Redefining the Nation: Center-Right Party Outreach Toward Ethnic Minorities in Western Europe

by

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Professor Robert W. Mickey
Dedication

For my parents, Donald L. Miller and Angelina Miller, my grandmother, Janice D. Miller, my sister, Melissa A. Miller, and my rock, Bisous.
Acknowledgements

Many people’s kindness, generosity, and unwavering support made this dissertation possible. First, my thanks go to my committee members, Anna Grzymala-Busse, Kenneth Kollman, Robert Mickey, Robert Franzese, and Andrei Markovits. They all provided me countless hours of their time and energy, and I am forever in their gratitude. Anna Grzymala-Busse has tirelessly given me intellectual and moral support since the dissertation’s inception. Her guidance has been the most influential part of graduate school for me. I entered her course on regimes convinced political science was not for me; I left passionate to learn more. More than her keen intellect, I am indebted to Anna for her warmth and genuine care. She boosted my confidence when it was at an all-time low, and has been there for me through my darkest days. It is because of her that I was able to get this far, both for intellectual and personal reasons.

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broached sensitive issues with my committee for me. I feel incredibly lucky to have met Rob, and I hope one day I can help someone as much as he has helped me.

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Last, my heartfelt thanks got to my family. My parents taught me the value of family, high standards, hard work, and pure, unconditional love. Without their daily support, I would most certainly not have reached this support. I cannot overstate the importance of my sister Melissa’s unflinching friendship, wisdom, and insight. Her wit, empathy, and intelligence inspire me. I am incredibly luck to have her as my sister. I would also like to thank my beautiful and loving grandmother, Janice Miller, for believing in me when no one else did. Her words of encouragement gave me the strength to finish this dissertation. Finally, Bisous never left my side as I researched and wrote this dissertation, providing me with love and comfort every step of the way. This dissertation is dedicated to them.
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## List of Abbreviations

### Political Party Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Christen Democratisch Appèl (Christian Democratic Appeal), Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christlich Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union), Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSU</td>
<td>Christlich Soziale Union (Christian Social Union), Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D66</td>
<td>Democraten 66 (Democrats 66), Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party), Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GL</td>
<td>GroenLinks (GreenLeft), Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>Front National (National Front), France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KF</td>
<td>Det Konservative Folkeparti (Conservative People’s Party), Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>Moderaterna (The Moderates), Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Party of Democratic Socialism), Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Parti socialiste (Socialist Party), France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>Partij van de Arbeid (Labor Party), Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVV</td>
<td>Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom), Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPR</td>
<td>Rassemblement pour la république (Rally for the Republic), France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Socialdemokratiska arbetareparti (Social Democratic Party), Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Socialdemokraterne (Social Democrats), Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>Union pour la démocratie française (Union for French Democracy), France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMP</td>
<td>Union pour un mouvement populaire (Union for a Popular Movement), France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VVD</td>
<td>Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy), Netherlands</td>
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</table>
Abstract

Why do mainstream center-right parties in Western Europe seek the votes of immigrants at some time and not others? What are the implications of party strategies for immigrants’ future political incorporation? Dominant explanations focus on these parties’ use of immigration and race issues to attract anti-immigrant rather than immigrant voters. Yet considerable spatial and temporal variation in center-right party strategy toward ethnic minorities challenges this view. The explanation offered in this dissertation is that rather than treat all ethnic minorities the same, center-right parties distinguish between those with citizenship and those without, and this difference drives their outreach strategies. Specifically, they may pair exclusive positions toward non-citizens with inclusive stances toward citizens. Yet in retaining core voters by antagonizing non-nationals, these parties forfeit the support of future ethnic minorities citizens, thus introducing a second, inter-temporal trade-off in addition to the broadening versus mobilizing dilemma. The severity of both trade-offs varies with the ratio of ethnic minority citizens to non-citizens. Moreover, these trade-offs are not fixed; parties may seek to mitigate them through electoral outreach and policy. Statistical analysis of party positions from the Comparative Manifesto Project combined with data on naturalization rates from Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK, from 1970-2010 show that changes in this citizenship ratio best account for variation in center-right party outreach despite differences in institutional, competitive, and economic conditions. It is when the number of citizens relative to the number of foreigners is growing that center-right parties seek to redefine the nation.
Chapter 1: Introduction

Why do some mainstream, center-right parties in Western Europe seek the votes of ethnic minorities, or non-Western immigrants and their descendants, at some times and not others? This question is pressing in light of the challenges presented by post-war migration. Between 1950 and 1970, approximately 30 million people entered Western Europe, making this wave of mass immigration among the largest in recorded history (Castles et al. 1984, 1). Immigration of this magnitude can radically and permanently affect a population’s composition. Indeed, according to official state projections, by 2050, between 15 to 30 percent of national populations in Western Europe will be of foreign origin (Coleman 2006, 415). This wave of migration is also remarkable for its composition. Unlike previous inflows to Europe – to the extent there was any – most migrants came from non-European countries (Lucassen and Laarman 2009, 53). It is this consequence of immigration – cultural and ethnic diversity – that captures the majority of political and public attention (see e.g., Koopmans et al. 2005; Bleich 2003).

What is of interest here is how mainstream center-right parties respond to these demographic and cultural changes. The majority of these parties trace their origins to the time of nation building during which their progenitors engaged in a systematic effort to build a nation through cultural homogenization and standardization. These parties have since portrayed themselves as national, rather than sectional, parties, and have built reputations of protecting “us” from “them.” Thus, the conventional wisdom is that these parties would rush to defend their visions of nationhood from the threat posed by the presence of millions of
culturally, religiously, and racially diverse immigrants. Specifically, as more ethnic minorities enter the national electorate, observers would predict that these parties would forgo their votes. They would concentrate instead on mobilizing native voters, perhaps, in part, by expressing some antagonism toward ethnic minority groups. After all, the preservation of the nation-state and national identity are critical components of these parties’ identities, and thus the retention of “core supporters.”

Yet substantial temporal and spatial in outreach strategies confounds these expectations. Some of these parties have championed anti-discrimination and even affirmative action policies. In the Netherlands, the center-right Party for Democracy and Freedom (VVD), governing in coalition with the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), proposed and passed the 1987 Ethnic Minorities in Public Service Act. This measure established quotas for the number of ethnic minorities in the public service to increase their representation.¹

Others have actively recruited ethnic minority candidates, and restructured their organizations to boost ethnic minority participation and representation. Beginning in 1976, the British Conservatives have created internal party divisions to increase ethnic minorities’ support for and representation within the party. By the 2005 general election, the Conservative Party had the highest proportion of ethnic minority candidates, surpassing even Labour (Norris 2005a).

Center-right politicians have also delivered high profile, symbolic speeches lauding ethnic minorities’ contribution to the country. In 2006, the governing German Christian Democrats (CDU), proposed the “Germany Islam Conference – Prospects for a Common

Future.” Wolfgang Schäuble, CDU-member and Minister of the Interior, declared in his parliamentary speech introducing the conference, “Islam is a part of Germany...Muslims are welcome in Germany. They should develop their talents and they will drive our country further.”\(^2\) This statement stood in stark contrast to the party’s former strategy of “no recognition” of ethnic minorities as either present or future German citizens during the Kohl government, i.e., the CDU/CSU-led ruling coalition government of 1982-1998 (Joppke 1999).

These examples demonstrate that center-right parties have appealed to ethnic minorities, and that they employ a diversity of methods in doing so. Such variation raises questions regarding these choices’ determinants. These differences matter as they have distinct policy correlates as well as implications for immigrant political incorporation. My explanation is *center-right parties recognize the difference between ethnic minorities with citizenship and those without in their policy positions, and this distinction drives their outreach strategies.*

Although the immigration and party literature addresses the differences in the politics of immigration control and integration, it overlooks the pressures specific to those policies targeting citizens versus non-citizens, obscuring the powerful effect minorities’ legal status and voting rights have on party strategy. Specifically, center-right parties may pair exclusive positions toward non-citizens with inclusive stances toward citizens. Yet in retaining core voters by antagonizing non-nationals, these parties forfeit the support of those ethnic minorities who become citizens in the future. Center-right parties thus face an inter-temporal trade-off as well as a broadening versus mobilizing dilemma. The severity of both trade-offs varies with the ratio of ethnic minority citizens to non-citizens. Changes in this citizenship

\(^2\) Deutscher Bundestag. 2006. Stenografischer Bericht. 54 Sitzung. 28 September.
ratio best account for variation in center-right party outreach strategy. Moreover, these trade-offs are not fixed; parties may seek to mitigate them through electoral, organizational, and programmatic tactics. Critically, under certain conditions, parties may enact policies to alter the boundaries and content of citizenship, and thus seek to redefine the nation.

This chapter proceeds as follows. In Section I, I marshal theoretical and empirical evidence to demonstrate why this research question does indeed constitute a puzzle. I then provide an overview of the observed variation on the dependent variable. Section II reviews the set of explanations offered to account for such variation, namely those that emphasize party competition, the sociological climate, and the institutional environment. Given that these explanations are ultimately unsatisfactory, in Section III, I propose an alternative way of looking at the puzzle. I posit that the answer to this dissertation’s guiding question lies in recognizing the way that politicians see the complexity of the ethnic minority population in light of their goals. Section IV describes the case selection and methodology. Finally, Section V concludes with an overview of the dissertation.

I. Presenting The Puzzle And Variation in Party Strategy

Center-Right Parties As Unlikely Suitors

Why does this research question constitute a puzzle? That is, why are center-right parties unlikely suitors for ethnic minorities’ electoral support? After all, current demographic trends suggest that ethnic minorities will constitute a non-negligible proportion of the population in Western European states by 2050, as evident in Figure 1.1. Moreover, parties would want to mobilize immigrant voters in particular because they are relatively “blank slates” – they enter the electorate without being socialized by family experiences or having had experienced the major national events that has marked the voting patterns of the
rest of the electorate. In this sense, they are far more ‘available’ for mobilization by all major political parties, and their electoral impact can alter balances within the party system for generations to come (Schain 2008, 466). Yet despite such incentives, there are two reasons why center-right parties are still unlikely to court ethnic minority voters.

Figure 1.1 Projected growth of the foreign origin population, 2000-2050

First, outreach is a puzzle in light of these parties’ ideological identity. The majority of dominant center-right parties are the successors of early nation-building elites. As a result of their lineage, the rhetoric of patriotism and the nation-state is thought to be the preserve of the political right (Taylor 1990). Moreover, their philosophies include “a rigorous defense of the ‘national interest’ against threats from without and from within” (Taylor 1990, 972). Ethnic minorities and their increasing demands for cultural recognition would seemingly constitute such a threat (see e.g., Koopmans et al. 2005). Mainstream parties of the right thus

Source: Coleman 2006. Note: “Medium variant” reflects a moderate level of in-migration.
face a mobilizational dilemma. By pursuing ethnic minority votes, they dilute their positions on central issues thereby diminishing their ability to mobilize core voters.

By contrast, ideology facilitates center-left party outreach toward ethnic minorities. The genesis of social democratic parties lies in the wake of industrialization as proponents of the working class (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Their historical origins make them credible champions socioeconomically disadvantaged, the politically vulnerable, and the socially marginalized (Messina 2006, 481). As a result, both party elites and rank-in-file members favor eradicating social inequalities and extending immigrant rights (Lahav 2004).

Second, reaching out toward ethnic minorities is also puzzling because the immediate payoff is expected to be low, incurring high costs – in terms of votes lost – and meager benefits – measured in number of ethnic minority votes gained. Regarding the latter, ethnic minorities in Western Europe overwhelmingly vote for left-of-center parties, which decreases the total number of votes center-right parties’ efforts will generate. Indeed, ethnic minorities’ support for center-left parties has been referred to as an “iron law” (Saggar 2000). Table 1.1 presents the vote intentions of ethnic minority citizens by nation of origin for France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK. It is immediately apparent that across all groups and all countries, the center-left disproportionately benefits from ethnic minorities’ support.

The Netherlands provides a notable exception. By the late 1990’s, Turkish and Antillean voters supported the Dutch VVD at rates similar to natives (Penninx et al. 1998, 471). Yet in 2006, the VVD lost much of its ground among ethnic minority voters, especially Turks, as a result of the party’s increasingly strident tone regarding multiculturalism. The Labor Party (PvdA) was the primary beneficiary of these defections, receiving a full 84
percent of their support (Heelsum and Tillie 2006). Of the Turkish VVD voters, 62 percent switched to the PvdA (Tillie 2009).

Table 1.1 Vote intention of ethnic minorities by country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Far-Left</td>
<td>Communists</td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>Socialist Party</td>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>UMP</td>
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<tr>
<td>North African</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Africa</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
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<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Germany: Vote Intention by Naturalized Turks, in %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Left Alliance/PDS</th>
<th>Greens</th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>FDP</th>
<th>CDU/CSU</th>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
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<td>2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
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United Kingdom: Vote Intention by Ethnic Group, in %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>Conservatives Asian</th>
<th>Labour Black</th>
<th>Conservatives Black</th>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>1987</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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The Netherlands: Vote Intention by Country of Origin, in %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Socialist Party</th>
<th>Green Left</th>
<th>PvdA</th>
<th>D66</th>
<th>CDA</th>
<th>VVD</th>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Morocco</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Surinam</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dutch Antilles</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Electorate</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: France (Brouard and Tiberj 2005); Germany (Wüst 2006; Alonso and Da Fonseca 2011a); UK (Anwar 2001; Messina 2007); Netherlands (Tillie 2009).

This support for center-left parties appears to be more than simply an artifact of economic interest. On the whole, the majority of ethnic minorities have below average incomes, are concentrated low-skilled occupations, and have higher than average welfare
state dependence – all which align their economic interests with those of center-left constituencies (Koopmans 2010; Messina 2007). Yet even when their socioeconomic status improves, ethnic minorities continue to vote for center-left parties. Such inelasticity in vote choice suggests that in their evaluation of political alternatives, identity trumps class for ethnic minorities. From this perspective, shared experiences of discrimination and interactions with dominant groups make it efficient for individual ethnic minorities to use their perception of the interests of ethnic minorities as whole as proxy for their own interests (Dawson 1994; Ireland 2000).

Outreach is also likely to be costly given center-right partisans’ opinions regarding immigrants and ethnic minorities. Figure 1.2 displays the distribution of opinion by partisans regarding the statement “people who do not share the country’s customs cannot become fully (country’s nationality).” The source of this data is the International Social Survey taken in 2003. The mean response by partisans of center-left parties is also “agree”; however, the inter-quartile range encompasses “agree” to “disagree”. The mean response for center-right partisans is “agree”, with an inter-quartile range extending from “agree strongly” to “neither agree nor disagree.” Those center-right party identifiers who “disagree strongly” are outliers. The only other party family with a constituency exhibiting the same distribution is the far-right. In fact, the electoral rise of radical right parties across the continent raises the costs of appealing to ethnic minorities by offering disgruntled constituents a viable exit option (Alonso and da Fonseca 2011b).
In light of these challenges, the use of the following incendiary slogan is unsurprising: “If you want a nigger for a neighbour – vote Labour.” In the general election of 1964, Peter Griffiths, a Conservative candidate for Parliament, bucked national trends and defeated the Labor incumbent no doubt by running an anti-immigrant campaign featuring this infamous 10-word slogan. Posters with this racist slogan were displayed prominently around the area. Approximately 20 years later, the Conservative Party’s posters were remarkably different. During the 1983 General Election campaign, the Conservative Party launched an ambitious bid to capture the ethnic vote. The party ran a series of poster campaigns focused on images of second generation Asians and Black Caribbeans. Accompanied by he claim that “Labour says he’s Black – Tories say He’s British.” The campaign aimed to court Conservative sympathizers among the black electorate (Layton-Henry 1984). While criticized for being heavy-handed, the party’s effort demonstrated a clear departure from its previous position.
The center-right Dutch VVD exhibited a similar trajectory, although in reverse. While party leader Frits Bolkestein did use inflammatory language in his discussion of Islam and the West in the early 1990s, the VVD was careful to temper this rhetoric with the promotion of anti-discrimination policies. As such, the party criticized the center-left government for not spending enough money on helping minorities nor including sufficient plans to help decrease the unemployment levels of ethnic minorities.\(^3\) Indeed, the government’s policy to reduce ethnic minority unemployment consisted of a non-binding agreement made by a cooperative body of employers and workers.\(^4\) The plan’s failure, due, in part, to its lack of enforcement mechanisms, prompted the VVD, along with the liberal D66 and the GroenLinks (Greens) to propose and pass a much tougher law, the 1994 Law to Promote Proportional Employment for Minorities. This law required employers to report annually the number of ethnic minorities hired. Non-compliance resulted in economic penalties and jail time.\(^5\) Despite the mixed findings regarding the policy’s effectiveness, it was favorably described as “wide ranging” and “proactive” (Joppke 2007, 260). By 2004, not only did the party allow the law to expire, but it also tried to repeal any affirmative action provisions in existing antidiscrimination laws.\(^6\) Moreover, Bolkestein’s earlier language was magnified and adopted in the party platform of 2004, in which the VVD emphasized the superiority of western civilization (van Kersbergen and Krouwel 2008).

\(^3\) *NRC*. 18 June 1991. “Opposities kritisch over opvangbeleid voor buitenlanders.”
\(^4\) *NRC*. 3 October 1990. “Kritiek op vage afspraken sociale partners; Akkoord over WAO en banen voor migranten.”
Variation in Center-Right Strategy toward Ethnic Minorities

The aforementioned anecdotes of center-right parties reaching out to ethnic minority voters challenge the conventional wisdom that these parties either solely ignore ethnic minority voters or mobilize against them. Yet how widespread are these efforts, and to what extent do center-right actors promote public policies that address ethnic minorities’ common concerns and further their interests? I take each in turn.

There are a variety of methods by which parties may seek to mobilize ethnic minority groups to participate in national elections. Indeed, the ways in which a party may appeal to a potential constituency are so diverse that it is difficult to operationalize. Party collaborations with community organizations, visits to areas with a high concentration of ethnic minorities, and features of diverse images in campaign materials all signal that the party welcomes ethnic minority support. For instance, in the run up to the 2002 French presidential election, the incumbent and candidate for the center-right, Jacques Chirac, made a point to increase his interactions with mothers of families in djeballas, a traditional North African garment, included images of himself with young people of North African descent on his campaign posters, and made highly-publicized visits to the Grand Mosque of Paris.7 In 1992, the Dutch VVD launched “Talent Management”, a candidate recruitment strategy to increase the number of ethnic minorities and young people on its list of candidates for the 1994 parliamentary elections. Candidate selection rules accompanied this initiative to ensure

broader representativeness. Having said that, one thing that these parties may all do to win ethnic minority votes is appeal to them in their party manifestos.

I draw on data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) to determine parties’ general level of electoral outreach (Volkens et al. 2012). This dataset records a party’s support for and prioritization of a set of issue positions. Outreach toward ethnic minorities can be measured by subtracting the total proportion of negative statements regarding ethnic pluralism from the total percentage of positive statements on this topic. Favorable mentions toward underprivileged minorities and support for multiculturalism capture the latter, while opposition to multiculturalism and promotion of a nationalistic way of life encapsulate the former. Figure 1.3 shows the general trajectory of parties’ outreach strategy from 1970 through 2010. Strategies of these center-right parties’ counterparts to the left are included to contextualize the level of outreach. The blue triangles represent the center-right’s position and the red circle the center-left’s position, respectively. Points above the x-axis represent inclusive positions toward ethnic minorities and those below exclusive positions.

As Figure 1.3 demonstrates, there is considerable variation in both center-right and center-left parties’ positions toward ethnic minorities. At some times, the center-right is more inclusive than the center-left, while other times the center-left clearly is more welcoming. Moreover, at some times, the two parties move in tandem, whereas in others they are polarized. The Danish and Dutch mainstream parties appear to move in similar directions. By contrast, the parties take opposing tacks in Germany and Sweden. Diverging positions

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9 To ensure the validity of this measure, I checked the trajectory of the constructed indicator variable against contemporary news sources and secondary literature. It appears to capture whether or not the party did reach out to ethnic minorities, and the general level of its efforts.
characterized the French mainstream from 1970 through 1994. In the ensuing years, however, the UMP and the Socialist Party (PS) have largely moved in sync.

Figure 1.3 Outreach as proportion of party manifestos, 1970–2010

While the focus of the empirical portion of this dissertation is on the center-right’s electoral activities, it is worth noting that its efforts extend beyond the campaign trail. Rather, once in office, or even while in opposition, center-right parties have also implemented policies that benefit ethnic minorities, namely anti-discrimination policies. Figure 1.4 shows variation in the proposal and passage of all anti-discrimination policies between 1970 and 2007. It is based on original data collected by an international team of research assistants.

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In accordance with Givens and Luedtke (2005), the definition of policy is kept as broad as possible, encompassing executive regulations, decrees, administrative rulings, and acts of parliament.
who were familiar with the language and politics in each of the six cases. These laws are weighted to capture their relative importance. Those policies that amended existing administrative and criminal law in minor ways warranted a 1, whereas those amending the civil code received a 2. Major criminal and civil policies, meaning that they were stand-alone laws, were coded 3 and 4, respectively. This coding scheme accords with the general consensus in the literature that civil law is a more effective method of fighting discrimination as convictions are easier to achieve.\(^\text{11}\) Blue indicates that policies were passed by the center-right and red the center-left. Yellow represents those policies passed by governments comprising both parties of the center-left and center-right.

Figure 1.4 Anti-discrimination policy by partisanship of proposing party

As the data in the graph clearly show, center-right parties have proposed and implemented major pieces of anti-discrimination legislation. The French UMP, the Dutch

\(^{11}\) The research assistants first coded each law on their own and then consulted with the author to get a second opinion on their judgments.
VVD, and the Danish Conservative People’s Party (KF) have been especially active in this regard, outpacing the efforts of the center-left. Conversely, the Swedish Moderates and German CDU have been much less active in this regard. The British Conservatives are especially weak in this regard. The party passed only one piece of antidiscrimination legislation – and a minor one at that – despite being in government from 1979 through 1997.

Of course, one may be tempted to dismiss these efforts because anti-discrimination laws align with the universal-liberal values characteristic of many parties on the right. Yet there is a surfeit of evidence that even these policies are met with staunch resistance within center-right parties’ ranks. For instance, in 1999, Gaullist party leader Alain Juppé advocated the creation of an independent authority that would examine discrimination cases in an effort to assist victims without means to seek legal redress. The governing Socialists decided against this proposition, in favor of creating an advisory board to study discrimination and establishing a telephone hotline for victims of discrimination (Geddes and Guiraudon 2004, 345). It was only until 2004, under the aegis of the Gaullist government and direction from the European Union, that such an equality body came into being. Nevertheless, according to Frédéric Salat-Baroux, the anti-discrimination body’s original proponent in 1999 and President Jacques Chirac’s chief-of-staff at the time of the bill’s proposal and passage, many of the party’s legislators initially balked at the legislation and only grudgingly voted for it.  

Even more costly are the type of antidiscrimination measures that include elements of affirmative action on the basis of group membership, which, as we have seen, the center-right has championed in the Netherlands.

12 Interview with Frédéric Salat-Baroux, 8 December 2010, Paris.
II. Potential Explanations And Their Limitations

What are the explanations offered to account for such variation? The literature overlooks the majority of center-right parties’ efforts, but insofar as it has examined this puzzle, there are three sets of explanations generated.

Party Competition

The first focuses on the structure of competition, namely the presence of a radical right competitor. Formed around immigration and ethnic minority issues, these actors initially functioned as single-issue parties, addressing immigration and minority issues that established parties commonly neglected (Meguid 2005; Betz 2002; Kitschelt and McGann 1995). Anti-immigrant parties thus not only raised public concern about these issues (Kresi 1999), but also forced mainstream parties to assume and/or change their positions on these topics (van Spanje 2010; Norris 2005b). Specifically, established players responded by shifting toward the right (Norris 2005b; Bale 2003; Harmel and Svåsand 1997; Pettigrew 1998), and co-opting the radical right’s positions and rhetoric (Minkenberg 2002; Schain 1987, 2002). The size of this movement depends on a party’s position on the left-right ideological continuum, with right-wing parties more likely to react quickly and decisively. Parties on the right are more susceptible to anti-immigrant parties for multiple reasons: they are anti-immigrant parties’ primary competition for votes (Carter 2005; van der Brug et al. 2005), immigration and integration have long preoccupied center-right parties’ core voters, even prior to a far-right threat (Perlmutter 1996), and their ownership of issues such as national unity and pride make it relatively easy to appropriate anti-immigrant parties’ stances (Bale 2003).
Two implications follow. First, mainstream parties are less likely to compete on the immigration and integration issue absent an anti-immigrant party. Although anti-immigrant parties undoubtedly played an important agenda-setting role, parties have long campaigned on these issues. For instance, immigration and integration has been a politicized issue in Germany since 1973 (Thränhardt 2000). Table 1.2 shows the total number of electoral programs between 1960 and 2010 in which a mainstream party made no reference to minorities, as measured earlier using CMP data.

Table 1.2 Salience of minority issues and anti-immigrant party emergence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of Programs</th>
<th>Programs with Zero Mentions</th>
<th>% Of Programs with Zero Mentions</th>
<th>% Before Anti-Immigrant Party Emergence</th>
<th>% After Anti-Immigrant Party Emergence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>CL</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CR</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>CL</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CR</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>CL</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CR</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>CL</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CR</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>CL</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CR</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>CL</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CR</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The data suggest that parties do highlight these issues in the absence of an anti-immigrant party. In two-thirds of our countries, less than 10 percent of all electoral manifests in this time period neglected these issues. While roughly a quarter to a third of Danish party manifestos that make no mention of minority issues occur prior to the emergence of an anti-immigrant party, the majority occur after the emergence of the anti-immigrant party. In contrast, the German parties largely conform to expectations. Yet given
that the German Republicaner’s did not make its national debut until relatively late, in 1990, it is unsurprising that all instances of neglect mention fall prior to its breakthrough.

Second, as anti-immigrant parties improve their electoral performance, center-right parties are less likely to engage in ethnic minority outreach and promote ethnic relations policies. However, center-right parties have supported inclusive ethnic relations policies not only when anti-immigration parties are present, but even after these parties’ most impressive electoral performances. For instance, following the electoral breakthrough of the Swedish anti-immigrant party, New Democracy, in 1991, when it managed to score seats in parliament, the governing Swedish Moderates proposed and ushered through Sweden’s first law prohibiting discrimination in the labor market (Graham and Soininen 1998). Similarly, beginning in 1997, the French center-right dramatically altered its strategy toward ethnic minorities, even as the radical right National Front (FN) took progressively more of its vote share (Meguid 2005). After the surprising appearance of FN candidate Jean Marie Le Pen in the second round of the 2002 presidential election, the party orchestrated a series of appeals to ethnic minorities, including the implementation of the French Council of the Muslim Faith in 2002 and promotion of programs with elements of affirmative action (Geisser and Zemouri 2007).13 Finally, there appears to be no relationship between prior anti-immigrant party electoral performance and whether or not a center-right party adopts a negative or positive stance position toward ethnic minorities (see Figure 1.5).

Similarly, while there are many examples of the mainstream right adopting radical right rhetoric, there are also many reports of the mainstream left engaging in the same behavior. For instance, both the Danish Social Democrats and the French Socialist Party have shifted to the right on immigration and minority issues following strong electoral performances by anti-immigrant parties (Bale et al. 2010). Such movements indicate that the left alters its strategy upon encountering a far-right challenger, as Figure 1.6 supports.
A modified understanding of party competition, then, has arisen to provide leverage on these puzzling outcomes. The modified spatial theory of party competition expands parties’ strategic responses to include tactics that influence the competitiveness of potential political dimensions (Meguid 2005; Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989; Budge et al. 1987). By emphasizing or ignoring an issue in an effort to increase or decrease its salience, parties are thus able to affect the electoral performance of opponents anywhere on a policy dimension (Meguid 2005). According to this framework, center-left parties adopt divergent positions on immigration to increase the issue’s salience and force the center-right to compete with the new entrant for voters (Meguid 2005). When center-left parties pursue the opposite strategy and move to the right on immigration and integration, they aim to undermine the radical
right’s support. The use of this tactic suggests that the center-left considers its voters to be susceptible to far-right appeals.

This approach still raises questions regarding party behavior on immigration and integration. First, it is not immediately obvious that an adversarial strategy provides center-left parties enough votes to justify deploying it. As previously discussed, center-right parties are credible proponents of more restrictive immigration and integration policies. Such restrictive positions are in line with public opinion, namely the average voter (Ivarsflaten 2005). All else held equal, increasing these issues’ salience may ultimately help the center-right, not hurt it. By that logic, why would the center-left choose to adopt a divergent policy stance if it knows that public opinion is against it? The ensuing loss of support to parties on its left flank is minimal (Bale et al. 2010). Second, the theory provides little insight into center-right’s choice to ignore the radical right, or adopt an adversarial position. For instance, the Gaullist’s and Swedish Moderate’s embrace of anti-discrimination policies following the spectacular electoral performance of the radical right suggests that short-term vote maximization may not have been the driver of party behavior.

**Sociological Climate**

The second set of explanations emphasizes the sociological climate in which parties compete. First, the economy’s health is thought to matter by creating conditions under which ethnic intolerance swells. When the economy is contracting, the demand for exclusionary politics grows (see e.g., Golder 2003; Jackman and Volpert 1996). Parties are thus more likely to refrain from courting ethnic minority votes, and may adopt antagonistic positions instead. By the same token, arguments in favor of diversity are more convincing to native voters during times of economic expansion (Quillian 1995). For instance, Blalock (1967:
viewed improved economic conditions as a possible source of improved relations between Whites and Blacks in the United States.

Second, the prevalence of immigrants has been posited both to decrease and increase the likelihood of mainstream parties seeking ethnic minority votes. In the first scenario, a large immigrant population is said to evoke anti-immigrant sentiment. Sociologists have long speculated that prejudice and discrimination increase as the relative size of the subordinate group increases (see e.g., Hjerm 2009; Quillian 1995). Blalock (1967) offers two reasons for this connection: (1) competition for scarce resources increases, and (2) potential for political mobilization. Blumer’s (1958) “group threat” theory suggests that prejudice should also increase in tandem with growth of the minority group. According to this theory, prejudice is a defensive reaction against explicit or implicit challenges to the dominant group’s exclusive claim to privileges. The greater the sense of threat to their prerogatives, the more likely dominant group members are to express prejudice against outsiders. For members of a majority group, the presence of a large ethnic minority population acts as an information cue of group threat, resulting in an increase in anti-minority attitudes and mobilization on anti-minority issues (Leighley 2001; Kunovich 2002; Quillian 1995; Scheepers et al. 2002; Semyonov et al. 2006, 2008; Schneider 2008; but see Hello et al. 2002; Hjerm 2007; Sides and Citrin 2007).

In the second scenario, parties are said to see a sizeable immigrant population as a potential source of votes. This explanation suggests that parties will be more likely to adopt inclusive positions when this population is larger. The mere existence of a group in electoral space ought to move the median voter towards the group’s interests (Benoit and Shepsle 1995; Key 1949). Further, the need to secure a majority creates the incentive for parties to
reach out and represent any and all groups (Dahl 1967; Holden 1966; Schattschneider 1942). The identity of the group is of little importance as “parties are remarkably hospitable to all points of views and to all manners of interests and people” (Keefe 1972, 10, quoted in Frymer and Skrentny 1990, 130). Yet parties’ behavior toward African-American voters contradicts these conclusions. First, party platforms were found to move further right as the African-American proportion of a district grew (Glazer et al. 1998). Second, Democrats largely ignored African-American interests while Republicans constructed a coalition on the basis of opposition to policies associated with African-Americans (Frymer and Skrentny 1998, 131-132). In light of these results, a variant of the Downsian model of party competition argues that relationship between party outreach and the size of the minority group in question is non-linear. An increase in the number of disliked voters should result in movements of party platforms away from the group; however, beyond a certain point the number of disliked numbers comprise an important share of the electorate and party outreach should occur (Glazer et al. 1998).

Evidence for these arguments have been mixed. The lack of a definitive answer may be a product of the way by which the presence of minorities is modeled. In empirical models, both explanations accounted for by measures of a country’s foreign population as a percentage of the total population. This oversight is surprising given that growing percentages of ethnic minorities within Europe become citizens through birth or naturalization. Party positions on ethnic relations issues may defy conventional expectations as a result of their strategies toward current or future ethnic minority voters.
**Institutional Factors**

The final class of explanations highlights institutional factors, a state’s citizenship regime and electoral system. Both have implications for the puzzle examined here: the variation in degree to which center-right parties reach out to ethnic minorities and support policies that benefit them.

First, configurations of nationhood and citizenship affect the form and intensity of political parties’ strategies to incorporate ethnic minorities. These models have an enduring impact on immigration policies and migrant incorporation (Brubaker 1992; Joppke 1999). Nation-specific traditions, crystallized in concrete policies, thus influence the opportunities for immigrants and their descendants to participate and be represented by political parties (Bleich 2003; Freeman 2004; Koopmans et al. 2005). For instance, national citizenship structures shape the type of identities ascribed to immigrants and their descendants, such as racial identities, ethnic and national identities, or policy-status identifiers (Koopmans et al. 2005).¹⁴

Two particular dimensions of citizenship – ease of access to the national community and level of group rights – are thought to influence the receptiveness of political parties to ethnic minority incorporation. The first concerns the ease of access to the national citizenship, and captures the degree to which citizenship acquisition emphasizes ethnic bonds or the territorial principle. The second concerns the amount of cultural difference citizenship allows, ranging from the insistence of cultural conformity, or assimilation, to cultural pluralism, or multiculturalism (e.g., Koopmans et al. 2005; Koopmans and Statham 1999; Safran 1997).

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¹⁴Similarly, traditional patterns of state-church relations impact the extent to which states recognize the religious claims of Muslims (Soper and Fetzer 2007).
Where policies emphasize shared descent and assimilation, opportunities for mainstream parties to reach out to ethnic minorities as such (rather than as members of a social class for instance) decrease. In contrast, where the programs and policies of a country integrate civic-political elements, mainstream parties intensify their outreach efforts. Policies that acknowledge group difference and emphasize civic forms of citizenship are said to facilitate the political incorporation of ethnic minorities for several reasons: immigrants enjoy easy access to citizenship and voting rights, ethnic minorities are recognized as possessing a distinct culture and set of interest, parties may explicitly target ethnic minorities in both policy offerings and electoral appeals, these solutions are more likely to resonate with the wider values and culture of the population, and finally, if parties do not engage in outreach, multiculturalism provides the symbolic and material resources that ethnic minorities need to agitate for inclusion (Bloemraad 2006, 236; Bird 2005; Geddes and Guiraudon 2004).

This model relies on two questionable assumptions. First, it assumes that citizens in states with ethno-cultural ideal types of national identity have strong preferences for cultural homogeneity and restricted access to membership. Politicians are thus constrained in the type of frames and policies they may advocate given the preferences of the electorate. Yet public opinion data show that there is simply little relationship between mass attitudes and citizenship policies (Howard 2006). In fact, the relationship between citizenship policies and attitudes is in the opposite direction than this theory would suggest, with the public more in favor of cultural monism in countries with less restrictive policies (Citrin and Sides 2008).

Second, this model assumes that existing integration policies predict ethnic political cohesion. Mobilization is easier in states with multicultural policies as ethnic minorities are more likely to exhibit a strong collective identity. While multicultural policies may provide
incentives for political entrepreneurs to adopt and maintain a certain identity, other factors, such as extensive social networks, shared cultural socialization, high levels of trust, and similar class interest (Zuckerman 1999). Furthermore, ethnic political cohesion and division are also functions of political institutions, especially political parties that stake positions that mobilize ethnic groups into their electoral coalitions or de-mobilize them out of an existing coalition (Kotler-Berkowitz 2001, 648). Bloc voting and mobilization on a specific identity should be seen as a consequence of group and party politics (Benoit and Shepsle 1995).

The electoral system acts as another set of institutional constraints on party strategy. In fact, their ability to structure the party system and offer elites incentives to behave in certain ways render them one of the most important institutional mechanisms for shaping political competition (Reilly and Reynolds 2000, 425). Three parameters characterize the electoral system: the number of votes cast per voter, the number of seats awarded in the typical district, and the level of proportionality by which votes are converted into seats. These elements, in turn, influence whether party leaders choose to adopt a persuasion strategy, or develop moderate programs aimed at attracting the greatest number of voters, or a mobilization strategy, or offer extreme programs that appeal to core constituents (Cox 2005). 15 This distinction between mobilization and persuasion strategies helps structure our thinking of how electoral systems affect center-right parties’ likelihood of pursuing ethnic minority support. We can assume that center-right party outreach toward ethnic minorities constitutes a form of persuasion because ethnic minorities are not a “natural” center-right constituency. Electoral systems with single-member districts and plurality or majoritarian

15Another possible strategy is coordination; however, I omit it from this analysis as it is peripheral to the dissertation’s primary questions. Moreover, since the number of votes per voter is one for each of our cases, I only examine district magnitude and electoral formula.
electoral formulas tend to whittle down the number of viable parties in a district to two and incentivize parties to converge on the median voter (Cox 1999). Two-party systems thus breed moderate and inclusive parties. The conventional wisdom is that single-member, first-past-the-post (SMD) electoral systems facilitate the incorporation of new groups, and immigrant groups in particular, as both parties seek to increase the size of their coalitions in order to win legislative representation (e.g., Dahl 1967; Downs 1957; Schattschneider 1942).

Conversely, when parties compete in proportional systems (PR) with higher numbers of seats per district, the likelihood of center-right party outreach should decrease. Proportional systems with high district magnitudes impede outreach by center-right parties at the national level for two reasons. First, an increase in both the number of seats per district and the degree of proportionality leads competitors to cater to narrow clienteles and to focus on mobilizing these core constituents’ support. Second, it is risky to mobilize new voters in PR systems. It is unclear whether they will support the mobilizing party or a spatially adjacent competitor (Cox 2005, 1999, 1990). The intuition behind the prevalence of persuasion and mobilization in different systems is as follows. When there are many seats to attain and they are allocated proportionally, parties only have to acquire small vote shares to win representation. Thus, parties may carve out ideological niches and still be successful. When parties vie for a single seat that is given to the plurality winner, they may win seats only if they can amass the largest shares of votes. Consequently, “appealing to a narrow ideological niche is insufficient to win seats and a broader appeal must be fashioned” (Cox 2005, 82).

Yet if the persuasion versus mobilization theory is right, then outreach is more likely in systems with plurality or majoritarian electoral formulas, or, in proportional systems with
lower district magnitudes. However, the correlation between the number of positive appeals in a party manifesto and average district magnitude is -0.12 and insignificant. This may be the result of the lack of consideration of the countervailing effect of the size and spatial concentration of ethnic minorities. On the one hand, when groups are small and spatially concentrated, single-member districts enhance representation because at least one of the ethnic minority groups will constitute a majority in at least one electoral district (Reynolds 1995). On the other hand, small groups are disadvantaged in proportional systems because they are not large enough to constitute a significant voting bloc. In contrast, when the ethnic minority group is both large and spatially concentrated, competitors in both PR and SMD systems ought to pursue ethnic minorities votes (given that in the SMD systems ethnic minorities constitute a large enough number of votes to affect the outcome in a relatively large number of districts) (Moser 2008). Finally, a large, geographically dispersed ethnic group should be a more attractive constituency in PR systems as the group can marshal a sizeable voting bloc. In SMD systems, the group’s spatial scattering renders them a less attractive constituency as it may not be large enough to be pivotal in many districts. It is worth noting that this final scenario is also the most rare given the well-established fact that immigrant communities are geographically concentrated (see e.g., Money 1997; White 1993).

In fact, given the spatial concentration of most minority groups, some scholars fault the lack of geographic accountability in proportional electoral systems for the lower level of political incorporation of ethnic minorities in Europe as compared to the United States. As district magnitude increases, the link between parties and their geographic electorate weakens (Cox 2005; Reilly and Reynolds 2000). Thus, in the United States, parties “gain power by mobilizing geographically concentrated ethnic and other interest groups to support candidates
allied with the party”, whereas in Europe, “most nations have some form of proportional representation only loosely linked to specific places” and “parties make appeals more in terms of class and ideology than group membership” (Mollenkopf and Hochschild 2010, 33). This explanation suggests that center-right party strategy toward ethnic minorities in majoritarian systems depends more on minority group spatial concentration than size, whereas the strategy of their counterparts in proportional systems hinges on the size of the minority group more than their spatial concentration.

Studies of minority representation reach a different conclusion; in fact, the consensus is that proportional representation provides better representation of ethnic minorities than SMD systems (see Moser 2008 for a review). First, minorities may create their own parties if they feel underrepresented by larger ones (Holden 2008). Second, larger parties may seek to place candidates on the party list who reflect minority constituencies to keep groups from straying (Holden 2008; Moser 2008; Reynolds 1995). The greater proportionality of the system encourages all parties to try to capture voting blocs, since even small increases in party’s vote share could translate into more legislative seats (Holden 2008; Moser 2008; Reynolds 1995).

The argument that the fewer the number of votes required to win an additional seat increases the value of minority votes is essentially one about competition. Across electoral systems, competition encourages parties to mobilize the greatest number of voters possible given that the probability of their effort translating into a parliamentary seat is much higher. Because every vote counts in PR, parties have an incentive to mobilize everywhere, resulting in more competitive elections (Gosnell 1930; Tingsten 1937). As Togeby (2008) states, “The intense competition among parties in a PR system creates incentives for the political parties
to place ethnic minority candidates on the list” (329). In contrast, the number of additional votes required to attain an additional seat is more variable in SMD systems (Blais and Lago 2009). When a district is uncompetitive, elites will neither engage in mobilizing support nor persuading voters. The probability of their efforts affecting the outcome is low (Cox 1999). In contrast, where competition is intense, parties will seek to mobilize a constituency if they perceive its support as being decisive. Minorities may become the object of party competition if they reside in hotly contested districted and if parties view their votes as deciding the winner (Leighley 2001; Saggar 1998). Thus, competition is the critical condition under which such claims that SMD generates highly integrative and accommodating parties obtain (see e.g., Key 1949).

**Limitations to Existing Approaches**

Ultimately, however, solely focusing on this set of existing explanations is problematic as they share the following three limitations. First, they tend to focus on only one or two parties over a small sliver of time. We are thus limited in our ability to understand the general factors, if any, are responsible for center-right parties’ strategic choices. Second, most studies treat short-term vote maximization as a given goal. Yet there are notable instances of center-right parties acting in ways incompatible with this goal. One need not look further than the Dutch VVD and French UMP’s aforementioned support of affirmative action and anti-discrimination policies. Rather than simply adopt policy positions in an effort to gain votes, parties may also adopt sub-optimal positions as an electoral investment in the future (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). We cannot take short-term vote maximization as a given goal. Instead, we should examine the totality of party goals and the role that pursuing
ethnic minorities have among these, as well as the short- and long-term trade-offs that would occur between these goals and the pursuit of a new constituency.

Finally, these dominant approaches tend to conflate two distinct categories of ethnic minorities: those who are citizens and can vote in national elections, and those who are not citizens and cannot vote. Instead, most scholars assume that parties adopt undifferentiated strategies toward immigrants regardless of their citizenship status. Similarly, much of this literature lumps together those integration policies that are aimed exclusively at non-nationals, such as citizenship laws, and those aimed at ethnic minorities more broadly, namely anti-discrimination policies. These studies assume that a party’s level of restrictiveness on immigration correlates positively with its opposition to policies that seek to retain or even stimulate cultural heterogeneity. Thus, a party’s position on one dimension is indicative of its position on the other. For instance, to measure a party’s stance on the immigration issue, scholars often employ Lubbers’s (2001) expert survey, which asks participants to provide an “immigration restriction” score for parties by placing them on a scale concerning “which runs from not very restrictive concerning immigration (0) to very restrictive (10)” (2001, 9). Rightward movements on this scale have been interpreted both as indicating a party’s withdrawal of support for the ideal of a multicultural society as a political ideal as well as a shift to a more restrictive immigration policy (Van Spanje 2010).

Thus, it is assumed that the same political logic guides party behavior on both issue dimensions, leaving us unable to explain why several center-right parties’ have shifted away from the ideal of cultural unity (Van Spanje 2010, 580). Previous work on immigration policymaking has shown that immigrant control and integration ought to be considered as two separate policy areas, with different political logics (Money 1999; Givens and Luedtke
At a basic level, it comprises those policies designed to deal with the longer-term consequences of migration and settlement that aim to construct a “successful, well-functioning multicultural or multi-racial society” (Favell 2003, 14). Given that the present ethnic diversity in Europe is due to large-scale postwar immigration, policies seeking to manage the issues that arise from racial and ethnic diversity “must in part be seen as linked to issues of immigrant integration” (Bleich 2003, 3). Bleich argues that while concerns about race cannot be completely separated from issues regarding immigrant integration, “they must often be seen as semi-autonomous, because race policies are not simply targeted at immigrants” (Bleich 2003, 4). He hypothesizes “as growing percentages of ethnic minorities within Europe become citizens through birth or naturalization, race and racism will stake out increasing independence from concerns about immigration and integration” (4). Thus, unlike immigration policies and certain integration policies, ethnic relations policies dealing with managing the consequences of diversity directly implicate a segment of the electorate. Parties may then weigh a different set of costs and benefits when formulating their strategies on these issues as opposed to those affecting non-nationals. For these reasons, these explanations are unsatisfactory, prompting us to ask, what is another way to look at this puzzle?

**III. An Alternate Explanation**

My explanation focuses on party strategy and the trade-offs parties face, specifically those between ethnic minority and core constituency support. The emergence and severity of this trade-off, I argue, is a function of a party’s historically rooted identity. For center-right parties, their historic association with the nation and the subsequent reputation as its
guardians means that to target and promote the interests of groups outside the nation, namely non-citizens, will cost them core voters’ support. After all, foreigners, who are not citizens, are, by definition, outside the national political community.

By contrast, the relationship between social democratic parties and the nation is more problematic (Taylor 1990). In fact, it has been described as one of “mutual rejection” (Van Ginderachter 2007, 215). Given their internationalist provenance, these parties do not face a citizen-versus-foreigner constraint. That is not to say that appealing to ethnic minorities is a costless venture for the center-left. Yet while they may still lose voter support as a result of approaching certain ethnic minority groups, the legal status of the targeted constituency will not be the cause.

The source of the electoral trade-off provides the theoretical foundation for the following two empirical claims. First, center-right parties distinguish between ethnic minority citizens, who can vote in national elections, and ethnic minority foreigners, who cannot. To appeal to ethnic minorities with citizenship is to reach out to a constituency and potentially gain votes. By contrast, courting ethnic minorities without citizenship only threatens the party’s identity while failing to offset any loss in core voter support with compensatory ethnic minority votes.

Second, center-right parties distinguish between those immigration and integration policies that pertain to ethnic minorities broadly and those that apply exclusively to foreigners. Pairing inclusive positions on the former with restrictive positions on the latter thus allows the party to expand and maintain its base simultaneously. That is, the party can cater to its base by adopting exclusionary positions on those policies that affect denizens. It
may also burnish its reputation among ethnic minorities by staking highly inclusive positions on those measures beneficial to them.

Yet as a result of distinguishing between citizens and non-citizens, center-right parties introduce an additional electoral trade-off: the intertemporal choice between preserving their present coalition and securing the votes of ethnic minorities in the future. This second voting bloc comprises current ethnic minority citizens, foreign nationals who naturalize, and members of ensuing generations who are able to become citizens. Those newly enfranchised ethnic minority who were once the object of the center-right’s more vitriolic rhetoric and draconian laws are unlikely to cast their first ballot for these parties. Thus, a dual-strategy may improve the center-right’s electoral performance in the short-term, but may cost them the support of a whole generation of voters in the long-term. Conversely, center-left parties do not face this brand of intertemporal trade-off. Their positions on integration and immigration policies are not constrained by the citizenship status of their intended beneficiaries.

Not all center-right parties face equally daunting challenges when considering reaching out to ethnic minorities; there are appreciable variations in the severity of these trade-offs. Yet what, exactly, renders these trade-offs more or less severe? I argue that it is the size and expected trajectory of the relative number of ethnic minority citizens to non-citizens, or the citizenship ratio, that determines their objective slope. This ratio affects the number of ethnic minority votes currently at stake and the potential size of the ethnic minority voting bloc in the future.

While changes in the citizenship ratio alter the severity of the trade-offs inherent in ethnic minority outreach, it is party leaders’ perceptions of this ratio that accounts for
variation in parties’ strategic choices. I posit that there are three means by which party leaders are made aware of the citizenship ratio: precipitous shifts in the ratio’s value, its effects on internal and external constituencies, and focusing events. Changes in the naturalization rate, or the number of citizenship acquisitions relative to the number of foreigners, is the primary driver of changes in the ratio, and thus those seismic shifts that garner party leaders’ attention and affect their relevant constituencies.

Party leaders are not helpless in the face of these trade-offs or the citizenship ratio. Rather, center-right parties may alter them through two tactics: outreach and policy. Outreach represents an electoral strategy by which a party seeks to increase its vote share among ethnic minorities while maintaining core voter support in the proximate election. This tactic has two goals. By explicitly targeting ethnic minorities, the party signals to ethnic minorities that they are welcome in the party. The party also aims to contain vote loss by influencing how its core supporters perceive diversity. It does this by highlighting social and cultural diversity’s advantages, as well as its compatibility with national identity.

In contrast, policy is an electoral investment intended to redefine constituencies. Rather than rely solely on the reputational benefits such policies may bestow in the short-term, parties implement these measures to diminish the differences between ethnic minority voters and the native population, and current non-citizens and the native population. Through these policies, the party intends to integrate ethnic minorities, whether it is in the domain of economic or educational achievement, so that individuals within this category vote based on their social values or economic interests, rather than on ethnic group concerns. The party is essentially diffusing a potential political cleavage, one that would be most likely to support a competitor. It is also minimizes the trade-off between current immigrants and future citizens
of immigrant descent, as well as its core clientele and ethnic minority voters. Namely, policies that improve the socio-economic status of ethnic minorities diminish the differences between citizens of foreign descent and the rest of the party clientele, and thus reduce this party trade-off. It also ensures that those immigrants who do become citizens will have the opportunity to improve their socio-economic position to the best of their individual abilities, which raises the probability of these voters supporting center-right parties bases on their economic interests or value-based concerns.

IV. Testing the Propositions: Case Selection and Methodology

To understand the how and the why of center-right party outreach toward ethnic minorities, this dissertation explores the strategic trajectory of center-right parties in six Western European countries from 1970 through 2010: Denmark, France, Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, and Sweden. This case selection provides variance on key environmental factors (see Table 1.3). For instance, the electoral formulas range from majoritarian - France, UK - to mixed - Germany - to proportional - the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden. Within these types of electoral systems, there is also variation in the peak performance of the radical right, the average size of the foreign population, measured as a percentage of the national population, and the ease by which foreigners may become a citizen, as indicated by the citizenship regime.

Within these countries, I examine variation in efforts by the following six center-right parties: the Danish Conservative People’s Party, the French Gaullists, the German Christian Democrats, the Dutch People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy, the Swedish Moderates, and the British Conservatives. I selected these parties based on their electoral dominance of the right ideological bloc in their respective country, which I defined on the basis of their
ideological position on the Left-Right economic axis as measured by expert surveys (Castles and Mair 1984). Moreover, I have examined these parties’ histories to confirm that they are the “guardians of the nation” in their respective countries.

Table 1.3 Case selection and values on key environmental variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Electoral System</th>
<th>Peak Radical Right Vote</th>
<th>Mean Percent Foreign</th>
<th>Citizenship Regime</th>
<th>Mean Outreach Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Liberal; Medium</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>Restrictive; Medium</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>Restrictive</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>Medium; Liberal</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Migration Policy Institute Country Profiles; World Bank; OECD. Note: Mean percent foreign is measured as the average between 1970 and 2010. Peak radical right performance is taken from 1980 and 2010.

I evaluate my theory using three complementary research methods. First, an analysis of Eurobarometer, European Social Survey, and International Social Survey data corroborates the theory’s propositions regarding the structure of partisan opinion toward minorities and immigrants. Second, I analyze an original dataset including naturalization rates, anti-discrimination policies, and citizenship policies from Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK between 1970 and 2010 to test the effect of changes in the citizenship ratio on the likelihood and choice outreach tactics. These cross-sectional time-series analyses confirm that changes in the composition of the ethnic minority population better accounts for variation in center-right strategies than party competition and socioeconomic conditions. Third, in the theory chapter, I assess the evidence for the theory’s
proposed mechanisms and processes by examining the center-right party’s decision to engage in outreach in France and the Netherlands. I systematically investigated internal party documents and conducted structured interviews with senior party officials and members as well as minority organizations to help evaluate whether explanatory factors and outcomes are correlated in ways consistent with the theory.

V. Outline of Dissertation

The dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I develop more fully an explanation for center-right party outreach toward ethnic minorities is more nuanced than standard treatments of their strategy in the immigration and integration literature posits. Rather than treat all ethnic minorities the same, center-right party leaders distinguish between those with citizenship and those without. Several ramifications follow, leading to a conception of party strategy toward ethnic minorities in which center-right parties can stake contrasting positions immigration and integration policies *writ large* based on their target population. I conclude with the theory’s testable hypotheses regarding the effect of citizenship status on center-right party strategy.

In Chapter 3, I test the theory’s empirical claims and implications. First, an exhaustive analysis of survey data supports the claim that center-left partisans hold consistent views on issues regarding minorities and immigrants whereas the opinion structure of center-right partisans differs based on the citizenship status of the intended beneficiaries. Second, I use evidence of party strategy toward ethnic minorities in six Western European countries from 1970 through 2010 to test the effect of changes in the citizenship ratio on the likelihood and form of outreach. I also measure the explanatory power of my model against that of competing explanations. These cross-sectional time-series analyses confirm that changes in
the composition of the ethnic minority population better account for intertemporal variation in center-right party outreach strategy.

Chapter 4 presents a summary of the dissertation’s argument and its main findings on the electoral strategies of center-right parties toward ethnic minorities. I then discuss future avenues of research. The chapter then concludes with a discussion of the larger implications of this study for the future incorporation of ethnic minorities in Western Europe.
Chapter 2: A Theory of Ethnic Minority Outreach

Mainstream center-right parties appear to be unlikely suitors for ethnic minority votes, even in light of record levels of international migration and minority naturalization in Western Europe (Coleman 2008). After all, these parties have proved willing to stoke voters’ anxiety about immigration to boost their vote share. Some have governed in coalition with fervently anti-immigrant parties to fulfill their office ambitions. Once in power, many have implemented restrictive citizenship policies consistent with their ideological vision of state membership.

Given the compatibility of anti-minority stances with a variety of their goals, why would center-right parties abandon this strategy of exclusion in favor of inclusion? Ethnic minorities’ low rates of political participation combined with the public’s general aversion to diversity render this strategy risky for any mainstream party, let alone the center-right. The odds of success grow even longer the more a party historically relied on a strategy portraying the presence of cultural diversity as a threat to national identity. Such a party’s about-face would most likely be greeted with suspicion and derision from ethnic minorities and hostility from core constituents. As a result, observers would predict that center-right parties would forgo seeking ethnic minority votes, choosing either to ignore this constituency or to mobilize native voters, perhaps, in part, by expressing antagonism toward these groups.

Yet as Chapter 1 shows, mainstream center-right parties do pursue ethnic minority support and in a variety of ways. They have created national consultation structures for immigrants and their descendants to influence policy, established quota systems to combat
minority unemployment, appointed ethnic minorities to high-level (and highly visible) ministerial posts, and canvassed votes in primarily ethnic neighborhoods. What accounts for such variation in positions toward ethnic minorities? Put differently, when and why do center-right parties view ethnic minorities as potential friend or foe?

The existing literature is much better at explaining the latter than the former. By taking short-term vote maximization as a given goal, the literature provides many reasons why center-right parties use immigration and race issues to attract anti-immigrant rather than immigrant constituents. Given the well-known electoral purchase of a hardline stance on immigration, outreach toward immigrant voters ought not to occur often, if at all (see e.g., Thränhardt 1995). More precisely, by assuming a single party objective and focusing on immediate electoral imperatives, current approaches are unable to account variation in center-right parties’ strategies toward immigrants and their descendants. Two questions thus remain. First, how do center-right party leaders perceive the challenges outreach presents? Second, what general factors affect the likelihood of center-right parties reaching out, despite differences in their competitive and institutional environments?

To answer these questions, I provide a theoretical framework, briefly reviewed here, that supports the following two empirical claims. First, center-right parties distinguish between ethnic minority citizens, who have the right to vote in national elections, and ethnic minority foreigners, who do not. Across Western Europe, only citizens are permitted to vote in national elections. To appeal to ethnic minority citizens is to reach out to a constituency and possibly increase the party’s vote share; to appeal to ethnic minorities without citizenship

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16 The UK is the sole exception. Citizens from the 54 Commonwealth and immigrants from 15 Dependent Territories are eligible to vote in national elections once they have established residency and registered to vote (Schain 2008). This eligibility is explained on the UK Electoral Commission: www.electoralcommission.org.uk.
threatens the party’s identity without the potential vote gain. Second, center-right parties distinguish between those immigration and integration policies that pertain to ethnic minorities broadly, and those that apply only to foreigners. Pairing inclusive positions on the former with restrictive positions on the latter allows the party to expand and maintain its base simultaneously.

By making these distinctions, center-right parties face two challenges when appealing to ethnic minorities. The first is an immediate electoral trade-off between mobilizing core constituents and broadening their base of support to include ethnic minorities. The second is an intertemporal electoral trade-off between maintaining their present electoral coalition and winning the support of ethnic minorities with citizenship in the future. The objective severity of these trade-offs, in turn, depends on the current and projected number of ethnic minorities citizens relative to ethnic minority non-citizens. This ratio’s magnitude and trajectory determine the current and future number of ethnic minority votes at stake. A growing number of ethnic minorities citizens to non-citizens translate to milder current electoral trade-offs and steeper intertemporal trade-offs by providing a pool of votes in the short-term and the potential for even more votes in the next five to ten years. By contrast, a decreasing ratio renders a mild inter-temporal trade-off, eliminating the specter of a sizeable ethnic minority vote. Parties may maximize their current vote share without fearing its potential effect on winning minority votes in the future.

While changes in the citizenship ratio alter the severity of the trade-offs parties face, such shifts may only account for variation in party strategy to the extent that party leaders perceive them and modify their strategy accordingly. There are countless reasons why party leaders may notice these changes; however, I posit that the majority falls into one of three
categories. First, the change’s size may be large enough to garner party leaders’ attention, such as a precipitate rise in the number of naturalizations in the wake of citizenship reform. Second, internal constituencies may inform party leaders of a sharp disjuncture in the ratio’s value. Local party officials reporting the strain on public services resulting from a surge in the number of foreigners is one such example. Third, party leaders may also perceive changes to the ratio via focusing events highlighting the social or political ramifications of the evolving ethnic minority population. One example of this mechanism is a riot by second-generation immigrants in response to widespread discrimination and chronic unemployment, which draws party officials’ attention to the size of the ethnic minority population with citizenship. Once aware of changes in the composition of the ethnic minority population, party officials may update the relevant trade-off parameters, and, quite possibly, their parties’ stance toward minorities.

These trade-offs are neither exogenous nor constant but rather amenable to two types of party tactics – outreach and policy. Outreach encompasses the set of appeals a party makes in its capacity in the electorate, as an organization, and as a governing institution to win a constituency’s electoral support. Policy includes those provisions that define citizenship’s boundaries and content. These two tactics have distinct time-horizons. Outreach is a short- to medium-term strategy. When a party engages in outreach, it aims to bolster its share of the vote in the next election while also setting the ground for new voters over the next five to ten years. The time horizon for policy is much lengthier. Parties do not enact such measures solely for their reputational benefits but also to redefine the boundaries, rights, and duties of belonging to the nation, thereby reshaping the character of the electorate.
Consequently, these policies may smooth the expected trade-off between core and ethnic minority voters.

In brief, the theoretical framework I develop here is build upon the obstacles center-right parties confront when appealing to immigrants and their descendants. The ratio of citizens to foreign nationals accounts for variation in the pay-offs associated with outreach strategies. This variable captures the rate at which ethnic minorities are passing through rather than huddling outside the ‘entrance gates’ of state membership (Hammar 1990). Party leaders’ perceptions of this ratio’s size and expectations of its trajectory affect both their decision to target ethnic minorities and the degree to which they appeal to ethnic minorities versus their core clientele. Such assessments also influence the set of tactics parties employ. Thus, the leadership’s estimation of the citizenship ratio’s actual and future size explains the likelihood that parties appeal to ethnic minorities and the mix of tactics they use.

This chapter presents in greater detail the theoretical framework sketched above. I elaborate on both types of trade-offs, their nidus, and their indicators in Section I. In Section II, I expatiate on the determinant of these trade-offs’ parameters, the citizenship ratio. I provide a more complete definition of the citizenship ratio and its component parts, present how it shapes parties’ environments, and explicate the ways it affects party leaders’ strategic choices. Having considered party strategy in terms of ‘whom’ to recruit, in Section III, I address the ‘how’ of strategies by connecting party leaders’ goals at different time horizons to the mix of tactics they employ. Section IV concludes with a list of this explanation’s observable implications.
I. The Challenges of Seeking Minority Support

Center-right parties reaching out to ethnic minorities face immediate and intertemporal electoral trade-offs. I begin by examining why and how appealing to ethnic minorities may hamper parties’ ability to maintain core constituent support. I argue that a party’s ideological identity is the source of the potential conflict between these two constituencies. It is this identity, in turn, that distinguishes center-right parties’ challenges from those confronting their counterparts on the center-left. I then describe both trade-offs’ observable features and consequences.

Electoral Trade-Offs and Their Determinants

The concept of an electoral trade-off rests on the assumption that, on a very general level, political parties cannot appeal to all social groups successfully. For a trade-off to occur, pursuing one constituency results in losing support from another. As Przeworski and Sprague (1985) note, “[A]n electoral trade-off can be found between any two groups” (63). This observation rings particularly true when ethnic minorities comprise one of these groups in light of the “strong hostility to immigrants on the party of many, if not most, Europeans” (Howard 2009, 55). One such manifestation of public antipathy to immigrants is the rise of anti-immigrant parties. These parties’ ability to garner support across social groups, most notably blue-collar workers and small-business owners, suggests that outreach poses significant challenges to mainstream parties on the left and right alike (Ivarsflaten 2005, 465). While minority outreach may affect parties’ performance among many constituencies, the focus here is on the interrelationship between core constituencies and ethnic minorities.

I posit for an electoral trade-off to occur, party leaders must consider ethnic minorities divisive. By appealing to ethnic minorities’ interests, party leaders undermine their
ability to maintain their current coalition’s support (Frymer and Skrentny 1998). As Chapter 3 will demonstrate, divisiveness is primarily a function of a party’s historically rooted identity. After all, “[P]olitical parties are not empty vessels into which issue positions are poured in response to electoral or constituency pressures; rather, they are organizations with historically rooted orientations that guide their response to new issues” (Marks and Wilson 2000, 434). According to Lipset and Rokkan’s theory of party system formation, parties of the center-left and center-right mobilized under similar historical circumstances to represent the same interests (Marks and Wilson 2000; Mair and Mudde 1998). These parties consequently share core identities. Concordantly, the expectation is that leaders of the same party family encounter similar challenges when considering reaching out to minorities. Party identity influences the difficulties outreach presents by establishing core constituencies and defining the now long-standing agendas that mobilize intense commitments among party leaders and activists (Marks and Wilson 2000; Panebianco 1988; Budge et al. 1987). The range of potential strategies is therefore a product of foundational ideologies and endogenous organizational constraints (Marks and Wilson 2000, 434). On those issues evoking values central to their identity and the retention of core voters, parties have less flexibility.

Thus, mainstream parties face tough choices between enlarging and maintaining their base, but center-right parties’ core ideological feature, namely their historic relationship with the nation, distinguishes their challenges from the center-left’s. For the center-right, defense of tradition and the nation are integral to its identity. These parties are the “political guardians” of society’s set of core values that give the nation its defining characteristics (Parkin 1967, 279-280). The majority of these parties’ progenitors were “active nation-building elites” who mobilized to build a nation through cultural homogenization and
standardization “at the eve of the breakthrough of democratization” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 35-37). The continued association of these parties with cultural conceptions of the nation is captured in a description of the type of resistance nation-building elites faced from corporate claims of the church. What was at stake “was far more than a matter of economics…the fundamental issue was one of morals, the control of community norms” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 15). The two parties whose inceptions were much more recent – the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and French Gaullists – have no less of a claim to the role of “political guardians” of national interests (see e.g., Wiliarty 2010; Lachaise 1994; Haegel 1990).

By contrast, the historical relationship between social democratic parties and the nation has been less harmonious. Simply put, “nationalists were deaf to class appeals and socialists had no fatherland” (Van Ginderachter 2007, 215). Socialist parties emerged in the wake of early industrialization to promote the working class’s interests. Rather than acting as the grounds for mobilization, the nation, and national identity in particular, served a potential foil. Indeed, Marx deemed nationalism a bourgeois contrivance created to divide emancipatory movements (Berger 1999). Early party leaders echoed this sentiment, denouncing national identity as a false consciousness obstructing the proletariat’s class awakening (Van Ginderachter 2007). ‘Class-consciousness’, on the other hand, a distinctively proletarian value-system, embodies principles that, at many points, opposed the capitalist order (Parkin 1967, 284-485). As a result, Parkin notes that in capitalist societies, the values and symbols historically associated with parties of the left are “at odds with the dominant institutional orders and central values of the society” (1967, 280).
Socialist parties’ orientation toward the nation at the time of their emergence stands in sharp contrast with that of the center-right. The modern center-right and center-left’s predecessors initiate and close Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) account of the formation of the European party system. In describing its development, the authors observe:

“There is an intriguing cyclical movement in this scheme. The process gets under way with the breakdown of one supranational order and the establishment of strong territorial bureaucracies legitimizing themselves through the standardizing of nationally distinct religions and languages, and it ends with a conflict over national versus international loyalties within the last strata to be formally integrated into the nation-state, the rural and the industrial workers” (47-48).

Both historical relationships with the nation have implications for the type of challenges appealing to immigrant voters poses for the center-left and center-right. The center-left’s ideological identity does not preclude reaching out to ethnic minorities without citizenship. Appealing to denizens is consonant with the mainstream center-left’s historical origins. These parties’ predecessors mobilized to equalize living conditions, promote social rights, and create formal legal equality (Markovits 2005; Hobsbawm 1996, 43; Marshall 1950).

By contrast, reaching out to groups considered outside the national community places considerable stress on center-right parties’ identities. Citizenship, understood simply as a legal category, institutionalizes this trade-off. By sharply delineating the boundaries of national membership, citizenship demarcates “who is included in the concept of ‘the people’…[and] at least an implicit understanding of who is excluded” (Howard 2009, 3).

The possession of a passport does not automatically translate into full-fledged acceptance as an equal member of the nation. Cultural notions of belonging also matter. Recognition by the majority population, and center-right partisans in particular, varies with a
group’s *perceptual distinctiveness* and its *salience* (Sniderman et al. 2004). Some minorities in Western Europe may stand out by virtue of skin color, religious dress, language skills, or educational and labor market handicaps (Hagendoor et al. 2003, quoted in Sniderman et al. 2004). Phenotype and religious dress provide visual cues about group membership are particularly conspicuous in many Western Europe countries, precisely because of their homogeneity (Bail 2012, 54). These cues may limit positive contact between groups, allowing racial and religious stereotypes to persist unchallenged (Allport 1958).

External events and collective memories may increase a minority group’s salience. For instance, following the 2002 and 2004 murders of two strident and prominent critics of Islam, filmmaker Theo Van Gogh and populist politician Pim Fortuyn, Muslim minorities’ perceived distinctiveness in the Netherlands soared (Andeweg and Irwin 2009). Surveys since have shown that the general public regards the Surinamese the minority group most integrated into Dutch society. While their phenotype makes them one of the Netherland’s most visible minority groups, those of Surinamese descent are considered more Dutch than the “white-but-not-quite-so-white” Moroccans and Turks (Andeweg and Irwin 2009, 47; Essed and Trienkens 2008, 58).

Two implications follow. First, center-right party outreach toward minorities recognizes the difference between immigrants who are not citizens, and thus ineligible to vote in national elections, and immigrants who are citizens and consequently can vote. To appeal to ethnic minority citizens is to reach out to a constituency and potentially boost the party’s vote share. To appeal to ethnic minority non-nationals threatens the party’s identity

17 Non-nationals do have the right to vote in local elections in some Western European states, including Denmark, Sweden, and The Netherlands (e.g., Howard 2009; Koopmans et al. 2005).
while failing to offset a loss in core voter support with a potential gain in votes. Second, parties differentiate between immigration and integration policies that do not apply to citizens, and those that do. Party strategy on these two policy dimensions ought to follow different logics as the latter directly implicates part of the electorate while the former does not (Wilson 1986). At a minimum, it renders center-right parties’ positions on these policies less manifestly contradictory.

From the perspective of these distinctions, center-right parties confront two electoral trade-offs. The first is the immediate choice between the support of ethnic minority voters and that of its core clientele. Although these ethnic minorities are citizens, seeking their votes is not without cost, especially if voters hold consistent policy attitudes on immigration and integration, and lump “foreigners”, “immigrants”, and “ethnic minorities” into one category (Crowley 2001, 104). In this case, parties may employ outreach methods that explicitly acknowledge their legal status. They may also attempt to uncouple immigration issues from those arising as a result of cultural and ethnic diversity, such as anti-discrimination policy, which affect ethnic minorities regardless of their nationality.

The treatment of such policies as “semi-autonomous” would benefit center-right parties in two ways. First, it would free them from competing for ethnic minority votes on existing immigration policies – a risky endeavor given many center-right parties’ historical support of more draconian measures. Second, this strategy would help persuade voters that immigration and integration are better perceived as two separate issue domains based on the intended beneficiary’s citizenship status (Druckman and Lupia 2000, 6). If successful, core voters may be less likely to view outreach efforts as aimed at foreigners and thus anathema. Such attempts to create new axes of competition by separating diversity-related issues from
immigration, termed “heresthetics” by Riker (1986), would benefit the party if successful by setting the standards on which it and other parties compete for minority votes. Of course, the diversity issue must not have recently, or ever, the basis of competition for this strategy to work.

For example, the French Union for a Popular Movement’s (UMP) ardently promoted diversity and equal opportunity issues, topics the political class rarely touched. Beginning in 2004, the party implemented a series of measures to foster diversity in the private and public sectors, the media, and in higher education (Bereni and Jaunait 2009; Simon 2008). Not only did these efforts lead scholars and public alike to view the UMP as ‘owners’ of diversity issue (Simon 2007), but the party also managed to supplant foreigner integration with recognition of ‘visible minorities’ as the dominant framing of diversity-related issues in politics (Escafré-Dublet and Simon 2009, 142).

The second trade-off center-right parties encounter is the intertemporal choice between preserving their current coalition and securing ethnic minorities’ votes in the future. This second group comprises those ethnic minorities who are currently citizens, those who are nonnationals but naturalize in the future, and members of ensuing generations who are able to become citizens.18 To maintain the countenance of their present coalition, these parties may engage in exclusivist rhetoric toward foreigners and stake restrictive positions on immigration policies. Yet by mobilizing core constituents on the basis of anti-foreigner rhetoric and policies, the party sets in motion a nonlinear electoral performance – short-term

18 There is significant variation in how states attribute citizenship to second- and third-generation immigrants. Some allow for citizenship at birth while others provide for citizenship upon reaching majority, either as an entitlement or at the bureaucracy’s discretion (see Howard 2009, 20-22).
benefits – while potentially losing the future support of a whole generation of voters – long-term costs.

Conversely, the center-left does not face as steep an intertemporal trade-off because these parties’ self-definition does not include defining and preserving national identity. Party leaders’ policy positions on integration and immigration policies are not constrained by the citizenship status of the intended beneficiaries. Thus, while mainstream center-left and center-right parties risk losing core constituent support by appealing to minorities, they do so for different reasons, and this distinction based on citizenship produces an additional, intertemporal trade-off for the center-right.

The Diverse Manifestations of Electoral Trade-Offs

The trade-off between mobilizing and broadening the party’s base may assume a variety of forms. Some may have a specific tactical fillip, occurring as result of the use of programmatic or organizational methods to acquire minority support. Others emerge by sheer virtue of deciding to target ethnic minorities and are thus more commonly observed. In this section, I review two forms this trade-off may take, specifically between satisfying activists and new constituents, and maximizing vote and office aspirations.

One form the trade-off may take is as a conflict between catering to party activists and potential new constituents. Emphasizing the benefits of securing future electoral successes holds little sway over ideologically-motivated activists as they unlikely ever to hold office themselves, and will thus care little about these long-term strategic considerations (Hirschman 1970). Moreover, the party’s “identity” wing will most likely be the source of this strategy’s most vociferous opponents. These supporters are most inclined to see immigrants as a challenge to national identity (Bale 2008, 324; Schain 2008, 154). Resistance
from these internal constituents is likely to the extent that outreach threatens core ideological principles.

This variant of the broadening-mobilization predicament is especially pernicious for two reasons. First, when activists fiercely cling to extreme views, they effectively obstruct compromise (see e.g., Aldrich 1995; Wilson 1962; Hirschman 1970). Second, activists may directly influence strategy through formal mechanisms of intraparty democracy and their provision of personnel- and campaign-related services (Carty 2004; Scarrow et al. 2000; Strøm and Müller 1999; Mair 1994). It follows that activists raise the costs of outreach when they have both the capacity and opportunity to affect party strategy, such as in candidate selection and in the drafting of electoral programs.

First, nominating ethnic minority parliamentary candidates may prove costly given that activists increasingly wield influence over candidate selection (Carty 2004; Scarrow et al. 2002). Activists may undermine outreach efforts by ignoring or opposing outright any central office orders to nominate more ethnic minorities. For instance, local constituencies, normally charged with candidate selection, greeted the British Conservatives’ “A-list” initiative of preferred parliamentary candidates consisting of minorities and women with considerable resistance. The party quietly dropped the program in 2010.19

Intra-party tensions will likely be on full display when the policy program is subject to vote at the party conference. Its vaunted status as the “authoritative statements” of party policies makes the electoral program a natural focal point for activist mobilization (Klingemann et al. 2006; Strøm and Müller 1999, 10). The public airing of dissent is a

potential electoral liability insofar as it causes voters to discount the future implementation of the party’s policy commitments (Dunleavy and Ward 1981, 378). Such rancor was on full display at the 2005 UMP symposium on integration. As reported by the media, “activists in the room booed several times” as invited speakers held forth. Notably, an audience member interrupted a speech on the value of increasing the number of visible minorities in the media by exclaiming, “I, too, am a minority! I have blue eyes and I’m blonde.” At one point, an activist’s statement caused panelist Kacet Salem to marvel, “But what party am I in! This is not a debate; this is a smear campaign!”

In countries with multi-party systems and where intense strategic interactions characterize government formation, this trade-off may manifest as a choice between maximizing votes and coalition potential. Simply put, coalition governments create differential strategic incentives for parties. Mainstream parties may refrain from mobilizing certain issues because the potential electoral gains cannot be guaranteed outweigh the costs associated with the loss of future coalition partners (De Vries and Hobolt 2012, 251). Positions on issues of societal diversity may affect the center-right’s ability to secure the support of small liberal parties of the center. These parties are the most likely coalition partners of the mainstream center-right, but in the case of an ideological conflict over social-cultural issues, may drift to the left (Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008; Harmel and Svåsand 1997). For example, in the 2006 election, the Swedish Conservatives adopted a more centrist position on integration issues, emphasizing the importance of Swedish language education, combating discrimination, and providing equal opportunities in the labor market. The party adopted these positions as part of its overall effort to form a center-right

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‘Alliance’ with the Liberal People’s Party, the Center Party, and the Christian Democrats to stand united against the Social Democrats (Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008). Furthermore, by moderating its positions on ethnic minority issues, the party may multiply the number of potential coalition partners so as to include less common partners, such as the center-left. As a result, its chances for entering government grow, especially in countries with many political parties (Strøm 1990).

For mainstream parties accustomed to governing, such an outcome is highly prized. After all, votes have no intrinsic value in and of themselves. Politicians pursue and cling to electoral coalitions as means of winning office (Müller and Strøm 1990; Riker 1962). Joining a bi-partisan government fulfills these ambitions, but the cost may be steep. Participating in “grand” coalitions may prove to be an electoral liability, saddling the members with policies their supporters abhor (Hillebrand and Irwin 1999), and potentially stranding the party in the opposition for the foreseeable future (Strøm 1990; Laver 1989). In fact, party activists and core voters may prefer a coalition with the untested radical right to the mainstream left. For example, during the 2010 Dutch cabinet negotiations, activists deluged the VVD’s Rotterdam office with emails and letters opposing the party entering government with Labor (PvdA). Only two activists objected to the party cooperating with the anti-immigrant Party for Freedom (PVV).\(^\text{21}\)

The first indicator that the party perceives a trade-off between pursuing ethnic minority voters and preserving core constituent support is the ratio of the party’s symbolic to substantive programmatic appeals. Symbolic policy proposals comprise those highly visible measures designed to have little or no real effect (Mazur 1995; Elder and Cobb 1983; 

\(^\text{21}\) Interview with Jean-Paul Frishert, 19 April 2011, Rotterdam, the Netherlands.
Edelman 1964). Once in office, center-right parties may recourse to symbolic policy to appear responsive to ethnic minorities while maintaining core constituent support.

Indeed, European center-right parties have championed symbolic policies targeted toward ethnic minorities. In 2005, French prime minister and member of the center-right UMP, Dominique Villepin, created the Ministry of the Promotion of the Equality of Opportunity and appointed the first-ever person of North African descent as governmental minister (others before him had been secretary of state), Azouz Begag. Later, in his tell-all book, Begag reported his constant frustration at the lack of resources available to implement any policies (Begag 2007). In Sweden, the center-right coalition passed the country’s first comprehensive law forbidding ethnic discrimination; however, the law was limited in scope and poorly implemented. Indeed, the government stated outright that the law’s primary purpose was to alter the public sense of justice as to prevent discrimination by means of its ‘signal effect’ (Graham and Soininen 1998). Thus, the center-right government promulgated a law that was clear and concrete, arguing that too complex a law may irritate the majority population and thus lead to resentment against the very people the law was designed to protect.

Another indicator of the short-term trade-off is the symbolic use of the party’s organization. Traditionally, a party’s organization is a mechanism used during electoral campaigns to reach voters and increase turnout. The symbolic use of the party organization, in contrast, is not to mobilize voters but to present diversity among its members as a method to attract new voters (Philpot 2002; Rohrschneider 2002). The German CDU’s pursuit of

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22 Agence France Presse. 2 June 2005. “Azouz Begag, nouveau ministre délégué à la Promotion de l’égalité des chances.”
23 Regeringens Proposition 1993/94, 6.4:37.
Turkish-origin voters’ support exemplifies this tactic. In 1997, the party created the German Turkish forum. Ten years later, its website highlighted their shared conservative values (Donovan 2007, 467-468).

Yet why, exactly, do symbolic gestures reveal party leaders’ sense that appealing to ethnic minorities will be divisive? Through such efforts, the party appears to accommodate new demands all the while remaining loyal to its traditional agenda. This strategy is difficult to execute. To be successful, the party must simultaneously convey to core voters that it has not changed while convincing ethnic minorities its efforts are sincere. Conversely, adopting policy positions that clearly benefit ethnic minorities signals the importance of securing ethnic minority support to the party (Meguid 2008, 48). Where the leadership perceives a conflict between ethnic minorities and core constituents, it will concentrate its efforts on symbolic gestures to appeal to ethnic minorities.

Assuming that substantive policy positions are indicative of the sincerity of party efforts, and thus more effective in winning ethnic minority support than symbolic policies and gestures carries two important caveats. First, events heavy on symbolism but light on symbolism but light on everything else have proven capable of repelling and attracting voters (Basler 2008). Second, individuals incorporate both affective and substantive components when forming their image and evaluations of a party, with some people missing greater weights to certain aspects than others (see e.g., Philpot 2004, 249-250; Petrocik 1996; Matthews and Prothro 1962). Assessments of the sincerity of party efforts based on the relative use of symbolic and substantive appeals should keep these provisos in mind.

**Evidence of Intertemporal Trade-Offs**

The theory advanced here stipulates that party leaders consider outreach strategies’
diachronic and synchronic costs and benefits before making a final choice. In particular, party leaders considering pairing outreach with restrictive positions on immigration must recognize this dual strategy’s long-term consequences, and incorporate intertemporal costs and benefits in their decision calculus. Such a requirement renders this theory far more exigent than typical explanations of party strategy. By positing that party actors make choices on the basis of their long-term consequences, as well as their immediate effects, this theory stipulates that party elites behave in a way that flies in the face of the known “democratic myopia” (Nordhaus 1975, 188). Yet there are theoretical reasons to suggest and empirical evidence to suggest that political actors are capable of seeing beyond the short-run.

First, the prolific literature on party behavior abounds with explanations predicated on the capacity of key actors to think beyond the short-term (see e.g., Tavits 2006; Cox 1997, 158-159; Laver 1997, 137; Strom 1990). Indeed, one prominent theory attributes the very origin of parties to political actors’ foresight. Legislators would still be constantly negotiating new winning coalitions instead of investing in the formation of durable legislative coalitions, that is, political parties, if not for their ability to weigh the potential future benefits against current costs (Aldrich 1995; Schwartz 1989). The long-term evaluations of party actors even feature among studies examining party behavior during electoral campaigns, one arena in which short-term outcomes are arguably the most consequential. For example, researchers explain why parties adopt extreme positions that may not be electorally optimal in the short run by referencing long-term incentives to increase the party's likelihood of winning elections and effect social transformation (Iversen 1994a, 1994b; Gerber and Jackson 1993; Przeworski and Sprague 1986).
Empirically, instances of policy investment, such as pension reform and carbon taxes, evidence the ability of political actors to make intertemporal choices. These measures comprise policy investments, choices that require the extraction of resources in the short term in the service of outcomes only manifest in the long-term. Simply put, policy investments would be unthinkable if elected officials only responded to the myopic pressures of electoral politics (Jacobs 2011, 3). Many valued outcomes, such as a skilled workforce, are only generated through slow-moving processes (Jacobs 2011, 2008; Grzymala-Busse 2011; Garrett 1993). Similarly, policies enacted to intervene early in slow-moving processes that generate public “bads” require that leaders value these policies’ future benefits more than their short-term costs (Jacobs 2011). Voters, in turn, are either unaware of such costs if they are diffuse, or are willing to accept them on the basis of the future benefits these policies are expected produce (Jacobs 2011, 2008; Moravcsik 1993, 487-488).

Having established that party leaders do have incentives to consider the long-term consequences of their strategic choices, we must then ask what observable features do such types of decisions generate. At heart, choices that take on an intertemporal structure in the context of center-right party outreach are defined by a comparison between expected vote share gains in the near-term and vote share losses in the long-term. Thus, evidence that a long-term trade-off is occurring is most readily apparent in settings where strategic choices emerge, namely party deliberations, and have implications for the arguments participants employ, the way in which they frame the choice, and the type of information they marshal.

First, the arguments participants call forth when debating the merits of the dual strategy should explicitly reference the consequences of maintaining an anti-foreigner position on the party’s future share of the ethnic minority vote. Second, the lines of reasoning
elites will employ will often be predicated on the assumption that the party has little chance of improving its future electoral position without current sacrifice or preemptive action. This implication reflects the general tendency for influential actors to include long-term considerations in their decision-making when they perceive a certain outcome to be unavoidable and feel constrained in their ability to avoid it (Jacobs 2011, 23). Third, actors should draw on information that points to the expected size of the ethnic minority population or features of this population that would render it unlikely to support the party on the basis of objective criteria. For example, they may show that ethnic minorities’ current level of educational attainment or labor market position suggest that they will continue to constitute a natural base of support for their competitors.

Finally, there are implications for the set of policy choices that emerge when the trade-offs party leaders face take an intertemporal form. Party leaders may seek to mitigate the potential costs of its position on immigration by enacting policy reducing the future size of the ethnic minority citizenship population. One method is to make it more difficult to acquire citizenship. The spate in civic integration tests required for citizenship, and even for entry, does just this. In Denmark, the center-right government raised the level of difficulty of a citizenship test whereby applicants demonstrate their knowledge of Danish culture, history, and society in 2008 resulted in a sharp drop in the naturalization numbers even though the number of immigrants enrolled in the preparatory program increased (Ersbøll 2010).

Another method by which parties may decrease the number of ethnic minorities with citizenship is to reduce the number of second-generation immigrants eligible to acquire citizenship through deportation. We may now understand why during the French presidential elections in 1981, the Gaullist party’s candidate for the presidency, Jacques Chirac,
supported the deportation of children born in France to immigrant parents, *many of whom would automatically become citizens at the age of 18.*24 The public outcry these more draconian measures historically provoke may lead parties to choose to limit the number of second-generation immigrants eligible for citizenship by modifying the citizenship code. For instance, in 1996, the Dutch center-right majority blocked a law formalizing a policy instated by the Minister of Justice four years earlier that permitted dual-citizenship, and thus enabled many second-generation Turks to become Dutch citizens. The argument was that the increase in the number of naturalizations was evidence that the process was too easy. The center-right prevailed, and naturalization rates subsequently fell (Böcker and Thränhardt 2006, 82-84).

The feasibility of potential policy, both in terms of its effectiveness and the party’s ability to pass it, depends on elite *perceptions* of two temporal processes: the speed at which the processes producing a second generation population are unfolding, and the amount of time left before it is prohibitively costly to reverse this process. The latter consideration is critical as these public policies are designed to intervene early in slow-moving processes, while the former affects the choice between policies based on their temporal horizons, with rapid growth demanding an immediate response. By contrast, these policy choices should be absent if party leaders view these processes as nearly complete and irreversible, and their set of feasible actions most likely oriented at reducing the pool of potential citizens, i.e., foreigners. This situation is most commonly observed when the center-right has previously implemented measures to restrict growth of the second-generation population. The subsequent reversal of these policies and the aging of the second-generation population both

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raise the costs of this tactic and narrow the scope of its impact. Such a process characterizes the French case, whereby the second generation’s right to French citizenship was cemented in a 1998 law and is no longer contested. As one scholar notes, “Sarkozy and the right are turning their attention to questions of entry (and exit, as they actively push for the deportation of undocumented immigrants), without putting into question the citizenship rights of the second generation born in France” (Howard 2009, 153 fn. 18).

In such cases, when the number of ethnic minority citizens is too large, and when the number of ethnic minorities is increasing steadily, parties may implement measures to diminish the differences between ethnic minorities and the native population, and thus the salience of ethnic identity. Such policies would include anti-discrimination measures, aimed at improving ethnic minorities’ socio-economic position by removing artificial barriers to social mobility, as well redistributive policies, a more aggressive method whereby the government reduces inequality between the native and ethnic minority population by redistributing economic, political, or cultural rights. The former policy is less politically costly than the latter in that it is less likely to stir up resentment among native voters. After all, anti-discrimination policies provide ethnic minorities (as individuals) access to the equal treatment that citizenship formally promises, whereas affirmative action or positive discrimination policies is explicitly unequal in its treatment of citizens. While anti-discrimination policy is more politically palatable for this reason, targeted redistribution is often considered more effective (de Zwart 2005). Yet parties are acutely aware that targeted programs, especially those that designate minority groups as beneficiaries, entail recognition and accentuation of the very social distinctions considered to be the root cause of the inequality these policies seek to eliminate. These policies may potentially cause resentment,
“entrench ethnic divisions, stimulate ethnic conflict, and thus be an even greater threat to the nation” (de Zwart 2005, 138). Parties may advocate this type of policy design out of administrative pragmatism, or opt to construct less polarizing criteria for inclusion, such as geographic location. The benefit of the latter type of provisions is that its costs tend to be diffuse, indicating that voters are largely unaware of these redistribution schemes. Given that electoral considerations are not the sole rational for adopting these policies, it is worth reiterating that the arguments party leaders use to advocate for their implementation must include those features delineated earlier. Table 2.1 summarizes the discussion above.

Table 2.1 The Intertemporal Trade-Off and its Policy Implications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICY</th>
<th>OBJECTIVE</th>
<th>DEVELOPMENT OF ETHNIC MINORITY CITIZEN POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions to Citizenship Acquisition</td>
<td>Reduce number of ethnic minority citizens</td>
<td>Growth in ethnic minority citizen population; applicable at most rates of change and stages of development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions to Automatic Naturalization for Second Generation</td>
<td>Impede citizenship acquisition for second generation</td>
<td>Rapid change in the number of citizens; early stage of development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repatriation</td>
<td>Reduce size of second generation population</td>
<td>Rapid change in the number of citizens; early stage of development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Discrimination Policy</td>
<td>Reduce size of electoral trade-off in the future</td>
<td>Growth in ethnic minority citizen population; applicable at most rates of change and stages of development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative Action – Ethnic Categories</td>
<td>Reduce size of electoral trade-off in the future</td>
<td>Rapid change in the number of citizens; medium to late stage of development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative Action – Non-Ethnic Categories</td>
<td>Reduce size of electoral trade-off in the future</td>
<td>Medium to rapid change in the number of citizens; any stage of development.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. Understanding the Citizenship Ratio and Its Effect on Party Strategy

Having established the trade-offs that center-right parties face, I turn to the determinants of their slope: the ratio of ethnic minorities citizens to non-citizens. I describe
the citizenship ratio in more detail, explaining the factors driving its trajectory, and thus, the conditions that objectively render the trade-offs outreach presents center-right parties more or less severe. Based on identifying these determinants and their potential impact on parties’ strategic choices, this section advances a set of conditions under which party leaders are likely to perceive, and thus act upon, the citizenship ratio and its expected trajectory. In particular, the citizenship ratio is most likely to affect party strategy when there is a sharp disjuncture in the ratio’s trajectory, when its features affect center-right parties’ internal constituencies, or when focusing events make certain features of the citizenship ratio salient.

**The Citizenship Ratio’s Impact on The Expected Payoffs of Strategic Appeals**

While the distinction between citizens and non-citizens is key to identifying the set of trade-offs center-right parties face, the ratio of ethnic minorities citizens to non-citizens, or the *citizenship ratio*, determines their slope. Precisely because it captures the number of ethnic minority votes at stake in the proximate election and the pool of ethnic minorities still available to enter the electorate, the citizenship ratio is an important consideration. In essence, the ratio’s *magnitude* and *general direction of growth* renders the environment in which a party operates more or less hospitable to reaching out to ethnic minorities. I take each in turn.

The magnitude of the citizenship ratio and its component elements influences center-right party strategy in the following ways. First, the numerator, or the number of ethnic minorities with citizenship, indicates the upper bound of potential votes to be won in the proximate election. This value is crucial for establishing the magnitude of the electoral trade-off, representing the benefits against which parties compare the potential costs of an outreach strategy. Few ethnic minorities with citizenship imply that the immediate payoff of ethnic minority outreach is slight, all else equal.
Second, the denominator, or the number of ethnic minority foreigners, represents the stock of foreigners at the present time that are potentially eligible to enter the electorate.\textsuperscript{25} The number of non-citizens also provides a value against which the consequences of short-term strategies are evaluated. For instance, the long-term costs of pursuing an exclusionary strategy on immigration policy in the proximate election would be a function of the stock of number of foreigners eligible for naturalization.

For illustrative purposes, Table 2.2 presents the citizenship ratio and its component parts for Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK.\textsuperscript{26} As is readily apparent, the number of ethnic minority citizens indicates that there are more incentives for parties to reach out to ethnic minorities in countries like the UK and the Netherlands than for those in Denmark, where ethnic minorities with citizenship comprise just 1.3 percent of the population aged 15 and older. Examining the number of non-citizens suggests that the stock of potential voters is larger in Germany and Denmark than in the other four countries. Note that this value only provides the information to evaluate strategies implemented in the present.

\textsuperscript{25} Not all ethnic minority foreign nationals at a given time point are eligible for naturalization, most notably illegal migrants, and asylum and refugee seekers awaiting decisions on their applications.

\textsuperscript{26} I utilize the 2002 European Social Survey to calculate the citizenship ratio, wherein ethnic minorities include first-generation migrants and second-generation migrant-origin individuals from non-EU countries. Drawing on the coding procedure employed by Maxwell (2010), first-generation migrants are individuals born abroad with both parents also born abroad, and second-generation individuals have at least one parent born abroad.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Minority Citizens</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Minority Foreigners</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship Ratio</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Social Survey 2002; data weighted. Note: Figures includes only those individuals 15 years old and older. Measured as proportion of the population, aged 15 and older. Ethnic minorities with citizenship comprise first-generation migrants and second-generation migrant-origin individuals from non-EU countries (Maxwell 2010).

Finally, the value of the ratio as whole indirectly affects the trade-offs of outreach by indicating the divisiveness of ethnic minorities. Specifically, it suggests the image core constituents may conjure when presented with the term “ethnic minority” and the degree to which they perceive this group as threatening to national self-understanding. After all, while party leaders have an incentive to differentiate between ethnic minorities based on their citizenship status, core constituents do not. Instead, they are apt to judge messages based on salient clues and attend to broad and superficial similarities between objects (Petty and Cacioppo 1981; Chaiken 1980).

Citizenship status is one indicator of the level of integration of immigrants into the host society, and thus the degree to which the term “immigrant” evokes the “other” (Hanson 1998). For instance, many scholars have argued that immigrants who become naturalized citizens are likely to become much more integrated in their new country than those who remain noncitizen residents. Naturalized citizens tend to have better command of the host-country language, to experience more loyalty to the new country, and to be relatively accepted by their fellow citizens (see e.g., Howard 2009, 7-8; Hansen 1998; Bratsberg et al.)
By contrast, new arrivals are less likely to be culturally fluent and more visibly different in appearance, customs and values (see e.g., OECD 2010). Not surprisingly, popular conceptions evoked by these terms will differ if the ethnic minority population with citizenship dwarfs the denizen population and vice-versa. Thus, the indirect effect of a smaller ratio value is to produce a more severe electoral trade-off.

The general direction in which the ratio is changing affects the slope of the intertemporal trade-off. Growth in this ratio suggests that more ethnic minorities are becoming citizens than contributing to the denizen population; decline is evidence that the number of ethnic minorities attaining citizenship is outpaced by net immigration flows. These trends are thus indicative of the future costs of ignoring ethnic minorities or simultaneously targeting ethnic minorities and core constituents.

The mechanisms at work and their effects can be clarified with the use of some symbols. Note that the symbolic representation of the citizenship ratio above is primarily for illustrative purposes, serving to identify the factors that systematically affect the citizenship ratio. The citizenship ratio, $c$, is equal to $v/n$, where $v$ is the number of ethnic minority citizens and $n$ is number of ethnic minorities without citizenship (where $v$ is a function of citizenship policy, the maturity of the migration process, and status as a former colonial power, and $n$ is a function of net migration, irregular and forced immigration, and foreign nationals’ access to social and political rights).

The birth rate of ethnic minorities also contributes to this ratio, although whether it contributes to the number of citizens or foreigners depends on how or whether citizenship is

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27 This outcome is not surprising considering that most countries’ naturalization requirements include a minimum of five years residency and competency in the host language.
attributed to children born on its soil. The birth rate contributes to the number of citizens
where states grant citizenship automatically, whether at birth or by majority. In those
countries where the provision of citizenship is subject to the arbitrary discretion of the
country’s bureaucracy, the birth rate disproportionately affects the number of foreigners.

The general form of numerator, \( v \), and denominator, \( n \), at time \( t \) is

\[
\begin{align*}
    v_t &= f(A, M, P, B_a) \\
    n_t &= g(N, I, R, B_d)
\end{align*}
\]

where

- \( A \) = citizenship acquisitions,
- \( M \) = maturation of immigration,
- \( P \) = former colonial power,
- \( N \) = net migration,
- \( I \) = irregular and forced immigration,
- \( R \) = foreign nationals’ access to social and political rights, and
- \( B \) = attribution of citizenship automatically (\( B_a \)) or at the discretion of
  state bureaucracy (\( B_d \)).

The citizenship ratio, \( c \), is below.

**Equation 1.1**

\[
c = \frac{f(A, M, P, B_a)}{g(N, I, R, B_d)}
\]

The number of ethnic minorities with citizenship is represented by a function \( f \) that is
positively increasing with \( A, M, \) and \( P \). That is, an increase in the openness of citizenship
policy, the length of experience with migration, and experience as a former colonial power
all expand the relative number of ethnic minorities with citizenship. The number of ethnic
minority foreigners is defined by a function \( g \) that increases with \( N, I, \) and \( R \). When the
inflow of migrants exceeds the outflow, asylum seekers and illegal aliens represent
increasing large portions of immigration (rather than from labor, secondary and permanent
immigration), and foreign nationals have increased access to social and political rights, the
foreigner population is likely to become larger.
The logic behind the final two factors contributing to the growth of the foreigner population is as follows. First, not all ethnic minority foreign nationals at a given time point are eligible for naturalization, most notably asylum and refugee seekers awaiting decisions on their applications. Despite the low asylum recognition rates in Europe – hovering around 9 percent at the end of the 1990s – asylum seekers find ways to reside in the country while their applications are pending and often ever after they have been officially rejected. Thus, they “provide migrant-receiving states with a large and seemingly inexhaustible supply of permanent immigrants” (Messina 2007, 44; emphasis added). Second, empirical analysis has found that in countries where foreign residents have access to a substantial bundle of social and political rights, there are fewer incentives to acquire citizenship and naturalization rates fall (Baubock and Cinar 1994).

The key indicator of the ratio’s growth is the number of citizenship acquisitions relative to the size of net migration, or the naturalization rate. In turn, net migration and citizenship policy are the factors that account for variation in the naturalization rate. These two elements are both subject to government influence, and its impact volatile. In general, population increase in Europe is driven primarily by international migration, not by the other two components of demographic change, births and death (Coleman 2008). It is also the only of the three to be under substantial and direct policy influence (Coleman 2009, 2008; Hollifield 2000). With regards to naturalization rates, analyses find that the overall openness of a state’s citizenship policy is empirically more important than automatic or facilitated attribution of citizenship for second-generation immigrants. Moreover, among destination country characteristics, only citizenship policy and net migration rate have a significant effect on immigrant citizenship status in Europe (Dronkers and Vink 2012, 18-19). Thus,
while other components of the ratio are products of policy, such as foreign nationals’ access to social and political rights, their impact on the citizenship ratio pales in comparison to the sheer inflow of migrants or restrictiveness of citizenship policy (Baubock and Cinar 1994). The implication is that the citizenship ratio constitutes both the determinant and potential target of party strategy (Coleman 2009, 2008; Hollifield 2000; Baubock and Cinar 1994).

By contrast, the maturation of immigration flows and experience with colonialism account for cross-national differences in the magnitude, though not dynamics, of the ratio. For example, postcolonial migration infused early and unprecedented levels of ethnic diversity into former colonial powers’ societies, and migrants were often admitted as citizens with legal status (Goodman 2010). While former colonial powers may begin with larger ethnic minority populations with citizenship, long-standing differences among countries that result from colonialism are unlikely to change. That is, there is an expectation that the rate of growth associated with these changes will be constant, and thus not the source of diverging patterns. Table 2.3 summarizes the discussion above.
Table 2.3 Aspects of the Citizenship Ratio and Their Impact on Trade-Off

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizenship Ratio</th>
<th>Trade-Off</th>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Impact on Payoff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size of Numerator (Number of Ethnic Minority Citizens)</td>
<td>Short-Term</td>
<td>Number of votes outreach may capture.</td>
<td>Larger Values → Increase Potential Payoff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of Denominator (Number of Ethnic Minority Non-Citizens)</td>
<td>Long-Term</td>
<td>The pool of potential future voters, and thus the number of votes a hardline stance may cost.</td>
<td>Larger Values → Decrease in Potential Payoff (Higher Costs in Long-Term)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of Ratio</td>
<td>Short-Term</td>
<td>Suggests voters’ image of “ethnic minority”.</td>
<td>Smaller Values → Decrease in Potential Payoff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trajectory of Change in Numerator vs. Denominator (Naturalizations Relative to Foreign Population)</td>
<td>Short-Term</td>
<td>Number of future votes that may be lost in case of inaction.</td>
<td>Numerator Increasing Relative to Denominator → Decrease in Potential Payoff (Higher Costs in Long-Term)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Elite Perceptions’ of the Citizenship Ratio

If the citizenship ratio sets the potential payoffs of distinct strategic choices, it is party leaders’ perceptions of the changes in the citizenship ratio, namely its size and expected trajectory, which affects variation in the outcome of strategic choices. Party elites simply have too many demands on their time and attention to track every dip and rise of the citizenship ratio, update the current and long-term payoffs of possible strategies accordingly, and then alter their strategic course if necessary. Instead, I posit that party elites will only act upon developments in the citizenship ratio when they recognize those changes modifying the electoral payoffs associated with the current strategy relative to alternative courses. They may then adjust their strategy if it is no longer optimal, assuming, for now, institutions, party competition, and prior decisions do not constrain party leaders’ actions. Yet what types of changes are most likely to catch a party leader’s eye? Although there are numerous reasons
why party leaders would notice their countries’ changing demographics, I argue three in particular are likely to emerge in the context of the ethnic minority population.

There are three ways in which party actors notice changes to the citizenship ratio. First, movements in the citizenship ratio itself may be sufficient to catch the attention of party leaders, with critical actors most likely to perceive sharp discontinuities, rather than incremental shifts (Harmel and Janda 1994; Deschouwer 1992). While environmental changes may register through party actors’ own observations of the world around them, such information is routinely shared in a variety of ways. Governmental policy papers, internal party research departments’ memos, and reports developed by municipal governments commonly include population data. Information on the size and composition of the country’s population are regularly produced via statistical bureaus and census reports, and constitute the subject of academic inquiry. Yet only those numbers that vary dramatically from previous estimates or prevailing perceptions are likely to draw and maintain the attention of party elites.

Second, the citizenship ratio may be brought to the party’s attention though its effects on center-right parties’ constituencies, both internal and external. Internal pressure to change strategy are likely when shifts in the citizenship ratio present members of the lower organizational strata with new institutional or electoral demands, or by members of the party with longer time horizons, such as younger members (see e.g., Alesina and Spear 1988). For example, lower-level elected officials tasked with governing are most likely to relay the demands and strains on public services generated by a growing ethnic minority population (see e.g., Samuels 2004). By contrast, subnational party leaders and candidates confronting the demands of electoral competition may transmit the electoral exigencies resulting from
demographic change. Younger party members are also likely to put a break on antagonizing immigrants. Such was case in the Netherlands when the controversial Frits Bolkesteins lead the VVD. The youth organization, a traditional breeding ground for the VVD’s parliamentary candidates, routinely criticized the party’s inflammatory statements and policies toward foreigners, stating, “Not only must immigrants adapt, but the Dutch as well”.

The effect of changes in the citizenship ratio on external constituencies may also constitute a mechanism of transmission (Schain 2008). For instance, business interests, typically favorable to immigration, may draw the leadership’s attention to their increasing need for qualified workers. They may lobby for more expansive immigration policies. Alternatively, facing an aging population and scarcity of the labor force, they may advocate policies to restore the employability of immigrants’ descendants so as to not to depend on the adjustment of immigrant labor (Simon 2007). Such was the case in France when business-oriented think tanks began to the lobby the center-right to adopt diversity policies (Simon 2007, 160). These requests may result in the party supporting policies targeted toward ethnic minorities. They also may draw the party’s attention to the composition of the citizenship ratio and its electoral implications in light of its current trajectory.

Third, social crises associated with ethnic minorities draw party leaders’ attention to the citizenship ratio as well as to the potential ramifications of how the ethnic minority population is evolving (Keeler 1993). Like focusing events, both are sudden, relatively uncommon, and can be reasonably defined as harmful or revealing the possibility of

potentially greater future harms (Birkland 1998). They stand out against the background of social life, generating rare, punctuated signals of trouble, and “concentrate outcomes that are otherwise highly diffused” (Jacobs 2011, 48). These features also make this method of transmission the most likely to prompt party leaders to reevaluate the long-term payoffs of their current strategy. The emphasis on potential losses and the presentation of outcomes as certain may lead actors to develop longer time horizons and to adopt hyperbolic discount rates, whereby the immediate future is heavily discounted and more weight is given to the distant future (Streich and Levy 2007). Negative focusing events also provide leaders a powerful set of rhetorical tools to justify the pain of short-term costs by signaling the prospect of future losses of inaction.

Social crisis afflicting one particular segment of the ethnic minority population – citizens or foreigners – draws the attention of party leadership to the citizenship ratio. Those primarily involving second-generation youths with citizenship, for example, may highlight the size of this population and the potential risks of not seeking policies and strategies of social and political incorporation. If such social difficulties are concentrated among non-citizens, then center-right parties may attempt to reduce the non-citizen population through the management of migrant inflow. To minimize the potential costs associated with a great number of these non-citizens entering the electorate, the party may opt to alter citizenship laws. Conversely, manifestations of social unrest among ethnic minority citizens will most likely draw attention to the size of the citizenship ratio’s numerator and its trajectory, that is, whether it is growing or decreasing.

Yet what types of events are most likely to catch the eye of center-right party elites? I argue that those negative events that pose a security threat are most likely to garner their
attention given these parties’ issue handling-reputations. Across Europe, center-right parties have carefully cultivated an image of ensuring law and order is maintained and national security is protected (Bale 2008, 319; Bélanger 2003, 540; Budge and Farlie 1983). These areas of issue ownership have two implications for center-right party strategy. First, the center-right may be swift to offer a programmatic response to instances of social instability rather than to other negative focusing events, such as mass protests or strikes, in an effort protect its reputation. Second, policies in response to social instability among ethnic minorities allow the party to pursue a twin strategy through emphasizing and implementing policies to keep order. It allows the party to appease core constituents while setting the ground for ethnic minorities, either by conveying that the party cares about them or through the long-term effects of such policy on the socio-economic status of minorities.

III. Party Goals and Repertoires of Strategy

The citizenship ratio and its effects on the trade-offs outreach presents are powerful determinants of center-right parties’ strategy; however, neither are constant nor wholly exogenous constraints. In this section, I present the two strategic tactics parties deploy to mitigate the current and future electoral trade-offs’ severity. First, they may use outreach, a set of political appeals, to assuage the short- and medium-term electoral trade-offs they face. Second, parties may effectuate policies that palliate or all together eradicate these underlying electoral trade-offs. They may also implement measures to alter the citizenship ratio itself.

Changing The Nature of The Electoral Trade-Off: The Roles of Outreach And Policy

The electoral trade-offs between support from core constituent and ethnic minorities are not immutable, but are contingent upon the specific nature of center-right party appeals as encompassed by its outreach strategy. In this context, outreach represents the set of appeals a
party makes in its capacity in the electorate, as an organization, and as a governing institution, to win the electoral support of a constituency. These tactics are further distinguished by their temporal horizons: some impact voters immediately, others more slowly and over a longer time frame. Engaging in outreach may thus represent a short-term strategy to win an election or a medium-term strategy to set the ground for new voters, with the choice in tactics reflecting these overarching goals.

When pursued over the course of a political campaign, outreach represents an electoral strategy by which parties seek to increase its vote share among ethnic minorities while maintaining core voter support in the current election. The emergence and severity of this electoral trade-off depends on the extent that center-right party supporters view cultural diversity as inimical to national identity. The goal of outreach is thus two-fold. First, it explicitly targets ethnic minorities. These parties are well aware that their general appeals have been wholly ineffective. These forthright appeals signal to ethnic minorities that the party considers them full and equal members of the nation. Second, the party aims to influence how core voters perceive diversity to contain any political fallout resulting from appealing to ethnic minorities. By actively seeking to convince ordinary people of the advantages of cultural heterogeneity, as well as its compatibility with national identity, the party influences how diversity is perceived in the short-term (see e.g., Hebling et. al. 2010).

The set of appeals that comprise this short-term form of outreach are defined by a common, short temporal horizon. These tactics are all expected to affect voters immediately, although they may differ in the effect’s certainty and duration. When engaging in outreach as a short-term strategy, parties employ those tactics that fulfill their function in the electorate or as an organization. With regards to the former, parties engage in tactics to increase ethnic
minority participation, such as mobilization of voters. Other tactics generate symbols of identification and loyalty in an effort to create and foster a sense of identification with the party (Dalton and Wattenberg 2002). Appeals to forge partisan ties would include those declarations made by the party, its candidates, and/or leadership that champion diversity or celebrate elements of non-majority culture. Visits to ethnic minority communities by party officials, and collaborations with such organizations as mosques or anti-racism groups represent two other tactics intended to increase the number of ethnic minorities that support the party.

The party may also seek to improve its electoral performance among ethnic minorities, as well as stimulate turnout, through organizational tactics. Two of these methods speak to the fundamental functions performed by political parties: the selection of political elites, and the articulation of political interests. First, the nomination of ethnic minority candidates for parliament is one way by which the party may achieve both goals. Second, parties may adopt tactics of interest articulation and aggregation to win ethnic minority support. Parties may claim to represent the interests of ethnic minorities by promoting measures to end discrimination, to combat its effects, and to support the maintenance and practice of culture. Political campaigns offer parties many venues in which they may offer specific policy proposals in an effort to attract ethnic minority votes; however, only when these interests are aggregated with those of other constituents in the parties manifesto do these appeals credibly translate into policy outcomes. These programs provide a basis for governing (Dalton and Wattenberg 2002, 8), and the betrayal of such public pledges carry electoral and parliamentary costs (Budge 1987; Bowler 1990).
Other components of outreach aim to set the ground of for new voters and may not have an immediate impact on the composition of the party’s electoral coalition until the medium term. After all, the ability to be responsive to ethnic minorities, whether it is through programmatic accommodation or increased representation, often requires foresight. For instance, parties may seek to run more ethnic minorities as parliamentary candidates; however, they may be unable to implement this strategy if they count relatively few ethnic minorities among their members and only intermittingly recruit those with candidate potential.  

The party’s ability to attract and retain members, as well as garner more support for outreach among party members, often require that party leaders alter organizational structures and practices (Scarrow 1996, 46-47).

Parties thus employ organizational tactics to increase responsiveness so as to attract and maintain minority support. One notable method is the creation of an internal minorities commission. These commissions have multiple purposes. Their objectives may include raising awareness among party members of the growing importance of ethnic electors, influence party policy, improve the image of the party among ethnic minorities, and facilitate the retention of those ethnic minorities who are already members (Anwar 2001, 541; Penninx et al. 1998, 471-472; Layton-Henry 1978, 275).

The second strategy consists of the party enacting policies targeted toward ethnic minorities; it represents an electoral investment aiming to redefine constituencies. Specifically, these policies include those Koopmans et al. (2005) identify as comprising the universe of cross-nationally comparable policies that define citizenship. These policies can

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be characterized by the extent to which they emphasize equality of access to the three categories of citizenship rights – civic-legal, political, and social – and the amount of cultural difference and group rights citizenship allows. The former ranges from those policies that favor ethnic bonds to those that emphasize civic rights. The cultural dimension extends from insistence on conformity to a single cultural model to culturally pluralist conceptions seeking to retain, or even stimulate, diversity (Koopmans et al. 2005, 14).

By implementing these policies, the party may potentially achieve three goals. First, it reduces the size that the current trade-off between ethnic minority voters and more nativist core constituents would assume in future elections. Policies that improve the objective socio-economic status of ethnic minorities and eliminate discrimination allow individual boundary crossing whereby individual ethnic minorities may enter into the nation unobstructed. Increase social mobility may reduce their level of difference from the majority population, while also facilitating a transfer of allegiance from center-left to center-right based on socio-economic interests. Those policies that incorporate core cultural elements from certain ethnic minority groups affect the structure of the receiving society and blur boundaries between incoming groups and insiders (Zolberg and Woon 1999, 8-9). It paves the way for the redefinition of what is considered “normal” and part of the nation’s identity.

Second, the party’s reputation may improve among ethnic minorities as a result of enacting these policies, which would reduce the future size of the trade-off between ethnic minorities and core constituents. In improving the party’s image in the eyes of these voters, they increase the number of expected votes they may expect to gain from ethnic minorities in the future. Reaping these types of benefits depend on the extent to which that ethnic minorities are cognizant of the policy, are able to assign credit to the correct party for its
implementation, and approve of the policy. For instance, if a party implements a policy that aims to improve the socio-economic status of ethnic minorities, but it frames its implementation as a way of reducing the threats to security posed by ethnic minorities, then the party will be unlikely to receive reputational gains (although the policy may achieve its stated goals of razing economic inequalities).

Third, through naturalization policies, the party can control to a certain extent the profile of new electors. By stipulating certain requirements for citizenship those foreigners who acquire citizenship are more likely to possess those qualities that make them more likely to vote for the center-right (such limited welfare reliance) and less likely to divide these parties’ coalition. As a result, this strategy minimizes the trade-off between current immigrants and future citizens of immigrant descent, as well as its core clientele and ethnic minority voters.

IV. Observable Implications

This chapter has presented a theoretical framework for explaining variation in center-right party outreach strategies toward ethnic minorities in Western Europe since 1970. Instead of viewing all immigrants the same, center-right parties, I argue, make distinctions between those with citizenship and those without. Specifically, center-right parties recognize the difference between foreigners and citizens in their minority policy, and this difference drives their outreach strategies while also helping to explain puzzling party behavior.

While explanations for center-right party strategy toward immigrants abound, the exigencies created by changes in the legal status, and thus electoral power, of members in this population call for a new theory. Where a portion of the immigrant population are citizens and thus may vote in national elections, center-right parties may adopt distinct
positions on immigration and integration policies based of their target population. As a result of these distinctions, center-right parties face two challenges, in the form of an immediate electoral trade-off and an intertemporal trade-off. The severity of these trade-offs, in turn, varies with the relative number of ethnic minorities with citizenship to those without. When party leaders perceive these changes, they may reassess their current strategy toward ethnic minorities versus alternatives, and also seek to shape the citizenship ratio itself so as to mitigate the trade-offs they face.

If these propositions are correct, we should observe the following:

1. While citizenship status matters for the cent-right, it does not for the center-left. It follows that center-right and center-left parties ought to respond differently to features of the ethnic minority population, namely the size of the foreigner population. While a larger foreigner population translates into more outreach by the center-left, it provokes less outreach by the center-right.

2. The larger the ethnic minority population with citizenship, the more likely that center-right parties engage in outreach. An increasing tendency by center-right core constituents to view immigration as a threat to national identity, the sharper the electoral trade-off – despite the presence of a large minority population with citizenship. In turn, these conditions translate into a higher probability of center-right parties adopting a dual strategy of exclusive stances toward foreigners and inclusive positions toward citizens.

3. If party leaders view a dual strategy as entailing an intertemporal trade-off, not just a trade-off in the distribution of electoral support, then party deliberations should frame
the choice as one between expected near term vote share and the prospect of long-term vote-share.

4. Outreach is more likely when the citizenship ratio is larger. In particular, given the conditions under which party leaders will perceive changes in the ratio, we should observe the following. The sharper the change in naturalization rates, the more likely party leaders are to change outreach strategies. The more the change in the citizenship ratio is characterized by positive growth, the higher the likelihood that parties will adopt programmatic tactics in the aims of reshaping constituencies.

Having formulated and specified a theory of center-right party outreach, in Chapter 3 I test the theory’s empirical claims and implications. First, a thorough analysis of survey data supports the claim that center-left partisans hold consistent views on issues regarding minorities and immigrants, whereas the opinion structure of center-right partisans differs based on citizenship status. Second, I use evidence of party strategy toward ethnic minorities in six Western European countries from 1970 through 2010 to test the effect of changes in the citizenship ratio on the likelihood and choice in the form of outreach. I also measure the explanatory power of my model against that of competing explanations. These cross-sectional time-series analysis confirm that changes in the composition of the ethnic minority population better accounts for intertemporal variation in center-right party strategy.
Chapter 3: An Analysis of Ethnic Minority Outreach in Western Europe

The tumultuous relationship between ethnic minorities and center-right parties across Western Europe is particularly evident during election campaigns. Since 1970, center-right politicians have proven willing to pursue a strategy portraying ethnic minorities as enemies in one election and friends in the next. In party programs and stump speeches, they have championed the ethnic and cultural diversity ushered in by post-war migration, only to decry its debilitating effect on the nation in a subsequent election. For instance, in France, the Gaullist Rally for the Republic’s (RPR) party manifesto in 1986 stated in no uncertain terms: “Our country does not want to become a multicultural society.”³⁰ In stark contrast, the 2007 website for the center-right party’s presidential candidate, Nicolas Sarkozy, prefaced his support for affirmative action policies by declaring: “We will not understand difference as a risk, but as a chance” (Simon 2007, 157-158). In the Netherlands, the center-right People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) pronounced in its 1981 party manifesto that it was the party’s “duty” to see that ethnic minority groups “are not disadvantaged and are able to develop their own character and culture.”³¹ Such support for multiculturalism waned over the years. In 2003, the party effectively swept away all remaining vestiges of its previous position by denouncing multiculturalism for its elements of western “self-hate” in its party program (van Kersbergen and Krouwel 2008, 406). Similar variation populates the histories

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of the British Conservatives, Danish Conservatives, German Christian Democrats, and Swedish Moderates.

In Chapter 2, I advanced an explanation for this puzzling variation based on the challenges center-right parties confront when they engage in outreach, most notably a potential trade-off between ethnic minority and core voter support. The emergence of such a trade-off is contingent on the degree to which cultivating and emphasizing ethnic minorities’ interests conflicts with the party’s ideological identity. Through the long-standing constituency ties it produces, party identity limits center-right parties’ ability to target certain segments of the ethnic minority population. For these parties, appealing to those perceived outside the national community, particularly non-citizens, generates an inverse relationship between gains in ethnic minority votes and loss in core clientele support. Two powerful implications follow. First, party leaders recognize the difference between ethnic minorities with citizenship and those without both in their immigration and integration policies and electoral strategy. Second, a booming ethnic minority population does not necessarily translate into more outreach. Instead, it is the change in the relative number of ethnic minority citizens to non-citizens, or citizenship ratio, which accounts for the degree to which center-right parties reach out to ethnic minorities.

The goal of this chapter is to test this theory’s empirical claims and its implications for the puzzle examined here: the variation in degree to which center-right parties appeal to ethnic minorities in their electoral campaigns. To this end, I leverage survey data to corroborate the theory’s empirical claims about the variation in partisan attitudes and policy orientations toward immigrants and minorities. I then identify two observational determinants consistent with the proposed attitudinal mechanism: the change in the
naturalization rate and the size of the foreigner population. Drawing on evidence from six Western European countries – Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK – from 1970 through 2010, I perform a series of cross-sectional time-series analyses of outreach to assess the impact of these two variables on the observed strategies of center-right parties. I test their strength against the competing explanations reviewed in Chapter 1: party competition, institutions, and sociological conditions.

Three critical points emerge from this analysis. First, center-right partisans’ attitudes and policy orientations differ markedly from those of center-left supporters, most notably with respect to those policies assisting foreign nationals.32 Second, a series of cross-sectional time-series analyses of mainstream parties’ outreach strategies empirically substantiates the hypothesized heterogeneity in responses by the center-right and center-left to features of the ethnic minority population. Third, changes in minorities’ citizenship status wield a powerful effect on center-right party strategy across Western Europe, persisting despite differences in electoral institutions, economic conditions, threat posed by the radical right, and openness of the citizenship regime.

This chapter proceeds as follows. Section I examines partisans’ attitudes toward ethnic minorities and immigrants using as evidence Eurobarometer, International Social Survey Programme, and European Social Survey data. Section II describes the operationalization of the dependent and independent variables to be included in the statistical analysis. Section III tests two of the theory’s implications, namely that mainstream parties respond differently to characteristics of the ethnic minority population, and changes in the

32 For ease of exposition, I use the terms “foreigner”, and “foreign citizens” to refer to ethnic minority non-citizens.
composition of the ethnic minority population account for intertemporal variation in center-right party strategy.

I. Partisan Opinion Toward Minorities and Immigrants

The goal of this section is to evaluate the empirical support for the attitudinal assumptions undergirding the proposed theoretical framework. The particular features of core constituents’ beliefs and policy preferences are presumed to constrain a party’s range of strategic responses to ethnic minorities in a specific way. Out of fear of core voter retribution, center-right parties will forgo targeting particular social groups and issuing certain appeals. Otherwise, these parties confront an electoral trade-off between gains in ethnic minority votes and loss in core clientele support. Yet what accounts for the ways in which appealing to ethnic minorities jeopardizes core support? In Chapter 2, I propose that the emergence and severity of an electoral trade-off in center-right party strategy is a function of these parties’ historic association with the nation. Specifically, the threat ethnic minorities pose to national identity and culture determines the degree to which appealing to ethnic minorities threatens the party’s level of support among core constituents. To appeal groups perceived outside of the national community is to reduce the party’s existing support. Ethnic minority groups may acquire “outsider” status by virtue of their perceptual distinctiveness, their salience, or, most simply and critically, their citizenship status. Given their internationalist provenance, center-left party leaders do not face a citizen-versus-foreigner constraint when considering reaching out to ethnic minorities. Put differently, while center-left party leaders may lose constituent support as a result of appealing to certain ethnic minority groups, it is not the legal status of the targeted constituency that causes these defections. This argument produces the following observable implications:
1. Preferences for cultural unity should be more prevalent among partisans of the center-right than center-left.

2. The presence of diversity should be more likely to trigger feelings of threat among partisans of the center-right than center-left.

3. Center-right partisans should be less likely to support those government policies directed toward non-nationals than those toward ethnic minorities more broadly.

4. Center-left party constituents should hold consistent attitudes on pertaining to ethnic minorities and immigrants, regardless of the citizenship status of the reference group.

I examine public opinion data to assess the degree to which these theoretical expectations are borne out.

Data

I draw on multiple surveys conducted between 1988 and 2008 to ensure that any evidence consistent with the theory is not an artifact of a particular survey or the product of context-specific factors, but rather results from time-invariant features of party identity. The analysis that follows draws primarily from five public opinion surveys: Eurobarometer 30 (1988), Eurobarometer 53 (2000), the 2003 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), the 2002 European Social Survey (ESS), and the 2008 European Social Survey (ESS). These surveys were chosen based on their inclusion of theoretically relevant items that allow for more precise distinctions to be made across a variety of different categories of out-groups (e.g., foreigners, immigrants, ethnic minorities, and religious minorities). The Eurobarometer surveys were chosen for their series of questions regarding respondents’ attitudes toward minorities, described to respondents as ‘people who live in (OUR COUNTRY)’ who ‘come from different races, religions or cultures’ and ‘form different groups of varying sizes which
are more or less homogenous’, and *immigrants*, or ‘people who have come to live in (OUR COUNTRY) and who are not citizens of a Member State of the European Union’ (Eurobarometer 2000, 13).³³ The ISSP survey, in turn, provides leverage on the role of non-legal of markers difference by asking questions regarding what it constitutes to be a member of the nation. The 2002 European Social Survey includes a host of questions on immigration and national identity, while the 2008 release includes questions about extending rights and benefits to resident non-nationals.

*Views on Cultural Diversity*

To assess the relative preference for cultural unity among mainstream party supporters, I draw on an item from 2002 ESS. Respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed with this statement: ‘It is better for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and traditions’. The response categories range from 1 to 5, where 1 is ‘strongly agree’ and 5 is ‘strongly disagree’. Although a fair share of center-left partisans agrees with this statement (41 percent), support is much higher among supporters of the center-right. Nearly 55 percent of center-right party identifiers agree with this item, compared to 24 percent who disagree and 20 percent who are ambivalent or do not know.³⁴ The mean value is 2.55 for center-right partisans and 2.93 for center-left supporters (p<0.01) The results of the adjusted Wald test indicate that these means are not statistically equivalent. Table 3.1 presents the distribution of responses by party family.

³³ Eurobarometer 30 described immigrants as ‘people living in (country) who are neither (nationality) nor citizens of the EEC’.
³⁴ All data presented in this analysis has been weighted. For this particular set of question from the 2002 ESS survey, I weigh the sample by calculating an adjustment weight, equal to the product of the design and population weights.
Table 3.1 Preferences for cultural unity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Better for country if everyone shares customs and traditions</th>
<th>Center-Left</th>
<th>Center-Right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree strongly</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree strongly</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>2.93***</td>
<td>2.55***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2002 European Social Survey. Question: Please tell me how much you agree or with this statement. It is better for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and traditions. Note: Only respondents in Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom were included in this analysis.

I corroborate this finding with two additional measures. Drawing on Eurobarometer 53 (2002), I gauge the degree to which center-right voters view various categories of ethnic minorities as the ‘other.’ Respondents were asked the same question about a series of potential out-groups: ‘Do you personally find the presence of people of another nationality (race/religion) disturbing?’. Figure 3.1 displays the level of agreement by party family. While the share of both groups answering in the affirmative is relatively low, a higher proportion of center-right partisans than center-left report being unsettled by the presence of members of each category ($p < 0.01$). Interestingly, a greater proportion of center-right supporters consider people from another nation to be more disturbing than people of another race or religion.
Second, I use data from the 2003 ISSP to assess the assumption that center-right partisans conceive of national belonging in cultural, as well as legal, terms. Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: ‘It is impossible for people who do not share (Country’s) customs and traditions to become fully (country nationality)’. While there is widespread support for this statement, the level of agreement among the center-right (69 percent) is striking. While a narrow majority (52 percent) of center-left voters embracing the same view, a full 17 percentage points separates the two groups ($p < 0.01$).

Variation in Immigration and Race Policy Orientations by Party Family

To interrogate partisans’ attitudes toward policies affecting immigrants and minorities, I begin by examining two questions posed in the Eurobarometer 30 (1988) survey. Respondents were asked, ‘Should non-EC immigrants’ rights be extended, left as they are, or
restricted?’. Figure 3.2 displays the distribution of responses. The mean responses for the center-left and center-right differ at statistically significant level of $p < 0.05$. The plot below clearly shows that while most center-left respondents leaned toward extending the rights of non-EC citizens, their counterparts on the center-right were inclined toward restricting their rights.

**Figure 3.2 Extension of rights to non-EC immigrants**

Source: Eurobarometer 30 (1988). Note: Includes Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Question: Talking about these people living in (country) who are neither (Nationality) nor citizens of the European Community, do you think we should…extend their rights, restrict their rights, or leave things as they are?

In the same survey, respondents in all four of our six countries of interest were later asked to what degree they agreed with the following statement, ‘The government should improve the social and economic position of minorities living in our country’. The mean response for both center-left and center-right identifiers was ‘Agree Somewhat’. As of 1988, there is a divide in partisan policy orientation based on the target of government action, minorities or immigrants.

The 2008 ESS poses a similar question, asking participants when they think immigrants should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens.
Respondents were given these options: immediately on arrival; after living in the country for a year, whether or not they have worked; only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year; once they have become a [country] citizen; they should never get the same rights.

Figure 3.3 presents the distribution of responses by party family. While the median preference is the same across party family, namely to allocate these rights and benefits ‘benefits after the individual has already paid at least one year’s worth of taxes’, the distribution of responses is not. Notably, the interquartile range of center-right opinion is tightly compressed, whereas the center-left’s range from ‘after a year, whether or not they have worked’ to ‘once they have become a citizen’.

Figure 3.3 Extension of right to social benefits and services

Source: 2008 European Social Survey. Note: Includes Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK.
Question: Thinking of people coming to live in [country] from other countries, when do you think they should obtain the same rights to social benefits as citizens already living here?

To investigate whether there is a difference in the structure of policy attitudes by partisanship as this previous analysis suggests, I conduct an exploratory factor analysis (principle components factoring with oblique rotation) using data from Eurobarometer 53 (2000). Five items were intended to measure attitudes toward integration policies, which are
directed toward resident non-nationals and ethnic minorities. Note that this wave uses the same definitions of ‘minorities’ and ‘immigrants’ Eurobarometer 30 (1988) employs. Respondents were asked if they tended to agree or disagree with the following questions regarding policies toward minority groups: ‘The authorities should make efforts to improve the situation of people from these minority groups’; ‘When hiring personnel, employers should only take account of qualifications, regardless of the person’s race, religion or culture’; and ‘Discrimination in the job market on grounds of a person’s race, religion or culture should be outlawed’. Respondents were then asked about their level of agreement with the following statements regarding immigrants: ‘Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should have the same social rights as the (NATIONALITY) citizens’, and ‘Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should have the right to bring members of their immediate family in (OUR COUNTRY).’ Table 3.2 displays the percentage of respondents who agree with the statement by party family.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.2 Policy orientations by party family, % agree</th>
<th>Center-Left</th>
<th>Center-Right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government should improve minority groups’ situation</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only qualifications should be considered in hiring decisions, not race, religion or culture</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination on grounds of race, religion or culture should be outlawed</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal immigrants should have right to bring in members of immediate family</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal immigrants who are not citizens should have same rights as citizens</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer 53 (2000). Note: Only includes respondents in Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

The exploratory factory analysis by party family reveals differences in the structure of attitudes by party family. Among the center-right partisans, questions regarding legal foreign residents formed its own dimension only slightly related to the questions regarding cultural,
religious, and racial minorities. The results for the center-left indicate that there is one
dimension underlying their attitudes toward both groups (see Table 3.3). In each analysis, the
principal axis has an eigenvalue above one.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Center-Left</th>
<th>Center-Right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Factor 1</td>
<td>Factor 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minority Groups</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorities should make effort to improve their situation</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When hiring personnel, employers should only take account of qualifications, regardless of the person's race, religion or culture</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination in the job market on grounds of a person's race, religion or culture should be outlawed</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Immigrants</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should have the same social rights as the (NATIONALITY) citizens</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should have the right to bring members of their immediate family in (OUR COUNTRY)</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>1,469</td>
<td>865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eigenvalue</strong></td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>1.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Explained Variance</strong></td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cronbach's alpha</strong></td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer 53 (2000). Note: Only includes respondents in Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

Thus, I find that there is an important difference in the structure of center-left and
center-right partisans’ attitudes toward government action to help immigrants and minorities.
While the former holds consistent attitudes regardless of the intended beneficiary, the latter
group’s opinions do vary systematically on the basis of the intended beneficiary. The next
step is to see whether these micro-foundations of divisiveness affect party strategies.

II. An Analysis of Variation in Outreach Strategies

Having found empirical support for these premises regarding partisan opinion, I turn
to their implications for variation in party strategy across and within six Western European
countries over time. To this end, I develop models of outreach strategies that allow us to test heterogeneity in party responses to their environment, and assess the impact of the citizenship ratio on center-right party outreach against three other factors: party competition, sociological conditions, and institutions. I discuss these independent and dependent variables below.

**Dependent Variable: Mainstream Party Outreach**

Although researchers have examined center-right parties’ anti-immigrant strategies (e.g., van Spanje 2010; Meguid 2008; Thränhardt 1995) and decisions to play the ‘race card’ (Vautier 2009; Saggar 1998a), these analyses rarely recognize these parties’ efforts to appeal to ethnic minority voters. Moreover, the handful of studies that do investigate the effort by the mainstream center-right to incorporate ethnic minorities into their support coalition all focus on a single party (see e.g., Saggar 1998b, 1992; Rich 1988; Geisser and Soum 2008), thus limiting our ability to understand the general factors, if any, responsible for center-right parties’ change in tack.

By contrast, I adopt a statistical approach that facilitates comparative analysis of mainstream parties’ outreach efforts across a variety of institutional and competitive contexts. What these parties say and do matter. Defined by their electoral dominance of the right ideological bloc, mainstream center-right parties are frequent government actors with a sizeable electorate. The stronger of these parties typically have greater media access, facilitating the communication of their message to the wider electorate (Meguid 2008, 46). Their status as governmental players means their programmatic stances may affect those of smaller parties jockeying to enter government. As a result, mainstream center-right parties are able to set the contours of public debate, influence individuals’ perceptions of minorities,
and shape how diversity is perceived. In fact, empirical analyses of public opinion toward immigrants attest to the powerful effect of situational triggers in translating the presence of diversity into feelings of threat (Hopkins 2010; Sniderman et al. 2004). The parties found most influential in stoking exclusionary reactions to immigrant minorities are not the incendiary radical-right but rather their staid, mainstream opponents (Bohman 2012; Helbling et al. 2011; Hopkins 2010; McLaren 2001).

The analysis that follows includes variation in outreach strategies across six Western European countries and 130 national elections. Not only does this case selection provide maximum temporal and spatial variation the dependent variable – inclusive stances toward ethnic minorities – but also supplies variance on key environmental factors. The proportion of ethnic minorities with citizenship is high in the UK and the Netherlands, medium in France and Germany, and low in Denmark and Sweden. The electoral formulas in place range from majoritarian - France, Great Britain - to mixed - Germany - to proportional - Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden.

There is also temporal and spatial variation in the presence and electoral strength of radical right parties. In the Netherlands, the radical right competed at the national level since the early 1980s, even entering parliament in 1982, but it only truly became a political force in 2002. By the same token, in 1994, the Danish radical right solidified its status as a major political actor after languishing in the background for more than a decade. The Swedish radical right broke through nationally in 1991, and its fortunes have since then vacillated wildly. Conversely, the radical right has largely been a non-issue in national politics for the German and British mainstream center-right, while its shadow has continuously loomed large over the French electoral landscape. This case selection thus allows us to account for
alternative explanations that privilege certain environmental features and competitive exigencies in addition to the theory advanced here. Table 3.4 summarizes the discussion above.

Table 3.4 Case selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Average Radical Right Vote Share</th>
<th>Median District Mag.</th>
<th>Electoral System</th>
<th>Ethnic Minority Citizens (% of Pop.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


I selected the mainstream parties from each country on the basis of their positions on the Left-Right ideological axis. Based on the expert survey party classification from Castles and Mair (1984, 83), I defined mainstream parties of the center-left as those parties with scores of 1.25 to 3.75 on a scale of 0 to 10. Their counterparts to the right are those parties with positions between 6.25 and 8.75. This procedure is consistent with Meguid (2005, 2008). Where more than one party met the same criterion in a given country, I chose the party with the highest electoral average from 1970 to 2010, and, using the secondary literature, strongest link to the nation. Thus, the Conservative People’s Party and the Moderates constitute the center-right as opposed to the Liberals in Denmark and Sweden, respectively. Table 3.5 presents the mainstream parties included in this empirical analysis.
Table 3.5 Mainstream parties in analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Center-Left</th>
<th>Center-Right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>KF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>PS</td>
<td>RPR/UMP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>CDU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>VVD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The next task is to measure these parties’ appeals during political campaigns, that is, the extent to which they engage in outreach as a short-term, electoral strategy. There are a variety of methods by which parties may appeal to a potential constituency. Empirically, the ways in which these parties have sought ethnic minority support are so diverse that they are difficult to operationalize. Party collaborations with community organizations, visits to areas with a high concentration of ethnic minorities, and features of diverse images in campaign materials all signal that the party welcomes ethnic minority support.

Yet one method common to all parties is appealing to ethnic minorities in party manifestos. I thereby generate a standard indicator of mainstream parties’ positions toward ethnic minorities using data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) (Volkens et al. 2012; Klingemann 2006; Budge et al. 2001). These data use election manifestos published in the context of national election campaigns to code a party’s emphasis and positions on 56 issues. The total number of manifesto sentences dedicated to each category is recorded as percentage of the total number of sentences in the manifesto.

---

35 To maximize the number of observations, I include data from the 1968 national election in Sweden and the 1969 election in the Federal Republic of Germany.
36 With the exception of one issue category, ‘economic goals’, all categories allow for positional interpretation, with some divided into negative and positive formulation (Alonso and da Fonseca 2009, 8).
There are two key advantages to measuring party strategy with CMP data versus alternative sources, particularly those based on expert surveys. First, these data provide information for every mainstream party in the post-war period, whereas expert surveys are conducted less frequently. The extended scope of these data facilitates temporal analysis, which is critical to testing the theory’s central hypotheses. Second, this dataset includes theoretically relevant categories for our analysis by disaggregating the set of issues commonly subsumed by a higher-order ‘immigration’ or ‘immigrant integration’ category. Often, experts are asked to identify a party’s position on ‘immigration issues’ as reflected by its positions on immigration *control*, or the regulation of the actual number of admissions (Money 1999). Scholars have then used these scores to measure a party’s position on integration and cultural diversity (see e.g., Van Spanje 2010). Yet in other expert datasets, the questionnaire employs such general language that the set of policies informing expert judgments remains unclear. For instance, one survey asked experts to place parties on a scale concerning “the programmes of the parties towards the immigration issue, which runs from not very restrictive concerning immigration (0) to very restrictive” (Lubbers 2001, 10). Later these data were presented as representing a party’s stance toward multiculturalism, a policy area concerned with the extension of cultural group recognition and rights to ethnic minorities (see e.g., Van Spanje 2010).

These data are not perfect. Critics challenge the use party programs to measure parties’ positions, charging voters rarely consult them (e.g., Kriesi et al. 2008). Others point to the lack of any measurement of uncertainty that accompanies these estimates of policy emphasis (Benoit and Laver 2007). Researchers are unable to distinguish between measurement error and real differences in policy positions (e.g., Benoit et al. 2009). Critical to this analysis, no
category directly measures a party’s position on immigration restrictions. As a result, the empirical investigation that follows only tests among potential determinants of adopting an inclusive stance on issues of diversity and favorable mentions toward ethnic minorities, leaving questions regarding the implementation of a dual strategy unanswered.

To mitigate these shortcomings, I employ a measure of outreach consistent with dominant approaches in the literature (Helbling et al. 2011; Alonso and da Fonseca 2009, Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008). I construct an outreach indicator based on four coding categories that either address issues of cultural diversity linked to immigration or directly appeal to ethnic minorities. The four categories include two positive mentions – support for multiculturalism (variable 607) and favorable references to underprivileged minority groups (variable 705) – and two negative mentions – opposition to multiculturalism (variable 608) and support for a national(istic) way of life (variable 601).

My approach departs from Arzheimer and Carter (2006), Helbling et al. (2011), and Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup (2008) in two respects. First, I exclude the category ‘support for law and order’ (variable 605) given that in addition to capturing immigration-related positions, it also includes issues with little or no connection to the immigration issue, such as funding police forces. Including this category in the measure would disproportionately depress parties’ outreach efforts (Alonso and da Fonseca 2009). Second, this measure omits ‘national way of life: negative’ (variable 602). Theoretically, we would expect very few

\[ \text{to ensure the validity of this measure, I checked the trajectory of the constructed indicator variable against contemporary news sources and secondary literature. It appears to capture whether or not the party did reach out to ethnic minorities, and the general level of its efforts.} \]

\[ \text{While underprivileged minorities also include the handicapped and homosexuals, Alonso and da Fonseca’s (2009) review of the coded manifestos and conversations with the CMP’s lead investigator confirm that the two most mentioned groups are immigrants and the handicapped (10).} \]
mainstream parties to include statements in their manifestos ‘against patriotism and/or nationalism; opposition to the national state’ and voicing opposition to established national ideas. Empirically, the data supports this intuition. The mean difference between the support and opposition for national way of life was 0.12. Out of 148 observations, only in 12 instances would the inclusion of the category ‘national way of life: negative’ alter a party’s position on the positive formulation of this issue.

Researchers typically use these categories to construct a party’s position score, measured as the relative balance of pro and con text units, taken as proportion of all text units on the relevant subjects (Laver and Garry 2000, 628). While this operationalization does not capture the amount of emphasis a party placed on an issue, that is, its salience, it is independent of manifesto length, a bias introduced by most salience scores. To calculate this score, the difference between positive and negative mentions is divided by the sum of positive and negative mentions on the subject (Ray 2007, 16; see also Marks et al. 2007, 24). This score ranges from -1 – solely negative mentions or an entirely exclusive position – to 1 – purely positive mentions or an inclusive position. The position score is the dependent variable for the following analysis.

Equation 3.1

\[
\text{Position Score} = \frac{\text{% Positive Sentences} - \text{% Negative Sentences}}{\text{% Positive Sentences} + \text{% Negative Sentences}}
\]

Figure 3.4 presents the trajectory of outreach strategy as measured by the salience score for the center-left and center-right parties included in this analysis. Consistent with the argument that the center-left seeks ethnic minority votes, the average position score for the center-left is higher than that of the center-right in all six countries. Yet there are instances when the center-right adopts a more inclusive position than the center-left, which contradicts the even stronger statement that it is always the center-left that pursue this strategy. These
graphs show that there is enough variation in the position of the center-right across time and space to warrant explanation.

Figure 3.4 Position score of mainstream party outreach toward ethnic minorities, 1970-2010

Source: Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al. 2012).

**Independent Variables**

What factors affect the degree to which center-right parties stake inclusive positions toward ethnic minorities in an effort to win their votes? I begin by reviewing the two variables of interest for the theory advanced here, the change in the naturalization rate and the foreign population as a proportion of the total population. I then turn to existing explanations of a mainstream party’s choice to adopt inclusive or exclusive positions toward ethnic minorities and cultural diversity, and the three sets of variables they emphasize: party competition, sociological conditions, and institutions.
Features of the Ethnic Minority Population

The argument of this dissertation is that the distinction between citizens and non-citizens drives center-right parties’ positions on immigrant and minority policies and their outreach strategies. This constraint on the range of potential strategies is the product of party identity and the constituency it has established. Specifically, core voters’ distinct views and policy orientations toward minorities with citizenship and those without limit center-right parties from promoting the interests of non-citizens in an effort to cultivate their support. As our prior review of public opinion data demonstrates, center-left partisans do not make such distinctions. The center-left thus does not confront a citizen-foreigner trade-off.

By specifying the constraints on center-right party outreach and their provenance, we are able to ascertain the specific factor accounting for variation in center-right party outreach strategy, and the feature of the ethnic minority population that will promote different responses by mainstream parties of the center-left and center-right. The central hypothesis is that changes in the citizenship ratio, the number of ethnic minorities with citizenship relative to those without, substantially affect center-right parties' outreach strategies. After all, growth in the number of eligible voters renders outreach a more attractive strategy than it was previously, and vice-versa.

Given the attitudes and policy orientations among their core supporters, it follows that parties of the center-left and center-right ought to respond differently to the prevalence of foreigners, and changes in the citizenship ratio. First, the presence of a sizable foreigner population ought to provide incentives for the center-left to issue more inclusive appeals and the center-right to be less inclusive, even becoming exclusionary. As discussed in Chapter 2, ethnic minorities without citizenship tend to be less well integrated than those with
citizenship. Most countries require a minimum of five years residence and competency in the host language in order to become naturalized. Naturalized citizens tend to have better command of the host-country language, have higher socio-economic status, and are more accepted by their fellow citizens (see, e.g., OECD 2010; Howard 2009, 7-8; Hansen 1998; Bratsberg et al. 2002). Crucially, they also have the right to vote in national elections. For center-right partisans, a sizeable foreign population will likely evoke the specter of an alien “other” threatening the nation’s way of life and identity, thereby raising the costs of outreach for the center-right without any compensation by way of votes.

Second, the direction and magnitude of change in the citizenship ratio over a discrete time period produce slightly different strategic responses from the center-right and center-left. For the center-right, the direction in which the ratio is moving reveals how many ethnic minorities may soon enter the electorate, with discontinuities providing the external stimuli that actors are able to perceive to initiate a change in party strategy (Harmel and Janda 1994; Deschouwer 1992). Not only would a sharp bump in the number of citizens indicate that there are more votes for the party to win, but, as argued in Chapter 2, is more likely that seismic shifts in citizenship acquisitions, not incremental gains, would garner party leaders’ attention. We thus expect larger changes in the number of citizens to foreigners are more likely to prompt center-right parties’ to adopt increasingly inclusive or exclusive positions toward ethnic minorities.

Changes in the citizenship ratio have less clear implications for the center-left. Both the growth in the foreigner population and pool of naturalized citizens generate incentives for center-left parties to appeal to ethnic minorities. Disregarding the other conditions that raise the costs of outreach for center-left, we should expect center-left parties to select less
inclusive positions in response to changes in the citizenship ratio only when both decreases in
the number of naturalizations and the foreigner population are driving the ratio’s trajectory.
Having identified the theory’s observable causal factors and their expected relationship to
outreach, I turn to their measurement.

**Change in Naturalization Rates.** As argued in Chapter 2, the citizenship ratio’s variation is largely a product of elements: citizenship acquisitions and net migration. The key indicator of the change in the citizenship ratio is thus the *naturalization rate*: the relative number of citizenship acquisitions at the end of year \( t \) to foreigners at the beginning of year \( t \).\(^{39}40\) Specifically, I use the *change in the naturalization rate* as a proxy for shifts in the citizenship ratio, measured as the difference between the naturalization rate at the end of the current election year and the previous year. Note that this variable is not a demographic feature, but rather a part of the institutional environment as both access to citizenship and grounds of entry, residence, and expulsion are within the purview of the state (Coleman 2009; Howard 2009).

---

\(^{39}\) Scholars have also used the saliency score to operationalize parties’ positions on a variety of dimensions. The saliency score comprises the percentage of positive statements to negative statements, and is measured by subtracting the total negative statements from the positive statements. This variable ranges from -100, representing manifestos exclusively dedicated to anti-immigrant issues, to 100, representing those exclusively dedicated to pro-immigrant issues. This operationalization has two shortcomings. First, it is sensitive to the length of the entire manifesto as these numbers represent the percentage of all manifesto sentences dedicated to the issue in question. Two parties devoting the same number of sentences to minority issues may receive different scores if one manifesto is longer. Second, it does not distinguish between manifestos failing to reference these issues and those that make an equal number of positive and negative mentions. The two would both receive a saliency score of zero. For these reasons, I have chosen to use the position score as my dependent variable. That said, the results that follow are models using the saliency score as the dependent variable. The consistency in findings is unsurprising given the strength of the empirical association between the saliency and positions scores (\( r = 0.77, p<0.01 \)).

\(^{40}\) In contrast, the ratio’s other constituent components – maturation of immigration process, status as a former colonial power, and foreign nationals’ access to social and political rights – only account for broad cross-national differences in the size of the ratio (see e.g., Coleman 2009).
Measures of citizenship acquisition, or the citizenship status of the foreigner population more generally, are absent from the statistical models analyzing party competition and immigration. To my knowledge, this study is the first to use a quantitative indicator of citizenship status to help account for parties’ positions on cultural diversity over a significant time span and across a large number of countries. These data are often excluded for two reasons. First, they are difficult to attain. Most cross-national datasets compiling these data, such as Eurostat, extend only for ten or twenty years. One must reference annual statistical yearbooks to gather most data prior to 1990. Second, these data are generated by national immigration rules and thus are not comparable (Coleman 2008). The quality of these data is also variable.

I compensate for these deficiencies by gathering data produced by each country’s statistical body for the year in question, taking care to exclude those citizenship acquisitions due to adoption or to children of co-nationals born abroad.41 Although the methods by which countries attribute citizenship vary cross-nationally, this theory does not depend on the objective change in the ethnic minority population. Instead, what matters for the explanation presented here are party elites’ perceptions of the evolution in the ethnic minority population, measured and understood in categories relevant to them. Moreover, by using national statistical yearbooks as the source of my data, I capture the data available to elites at the time they make their strategic choices. This approach renders moot concerns about the accuracy of the data given that elites would reference these very data when seeking information on the

41 In the West German case, the data provided by the national statistics institutes allows us to distinguish the number of citizenship acquisitions made by ethnic Germans Aussiedler. Given that the naturalization of ethnic Germans generates very different strategic considerations (see e.g.,Thränhardt 2002), and their inclusion in the naturalization rate distorts the actual pace by which the remaining Ausländer entered the electorate, the naturalization rate excludes those acquisitions from 1968 through 1999 and ex lege acquisitions since 2000.
demographic profile of the immigrant population, and they would be unlikely to be aware of these errors.

For example, to identify the number of citizenship acquisitions in the Netherlands in 1982, I reference *Statistich zakboek 1984*, the Dutch statistical yearbook published in 1983. These data indicate that as of January 1982, the resident foreign national population in the Netherlands numbered 537,600. At the end of 1982, 1,5310 individuals acquired Dutch citizenship, representing a naturalization rate of 2.85 (Centraal Bureau Voor De Statistiek 1984). The naturalization rate for each country from 1970 through 2010 is presented in Figure 3.5. These graphs reveal that the naturalization rate and its change over a single year are highly variable.

**Figure 3.5 Naturalization Rate by Country, 1970 – 2010**
One potential criticism of this measure is that it may not accurately reflect ethnic minorities’ naturalization rates, but rather those of Western immigrants. While statistical bureaus often provide statistics on the previous nationality of individuals acquiring citizenship, they vary in their comprehensiveness. As a result, the rate of non-Western naturalization could not be consistently calculated. Figure 3.6 displays the total number of citizenship acquisitions in a year by foreigners of Western and non-Western origin. With the exception of Sweden, which experienced a good deal of Western naturalizations up until the mid-1980s, non-Western immigrants have represented a great deal more of the citizenship acquisitions in a given state than Western immigrants.

Figure 3.6 Citizenship acquisitions (in thousands), by Western / Non-Western origin

42 “Western” countries comprise all OECD member-states; all other states are “non-Western.”
PERCENT FOREIGN. A key source of heterogeneity in party responses to features of the ethnic minority population is the response the prevalence of foreigners. To assess the degree to which center-right and center-left parties respond differently to the ethnic minority population on the basis of its legal status, I include the variable, the foreign population as a percentage of the total population. For the center-left, foreigners represent a pool of potential voters; their presence increases the payoffs associated with outreach. For the center-right, the presence of a large population of immigrants, who are visibly different in appearance, customs, and values, raise the costs of outreach by heightening the sense of threat that immigrants and their descendants pose to core constituents’ perception of the nation (Sides and Citrin 2007). According to the theory, this feature of the sociological environment should be positively correlated with outreach by the center-left and negatively associated with efforts by the center-right. This measure is the common operationalization of the immigrant population in empirical analyses of anti-immigration party support. Statistical yearbooks were also the source for this data.

Sociological Conditions

The vast literature on xenophobic politics has long sought to identify the conditions under which ethnic intolerance swells and the ‘demand’ for xenophobic politics emerges (see Mudde 2007 for a review). The dominant socio-structural explanations invoke economic and demographic conditions to explain widespread anti-immigrant sentiment. In particular, a society’s economic health and the prevalence of immigrants serve as key explanatory variables for the emergence or salience of anti-immigrant parties and politics (Givens 2005; Golder 2003; Swank and Betz 2003; Zimmerman 2003; Weyland 1999).
Grim economic conditions act to stimulate demand for anti-immigrant politics by generating conflict between natives and immigrants over resources, and facilitating the success of radical right parties. The first consequence is most likely to affect the center-left given the socio-economic composition of their electorate. Their voters are most likely to be competing with immigrants and minorities for low-wage jobs. The center-right will acutely experience the indirect effect of poor economic conditions, namely the success of the radical right (though see Ivarsflaten 2005). Thus, the general theoretical expectation is that mainstream parties will be more likely to adopt exclusionary positions toward immigrants during times of high unemployment and/or economic shrinkage, but for different reasons.

Conversely, there are theoretical reasons to believe that during times of economic expansion center-right parties will be more likely to adopt inclusive stances toward ethnic minorities on the prodding of one of its key internal constituents, business. Neoclassical trade theory, when applied to immigration, suggests that economic expansion stimulates demand for immigrant labor, all other things held equal (Simon 1989). Businesses may pressure the center-right to be more inclusive to ethnic minorities to render the environment more receptive to increased migrant inflow. Alternatively, they may lobby for the center-right to be more inclusive to ethnic minorities to alter perceptions that the country is unwelcoming to immigrant minorities, a reputation that may deter the inflow of labor, especially of the high-skilled type. For these reasons, we may expect higher levels of GDP to translate into more outreach by the center-right.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS. Consistent with the literature on radical right parties (see e.g., Golder 2003; Jackman and Volpert 1996), I use the current level of GDP per capita and the current unemployment rate in a given election year to measure the state of the economy. GDP
per capita is reported at current purchasing power parity (PPP) in thousands of U.S. dollars, and, along with the unemployment rate, was obtained from the OECD statistical library.

**Economic Conditions and Percent Foreign.** While the number of foreigners has long been predicted to influence the support for radical right parties, and by extension, anti-immigrant politics, some claim that this relationship is contingent on the unemployment rate (Golder 2003). To account for this hypothesis, I interact *percent foreign* with the *unemployment rate*.

**Party Competition**

Characteristics of party competition are frequently touted as the principal determinant of center-right parties’ positioning on immigration and integration issues (e.g., van Spanje 2010; Norris 2005; Betz 2002). In response to a radical right threat, center-right parties shift to the right (Bale 2003; Norris 2005; Pettigrew 1998), and co-opt the neophyte’s positions and rhetoric to prevent voter defection (Minkenberg 2002; Downs 2001; Schain 1987). Proponents of this approach posit that the size of this effect is contingent on the electoral system, with higher district magnitude translating into greater potential to alter electoral outcomes (Golder 2003). Moreover, a party’s vulnerability to radical right influence is a function of its position on the left-right ideological continuum, with those further to the right most likely to react quickly and decisively so as to prevent voter flight (van Spanje 2010).

**Radical Right Threat.** The radical right’s ability to exert this influence is conditional on its vote share (van Spanje 2010; Golder 2003). As a radical right party’s electoral performance improves, the literature predicts that the mainstream right will eschew appealing to the center and draw closer to its competitor. To test this hypothesis, I employ two measures of radical right influence: its *vote share, lagged*, and its *current vote share*. I
also interact the *log of the median district* with the *vote share of the radical right* to account for the proposed conditionality of its influence (Meguid 2008, 2005; Golder 2003). The expectation is that the radical right party’s vote share and consequent influence is positively correlated with district magnitude, with the marginal effect decreasing as the district magnitude becomes large.

**ELECTORAL SAFETY.** To assess a party’s strategic flexibility, I also include the mainstream party’s *vote share from the previous election*. The prolific literature on political parties and elections posits that parties enjoying high vote share are able to engage in riskier strategies (e.g., Jacobs 2011; Garrett 1993; Keeler 1993). The extra votes provide parties with an electoral safety net, insulating them from electoral punishment. According to this argument, higher levels of previous vote share should facilitate center-right parties to adopt increasingly inclusive positions toward ethnic minorities.

**Institutions**

Electoral rules should exert an independent effect on party strategy toward ethnic minorities, particularly in its ability to the incentivize elites to construct broad coalitions, or mobilize select segments of the electorate. As discussed more fully in Chapter 1, the proportionality of the electoral system influences whether party leaders choose to adopt a *persuasion* strategy, or develop moderate programs aimed at attracting the greatest number of voters, or a *mobilization* strategy, or offer extreme programs that appeal to core constituents (Cox 2005). Chapter 1 also demonstrated that ethnic minorities do not constitute a “natural” center-right constituency; therefore, center-right party outreach constitutes a form of *persuasion*. When there are many seats to attain and they are allocated proportionally, parties only have to acquire small vote shares to win representation. They may then carve out
ideological niches and still gain representation. When parties vie for a single seat that is
given to the plurality winner, they may win seats only if they can amass the largest shares of
votes. For this reason, first-past-the-post (SMD) electoral systems are thought to facilitate the
incorporation of immigrant groups in particular, as both parties seek to increase the size of
their coalitions in order to win legislative representation (e.g., Dahl 1967; Holden 1966;
Schattschneider 1942).

Literature on the political incorporation of immigrants and their descendants in
Western Europe have pointed to the openness of the citizenship regime to explain the
willingness of mainstream parties to mobilize minority populations (e.g., da Fonseca 2011;
Bird 2005; Koopmans et al. 2005). According to this view, party strategies may also be
constrained by existing configurations of nationhood and citizenship. For instance, national
citizenship regimes – defined as the institutions relating to the acquisition and expression of
citizenship – are thought to shape popular attitudes toward ethnic minorities (Weldon 2006),
and the type of identities ascribed to immigrants and their descendants (e.g., racial identities,
ethnic and national identities, or policy-status identifiers) (Koopmans et al. 2005). One
important measure is the legal requirements for citizenship and the degree to which they
make it easy or difficult to acquire citizenship (e.g., Howard 2009; Koopmans et al. 2005).
The easier it is to transform immigrants into citizens, the more likely center-right parties will
have a constituency of large enough size to warrant attention, and the more inclusive their
campaigns.

**Electoral Rules.** To account for the institutional incentives for elites to brandish
broad, inclusive appeals or mobilize core clientele, scholars include in their statistical models
the *logged magnitude of the median legislator’s district*. District magnitude is the critical
determinant in setting the level of proportionality. The more deputies that are to be elected in
the district, the smaller the percentage of the vote that is necessary to win at least one more
seat. These theories broadly predict that in proportional systems we should not see outreach
whereas in majoritarian systems we should.

Citizenship Regime. The ease with which foreign residents can become citizens is
hypothesized to affect political parties’ incentives to appeal to ethnic minorities (da Fonseca
2011; Bird 2005). Where there are fewer obstacles to attaining citizenship, immigrants enjoy
easy access to citizenship, and, crucially, national voting rights. I employ Howard’s (2009)
citizenship policy index (CPI) to test if outreach strategy is affected by the degree to which
countries are “liberal”, “medium” or “restrictive” in their granting of citizenship, measured
on a scale of 0 (restrictive) to 6 (liberal).43 Each country receives a score for the set of
policies in place during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Given that many citizenship policies
did not begin to change until 1980 (Howard 2009), I apply the 1980 score to characterize the
citizenship regime during the 1970s. Higher values on the citizenship policy index should
translate into more positive positions toward ethnic minorities. This argument will most
likely explain cross-national variation, although it may also provide leverage on temporal
variation when citizenship policy has undergone substantial change. These hypotheses are
summarized below in Table 3.6.

________________________

43 Classification is calculated by summing these three components: attribution of *jus soli*, coded as 0 (not
allowed) or 2 (allowed); residency requirements for naturalization, coded as 0 (at least 10 years), 1 (6–9 years),
and 2 (5 years or less); and acceptance of dual citizenship for immigrants, coded as either 0 (naturalized citizens
must relinquish their prior citizenship) or 2 (naturalized immigrants can retain their previous citizenship)
(Howard 2006, 452).
Table 3.6 Independent variables and predicted effect on center-right outreach

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class of Explanation</th>
<th>Predicted Sign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic Minority Population</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Foreign</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Naturalization Rate</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sociological Conditions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Foreign x Unemployment</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party Competition</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Right Vote Share</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Right Vote Share x District Magnitude</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainstream Vote Share, Lagged</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Median District Magnitude</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship Policy Index (CPI)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**III. Models and Analyses**

I employ pooled cross-sectional time series (TSCS) analysis to assess the determinants of party outreach. To test statistically the claim that center-left and center-right parties respond differently to environmental, institutional, and competitive conditions, I estimate a fully interactive pooled-sample regression (Kam 2009; Kam and Franzese 2007). In each model, I interact the key independent variables with a *Center-Left* dummy, coded 0 for parties of the center-right and 1 for those of the center-left, and check for party family heterogeneity via a simple t-test on the interaction terms (Kam 2009, 610).
Additionally, all models include a lagged dependent variable, trend variables by decade, panel-corrected standard errors, and country dummy variables (Wilson and Butler 2007; Beck and Katz 1995, 1996). I take each in turn. First, it turns out that there is first-order autocorrelation in each of my analyses, and so in each I have included lags of the dependent variable. Subsequent tests for serially correlated errors via the TSCS analogue of the standard Lagrange multiplier test show that the lagged dependent variable solved the problem (Wilson and Butler 2007). Second, each model comprises decade dummy variables to control for common effects in each decade, such as the oil shock in the 1970s that resulted in Germany, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and France ending or sharply reducing labor migration (Hansen 2003, 26). The decade dummy for the 2000s is the reference category against which other decade effects are compared, and thus is dropped in each case. I employ panel-corrected standard errors to account for contemporaneously correlated and panel heteroskedastic errors (Beck and Katz 1995, 1996). Finally, I include country dummy variables to minimize country-level heteroskedasticity and to account for unobserved country-level features, such as the distribution of voters’ preferences on the policy space. The results of F-tests indicate that fixed-effects are appropriate for these data. The country dummy for France is dropped in each case.

The analysis of outreach proceeds as follows. Model 1 tests the heterogeneity of center-left and center-right parties’ responses to characteristics of the ethnic minority

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44 Fixed-effects models cannot be used to investigate time-invariant causes of the dependent variables. Technically, those country-level features that remain unchanged over time are perfectly collinear with the dummies (Kohler and Kreuter 2009, 245). While a fixed effects model is an appropriate estimation strategy for reasons both theoretical – my primary variable of interest is the effect of the changing naturalization rate within units – and empirical – my errors are not correlated with my regressors - this method is ill suited for estimating the independent effect of average district magnitude. For this reason, the effect of the electoral formula is analyzed through its intervening effect on radical right party strength.
population, and Model 2 gauges the effect of sociological variables. I incorporate party competition variables in Models 3 and 4, while Models 5 and 6 assess the impact of institutional features. Model 7 incorporates variables from each class of explanation, and is represented by Equation 3.2 below.

**Equation 3.2**

\[
\text{Outreach}_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{CL} + \beta_1 \text{Outreach}_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 (\text{CL} \times \text{Outreach})_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 \Delta \text{in Nat. Rate}_{i,t} + \\
\beta_4 (\text{CL} \times \Delta \text{in Nat RATE})_{i,t} + \beta_5 \% \text{Foreign}_{i,t} + \beta_6 (\text{CL} \times \% \text{Foreign})_{i,t} + \\
\beta_7 \text{Unemployment}_{i,t} + \beta_8 (\text{CL} \times \text{Unemployment})_{i,t} + \beta_9 \text{Vote Share}_{i,t-1} + \\
\beta_{10} (\text{CL} \times \text{Vote Share})_{i,t-1} + \beta_{11} \text{Log Med. District}_{i,t} + \beta_{12} (\text{CL} \times \text{Log Med. District})_{i,t} + \\
\beta_{13} \text{Radical Right Vote}_{i,t-1} + \beta_{14} (\text{CL} \times \text{Radical Right Vote})_{i,t-1} + \\
\beta_{14} (\text{Log Median District} \times \text{Radical Right Vote})_{i,t-1} + \\
\beta_{15} (\text{CL} \times \text{Log Median District} \times \text{Radical Right Vote})_{i,t-1} + \\
\beta_{16} \text{Citizenship Policy Index}_{i,t} + \beta_{17} (\text{CL} \times \text{Citizenship Policy Index})_{i,t} + \\
\beta_{18-28} \text{COUNTRY DUMMIES}_{i,t} + \beta_{29-35} \text{DECADE DUMMIES}_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}.
\]

**Results**

The results for the models testing the heterogeneous response and sociological hypotheses are presented in Table 3.7. The former model comprises *Change in the Naturalization Rate* and *Percent Foreign*, while the latter adds *GDP*, *Unemployment*, and an interaction between *Percent Foreign* and *Unemployment*. It is immediately evident that center-left and center-right parties will engage in outreach on the basis of different indicators. The coefficient on *Change in the Naturalization Rate*, the primary variable of interest, is significant and positive in both models. Specifically, it is 0.22 in both Model 1 and in the sociological model, Model 2; both coefficients have a *p*-value 0.00 (can reject the null). These results suggest that for the center-right, increases in the citizenship ratio correspond with more inclusive positions toward ethnic minorities. By contrast, center-left parties’ positions toward ethnic minorities rely significantly less on changes in the naturalization rate.
(as demonstrated by the significant interaction between Center-Left and Change in the Naturalization Rate in both models). The size of the coefficient for the center-left in Model 1 is 0.05 with a $p$-value of 0.15 (cannot reject the null), and 0.07 with a $p$-value of 0.07 in Model 2.\(^\text{45}\)

Turning to the size of the foreign population as a percentage of the national population, Percent Foreign, the results from Model 1 indicate that center-right parties do respond to the size of the non-national population whereas center-left parties do not. The results for the center-right show that $\beta = -0.21$, with a standard error of 0.08, and a resulting $p$-value of 0.01 (can reject the null); the analysis indicates that center-right parties adopt less inclusive positions toward ethnic minorities as the size of the non-national population grows. The interaction between Percent Foreign and Center-Left yields a coefficient of 0.21 that is statistically significant at the 0.10 level ($p$-value = 0.06), suggesting that the size of the foreigner population produces different effects for center-left parties. With the recoded center-left variable, the coefficient on Percent Foreign is statistically indistinguishable from zero. In this case, the center-left’s position toward ethnic minorities appears to be independent of the number of foreigners, as well as the change in the naturalization rate.

The set of coefficients in the second column identifies the effect of Percent Foreign on center-right and center-left ethnic minority outreach conditional on the unemployment rate. Turning first to the center-right, we see that when Unemployment equals zero, the effect of Percent Foreign is negative and significant. Even when times are good, a large foreigner population still translates to the center-right adopting more exclusive positions on issues of

\(^{45}\) Coefficients and $p$-values for the center-left can be acquired by simply recoding Center-Left to equal 1 for center-right parties and 0 for center-left parties, and then re-running the analyses with new interactions.
cultural diversity (as given by the coefficient -0.31 and with a \( p \)-value of 0.01). Once again, the effect of \textit{Percent Foreign} is statistically different between the two mainstream party families, as evidenced by the significant interaction between \textit{Center-Left} and \textit{Percent Foreign}. Here, we do see that \textit{Percent Foreign} yields a substantial impact on the center-left’s position toward ethnic minorities. Its coefficient of 0.21 is statistically significant at a 0.05 level. These findings suggest that under those conditions when economic competition between the center-left’s core constituents, the working class, and immigrants is minimal, center-left parties may approach a large immigrant population as pool of potential voters.

Next, we see that while the effect of \textit{Percent Foreign} on center-right party strategy is not conditional on \textit{Unemployment} (as evidenced by the statistically insignificant interaction between \textit{Unemployment} and \textit{Percent Foreign}), it is for the center-left (as given by the significant interaction between \textit{Center-Left}, \textit{Unemployment}, and \textit{Percent Foreign}). While the interaction term in the recoded model is negative and statistically significant (\( p \)-value = 0.01), the estimated interaction coefficient is only -0.03. Moreover, graphing the marginal effect of \textit{Percent Foreign} on center-left outreach across rising levels of \textit{Unemployment} provides no evidence that the effect of the size of the foreign population influences center-left outreach except for unemployment levels of 15 percent or higher.

The results of Model 2 provide little support for the hypotheses linking economic conditions to the outreach strategies adopted by either mainstream party family. Indeed, the major takeaway from this model is that center-right outreach is not responsive to economic variables: not one of the three economic variables reaches standard levels of statistical significance. While GDP appears to have no effect on the inclusiveness of the center-left’s position toward minorities, the unemployment rate does under those conditions when \textit{Percent
Foreign equals zero. The coefficient on Unemployment is 0.16 and is only statistically significant at a 0.10 level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.7 Features of the ethnic minority population and economic conditions, DV = Positional score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Center-Left</td>
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<tr>
<td>Position Score ( t-1 )</td>
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<tr>
<td>Center-Left x Position Score ( t-1 )</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic Minority Population</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Change in Naturalization Rate</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Center-Left x Change in Naturalization Rate</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Foreign</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Center-Left x Percent Foreign</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sociological Variables</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP/Capita (in thousands)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Center-Left x GDP/Capita (in thousands)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Center-Left x Unemployment</td>
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<td>Unemployment x Percent Foreign</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Center-Left x Unemployment x Percent Foreign</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: Country dummies and trend variables excluded.

Table 3.8 presents the results for the first party competition model, which includes the radical right vote share in the previous national election, Radical Right Vote Share\( t-1 \), in addition to Change in the Naturalization Rate, and Percent Foreign. It appears that the
electoral performance of a far-right competitor has a positive and statistically significant
effect on how inclusive the center-right is toward ethnic minorities, as evidenced by its
coefficient, 0.06 (p-value = 0.01). The failure of the coefficient on the Radical Right Vote
Share_{t-1} and Center-Left interaction to reach conventional levels of statistical significance (p-
value = 0.39) suggests that previous electoral performance of the radical right vote yields the
same impact on the inclusiveness of both center-left and center-right parties. Running
separate sample estimations confirms this suspicion, as the coefficient on Radical Right Vote
Share_{t-1} in the center-left regression is 0.4 (p-value = 0.00). Contrary to what alternative
explanations predict, the growing electoral strength of a radical right party prompts a more
inclusive, not exclusive, stance by mainstream parties.

What effect do features of the ethnic minority population have on center-right party
outreach having now accounted for competitive exigencies? The findings from Model 3 show
that the change in the citizenship ratio continues to have a positive and statistically
significant effect on center-right outreach, with a coefficient of 0.29 and a p-value of 0.00.
While the interaction between Change in the Naturalization Rate and Center-Left, (p-value =
0.00) suggests that the center-left reacts differently to changes in the citizenship ratio, the
coefficient for the center-left 0.10 (p-value = 0.06), indicates that the difference is in the size
of the effect, not the direction. Turning to another feature of the ethnic minority population –
Percent Foreign – it appears that the size of the foreign population no longer affects center-
right outreach as decisively as it did before; its coefficient is now 0.15 with a p-value of 0.10,
respectively. Upon removing the economic variables, the effect of Percent Foreign on party
strategy is statistically indistinguishable from zero.
The second party competition model, Model 4, incorporates the party’s previous vote share, $Vote Share_{t-1}$, to gauge the effect of electoral security on party strategy. The results are reported in the second column in Table 9. Upon accounting for the mainstream, center-right party’s previous electoral performance, the success (or lack thereof) of its radical right competitor no longer appears to have any bearing on the center-right’s decision to appeal to ethnic minorities. The lack of statistical significance of the interaction between Radical Right $Vote Share_{t-1}$ and Center-Left indicate that the mainstream center-left reacts similarly to its counterpart on the right when confronted by a far-right party. The coefficient on Radical Right $Vote Share_{t-1}$ for the center-left is small ($0.03 + 0.01 = 0.04$) and statistically significant at the 0.10 level.

Whereas the actions of the radical right in the previous election left no impact on center-right parties, the same cannot be said about their own performance in the previous election. The party’s performance in the previous election, $Vote Share_{t-1}$, yields the statistically significant coefficient of $-0.04$ ($p$-value = 0.00). Contrary to our expectations, stronger electoral showings by the center-right are followed by less inclusive positions, suggesting that ethnic minority outreach may be a strategy pursued by those parties on a losing streak desperately seeking to increase their vote share. The statistically significant coefficient on the interaction between Center-Left and $Vote Share_{t-1}$ suggests that the center-lefts’ previous performances have a different bearing on its position toward ethnic minorities and cultural diversity. Upon closer inspection, it appears that these parties’ previous electoral showings have no effect on how inclusive or exclusive they are toward ethnic minorities.

Even as we take into account the competitive exigencies center-right parties confront, Change in the Naturalization Rate continues to impact their strategy (as evidenced by the
statistically significant coefficient of 0.26 with a \( p \)-value = 0.00). \textit{Percent Foreign} continues to affect center-right party outreach, as demonstrated by its statistically significant -0.17 coefficient (\( p \)-value = 0.04). Turning to the center-left, \textit{Change in the Naturalization Rate} influences the degree of outreach, with a coefficient of 0.10 (\( p \)-value = 0.06), whereas \textit{Percent Foreign} once again fails to influence the center-left’s stance toward cultural diversity and ethnic minorities.

| Table 3.8 Features of the ethnic minority population and party competition, DV = Positional score |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                                                   | Model 3         | Model 4         |
| Center-Left                                      | -0.63           | -1.93*          |
|                                                  | (0.87)          | (1.08)          |
| Position Score \( t-1 \)                        | 0.28***         | 0.279***        |
|                                                  | (0.10)          | (0.09)          |
| Center-Left x Position Score \( t-1 \)          | -0.47***        | -0.47***        |
|                                                  | (0.15)          | (0.16)          |
| \textbf{Ethnic Minority Population}              |                  |                  |
| Change in Naturalization Rate                    | 0.29***         | 0.26***         |
|                                                  | (0.06)          | (0.06)          |
| Center-Left x Change in Naturalization Rate      | -0.19***        | -0.15**         |
|                                                  | (0.06)          | (0.06)          |
| Percent Foreign                                  | -0.16*          | -0.17**         |
|                                                  | (0.09)          | (0.08)          |
| Center-Left x Percent Foreign                    | 0.19            | 0.20*           |
|                                                  | (0.11)          | (0.12)          |
| \textbf{Party Competition Variables}             |                  |                  |
| Radical Right Vote Share \( t-1 \)              | 0.06***         | 0.03            |
|                                                  | (0.02)          | (0.02)          |
| Center-Left x Radical Right Vote Share \( t-1 \)| -0.02           | 0.01            |
|                                                  | (0.02)          | (0.03)          |
| Vote Share \( t-1 \)                             | -0.04***        |                 |
|                                                  | (0.02)          |                 |
| Center-Left x Vote Share \( t-1 \)               |                 | 0.04**          |
|                                                  |                 | (0.02)          |
| Constant                                         | 0.68            | 1.964**         |
|                                                  | (0.67)          | (0.80)          |
| Observations                                     | 93              | 92              |
| R-squared                                        | 0.63            | 0.67            |

Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses

*** \( p \textless 0.01 \), ** \( p \textless 0.05 \), * \( p \textless 0.1 \)

Note: Country dummies and trend variables excluded.
The findings from the institutional models are displayed in Table 3.9. There is only partial support for the heterogeneity hypothesis with regards to the size of the foreigner population as the interaction between Center-Left and Percent Foreign achieves statistical significance in Model 6 alone. In Model 5, neither the center-left nor the center-right appears to adjust their position toward ethnic minorities. While the sign on the Percent Foreign coefficient is negative, as the theory predicts, its $p$-value is equal to 0.91.\footnote{Diagnostic tests show that the variance inflation factor for Percent Foreign and Change in Naturalization Rate is well under 10, signifying that collinearity is not a problem.} Analyzing the center-left alone, the coefficient on Percent Foreign is meager – 0.04 – and fails to reach statistical significance. Upon including the Citizenship Policy Index, Percent Foreign gains significance. The coefficient is -0.19 ($p$-value = 0.01), indicating that center-right parties adopt more exclusionary positions as the size of the foreigner population as a proportion of the national population grows. The Center-Left and Percent Foreign interaction is also significant, though only at $p < 0.1$. The difference in the way the two mainstream parties respond to this demographic feature appears to be in the willingness to react to this feature: the relationship between the center-left’s position and Percent Foreign is faint (-0.19 + 0.20 = 0.01) and is statistically indistinguishable from zero ($p$-value = 0.91).

These two models allow us to assess the more nuanced argument regarding the radical right’s impact on center-right parties’ positions toward ethnic minorities, namely that its influence is conditional on the permissiveness of the electoral system. In systems with larger median district magnitudes, parties are better able to win seats and to affect election outcomes (Golder 2003, 441).
Table 3.9 Features of the ethnic minority population and institutional factors, DV = Positional score

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Center-Left</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>-1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.97)</td>
<td>(1.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position Score (t-1)</td>
<td>0.21**</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center-Left x Position Score (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.37**</td>
<td>-0.30**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ethnic Minority Population**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change in Naturalization Rate</th>
<th>0.15**</th>
<th>0.17**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center-Left x Change in Naturalization Rate</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Foreign</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.19***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center-Left x Percent Foreign</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.20*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Institutional Factors**

| Radical Right Vote Share    | 0.09*** | 0.08*** |
|                            | (0.02)  | (0.02)  |
| Center-Left x Radical Right Vote Share | -0.04  | -0.03  |
|                            | (0.03)  | (0.03)  |
| Log Median District Magnitude | -0.11  | -0.18  |
|                              | (0.20)  | (0.19)  |
| Center-Left x Log Median District Mag. | -0.05  | -0.00  |
|                              | (0.29)  | (0.28)  |
| Radical Right Vote Share x Log Median District Mag. | -0.03*** | -0.02*** |
|                              | (0.01)  | (0.01)  |
| Center-Left x Radical Right Vote x Log Median District Mag. | 0.01  | 0.01  |
|                              | (0.01)  | (0.01)  |
| Citizenship Policy Index    |        | -0.24*** |
|                              |         | (0.08)  |
| Center-Left x Citizenship Policy Index | 0.11  |         |
|                              |         | (0.10)  |
| Constant                    | 0.41    | 2.63*** |
|                              | (0.70)  | (0.87)  |
| Observations                | 93      | 93      |
| R-squared                   | 0.68    | 0.72    |

Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: Country dummies and trend variables excluded.
The expectation is that a rise in the median district magnitude increases the electoral threat posed by the radical right, with the marginal causal effect of a unit change in district magnitude declining when the district magnitude is large. Examining the effect of Radical Right Vote Share$_{t-1}$ on its own only reveals the effect of the radical right’s electoral performance in countries with single member districts. In countries with single-member districts, the radical right’s performance in the previous national election is met with more inclusive appeals by the center-right, as the effect of Radical Right Vote Share$_{t-1}$ is positive and significant ($p < 0.001$) in both Models 5 and 6.

Turning to the evidence for the hypothesized conditional relationship, the statistically significant coefficient on the interaction between Radical Right Vote Share$_{t-1}$ andLogged Median District Magnitude in Models 5 and 6 suggests that there is a conditional relationship between the two variables. Yet to appreciate fully how the permissiveness of the electoral system influences the effect of radical right vote share on center-right party strategy, it is necessary to examine the full range of the conditional coefficients for Radical Right Vote Share$_{t-1}$. These are graphically illustrated for Model 5 in Figure 7 and Model 6 in Figure 8. The solid line indicates how the value of the estimated causal effect of Radical Right Vote Share$_{t-1}$ changes across the full range of values for Logged Median District Magnitude. The estimated causal effect of Radical Right Vote Share$_{t-1}$ is only significant when the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval are above or below the zero line. Whereas the results from Model 3 indicated that Radical Right Vote Share$_{t-1}$ always encouraged center-right parties to adopt more inclusive stances, Figures 7 and 8 illustrate that this is not the case when the log of the district magnitude is equal to or greater than 2.1. The positive
relationship only holds in Denmark from 1968 through 1998, and the following countries for all years: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.

Figure 3.7 Marginal effect of radical right vote on center-right outreach from Model 5
Turning to the center-left, the Center-Left and Radical Right Vote Share_{t-1} interaction is insignificant in both models, suggesting that the tenor of the radical right’s relationship with the center-left in plurality systems is the same as it is with the center-right. Separate sample estimations reveal that the effect of Radical Right Vote Share_{t-1} is positive in both models, but is only statistically significant in Model 5 (p-value = 0.04). The coefficient on the interaction of Center-Left, Radical Right Vote Share_{t-1}, and Logged Median District Magnitude in Model 5 has a p-value of 0.11 (cannot reject the null at conventional levels), suggesting that there is no heterogeneity in response across mainstream parties to the radical right’s vote share in the previous national election. Yet as Figure 9 shows, the effect of Radical Right Vote Share_{t-1} is never significant in countries with a median district magnitude greater than one. Thus, only in France, Germany, and the UK does the prior performance of the radical right affect the center-left’s position toward ethnic minorities and diversity. For
Model 6, the Center-Left and Radical Right Vote Share\(_{t-1}\) and Center-Left, Radical Right Vote Share\(_{t-1}\) and Logged Median District Magnitude interactions produce statistically insignificant coefficients, the fact that the upper and lower confidence intervals in Figure 10 are on opposite sides of the x-axis for all values of Logged Median District Magnitude indicates that the radical right does not affect the outreach positions of the center-left.

Figure 3.9 Marginal effect of radical right vote on center-left outreach from Model 5
The findings for Model 6 provide strong evidence that the openness of the citizenship regime influences the outreach positions of both mainstream parties, although in the exact opposite way in which the literature predicts. As the coefficient of -0.24 on Citizenship Policy Index (p-value = 0.00) attests, it appears that as the ease by which individuals can acquire citizenship and level of culture rights increases, the center-right’s level of inclusiveness decreases, and vice-versa. These countries exhibiting the former type of change include Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands, whereas the United Kingdom displays the latter. The results from the models using Center-Right as the dummy variable reveal that the Citizenship Policy Index is negatively related to center-left parties’ positions.

47 Slowly-moving variables in a fixed-effects model typically have high standard errors because they will be highly correlated with the fixed-effects (Wilson and Butler 2007). For this reason, including such variables in a fixed-effects model will make it hard for them to appear either substantively or statistically significant (Beck 2001). Including the citizenship policy index thus raises the bar for confirming that its impact on party strategy exists (Wilson and Butler 2007).
toward ethnic minorities, although the effect is nearly half of that for the center-right ($\hat{\beta} = -0.13$) and is only just barely statistically significant at conventional levels ($p$-value = 0.09).

Having examined each class of explanation separately, Model 7, represented by Equation 3.2, incorporates variables from each class of explanation. The first column of Table 10 displays the results of the fully interactive model; the second and third columns show those for the center-left and center-right, respectively. I first assess the support for the heterogeneity hypothesis. I then evaluate followed the relative strength of the citizenship ratio hypothesis against those emphasizing sociological factors, features of party competition, and the institutional environment in accounting for center-right parties’ positions toward ethnic minorities and diversity. I take each in turn.
Table 3.10 Full model, DV = Positional score

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Center-Left</th>
<th>Center-Right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Center-Left</td>
<td>-1.94</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.38)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Position Score (p/1)</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center-Left x Position Score (p/1)</td>
<td>-0.27*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Minority Population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Naturalization Rate</td>
<td>0.18**</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.18**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center-Left x Change in Naturalization Rate</td>
<td>-0.16**</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Foreign</td>
<td>-0.22***</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.22***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center-Left x Percent Foreign</td>
<td>0.23**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociological Variables</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center-Left x Unemployment</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party Competition Variables</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote Share (p/1)</td>
<td>-0.04***</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.04***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center-Left x Vote Share (p/1)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Right Vote Share (p/1)</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.06**</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center-Left x Radical Right Vote Share (p/1)</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Institutional Factors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Median District Magnitude</td>
<td>-0.44***</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.44***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center-Left x Log Median District Magnitude</td>
<td>0.41</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Right Vote Share (p/1) x Log Median District Mag.</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.20**</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center-Left x Rad. Right Vote (p/1) x Log Median District Mag.</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship Policy Index</td>
<td>-0.27***</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.27***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center-Left x Citizenship Policy Index</td>
<td>0.14</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.77***</td>
<td>1.83**</td>
<td>3.77***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.97)</td>
<td>(0.88)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>45</td>
<td>47</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
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<td>0.643</td>
<td>0.751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Parties</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The major claim advanced by the heterogeneity hypothesis is that the citizenship status of ethnic minorities matters for the center-right but it does not for the center-left. If this proposition is true, then the coefficients on two interactions, one between Center-Left and Change in Naturalization Rate and the other between Center-Left and Percent Foreign, ought to be statistically significant. There is one caveat to keep in mind when analyzing the results. The implications of changes to the naturalization rate for center-left strategy are not entirely clear. As previously discussed, under certain conditions, shifts in the citizenship ratio may elicit identical reactions from the left and the right. That said, the Center-Left and Change in Naturalization Rate interaction term is statistically significant at the more generous two-tailed $p < 0.10$. We see that the effect of Change in Naturalization Rate is positive and significant among center-right parties (as evidenced by the statistically significant coefficient of 0.18), whereas its effect is negligible among center-left parties (an estimated coefficient of 0.02) and statistically indistinguishable from zero. Further evidence for the heterogeneity hypothesis comes from the interaction between Center-Left and Percent Foreign, which is statistically significant at conventional levels of $p < 0.05$. Once again, the resulting effect is meager and statistically insignificant for the center-left (given by the estimated coefficient of 0.01, with s.e. = 0.07, and $p$-value = 0.89), but is strong and significant for the center-right (as demonstrated by the estimated coefficient of -0.22, with s.e. = 0.07, and $p$-value = 0.001). Center-right parties’ adopt positions on diversity and toward ethnic minorities based on features of the ethnic minority population, but center-left parties do not.

In addition to supporting the citizenship ratio explanation of center-right outreach, the findings provide strong evidence for institutional accounts and mixed results for the theories
emphasizing sociological and party competition variables. For center-right parties, positive changes in the number of naturalizations correspond with more inclusive appeals. Conversely, they are more likely to issue exclusionary appeals in the presence of a large foreigner population, as the sociological theory predicts. Yet outreach appears impervious to \textit{Unemployment, Radical Right Vote Share}_{t-1}, \textit{Radical Right Vote Share}_{t-1}, \textit{Radical Right Vote Share}_{t-1}, \textit{and Logged Median District Magnitude}. The party competition theory receives partial support as the \textit{Vote Share}_{t-1} is statistically significant ($\beta = -0.04$, with s.e. = 0.01, and $p$-value = 0.01). It appears that as the previous vote share of the center-right grows its position toward ethnic minorities and cultural diversity becomes more exclusionary. Once again, we see that the effect of the \textit{Citizenship Policy Index} is negative and statistically significant. Center-right parties adopt more exclusionary positions when it becomes easier for foreigners to become citizens.

\textbf{IV. Conclusion}

By not recognizing citizenship status and only considering population \textit{levels} rather than \textit{changes}, the existing literature found little support connecting the features of the ethnic minority population to mainstream parties’ willingness to issue exclusionary or inclusionary appeals as an electoral strategy (see e.g., Bohman 2012; Van Spanje 2010). As a result, most analyses have privileged the exigencies of party competition, sociological conditions, and institutional settings, especially when explaining center-right parties’ susceptibility to ‘contagion effects’ from the radical right. Yet as the analysis presented in this chapter shows, center-right parties’ positions toward ethnic minorities are not solely, or even, the product of competition with the right. Instead, their appeals correlate with a host of other factors, including changes in the naturalization rate. Indeed, this factor remained a critical determinant of center-right parties’ positions across a variety of model specifications.
The findings in this chapter also demonstrate that mainstream parties’ reactions to changes in the ethnic minority population are a product of core supporters’ attitudes and policy opinions. First, the prevalence of foreigners prompts more exclusionary positions among parties of the center-right while rarely eliciting a response by the center-left. Second, changes in the citizenship ratio had a limited impact on the strategic choices of the center-left and a consistent and substantial effect on the strategic orientation of the center-right. The literature’s reliance on pooled analyses may obscure these relationships. Because these factors do not appear to wield a substantial influence on center-left strategy, pooling center-left and center-right parties with a common coefficient will produce a seemingly non-substantive effect.

Finally, the theory presented in Chapter 2 posits that partisan attitudes explain this difference in response; in turn, this chapter empirically substantiated this claim. Drawing on multiple public opinions surveys, I find that while partisans of both the left and right perceive the presence of ethnic minorities as a threat to national self-understanding, this tendency is more pronounced among those on the right. The data also show immigration and race policy orientations among core constituents of the center-right and center-left differ in a key respect. While center-left voters hold consistent attitudes toward government policies regardless of their intended beneficiaries’ legal status, center-right voters do not. Instead, they have divergent opinions toward government programs based on their target populations, with those aimed exclusively at non-nationals receiving substantially less support than those directed at ethnic minorities broadly.
Chapter 4: Conclusion

I. Puzzle and Argument

This dissertation addresses several pressing questions regarding national identity and the democratic inclusion of underrepresented groups by explaining a puzzle in Western European politics: center-right parties’ attempts to win the votes of ethnic minorities, or non-Western immigrants and their descendants. In the post-war period, Western Europe has experienced unrivaled levels of migration of non-European origin. In contrast to traditional settler societies, the countries of Europe have largely become countries of immigration unintentionally and reactively (Hollifield 1992). The challenges presented by the influx of millions of racially and religiously different immigrants are more pronounced in Europe due, in part, because of these countries’ more ethnoculturally rooted conceptions of nationhood. Thus, immigrants not only potentially pose an economic threat to citizens, whether it be by pushing wages downward or competing with nationals for jobs, but their presence and seemingly increased demand for cultural recognition challenge the state’s dominant cultural self-conception: its national identity (see Koopmans et al. 2005).

As the political guardians of national identity, center-right parties not only should ignore ethnic minority voters but also actively mobilize fear of minority populations for

48 Even in France, considered the apotheosis of “civic” nationhood, more organic conceptions of nationhood emerge in public debates, such as during the Dreyfus affair (Zimmer 2003, 181), and by the frequent distinction made between immigrants and “Français de souche” (a person with only French ancestors—literally, “of French stock”).
electoral gain. In fact, scholars conclude that center-right parties use race and immigration to attract anti-immigrant voters while center-left parties adopt positions to appeal to immigrant voters (Messina 2006; Givens and Luedtke 2005; Money 1999). Yet center-right parties have fielded minority candidates, supported policies that deliver tangible benefits to minorities, and heavily recruited minorities into party membership. In light of the threat posed by far-right parties and the unpopularity of ethnic minorities in many countries, this outreach presents a puzzle, namely when does a party attempt to expand its coalition to include a constituency that it previously marginalized?

The literature provides few answers as scholars have largely focused on explaining the rise of the radical right and its consequent effects on mainstream parties’ strategies. To the extent they have examined mainstream parties’ attempts to incorporate minorities *writ large*, they have generated explanations emphasizing the institutional, competitive, and economic characteristics of the political environments in which parties compete. According to these theories, mainstream parties appeal to ethnic minorities, regardless of citizenship status, when radical right competitors are absent, the economy is strong, and both cultural and legal notions of citizenship are inclusive. Their efforts are always in pursuit of a pre-defined goal: short-term vote maximization.

This dissertation offers an alternative account. Its central argument focuses on parties’ challenge of retaining core voter support as they seek to include ethnic minorities among their electoral support. The origination and severity of this trade-off is a function a party’s historically rooted, ideological identity. The critical element for center-right parties is their association with the nation and reputation as its guardian. After all, center-right parties’ predecessors often transformed a population’s political allegiances, dress, manners, and daily
language, in essence, built a nation (Bell 2002, 198). As a result, to target and promote the interests of non-citizens, a group outside the nation, will cost them core voters’ support. By contrast, the citizen-non-citizen divide does not hamper center-left parties’ outreach strategies. While they undoubtedly face challenges in seek ethnic minorities’ support, it is not as a result of their positions toward foreigners as such.

The source of the electoral trade-off provides the theoretical foundation for two empirical claims. First, rather than treat all ethnic minorities the same, center-right politicians distinguish between those ethnic minorities with citizenship and those without. While citizens may vote in national elections, foreigners cannot. Second, center-right parties distinguish between those ethnic minorities with citizenship and those without in their immigration and integration policies. They may then pair inclusive positions on policies targeting the former with restrictive positions on the latter, enabling them to expand and maintain their electoral base simultaneously. Yet in making this distinction, center-right parties introduce an intertemporal electoral trade-off, casting preserving their current coalition against capturing the support of ethnic minorities’ in the future. This dual strategy may thus increase their electoral performance in the short-term while costing them the support of a whole generation of voters, notably that of current non-citizens who naturalize later.

Not all center-right parties face trade-offs of equal magnitude; their objective severity depends on both the relative number of ethnic minority citizens to non-citizens, and the movement of this ratio. While changes in the citizenship ratio alter the severity of the trade-offs parties face, it is party leaders’ perceptions of the size and expectations of its trajectory that accounts for variation in their outreach strategies. Yet party leaders are not held hostage
by these trade-offs. Rather they may seek to change them by engaging in outreach and enacting policies of membership definition. Outreach is an electoral tactic by which parties seek to recast the benefits of diversity in order to win ethnic minority votes while precluding loss of core constituent support. Enacting policy is a long-term tactic aiming to reshape constituencies, potentially eliminating the very trade-offs they currently confront.

II. Summary of Principal Findings

This dissertation produced three central insights. First, center-right and center-left parties reach out to ethnic minorities under different conditions. Second, center-right parties’ efforts are not mere artifacts of their institutional, competitive, and economic environments; instead, changes in the naturalization rate, and thus the citizenship ratio, drive their outreach strategies. Third, this dissertation offers a theoretical rationale for parties to adopt longer time horizons. I take each in turn.

As developed in Chapter 2, engaging in ethnic minority outreach poses distinct challenges for mainstream center-right and center-left parties. Their difficulties stem from their ideological identities. Center-right parties’ philosophical link to national self-understanding defines which strategies are at their disposal. Its principal effect is to prohibit center-right parties’ to appeal to ethnic minorities without citizenship. Conversely, center-left parties’ are not constrained in their ability to appeal to ethnic minorities on the basis of their citizenship status. Thus, their outreach strategies should be unaffected by this feature of the ethnic minority population.

The cross-sectional time-series analyses conducted in Chapter 3 largely confirm this prediction. Across six countries, and a variety of institutional, competitive, and sociological environments, center-right parties levels of outreach are consistently responsive to changes in
the naturalization rate whereas the center-left parties’ efforts are not. In fact, the degree to which center-left parties engage in outreach appears to be largely immune to features of the ethnic minority population. The use of fully interactive models allowed us to identify this significant difference, suggesting that the use of pooled models may have obscured the relationship between characteristics of the ethnic minority population and party strategy.

Two other important results regarding the determinants of center-right parties’ strategies emerged in Chapter 3. First, as briefly mentioned above, precipitous increases in the number of citizenship acquisitions relative to changes in the size of the foreigner population are a consistently powerful predictor of center-right parties’ level of outreach. Second, the presence and performance of radical right parties had no statistically significant effect on center-right parties’ outreach strategies. Instead, these actors had far more impact on center-left parties. This finding stands in stark contrast to the literature’s firm conclusion that these competitors exert a contagion effect on center-right parties’ strategies.

Finally, this dissertation provided a theoretical framework to account for the dizzying array of tactics center-right parties deploy as part of their minority strategy. The key to understanding the welter of tactics observed is in recognizing that center-right parties’ positions on immigration and integration policies aimed primarily at ethnic minority denizens are not necessarily indicative of their stances on policies targeting ethnic minority citizens. Instead, they may treat their positions on immigration and integration policies as strategic complements. Immigration is an issue the center-right “owns” and it is the strategic tool center-right parties use to mobilize their base (Bowler 1990; Meguid 2008). Yet they may marshal support for restrictive immigration and integration policies toward foreigners with inclusive positions on policies affecting ethnic minorities broadly. Essentially, strategically
employing both immigration and ethnic relations policies allows the party to mobilize its base and pursue new voters simultaneously. Enacting this dual strategy, however, introduces a intertemporal trade-off between maintaining its present coalition and securing the support of ethnic minorities – a growing constituency – in the future. In such instances, center-right parties enact policies that seek to redefine constituencies, and potentially, the nation.

III. Further Work

There are parts of this project that deserve further exploration to contribute to a literature on party competition and immigrant incorporation. I outline some of these possibilities below.

Further work is needed to understand the conditions under which parties will adopt longer time horizons and seek to shape the nature of the electoral trade-offs they face. Do the demographic considerations encompassed by the concept of the citizenship ratio affect the policies parties adopt? Moreover, do party leaders act in anticipation of demographic trends? While this dissertation provides a theoretical basis to suggest that the answer to both questions is yes, it does not systematically develop nor test this part of the theory’s observational implications. Important headway in this area is being made with regards to the political use of integration tests as a means of controlling immigration (Goodman 2011). A study such as this one could greatly benefit from these considerations when examining antidiscrimination policies.

This dissertation also leaves unexplored how parties transform immigrants into citizens. It gives little insight into how and these parties target specific groups over time or the processes by which they form these strategies. What internal and external factors affect these strategies’ development? On a related note, future work could focus on party leaders’
constraints and their effect on the final form and timing of outreach. In this project, party leaders operate in a vacuum; they are free to implement any strategy they choose. This scenario is undoubtedly false. Future work should examine how institutions, competition, and prior decisions shape party leaders’ ability to pursue outreach as well as implement long-term strategies.

Other lines of inquiry could focus on the effects of these strategies’ effectiveness, both in terms of winning ethnic minorities’ votes, and staving off any core constituent exodus. First, little is known about the conditions under which, if at all, party appeals successfully capture ethnic minority support. For instance, while it is well established that ethnic minorities overwhelmingly vote for parties of the Left, the source of this support is unclear. There is little evidence that it is their positions on policies of special concern to ethnic minorities. Numerous scholars emphasize that ethnic minorities are concerned with the same core issues that preoccupy natives (Messina 2007; Brouard and Tiberj 2005). Indeed, polls conducted in Britain from 1983 through 1997 consistently show that mainstream political and social issues, such as unemployment, education or health, are ranked higher by ethnic minorities than mother tongue teaching or immigration (Saggar, 2000, 32, quoted in Sobolewska 2005, 199). As Sobolewska (2005) notes,

“Strikingly, the notable proximity of the Labour Party on ethnic minorities’ view of equal opportunities for themselves does not benefit this party in any significant way. On the contrary, this issue seems to be the least important for party loyalty” (2005, 207).

Similarly, in France, Brouard and Tiberj (2005) show natives and first-, second-, and third-generation citizens of North African, African, and Turkish have very similar concerns. The concerns voiced by ethnic minorities diverged from those expressed by natives on only
one issue, immigrant integration (2005, 50). While natives did not mention it, ethnic minorities ranked it fifth.

The answer may lie in the rhetoric and actions of the center-right. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Dutch VVD’s loss in minority support following their attack on multiculturalism in 2004. Moreover, upon finding little ethnic minority support for the French UMP, scholars Brouard and Tiberj (2005) remarked:

“It appears that the signs sent to populations from immigrant backgrounds by the Raffarin government (UMP) have hardly had an influence: the appointment of a Muslim prefecture, the project of integration contract, the creation of the CFCM (French Council of the Muslim Faith), and many ‘specific’ measures that have had at the end, a weak electoral yield” (55).

Yet while then-Minister of the Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy, had yet to refer to immigrant youth as “scum” and suggest that the suburbs needed to be cleaned by a Kärcher, a well-known brand of high pressure cleaning equipment, his other remarks had already tarnished the party’s reputation among certain segments of the minority population. These examples suggest that perhaps symbolism may be more important than substantive policy in shaping voters’ preferences.

Second, it is known whether parties are able to shape partisans’ views on diversity, and, if so, which tactics, such as public pronouncements and policy offerings, are most successful in influencing these views. To answer this question, operationalization and measurement of party strategy must improve beyond today’s blunt measures. Improved measures would capture important empirical nuances and incorporate tactics beyond programmatic appeals. Such advancements would allow us to pinpoint which tactics are most effective in shaping public opinion, as well as answer other pressing research questions.
IV. Conclusion

Post-war migration has ushered in an age of diversity in Western Europe (Bleich 2003, 1-2). In fact, it is this consequence of immigration – cultural and ethnic diversity – that arguably captures the majority of political and public attention (see e.g., Koopmans et al. 2005; Bleich 2003). The effects of this cultural and ethnic diversity are wide-ranging. Champions and detractors may both point to indisputable advantages and challenges generated by diversity, which, in turn, may be invoked to heighten or mediate negative out-group feelings.

What is of interest in this dissertation is how political parties grapple with diversity-related issues, such as the rising number of ethnic and racial minorities and state regulation of cultural difference. These concerns are unlikely to fade away soon as they persist in the absence of their cause: large-scale immigration. The critical difference is that issues of ethnic diversity not only target immigrants, but citizens, that is, ostensible members of the nation (Bleich 2003; Crowley 2001). In this dissertation, I demonstrated how mainstream center-right parties’ decisions to emphasize the advantages of diversity as well as its disadvantages can be explained systematically by understanding how politicians see the complexity of the ethnic minority population in light of their goals. In doing so, we gain better understanding of when these parties do, in fact, seek to redefine the nation.


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