok, the mayor of Seoul between 1966 and 1970 was known as ‘Mayor Bulldozer’. Thugs were intermittently utilized, especially during times in which they had difficulty handling large numbers on their own, but police were unquestionably at the forefront.²⁸⁶

Early in 1972, the SMG announced that it would not destroy any shacks which had been constructed prior to November the previous year. At that time, Seoul had taken aerial footage and distributed the photographs to the various district offices. Some 173,900 shacks had been identified, of which ownership over the property was de-facto legalized. This essentially created two types of shantytown residents—squatter-owners with at least some rights, and squatter tenants without rights.²⁸⁷ Following this development, in 1973, the SMG adopted the Housing Redevelopment Act. Under this policy the city planned to demolish all illegal shacks, and force the legally recognized

²⁸⁴ Moberand, E.(2006). 103

²⁸⁵ Moberand, E. (2008). 376

²⁸⁶ Davis, L.K. (2011). 592; Moberand, E. (2008). 375, 380

²⁸⁷ Moberand, E. 2008. 379

squatter-owners to renovate by 1982 or face eviction. 196 areas had been designated as redevelopment areas.²⁸⁸ While district policies varied, squatter-owners were offered a mix of cash and/or housing loans in exchange for licensing conditional on improvements, or for vacating, while squatter tenants were not provided any compensation. Thus, redevelopment policies affected the two groups in different ways. Not only did the owners stand to gain compensation for simply vacating, they actually stood to gain significant profit given that redevelopment and upgrading of the area was highly correlated with increasing land prices. Squatter-tenants however, were left with the choice to either self-vacate, or be forcibly removed. The policy effectively aligned the squatter-owners on the side of government, pitting the tenants against state forces, land speculators, construction companies, businesses which called for more commercial space, and Seoul's increasingly expanding middle class who themselves were faced with rising prices due to the acute housing shortages.²⁸⁹

6.3: Role of Civil Society

Although forced evictions as part of redevelopment and beautification projects had been occurring since the 1960s, it had not attracted as much of the attention of civil society as did labor issues. Still, labor issues were intrinsically linked to the issues of housing. Korea's rapid push towards development for example, relied upon, at least in the early phases, a huge supply of cheap, unskilled labor to produce the goods necessary for Park's export-oriented industrialization. This in turn spurred massive urbanization, of which a large number of migrants settled in the shantytowns described above. Thus,

²⁸⁸ Ibid, (380)

²⁸⁹ Ibid, (381)

many of those who slaved under the horrible working conditions (an issue of which the overwhelming majority of civil society was focused upon), were additionally residents of the slums subject to redevelopment.

While the role of civil society groups in housing issues would increase rapidly in the 1980s, various student and religious organizations to be sure were involved in the early stages of redevelopment. As part of various student-led social justice movements for instance, housing issues fell under what is referred to generally as '*pinwal*' ("urban poor activities).” Under such programs students played an important role in helping those poor families who lived in slums, were homeless, unemployed or otherwise victims of the state’s myopic push towards development, organize against such government policies during this period.²⁹⁰ Religious groups such as the Seoul Metropolitan Community Mission (SMCM) and the Urban Industrial Mission as well assisted with advocating for the victims of forced evictions. They additionally were involved in building hospitals and health clinics, schools and churches, and assisting with procuring tax-breaks for small businesses.²⁹¹

6.4: Mok-dong Redevelopment Project: Protest and a changing of Government

Tactics

In 1981, having won the bids to host the 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Olympics, the Korean government was further given incentive to modernize its infrastructure and housing situation, and did so on an unprecedented pace. As noted by Davis (2007), much

²⁹⁰ Park, Mi. (2005). 278

²⁹¹ Katsiaficas, G.N. (2012). 145

of the redevelopment was carried out under the category of “city beautification,” a phrase which came to be understood widely as the removal of slums.²⁹²

While numerous redevelopment projects were carried out in the years leading up to both international sporting events, the most significant project in terms of the scope of this study (as it marked a shift towards privatization of the process) took place in *Mok-dong* in 1983. Prior delving into this case, a brief note on the timing and political environment in which this project took place is warranted. To remind ourselves, the start of this project began only 3 years following the *Kwangju* Uprising. Subsequent to massive suppression of the uprising, civil society had largely gone underground. The Chun regime furthermore, through a gross miscalculation of the status quo, began to liberalize some of the draconian controls they had utilized in order to instill order. With the mega sporting events rapidly approaching, increased international scrutiny was an additional issue that Chun’s regime had to consider. Thus, Chun’s administration faced the challenge to prepare for the Olympics, maintain economic development, increase the housing stock for Seoul’s growing middle-income strata, increase the popularity of his party, and do so all the while being cognizant of presenting a favorable international reputation.

Under a newly designed redevelopment scheme referred to as the Public Management Redevelopment Model (PMR), designed specifically to speed the process of development for the mass sporting games, the city assembled the land tracks, and then contracted with private construction firms. The SMG would then sell the redeveloped properties in order to generate revenue for the Olympics. The SMG initially utilized this

²⁹² Davis, L.K. (2007). 19. See also, Davis, L.K. (2011). 582-599

scheme in Mok-dong, a highly visible and underutilized district located in southwestern Seoul on the side of an arterial road leading to and from the Kimpo International Airport.²⁹³

In 1963, Mok-dong was predominately farm land with 82% being devoted to the agriculture sector, with a small population consisting of 451 households and 2,611 people. By 1984 however (when Mok-dong was arranged into 3 sub-sections), households had increased to 19,405 with a population of 82,610.²⁹⁴ Many of the residents of Mok-dong themselves had been resettled there by the SMG following squatter clearance programs carried out in the mid 1960s. The residents were furthermore initially allotted small plots of land upon which they built their makeshift houses on.²⁹⁵ Lee (1990) argues that although the majority of residents were residing in the area technically illegally, and without property rights, because many had been resettled there by the SMG they had a sense of de-facto legitimacy and a right to be there.²⁹⁶ According to one survey, only 38% percent of the residents were squatter-owners.²⁹⁷

Redevelopment was initially announced by the SMG in April of 1983, plans of which the Mok-dong squatter-tenants would protest over the course of 2 years. According to Lee (1990) protests ensued in four distinct phases. Phase one entailed 5 months of going through official channels, either by directly petitioning the district, or through intermediaries working in their behalf such as the Catholic Church and other religious organizations. Having failed to obtain concessions, the residents switched to the second

²⁹³ Kim, H.H. (1998). 206

²⁹⁴ Mok-dong was sectioned off into three separate districts, Mok 1 Dong, Mok 2 Dong and Mok 3 Dong.

²⁹⁵ Lee, Y.L. (1990). 126

²⁹⁶ IBID. (126)

²⁹⁷ IBID. (128)

phase of their protests, which included radicalized “mobilization for direct, non-institutional action” for a period of 3 months. As part of phase, on August 11th over 1,000 citizens joined an on-going rally and surged toward the Mok-dong development office in order to protest the development project. Subsequently, they attempted to go to City Hall in central Seoul, but were met with riot police which attempted to block their paths. In the process of battling with the police, some protesters employed the use of firebombs and rocks. In sub-doing the protest, police ended up arresting 500 participants.²⁹⁸

Although the March 11th protest was subdued, it did attract the attention of the Korean Church Social Ministry (KCSM), an influential ‘social action’ organization founded by prominent Catholics and Protestants which attempted to negotiate with the government on behalf of both squatter-owners and squatter-tenants.²⁹⁹ Such negotiations and protests continued through January of 1984 and proved largely ineffective, and although there instances of protests moving beyond Mok-dong, during phase-two they were predominately stayed within the confines of the redevelopment area.

Phase three specifically focused on protesting beyond the boundaries of Mok-dong in order to generate increased public visibility, support and solidarity with other anti-government actors and causes. Accordingly, over the course of 15 months, protests, often violent protests were held frequently at City Hall, the Myongdong Catholic Cathedral in downtown Seoul, and on the campuses of top universities such as Ehwa,

²⁹⁸ Ibid. (143)

²⁹⁹ Ibid. (143)

Yonsei and Seoul National University. The final phase included five weeks of further, but intensified protests.³⁰⁰

With the fast approaching 1986 Asian Games, a growing size of both general anti-eviction and anti-regime protests, in conjunction with increased international attention and media coverage, in March 1986, the government finally capitulated and awarded both the squatter-owner and squatter-tenants concessions and compensation.³⁰¹ The major affect of the Mok-dong project however went beyond squatter concessions in that it represented the last major project in which the government took the lead.

In the place of the Public Management Redevelopment Model, which had been implemented in Mok-dong, the Joint Redevelopment Project (JRP) system was developed. Under this scheme the redevelopment process was for all intents and purpose privatized. The plan went as followings: a redevelopment co-operative, a group consisting of at least two-thirds of pro-redevelopment owners, was organized. The construction company was then selected by the co-operative. The construction company was then tasked with providing compensation to the homeowners, either through some form of monetary payment, buying or leasing rights to the new homes, or some combination thereof, as well as ensuring the vacating of the land (the last of which was in reality the duty of the home owners). Whatever profits were leftover after redevelopment was left to the companies. Non-owner tenants were not guaranteed compensation under the scheme.³⁰²

The system proved effective. A fact finding report carried out by the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights (ACHR) notes that between 1983 and the time of the

³⁰⁰ Ibid: (125-125). See also Davis (2007). 24-25; Kim, J. (2010). 82-85

³⁰¹ Davis, L.K. (2007). 24

³⁰² For an extensive overview of Korea's housing laws, see Kim, J.H. (2010)

Olympics, an estimated 48,000 buildings which had housed 720,000 people had been destroyed.³⁰³ The same study cites that between 1982 and 1988, 250 sites had been designated as “redevelopment areas,” and by 1989 at the time of the study, 100 had been carried out. While different studies cite slightly varying statistics, the fact that Seoul underwent a massive and violent transition during the period leading up to the Olympics is clear.

The JRP did a number of important things. First, it expanded the amount of recognized squatter-owners, which had previously been restricted which further led to breaks in solidarity between existing squatter-owners and tenants—this in turn effectively reduced in part the level of potential resistance. Second, and importantly, it removed the financial burden which had previously been placed squarely on the government. Not only was the government removed from the financial burden, they additionally stood to gain from the increased property taxes, while at the same time expanding the market for the domestic business sector which at that time had been hit hard due to reduced overseas construction in the wake of the 1970s oil crisis.³⁰⁴ Third, it reduced the role of the government to one which was responsible for merely indirectly managing the process and selling parts of unutilized government properties—effectively removing city officials from directly carrying out unpopular actions such as forced removals.³⁰⁵ On this last point, Kim (1998) notes that “The government could also [in addition to providing the least amount of financial support] minimize the political costs of discordance with the residents, because, with the new plan, the conflict was between the cooperative and the

³⁰³ ACHR and the Third World Network (1989). 23, also cited in Davis, L.K. (2007). 21

³⁰⁴ Kim, H.H. (1998). 207

³⁰⁵ IBID. 206-207

residents.”³⁰⁶ This point was further emphasized by Davis (2007) who commented that privatization of the process “paved the way for increased extralegal hiring of private eviction companies who employed thugs and criminal elements to assist with getting rid of existing residents.”³⁰⁷

That the hired thugs, replacing the police, became the unofficial strong arm in the government’s push towards redevelopment is virtually undeniable. Where there are accounts of hundreds of tenant activists who have been detained, arrested, or otherwise harassed by government authorities, the same is not true for the construction companies or their hired specialists in violence. This fact was not lost on same ACHR report cited above which noted that because the main actors are the private home owners and construction companies, both local and central governments are afforded the ability to deny responsibility and thus, culpability. The violence surrounding Korea’s redevelopment projects was furthermore noted and condemned by the UN sponsored Habitat International Coalition (HIC) which in 1991 listed Korea’s housing policies second only to South Africa’s township system in its physical violence and brutality.³⁰⁸

While various laws, revisions and other measures having to do with compensation levels and protections for home-owners and tenants alike have been instituted both prior to and following the move towards democratic, direct presidential elections in 1987, the methods of redevelopment under the JRP, including the use of *yongyök-hoesa* (construction thugs) for forced evictions, have remained virtually the same since it was initially designed in 1983. Then, as it is now as of 2013, the methods utilized in forced

³⁰⁶ Ibid. 208

³⁰⁷ Davis, L.K. (2007). 14

³⁰⁸ ACHR. (7)

evictions are illegal, yet the practice continues in the face of democratic consolidation.³⁰⁹ In order to highlight this, I focus on two recent projects, the 2009 Yongsan redevelopment project and the 2011 campaign to evict illegal street vendors operating in Insadong.

6.5: Yongsan Redevelopment Project

As part of a campaign referred to as the “New Town Project,” an on-going government driven program of city beautification and modernization, Seoul’s Yongsan 4 district was scheduled for urban redevelopment in order to transform it into an international sub-center of the city, the Yongsan International Business District (hereafter YIBD).³¹⁰ Located north of the Han River and adjacent to the US Army Garrison Yongsan, this location is known for its red light districts, brothels and bars, illegal street vendors, and small stores which stock both low and high quality counterfeit goods, all which cater to the large presence of US military personnel, other foreigners, and Korean alike.

In 2007, after forming the Joint Redevelopment Association, consisting of 300 owners of real estate in the area, the Samsung Construction and Trading Corporation and POSCO E&C were chosen as the managing underwriters of the project. The project is to include the building of a landmark 100-story tower along with six forty-story

³⁰⁹ Such violence, while illegal as stipulated by Korea’s general criminal code, is further criminalized by the Security Service Industry Act by which private security companies are guided by. According Article 2.1 of the act for instance, security providers are limited to preventing dangerous situations from occurring. They are furthermore prohibited from exercising excessive force under Article 15.2. Despite such laws however enforcement is weak at best, and even in the case of a company being sanctioned and having their license revoked, simply paying a fine and registering under a different company name is common place. The Security Service Industry Act in its entirety was accessed through the following website:

<http://www.law.go.kr> (경비업법). See also: Button, M., Park, H., & Lee, J. (2006), p. 1-13

³¹⁰ Shin, K.H (2011). 12

multipurpose buildings, as well as other retail shopping centers, residential offices, and urban parks which are scheduled to be completed by 2017. Demolition of the existing outdated and dilapidated buildings and construction was to begin in February 2009 which was, like similar redevelopment projects in the past, delayed by tenant protests.³¹¹

What has come to be referred to widely as the ‘Yongsan Tragedy’ (Yongsan *Chamsa*) in which five protestors and one police officer died, along with 23 others injured, occurred on January 20th 2009.³¹² The events on January 20th however followed months of harassment and violent tactics by hired thugs against the recalcitrant merchant-tenants who refused to vacate due to protests over low levels of compensation and vaguely defined rights. Some of these tactics and issues were explained to me by a former tenant involved with the Yongsan development project. This tenant had operated a small bar in one of the buildings which was scheduled for demolition. After refusing what she believed to be an unfair level of compensation, she stated that the thugs started showing up in her bar. They (usually about 4 of them) would arrive as soon as they opened, order one bottle of beer or soju in between them (so as not to avoid “breaking the law”) and intimidate customers to the point where they would either not enter, or if they already had, promptly leave. Other tactics such as starting fires, breaking windows, blocking pathways to the business, throwing dead cats other animal carcasses in the vents (in order to create strong odors) and, sexual harassment were common place. When she went to the district office and police she was informed she needed proof, of which she then provided them with her CCTV coverage. Nothing on the matter was done. She further stated that “there’s no difference between the police and thugs—they work for the same people”

³¹¹ IBID: (12-14)

³¹² IBID: (18)

(VC1, VC2). Other victims in both the same Yongsan case as well those involved in different redevelopment projects noted similar experiences. One journalist who works for a prominent media group with close ties to the then current ruling party under Lee Myung Bak, noted that such occurrences are so common place that only in extreme cases will the top news services cover such events. In her words “people don’t want to hear about it.” She further explained that the majority of Seoul citizens stand to gain from city-wide redevelopment projects and that most people view the protestors as overly militant and greedy (R1). When I asked my police contacts about this case, they informed me that even if they had wanted to do something about it, they would not have had the support of their superiors or the prosecutor’s office. They explained that the reason why the Yongsan case was so highly covered was that violence between the protestor-merchants and those charged with evicting them was so great that there had to be police intervention (P1, P3, P8). Similar to other cases, the protestors rather than those involved in the forced evictions bore the force of the legal system. On June 1st, 2010 the Seoul High Court sentenced 9 of the protestors involved to 4 to 5 years in prison on the charges of killing one police officer and injuring citizens who had been nearby. 15 Police officers however, accused of excessive force were acquitted.³¹³

The case of the *Yongsan chamsa* however is decidedly different than the vast majority of instances of redevelopment projects for one particular reason. The protestors were effectively able to endure the onslaught of private violence, to the point where the police were forced to intervene. That the state ultimately utilized public sources to quell the protests however does not detract from this dissertation’s principle hypothesis. Indeed, the state has not fully decentralized violence, nor should we expect them to. To reiterate,

³¹³ Cho, I.W. (2010-09-27):

the dependent variable this study is seeking to explain is state-non-state collaboration in the market for force. Just because the state, through the police, intervened on January 20th, 2009, does not mean that collaboration did not occur. Rather, private thugs had for *months* been engaging in extra legal violence against the residents within the *Yongsan* district. The residents however were able to endure such measures, and escalate the conflict to the point where had the state *not* intervened; they would have run the risk of losing legitimacy in terms of the citizenry's perception of their ability to instill order. Even though the police and government have largely come under fire and increased scrutiny as a result of their heavy-handed crackdown, the focus remains on the *single* day in which the police intervened. That the state has faced such a tremendous amount of political backlash for the intervention, and in turn has been forced to make concessions to the residents and victims of the *Yongsan* tragedy, actually strengthens the argument. That the same type of concessions and political backlash largely do not occur in situations where the state does not intervene, leads credence to the argument that it truly does matter which groups are doing the repressing. Furthermore, where the case of *Yongsan* has received a tremendous amount of journalistic coverage and civil society focus (protests, vigils and even two popular documentaries on the subject), the same is not so for the victims of the overwhelming majority of cases in which the police have not had to intervene.

6.6: Insadong Street Vendor Removal

As private security groups are utilized for redevelopment projects outlined above, so too are they often utilized for removal of street vendors and other similar type actions, with a common set of rationales affecting the state decision to outsource. The only difference I could find however between the use of such groups for redevelopment

projects, and that of street vendor evictions is that contracts in the later are directly between the district offices and the ‘demolition’ companies themselves.

Making up one of the largest portions of Korea’s informal economy, street vendors in Korea exist in virtually every district to one extent or another throughout the country. Owing to the fact that the vast majority of street vendors are not recognized due to their informal status, obtaining exact accounts of their numbers is impossible. However, one 2005 study estimated that in Seoul alone there were roughly 800,000 such street vendors.³¹⁴

The relation between the state and street vendors has historically been one of toleration, despite their informal status. The first crackdowns against such actors occurred as late as 1986, along with Seoul’s other citywide ‘beautification’ and development programs instituted in preparation for the Asian Games and Summer Olympics. Similar crackdowns occurred during the run up to Seoul’s co-hosting of the 2002 FIFA World Cup.³¹⁵

As part of the President Lee Myung Bak’s aforementioned ‘new town project,’ sites throughout Seoul were designated for such ‘beautification’ programs. One of the sites was located in Insadong, a famous historic district and tourist haven located in Jongno District, central Seoul. The street vendors are, in the words of both police and business owners in the districts they occupy, a nuisance. Business owners specifically complained that they were paying high rents and taxes, while the street vendors were there illegally, not paying rent, nor taxes. Furthermore, they were often selling the same

³¹⁴ Bhowmik, S. (2005). (2262)

³¹⁵ IBID: (2262)

or similar goods for lower prices. Police in turn argued that they often crowd the streets and sidewalks, making for an unsafe environment (P1, P4).

Of the street vendors I was able to interview, the main argument was that vendors in this district was a long established institution in of itself—street vendors they argue, have been there since the nascent days of this district, with such stalls often passing from family member to family member. For most of the street vendors, the operation of these small businesses represents the only source of income. While they freely admit that what they are doing is illegal, they argue that it is the only way in which they can survive. And, while the district office offered to move them to designated locations, they explained that those locations were away from tourists and that those who had already moved in the previous year from different locations throughout the same district had suffered substantial financial losses. They further complained that while the Jongno-gu District office had promised to provide them with financial aid, the aid had not materialized. Because of these conditions, in one respondent’s words “they were ready to fight until they received better conditions.” They further explained, and this was confirmed by district sources, that they were fully prepared to start paying taxes if they were allowed to remain in the location (SV1, SV2, and SV3). The district office however remained recalcitrant.

Protests by the street vendors have been occurring frequently since the Jongno-gu district office announced their intent to remove them in 2009. Between then and May of 2011, there had been over 30 minor and major altercations, many of which involved physical violence.³¹⁶ On May 24th and the 25th of the same year I was able to witness two

³¹⁶ Kim, T.-j. (2011-05-29). Conflict Deepens in Insadong. The Korea Times.

such protest and subsequent street vendor “sweeps.”³¹⁷ Prior to the protest I was given a call by a member of Jongno-gu’s Street Vendor Association who informed me that the district office was going to take action on that day. After hearing this, I promptly arrived to find police in riot gear, on each side of the street, and a street full of locals and tourists. Two ambulances were on standby as well, situated at the opposing entrances to the roughly 700 meter long street. The street vendors themselves, identifiable by red headbands were prepared and well organized, having locked their carts with chains so as to prevent removal. Then came the thugs, 150 of them as I was later informed, both young men and women clad in yellow vests so as to identify them. The “street sweepers” as one business owner referred to them as, started going from one street vendor stall to the next, destroying carts, taking the goods, and beating the street vendors, regardless of their age or gender, if they confronted them, which they did. The police simply looked on, with seemingly little interest. One elderly street vendor approached what appeared to be a ranking police officer, with blood streaming down her face asking him why they were not protecting them—stating that “they were citizens as well.” She was ignored. On that day, two street vendors were taken to the hospital for serious injuries. The violence I directly witnessed that day and others, while tame compared to what they and others go through when myself or the public isn’t watching, was disturbing. Similar actions in Insadong continued to occur on and off for months, and as of August of 2011, only 16 out of the original 76 stall operating have agreed to move to designated spots. The remaining street vendors continue to be harassed. Importantly, although the clashes between the street vendors and the police have been widely covered by the media, the street vendors have

³¹⁷ Insadong consists of one main street, roughly 700 meters long, with small art stores, souvenir shops and restaurants along each side, in addition to small alley ways with similar type establishments.

overwhelmingly been portrayed as overly militant. Furthermore, on the first day, the 24th, the riot police, as noted, had a very visible presence. The media however, did not cover this day. The following day however, a number of national news services were ready with their cameras. The events of the day were aired during the national prime time news. The difference between the 24th and 25th however, was that on the 25th, the uniformed police were conspicuously absent.³¹⁸

Although I was unable to interview officials from the Jongno-gu District Office, the rationale for the use of private security as opposed to the police was explained to me over the course of a number of interviews with both current and retired police officials. The police, it was explained to me, were there to ensure that violence did not get out of hand, did not spill over into the shops or affect those beyond the street vendors. Although the street vendors were in fact breaking the law, the logistics of obtaining arrest warrants or handing out citations was not only overwhelming, but counter-productive in that they had in the past failed to work. The use of *Yongyök-hoesa* was in fact, more efficient and socially acceptable (P1, P4). A different officer at the same meeting explained that in the past, the police were the “kkanp’ae,” (thugs) and as such their threats were much more credible then, but since democratization the same methods once utilized during the authoritarian period were no longer available to them. Seoul citizens wanted the same things now as they did in the past (development and progress), but didn’t understand or accept the methods necessary to bring them about. The use of private companies allowed them to get the job done without having to deal with accusations of police brutality (P1).

³¹⁸ SBS covered the removal of street vendors on May 25th, 2011. I show up at the tail end of the coverage: http://news.sbs.co.kr/section_news/news_read.jsp?news_id=N1000919622

6.7: Conclusion

Based on the historical analysis with respect to forced evictions, both in redevelopment and city clean up projects, we can see a clear demarcation between the early 1960s and 1984. Park clearly preferred the use of public sources of coercion. The same preference was shown by Chun, until the switch towards the market in 1984. What was Chun's rationale for doing so? Obviously Chun needed to maintain economic development—this legitimizing factor is not unique to Korean politicians—authoritarian or otherwise. One argument may be that the market simply provided a more efficient method of redevelopment, not to mention reducing the economic burden on the state. This makes sense. The state was in fact forced to induce massive redevelopment and increase the housing stock, both in preparation for the then upcoming international sporting events as well as providing for Seoul's booming, and increasingly middle-class populace. That argument alone, while still holding explanatory power, is not sufficient. We have to remind ourselves that not only was the construction, planning and financing of such projects privatized, but so too was the coercive aspect of it. By privatizing forced evictions, the state effectively made it so that the conflict was between the redevelopers, the tenant-owners, and those being forcefully removed (through sheer intimidation and/or violence).

The question still remains as to why society would not punish the state for 'allowing' such violent practices to occur? Although redevelopment is carried out by private firms, the state is still charged with enforcing the very laws against violence that itself promulgated. In the case of forced evictions, although the direct, formal contracts between redevelopment firms and private security groups leave the government out of it,

thus providing the government a level of plausible ‘deniability’, the argument that the government ‘doesn’t know’ fails to hold water when we bring in the case of forced evictions of street vendors. The contracts in those cases are formally between the district offices (i.e. the ‘state’) and the thugs which make up the eviction crews. This fact is well known, yet civil society, and importantly, the middle-class, still remains, for the most part, ambivalent. The short answer as to why is that history matters. The direct involvement by the police conjures up images of the old Korea. In other words, the relative level of interest in any one event is a function of its level of politicization. The direct involvement of the police in turn, acts a politicizing multiplier—as evidenced by the variance in level of society’s response in the Yongsan and Insadong cases. The following section will cover the case of labor repression, thus adding more supporting empirical evidence to the argument.

Chapter 7

The Politics and Processes of Labor Suppression

7.1: Introduction

In general the issue the labor has long attracted the attention of social scientists from a variety of backgrounds, disciplines and approaches. The case of labor issues in Korea is no exception, and especially so regarding scholarship focused on explaining Korea's rapid economic 'miracle.' When Park assumed power following the 1961 coup d'état, as already explained throughout the preceding chapters, he did so under the pledge to instill economic growth and order. Moving away from the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) approach which had been adopted, much to the detriment of the economy by the Rhee regime, Park first focused on the development and promotion of labor-intensive export oriented industrialization (EOI) (1961-1972).³¹⁹ This move towards EOI was rewarded with remarkable growth until the end of the decade when the GNP began to decline, coupled with rising inflation and wages among other worrisome economic conditions. In conjunction with an economy in decline (and thus Park's legitimacy), politically, Park's regime was increasingly being challenged by opposition

³¹⁹ Haggard, S., & Moon, C.-i. (1993). 54

seeking to capitalize on the weak economic performance.³²⁰ Park was able to solve both the economic and political challenges through the implementation of the Yushin constitution and the ‘big push’ towards the heavy and chemical industries (1973-1979).³²¹ In the process of creating ‘Korea Inc.,’ a handful of Korea’s conglomerate firms (*chaebols*) dominated the economy, with the top 50 accounting for 43% of GDP in 1978 (thus giving them greater bargaining power vis-à-vis the state).³²² The price of labor as well began to increase yet again which further threatened to limit the international competitiveness of Korean firms. Thus, between 1981 and 1985, the Chun regime focused on the restructuring of the economy and instituting stabilization measures.³²³

Why does the above discussion matter for this section? It matters because the largely successful policies mentioned have been determined by not only a strong government-business relationship, but additionally by the tight control of labor.³²⁴ Although there is debate on how effective the state was at engineering and/or maintaining certain factors which led to growth related to labor (e.g. controlling the price of labor), there is no doubt that they tried their utmost.

This chapter traces the ways in which the Korean state, beginning in 1961 has attempted to address the challenges of collective action and protest by labor. As will be shown, from the beginning of industrialization in the early 1960s through the mid 1980s, suppression of labor was the business of the state. In 1987 however, in the midst of the democratization movement and what has become to be referred to as the Great Labor Uprising (1987-1989), strike suppression, often times violent suppression, was largely

³²⁰ Ibid. (73)

³²¹ Woo, M. (1991)

³²² Haggard, S., & Moon, C.-i. (1993). 80

³²³ Ibid. (82)

³²⁴ Ibid. (54)

privatized and remains as such throughout the contemporary period. Though again, as with forced evictions, the state has not completely retreated. However, it has drastically minimized its direct role in managing labor disputes. The purpose of this discussion then, is to explain why, in the case of labor disputes and strike suppression, the state yet again turned towards the private market for force.

7.2: Control of Labor

During the 1960s, 70s and 80s, labor, as a collective, was to be sure, weak vis-à-vis the ‘state.’ The state utilized and or supported a number of public and private methods in which to insure the control of workers and prevent ‘upstart’ collective action, including the legal system, management, monopoly control over all legal unions, the police, the KCIA, and finally, beginning in the 1980s, thugs which were either ‘company men’ (e.g. *kusadae* “save the company” squads) or privately sourced ‘service companies (*yong-yeok hwaesa*).³²⁵

As highlighted in chapter two, the justice system, from the courts to the rank-in-file police during and up until the reform periods beginning in the late 1980s and early 90s was one in which neutrality from political power was virtually non-existent. Indeed, the state controlled nearly every aspect of the origin and survival such actors and it is thus not surprising that they were the go-to tool for enforcing the state’s interests.

Beginning in 1963, workers were in fact allowed to unionize—though they would have to apply for official permission at the Office of Labor Affairs. Only upon approval however were they allowed to begin negotiations with the company. Although collective

³²⁵ Ogle, G.E. (1990). 47-64

bargaining was permitted, if there was a break-down in negotiations, the union was required to enter into a ‘cooling’ off period in which mediation was intervention by the Labor Committees was available. If negotiations following the cooling off period were still not successful, the union might be given ‘permission’ to strike. More likely than not however the government would intercede, declare an endangerment to national security and institute a settlement.³²⁶

In 1971 Park instituted the Yushin Constitution and with it, created the Special Law in Labor and Foreign Invested Firms which made it illegal for the overwhelming majority of union activity to occur.³²⁷ Furthermore, in 1973 through emergency decree, Park made all work stoppages illegal.³²⁸ Such was the legal situation until 1981, when Chun Doo-hwan, while lifting the Emergency decrees, created laws which further made unionization difficult—laws such as requiring at least 30 workers or 20 percent of the work force agreeing in order to being even allowed to apply for recognition. Additionally, the Chun regime made it illegal for any outside, third party to interfere in negotiations—thus, collective bargaining was restricted to the local union and the firm.³²⁹ Furthermore, legally, only one union per firm was allowed.³³⁰

Setting aside the legal system, members of management were the ones on the front lines of controlling labor. Managers oversaw the day-to-day actions, gathered information on suspect employees and had the ability to lay-off or outright fire individuals, ‘educate’ them or otherwise persuade those under them. Management in turn worked closely with the unions, which were furthermore utilized for controlling workers.

³²⁶ Ibid. (54)

³²⁷ Ibid. (54)

³²⁸ Cumings, B. (1997) 358; Ogle, G.E. (54)

³²⁹ Ibid. (54-55)

³³⁰ Koo, H. (1993). 135

Because there was only one union per firm allowed, companies often surreptitiously had a union formed by hand-picked representatives. If other workers sought to organize their own union, they would often be denied because one already existed.³³¹

Rightist labor organizations were yet another tool to control the emergence and activities of Leftist organizations. Having its origins in the period following the end of colonialism, backed by the USMGIK, Rightists created the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) in 1946. Koo (1993) notes, that the FKTU's main objective was not just the promotion of workers' rights but also to crack down any leftist union formation and activities. Ogle (1990) further explains that the KCIA kept the FKTU 'under its wing'—having the ability to even appoint its leadership. Through the FKTU then, the KCIA was able to control other nation-wide industry-specific unions which further enjoyed hierarchical control of local unions within individual firms.³³² The KCIA would often take point in carrying out investigations, intimidation and torture.³³³

In addition to the layers of control above, the police played a direct role in the control of labor. In every precinct located in an industrial area for instance, was an office in charge of labor issues. Management again would report suspect workers or unauthorized union activities to the police, who would then, under the auspices of either the KCIA or the prosecutor's office, investigate. If work stoppages or strikes did occur, up until the late 1980s they were the main suppressors. Among the police was a special riot squad made up of martial arts specialists called the *paekkol-tan* ('white skeleton squad'),

³³¹ Ogle, G.E. (1990). 59

³³² Ibid. (77-78)

³³³ Ibid. (60)

referred to as such for their dark padded clothing (without name tags) and white helmets.³³⁴

Finally, groups of anti-union ‘company men’ referred to as *kusadae* (‘save-the-company squads’) came to the scene in response to massive strikes in the late 1980s. Although there are accounts of firms hiring trained specialists or even thugs for the outright purpose of suppressing labor, most came from within the company. Still, the majority of men in Korean society have had to undergo at least a modicum of military training due to conscription requirements.³³⁵ The first accounts of organized *kusadae* came from the *Hyundai* conglomerate. Chung Ju Yong, the founder of Hyundai, in the midst of mass labor unrest in 1987, reportedly called upon his employees who had served in the ROK Marine Corps, declaring union riots to be a part of a communist plot and appealing for the Marines to once more “come to the defense of the motherland by defeating the labor union at Hyundai.”³³⁶

Yongyök-hoesa (as well as other private security firms) additionally have their start in the same tumultuous period which gave *kusadae* their start.³³⁷ Although there are a few accounts of private security involvement prior 1987, between 1984 and their move towards labor suppression, they were primarily involved in forced evictions as discussed in the previous section.³³⁸

³³⁴ Ibid (60). In the preceding discussion of forced evictions, the police informant who commented that during the 1980s, the police “were the gangsters,” was in fact a member of this notoriously brutal squad. He went onto become a high-ranking member of the national violent and organized crime division.

³³⁵ Ibid. (62)

³³⁶ Ibid. (120)

³³⁷ Ibid. (61-62)

³³⁸ Ogle, G.E. (1990) notes a few accounts of ‘hoodlums’ being involved in labor issues during the 1970s. Of course, as already discussed, militant Rightists thugs were widely utilized between 1945 and throughout the Rhee period. Although it would be convenient if there were zero accounts of private coercion between 1961 and the late 1980s in terms of this dissertation’s argument, the system was not rationalized until 1984 (with respect to forced evictions) and 1987 (with respect to labor suppression).

7.3: Role of Civil Society

Koo (1993) notes that, although accounts of unionized workers during the 1960s was not much lower than in the 1970s (11.2 percent in 1965 versus 12.4% in 1970), towards the end of the 1960s a number of factors including but not limited to a shifting economy, massive layoffs, and poor, intolerable work conditions led to a spike in spontaneous, unorganized protests.³³⁹ However, as explained by Koo (2000), “the labor movement at that time (1960s and early 1970s) basically focused on economic and welfare issues and did not challenge the political legitimacy of the Park regime.”³⁴⁰ One widely covered and written about dramatic act by an individual however, would bring the issue of human rights and the plight of labor to the forefront of civil society’s consciousness.³⁴¹

In protest of such intolerable conditions and a recalcitrant government force suppressing calls for labor reform, in November of 1970, Chun Tae Il, a young worker in a garment factory immolated himself during a demonstration. While on fire he held onto a booklet describing the Labor Standard Laws, screaming “Let us rest on Sunday!” “Abide by the Labor Standard Laws!” “We are not machines!”³⁴² Chun Tae Il would die of his burns, but in doing so his act of defiance would prove to be the force that ‘awakened’ intellectuals, students and church leaders to begin organizing within the ranks of South Korea’s growing labor force.³⁴³

³³⁹ Koo, H. (1993). 138-139

³⁴⁰ Kim, S.H. (2000). 55

³⁴¹ Ibid. (139); Kim S.H. (2000). 55

³⁴² Ibid. (139)

³⁴³ Ibid. (139)

As already discussed, Christian organizations began to be actively involved in the labor movement during the 1970s and helped to organized workers' night schools; facilitate discussions and other class-conscious creating/galvanizing activities. Students as well began their involvement in labor issues during the 1970s.³⁴⁴ The institution of the *Yushin* Constitution as well galvanized civil society in general and enmeshed and brought the issues of labor, Christian organizations, intellectuals and students alike into a larger group of anti-regime activists.

Following the assassination of Park Chung Hee in 1979, labor activism skyrocketed—new unions were organized, deepened and carried out more labor disputes during the first five months of 1980 than had occurred over the course of the entire *Yushin* period (with 900 disputes).³⁴⁵ The following year, labor dispute incidents declined to 186 and then to only 88 in 1982.³⁴⁶ In the midst of labor crackdowns, the Kwangju Massacre was carried out, in addition to the implementation of the infamous re-education camps and other social 'purges.'

Chun Doo Hwan's relaxation of the various political controls yet again led to a resurgence in unions and labor disputes. In 1984 the Economic Planning Board (EPB) recorded 113 disputes, in 1985 there were 265, and in 1986, 276.³⁴⁷ Following the June 29th declaration of the state's move towards democratic elections there was a massive increase in unions—with the creation of 1048 more unions than the previous year. Furthermore, in July and August, there were 3,337 recorded labor strikes which ushered

³⁴⁴ Koo (2002). 112-114

³⁴⁵ Kim, S.H. (66-68)

³⁴⁶ Woo, M. (1991). 181

³⁴⁷ Kim, S.H. (2000). 93

in the Great Labor Struggle, and in turn, the state's move towards the private market for force.³⁴⁸

Although the middle class had been supportive of the early labor movement during the authoritarian period, its growing militancy and on-going labor disputes created a schism between the two. While the move towards democratic elections largely placated the middle class—the regime's declaration had not addressed the socioeconomic concerns of labor. On-going, often militant, violent labor clashes following democratic elections began to create a negative image of labor and the perception that the movement has lost its 'moral authority' in the minds of the middle class.³⁴⁹ Furthermore, Oh (1999) notes that there was a visible shift in the middle classes' attitude toward labor in the face of real or perceived threats to economic or political stability—events which could easily be spun by the government friendly media as being a result of frequent labor disputes.³⁵⁰

Importantly, although labor disputes and correspondently, labor militancy was on the rise, as already explained, the middle class had largely been de-mobilized through political liberalization. However, one key civil society group would emerge in 1989. Made up of Korea's educated elite (e.g. academics, religious leaders, journalists, doctors, lawyers, etc.), the Citizen's Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ), as its name implies, focused on economic issues such as income distribution, real estate speculation, inadequate tax and financial systems, as well as agricultural, environmental and labor issues. Starting with 500 initial members, by 1993 it had exploded to 7,000. The CCEJ from its beginnings stated that it would be committed to peaceful, non-violent means of "non-political" social change and advocacy. Although other civil society groups would

³⁴⁸ Ibid. (93)

³⁴⁹ Ibid. (129)

³⁵⁰ Oh, J.K. (1999). 114

emerge, the CCEJ was characteristic of the new wave of civil society groups which espoused non-violence means.³⁵¹ It was furthermore clear that the middle-class would not tolerate overt militancy—either by political activists or the government. Thus, there was a stark difference in the political environment following the 1987 move towards direct presidential elections. The observable implications of this political shift can be seen in the changed tactics of labor suppression which will be discussed below.

7.4: Labor Suppression following Authoritarianism: 1987 to the Present

As already stated, Rho Tae Woo's statement that promised democratic elections largely placated much of the civil society protest and turmoil—and importantly, demobilized the middle class. The same statement however, provided labor with the window with which to organize on a massive scale. On July 6, 1987, less than two weeks after Rho's declaration, employees at Hyundai quickly came together, organized and registered their union with the Office of Labor Affairs—making it the first union at the plant. Initially consisting of just 120 employees, membership increased by more than 10 times to 1,400 almost immediately after it was created. The union formation at Hyundai engine then quickly precipitated the attempted formation of unions at Hyundai Shipyards and Hyundai Motors. Prior to their registration however, Hyundai Group had already sent company men to register their own respective 'unions' so as to co-opt the legal formation of the workers' organizations—this move by Hyundai's management in turn resulted in mass demonstrations within the Hyundai group and reached other industrial areas in

³⁵¹ Koo, H. (2002). 119

August 1987.³⁵² Hyundai's labor issues soon spread to other conglomerates—with 69 percent of firms with one thousand or more employees being affected by work stoppages, and 38.5 percent of firms with less than one thousand being affected as well.³⁵³

The demands of workers went beyond the largely economic concerns which had dominated the rationale for strikes and labor disputes during the 1960s, 70s and early to mid 1980s. In particular, strikes were focused on the right to establish democratic and independent unions, and a removal of the state-corporatist unions which had been utilized not for workers' concern, but for the suppression of collective action. In other words, union activities were focused on the democratization of the workplace.³⁵⁴

The state's response is interesting. Up to until early August 1987, the regime had stayed on the sidelines of the labor dispute. Kim, S.H. (2000) for instance explains that the then existing regime did not want to 'tarnish' its new image as the progenitor of democracy through the visible mobilization of police forces the subsequent suppression of labor resistance.³⁵⁵ The last general-come-president Rho, as the greatest beneficiary of the past authoritarian regimes, was in fact limited in what he was able to do.³⁵⁶

On September 2nd one incident however, in Ulsan (ground zero for the movement) occurred. Demonstrators took their protest to the streets and were met by an outnumbered regiment of riot police—one splinter group went so far as to storm City Hall, smashing windows and destroying furniture. Two days later, in the face of escalating violence and

³⁵² Ogle, G.E. (117-118)

³⁵³ Ibid. (116)

³⁵⁴ Kim, S.H. (2000). 94

³⁵⁵ Ibid. (94)

³⁵⁶ Lee, S. J. (2000). 285

continued appeals from Korea's conglomerates, the police were finally mobilized, cracked down and instilled order.³⁵⁷

Although the state was able to effectively suppress the strikes, initial inaction by the state prompted Chung Ju Yong (of Hyundai Group) to add two additional layers of protection. First, the *kusadae* squads were formed as noted before. Second, Chung recruited thugs to be utilized as needed against unruly labor and strikes. Other firms would follow suit, making *kusadae* and hired 'security' the main coercive elements on the front lines of labor suppression.³⁵⁸ One early case which exemplifies the business-state-criminal nexus involves yet again the Hyundai Group. At least one executive within Hyundai Heavy Chemicals (headed by Chung Ju Yong's son) learned about a meeting among nineteen union chiefs within several of Hyundai's companies. Having learned of this information, the executive (Han Yu Dong) contacted James Lee (a Korean-American) to act as a 'union-buster.' Lee planned the raid while Han contacted the police superintendent to inform him of Lee's planned attack, of which the superintendent agreed not to intervene.³⁵⁹

Lee had amassed and trained a group of one hundred 'company' men, obtained communication equipment, iron rods and three company busses. They then proceeded to the location. After being stopped by a police road block which would not allow them to pass, a call was made to the superintendent who informed the sergeant in-charge to allow them to pass. Once reaching their destination they started to 'educate' the union men by beating them badly. Once through with the union members, they then drove to the city and broke into offices of the 'Association of Dismissed Hyundai Employees' and

³⁵⁷ Ogle, G.E. (1990). 119

³⁵⁸ Ibid. (122-153)

³⁵⁹ Ibid (1990) 122-123

destroyed whatever they could find while beating five more people in the office, and dragging them outside—reportedly forcing them to chant, “Our father is Kim Il Sung.”³⁶⁰

Although it was intended for the raid to remain a secret, when word was leaked that a foreigner was involved in organizing the incident, the press reported the incident which prompted members of the National Assembly to go to Ulsan to investigate.³⁶¹ The investigation in turn led to the arrest of James Lee and others. Lee and Han Yu Dong both received light punishment with one year sentences, while one other received a one year and 6 month sentence. Thirty one other assailants received *suspended* sentences and were released.³⁶² Although some of the perpetrators of violence in this case were prosecuted, the vast majority of instances fail to reach the news and/or generate significant interest. The fact that James Lee was a foreigner most assuredly influenced the publicity of the case, and thus, the response by the state.

Beyond the introduction of *Kusadae* and other private actors in the market for force, further measures were taken by the state to distance themselves from the authoritarian past. As discussed in chapter two, through a number of reforms of Korea’s justice system—including the coercive element of the system, significant measures were implemented to increase civilian collaboration and oversight—and in doing so, significantly decreased the amount of autonomy such groups once enjoyed. Tactics as well changed, and especially so during the Kim Dae Jung administration (1998-2003).

Under Kim Dae Jung, Police Commissioner General Lee Moo-Young launched his “Operation Grand Reform” which included two tactical changes. First, the use of tear-gas as the previously go-to-weapon of choice for the police was removed as an option

³⁶⁰ Asia Watch (1990). 55

³⁶¹ Ogle, G.E. (1990). 123

³⁶² Asia Watch (1990) 56

under the “No CS-Gas policy.” The frequent use of tear-gas had a long history in Korea’s authoritarian past.³⁶³ If we remember back to 1960, the discovery of a 16 year old victim with a tear-gas canister lodged in his skull had set off the waves of protest which ultimately culminated in the ouster of Rhee Syngman. Of the rationale, Police Commissioner Lee stated in an interview with the International Herald Tribune in February of 2000 that when tear-gas is fired, “Molotov cocktails always follow”.³⁶⁴ In an interview with police officials and representatives of the Korea Employers Federation (KFF), it was explained to Kwon (2011) that democracy in Korea could be measured by the amount of shot tear-gas canisters.³⁶⁵ In 1996, 210,000 canisters were shot; in 1998, only 3,400 and in 1999, zero.³⁶⁶

In place of tear-gas was the implementation of an ingenious tactic—referred to as the “lip-stick” line. Unarmed policewomen in their pressed uniforms with white gloves were sent to protest venues. They would stand at the front lines of the protest, effectively creating a cordoning-off barrier between the protesters and the civilian line. Ahn Pong Sul, international director of the Federation of Korean Trade Unions, was cited in the same International Tribune article listed above, as stating that: “They’ve placed these female police officers on the front lines...of course, they are unarmed. How can we attack females?”³⁶⁷

The “lip-stick” line, while helping to reduce the militant image of the police, has not replaced the riot police, *kusadae* corps or private security. Indeed, behind the women

³⁶³ Kwon (2002). 62

³⁶⁴ Kirk, D. (2000-02-23). Who Needs Tear-Gas? Seoul Puts Policewomen Out Front. The New York Times. Also cited in Kwon, J.B. (2011). 65

³⁶⁵ Kwon, J.B. (2011). 65

³⁶⁶ Ibid. (65). Also cited in the newspaper article referenced above.

³⁶⁷ International Tribune (02/23/2000).

police officers are often those very actors—in place and ready to act if violence in fact erupts. In preventing violence from spilling over pre-determined areas (e.g. into the view of non-protesting civilians), the “lip-stick” line has proven invaluable. Furthermore, as Kwon (2012) notes, “In highly populated public settings the police have to be careful to conceal their violence, or its potentiality, embodied in the black-clad riot police...The police did not generally intrude into the contained space of specified protest venues. Violence occurred, rather, during the march through the streets, as the large throng of laborers and activists threatened to break containment.”³⁶⁸

As we can see from the discussion above, the state has not retreated but has rather sought to contain the violence which occurs out of the view of society—in an ‘out of sight out of mind’ sort of rationale. Violence perpetrated by *kusadae* thugs or private, *yongyök-hoesa* as well often occurs away from the site of the public—with the police assuming the role again of preventing escalations of conflict.

The recent case of labor suppression highlights the continued role of private thugs in strike-breaking. In July, 2012 workers at the SJM auto parts factory in Ansan, Gyeonggi Province (just south of Seoul) were protesting for higher wages and the company’s response by locking them out. In response to the on-going protest, SJM hired Contacus—a private security firm with close ties and connections to both Lee Myung Pak and members of his ruling Saenuri Party—to suppress and disperse the demonstrators.³⁶⁹ The same firm furthermore was in charge of President Lee Myung Pak’s personal

³⁶⁸ Kwon, J.B. (2011). 66

³⁶⁹ Yi, W.-w. (2012-08-12). Saenuri staffer behind attack on unionists. The Korea Times. The article notes that the president of Contacus at the time was Saenuri Party member and part of Lee Myung Pak’s 2007 campaign team, Moon Sung-ho. As is typical of staffers of such firms, Moon had majored in martial arts at university.

security during his presidential run, as well as being involved in redevelopment projects.³⁷⁰

In the morning of July 27th 200 men from Contactus, donning helmets, shields and wielding clubs, arrived on scene and began assaulting the 150 unionists. In addition to clubs and shields, the ‘security’ force lodged pieces of metal at the demonstrators as well as spraying them with fire extinguishers.³⁷¹ At 4:30 am, according to the SJM labor union, one of its members reportedly phoned the 112 Emergency Call Center. One hour later, the police arrived and remained outside the plant, taking no action against the security thugs while the conflict lasted for hours.³⁷² The police were cited as stating that “everything was already under control when they arrived at the scene an hour after receiving the report.”³⁷³ This statement was contradicted however by the NPA who stated that the commanding officer of the riot police on scene “did not take any action as he mistook the security guards for policemen in the dark as they were wearing helmets and protective gear.”³⁷⁴ In the process of suppressing the demonstration, thirty-four workers suffered injuries—ten of which were reportedly serious.³⁷⁵

The Korean Metal Workers Unions (KMWU) publicized this event, in large part helped by the fact that the scenes described above were captured by video, and called for an investigation into both the firm Contactus, Moon (as its president), and police’s non-action. In response, Kim Ki-yong, commissioner general of the NPA ordered the police to

³⁷⁰ (2012-08-01). Steep Rise in Violence Services Business: Was There Government Protection? The Kyunghyang Shinmun.

³⁷¹ Yi, W.-w. (2012-08-01). Company hired security staff to attack unionists. The Korea Times

³⁷² Yi, W.-w. (2012-08-08). Police apologize for mishandling assault case of SJM’s unionists. The Korea Times.

³⁷³ Yi, W.-w. (2012-08-01).

³⁷⁴ Yi, W.-w. (2012-08-08). There exist numerous videos of this strike suppression. See for instance: <http://news.linktv.org/videos/violent-security-firm-attacks-striking-south-korean-workers>

³⁷⁵ Ibid.

conduct an internal investigation and take disciplinary actions against those responsible, which included the commanding officer of the riot police. An unnamed police official further noted that “A private security firm can intervene in protests and strikes but it must report to us in advance for us to keep an eye on any possible violent acts. Contactus obvious failed to do its duty.”³⁷⁶ Officials at Contactus as well offered a quasi-apology but in doing so stated that “they [the workers] are not innocent people, but a brutal group that must be inevitably suppressed.” They further explained that “Without us, business activity will wither and there will be a burden on government authority.”³⁷⁷

What we can see clearly from this case is that the ‘state’ has largely moved away from active engagement in strike suppressions (as well as in other cases of protest) towards managing and containing the violence. In place of the riot police, who remain mobilized and present, are private security firms and *kusadae* who carry out the suppressions. By operating under the façade of de-militarization, in term helps the state avoid politicizing any one action. In the events where the police are forced to intervene, their involvement is limited—thus reducing the overall level of politicization.

7.5: Conclusion

In establishing the military junta’s power, we can see a similar trajectory of state development in Korea, which was followed by European state makers. State seekers come state actors utilized a range of mixed methods with which to establish dominance, including ‘eliminating,’ ‘subjugating,’ and ‘buying’ as the ‘occasions presented themselves.’ Rhee’s political machine relied upon non-state groups largely under logic of

³⁷⁶ IBID

³⁷⁷ (2012-08-01). The Kyunghyang Shinmun.

capacity during and following the establishment of the Republic of Korea. Bowing to growing societal pressure, Rhee was forced to step down from power, thus opening the door for the military under Park's leadership to take power via coup over the toothless government that had come into power following the Liberal Party's collapse.

Although Park came to power through coup, he was cognizant that he could not rule by iron fist alone, and assuredly not without the support of US aid. Thus, the military junta came to the scene with the immediate goal of eliminating any potential rival, which included going after the once powerful set of criminal organizations that had helped prop up the Rhee's Liberal Party. This in turn proved popular with society which had blamed such groups for much of the state's failings under Rhee. Between 1961 and 1963, the military junta was effectively able to break the back of 'political gangsterism.' And, despite my not being able to locate reliable, easily-triangulated evidence linking criminal groups to high level political power during Park's 'democratic period' (1963-1971), there are varying accounts that such organizations were utilized, albeit, sparingly, as the occasions presented themselves (e.g. during elections). Although this is an area which admittedly requires more study, I can surmise that given Park's low levels of popularity, and the semblance of democracy that he was attempting to maintain, the use of such groups helped to avoid the odium of coercion that would have fallen on to his regime's shoulders had the police been used in such instances.

That Park had a preference for public as opposed to private sources of coercion is evident. When asked why gangsters were not utilized during the authoritarian period under Park and the early period of Chun Doo-hwan's regime, one police respondent noted, quite forcefully that "during that time we were the gangsters' (P1). In other words,

they didn't need to use such non-state, violence wielding groups—there was no façade of democracy and they had the iron fisted capacity with which to instill order.

Through economic development came an increasingly urbanized, educated populace—a necessary component of Park's rapid industrialization plan. Although Park was killed in 1979, the seeds of a growing, contentious society had been planted—the consequence of which Chun Doo Hwan would have to deal with. Repression of dissent, specifically repression by state sources, was met with more protest. The specific actors carrying out repression in other words, as it has been shown, matters. Chun's backward move towards the use private actors in the face of yet another authoritarian crisis in the form of widespread protests and pressure mobilized by an expanded civil society is observable implication decreased government autonomy.

Although I was unable to witness firsthand, the violence carried out in the cases of forced evictions (of tenants) and labor suppression, I did witness it in the case of forced removals of street vendors. Seeing the riot police idly standing by, I asked myself the same questions which motivated this study. Namely, why would society allow such things to occur? Such violence, I had assumed, should not be occurring in a democratically developed society, as South Korea in 2011, was and remains to be characterized as such. If the street vendors, laborers, students, or anyone else is breaking the law, why can't the state simply mobilize the police to arrest or otherwise sanction such actors through the legal system engendered to ensure order? The answer as already stated, is that history matters.

Years of autocratic, corrupt and brutal rule coupled with rapid economic development led to what Koo (1993) aptly characterized as the simultaneous existence of

a strong state with a contentious society. Park engineered, through a mixture of sheer genius and heavy-handed repression, rapid industrialization. One of the reasons he had succeeded, where others had failed, is that he was able to accumulate the necessary coercive capacity with which to shape the direction of the economy while suppressing any and all challengers. Park was able to do so under the semblance of democracy between 1963 and 1971. Society over that brief period of time however shifted to become largely urbanized and educated. Such a transition, while necessary for South Korea's move away from light to heavy industry, created a situation in which governing the masses, became incrementally more difficult. In other words, the state's autonomy from society forces was rapidly decreasing. Park's capitulation to the demands of business was no doubt unpopular—and if we believe Woo's (1991) argument, impossible under the guise of democratic rule—prompted the move towards full-blown authoritarianism. Why didn't we see the move towards the private market for force during this period? This is because Park's regime didn't need to. They had a tremendous amount of coercive capacity and no need to follow the semblance of democratic rule.

The political environment that Chun 'inherited' following the assassination of Park and a brief interlude was vastly different than the one which Park had initially started with. Chun thus faced an environment in which he had to increasingly utilize repression on an unprecedented scale. Chun's measures indeed proved successful, so why the move towards the market in 1984 with forced evictions and 1987 with respect to labor suppression? The reason why is that Chun was attempting to 'have his cake and eat it too.' Chun's regime had first miscalculated the status quo and began to lift his heavy repressive finger. Chun was faced with providing public goods which required coercive

measures to bring them about, all the while attempting to increase both the domestic and international popularity of his regime. By privatizing redevelopment projects, Chun effectively removed the state from the vast majority of direct forced evictions. Despite Chun's changing tactics, civil society's power, something he ostensibly underestimated, proved to be his downfall.

1987 not only saw the removal of Chun, but additionally the promulgation of direct presidential elections. Political liberalization however neither addressed the socioeconomic concerns of labor, nor the maximalist demands of some of the more radical elements of civil society. The middle-class, happy enough with direct elections, were effectively demobilized. However, cognizant of the middle-classes' power, the government, first under Roh, were careful not to provide them with galvanizing images of Korea's authoritarian past—enter in the *kusadae* and involvement of *yong-yeok* companies in the area of labor suppression. As in the case of forced evictions, Korea's police have shifted from being the perpetrators of violence and coercion, to managers of it. The state has to extremely careful not to provide the middle class a reason to mobilize. As long as forced evictions and labor suppression remain de-politicized, the middle class has shown a tremendous amount of toleration.

The legitimacy of the state in Korea, and thus the success and survival of political actors then, has become dependent not only on sustaining economic growth and maintaining security, but also dependent upon insuring the growth, expansion and protection of democracy. While we generally expect that most governments within democracies should derive their legitimacy from such tasks, Korea, because of its recent period of brutal, authoritarian rule, faces unique challenges. The paramount challenge is

distancing itself from the history of autocratic and brutal rule, following (at least the appearance of) the rule of law, while at the same time instilling order. Instilling order then, has become a tightrope walk for governments during the post-authoritarian period. As the police under Japanese rule had become symbols of colonialism, the police following Japan's surrender became symbols to corrupt, authoritarian rule and the state's numerous broken promises of democracy. As argued by Kwon (2011), the use of coercion by state actors (i.e. the police) in the contemporary era, runs the risk of conjuring up recent memories of Korea's authoritarian past. "State violence has significant symbolic valance in post-authoritarian Korea, constituting an interpretive frame by which political legitimacy is evaluated, for both the state and civil society groups."³⁷⁸

As noted by Koo (1993), although the state has played a tremendously influential and critical role in setting the trajectory and framework of Korea's economic, social and political transformation, social and political change have come as a result of the ways in which various sub-sets of society have reacted, either individually or collectively, to state actions.³⁷⁹ Society in other words, has shaped, and continues to shape the institutional capacity of the state. The institutional capacity of the state in turn has varied over time, thus influencing the preferences of state actors. Contemporary state-non-state collaboration in the Korean market for force then, is the observable implication of the state's decreased ability to ignore the *society's* own preferences. The phenomenon of sub-contracting of force, in other words, is the state's calculated attempt to distance itself from actions deemed authoritarian, and thus punishable by society's liberal forces.

³⁷⁸ Kwon, J.B. (2011). 59

³⁷⁹ Koo, H. (1993). 231

Chapter 8

Conclusion and Extension of Argument Beyond Korea

8.1: Summary of main argument

The goal of this dissertation was to examine the practice of collaboration and collusion between state and non-state actors in the market for *criminal* violence, and specifically offer an explanation for why this occurs in developed, high capacity settings. Using the case of Korea in order to develop and refine this study's guiding hypotheses, we can clearly see that the process of state-non-state collaboration in early Korean state development followed closely the same trajectory as explained by conventional wisdom. Namely, state seekers and state actors mobilized whatever forces were available, criminal or otherwise, to assist them in gaining coercive supremacy. Such collaboration in turn occurred under logic of weak capacity. Once Park Chung Hee ascended to power through his 1961 coup d'état he further went about establishing a clear demarcation between the legitimacy of the state's coercive power and its use, and the illegitimacy of non-state competitors. That there was ambiguity between state and non-state sources of violence prior to Park is clear. It is also clear that the 'grey zone' of violence—although not completely eradicated—was significantly reduced during Park's 18 year tenure.

If we looked no further than the 1945 to 1960 period of early state development in Korea, again, much of the findings (though not all) would in fact be readily explained by

existent, weak-state explanations. Collaboration between state actors and private specialists in violence, however, would emerge through the early Park period, be squashed following his move towards explicit authoritarianism, and yet again emerge in the wake of declining political autonomy during the 1980s. The conditions with which such collaborative arrangements flourished in the post-Rhee regime however were decidedly different. Namely, the state at that time had a tremendous amount of coercive power. Park's early regime between the early 1960s and 1970 was constrained through the need to pretend that Korea was at least moving towards a democracy. Over the course of his tenure Korean society experienced rapid economic development, became urbanized, and increasingly educated and contentious. The Korea that Chun inherited was thus vastly different than at any period in Korea's long history. Indeed, Chun faced uncooperative students, labor, intellectuals, and the new middle class, which formed into a powerful anti-authoritarian alliance. In order to deflect certain societal forces, the state, first under Chun, turned towards the private market for forced evictions, thereby removing themselves from not only domestic criticism and forces, but international as well. Coercion and violence did not end to be sure, but the actors perpetrating it changed. With this move the grey zone of violence once again expanded. It would expand even more so following massive labor riots in the wake of the move towards direct, democratic elections, in which successive governments' legitimacy depended upon their distancing themselves from Korea's authoritarian past. The ambiguity between public and private violence wielders in turn helps the state to avoid direct political backlash.

Although the middle class stands to gain from projects which increase the housing stock, improve infrastructure, or maintain economic stability, violence by state

actors, as Kwon (2011) explains, has significant symbolic valence which threatens to mobilize the middle class actors against the state. The state in turn enlists the coercive forces of non-state actors in order to avoid increasing the probability of such action. The potential for middle class mobilization, in short, is *the* mechanism which pushes the state towards collaboration with private actors in the market for criminal force.

8.2 Beyond the case of Korea

State-non-state collusion in the market for criminal violence to be sure is not unique to Korea. It is furthermore not merely a function of something unique to ‘Korean culture,’ but rather a response to a particular set of political conditions and calculations on behalf of state actors. Although more study is needed, we can clearly see at least the possibility that the same logic was at work in the former slave-owning states of the US south, where lynch mobs and thugs collaborated with the landed aristocracy, police and political powers in carrying out extra-legal coercion and mass intimidation. State-criminal collaboration in Japan is furthermore well documented by historians and journalists, but remains largely understudied by social scientists. The following section briefly covers both the US south and Japanese cases.

8.2.1: Lynchings, the KKK and state collaboration

Following the end of the Civil War much of the legal control whites had over southern blacks had been lost with the passage of the Thirteenth amendment. Through various attempts at regaining control via legal means, principally over African-American *labor*, southern governments instituted what were referred to as the “Black Codes.” South Carolina for example promulgated a law making it illegal for an African American to be

employed as anything other than a farmer or servant unless they paid a significant tax.³⁸⁰ Louisiana's Labor Contract Law further required that freed men employed as laborers sign binding one year contracts during the first 10 days of each January.³⁸¹ Other laws throughout the south as well made it illegal for African-Americans to keep or carry firearms, ammunition, or other types of weapons.

Despite southern governments' attempts at re-asserting their legal power over African-Americans, and further despite President Andrew Jackson's veto power which he used in March 1866, Congress was able to over-ride the executive decision and pass the Civil Rights Act a month later. African-Americans became full-fledged citizens and white southerners had a problem on their hands.³⁸² Of this time, Tolnay and Beck (1992) explain, "If southern whites were to continue to enjoy an economy in which blacks labored to create wealth for the privileged, it would be necessary to devise some alternative mechanisms to again harness African-American labor. The mechanism of choice became violent repression."³⁸³ Extra-legal lynching in turn became a favorite tool.

Although having started earlier, between 1882 and 1930, following the end of Reconstruction, roughly 2,800 citizens died as a result of lynching, of which almost 2,500 were African Americans and 94 percent of those having been victims of white lynch mobs.³⁸⁴ The vindicating rhetoric and argument for such extra-legal lynching of the time was that it made up for an inefficient and overly lenient justice system in the face of increasing black on white crime. Although much of the violence was directed towards

³⁸⁰ Tolnay, S. E., & Beck, E. M. (1995). 4

³⁸¹ Ibid. (4)

³⁸² Ibid. (4-5)

³⁸³ Ibid. (5)

³⁸⁴ Ibid. (IX)

suspected ‘criminals,’ evidence suggests that the justice system in the south was far from afraid of administering lethal or otherwise harsh sentences to African-Americans, and did so at a ‘prodigious’ rate.³⁸⁵ If the evidence points to the legal system as having both the capacity *and* the willingness to dole out racially-prejudiced ‘justice’, why the need for privately sourced coercion? Tolnay and Beck again argue that beyond insuring swift ‘popular justice,’ lynching served three inter-related functions: (1) it helped maintain social control over African-Americans through [extra-legal] terror; (2) it helped to suppress or eliminate African-American competitors from economic, political or social rewards, and; (3) it served to stabilize white class structure and preserve the white aristocracy’s privileged status.³⁸⁶ The former governor of Mississippi, James K. Vardaman (1904-1908) summed up much of the white sentiment of the time when he stated that “If it is necessary every Negro in the state will be lynched; it will be done to maintain white supremacy.”³⁸⁷

The southern whites turned towards lynch mobs and other forms of extra-legal coercion and intimidation following the end of the civil war is a well-documented chapter in US history. How might the theory posited in this study help explain such collaboration? Prior to the Civil War repression and slavery was a legal institution. Slave states in short did not need to turn to non-state groups simply because the state *itself* was the terrorist. With the end of the Civil War, southern states faced a new political environment in which the federal government, through federal troops, forced legal recognition of African-Americans—effectively reducing their autonomy, albeit, not from societal forces but from federal sources. Although the south had largely been decimated in the process of the

³⁸⁵ Ibid. (18)

³⁸⁶ Ibid. (18-19)

³⁸⁷ Ibid. (25)

Civil War, (along with its institutional capacity), following Reconstruction (1865-1880) much of what had been destroyed was re-established. If there were accounts of state actors turning towards non-state lynch mobs as a result of deficiencies in institutional capacity it'd make for a nice complementary and linier story with that of the Korean case. However, as far as I have been able to ascertain, the evidence does not support a capacity argument for the turn towards extra-legal violence, but rather, and overwhelmingly, a normative one.

With both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments having been ratified, poor whites faced roughly 4 million new economic competitors in the form of southern African Americans who would work for less, so it's easy enough to guess at their motivations for turning towards terrorism.³⁸⁸ Although poor whites made up much of the lynch mobs that carried out such 'southern justice' however, they did so with at least the complicity of state and local level actors, as well as with the white landowners and members of the aristocracy.³⁸⁹

That state and local police would benefit from such social control measures is, as with the poor whites' rational, readily understandable (yet still reprehensible). Why then would white landowners and other elites, who stood to gain from low labor prices and ostensibly, easier to control workers, support such measures? One oft-cited reason is that racial violence instigated by white land-owners may have been a way to maintain control over, and thus prevent resistance by their African-American workers.³⁹⁰ Still yet another reason provided is such 'mob-justice,' again, predominately carried out by poor whites,

³⁸⁸ Ibid. (57)

³⁸⁹ Ibid. (70)

³⁹⁰ Ibid. (70)

served to maintain the social division between both sets of low-wage workers. In other words, it served to prevent coalition and collective action against the white elite, by poor black *and* poor whites.³⁹¹ As explained by Morris (1984):

All members of the white group had a stake in racial domination, because they derived privileges from it. Poor and middle-class whites benefited because the segregated labor force prevented blacks from competing with them for better-paying jobs. The Southern white ruling class benefited because blacks supplied them with cheap labor and a weapon against the labor movement. Finally, most Southern whites benefited psychologically from the system's implicit assurance that no matter how poor and uneducated, they were "always better than the niggers."³⁹²

Through such continued practices of lynching and other forms of repression, the south saw an exodus of African-Americans which in turn began to populate much of the North.

The 1960s is yet another tumultuous and well-documented, violent period in the US south. In the midst of the Civil Rights Movement for instance, a number of instances showcase not only state-level toleration and complicity in criminal violence, but federal involvement as well.

On June 3rd, 1946 the US Supreme Court, in *Morgan v. Virginia*, ruled against segregated seating on interstate busses and trains. President Truman however failed to back the ruling with federal enforcement. In 1960, the court further ruled in *Boynton v. Virginia* that segregation in restaurants, waiting rooms, and restrooms was again, unconstitutional. The government under Eisenhower, similar to Truman's response, again

³⁹¹ Ibid. 70

³⁹² Morris (1984). 3; Also cited in: De Fazio, G. (2009). 170

remained unwilling to enforce federal law at the state and local levels.³⁹³ Thus, segregation, despite being ruled illegal by federal law, remained in place as the unofficial law.³⁹⁴

On May 4th, 1961 13 Freedom Riders boarded their buses bound for the Alabama in opposition to and in demonstration of locally, though ‘informally’ enforced segregation. Upon hearing about the Freedom Rider’s intent to break the ‘color line’ in Alabama, Birmingham police Sgt. Tom Cook and detective W.W. “Red” Self summoned Gary Rowe, a Ku Klux Klan (KKK) member (and unknowing to either Cook or Self, an FBI informant), to a meeting. Reportedly, Cook stated “I don’t give a damn if you beat them, bomb them, murder or kill them. We don’t ever want to see another nigger ride on the bus into Birmingham again.”³⁹⁵ A group of 60 KKK members were then chosen to attack the riders on May 14th when they arrived. The Knights would have a 15 minute ‘grace period’ granted by Eugene “Bull” O’Connor, the Commissioner of Public Safety. Connor specifically instructed: “By God, if you are going to do this, do it right,” and further stated that the demonstrators should be beaten until they “looked like a bulldog got hold of them,” stripped of their clothes and chased from the bus depot whereby the police would arrest them for indecent exposure. Furthermore, “if any Klansman overstayed their welcome and wound up in jail were guaranteed light sentences.”³⁹⁶

Rowe informed his FBI handler of the plot who in turn notified Birmingham’s police chief, Jamie Moore. Moore in turn delegated control to Tom Cook no less, one of the originators of the planned raid. In route to Birmingham, Klansmen met the bus in

³⁹³ Newton, M. (2005). 70

³⁹⁴ Ibid. (70)

³⁹⁵ Ibid. (70)

³⁹⁶ Ibid. (71)

Anniston and quickly overtook it, boarding the bus and assaulting the riders—one of which was beaten so badly he had permanent brain damage. Passively watching the assault were FBI agents and three local policemen. One officer on scene reportedly boarded the bus and told the Knights “Don’t worry about no lawsuits, I ain’t seen a thing.”³⁹⁷

With nine Klansmen still aboard, the hijacked bus then proceeded to Birmingham where more Knights gathered in wait, armed with blackjacks, leaded baseball bats and steel pipes, including the FBI informant, Rowe. When the bus arrived the mob rushed the victims and carried out yet another round of ‘southern justice.’ As Rowe was clubbing an unidentified black woman, police detective Red Self informed him that the Klan’s 15 minutes were over. As the Klansmen retreated, Self made sure he thanked him for doing a “good job.”³⁹⁸

Following the Birmingham riots the action moved towards Montgomery on the 20th of May. The FBI again informed authorities that the freedom riders were in route, and once again thugs were waiting for the demonstrators. Ten minutes into the riots the police arrived and remained on the sidelines. An hour and fifteen minutes later the police and sheriffs began to disperse the rioters. One white couple was arrested and jailed for “disorderly conduct”—they had been shielding victims from further assault.³⁹⁹

Following the Birmingham riots the FBI questioned a number of those involved in the riots but federal charges were not initially filed. It finally took criticism of the bureau’s handling of the riots by Assistant Attorney William Orrick directly to Robert

³⁹⁷ Ibid. (72)

³⁹⁸ Ibid. (72)

³⁹⁹ Ibid. (73)

Kennedy to get the bureau to finally act, though by 1962 only five were convicted. Even then those convicted received only light punishment.⁴⁰⁰ Rather than investigating the violence carried out by the Klan, Hoover was reportedly more interested in directing FBI resources towards checking the criminal backgrounds of the potentially ‘communist’ Freedom Riders.⁴⁰¹

Although again it is easy enough to ascertain the incentives of the state officials and local police for collaboration with members of the KKK (many of the officials were themselves members of course), the FBI’s response, or rather, lack thereof, is rather interesting. Though it’s less straight forward than the other cases and warrants much more research, the FBI did engage in various types of collaborative arrangements with certain groups and elements of the KKK. Cunningham (2013) argues that although Hoover had disdain for the KKK, going so far as to call them a “group of sadistic, vicious white trash,” he apparently found the civil rights activists more distasteful and the KKK useful for harassing them and suspected Communist members.⁴⁰² Cunningham further explains:

“He [Hoover] also felt strongly that the [civil rights] movement, which purportedly had ties to communist interests, posed a significant security risk. In a very real sense, the FBI allied with the klan’s goals, as it had long monitored and attempted to suppress civil rights initiatives through its “radical matters” investigations of prominent civil rights organizations and leaders—including Martin Luther King Jr.—whose purported moral shortcomings and alliances with communist agents made them suspect “subversives.”⁴⁰³

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid. (74)

⁴⁰¹ Ibid. (74)

⁴⁰² Cunningham, D. (2013). 195

⁴⁰³ Ibid. (195)

Given the overlap in interests, the FBI under Hoover emphasized controlling various factions of the KKK rather than eliminating them.⁴⁰⁴ This emphasis in turn allowed for a certain amount of Klan mobilization.⁴⁰⁵ Still, the FBI had a dual purpose. Close relations with the Klan, although opening up the door for their mobilization and use by the bureau at times, allowed for the FBI to gather substantial information through their informants and/or carry out anti-Klan FBI actions such as spreading rumors or otherwise creating division within their ranks. Thus, even though there are accounts of the FBI utilizing the Klan as the occasions called for (as exemplified in the Freedom Riders example above), they also put themselves in a position to neutralize them when the time came for it.⁴⁰⁶ The 1964 Freedom Summer project murders in Neshoba County, Mississippi would provide in part the impetus for the FBI to do so. On June 21st of that year, civil rights activists James Chaney, Andrew Goodman, and Michael Schwerner were brutally murdered, in which twenty-one people tied to KKK, including the architects of the attack, police Deputy Price and County Sheriff Rainey, were implicated. This act, as depicted in the film, *Mississippi Burning*, would generate significant national attention and pressure and which culminated into a heavy handed federal response and crackdown on KKK activities through the efforts of the FBI.⁴⁰⁷

8.2.2: The Japanese state-criminal nexus

In addition to the case of case of collaboration in southern US states as described above, Japan has had a long and varied history of state-criminal collaboration in the market for extra-legal force. As explained briefly in the theory chapter, beginning as early

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid. (202)

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid. (202)

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid. (203)

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid. (57-59)

as the Tokugawa period (1603-1887) the *shogunate* (military commander), faced with financial shortages, famines and peasant protests during the 1830s turned towards so-called *bakuto* (gamblers, who along with the itinerant peddlers (*tekiya*) were the predecessors to modern day *yakuza*) for assisting with maintaining order, acting as guides and informants in areas where the shogunate's power was either weak or ambiguous at best.⁴⁰⁸ In other words, the *shogunate* was forced to rely on such non-state groups out of sheer weakness (i.g. capacity concerns). Although *Bakuto* had their origins in gambling they were forced to develop a capacity for coercion in order to protect their territories from other potentially predatory *bakuto*. The *Tokugawa* government in turn capitalized on both the *bakuto*'s ability and willingness to use that violence.

Prior to *shogunate-bakuto* collaboration however in the mid to late 1800s, local law enforcement and officials would cooperate with such groups in order to enlist their help not only as informants but also in harnessing them to act as quasi-bounty hunters in return for leniency or release from jail for their own crimes. Unimpeded by official boundaries, *bakuto* could travel freely to other jurisdictions, capture criminals and bring them back without a formal appeal to officials in the other territories, which was required if the *daimyo* (lord) sent his warrior retainers.⁴⁰⁹ Constrained by such horizontal and vertical procedures then, *daimyu* were presumably forced to resort to non-official, private means and mechanisms in order to enforce their will while at the same time avoiding the repercussions for doing so.

In addition to the above instances of collaboration, during various struggles between the Tokugawa regime and pro-imperial forces the *bakuto*, with their reserves of

⁴⁰⁸ Siniawer, E.M. (2008). 20-24; See Also Gragert, B.A. (1997)

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid. (23)

fighting forces became important in determining many of outcomes of the battles, much as the pubosang and later criminal gangs had in early Korean history and the run up to the 1953 war, though again we can assume that this was largely under a logic of capacity.⁴¹⁰

During the 1920s, an economically prosperous period referred as the “Taisho” democracy era, saw the introduction of universal suffrage, an expansion of the middle class and an upsurge in labor unions.⁴¹¹ This period also saw the growth of Rightists and ultranationalists which enlisted the ranks of gangsters.⁴¹² Formed in 1919, in part of the brainchild of Takejiro Tokunami (the then minister of home affairs), the *Dai Nippon Kokusui-kai* (Great Japan National Essence Society) for example, an organization of more 60,000 gangsters, laborers, was extensively used as strike-breakers. Among many other instances, the *Kokusui-kai* force was used to violently attack 28,000 men who had walked out in the 1920 Yawata Iron Works strike.⁴¹³ When the original president of the *Kokusui-kai* died in 1926, the long time politician and former minister of foreign affairs, civilian governor of Taiwan and mayor of Tokyo (among other high level positions), Goto Shinpei, reportedly lobbied for the top position of the organization but was passed over for not having sufficiently anti-communist qualifications.⁴¹⁴ Three years later Suzuki Kisaburo, former home minister and minister of Justice assumed the president of the organization, as well as the head of the rightist Seiyuikai political party.⁴¹⁵ Of the criminal-political alliance, Siniawer (2012) notes that: “Ultimately, the violence of the *Kokusui-kai* did inspire probing questions about the organization, but the murkiness of

⁴¹⁰ Hill, P. (2003) 40

⁴¹¹ Kaplan, D. E., & Dubro, A. (2003). 24-25

⁴¹² Ibid. (25)

⁴¹³ Ibid. (25)

⁴¹⁴ Siniawer, E.M. (2008). 125-126

⁴¹⁵ Ibid. (127)

the state-yakuza relationship helped shield the state from the brunt of criticism.”⁴¹⁶ *Seiyuikai*'s principle opposition, the *Minseito* Party, among other political powers organized their own paramilitary forces which were also staffed by gangsters.⁴¹⁷ Such direct political-gangster collaboration would continue throughout the end of WWII.⁴¹⁸

The above description of political-criminal ties through the end of World War II by no means covers the entire extent of such relationships. Indeed, following surrender in 1945 US occupying forces as well found thugs and gangsters particularly useful in going after leftists and suspected or self-acknowledge communists as had occurred during the US military occupation of Korea (1945-1948).⁴¹⁹ And again, similar to the case of state-criminal collaboration beginning in the 1920s, such collusion cannot simply be explained by the weak-state hypothesis.

8.3: Conclusion

Such state-criminal collaboration as explained in the empirical chapters of this dissertation, as well as the US and Japanese cases briefly discussed above, highlights a largely understudied phenomenon of cooperation between two seemingly unlikely partners. In all three contexts we can clearly see state actors capitalizing on the ambiguity between legitimate, state coercion, and the illegitimacy of violent actions by non-state actors. Such collaboration cannot merely be explained away by the weak-state hypothesis. This study argues that although the weak capacity argument in part can explain certain types and instances of collaboration, the argument by itself is insufficient, and especially

⁴¹⁶ Siniawer, E.M. (2012). 629

⁴¹⁷ Kaplan, D. E., & Dubro, A. (2003). 125

⁴¹⁸ Ibid. (125-126)

⁴¹⁹ Ibid. (48)

so in cases where the state has the capacity to act, but chooses instead to delegate. In such instances, collaboration occurs as a result of a set of strategic choices—choices employed to avoid the ramifications of violence deemed politically risky, but necessary.

APPENDICES

1. Korean OC Groups and Members⁴²⁰

Region (pop)		Population of members		OC Groups	
		members	% of total	#	% of total
Seoul special region (9,820,171)		9,796	20.7	62	16.2
<i>Kyōng-in</i> (경인)	<i>Inch'ōn</i>	2,526	5.3	24	6.3
	<i>Kyōng-gi</i>	10,419	22.0	37	9.7
	Total	12,945	27.3	61	16.0
<i>Bu-kyōng</i> (부경)	<i>Pusan</i>	3,519	7.4	97	25.3
	<i>Ulsan</i>	1,047	2.2	8	2.1
	<i>Kyōngnam</i>	3,054	6.5	14	3.7
	Total	7,620	16.1	119	31.1
<i>Dae-kyōng</i> (대경)	<i>Daegu</i>	2,462	5.2	27	7.0
	<i>kyōngbuk</i>	2,630	5.6	11	2.9
	Total	5,092	10.8	38	9.9
<i>Chung-bu</i> (충부)	<i>Daecheon</i>	1,442	3.1	10	2.6
	<i>Chung-nam</i>	1,890	4.0	16	4.2
	<i>Chung-buk</i>	1,459	3.1	9	2.3

⁴²⁰ Based on 2006 estimates from the Supreme Prosecutor's Office in Korea

	Total	4,791	10.2	35	9.1
<i>Ho-nam</i>	<i>Kwangju</i>	1,417	3.0	20	5.2
<i>호남</i>	<i>Chŏn-nam</i>	1,819	3.8	15	3.9
	<i>Chŏn-buk</i>	1,781	3.8	15	3.9
	Total	5,017	10.6	50	13.0
<i>Kangwŏn</i>		1,461	3.1	15	3.9
<i>Cheju-do</i>		529	1.1	3	0.8
Total		47,251	100.0	383	100.0

Source: *Chochik p'oklyŏk pŏmchae ũi sirtae e kwanhan chosa yŏnsa*. 2006. 10 (p. 121)

2. Distribution of Main Criminal Groups in Korea:⁴²¹

Seoul Special Region⁴²²

LOCATION	NAME
<i>Miari</i>	<i>Ssang t'aek yi p'a</i> (쌍택이파)
<i>Mugyŏ-dong</i>	<i>Pŏm Ho Nam P'a</i> (범호남파); <i>Yang Un Yi P'a</i> (양은이파); <i>Sŏ P ang P'a</i> (서방파); <i>OB Dong Chae P'a</i> (OB 동재파)
<i>Myŏng -dong</i>	<i>Sin Sang Sa P'a</i> (신상사파)
<i>Yŏng Dŭng Po</i>	<i>Sam Il Tang</i> (삼일당) → <i>Chung Ang Dong P'a</i> (중앙동파); <i>Yŏng Dŭng Po P'a</i> (영등포파); <i>Yŏng Dŭng Po Si Jang P'a</i> (영등포 시장파)
<i>Dongdaemun Ku</i>	<i>Kuk P'il Yi P'a</i> (국필이파) → <i>Kka Pul Yi P'a</i> (까불이파) → <i>Ch'ŏng Yang Ri P'a</i> (청량리파); <i>Dong Dae Mun P'a</i> (동대문파)
<i>Kangnam-Ku</i>	<i>Mok Po P'a</i> (목포파); <i>Dong A P'a</i> (동아파); <i>Hak Dong P'a</i> (학동파)
<i>Gwanak-Ku</i>	<i>Bong Ch'ŏn Sa Go Ri P'a</i> (봉천사거리파) → <i>Bong Ch'ŏn P'a</i> (봉천파); <i>Eagles P'a</i> (이글수 파)

Outside of Seoul

LOCATION	NAME
<i>Kyŏng-in</i>	<i>Kkoll Mang P'a</i> (꼴망파); <i>Sŏn Jang P'a</i> (선장파); <i>Pu P'yŏng Sik Ku P'a</i> (부평 식구파); <i>Pu Ch'ŏn P'a</i> (부천파); <i>Pu Ch'ŏn Sik Ku</i>

⁴²¹ This partial list is based in part on the one provided in An, H.J. (2003), p.183-185, which was then cross-checked and updated through interviews. Furthermore, this is not an exhaustive list by any means, but represents the main organized crime groups to the best of my knowledge.

⁴²² The majority of groups in Seoul tend not to be territorial in nature, and many of the groups operating within the Seoul region are based in other provinces.

	<i>P'a</i> (부천 식구파); <i>Suwŏn P'a</i> (수원파); <i>Nam Mun P'a</i> (남문파); <i>Puk Mun P'a</i> (북문파); <i>Chu An P'a</i> (주안파); <i>Yŏk Chŏn P'a</i> (역전파); <i>Ch'ŏnghawi Sang P'a</i> (청하위생파); <i>Tigers P'a</i> (태이거파); <i>Kuk Che Mapia P'a</i> (국제마피아파); <i>Wŏn ju Min P'a</i> (원주민파)
<i>Bu-kyŏng</i>	<i>Ch'il Sŏng P'a</i> (칠성파)→ <i>Sin Ch'il Sŏng P'a</i> (신 칠성파); <i>Yŏng Do P'a</i> 영도파; <i>Hae Un Dong Ch'il Sŏng P'a</i> (해운동 칠성파); <i>Yutae P'a</i> (유대파); <i>20 Sae Gi P'a</i> (20 세기파)→ <i>Sin 20 Sae Gi P'a</i> (신 20 세기파); <i>Baek Ho P'a</i> (백호파); <i>Ul San Pok Gong P'a</i> (울산 북공파); <i>Ul San San Yŏk Chŏn P'a</i> (울산 산역전파); <i>Mi Ryang Yŏng Song P'a</i> 밀양 영성파; <i>Ma San Buk P'a</i> (마산 북파); <i>Sin Sin Yŏkchŏn P'a</i> (신신역전파); <i>Sin Mŏk Gong P'a</i> (신목공파);
<i>Dae-kyŏng</i>	<i>Hyang Chon Dong P'a</i> (향촌동파); <i>Dong Sŏng No P'a</i> (동성로파)→ <i>Sin Dong Sŏng No P'a</i> (신동성로파); <i>Dong Ku Yonhap P'a</i> (동구연합파); <i>An Dong Dae Myŏng Hoe</i> (안동 대명회); <i>Ku Mi Kŭm O San P'a</i> (구미 금오산파); <i>Po Hang Il Sim Hoe</i> (포항 일심회); <i>Daemyŏnhae</i> (대명회); <i>Donghap P'a</i> (통합파); <i>Samgori P'a</i> (삼거리파)
<i>Chung-bu:</i>	<i>Ya Mang P'a</i> (야망파); <i>P'aridaisu P'a</i> (파리다이스파); <i>Ch'il Sul- I P'a</i> (질술이파); <i>Mog Po Nae Gi P'a</i> 목포내기파→ <i>Ok Tae P'a</i> (옥태파); <i>Dae Ch'ŏn Tae Yang Hoe</i> (대천 태양회); <i>A San Tae P'yŏng Yang P'a</i> (아산 태평양파); <i>Hwa Sŏng P'a</i> (화성 파); <i>Siranoni P'a</i> (시라노니 파); <i>Sinkuraendu P'a</i> (신구랜드파); <i>Song ak P'a</i> (송악 파); <i>Taeyanghi P'a</i> (태양회 파)
<i>Ho-nam</i>	<i>Haeng Yo Na</i> (행여나)→ <i>Dae Ho P'a</i> (대호파)→ <i>Sŏng In P'ok Lyŏk Cho Chik OB P'a</i> (성인 폭력조직 OB 파)→ <i>Sin OB P'a</i> (신 OB 파)→ <i>OB Dong Chae P'a</i> (OB 동재파) (Seoul); <i>Dong A P'a</i> → <i>Seoul Dong A P'a</i> (서울동아파) → <i>Yang Un Yi P'a</i>

	(Seoul) (양은이파) (서울); <i>Kwangju Sǒ Pang P'a</i> (광주 서방파)→ <i>Sǒ Pang P'a</i> (서방파) (Seoul); <i>Kuk Che PJ P'a</i> (국제 PJ 파); 콜박스파; <i>Mu Dǔng San P'a</i> (무등산파); <i>Dae In Dong P'a</i> (대인동파); <i>Jun Ch'ǒn Si Min P'a</i> (준천 시민파); <i>Sun Ch'ǒn Chung Ang P'a</i> (순천 중앙파); <i>Mog Po So Sang P'a</i> (목포 서산파); <i>Kwang Yang Baek Ho P'a</i> (광양 백호파); <i>Na Ju Daehong Dong P'a</i> (나주 대홍동파); <i>Po Sang Yǒk Chǒn P'a</i> (보성 역전파); <i>Chǒn Ju P'a</i> (전주파); <i>Wǒldǔk'up P'a</i> (월드컵파); <i>Na-i Tǔ P'a</i> (나이트파); <i>Baek Hak Gwan P'a</i> (백학관파); <i>Kurandu P'a</i> (그랜드파); <i>Paejiwhang P'a</i> (배치장파)
<i>Kangwǒn-do</i>	<i>Yǒn Pang P'a</i> (연방파); <i>San Chong Noki Hwik P'a</i> (산중로기 획파); <i>San Pik T'ori P'a</i> (산빅토리파)
<i>Cheju-do</i>	<i>Yu Tak P'a</i> (유탕파; 산지파); <i>Ttang Pǒl P'a</i> (땅벌파)

3. Key to Research Participants

Police/prosecutors

NAME	OCCUPATION	STATUS	CITY
Kim, Jung Gil	Minister of Justice	Retired	Seoul
Kim, Hong Il	Prosecutor	Chief Prosecutor/General of Narcotics and Organized Crime (OC)	Seoul
Kim, Young Jin	Prosecutor	Senior Prosecutor, Director: OC Division	Seoul
Lee, Sung-Yoon	Chief Prosecutor	Drug and OC Dept.	Inch'ŏn
Kim, Tae-Kwon	Public Prosecutor	Drugs and OC Dept.	Inch'ŏn
Park, Dong In	Public Prosecutor	Drugs and OC Dept.	Inch'ŏn
Chae, Yong-Jae	Police Officer	Chief of Korean National Police OC Div.	Seoul
An, Heung Jin	Police Officer	Chief of Korean National Police OC Div (Retired)	Seoul
Pyo, Chang Won	Professor	Korean National Police University	Yongin
Tanigawa, Kunitomo	Police Officer	National Police Agency (Japan). Japanese Liaison based in Seoul	Seoul
Tokashi, Susumu	Police Officer	National Police Agency (Japan). Japanese Liaison based in Seoul	Seoul
P1	Police Officer	Violent Crime Division	Seoul

P2	Police Officer	Violent Crime Division	Seoul
P3	Police Officer	Violent Crime Division	Seoul
P4	Police Officer	Violent Crime Division	Seoul
P5	Police Officer	Violent Crime Division	Seoul
P6	Police Officer	Violent Crime Division	Ansan
P7	Police Officer	Violent Crime Division	Ansan
P8	Police Officer	Organized Crime Division	Pusan
P9	Police Officer	Organized Crime Division	Pusan

***Göntal*: Group A**

NAME	OCCUPATION	STATUS	CITY
GA1	<i>Göntal</i> (developer/promoter)	<i>Tumok</i>	Seoul
GA2	<i>Göntal</i> (construction)	<i>Pu-tumok</i>	Seoul
GA3	<i>Göntal</i> (entertainment)	<i>Pu-tumok</i>	Seoul
GA4	<i>Former Göntal</i> (construction)	Former <i>Pu-tumok</i>	Seoul
GA5	<i>Former Göntal (local political organizer)</i>	Former <i>Pu-tumok</i>	Seoul/ Chönju
GA5	Former <i>Göntal</i> (small business owner)	<i>Ko mun</i>	Seoul

GA6	Former <i>Göntal</i> (political organizer)	<i>Ko mun</i>	Seoul
GA7	Former <i>Göntal</i> (gambling and loan shark)	Former enforcer	Seoul/Ansan
GA8	<i>Göntal</i> (gas stations, land speculator)	<i>Haengtong-daechang</i>	Seoul/ Kyöng-gi
GA9	<i>Göntal</i> (gas stations, construction)	<i>Haengtong-daechang</i>	Seoul
GA10	<i>Göntal</i> (construction)	<i>Haengtong-daechang</i>	Seoul

***Göntal*: Group B**

NAME	OCCUPATION	STATUS	CITY
GB1	<i>Göntal</i> (entertainment/Technology)	<i>Tumok</i>	Seoul
GB2	<i>Göntal</i> (undisclosed)	<i>Pu-tumok</i>	Seoul
GB3	<i>Göntal</i> (entertainment)	<i>Pu-tumok</i>	Seoul
GB4	Former <i>Göntal</i> (Head of sports organization)	<i>Pu-tumok</i>	Seoul/Chönju
GB4	Former <i>Göntal</i> (massage parlors/room salons/escort service)	Former <i>Pu-tumok</i>	Seoul
GB5	Former <i>Göntal</i> (undisclosed)	<i>Ko mun</i>	Seoul

***Göntal*: Group C (outside of Seoul)**

NAME	OCCUPATION	STATUS	CITY
GC1	<i>Göntal</i> (undisclosed)	<i>Tumok</i>	Pohang
CG2	<i>Göntal</i> (nightclub owner)	<i>Haengtong-daechang</i>	Pohang

CG3	<i>Göntal</i> (hostess bar owner/escort service)	<i>Haengtong-daechang</i>	Pohang
GC4	<i>Göntal</i> (Construction)	<i>Tumok</i>	Suwŏn
GC5	<i>Göntal</i> (undisclosed)	<i>Haengtong-daechang</i>	Busan
GC6	<i>Göntal</i> (undisclosed)	<i>Haengtong-daechang</i>	Busan
GC7	<i>Göntal</i> (undisclosed)	<i>Haengtong-daechang</i>	Chŏnju
GC8	<i>Göntal</i> (undisclosed)	<i>Haengtong-daechang</i>	Chŏnju
GC9	Former <i>Göntal</i> (body guard and driver for a politician)	<i>Haengtong-daechang</i>	Chŏnju
GC10	Former <i>Göntal</i> (tattoo-artist)	<i>Haengtong-daechang</i>	Chonju

Forced Evictees

NAME	OCCUPATION	STATUS	CITY
Victim 1 (VC1)	NGO staff	Head of NGO	Seoul
Victim 2 (VC2)	NGO staff	Vice President of NGO	Seoul
Victim 3 (VC3)	Undisclosed	N/A	Seoul
Victim 4 (VC4)	Undisclosed	N/A	Seoul
Victim 5 (VC5)	Undisclosed	N/A	Seoul
Victim 6 (VC6)	Undisclosed	N/A	Seoul
Victim 7 (VC7)	Undisclosed	N/A	Seoul

Street Vendors

NAME	OCCUPATION	STATUS	CITY
SV1	Street vendor	N/A	Seoul
SV2	Street vendor	N/A	Seoul
SV3	Street vendor	N/A	Seoul
SV4	Street vendor	N/A	Seoul
SV5	Street vendor	N/A	Seoul
SV6	Street vendor	N/A	Seoul

4 . IRB Participant Consent Form

Consent to Participate in a Research Study

The Political Economy of Private Protection: Funded by Fulbright Korea

PI: Jonson Porteux, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan

Faculty Adviser: Assistant Professor Kenneth McElwain, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan

Jonson Porteux invites you to participate in a research study about outsourcing of protection to non-state actors in South Korea. The purpose of this study is to understand how states organize and regulate violence wielding institutions (in this case, South Korea) in the face of political and economic development. This study is funded by the Fulbright Commission (Korean-American Education Commission).

I am very glad to have you as one of my respondents in this study and I hope you can accept our interview. Your experience and opinions are very important to this research. While you may not directly benefit from this research in the short term, it is the overall hope to better understand this phenomenon and your assistance will greatly help with the intended result of this study.

The researchers have taken the following steps to minimize the risks of this study. You will not be identified in any reports of this study. All your answers and records including your name, address, and contact methods will be kept confidential and will be destroyed after the research is complete. Your name will absolutely not be identified in this study, and will instead be listed as a number and letter of the alphabet (e.g. respondent A1). Furthermore, Sensitive questions will only be asked at the general, non-specific level so as not to put you at risk from punitive damage (legal or otherwise).

We plan to publish the results of this study, but again, we will not include any information that would identify you. There are some reasons why people other than researchers may need to see information you provided as part of this study. This includes organizations responsible for making sure the research is done safely and properly, including the University of Michigan, government offices or the study sponsor, the Fulbright Commission.

The interview will take about 40 minutes. However, it may be necessary to contact you again for further questions and/or clarification of answers previously provided. The maximum amount of secondary contacts would be no more than 4—each consisting of a maximum time of 40 minutes each. During the process of interview, there might be some questions that you are not familiar with, we hope you can understand and cooperate. I would like to remind you that your participation in this study is completely voluntary. If at some point you are not comfortable with the interview, or with the way it's going, you can ask us to stop the interview. Even after the interview is over, if you would like us to not use the interview, please let us know. That will be absolutely fine. If it is not convenient for you to answer any specific question please let us know, we will respect your opinion, skip this question, and move on to the next. And also, during the interview, please do not give your name, address, and other identifying information. Lastly, when referring to other people, please do not use names of other people.

If you have questions regarding the research project, please contact the Principal Investigator, Jonson Porteux by email at jporteux@umich.edu. If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, or wish to obtain information, ask questions or discuss any concerns about this study with someone other than the researcher(s), please contact the University of Michigan Health Sciences and Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board, 540 E Liberty St., Ste 202, Ann Arbor, MI 48104-2210, (734) 936-0933 [or toll free, (866) 936-0933], irbhsbs@umich.edu.

Thank you for your cooperation!

고지에 입각한 동의 알림

사적 보호의 정치 경제학

연구 책임자: 펠트 존슨 (Jonson Porteux), 정치학과

연구 교수: Kenneth McElwain 정치학과

미국의 미시간 대학은 한국에서 사설조직에 폭력행위를 의뢰하는 일에 대한 연구를 수행하고 있습니다. 이 연구의 목적은 한국처럼 정치적, 경제적 발전을 이룩한 국가에서 정부가 폭력조직들을 어떻게 통제하는지 이해하기 위한 것입니다. 저희는 이 연구에 도움을 주실 분으로 귀하를 모시게 되어 대단히 기쁘며 저희의 인터뷰를 받아들여 주시기를 희망합니다. 인터뷰를 통해 듣게 될 귀하의 경험과 의견은 저희의 연구에 매우 중요한 것입니다. 저희는 진심으로 귀하의 격려와 도움을 받게 되기를 바라며 귀하는 이 연구와 관련된 어떤 보고서에서도 신원이 노출되지 않을 것입니다. 귀하께서 주신 모든 답변과 정보, 즉 귀하의 이름과 주소, 연락처 등은 기밀로 유지될 것이며 이 연구가 끝난 뒤에는 모두 파기될 것입니다. 인터뷰는 40 분 정도 소요되며 중간에 귀하께 익숙하지 않은 질문이 나올 수도 있습니다. 하지만 추후에 심층질문을 드리거나 기존의 답변 내용을 명확히 하기 위해 다시 연락을 드려야 할 필요가 있을 수 있습니다. 이 점 이해하고 협조해 주시면 대단히 감사하겠습니다.

이 연구에 귀하가 참여하는 것은 전적으로 자발적이어야 한다는 것을 알려 드리고 싶습니다. 인터뷰 도중 불편해지면 귀하께서는 언제나 저희에게 중지할 것을 요구하실 수 있습니다. 인터뷰가 끝난 후에라도 귀하가 제공한 정보나 의견이 이용되는 것을 바라지 않으시면 저희에게 말씀해 주시면 되며 그것은 전혀 무리한 요구가 아닙니다. 그리고 어떤 질문에 답하기가 곤란하실 때 진행자에게 말씀하시면 귀하의 의견을 존중해서 그런 질문은 피하고 다음 질문으로 넘어가겠습니다. 또한 인터뷰 도중에 이름과 주소, 또 달리 신원을 밝힐 만한 정보를 주지 마십시오. 마지막으로, 다른 사람을 언급할 때 그들의 이름도 직접 인용하지 말아 주실 것을 부탁드립니다.

연구 프로젝트와 관련하여 궁금한 점이 있으시면 연구 책임자인 Jonson Porteux (jporteux@umich.edu)에게 이메일을 보내 주십시오.

연구 참가자로서의 권리에 대한 궁금한 점이 있으시거나 이 연구의 승인과 관련해 알고 싶은 점이 있으시면 미시건 대학의 행동과학 및 건강 분야 연구윤리심의위원회 Institutional Review Board for Behavioral Science and Health (주소 : 540 East Liberty Street, Suite 202, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA 48104-2210)에 연락해 주십시오. 전화 번호는 734-936-0933 이고 이메일은 irbhsbs@umich.edu 입니다.

협조에 감사 드립니다. 자, 이제 시작해 볼까요?

5. IRB Oral Script

The Political Economy of Private Protection: Project funded by Fulbright Korea

PI: Jonson Porteux, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, affiliated with Seoul National University

Faculty Adviser: Professor Kenneth McElwain, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan

Hello. I am researcher from the University of Michigan in the United States, and I am conducting research on the outsourcing of protection and enforcement of regulation to non-state actors. I am wondering if you could kindly agree to participate in my interviews. I will ask some questions about your opinions and experiences concerning private protection. The interview will take about 40 minutes. The interview will take place at a convenient time and location for you. I very much appreciate your support!

안녕하세요? 저희는 미국 미시건 대학 소속의 연구원들입니다. '저희는 정부가 단체에 보호활동을 의뢰하는 일이나 사례에 대한 연구를 수행하고 있습니다.. 귀하께서 저희의 인터뷰에 응해 주실 수 있는지 여쭙고자 합니다. 저희는 지방 법 제도와 관련한 귀하의 의견과 경험에 대한 질문을 할 것입니다. 인터뷰는 40 분 가량 소요됩니다. 인터뷰는 귀하께서 편한 시간과 장소에서 하고자 합니다. 도움에 진심으로 감사드립니다.

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